































δι
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56

ART, TECHNOLOGY, AND TRUTH 
in the Thought of Martin Heidegger

FELIPE DANIEL MONTERO

In mythology, autochthones (from the Ancient Greek αὐτός "self," and χθών 
"soil"; i.e. "people sprung from earth itself") are those mortals who have sprung 
from the soil, rocks and trees. They are rooted and belong to the land eternally.1

I. INTRODUCTION

In his “Deromanticizing Heidegger,” American philosopher Don Ihde attempts to 
denounce some arbitrary stances in Martin Heidegger’s thought in order to propose 
a philosophy of technology purged of what he deems the philosopher’s romantic, 
and implicitly Nazi, preferences. Ihde begins in stating: “A century after his birth, 
two very contrary statements can be made concerning Martin Heidegger: First, in a 
significant sense, he is surely one of the most important founders of the philosophy 
of technology […] Second, we all also know that he joined the National Socialist 
German Workers' Party and remained with it through the war […] My question is 
this: Is there something at the very heart of Heidegger's thought that makes both of 
these contraries possible?”2 The aim of this present work attempts to answer Ihde’s 
question following a close reading of Heidegger’s public speech “Memorial Address” 

1 Josine H Blok. “Gentrifying Genealogy: On the Genesis of the Athenian Autochthony Myth.” In Ancient Myth. 
Media, Transformations and Sense-Constructions, 251–75. Edited by Ueli Dill and Christine Walde. (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2009), 261.

2 Don Ihde, Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives, (New York, Fordham University Press, 2010), 
74.



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(Gelassenheit).3 If we assess the rest of Heidegger’s works in light of this speech, then it 
is possible to reach a systematic understanding of the relationships that exist between 
art, technology and truth in Heidegger’s thought. In turn, this analysis specifically 
allows us to appreciate what aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy lead him to his so-
called romanticism and the consequent error of subscribing to Nazism. Finally, this 
essay also explains how, in the words uttered ten years after the end of the war, 
Heidegger himself managed to offer an alternative to fascism so as to confront the 
threats of modern technology.

II. THE CONCEPT OF EARTH: PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON 
HEIDEGGER’S ROMANTICISM

Many of Martin Heidegger’s works, such works as “The Origin of the Work of Art,” or 
“The Question Concerning Technology,” are filled with a romanticization of German 
country life that remains implicitly related (at least it is hard to argue otherwise) 
to Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism. And yet, this supposed romanticization 
does not result from a mere ideological preference, but rather, is grounded in the 
very concept of a homeland (Heimat) or a home ground (heimatlicher Boden) 
consequently employed in Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit” (n.b. both of these concepts 
approximately correspond to what in “The Origin of the Work of Art” he refers to 
as ‘the earth’).4 Heidegger concludes through his phenomenological explication of 
the work of art that the essence of the work is the strife between earth and world, 
and that “[w]hat thus happens in the strife […is] the inauguration of the open in 
the struggle between the unconcealed and the concealed, the coming-out of hiding 
and deception—this self-contained event is the happening of what we call truth.”5 
The making of a work of art produces the earth, comparable to the sound in music, 
the words in literature or color in the visual arts. Nonetheless, we cannot reduce the 
earth to such isolated concepts as ‘matter’ or ‘the sensuous’ since Heidegger conceives 
of it as the opaque aspect of beings, which resists being brought to the clearing of 
intelligibility. In opposition to the earth, the world is that which is opened by the 
work. Earth and world, then, describe two different dimensions of intelligibility: 
the opaque, or that which resists interpretation (concealment), and the world as 
“revealing,” or the transparent aspect of entities. Art as “the becoming and happening 
of truth”6 manifests then when the earth—as that which closes upon itself—becomes 
brought to the open of the world in the strife instigated by the work; that is, in the 
tensional relationship established between what there already is and the elusive aspect 
of the receding earth. 

3 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959)
4 Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 110
5 Martin Heidegger, “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks: Erste Ausarbeitung” Heidegger Studies Vol. 5 (1989): 5-22. 
 The original text reads: “Was so in der Bestreitung geschieht: die Eröffnung der Offenheit des Widerstreits von 

Unverborgenem und Verborgenem, das Herauskommen von Verdeckung und Verstellung, — dieses in sich 
gefügte Geschehen ist das Geschehen dessen, was wir Wahrheit nennen.”

6 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 71.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

Despite the alleged ontological complexity of Heidegger’s concept of ‘earth,’ he still 
can claim that, “[w]e notice that a work of art has flowered in the ground of our 
homeland. As we hold this simple fact in mind, we cannot help [but remember 
that] at once […] during the last two centuries great poets and thinkers have been 
brought forth from the Swabian land. Thinking about it further makes clear at once 
that Central Germany is likewise such a land, and so are East Prussia, Silesia, and 
Bohemia.”7 Given these statements, it seems like we must concede to Ihde that 
Heidegger’s romantic tastes are intrinsically linked to his nationalist ideology and 
represent a great obstacle not only for the philosophy of technology, but also for 
his aesthetics (including his concept of truth). Nonetheless, this pivot too hurriedly 
dismisses Heidegger’s thought, which can be corrected if we approach his critique of 
modern technology from the horizon of his remaining corpus. 

As stated earlier, Heidegger claims that the essence of the work of art takes place 
in strife, which itself hosts the occurrence of truth as unconcealment. In “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” the essence of technology as enframing (Gestell) 
is characterized as modernity’s hegemonic mode of unconcealing. In this way, art 
and technology are revealed as diametrically opposed modes of unconcealment or 
truth, and as Ihde points out—concerning the latter—Heidegger has the tendency to 
oppose a ‘good’ technology to a ‘bad’ one. What characterizes the good technology is 
its artistic dimension as a result from art not yet being distinguished in its particularity 
from the rest of technology, as is the case in Greek philosophy—where the concept 
of techné is understood as encompassing the poiesis of fine arts since the artist is not 
distinguished from the artisan. Yet, Ihde understands that Heidegger’s distinction 
has its grounds in subjective preferences; in particular, a nostalgia for traditional 
modes of production and an ecological awareness that rejects those technologies that 
“provoke” (herausfordern) nature. In “Gelassenheit”, Heidegger claims that in order 
to face the threats that modern technology poses, “[w]e can use technical devices 
as they ought to be used.”8 Phenomenology (methodologically speaking) precludes 
this type of normative claims because it must be descriptive. Although we might 
conclude that in this speech Heidegger betrays his arbitrariness by uttering explicitly 
normative claims, there are still, nonetheless, many sufficient arguments to doubt this 
deduction. In the next section, I initially expound Heidegger’s characterization of the 
provocative mode of unconcealing as derived from a more original one, and secondly, 
offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s project in “Gelassenheit” that emphasizes the 
non-normative grounds of his statements. In both of these cases, the original/derived 
distinction grounds Heidegger’s preferences. These must be understood as stemming 
from a purely phenomenological basis that does not allow itself to be tainted by 
subjective tastes or a normativity incompatible with the phenomenological method.

7 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 47.
8 Ibid, 54.



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III. BEYOND ROMANTICISM: THE TRANSCENDENTAL 
ARTWORK 

In the “Question Concerning Technology,” after a brief detour through the traditional 
conception of technology as a means to an end, and a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s 
concept of causality, Heidegger formulates the essence of technology as the Gestell, 
or “enframing”. The Gestell marks one of the epochs in Heidegger’s depiction of the 
history of western metaphysics, which just as the Idea was for Plato, is the way in 
which being announces itself to us in our times. What characterizes our epoch is that 
the Gestell interpellates us to unconceal the totality of beings as “stock” (Bestand) 
in the manner of a provocative order or solicitation (herausfondernde Bestellen).9 
Discerning what exactly Heidegger considers to be the particular characteristics and 
limits that enable us to distinguish the provocative mode of unconcealment from 
non-provocative ones represents a tough exegetical challenge. Why exactly does the 
hydroelectrical dam on the Rhine provoke Nature whereas the temple does not?  In 
this respect, Ihde opposes Heidegger’s description of the Greek temple in the “Origin 
of the Work of Art” to that which J. Donald Hughes offers in his Ecology in ancient 
civilizations. While Heidegger offers a highly romanticized depiction of the temple, 
Hughes emphasizes the environmental impact that one can see around the Acropolis. 
Hughes also mentions how even Plato witnessed these concerning ecological 
transformations when he visited various temples devoted to the guardian spirits of 
streams, which had already dried out by his time. Nonetheless, these counterexamples 
suffer from two defects. First, the contrast between these examples results from 
Heidegger’s stance that we must understand the work of art in the context of the 
world that is opened up by it. It is then justified to offer a romanticized depiction of 
the temple since only in this way can we offer an account of its original situation in 
which the temple properly functions as a work of art. The two examples offered by 
Hughes depict works whose worlds have already closed. Second, we must concede 
to Ihde that Hughes’ examples demonstrate how the damage done to nature is not 
something exclusive to modern technology. However, this does not mean that Greek 
technology provoked nature in a Heideggerian sense.  What concerns Heidegger is 
the complete hegemony of a certain way of approaching beings that threatens to take 
over all other possible modes of unconcealment.  We must take into account that 
even if the ancient Greeks could be said to have damaged nature just as much as the 
English did in the times of Francis Bacon, the difference between the two of them—
and of unique interest to Heidegger—is how from a certain historical horizon nature 
can be seen as something to be dominated, which is clearly incompatible with the 
Greek conception of physis.10 

9 Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 17.
10 In more analytical terms, the distinction is not quantitative but qualitative. It does not refer to a measurable 

difference in ecological damage but rather to a change in humanity’s relation to nature. The type of comparison 
that Ihde makes rests in the type of thinking that Heidegger is criticizing, that is, the calculative mode of thought 
that hopes to settle all questions by way of empirical obervations and measurements.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

The ultimate danger that the Gestell represents is that all modes of unconcealment 
would be redirected to that of provocation. This would signify the end of meditative 
thinking and the total hegemony of what Heidegger terms the calculative mode of 
thought. Heidegger claims that the Gestell, which becomes pervasively evident in our 
times with the advent of such technologies as the nuclear bomb, began operating 
and developing itself long ago—being the root of modern science’s instrumental 
character and understanding of nature in terms of measurable extension. In this way, 
Heidegger worries that the only possibility that would remain for man would be “of 
pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering (Bestellen), 
and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is 
blocked, that man might be admitted more and sooner and ever more primally to 
the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he 
might experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.”11 In the language 
of Being and Time, man would fall into an improper mode of existence in which he 
would no longer understand himself from himself, and, remain oblivious to his own 
essence as a consequence of understanding both nature and himself in terms of stock 
(Bestand). Ihde admits that “Heidegger does not simply outright condemn modern 
technology—its essence, enframing, is simultaneously a revealing of the world and 
an openness.” In spite of this, Ihde dismisses the danger that Heidegger warms us of 
by introducing the following question: “In short, all of nature, including the human 
being, will be seen as reduced to a vast resource well (Bestand) – but the question 
then is: for who, or for what end?”12 However, if we properly understand Heidegger’s 
stance that the Gestell grounds an epoch of our understanding of beings, then it does 
not result from any human will or in favor of any human interests. In this respect, 
Heidegger’s stance regarding the hegemony of the Gestell can be compared to Michel 
Foucault’s description of power relations. Instead of the traditional models of power 
vested in a source of authority, an individual figure or within a particular group, the 
microphysics of power do not respond to any such central source; instead, oppressed 
individuals reproduce within themselves these same structures biopolitically.13 
The following quote from Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit,” thus, takes on the following 
relevance: “these forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond 
his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision[s].”14

Another aspect of Heidegger’s romanticism remains in his nationalism as a form 
of the concept of ‘home ground,’ which specifically protrudes in “Gelassenheit.” In 
relation to art, Heidegger asks “does not the flourishing of any genuine work depend 
upon its roots in a native soil? […] does man still dwell calmly between heaven and 
earth? […] is there still a life-giving home-land in whose ground man may stand 

11 Martin Heidegger, The question concerning technology, and other essays, (New York, Harper Perennial, 2013): 26.
12 Don Ihde, Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives. (New York, Fordham University Press, 2010), 

81.
13 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 26.
14 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 51.



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rooted, that is, be autochthonic?”15 These concepts lend themselves easily to an 
interpretation that relates Heidegger’s thought immediately back to his involvement 
with Nazism, but this issue is far more complex. The concept of earth is the result of 
a phenomenology of the work of art and his phenomenology—as is the case for the 
phenomenology of “equipment” towards the beginning of Being and Time, which 
focuses exclusively on the artisanal mode of production—takes the thematic entity 
under description from the perspective of a primitive experience. In this way, we can 
say that Heidegger’s phenomenology of art, although seeking to arrive at the essence 
of art as such, focuses on a model of art in which the production of beautiful objects 
is not yet distinguished in its particularity from the rest of technological production. 
In this manner, there seems to be a radical difference between the Greek temple as 
studied in the “Origin of the Work of Art” and the example of Van Gogh’s painting 
“A Pair of Shoes” offered in that very same text. While the essence of the work of 
art as strife must be descriptive of all forms of art, it seems that the Greek temple 
is limited to the world of the Greeks, whereas Van Gogh’s painting properly reveals 
to Heidegger the essence of art as such. Iain Thomson claims that “in Van Gogh’s 
painting—the strange space which surrounds these shoes like an underlying and yet 
also enveloping atmosphere—one can notice that inchoate forms begin to emerge 
from the background but never quite take a firm shape; in fact, these shapes tend to 
disappear when one tries to pin them down.”16 In this manner, Van Gogh’s painting 
can be said to reflect the structure of the type of strife that Heidegger deems the 
essence of the work of art.

Meyer Schapiro famously objected to Heidegger’s interpretation of Van Gogh’s 
painting as nothing but a subjective projection of his own romantic preferences, 
since the shoes that the painting depicted were Van Gogh’s own—those of a city 
man, and not, as he states, those of a countrywoman. Most Heideggerians would 
claim that Schapiro misses the important aspects of Heidegger’s example; namely, 
the ontological depth sought in the phenomenological description of the work. 
While I partially agree with this rebuke, the fact that Van Gogh painted his own 
shoes17 acquires utmost importance precisely because it means that we are facing an 
ontological work that reflects on its own being—a transcendental art18 that reveals 

15 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 47-48.
16 Thomson, Iain D., "Heidegger’s Aesthetics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), 

Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/heidegger-aesthetics/>.
17 Van Gogh’s painting then doesn’t reveal the world of the country woman but the world of the artist. Here we 

have an opposition between the two modes of reading the concept of earth. If we take the shoes to be those 
of the German country woman, we read the earth as soil (in a way reminiscent of the Nazi slogan “blood and 
soil”) whereas if we take them to be the artist’s, we are confronted with the concept of earth as that dimension 
of inteligibility that resists totalitarian closure. I’d venture to claim that Van Gogh’s painting could only reveal 
art’s essence to Heidegger in so far as it expresses the artist’s relationship to the earth which involves a constantly 
renewed attempt to seize those fleeting instants that are worthy of being immortalized in the artwork. Derrida 
seems to be pointing in this direction on Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question and also on The Truth in Painting.

18 There is much to develop and further enquire in regard to this concept since the reflexive character of modern 
art is an extensive phenomenon. I recently came upon a book by literary critic Robert Alter named “Partial 
Magic: The Novel as a Self-conscious Genre,” which sees in the Quixote not only the birth of the novel, but also 
the archetype that contains all the self-reflexive exercises that later novelists will explore and exploit (with the 



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

the conditions of its own possibility. This kind of art differs altogether from what 
one could deem pre-transcendental art, such as the Greek temple, or any other work 
of art previous to Cervantes’ revolution in putting forth his highly reflective Don 
Quixote—comparable to that started in philosophy twenty years later by Descartes 
in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind.19 We can say, without departing too much 
from Heidegger, that a work of pre-transcendental art is a sensible manifestation of 
the spirit of a community or, in less Hegelian terms, that it consolidates its ethno-
political identity by providing a tangible foundation for its political organization. 
Nonetheless, we can only claim that this is art’s function because of Heidegger’s 
radical claim that the temple founds the Greek world in the sense of a cosmovision, 
opening the historical horizon of intelligibility for their understanding of beings. 
As Heidegger says, “Standing there, the temple first gives to things their look, and 
to men their outlook on themselves.”20 While the temple’s essence is the strife in 
which the earth is brought to the clearing of human intelligibility, Van Gogh’s 
painting reflects the strife itself, as his broad brushstrokes abandon the defined lines 
of realism and evoke the elusive and receding aspect of the earth. In this way, we can 
appreciate the link between Heidegger’s aesthetics and nationalism, since as long as 
an explicit distinction between transcendental and pre-transcendental art does not 
arise, the concept of ‘earth’ remains tied to that of a ‘home ground’ and autochthony. 
Heidegger’s “Gelassenheit” functions as an exhortation for thinking about a new 
autochthony that would allow us to dwell properly in the midst of the irreversible 
changes brought through modern technology. 

Releasement (Gellasenheit) is the attitude that Heidegger proposes as that which 
we need to assume in order to face the threats of modern technology. In “The 
Experience of Technology: Human-Machine Relations,” Ihde states that “there 
is a 'technosphere' within which we do a good deal of our living, surrounding 
us in part the way technological artifacts do literally for astronauts and deep sea 
investigators.”21 Despite his romanticism, Heidegger similarly observes that, “[f ]or 
all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or 
lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would 
be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical 
devices.”22 Given that we depend on the world of technology or the technosphere, 
releasement means saying “yes” to modern technology, remembering, however, that 

exception of those who subscribe to literary realism). Furthermore, an interesting dialogue can be opened with 
Danto’s philosophy of art since his periodization of the history of art responds to the degree of self-consciousness 
evidenced by artists. Danto distinguishes between pre-art and Art, the latter corresponding to the epoch in which 
artists as the makers of beautiful objects are distinguished from artisans. The infamous claim of the end of art 
precisely refers to the epoch in history, the 20th century, where art itself becomes philosophical as it explicitly 
poses the question, “What is art?"

19 We could also mention here another exponent of the Spanish renaissance: the painter Velazquez, known for his 
self-portrait Las Meninas and his extensive depiction of mirrors.

20 Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track,  (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21.
21 Ihde, D. Technics and praxis, (Dordrecht, D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979), 14.
22 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 53.



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the essence of modern technology insofar as it compels us to understand nature 
merely as a quantitatively measurable reserve of resources (including what we deem 
the “human resources”) threatens to redirect all modes of unconcealment to that of 
provocation. Since this would signify a fall into an improper mode of existence as 
we stop reflecting upon ourselves to understand humanity merely in terms of stock, 
releasement simultaneously has to say “no” to the pervasiveness of the Gestell: “We 
can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to 
dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.”23 This saying yes 
to the unavoidable character of technology acknowledges that “a profound change is 
taking place in man's relation to nature and to the world. But the meaning that reigns 
in this change remains obscure.”24 Given this opacity in modern technology’s essence, 
the openness to mystery becomes the other part to Heidegger’s solution to face the 
dangers of the Gestell. With this openness, Heidegger simultaneously recognizes the 
imperative to accept the inevitable while humbly admitting that his limitations as a 
man of a past generation preclude him from imagining how man can dwell properly 
in the time of the Gestell. Insofar as “mystery” is defined by Heidegger as that which 
shows itself at the same time as it conceals itself, the openness to mystery is the 
way in which we keep meditative or self-reflexive thought alive by staying in the 
realm of truth as unconcealment.  It is worth noting how the mystery to which we 
remain open evokes the concept of earth, for one of Heidegger’s main contributions 
to philosophy is his stance that humans first and foremost understand the world 
through the manipulation of tools and the production of works. Thus, thought as 
openness to mystery and art are identified—as in Nietzsche’s stance that art is the 
properly metaphysical activity of man or Danto’s claim that the defining trait of 20th 
century art remains its philosophical character since it explicitly poses the question 
“What is art?”

V. CONCLUSION

Releasement and openness to mystery “grant us the possibility of dwelling in the 
world in a totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation 
upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being 
imperiled by it. Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery grants us a 
vision of a new autochthony, which someday even might be fit to recapture the old 
and now rapidly disappearing autochthony in a changed form.”25 The lost rooting 
that Heidegger denounces is not simply the subordination of meditative thinking 
to calculative thought: the hegemony of modern technology brings about the 
shortening of all distances in space and time, the erasure of all localisms as a result of 
globalization. As Ihde claims, “[t]he dramatic space shots of Earth from the moon or 
a satellite are very un-Heideggerian precisely because they place Earth at a distance 

23 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on thinking: a translation of Gelassenheit, (New York, Harper & Row, 1959), 54..
24 Ibid, Pg. 55.
25 Ibid.



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from Earth-as-ground. But they are also irreversibly part of the postmodern view of 
Earth-as-globe, with a very different sense of what constitutes our ‘home’.”26 As this 
essay demonstrated, Heidegger recognizes this irreversible aspect of the profound 
changes in humanity’s relation to nature and the world and exhorts us to think so that 
we can build a “home” in the technical world. In this regard, Heidegger’s thought is 
closer than ever to the spirit of Kant’s philosophy: not only does he offer a critique 
of the illegitimate claims of the science of his time that threaten to warp and destroy 
human freedom, but he also calls upon us to understand our dwelling within the 
world in cosmopolitan terms. ◆

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Autochthony Myth.” In Ancient Myth. Media, Transformations and Sense-
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Gruyter, 2009.

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

Ihde, D. Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010.

Ihde, D. Technics and praxis. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979.

Heidegger, M. Discourse on thinking.: a translation of Gelassenheit. John M. Anderson 
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Heidegger, M. Off the Beaten Track.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002

Heidegger, M. Poetry, Language, Thought. A. Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper & 
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Heidegger, M.  “Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks: Erste Ausarbeitung”. Heidegger 
Studies Vol. 5 (1989); 5-22

Heidegger, M. Vorträge und Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
2000.

Heidegger, M. The question concerning technology, and other essays. New York: Harper 
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Thomas, Iain D., “Heidegger’s Aesthetics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2019 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (e.d.), URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2019/entries/heidegger-aesthetics>.

Thomson, Iain D. Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.

26 Don Ihde. Heidegger’s technologies: postphenomenological perspectives, (New York, Fordham University Press, 2010): 
85.


