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An Analysis of the Overlooked Value of Greatness

δι
άν

οι
α

AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERLOOKED VALUE 
OF GREATNESS 

 BRANDON BEESLEY

INTRODUCTION

Greatness is a concept ubiquitous throughout human history; amorphous, 
unde!ned, yet tauntingly and irresistibly alluring.1 Humanity’s interest in 

achievement is demonstrated by philosophy’s many attempts at distilling the concept, 
with concessions ranging from Aristotle’s virtue-oriented megalopsychos to Nietzsche’s 
power-hungry Übermensch. "ese two dichotomously opposed !gures (the 
megalopsychos and Übermensch) both, in the minds of the philosophers who created 
them, embody human greatness. Contextualized by the obsessive, overwhelming, 
and often anxiety-inducing human aspiration to greatness, the dissimilarities between 
them become somewhat disconcerting, and we must ask: what exactly is greatness? 
"is essay aims to shed additional light on this question from the space between 
prevalent philosophical interpretations of greatness.

Generally, it seems that attempts to de!ne greatness !t within one of two categories. 
"e !rst of these prioritizes a link to virtue and morality, while the second 
understands power to be the measure of greatness. Aristotle, Plato, and Saint "omas 
Aquinas understand greatness in terms of virtue, while Nietzsche and certain feminist 
philosophers understand it to emerge out of an exercise of power.

 Essentially, the virtue-oriented thinkers purport that greatness is achieved by a life of 
virtuous acts conducive to happiness and honor. Megalopsychia is “a sort of crown of 

1 I would like to thank Dr. Nate Whelan-Jackson and Dr. E. Wray Bryant for their support and suggestions on the 
many versions of this work.



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the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them.”2 Adversely, 
with a conspicuous disdain for the “whole virtuous dirtiness” of the !rst category, 
Nietzsche’s Will to Power purports that the concept of greatness is intrinsically 
linked to personal power.3 Valuing only the conquering of obstacles and expansion 
of strength, status, wealth, and in#uence, the Übermensch is an eagle amongst lambs, 
yielding only to its own will to power.

IS GREATNESS IN 'POWER!TO' OR 'POWER!OVER'?
Nietzsche’s de!nition of power that prioritizes strength and force, however, is 
challenged by certain feminist perspectives on power. Amy Allen, for instance, notes 
the predominantly masculine and oppressive form of power, described by Robert 
Dahl, as a scenario in which “[person] A has power over [person] B to the extent that 
he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do,” has come to be known 
as the ‘power-over’ understanding of power.4 "is understanding of power is similar 
to Nietzsche’s philosophy: it values physical strength, in#uence, and social status. 
Historically, the mistreatment of women has led to the interpretation of this notion of 
power as a tool of the patriarchy. "e feminist perspective, in an attempt to remediate 
this oppressive and misogynistic concept, has instead promoted conceptions of power 
that empowerment of action – ‘power-to’ rather than ‘power-over.’ 

A ‘power-to’ perspective focuses on a more positive relationship with others, noting 
facets of power as the ability to empower and inspire transformation in oneself and 
others; put simply, it is the ability to enact change. "is perspective places few, if 
any, restrictions who can potentially be counted among the powerful. As Johanna 
Oksala notes, women have impacted immeasurable change, even when consigned to 
the roles of mothers and caretakers, through the upbringing and nurturing of others.5 
She further summarizes the feminist response to power, “In other words, the fact that 
women are often reluctant to take or exercise power over others does not indicate that 
women have a problem; it indicates that there is a problem with our understanding 
of power, as well as in our relationships with each other in patriarchal societies,” a 
problem the ‘power-to’ concept attempts to remediate.6 

 2 Understood as ‘greatness of soul’;$Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7.3.

3 Friedrich Nietzsche, "e Antichrist, Translated by H. L. Mencken. Binghamton (NY: Vail-Ballou Press, 1924): 21.

4 Amy Allen, “Feminist Perspectives on Power,” "e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition): 1.
5  Johanna Oksala, “Feminism and Power,” "e Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, (2017): 680.

6  Oksala, “Feminism and Power,” 681.



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An Analysis of the Overlooked Value of Greatness

GREATNESS AND ITS VALUE AS POWER: A FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVE 
"e feminist perspective, with a de!nition of power vastly di%erent than Nietzsche’s, 
still supports the idea that greatness is reliant upon the expression of power. An 
excellent example of speci!c feminine greatness is discussed in Alison Booth’s 
Greatness Engendered: George Eliot and Virginia Woolf, in which Booth discusses 
the in#uence the two authors held over their patriarchal Victorian-era society, 
exemplifying ‘power-to’ through literature. Booth suggests their greatness results 
from their persuasiveness; their ability to describe through their writing a society 
of inclusion and progress elicited reactions from readers that broke the strongly 
enforced gender roles of the late 19th century. Persuasion, of course, is an expression 
of ‘power-to,’ speci!cally power to in#uence others and incite change. 

Woolf and Eliot displayed a visceral expression of power through their persuasive 
literature, an achievement magni!ed by the oppressive, damaging gender norms to 
which they were constrained. T. S. Elliot even “a&rms that Woolf became ‘the centre 
. . . of the literary life of London,’ ‘the symbol’ of the ‘Victorian upper middle-
class’ cultural tradition,” despite her womanhood being a social disadvantage.7 "eir 
ability to in#uence their readership with notions of “a shared, progressive life beyond 
individuality” is certainly reason to deem these two authors great wordsmiths, and 
while the ability to persuade and in#uence is an important component of the feminist 
assessment of greatness, it is not the only one.8 Equally as important to the concept 
is the predominantly feminist ethic of care.

Care and Power
"is ethic of care is not exactly the naive, benevolent depiction the connotation 
of ‘care’ may evoke. Virginia Held addresses the presence of violence, particularly 
against women, and how the ethics of care has been designed to handle such stark 
possibilities. Rather than negatively attempting to suppress or harm those who may 
be violent, the ethic of care searches for a more positive, peaceful resolution. “Within 
practices of care, as we have seen, rights should be recognized, including rights to 
peace and security of the [violent] person. Force may sometimes be needed to assure 
respect for such rights. "is does not mean that the background of care can be 
forgotten.”9 "is ‘background of care’ and, in fact, the general term ‘care,’ has been 
given various de!nitions by numerous thinkers; Joan Tronto focuses on the work of 
caring for someone, and Nel Noddings on the attitude with which one is willing to 
care. 

7  Alison Booth, Greatness Engendered: George Eliot and Virginia Booth (NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 1.
8  Booth, Greatness Engendered: George Eliot and Virginia Booth, 6.
9  Virginia Held, "e Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 139.



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After sifting through the many o%ered de!nitions, Held provides and seems to 
prioritize the de!nition o%ered by Diemut Bubeck, who believes “Caring for is the 
meeting of the needs of one person by another person, where face-to-face interaction 
between carer and cared-for is a crucial element of the overall activity and where the 
need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself.”10 
Bubeck’s de!nition simultaneously separates care from being a service for one capable 
to complete an act themselves, and allows care to be universally o%ered without a 
prerequisite of emotional attachment. However, there are, at risk of dramatization, 
fatal #aws in Bubeck’s contender that desecrate its validity in Held’s eyes. She notes 
that Bubeck does not pay mind to the intent of the caregiver; a nurse may utterly hate 
a patient, wishing them death, but still o%er them services. Is this truly care? Bubeck 
says yes; Held is less certain. She adjusts the original de!nition to form her own:

Care is both a practice and a value…it shows us how to respond to needs 
and why we should. It builds trust and mutual concern and connectedness 
between persons….along with its appropriate attitudes…Practices of care 
should express the caring relations that bring persons together, and they 
should do so in ways that are progressively more morally satisfactory. Caring 
practices should gradually transform children and others into human beings 
who are increasingly morally admirable…In addition to being a practice, 
care is also a value. Caring persons and caring attitudes should be valued…
We can ask if persons are attentive and responsive to each other’s needs 
or indi%erent and self-absorbed. Care is…more the characterization of a 
social relation than the description of an individual disposition, and social 
relations are not reducible to individual states.11

Held’s description of care recti!es the #aws found in Bubeck’s de!nition while 
maintaining the universality and distinctiveness of acts of service originally proposed. 

Care plays an important role in the feminist assessment of greatness, as it is through 
care that empowerment and in#uence must be a%ected. While moral value seems to 
permeate this understanding of care and empowerment, it is important to recognize 
that the feminist analysis of greatness credits the power, the ability to in#uence 
positive change as the variable pertinent to greatness, rather than the morality 
intrinsically present in care and empowerment. "e ethics of care certainly !t into the 
feminist perspective of ‘power-to’ as a necessary condition for empowerment, which 
in turn leads to the !nal value of greatness– per this assessment, that is the power 
to incite change. Interestingly, these characteristics–care, empowerment, and social 
progressiveness– seem to be the antithesis of the Nietzschean power characteristics 
of wealth, status, and strength. However, despite their di%erences in understanding 

10  Held, "e Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 139.
11  Held, "e Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 42.



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An Analysis of the Overlooked Value of Greatness

of the term, both the feminist perspective and Nietzsche contend that expression of 
power is the ultimate value of greatness.

POWER? OR VIRTUE?
Now that the proponents for each set have been introduced, and their arguments 
described, who do we believe? Is the reason humanity strives for greatness tied to 
morality and virtue? Or is greatness simply an expression of human power, with no tie 
to morality? It seems evident that the much more likely and correct answer is a third 
option; morality and power are both required to achieve greatness. More speci!cally, 
expressions of power that are consistent with morality and exhibit virtue are the only 
actions that mirror the characteristic of greatness. Analyses of the reasoning provided 
by both the virtue-centric and power-centric proponents will now be conducted in 
order to determine the validity of each–are they self-su&cient and satisfactory? Or do 
they support this essay’s contention?

An Analysis of 'Power-Over' Greatness
Nietzsche’s argument against the idea of virtue as having any role in the value 
of greatness, and thus his argument against this paper’s contention, are quite 
unconvincing. He asserts that the achievement of great acts, through all the pain 
and su%ering they bring, grows personal power in accordance with the innate will to 
power living beings experience; this growth of power is the ultimate good along with 
the expression of personal power over opposition. In this view, either power-over is a 
su&cient condition for greatness, meaning those with power have a correlated claim 
to greatness, or that power is a necessary condition for greatness, meaning that if one 
is great one must possess power. 

Both of these logical avenues struggle in defending Nietzsche’s contentions. Firstly, 
let’s assess power-over as a su&cient condition for greatness. "e existence of tyrants 
and oppressive power, the likes of Hitler and Stalin, discredit this avenue for (what 
should be) an overwhelming majority. "e power and in#uence these two men 
speci!cally possessed was immense, yet without morality to guide them, such power 
lent itself to atrocities rather than greatness. "eir growth in power did not ultimately 
lead them to happiness, rather, their thirst for power and conquest was insatiable 
and unsatisfying. "ese two tyrants exemplify the Übermensch, possessing power, 
in#uence, strength, and wealth. Yet they are lacking the result expected from this 
Nietzschean equation: greatness of character is certainly not associated with these 
dictators. "us, Nietzschean power is not a su&cient condition for greatness.

"e conclusion that strength, in#uence, and, in general, ‘power-over’ is not necessary 
for greatness rests upon the assumption mentioned in the introduction–humanity 
is able to intuitively identify greatness of character. Without this assumption, a 



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ridiculous conclusion and counter may conceivably be o%ered by the !ercest and 
most adamant subscribers of Nietzschean philosophy: that such horri!c tyrants are 
great. In this context, the assumption that those engaging with this discussion are 
reasonable enough to denounce vehemently this conclusion is necessary, and benign 
to the analysis. However, Nietzsche’s philosophy does play a supportive role in the 
concept of greatness and its value this discussion proposes.

Although certainly not su&cient, it seems to be the case that power is instead a 
necessary condition for greatness. If this is indeed the case, no examples of greatness 
without power exist. In this aspect, Nietzsche appears to be somewhat correct. 
Harriet Tubman’s incredible life provides an equally inspiring and fascinating 
example to explore through a Nietzschean lens. Tubman embodies the opposite of 
the aforementioned Übermensch and tyrants: a woman widely (and rightly) regarded 
as great (again, relying on the precursory assumption), who had little, if any, social 
power. As an escaped slave, she possessed no in#uence, no wealth, and no particular 
physical strength. As the victim of a head injury that left her susceptible to seizures, 
blurred vision, and headaches, it seems quite the opposite was true.12 Despite 
having no resemblance to the typically described Übermensch, Tubman does, in fact, 
demonstrate a will to power.

Tubman’s will was not expressed in grandiose displays of power or in#uence, rather, 
it was expressed both in her daring escape from slavery and through the thirteen 
acts that earned her a place amongst the great; the thirteen sel#ess and daunting 
journeys that delivered emancipation to over seventy people. Simply, Tubman willed 
to free herself and others, and enacted that will through her power. Defying the 
racial oppression–perhaps more appropriately, the racially motivated abuse–she and 
countless others were subjected to, Tubman’s story exempli!es the human desire 
to “overcome the world” against them that Nietzsche describes.13 Tubman’s story, 
although certainly incredible, is just one example of power’s intricate relationship 
with greatness. Syntactically,

Each choice demonstrates an expression of power (the power to choose one outcome 
or another).

Agential actions require the choice to act. 

Great acts that elucidate greatness of character must be agential.14

12  Harriet Tubman Byway, “About Harriet Tubman.” Accessed July 23, 2022, harriettubmanbyway.or g/harriet-
tubman/#about.

13  Friedrich Nietzsche, "e Will to Power. Edited by Walter A. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, Translated by 
Walter A. Kaufmann. (NY: Random House, 1968), 182.

14  (c) serves as a defense against technicality. If one is theoretically forced to do a great action against their will, the 
action does not elucidate greatness of its actor’s character, and is thus out of this discussion’s intended scope.



63Issue X ◆ Spring 2023

An Analysis of the Overlooked Value of Greatness

"erefore, great actions (actions denoting greatness of character) must be a result of 
power.

In this notation, power is necessary for greatness. However, since power is not su&cient 
for greatness, as we deduced earlier, then a second characteristic in cooperation with 
power must also be responsible for greatness. "is second characteristic reveals itself 
to be morality, as Tubman’s life exempli!es.

Along with expressing her will to power against an oppressive society, the 
morality Tubman’s actions displayed was perhaps equally, if not more, 
responsible in warranting her the recognition of greatness. "e actions 
through which she expressed virtue were plentiful, as her thirteen journeys 
liberating slaves through the Underground Railroad were simply precursors 
to her serv[ing] as a spy and scout; provid[ing] extensive assistance to 
soldiers including nursing, cooking, and laundering, and even help[ing] 
lead a major attack on Confederate property called the Combahee River 
raid…yield[ing] new union enlistments and over 700 “contrabands” (freed 
slaves).15

"ese heroic and sel#ess expressions of will exempli!ed courage, ambition, 
sel#essness, and certainly several other virtues– all of which elucidated the greatness 
of her character. While Nietzsche’s argument of the will to power is unsatisfactory as 
a su&cient condition of greatness, Harriet Tubman’s life demonstrates its conceivable 
role as a necessary condition illuminates the !rst evidence of this essay’s contention–
greatness’ value lies in the crossroads of expressing power and morality.

An Analysis of 'Power-To' Greatness
To further support the argument that both power and virtue play a role in greatness 
and its value, we will once again use the su&cient and necessary logical avenues to 
analyze the validity of the ‘power-to’ argument o%ered by the feminist perspective, 
which states that displays of greatness–de!ned as acts that empower and in#uence 
change through ethics of care–are valuable in the social change they e%ect. Again, 
either ‘power-to’ is a su&cient condition, suggesting that no ‘power-to’ is expressed 
without greatness, or it is a necessary condition, meaning no greatness is evident 
without the expression of ‘power-to.’ "e ultimate value prescribed by the feminist 
perspective of ‘power-to,’ and thus greatness, is the instigation of social change. 

"is expression of power as it is understood by the feminist perspective, upon logical 
analysis, appears to contain variables necessary for greatness but o%ers none su&cient 
for greatness. While many examples of vicious leaders lacking the distinction of 

15  Lasch-Quinn, Elisabeth. “Harriet Tubman: An American Idol,” "e Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, no. 
43, (Spring 2004):124, jstor.org/stable/4133571.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

greatness certainly possessed and demonstrated characteristics of the feminist 
assessment, speci!cally in#uence, the morality required for care and empowerment 
seems to be the !lter such tyrants and dictators cannot percolate. Hitler, for example, 
achieved immense in#uence over Germany through his oration. Daniel Binchy 
recalls listening to him speak at a meeting that took place in 1921, at the University 
of Munich. “Here was a born natural orator,” he describes, “He began slowly, almost 
hesitatingly, stumbling over the construction of his sentences, correcting his dialect 
pronunciation. "en all at once he seemed to take !re. His voice rose victorious over 
falterings, his eyes blazed with conviction, his whole body became an instrument of 
rude eloquence.”16 "e speech ends with a response from the audience, “a scene of 
hysterical enthusiasm which ba'es description,” Binchy recalls.17 "e captivation 
Hitler commanded over a listening audience demonstrates a similar degree of 
persuasiveness that Woolf and Eliot possessed through their literature. Unlike these 
two great authors, however, Hitler used this persuasion to persecute, oppress, and 
breed hatred, rather than empower positive social change. 

He did, however, empower himself. Allen’s understanding of Held’s concept of 
‘power-to’ clari!es that the “capacity to transform and empower oneself ” is compliant 
with the sickening expression of power Hitler demonstrated.18 "rough propaganda, 
manipulation, and fear, Hitler empowered himself and his political party, posing as 
a moral crusader while victimizing millions throughout his cynical rampage.19 While 
he was undeniably lacking care as described by Held, the evidence that such a terrible 
man displayed both empowerment and in#uence characterizes where this assessment 
of power is subject to dispute and provides evidence against ‘power-to’ as a su&cient 
condition for greatness. 

It appears that without morality, the abilities of empowerment, in#uence, and 
ultimately, the means to produce societal change, do not warrant the distinction 
of greatness. "e unique aspect of care, though, and the virtue intrinsically woven 
within care undoubtedly !t into our concept of power with virtue. Care certainly 
demonstrates characteristics representative of the expression of will; an enactment of 
personal power. Held notes that “An important aspect of care is how it expresses our 
attitudes and relationships,” meaning that the intentions of a caregiver must match 
their actions to be genuine care.20 "is acting upon one’s desire is compatible with the 
Nietzschean concept of Will to Power; the caregiver expresses their personal power, 
(i.e. ability to care) in response to their will (i.e. their desire to care). While they may 
not necessarily be facing the social opposition Nietzsche posits, they are certainly 

16  Daniel A. Binchy, “Adolf Hitler,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 22, no. 85 (March 1933): 1, jstor.org/ 
stable/30094970.

17  Binchy, Adolf Hitler, 2.
18  Allen, Feminist Perspectives on Power, 4.
19  Richard Weikart, Hitler’s Ethics: "e Nazi Pursuit of Evolutionary Progress, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 

17.
20  Held, "e Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 33.



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An Analysis of the Overlooked Value of Greatness

attempting to overcome an obstacle; they are attempting to alleviate whatever the 
cared-for may be facing, an obstacle that, through relationship, becomes personal. 
While the feminist perspective is unsatisfactory alone in its assessment of greatness, 
the understanding of care as the expression of one’s will and power, partnered with 
the intrinsic morality present in care, appears to further support the conclusion that 
both power and virtue are essential in greatness and its value.

THE VIRTUE!CENTRIC CONTENTION
Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Aquinas each believe that greatness and its value are 
closely related and dependent upon moral standards and displays of virtue. Aristotle 
particularly argues that greatness of soul, megalopsychia, is a crown that indicates the 
metaphorical wearer as one who possesses and appropriately practices each virtue. 
Greatness, as argued by these essentially eudaemonistic philosophers, holds value as 
the practice of virtue required for greatness is also the path to happiness. Similarly, 
great acts are valuable in that they reveal greatness of character.

Contrary to the Aristotelian theory of unity, which unconvincingly describes that 
one cannot possess a single virtue if they do not possess all of them, –a theory that 
has been discredited by numerous scholars– it appears that greatness does not require 
the display of each virtue. Referring again to the moon landing, the undeniable act 
of greatness certainly lacked some of the twelve virtues Aristotle notes–humorous wit 
was likely not a large factor in the endeavor–but appropriate temperance, courage, 
ambition, and liberality undeniably were.21 "e appropriate practice of these four 
virtues required to complete the mission still demonstrated the greatness of character 
the astronauts on board possessed, and further, seem to entail a correlation with 
honor. 

As virtuous actions are valued by and rewarded with honor, the more virtues 
represented in an action, the more honor and greatness they seem to elicit. While 
greatness may not require every virtue, it is important to note that great acts must 
always be compatible with morality and all twelve virtues. For example, one may 
harbor ambition for an act of evil that directly opposes friendliness or justice. 
Ambition, one of the twelve virtues, does not make this potential act great; the lack 
of morality necessary for compatibility with virtue transforms ambition from a virtue 
into a vice. Acts of greatness, then, must show compatibility with the twelve virtues 
while demonstrating an appropriate practice of at least one virtue worth honoring.22 
An analysis of this argument, as stated, will reveal whether virtue and morality are 
necessary, su&cient, or both in regard to achieving greatness. 

21  "e twelve virtues being Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnanimity, Ambition, Patience, Truthfulness, 
Wittiness, Friendliness, Modesty, and Righteous Indignation (Justice), via W. F. DeMoss. 

22  W.F. DeMoss, “Spenser’s Twelve Moral Virtues: According to Aristotle,” Modern Philology 16, no. 1 (May 
1918): 25, jstor.org/stable/433028; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.7.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

It appears that a display of virtue that is morally compatible with each virtue is 
necessary for acts of greatness. An action incompatible with virtue–an action 
incompatible with justice, friendliness, or truthfulness– simply fails to be great. For 
example, winning an Olympic gold medal for one’s country certainly seems like a 
great action. By Saint Aquinas’ de!nition that explains “one mak[ing] a very good 
use of [an item or action]” is proportional greatness, it certainly is.23As such, any 
athlete capable of this feat inarguably demonstrates ambition, courage, temperance, 
and many other virtues both in their training and performance. Such an achievement 
is great unless of course, the athlete was cheating. Using banned performance 
enhancers, for instance, is incompatible with the virtues of justice and truthfulness–
the action is both unfair to the other competitors and is untruthful of the athlete, and 
thus, fails to be great. "e incompatibility of the twelve virtues perverts what would 
be an honorable and great action into a dishonorable act. It is the only aspect of this 
athlete’s conduct that excludes them from the designation of greatness. 

"is particular distinction between moral compatibility and incompatibility 
demonstrates quite well the necessity of morality: an action that would, by all other 
accounts, be great, marred by an act incompatible with virtue, fails to be great. 
Logically, then, virtue compatibility is necessary for great achievement. Additionally, 
excellent displays of virtue seem to be a requirement for greatness; an act is not great 
simply because they are compatible with virtue, it must display something worthy of 
honor. Which, as previously discussed, excellent demonstrations of virtue are worthy 
of honor. With a simple example, we have demonstrated the necessary roles of both 
virtue compatibility and displaying virtue in the achievement of great acts, through 
which greatness of character is represented.  

POWER LED BY VIRTUE 
When determining whether demonstrations of honorable virtue and virtue 
compatibility are su&cient for greatness, a dilemma requiring further attention 
appears. Our conclusion, upon logical analyses of both Nietzsche’s and the feminist 
perspective’s arguments, revealed the false dichotomy between the virtue and power 
assessments of greatness; both power and virtue seem necessary for greatness. When 
taken as two separate variables, virtue could not, then, be a su&cient condition, as 
the presence of an expression of power is required to achieve greatness. However, a 
di%erent perspective reveals that they are not distinct variables, rather, expressions 
of power and morality are so closely intertwined that the two variables act as one– 
through one’s will and expression of personal power, virtues signifying greatness may 
be performed. 

23 Aquinas, Summa "eologica, 2.2.129.



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An important aspect of virtue ethics as Aristotle describes them is the intention behind 
an action. He explains that we, as humans, deliberate amongst ourselves over choices 
we can control, including both virtue and vice. Whether one expresses virtuous 
acts depends, for the most part, upon their own choice and internal deliberation. 
Aristotle describes this ability by explaining, “For where it is in our power to act it 
is also in our power not to act, and vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, 
is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not 
to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in 
our power;” our personal will, most often decided upon by our reasoning, determine 
whether we express virtues or ‘base’ actions in any given scenario.24 

"is description of internal con#ict and expressions of power seems quite reminiscent 
of the Nietzschean description of a being’s expression of their will to power, as well 
as the ‘power-to’ contention; indulging one’s will in an expression of power based 
solely on their whims and the ability to act upon one’s choice and in#uence change. 
“How does one become stronger?” Nietzsche asks before answering, “By coming 
to decisions slowly; and by clinging tenaciously to what one has decided.”25 "e 
permeating undertones of intention and choice are not unique to Aristotle and 
Nietzsche, as evidenced by the feminist contention.

"e opposite distinction of power also understands choice as a crucial element, a 
power even described by Sarah Lucia Hoagland as “power of ability, of choice and 
engagement.”26 "e presence of deliberation and decision followed by the expression 
of power required to enact that decision in Will to Power, a ‘power-to’ approach, 
and Nicomachean Ethics supports the conclusion that both power and virtue are 
required for greatness. Saint Aquinas strengthens this notion, stating “"e word 
‘choice’ implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something 
belonging to the will…choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the 
will… of the appetitive power” within us.27 One must possess the will and power 
required to choose and act upon their decision to display virtue, thus displays of 
virtue are intrinsically woven with an expression of power.28 Rather than interpreting 
these as separate variables, it seems that, due to their inseparable nature, the more 
appropriate route would be to conclude that power is an essential part of the practice 

24  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5; Base meaning ‘lowly, ine&cient.’ via Rose Cherubin. “Ancient Greek 
Vocabulary: Aristotle.” Accessed July 4, 2022, mason.gmu.edu/~rcherubi/arvoc.htm.

25  Nietzsche, Will to Power, 486.
26  Sarah Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Towards New Value (CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), 
118.
27  Aquinas, Summa "eologica, 2.1.13.
28  We have discovered here that choice is an integral part of greatness. As an expression of one’s will or power, 

it is the link between power and virtue. Without choice, a distinction of ‘greatness’ is neither important nor 
honorable for the one receiving it: they did not accomplish anything worthy of the distinction! Only because 
there is a possibility not to be virtuous or moral is such an act honorable and great. Of course, this relies upon 
the belief that human free will is a reality. Without such a belief, human greatness (as is human evil, or any 
other human characteristic) is a falsity. Discussions on this topic (free will) can be found in Aquinas, Augustine, 
Bonaventure, Slote 1980.



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of virtues. "erefore, the expression of virtues, through acts compatible with every 
virtue, is su&cient for the acts of greatness required in the demonstration of greatness 
of character.

CONCLUSION 
In our attempt to construct a clearer understanding of greatness, the concepts once 
held to be diametrically opposed have become amalgam, enmeshed by the shared 
aspect of choice. It does not appear, through our analysis, that power alone is 
su&cient for a claim to greatness: as stand-alone contentions, both the Nietzschean 
and feminist perspectives of power encounter rather problematic implications that 
are incompatible with the notion of human excellence.29 Nietzsche’s perspective, 
termed ‘power-over,’ accommodates tyranny, oppression, and systemic violence in a 
concept of human excellence—a conclusion we must vehemently refute. While the 
progressive notion of ‘power-to’ as o%ered by the feminist perspective is an alternative 
account that resists the historically marginalizing patriarchal tones of ‘power-over,’ it 
too falls victim to similar unacceptable implications. Recounts of Hitler’s in#uence, 
persuasion, and vicious self-empowerment re#ect rather eerily the pillars upon which 
a ‘power-to’ perspective lies.

 "e apparent ‘saving grace’ of these power-centric concepts of greatness 
seems to be the necessary infusion of virtue, whether purely Aristotelian or mediated 
by Held’s ethic of care. "is formulation immediately excludes the preposterous 
notion of tyrants qualifying as great and adds to greatness a value as conducive to 
happiness and honor (in proportion to the virtue displayed). "e example of the 
dishonest Olympian demonstrates the necessity of virtue for greatness; actions 
normally worthy of honor, marred by an act incompatible with morality, simply fail 
to demonstrate greatness. Additionally, Harriet Tubman’s incredible life exempli!es 
the integral role of personal power (speci!cally, the personal power to choose) in 
expressing virtue, a notion which is supported by both the virtue-centric and power-
centric perspectives. "us, it appears that what began as two seemingly dichotomous 
understandings of greatness have emerged from our analysis as one, with virtue acting 
as a link between power (choice) and human greatness. 

29  People seem to be capable of identifying greatness of character, albeit without necessarily articulating what 
characteristic is being recognized. Simply, people can discern a !gure as great without understanding why that 
!gure is great. "is notion can be more familiarly described by (imperfectly but e%ectively) analogizing the 
assumption that people are able to identify pieces of art as art, without having a distinct or articulable notion 
of what makes such a piece art–asking someone to describe the distinct characteristics that denote both Anish 
Kapoor’s Cloud Gate and Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box as art may prove this point.



69Issue X ◆ Spring 2023

An Analysis of the Overlooked Value of Greatness

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