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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

δι
άν

οι
α

A NATURAL INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTE-
LIAN TELEOLOGY

JORDAN SMITH

§1: AN OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES
 At several key points throughout his works, Aristotle presents 
his understanding of the causal mechanisms affecting all-natural sub-
stances.1 In this view, there are four distinct types of causes: material, 

r  e ien  n  n  ug  i  is i p ssi e  u  e p i e 
any of these modes of causation in isolation from the others,2 some 
basic distinctions between them can nonetheless be drawn. To start, 
the material cause refers to “that out of which a thing comes to be and 
which persists.”3 That is to say, it is the matter of which the thing being 
explained is composed. In contrast to matter, the formal cause is “the 
e ni i n  e essen e 4 in e sense  i  e nes er in su   

way as to make a substance what it is. Next, Aristotle explains that the 
e ien  use is the primary source of the change or rest” in the way 

1  E.g. Aristotle, R. K. Gaye, and R. P. Hardie, “Physics,” essay, in The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), II.3, 194b24-195a3. Aristotle, 
“Metaphysics,” essay, in The Works of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 8 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1908), I.3, 983a24-32.

2  D.C. Schindler helpfully describes Aristotle’s four causes as 
“interdependent.” See D. C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 145-148.

3  Aristotle, Physics II.3, 194b24-194b26.
4  Id., 194b27-194b29.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

that “the father is cause of the child.”5 Finally, and most interestingly 
for current purposes, Aristotle affirms the existence of the final cause 
“in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. 
health is the cause of walking about.”6 i en  n  us i n es 
not only pertain to humans but all-natural substances, Aristotle’s talk of 
“ends” and actions being “for the sake” of goals may give the impres-
sion that he is projecting anthropomorphic categories onto the natural 

r  espi e rs  ppe r n es  n e in i n  is en s n 
n  us i  re  i in e r er n e   is e p si  

worldview reveals that this interpretation completely inverts Aristotle’s 
priorities. For the Stagirite, human intentions are, in fact, teleological 
(i.e. directed to an end or telos) in a merely derivative manner. Rather 
than human intentions and desires, the primary sense of teleology for 
Aristotle is the movement of natural substances to their pre-given natu-
ral ends.

§2:  PROBLEMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOT-
LE’S TELEOLOGY
 In order to demonstrate that the primary point of reference for 
understanding teleology in Aristotle’s thought is nature, a few common 

isin erpre i ns  ris e i n e e g  us  rs  e e p un e  
n  su se uen  re u e  e rs  n  s  si  ng ese is-

readings are those models that attempt to reduce Aristotle’s teleology 
 s e er e  us i n  su  s e ien  r eri  n  

un   ris e s e e g  u  e s u   n  uses ne es-
sarily presupposes that he did r   uni ue e  n  us i  

 r  su   e r  s is re uire   e esis  e e g  is 
the movement of substances to their natural ends, therefore requires 

 re u i nis i  in erpre i ns  ris e s n  uses  s e 
other form of causation be rejected. Second, to determine if Aristotle’s 
understanding of teleology is grounded in his theory of nature, it will 
be necessary to discern what he means by the term “nature” (phusis). 

i en ris e s se er  s e en s n erning e r  e ne  
character of nature, it is somewhat surprising how many have restricted 
his use of the term to merely mean the sum total of biological organ-
isms. This interpretation will be shown to be far too narrow to account 
for all the situations in which Aristotle makes use of the concepts of 

5  Id.,194b30-194b32.
6  Id.,194b33-195a2.



69Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

nature and teleology as causal factors. Lastly, any anthropocentric 
interpretation that claims all things in the universe exists for the sake of 

n in  s eir en  runs up g ins  e i e   n  uses  in ris-
totle, are primarily grounded in the nature of each individual substance 
and are therefore logically before any consideration of human beings 
in particular. As shall be demonstrated, the anthropocentric interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s teleology goes against his broader metaphysical 
isi n  i  r s e ne essi   r s  e n ure use u  r 

mankind. Refuting these three inaccurate understandings of teleology 
in Aristotle shall constitute the majority of this essay. Once the ground 
has been cleared, a positive case for a more robust understanding of 
Aristotelian teleology that is grounded in nature shall be presented.

§3:  REDUCTIONISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FINAL 
CAUSES
 Several scholars have, in one way or another, argued that Aris-

e s n ep i n  n  us i  is re u i e  s e er r   
us i n  u   r e s  in uen i  n  s p is i e  un   

this sort is provided by Allan Gotthelf.7 He asserts that his understand-
ing  n  uses in ris e  e su ri e  s e irre u i e 
potential’ interpretation.”8 Gotthelf chooses this description because, in 
his view, “[p]rocesses for the sake of something are distinguished from 

7  See Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” essay, 
in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James 
G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 204–42. This 
seminal work has birthed other reductionistic interpretations, sometimes 
even more reductionistic than Gotthelf’s own. E.g. Michael Bradie and 
Fred D. Miller, “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle,” History 
of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 2 (April 1984): 133–46, esp. 142. 
Cf. Susan Sauve Meyer, “Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction,” The 
Philosophical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1992): 791–825, https://doi.
org/10.2307/2185925. Meyer takes a more epistemological approach to the 
issue or teleological reducibility: “My conclusion is not that something›s 
e ien  use is i s n  use  n r is i   n ing i  n in rinsi  
e ien  use ere  s r is  n  use  er   n usi n is 
si p   s e in rinsi  e ien  us  i s re su ien  r e ru  

 n us  i s   e pr e  i  is re ing is  r 
Aristotle, each type of cause is an “objective factor in nature,” as Balme 
puts it. David Balme, 3“Teleology and Necessity,” essay, in Philosophical 
Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 281. Aristotle’s discussion 
of causes, therefore, fundamentally concerns ontology (as opposed to 
merely epistemology, as Meyer’s interpretation suggests). 

8  Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251.



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those that are not by the presence in the one case, and the absence in 
the other, of a potential for form.”9 In is in erpre i n   n  use 
is the actualization of a potential that something possesses to take on a 
certain form. Hence, as Gotthelf explains, “For a living organism of a 
certain form to come to be for the sake of something is precisely for it 
to result from a sum of actualizations of potentials, one of which—and 
the most explanatorily important of which—is an irreducible potential 
for an organism of that form.”10 What Gotthelf means is that, for Aris-
totle, the matter out of which, say, a moose is made had the potential to 
take on many different forms, whether that be the form of some other 
animal or even a race car. To explain why this matter takes on the form 
that it does (e.g. that of a moose), one must have recourse to form, 

i  pr i es  e ni i n  er   n inue i  e se 
example, some of the matter composing this animal has its potential to 
be an antler actualized while other material has the potential to be eyes, 
hooves, or intestines actualized. What Gotthelf wishes to emphasize 
is that there is one form which unites together all these parts of the 
moose together so that it is one organism, and there must therefore be 
a corresponding potential to be a moose in all the matter that makes up 
its various parts (in addition to the potentials the matter has to be each 
part of the moose). Because the form of moose interpenetrates all of the 
p r s  e se n  n  ne p r   i  n su e  e  se  
the potential to be a moose cannot be reduced to any one or even any 
collection of the moose’s parts. Final causality, for Gotthelf, is the 
actualization of this irreducible potential for form. This account con-
nects to Aristotle’s teleological language insofar as all the parts of the 
moose are “for the sake of” the moose as a whole. This whole, in turn, 
is an “end” in the sense that the organism develops into a fully grown 
moose, and this stage of development marks its completion. Gotthelf, 
therefore, presents a respectable interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology 

 es in  un  n  n  e ngu ge e uses  es ri e n  
causes but also his broader metaphysical system.

 Despite the positive qualities Gotthelf’s interpretation pos-
sesses, it must ultimately be rejected because of its (admittedly subtle) 
reductionism. Before Gotthelf’s theory in particular is addressed, some 
general preliminary remarks concerning the problems with reduction-
is i  in erpre i ns  n  us i  in ris e us  e e  ri  
facie, it would be strange for Aristotle to systematically distinguish 

9 Id., 250.
10 Ibid.



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

e een n  n  e ien  uses  n  r e r er  e re u i e 
to the latter.11 As D. M. Balme puts it, “Aristotle always presents the 
four causes as four separate factors in a causal explanation… They are 
not one factor plus three alternative descriptions or views of it.”12 Sec-
ond, and more to the point, there are multiple places at which Aristotle 
e p i i  enies  n  us i  is re u i e  e ien  us i  
as Gotthelf implies. To take only the clearest example, in one of his 
enumerations of the four causes and their distinctions, Aristotle says 

 e ir  pe  use is e e ien  use r e s ur e  e 
nge  n  e n  use r e purp se n  e g  is pp se  

 is i e  e e ien  use 13 These considerations render implau-
sible any reductionistic interpretation of Aristotelian teleology based on 

e pre ise  n  us i  is si p     es ri e  p r i u r 
pe  e ien  us i   re ins  e e ns r e  is  

Gotthelf’s argument does in fact attempt such a reduction.

 e re re e ing e re u i n  rue n  uses  ere  
e ien  uses in e s r  i  s u  e n e ge   
he does avoid a particular type of reduction. Indeed, Gotthelf him-
self clearly believes his theory is wholly non-reductionistic (or even 
anti-reductionistic), as the self-designation of his interpretation as one 
of “irreducible potential” clearly indicates.14 He certainly has some 
claim to the title of non-reductionist insofar as he refuses to let matter’s 
potential to be some organism be reduced down to matter’s potentials 
to be each of said organism’s parts. That being said, as Rich Cameron 
rightly notes after conceding this same point in his critique of Gotthelf, 
“his analysis does count as a form of reduction to the material cause in 
virtue of the fact that the analysans refers primarily to potentialities and 
potentialities are material elements in Aristotle’s ontology.”15 Though 

11  r ris e s e ni i e is in i n e een e ur uses  see ris e  
Physics II.3, 194b24-195a3.

12 Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 281. Emphasis mine.
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.3, 983a30-32. This example as well as less 

e p i i  e p es  ris e s is in i n e een n  n  e ien  
causes are explicated in Robert Bolton, “The Origins of Aristotle’s Natural 
Teleology in Physics II,” essay, in Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, 
ed. Mariska Leunissen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 121–43, esp. 122-125. Michael Bradie and Fred. D. Miller also 
rgue r e is in i eness  n  uses is is e ien  uses in 

Aristotle’s thought in Bradie and Miller, “Teleology and Natural Necessity 
in Aristotle,” 137.

14 E.g. Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251. Emphasis 
mine.

15 Rich Cameron, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause,” Apeiron 35, 
no. 2 (June 2002): 173, n. 43 and 44, https://doi.org/10.1515/



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

er n sees e  s re u ing n  us i n  eri  us i n 
in virtue of matter’s status as potential in Aristotle’s thought, it seems 
that, in addition to this account, one must also acknowledge that form 
n  e ien  us i n s  p   r e in is re u i n  er  

Gotthelf is proposing an irreducible potential (the material cause) for 
r  e r  use   us  e u i e   n e ien  use  

in r er r e n i i ns   n  use  in  is i eren e 
between Cameron’s critique and my own, of course, does not detract 
from the main issue, namely that Gotthelf’s interpretation does not 
presen  n u  un   n  uses u  ere  re u es e   
some other form(s) of causation. Indeed, it seems Gotthelf is willing to 
acknowledge the reality of every type of cause Aristotle presents, ex-
ep  r n  uses  is e ns  e s rgu en  es in  

fall victim to the critiques of reductionistic arguments presented above 
and that his interpretation, though coherent, is not true to the thought 

 ris e i se   in ins  r  is in i n e een  ur 
types of causes.

§4:  RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF TELEOLOGY
 The claim that Aristotle’s teleology is intrinsically grounded 
in the natures of the various entities that populate the cosmos necessar-
ily entails that anything that has a nature (including everything from 
ir   e s rs  u n eings  n e e  up n   n  use  

But there are many alternate readings of Aristotle, which preclude 
such a broad understanding of nature and, by extension, teleology. 
The primary mistake made when restricting the scope of Aristotle’s 
pp i i n  n  uses is ssu ing  is n ep i n  e e g  

entails a transposition of anthropomorphic categories onto the natural 
world.16 This mistake can be seen in the work of E. Zeller who claims 
that “Aristotle cannot conceive of regulated and orderly events except 
under the analogy of human action directed towards an end.”17 Similar 

apeiron.2002.35.2.153.
16 Gotthelf, though he does restrict teleological explanation to biological 

en i ies  n ne e ess i en i es is s ne   un en  
misinterpretations of Aristotle. Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final 
Causality,” 251, n. 52.

17 Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. 1, 2 vols. 
(London, UK: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 459. Zeller additionally 
claims that Aristotle explicitly states that the natural world, including the 

eri  e e en s  re in s e sense i e  Spe i  e i es Physics 
VIII.1, 250b10-250b14, the relevant part of which asks, “Is it [i.e. motion] 
in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life 



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

reasoning leads several other scholars to make the mistake of maintain-
ing  ris e e  n  us i   n  e pp i e  i gi  
organisms, which likewise evince some degree of desire and intention-
ality. This path is taken, among others, by D. M. Balme who argues for 

is res ri i e in erpre i n spe i   e e usi n  eri  
e e en s  e su un r  e e en s  ir e r  re n  er   e e-
ologically only when they are part of a living body; outside that (for 
ins n e in e urren e  r ins r s  ere is n  n  use ing 
n e  ris e n nes n ur  e e g   su un r  i e 18 

Compared to Balme, John M. Cooper is more attentive to Aristotle’s 
numerous claims that, in addition to biological entities, the elements 
re s  su e   n  us i  e  in e en  e  e p ies n  
uses  n  re  e  s e is isses ris e s i s n ern-

ing e i e en s r e e e en s  s ing  is us  re ers e g   re s 
tendency to heat things up.”19 On this reading, elemental teleology is 
reduced simply to a way of expressing the way the elements happen to 
behave without providing an explanation of why such behavior occurs 
regularly. Finally, the most powerful argument in favor of the view that 
Aristotle holds teleological explanations only to pertain to biological 
organisms is certainly Gotthelf’s observation that “in almost every 
passage in which Aristotle introduces, discusses, or argues for the ex-
is en e  n  us i  is en i n is use  n e gener i n n  
development of a living organism.”20 There is, therefore, a strong case 
to be made for a restrictive reading of teleology in Aristotle such that 
n  i ing eings n e e e   n  uses

 Despite the multiple lines of evidence pointing towards a 
restrictive interpretation of teleology, such an understanding is sim-
p  n  pre ensi e en ug   p ure  e uses  n  uses 
in the Aristotelian corpus. Though the various interpretations of the 

as it were to all naturally constituted things?” This one question out of 
e en ire ris e i n rpus r  su es  e ns r e  ris e 

maintained a sort of universal animism, especially when one considers the 
possibility that Aristotle here refers to “a sort of life” because he associates 
eternity with the divine, which is alive in some sense (This, and not 
anthropomorphism, is incidentally why Aristotle attributes life to the stars, 
which he believes are eternal). The point being conveyed, as the context 
clearly shows, is the eternity of motion, not the animacy of matter.

18 Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 277.
19 John M. Cooper, “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology,” essay, 

in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James 
G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 268, n. 26.

20 Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 229, n. 7, which 
refers back to his citations in n. 2 and 5.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

res ri i e ie   n  uses e  n in eir n p r i u r s  
all sides of the debate agree that Aristotle attributes teleology to those 
things which possess a nature.21 The contested issue, therefore, is 
spe i   pes  en i ies p ssess  n ure phusis) according 
to Aristotle. The views presented above generally ascribe a nature only 
to biological beings,22 but an analysis of Aristotle’s explicit comments 
on the subject reveal that he certainly had a much broader understand-
ing of the concept of nature. At the opening of Metaphysics VIII, for 
e p e  ris e is s re  e r  er  ir  s e pri e e p es  
“natural substances,” which are “recognized by all thinkers.”23 Aristotle 
provides further corroborating evidence of this broad understanding of 
nature in De Caelo III where he introduces the following distinction: 
“Now things that we call natural are either substances or functions and 

ri u es  su s n es  s su s n es I ss e si p e ies re  
earth, and the other terms of the series—and all things composed of 
them; for example, the heaven as a whole and its parts, animals, again, 
and plants and their parts.”24 Both of these passages make it clear that, 
on Aristotle’s account, substances with natures are not limited to plants 
and animals but also includes the four elements and the heavenly bod-
ies.

 Though Aristotle’s explicit statements as to what is included 
un er e s pe  n ure su e  un er ine e res ri i e in erpre-
tations presented above, these basic observations still leave open the 
question of precisely why these incomplete understandings fail. That 
is to say, what has been dealt with so far are merely conclusions, not 
premises and reasoning. To see why the reasoning behind the restric-
tive interpretations of nature fails, one must understand the criterion 
that Aristotle uses to include something under the category of nature. 

21 E.g. Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 275; Cooper, “Hypothetical 
Necessity and Natural Teleology,” 244; Zeller, Aristotle and Earlier 
Peripatetics, 459.

22 Zeller is an exception to this as he believes Aristotle attributes teleology 
 n ing i  in en i ns  n  e er g es n  r   ris e 

teaches everything has at least some low-level of conscious intentionality. 
Zeller, Aristotle and Earlier Peripatetics, 459-461. For a refutation of this 
interpretation, see n. 17.

23 Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII.1, 1042a6-12.
24 Aristotle, De Caelo, trans. J. Stocks (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 

1922), III.1, 598a29-32. See also De Caelo I.1, 268a1-6 where Aristotle 
e nes e s pe  e s u   n ure s  r   i  n in u e e 

whole material world, except man-made artifacts. For an analysis of this 
passage, see Monte Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 2008), 133.



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

He holds that natural and non-natural substances “plainly differ” since 
every case of the former “has within itself a principle of motion and 
of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by 
way of alteration).”25 For Aristotle, nature is this principle of motion 
and rest. His standard of what constitutes a natural substance therefore 
clearly presents a disjunction where any one of various conditions is 
satisfactory, but it seems that the restrictive theories of nature take the 
“growth and decrease” characteristic of organisms to be a necessary 
condition for naturalness. If Aristotle’s own standard is applied, how-
ever, then the elements are manifestly teleological for Aristotle, since 
he believes they have a natural tendency to move “in respect of place.” 
Earth has a tendency to move down, followed by water, and air tends to 

e up  n  surp sse   re 26 Thus, Aristotle holds that the motion 
of elements to the place they usually rest is the result of a natural tele-
ological movement, and this means both nature and teleology extend 
to all substances that possess a tendency to change in some consistent 
manner.

 ug  e spe i i n   e  ris e e ns  

25 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 192b12-15.
26 Christopher Byrne argues that the movement of the elements to their 

respective usual places is not driven by a teleology grounded in nature. His 
reasoning is that Aristotle claims the elements will not move teleologically 
if placed in a void, which implies that the teleological motion of the 
elements is not grounded in the substances themselves but in their mutual 
relations. Byrne concludes from this that natural motion refers to physically 
necessary motion (as opposed to teleological motion), and in this he seems 
to stand alone among scholars. I believe this is for good reason, since in 
addition to claiming that teleological motion is not possible in the void, 
Aristotle also says that physically necessary motion is impossible, which 
means one could wage the same critique concerning the non-intrinsic 
character of the type of motion in question against Byrne’s claim that 
physically necessary motion is natural motion. Aristotle’s express point is 
that no motion is possible in a void because all motion requires the ability 
to go, say, up or down, but these categories make no sense in the context of 
a void which lacks a point of reference. Additionally, in the very passage to 
which Byrne refers, Aristotle says that natural motion is prior to all other 
types of motion and makes them possible. Aristotle then says that natural 
motion is not possible in the void because there is neither up nor down. The 

ngu ge  up  n  n  n ur  i n is re e i e  ris e s r er 
discussions of elemental teleological motion (as opposed to physically 
ne ess r  i n  i   e ni i n is n  ire e  r s n  ire i n 
in particular). This implies that teleological motion is in fact natural motion, 
n  p si  ne ess r  i n is s ris e s s e se ere  e ne  s 

the deviation from this natural motion. Christopher Byrne, “Aristotle on 
Physical Necessity and the Limits of Teleological Explanation,” Apeiron 35, 
no. 1 (March 2002): 19–46, https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron.2002.35.1.19. 
Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV.8, 215a1-13.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

nature implicitly shows that most arguments for a restrictive interpre-
tation of teleology fail to adequately account for elemental motion, the 
question still remains why Aristotle puts so much emphasis on biolog-
i  e p es en is ussing n  uses  p ring is issue s  
helps clarify why so many scholars mistakenly restrict the purview 

 n  uses  p n s n  ni s in ris e  espi e e irresis -
ible” conclusion (to use Robert Wardy’s description) that Aristotle 
believes elemental motion is teleologically driven.27 Though certain 
scholars, such as Rich Cameron, have claimed that the constriction of 

n  us i  in ris e  e pure  i gi  sp ere is i e  
 ern u s n erning e eren e  n  us i 28 the 

ubiquity of biological examples in Aristotle’s presentations of teleolo-
gy provides a more generous interpretation of the restrictive teleology 
reading. To see how, one must turn to Physics II.8 where Aristotle ex-
plains that “the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake 
of which.”29 That is to say, wherever a formal cause is present, so too 

i   n  use 30 r urren  purp ses  e re e n e  is is  -
n  uses re s e si  i en i e s r  uses  sin e  n  use 
is present wherever a formal one is. If form is more apparent in plants 
and animals, then it follows that teleology is similarly more obvious in 
these cases. As Joseph Owens explains, the variegated character of the 
cosmos in Aristotle’s thought allows “form to play a proportionately 
greater role in the inanimate, plant, and animal kingdoms respectively, 
with corresponding increase in the obviousness of the teleology.”31 

e pre en e  i gi  e p es in ris e s is ussi n  n  
causality can, therefore, be explained in terms of pedagogical purposes. 
Aristotle uses the examples that are most obvious and easiest to discuss 
to demonstrate his points so as to avoid confusion. The restrictive 
in erpre i n  e e g  in ris e s r s is us re e i e  e 

27 Robert Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of 
Averages,” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 20, https://doi.
org/10.1163/156852893321052433.

28 Cameron, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause,” 153. Cf. Margaret 
Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8,” essay, in Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. David Sedley, vol. 34 (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 149.

29 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a30-32.
30 e re s n ris e es n  ire  i en i  r  n  n  use 

ppe rs  e  r i s e en s n  ere re n  uses  u  sin e 
they are not natural substances, they do not have a form. Final causes, 
therefore, are a broader category than formal causes.

31 Joseph Owens, “Teleology of Nature in Aristotle,” Monist 52, no. 2 (April 
1968): 173, n. 51, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist196852215. Owens rightly 
cites Aristotle’s Meteorology  I 2  0 2 2  n r  is p in



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

Stagirite’s predilection for biological examples, which is grounded in 
his hierarchical ontology of form and matter. This being said, Aristot-
le’s preference for explaining teleology in terms of biological processes 
s u  n  e en  e e usi n  er e s  n  uses  s 
is done by those who support the restrictive interpretation of teleology.

§5: THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC INTERPRETATION OF 
TELEOLOGY
 r n ne  e s  in uen i  presen i n  e n r p -
centric reading of teleology in Aristotle is that of David Sedley. Unlike 
those guilty of anthropomorphism who claim that the world possesses 
some low level of intentionality, Sedley argues that everything (even 
elements devoid of consciousness) in the universe is for the sake of 

n in   is  u ns re e n  use n  en    ings  is 
si  presen i n  e er  re uires n i p r n  u i er  Se e  

correctly notes that Aristotle draws a distinction between two ways 
one thing can be for the sake of something else. This distinction is that 
“between the beneficiary of a process or state of affairs, and its aim or 
object of aspiration.”32 The essence of this distinction is that something 

n e n en  ei er in e sense  eing ene e  r  ing ers 
i i e i se  i  is i  r  es is e  Se e  is e 
to clarify that “Nature is anthropocentric to the extent that man is the 
ultimate beneficiary.”33 If this is true, then Aristotelian teleology would 
not be grounded in the nature of each substance, as I have claimed, but 
in human nature in particular. Sedley’s interpretation, therefore, must 
be dealt with in detail prior to constructing a positive interpretation of 
Aristotle’s teleology grounded in the natures of each substance.

 Sedley presents two main arguments in support of his anthro-
p en ri  re ing  ris e i n e e g  e rs  ng ese is 
simply conveying what Aristotle, himself, explicitly states concern-
ing the issue. At one point, Aristotle claims: “For the arts too make 
their material: some of it they make simpliciter, some of it they make 
workable. And we use it on the ground that everything exists for our 
sake. For we ourselves too are, in one sense, an end.”34 Sedley would, 

 urse  in erpre  e in ne sense   e n in e sense   ene -

32 David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” Phronesis 36, 
no. 2 (1991): 180, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852891321052778.

33 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180.
34 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s 

Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189.



78

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

ciary.35 On this reading, it is hard to ignore the presence of a universal 
anthropocentrism in Aristotle’s thought. Furthermore, in a passage in 
the Politics, Aristotle expresses a similarly broad understanding of the 
scope of entities that are for the sake of mankind:

Hence it is equally clear that we should also suppose that, 
after birth, plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other 
animals for the sake of men — domesticated animals for 
both usefulness and food, and most if not all wild animals 
for food and other assistance, as a source of clothing and 
other utilities. If, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or 
pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for 
the sake of men.36

According to this passage, in virtue of their ability to provide food, 
clothing, and assistance, animals are for the sake of humans. Addition-
ally, plants are for the sake of animals since the former can be eaten by 

e er  n  p n s  in urn  re e ene i ries  e e e en s e g  
er use    er r r i n  us  i  u  see    e 

n ur  r  is in ire  i p i e  in e n r p en ris   n  
causality.

 In addition to direct textual evidence, Sedley also presents an 
argument for his anthropocentric reading on the basis of an oft-dis-
cussed passage concerning the teleology of winter rain. In his refuta-
tion to Empedoclean natural philosophy, which denies the reality of 

n  uses  ris e pr p ses n e i n  is n ie  e  
by his response:

 i u  presen s i se   s u  n  n ure r  n  
for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just 
as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of 
necessity?... Yet it is impossible that this should be the true 
view…. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence 
the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer 

35 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189.
36 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s 

Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. Aristotle’s caveat that it is “most if 
n   i  ni s  re ene i  s u  e ne suspi i us  
how precise Aristotle’s statements of the universality of anthropocentric 
teleology are intended to be.



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

we do; nor heat in summer but only if we have it in winter. 
If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coinci-
dence or for the sake of something, and these cannot be the 
result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must 
be for the sake of something.37

The relevance of this passage is that Aristotle claims winter rain is not 
solely the result of blind mechanical forces; rather, it is for the sake of 
something. Additionally, Aristotle claims that summer rain is attributed 
to chance, since it usually does not rain in the summer in Athens. Sedley 
nicely summarizes his thoughts on this topic: “Clearly, then, he [i.e. 
Aristotle] thinks that winter rainfall is for a purpose, and natural, and 
that it is only summer rainfall that is accidental, and, strictly speaking, 
unnatural.”38 In virtue of this distinction, Sedley is able to claim that the 
spe i  se  e e gi  in er r in   e s  is n  e resu   
water’s movement towards its own natural place (down to the earth).39 
If it were, then rainfall in both the winter and the summer would be 
considered teleological. But, so Sedley claims, Aristotle’s distinction be-
tween winter and summer rain implies that only the former is teleolog-
i  i en is ssu p i n  e n  use  in er r in  nn  
be its proclivity to return to its natural place, Sedley concludes: “It rains 
[in the winter] in order to make the crops grow.”40 The growth of crops, 

 urse  is ene i  r e pe p e pr u ing e  s  is re ing  
ris e s in er r in rgu en  ur er n r s Se e s n r p en-

tric interpretation of teleology.

 When addressing Sedley’s arguments, some problems immedi-
ately arise. For starters, there is a grammatical ambiguity in the Greek of 
the passage Sedley translates as “everything exists for our sake.”41 Sed-
ley acknowledges that the passage is usually rendered in a counterfactu-

37 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 198b17-199a8.
38 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 183.
39 Id., 4  Se e  es i   ris e r s e re i   e e g  

grounded in the movement of elements to their natural places, but he limits 
the scope of this type of causality such that it is not applicable to winter 
r in  I  is un e r  Se e  u  n  r   i  r ins in e in er 
both for the sake of crop growth and for water to reach its natural place or 
that winter rain is solely for the sake of crop growth but winter rain can 
still be for the sake of water attaining its natural place. By ignoring these 
options, Sedley is forced to maintain that summer rain cannot be teleological 
at all, which seems to run up against his concession that the elements can be 
teleologically driven to their natural place.

40 Ibid.
41 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s 

e e g  n r p en ri   e igui  in spe i  is  



80

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

al manner such that Aristotle’s meaning would be “It is as if everything 
e is s r ur s e  u  Se e  r er ipp n  is isses is ern e 
r ns i n  s ing i  us  ere  re e  n in erpre i e pre u i e 42 

Robert Wardy concedes that Sedley’s “grammatical observation is 
correct—so long as one appends the caveat that the construction does 
not preclude the counterfactual reading either,” since the expression 
used “is the ideal Greek construction for not making a commitment.”43 
The issue, therefore, cannot be solved solely at the grammatical level. 
One must interpret the expression in context to determine its meaning. 
Sedley does so, but he fails to appreciate the variety of interpretations 
the passage welcomes. Interpreting Aristotle’s claim in light of the 
broader context concerning the arts, Sedley states that “Aristotle’s clear 
meaning is that the assumption underlying our practices of cooking, 
pottery, sculpture, and all such arts is that the raw materials of those 
r s e e   r n e  s ne  n  e is  r ur ene 44 

But this interpretation is by no means “clear,” or at least this reading 
does not exclude equally clear alternative ones. Indeed, it seems quite 
likely that Aristotle has in mind here that everything exists for our sake 
in e sense  i  is p e  eing ere  r ur ene   ri us 
arts. If, as Sedley suggests, Aristotle believes all things do exist for our 
sake in a direct sense, then the purpose of art becomes unintelligible. 
I  e er ing is n ur  rien e  r s e ene   n in  en 
why do people need to use art to “make workable”45 natural materials? 
Indeed, as shall be further elaborated below, Sedley’s singular failure 
seems to be this underestimation of the importance of art in the Aristo-
e i n s s e  r ing n ur  en i ies ene i  r u ns

 Aristotle’s claim that animals exist for the sake of men, plants 
r e s e  ni s  n  s  n es n  su e  pr e Se e s 

conclusion concerning a universally anthropocentric teleology. Aristo-
e en s e p ss ge ere e r s is see ing  n r p en ri  
e r   n  us i  s s  I  en  n ure es n ing 

incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all 

the construction  plus participle can connote uncertainty. Cf. Wardy, 
“Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 27.

42 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189.
43 Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 27. Emphasis in 

original.
44 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. Emphasis in 

original.
45 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36.



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

for the sake of men.”46 Sedley obviously takes this to mean Aristotle is 
r ing   ings re in  r e s e  n  n  e i -

mediate context does admittedly lend itself to such an interpretation. 
However, Aristotle’s general comments on nature actually require the 
rejection of the conditional’s antecedent, thereby leaving the conclu-
sion dubious. That is to say, Aristotle elsewhere claims that nature 
does make some things incomplete, which means nature does not 
necessarily act for the sake of mankind. That some things in nature are 
incomplete according to Aristotle is manifest in his discussion of the 
need for art, of which he says “generally art in some cases completes 

 n ure nn  ring   nis 47 I  n ure nee s  e nis e  
by art, it follows that nature is in the relevant sense not complete. The 
re e n  sense  n ure s e ien  is  in  pre ise   Se e  
mistakenly claims constitutes the perfection of nature, namely its being 
ene i  r n in  In  ris e s e  re  e i us 

empirical fact that art is often necessary to make natural substances 
useful to mankind, as in the case of the arts of hunting, farming, etc. 
Aristotle’s claim that “[i]f, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or 
pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of 
men”48 must therefore be read in the sense of insofar as nature is com-
plete, it is for the sake of mankind, but this does not exclude the fact 
that the intervention of art is frequently necessary to bring nature to its 
completion.

Finally, Sedley’s use of the winter rainfall example fails 
because it relies on the premise that only winter rain, which is bene-

i   u ns  is e e gi  ere s use ess su er r in is n  
teleological.49 The distinction Aristotle draws between the two types of 
rain, however, is between what is regular and irregular, not teleological 
and non-teleological, and the reason Aristotle employs this distinction 
is because of the dialectical character of the passage. He is trying to 
prove to his Empedoclean objectors that teleology is a real phenome-
non, so he naturally chooses the easiest examples to prove this, and the 
teleology of winter rain is more obvious than summer rain, not because 
it happens for the sake of mankind but because it happens consistently. 
But, as Aristotle clearly believes, water in general consistently returns 

46 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s 
Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180.

47 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a9-19.
48 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s 

Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180.
49 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 183.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

to the ground in virtue of its nature. Though, as a broader metaphysical 
claim, this is harder to prove and would therefore detract from his main 
point. Hence, Aristotle chooses to focus his argument on winter rain in 
spe i

Even if this dialectical reading of Aristotle’s intentions is 
mistaken, Sedley’s interpretation is not only unsupported by Aristotle’s 

ri ings  i  is ire  re u e  Se e  r s ris e s n usi n  
his discussion of winter and summer rainfall: “Therefore action for an 
end is present in things which come to be and are by nature.”50 Aristo-

e us es is es eing  n ur  su s n e s  su ien  n i i n 
for being teleological. Since Sedley wishes to say that summer rain-
fall, which does not aid in crop growth and is therefore not helpful to 
mankind, is not teleological, Sedley is therefore forced to maintain that 
summer rainfall is “unnatural.” However, as Monte Ransome Johnson 
has observed, “rainfall is not a substance,”51 which means it does not 
possess a nature at all. On the other hand, “[w]ater is a substance, and 
so it can be teleologically explained.”52 This means that, given that 
teleology applies to all natural substances, if winter rainfall qua water 
is su e   n  us i  s   su er r in  u  er us  e 
teleological. Aristotle’s metaphysics does not allow for the division 
Sedley attempts to introduce when he claims that winter rain is natural 
and therefore teleological, but summer rain is unnatural and therefore 
n  sus ep i e  n  uses  er is e n ure   r in  reg r ess 
of when it falls, so all rainfall insofar as it is water must be teleological. 
Since water must be treated as an irreducible category when discussing 
i s re i n  n  uses  Se e  nn  i   er s  e 
is for the sake of mankind, since his whole argument presupposes that 
 er in pe  er  n e  su er r in  is n  ene i  r 

people. One is thus left wondering what is the true end of water, and 
this raises the more general question of to what are all natural sub-
stances teleologically oriented. Answering this question will require a 
full elaboration of an interpretation of teleology in Aristotle’s works as 
grounded in the natures of substances.

§6: THE NATURAL INTERPRETATION OF TELEOLOGY
 Several lines of evidence converge on the conclusion that, for 
Aristotle, teleology is grounded in the nature of each particular type of 

50 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a1-8.
51 Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 156.
52 Ibid.



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A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology

substance. The notion that nature is the driving force behind Aristot-
le’s teleology is apparent in the opening line of Physics 2.8, where he 
states that “Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake 
of something.”53 Nature, as has already been established, refers to the 
totality of the nature of substances, ranging from the dirt below to the 
stars above, and all the organisms in between. Though Aristotle seems 
to identify nature as a subclass within the broader category of causes 
for the sake of something, his additional indirect statements concerning 

e re i n e een n  uses n  n ure re e   e er n-
s i u e e ri   e r er  e n  er pe  n  uses  

i  re en is en  en s e p r ig   n  us i  
in Aristotle, are the arts. Artistic creativity is not central to Aristotle’s 
understanding of teleology. This notion has already been implicitly 
demonstrated in the refutation of the biological interpretation of teleol-
g  i  p si s  in en i n i  is e essen e  n  us i n r 

Aristotle. Since the totality of biological organisms does not exhaust 
e s pe  en i ies su e   n  uses  i  s  r i ri  

artistic creativity, a very narrow type of animal intentionality, does not 
pr i e  su ien  pre ensi e e   un ers n  ris e s 

e r   n  uses   e ns r e  i  is n ure  s pp se   
e r s  i  s e en r  p e ng ris e s n  uses  

i  i  e ne ess r   ser e pre ise   e e ie es e  re n  
causes at all.

 ris e s i en i i n  n ure n  r  i p ies  n -
tures are the ends in the fullest sense of the term. This comes out most 
clearly in Physics II.8: “And since nature is twofold, the matter and the 
form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake 
of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake 
of which.”54 ere  s e s s e se ere  ris e r s  n ure 
can be spoken of as either the matter of something or as its form. Na-
ture, however, is more properly spoken of as form because “a thing is 
more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when 
it exists potentially.”55 Whereas matter has the potential to take on all 
s r s  i eren  s pes  r  is  gi es e ni i n  er n  
makes it what it is. Hence, the nature of a substance is in the strictest 
sense i en i   i s r  i en e i en i i n  r  n  n ure  
it becomes clear that nature is for the sake of which things exist, since 

53 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 198b10-16. Cf. Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in 
Aristotle’s Physics 2.8,” 152-154.

54 Id., 199a25-33.
55 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 193b7-12.



84

Aristotle clearly states that form is the end towards which substances 
s ri e  ur er re  e ire  i en i es n ure u  r  s  n  
cause. Since the form is the actualization and therefore perfection of 
matter, all matter in a natural substance is for the sake of its nature 
qua form. Contrary to the restrictive interpretations of Aristotelian 
e e g  i  re uire  i r ni  e e p en  r s  n  en  

such that the end is only achieved at the very end of a process (e.g. a 
baby moose is for the sake of the adult moose that will not emerge in 
i e un i  e rs er  ris e r s  in e  n  e er  en  

matter is wholly striving for its form in all substances.

 If Aristotle really does believe that teleology refers to the ac-
tualization of a substance’s nature, then it is unclear why he insists on 
using the seemingly anthropomorphic language of actions performed 
“for the sake of” some “end.” This problem is resolved, however, 
when one realizes that for Aristotle, in order for something to qualify 
as an end, it must be good. More precisely, Aristotle argues that each 
substance has its own particular good. For example, in the chap-
ter immediately preceding the winter rainfall example, he explains 
something can count as an end “because it is better thus (not without 
u i i n  u  i  re eren e  e su s n e in e  se 56 

Monte Ransome Johnson sums up the implications of this and several 
similar remarks made throughout the Aristotelian corpus: “The good 

i  e e gi  e p n i ns e re eren e  is spe i   e 
natural kind being explained. The good is not the same for all kinds 

 ings  r s es  ir s  n  p n s n   en i n s rs  e e en s  
households, cities, etc.).”57

Finally, a clearer image of Aristotle’s conception of teleology 
emerges. All substances possess a nature, which is an internal prin-
ciple of motion and rest. These natures are what allow substances to 
move to their respective ends, which vary according to the substance 
in question. In moving towards these ends, substances are moving 
towards their nature qua form, which is their actuality. When this 
full actuality is obtained, a nature qua principle of rest is in a state 
of full actualization, and the being has reached its perfection, both in 
the sense of completion and goodness. Because of the intrinsic moral 
character of these natural ends, Aristotle speaks appropriately when 
he says that non-conscious entities act for the sake of ends, just as 

56 Aristotle, Physics II.7, 198b8-9.
57 Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 278.



85Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

human beings always seek out their own good and perfection.

§7: CONCLUSION
 It is certainly easier to see the problems with alternative 
interpretations of Aristotle’s conception of teleology in retrospect. For 
e p e  ris e s i   n  uses re  r er eg r   
encompasses all formal causes shows that the former is not reducible 
to the latter. None of those who promote a reductionistic interpretation 

 n  uses in ris e i   r  uses re re u i e  n  
er pe  use  en e  ins r s n  uses re r  uses 

n  e en e ee  e  n  us i  si i r  nn  e re u e  
to any other mode of causation. With respect to the claim that natural 
substances capable of teleological explanation are merely coextensive 
with biological organisms, this is patently untenable in light of the 

e p si  un i n  n  uses in e u i   r s  Sin e 
teleology is the movement of a substance’s nature to its form, any 
entity with an internal principle of motion-oriented towards a consis-
en  g  en  is su e   n  uses  r ris e  is in u es n  

only plants and animals but also the elements, which reach their fullest 
actuality when in their natural places. Revisiting Sedley’s anthropo-
centric interpretation, one can see that making mankind the end of all 
substances ignores Aristotle’s claim that the good towards which each 
su s n e s ri es is spe i    in   su s n e  e es  re u -
tion of these rival theories is therefore the establishment of Aristotle’s 
actual view that teleology is grounded in substance’s natural movement 

r s pre e ne  en s

 It is understandable why so many scholars wish to propose 
alternative solutions to the problem of teleology in Aristotle. His un-
derstanding of causality can seem foreign and even paradoxical. After 
all, in Aristotle’s account, nature is both the principle of motion and 
the form towards which this principle strives. But this paradox ought 
n   e i e  s ris e pen  r s i  ure in e sense 
of a coming-to-be proceeds towards nature.”58 For Aristotle, nature is 
in some sense self-transcending, such that it is both what strives and 
what is striven after. This is part of his answer to the question, which 
plagued earlier Greek philosophers: How is change possible at all? Any 
non-paradoxical answer to this question runs the risk of creating either 
a static universe of eternal forms or an unintelligible world of matter 

58 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 193b13.



86

moving about randomly. If we are to take Aristotle’s metaphysics and 
the philosophical tradition he inherited seriously at all, therefore, we 
must make a central place for his account of teleology grounded in the 
natures of substances.



87Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

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