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A  former athlete at my local badminton club recently posted an article on Medium 
alleging sexual harassment against one of the coaches at the club. Her article included 

descriptions of her personal experiences with the coach, as well as the !rst-person testimony 
of other teenage players at the club, who alleged that the coach had given inappropriate 
massages and made sexually suggestive comments to the teenage badminton players at the 
club. In the article, the author wrote that she had reported her experiences with the coach 
to SafeSport, the governing body that oversees athletes’ safety. Unfortunately, SafeSport 
had failed to complete an investigation into the coach at the time when the author's 
complaints were reported; local law enforcement also failed to !nd evidence of a crime. 
 
Almost immediately after it was posted, reshares of the article erupted on Facebook. 
Some female athletes shared the article and added stories of their own experiences with 
the coach that corroborated the narrative put forth in the Medium article. Yet others—
many of whom were the victims’ classmates and training mates—posted long Facebook 
statuses attesting to the coach’s character and asked readers to give the coach the “bene!t 
of the doubt”. "e overarching thrust of their argument was that judgment should be 
withheld until the coach had a chance to publish a statement in defense of his actions.  
 
Both views present compelling arguments that have been defended at length in philosophical 
literature about the rights of sexual assault survivors and the rights of the accused, respectively. 

THE JUSTIFICATION)APPLICATION SPECTRUM:
Exploring Seyla Benhabib’s Reconciliation of the 

Generalized and Concrete Others

MEGAN WU



89Issue VIII � Spring 2021

The Justification-Application Spectrum

To be a feminist and a supporter of the #metoo movement requires that survivors of assault 
and their personal narratives be taken seriously. Yet, one might still wonder how it can be 
just to deny the accused a chance to defend their action. Contemporary problems, like the 
treatment of sexual assault in the media and popular culture, are as discursive as they are 
social because they raise questions about what perspectives are most important in a dialogue 
about each incident, and what form our public conversations about events ought to take. 
 
In particular, the responses to the article present an important tension between competing 
values: personal experiences, which come already grounded in a framework of identity 
and power central to subject positioning, and universal and purportedly identity-
independent principles that govern justice in societies. To navigate the relationship 
between both of these values, I turn to Seyla Benhabib’s work on discourse ethics. 
Re!ning our discourse, she argues, is the best way to mediate and balance abstract 
principles of justice with attention to non-abstract experiences, emotions, and identities. 
1 

BenhaBiB’s CommuniCative ethiCsBenhaBiB’s CommuniCative ethiCs
Seyla Benhabib, in her exploration of the embodied self, writes of two di#erent conceptions 
of identity: the Generalized Other and the Concrete Other.2 For Benhabib, the study of 
subjectivity is an important consideration for the study of ethics because philosophers like 
Kant and Rawls have historically derived normative claims from their descriptive assumptions 
about the subject.3 In this tradition, universalist philosophers assume the standpoint of the 
Generalized Other; that is, subjects are constituted by rationality and should be subject to 
the same formal laws of reciprocity and equality that we would ask of ourselves.4 Disparities 
like those that race and gender can only be remedied by a system of norms that require one 
to abstract from their personal identities so that they can objectively consider the interests 
of others and society as a whole. However, in opposition to the universalist tradition, moral 
psychologists like Carol Gilligan have identi!ed the necessity of adopting the standpoint 
of the Concrete Other; a subject for which individual history, identity, and desires are 
important.5 As Benhabib puts it—in the context of the Concrete Other—one views subjects 
in terms of their “concrete history, identity, and a#ective-emotional constitution […] we 
abstract from what constitutes our commonality.”6 "e female badminton players referenced 
in the introduction spoke from Concrete standpoints, which can be corroborated through  
their use of personal narratives, emotions, and their discussion of power imbalances 
in their experiences with the coach. "ose in defense of the coach took a Generalized 
standpoint wherein they drew on abstract, Rawlsian principles of justice like the rights 
of the accused and of formal legal inquiry. "ough it may be compelling to think of the 
Generalized and Concrete Others as diametrically opposed conceptions of subjectivity, 

1 Seyla Benhabib, ""e Generalized and the Concrete Other: "e Kohlberg-Gilligan 
Controversy and Feminist "eory." PRAXIS International, no. 4 (1985): 416.
2 Benhabib, !e Generalized and !e Concrete Other, 415.
3 Benhabib, !e Generalized and !e Concrete Other, 408-409.
4 Benhabib, !e Generalized and !e Concrete Other, 414.
5 Carol Gilligan, In a Di"erent Voice: Psychological !eory and Women’s Development. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 
100-101.
6 Benhabib, !e Generalized and !e Concrete Other, 411.



90

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

Benhabib’s argument is that reconciling the two is necessary for any moral theory; both 
conceptions of the self are important in di#erent scenarios. As a way of reconciling 
or navigating an interplay between the Generalized and Concrete others, Benhabib 
proposes the idea of communicative ethics, which consists of the following four principles:7 
 
 1. "at participants in the dialogue inquire about what others would want if  
 they were the a#ected party.

 2. "at there exist no epistemic constraints within the dialogue; in other words,  
 factors related to either universal principles, or to particularized, historically  
 contingent principles, ought to be recognized as important in good dialogues,  
 and ought to thereby give merit to both the Generalized and Concrete Others.

 3. "at there be no restrictions on the moral domain, which is to say, that all  
 choices merit ethical consideration by virtue of the fact that one of them could  
 involve either value judgments from, or interactions with, others.

 4. "at the “rules,” practices, and guidelines of the dialogue are subject to change. 
 
Benhabib defends the communicative ethics from critics in her work, “In Defense of 
Universalism: Yet Again!”, by clarifying that the act of deliberation itself su$ciently 
solves the problems that critics believe would arise in her discursive framework.8 
Benhabib’s thesis, which I will elaborate and expand on in the next section, is that 
when misrecognition of the Concrete Other occurs, having a conversation about it and 
correcting the misunderstanding is a prerequisite to resolving disagreements, both factual 
and moral. A communicative ethics is therefore an innately self-correcting system. 
 

answering asymmetriCal reCiproCityanswering asymmetriCal reCiproCity
Iris Marion Young responds to Benhabib’s “"e Generalized and "e Concrete Other” in 
“Asymmetrical Reciprocity: on Moral Respect, Wonder, and Elongated "ought,” wherein 
she argues that the process of universalizing, or imagining what another agent would want, 
goes awry when agents substitute their perception of another agent’s desires over what those 
desires actually are.9 In some cases, substitution may be a well-intentioned misunderstanding, 
such as a person mistakenly buying a gift that is already owned by the recipient. Other cases 
of substitution, like paternalistic substitution, are far more concerning; this would be akin to 
going on a service trip to an underdeveloped country without actually helping the country’s 
residents, but still bene!ting from the appearance of humanitarianism and charitability. 
"is thereby shows how models based on reciprocity can become problematic when they 

7 Benhabib, !e Generalized and !e Concrete Other, 417.
8 Seyla Benhabib, "In Defense of Universalism. Yet Again! A Response to Critics of Situating the Self." New German Critique, no. 62 
(1994): 176. doi:10.2307/488515
9 Iris Marion Young, “Feminism and the Public Sphere: Asymmetrical Reciprocity: on Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged "ought.” 
Constellations 3, no. 3 (1997): 354.



91Issue VIII � Spring 2021

The Justification-Application Spectrum

occur across imbalances of power. Young argues that paternalistic substitution causes agents 
to either impose or to assume their notion of what others want over and against the actual 
experiences, desires, and perspectives of the Other, which precludes the communicative 
ethics from striking a balance between honoring the perspectives of marginalized individuals 
in dialogues and maintaining Generalized principles like reciprocity and fairness. 
 
To resolve this issue, Young advocates for “asymmetrical reciprocity,”10 which argues that 
understanding and recognizing the other is necessary for reciprocity to work correctly. 
An asymmetrical understanding of reciprocity considers both the history of power 
dynamics present in the relationship, and the participants’ unique positions along the 
intersections of di#erent identities like race and gender.11 Functionally, asymmetrical 
reciprocity requires prioritizing the Concrete Other over the Generalized Other 
because recognizing the asymmetries of a relationship involves giving an account of the 
relationship in terms of the Concreteness of the participants (rather than Generalized 
ways in which the participants may interact). I argue, however, that evaluating the 
standpoint of the Concrete Other prior to that of the Generalized Other is made 
functionally impossible given the complexities of di#erent intersections between identity 
categories. I additionally defend Benhabib’s communicative ethics by arguing that their 
adherence alone is su$cient to resolve the de!ciencies of Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity. 
 
"e !rst de!ciency of asymmetrical reciprocity is that it cannot account for the 
interpersonal relationships between members of a marginalized group, and between 
members of a marginalized group and another group (whether marginal or otherwise). 
Attempting to describe the relationship in terms of an “asymmetry” ultimately fails 
because the particularities of identity cannot always easily translate into a simple, scalar 
comparison of privilege. One such example is that of colorist prejudice: many in the East 
Asian community are prejudiced against dark-skinned Asians for a number of reasons 
including darker skin being associated with low-class labor, Black skin, and opposition to 
Eurocentric beauty standards.12 However, though an asymmetry between light- and dark-
skinned East Asians certainly exists, the size of the asymmetry is too di$cult to quantify 
since its degree occurs on a sliding scale according to the individual color of one’s skin, 
rather than on a binary opposition between being or not being a member of a given racial 
group. Intersectionality, too, poses a problem for asymmetrical reciprocity: each person has 
a number of characteristics (e.g. economic class, gender, level of education, etc.) that make it 
di$cult to clearly tell which participants are the most disadvantaged relative to others in real, 
asymmetrical relationships. Ultimately, I contend that a communicative ethics is perhaps 
the best framework for apprehending the asymmetries posed by di#erences in identity: 
even if recognizing one’s structural privilege relative to others’ is impossible to know, the 
!rst principle of communicative ethics is that participants attempt to view problems from 

10 Young, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, 343.
11 Young, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, 347.
12 Trina Jones, “"e Signi!cance of Skin Color in Asian and Asian-American Communities: Initial Re%ections.” UC Irvine Law Review, 
University of California Press 3 (2013): 1114-1120.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

the standpoint of another. Not only does the !rst principle serve as a mechanism through 
which participants in a dialogue can abstract from their own unique positions, but it also 
allows for a better understanding of the positions of others. "is abstraction avoids the 
problem of substitution because participants do not speak from the perspective of others; 
they use substitution as a heuristic for openness to others’ ideas. Additionally, participants 
avoid the problem of having to calculate asymmetries between participants because all 
participants are equally obligated to understand others, independent of asymmetries. In 
doing so, participants are then able to open up a space to understand and to consider 
problems holistically—therefore mitigating the problem of asymmetries in discourse—and 
avoid relying solely on one standpoint which might be epistemically and socially-privileged. 
 
"ough it is certainly important to consider subject positioning in discourse ethics, relying 
on an understanding of subjectivity based on material features of a person’s identity can be 
in!nitely regressive. Each individual can point to any number of characteristics (e.g. Chinese, 
woman, fan of Harry Potter) that they consider to be an integral part of their identity and 
classi!cation, and it quickly becomes evident that no clear line exists for di#erentiating a 
person’s identity from the properties that describe them. "e implication of the di$culty in 
de!ning or parameterizing identity is that identity then becomes an impossible, or at least 
incomplete, basis for a dialogical framework, which poses a signi!cant issue for Young’s 
Asymmetrical Reciprocity. Furthermore, this suggests that Benhabib is ultimately correct 
to view both Concrete and Generalized standpoints as important features of ethics contra 
Young.

"e ability of identity to encompass a near-in!nite number of descriptors may suggest James 
Sterba’s objection that fully knowing the Other is impossible.13 In situations that require 
immediate action, or those in which speci!c knowledge may be necessary, a requirement 
to engage in discourse may present certain challenges. Moreover, as Sterba argues, to tell 
another participant in a dialogue one’s complete personal history and identity requires a 
level of vulnerability, trust, and time that participants may not have or be willing to share14; 
nonetheless, I believe that the communicative ethics is immune to this objection. "ough 
a person’s identity properties may very well prove in!nite, and full knowledge of the Other 
is impossible, participants do not need to know each other absolutely and entirely.  Under 
a communicative ethics, participants in a dialogue compelled to share their perspective 
must simply isolate or de!ne what segments of their identity and lived experiences are 
relevant to the problem at hand and do their best to make that description fungible.  
 
Another objection to asymmetrical reciprocity is that it positions subjects with greater 
socio-political privilege in dialogues with participants that possess less power and actually 
incentivizes them to mis-substitute, or wrongly assuming the needs of the Other. Such a 
dialogue would allow malicious actors with privilege to promote positions in the name of 

13 James P. Sterba, "Benhabib and Rawls's Hypothetical Contractualism." New German Critique, no. 62 (1994): 149-64. 
doi:10.2307/488513.
14 Sterba, Benhabib and Rawls, 152-153.



93Issue VIII � Spring 2021

The Justification-Application Spectrum

the worst o# that do not actually bene!t them and removes any institutional discursive 
check against this practice. For example, documented incidents of police brutality routinely 
spark societal discussions about increased police training and the use of body cameras. Police 
departments have in fact framed the need for increased funding to conduct trainings in 
terms of the goal of decreasing police violence.15 Yet, these increases in funding, despite 
claiming to be in the best interest of communities most at risk of police brutality, are in fact 
directly in con%ict with the aims the recent movement to defund the police and re-invest 
into communities.16 "e central issue with asymmetrical reciprocity which this example 
demonstrates is that listening to marginalized perspectives and responding to their general 
concerns does not necessarily imply that either the outcomes of dialogue will be in their best 
interest; in fact, their demands can be twisted or misinterpreted to give license to outcomes 
that contradict their goals.

On the other hand, the communicative ethics does have a structural method of restricting 
such a practice. Under the communicative ethics, participants in dialogues are allowed 
to de!ne the terms of their engagement by sharing exactly those parts of their experience 
which they determine to be relevant to the discussion and also to de!ne what that means 
in terms of shifts in practices and policies. Where the dialogue about police brutality has 
gone wrong is that the dialogue recognized an asymmetry without actually empowering 
the speakers whose voices had been disadvantaged: police departments generally listened 
to communities’ concerns about police violence, but did not then actively seek out, follow, 
or prioritize the leadership and policies of organizers. Should participants in dialogues 
with others give the highest credence to voices other than their own, as they do in the 
communicative ethics, participation in a dialogue can actually serve as a powerful tool that 
restores autonomy to speakers who have historically been denied agency. It allows them the 
advocacy and discursive space to reclaim ownership of their identity and desires from others. 
 
"e second de!ciency of asymmetrical reciprocity is its dependence on what Young 
calls temporality, which makes it challenging for asymmetrical reciprocity to guide 
judgements and actions.17 As Young de!nes it, temporality concerns the historical processes 
(change, continuity, and interaction with other groups) that have contributed to group 
identi#cation;18 it is therefore essential, Young argues, that dialogue participants consider 
temporality in their comprehension of asymmetries between participants. Nonetheless, 
problems may arise when temporality plays into how groups self-identify. First, many 
identity groups have historical rami!cations that must be grappled with, but under the 
framework of asymmetrical reciprocity, it is unclear what an individual’s responsibility 
for the temporality of his or her identity group should be. Tamara K. Nopper writes 
that Asian Americans !rst began to collectively identify as the racial group ‘Asian’ rather 
15 Matt Vasilogambros, “Training Police to Step In and Prevent Another George Floyd,” "e PEW Charitable Trusts, June 5, 2020, 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/05/training-police-to-step-in-and-prevent-another-george-
%oyd.
16 Grace Dickinson, “What does ‘defund the police’ mean, and what would it look like in Philly?” "e Philadelphia Inquirer, June 10, 
2020, https://www.inquirer.com/news/defund-the-police-black-lives-matter-what-does-it-mean-20200610.html.
17 Young, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, 352.
18 Young, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, 352.



94

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

than be ethnically divided into such groups as ‘Chinese’ or ‘Japanese’ in order to give 
weight to the Model Minority Myth—a stereotype that was intentionally used to elevate 
the perception of Asian Americans at the expense of Black Americans.19 Yet, if simply 
identifying as Asian American is intrinsically antiblack, then this raises a litany of questions 
such as: which identities are acceptable and which are not, what constitutes an identity, 
and what are some of the reparations participants in dialogues may owe each other? "ese 
are all necessary questions to think about, but then again, only considering the context 
of “fruitful discourse” seems to stymie and to gatekeep an active and lively discussion. As 
such, navigating the complex relationships between di#erent asymmetries makes the task 
of recognizing temporality in asymmetrical reciprocity di$cult. In fact, recognizing the 
complexities of historically contingent relationships of power may point to the need for 
a system like the communicative ethics, where participants will inevitably be called on to 
acknowledge temporality under the framework of an epistemically boundless dialogue.  
 
Second, while the history of relationships between groups is in one sense constitutive of 
asymmetries between groups, looking solely at history to de!ne power relationships may 
run the risk of abstracting too much from the lived experiences of participants in dialogue. 
By its nature as a historical descriptor, temporality is something that is constantly maturing 
and never static. "e relationships between di#erent communities might best be described 
as itself a constantly shifting dialogue, which indicates the utility of developing a system 
like the communicative ethics rather than rely on asymmetrical reciprocity as a framework. 
 

the JustifiCation-appliCation speCtrumthe JustifiCation-appliCation speCtrum
"ough I believe that Benhabib’s communicative ethics present a better model than 
Young’s asymmetrical reciprocity, I !nd Benhabib’s description of appropriate contexts 
for the Concrete and Generalized Others lacking. In response to James Sterba’s 
objections, Benhabib writes that she considers two “contexts” in which action occurs: 
the moral standpoint (which corresponds to the Concrete Other) and the standpoint of 
institutional justice (which corresponds to the Generalized Other).20 For Benhabib, the 
moral standpoint encompasses scenarios where norms are applied, making them contexts 
of application, whereas the standpoint of institutional justice refers to scenarios where 
abstract principles are justi!ed, making them contexts of justi!cation. Below, I have 
grouped the di#erent concepts and descriptors that Benhabib aligns with the mutually 
exclusive contexts of application and contexts of justi!cation into their respective categories.  
 
Contrary to Benhabib, I believe that contexts of application and those of justi!cation ought 
to be conceptualized as two ends of a spectrum, rather than separate contexts with no overlap. 
"e spectrum model is best understood as a model that explains how people’s obligations 
and perspectives change as new information is gathered through participating  
19 Tamara K. Nopper, “"e Unexceptional Racism of Andrew Sullivan,” Verso Books. Web. https://versobooks.com/blogs/3172-the-un-
exceptional-racism-of-andrew-sullivan.
20 Benhabib, In Defense of Universalism, 183.



95Issue VIII � Spring 2021

The Justification-Application Spectrum

in discursive formulations such as the communicative ethics. In essence, participants may 
enter into dialogues from a standpoint that is very close to either application or justi!cation 
but will move towards the other side as the dialogue continues; perspectives become either 
more Applied or more Justi!ed. I also contend that discourse causes conversations and 
participants to converge towards the middle of the spectrum, wherein the conclusions 
reached through conversations have elements that are both Applied and Justi!ed. 
 
"e spectrum model indicates how principles can exist in between purely justi!ed contexts 
and purely applied contexts—that we can have nuanced principles that re%ect material 
realities, but are still principles, rather than exceptions. For example, a professor who 
modi!es the norm that “extensions on papers will not be granted” to include “unless in the 
case of a documented family emergency” can still retain the Justi!ed Principle of wanting to 
give all students an equal amount of time on the assignment, while still accounting for the 
Applied contexts in which students may face constraints on their time that are personal and 
uncontrollable. Under the spectrum model, a maxim can include an exception for speci!c 
cases, while retaining its universal normative force as any student, through no fault of his 
or her own, might encounter an unforeseen emergency that meaningfully hampers his or 
her ability to write papers without extensions. "e spectrum model might suggest that 
exceptions to maxims are desirable if they could apply that the maxim would a#ect and be 
directly relevant to the appropriateness of the maxim’s primary subject.

To illustrate what I mean, consider a classroom setting where teachers and professors must 
establish fair rules that govern how the class will operate, such as deadlines and consistent 
grading scales that are shared by all members of the class. Professors construct class norms in 
contexts of justi!cation, where they legislate with the understanding that the norms they set 
will be the same for all of the students regardless of the students’ identity, educational history, 
or experiences; norms are enacted without reference to, or exceptions for, any particular 
student. But most classrooms are not so simple: as the class progresses, students may ask 
for extensions on assignments or for grades to be rounded up to an A. Students make those 
requests based on concrete features of their experience unique to them, ranging from disability 
accommodations to hardships that they may have experienced during the pandemic. In 
changing or making exceptions to class policies, teachers must take a middle-ground stance 
between the contexts of justi!cation and application and must view their students as both 



96

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

Generalized and Concrete. "e resulting dialogue that occurs between teachers and students 
and the outcome of most class norms by the end of the semester shows that there is a 
middle-ground between contexts of Application and Justi!cation, and demonstrates how 
stances that are in-between the ends of the spectrum are often both realistic and desirable. 
 
Finally, returning to the introductory example of the badminton coach, the athletes entered 
the dialogue (the online conversation surrounding the coach’s actions and their allegations) 
from a context of Application. "e Medium article made note of the power imbalances present 
between coach and student, and quoted the athletes’ accounts of harassment, indicating an 
attention to individualized experiences. "ose who defended the coach by attesting to his 
good character and citing the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” approached the 
conversation from a context of Justi!cation because the norms they cited were abstract 
and not tailored to the particulars of the situation. However, as conversations continued, 
participants on Facebook representing both sides of the divide seemed to reach a consensus 
on several stances: that the coach’s character should be evaluated in light of the plethora of 
accusations against him and that the testimony of the athletes held comparable weight to the 
coach’s defense of himself. "e terms of the dialogue shifted to a middle-ground between a 
context of Application and a context of Justi!cation. And, as dialogues continued, the overall 
evaluation of the coach seemed to become more nuanced: participants, whether in defense 
of the coach or not, seemed to agree that his intentions of “joking around” and “getting 
comfortable” with students were separate from the e"ects of his actions on the athletes. 
 

ConClusionConClusion
Shortly after the article was published, the coach published a post on his blog apologizing 
for his actions and was terminated by the Badminton Club. But, as conversations brought 
about by #metoo continue, the importance of discursive frameworks such as Benhabib’s 
communicative ethics cannot be understated. Historically, rights and laws have been 
created from the standpoint of the Generalized Other, which can foreclose important 
dialogue about whether principles that presuppose equality can be applied to situations 
where material inequalities and power imbalances are the norm. "e communicative 
ethics, which I have defended from the competing framework of asymmetrical 
reciprocity, not only provides an appropriate framework for understanding political 
discourse, but it also gives theorists a method of reconciling the seemingly opposite 
conceptions of subjectivity encompassed by the Generalized and Concrete Others. 
 
To construct this defense of Benhabib’s position, I have argued that the way that the 
Generalized and Concrete Others are reconciled in real-life discursive formulations 
aligns best with a spectrum between Justi!cation and Application, rather than a binary 
construction where situations are either Justi!ed or Applied. "e spectrum model adds 
%exibility to Benhabib’s communicative ethics as it applies to the process of creating real 
rules, policies, and laws. Put together, the spectrum model and Benhabib’s communicative 



97Issue VIII � Spring 2021

The Justification-Application Spectrum

ethics establish legitimate procedures for respectful and productive dialogue with other 
subjects, and can extend from typical, everyday encounters to societal policymaking. 

WORKS CITED
Benhabib, Seyla. "In Defense of Universalism. Yet Again! A Response to Critics 

of Situating the Self." New German Critique, no. 62 (1994): 173-89. 
doi:10.2307/488515

Benhabib, Seyla. ""e Generalized and the Concrete Other: "e Kohlberg-Gilligan 
Controversy and Feminist "eory." PRAXIS International, no. 4 (1985): 402-424.

Dickinson, Grace. “What does ‘defund the police’ mean, and what would it look like in 
Philly?” "e Philadelphia Inquirer, June 10, 2020, https://www.inquirer.com/news/
defund-the-police-black-lives-matter-what-does-it-mean-20200610.html.

Gilligan, Carol. In a Di"erent Voice: Psychological !eory and Women’s Development. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936).

Jones, Trina. “"e Signi!cance of Skin Color in Asian and Asian-American Communities: 
Initial Re%ections.” UC Irvine Law Review, University of California Press 3 (2013): 
1105-1123

Nopper, Tamara K. “"e Unexceptional Racism of Andrew Sullivan,” Verso Books. Web. 
https://versobooks.com/blogs/3172-the-unexceptional-racism-of-andrew-sullivan.

Sterba, James P. "Benhabib and Rawls's Hypothetical Contractualism." New German 
Critique, no. 62 (1994): 149-64. doi:10.2307/488513.

Vasilogambros, Matt. “Training Police to Step In and Prevent Another George Floyd,” "e 
PEW Charitable Trusts, June 5, 2020, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/05/training-police-to-step-in-and-prevent-another-
george-%oyd. 

Young, Iris Marion. “Feminism and the Public Sphere: Asymmetrical Reciprocity: on 
Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged "ought.” Constellations 3, no. 3 (1997): 340-
363.


