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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

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άν

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KANT'S RACIAL AND MORAL THEORIES
The Importance of a Teleological  Perspective 

 LAUREN TOENSING 

INTRODUCTION
It is often observed that the works of Immanuel Kant contain many propagations 
of racist and prejudiced beliefs, which seem to have been sincerely held by Kant 
himself. !ere is currently a large and growing body of scholarly work engaging with 
this fact: some authors have demonstrated his role in the development of scienti"c 
race theory in the 18th and 19th centuries; others are investigating the connections 
between these racist beliefs and other aspects of Kant’s thought; and still others are 
investigating what a serious engagement with Kant’s apparently racist positions might 
reveal about the rest of his work. As an example of the latter, read John Harfouch’s 
recent book, Another Mind-Body Problem. At its core, this essay is also attempting 
to understand Kant’s prejudiced beliefs in the context of his whole system of thought, 
both as it is situated in history and in its contemporary philosophical applications.

In particular, one short excerpt from Kant’s 1795 essay “Towards a Perpetual Peace” 
has been at the center of a debate about how Kant’s racism interacts with his political 
and moral theories. !is quotation, given in the “!ird de"nitive article”, reads:

If one compares with [the right of hospitality] the inhospitable behavior of 
the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, 
the injustice that the latter show when visiting foreign lands and peoples 
(which to them is one and the same as conquering those lands and peoples) 
takes on terrifying proportions… they brought in foreign troops under the 
pretext of merely intending to establish trading posts… they introduced 



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the oppression of the native inhabitants, the incitement of the di#erent 
states involved to expansive wars, famine, unrest, faithlessness, and the 
whole litany of evils that weigh upon the human species.1

A piece that has been highly controversial in this debate is a 2014 essay published 
by Pauline Kleingeld, in which she argues that Kant “radically changed his mind” 
on race.2 She bases most of her argument on an interpretation of “Perpetual Peace”, 
including the above quotation, that has Kant declaring people of color to be 
legitimate citizens of independent nations that demand the same respect as “civilized” 
or European nations. !is argument failed to convince many Kant scholars of what 
would have been a late-life change of heart. In response, many have tried to "nd 
other explanations for the apparent contradiction that Kleingeld points out in 
“Perpetual Peace.” One notable objection to Kleingeld’s piece is Lucy Allais’s “Kant’s 
Racism,” which argues that Kleingeld overemphasizes the notability of Kant’s critique 
of colonialism. Allais maintains instead that Kant was, in the end, consistently racist 
and that the contradictions in his universalist moral and political theories can be 
attributed to “cognitive de"ciencies” common to racists interested in creating a 
manufactured congruence between their racist and moral beliefs.3

Despite reaching opposite conclusions, both of these essays seem to view Kant’s 
racism as a basically psychological phenomenon that preexists and is separable from 
the development of his larger philosophical system. However, their insistence that 
racist attitudes necessarily generate contradictions ignores the possibility that Kant’s 
racial thought might be, in fact, entirely valid—even if also personally comfortable—
within his system of thought. I think it is clear that the Anthropology is not a 
peripheral text, as these arguments imply, and that the arguments and observations 
Kant puts forth in his non-critical works should not be dismissed as less important 
than or tangential to his a priori works. In this essay, I argue that Kleingeld and Allais’s 
arguments are unsatisfactory because they fail to adequately prioritize the teleology 
ubiquitous in Kant’s thinking when comparing his ethical and empirical work relating 
to race. Ultimately, I demonstrate that, while there may be apparent contradictions 
in Kant’s moral system regarding human di#erence, these contradictions are more 
easily accommodated for when viewed through the lens of his teleology, which unites 
his entire philosophy.

1 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Essay, in Toward Perpetual Peace and Other 
Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, edited by Pauline Kleingeld, translated by Jeremy Waldron, Michael W. 
Doyle, Allen W. Wood, and David L. Colclasure, 67–109, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 82.

2 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second !oughts on Colonialism,” essay, in Kant and Colonialism: Historical and 
Critical Perspectives, edited by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi, 43–67, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 
573.

3 Lucy Allais, “Kant’s Racism,” Philosophical Papers 45, no. 1-2 (2016): 1–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2
016.1199170, 30.



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"IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A 
COSMOPOLITAN  AIM" AND KANT'S TELEOLOGY 
Some of Kant’s most explicitly teleological thinking can be found in his philosophy of 
history. In his essay “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”, Kant’s 
view of history and his moral theory are engaged in a dialogue, and this complicated 
dialogue produces an interpretative di$culty for readers seeking to reconcile it with 
the rest of his work. In this section, I will discuss the relationship between reason, 
ethics, and teleological history, and demonstrate (A) the primacy of the history to 
Kant’s work and (B) the importance of viewing Kant’s moral theory through that 
teleological lens. I begin by discussing the role of teleology in “Idea for a Universal 
History”, and demonstrating that Kant’s belief in a purposed humanity underlies 
each of his major claims about the progression of history. !en, I investigate how 
this teleological sense of progress interacts with Kant’s de"nitions of rational human 
nature and perfection. !ese investigations lead to the conclusion that, for Kant, 
a state of human moral perfection is not yet realized, and can only be realized 
through cultural progress. Such a state of humanity, it will be observed, is necessarily 
hierarchical. !is hierarchical structure, it will be argued, o#ers an internal buttress 
and place for Kant’s racism.

!e opening line to “Universal History” reads: “Whatever concept of the freedom 
of the will one may develop in the context of metaphysics, the appearances of the 
will, human actions, are determined, like every other natural event, in accordance 
with universal natural laws”.4 Although “individual human beings and even whole 
nations” act according to their own free wills, the set of possibilities upon which 
they exercise their will is not determined by them. Observable human actions are no 
more than appearances of individual human wills, the freedom of which is realized 
only within certain bounds—namely, those set by the will of nature.5 !us, each free 
human action is merely participating in some larger history bounded by nature’s will, 
and all human actions over time direct themselves toward “the ultimate destiny of the 
human race”.6 With this, Kant immediately provides a limit through which human 
behavior—and its potential moral value—can and should be understood, which is 
the destiny coded into his predispositions.

Another aspect of Kant’s teleology exempli"ed in “Universal History” is its 
relationship to the Principle of Su$cient Reason, which informs many of Kant’s 
most basic philosophical claims. !e "rst proposition is as follows:

All natural predispositions of a creature are determined sometime to develop 
themselves completely and purposively. With all animals, external as well 

4 Wood and Kant, “Universal History”, 108.
5 Nature’s will is functionally the same for Kant as the will of God, and thus can also be understood as perfectly 

good.
6 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 252.



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as internal or analytical observation con"rms this. An organ that is not to 
be used, an arrangement that does not attain to its end, is a contradiction 
in the teleological doctrine of nature. For if we depart from that principle, 
then we no longer have a lawful nature but a purposelessly playing nature; 
and desolate chance takes the place of the guideline of reason.7

!e Principle of Su$cient Reason asserts that every true phenomenon must have 
a su$cient reason or cause to justify its truth.8 !is proposition implies that all 
observable biological phenomena must contribute to or result from some greater 
intentional goal of nature, or else they are absurd. It can be seen, then, that in a 
world according to reason, a thing cannot exist without a telos, or some "nal purpose. 
History, of course, is not exempt from this. Although the actual purpose of human 
history seems impossible to discover, Kant is con"dent that some guideline running 
through history should exist, and that philosophers should search for it.9,10 Most 
importantly, Kant believes that the best way to "nd this path is through the analysis 
of human predispositions, and their pointing toward some ultimate destiny of 
humanity. !at is to say, Kant believes that insofar as nature and telos intimately 
inform one another, adequate analysis of the predispositions given to us by our 
nature will elucidate our telos.

One of these predispositions, which receives the most mention in “Universal History”, 
is the capacity for reason. For Kant, reason is the foundation of all moral laws, and 
the human capacity for reason is what allows us to function as moral agents.11 Kant 
de"nes human beings as simultaneously causal and sensible creatures, meaning that, 
though they possess the ability to act autonomously—according to their free will and 
reason—they are also always bound by the laws of nature.12 !is duality of nature 
is what drives the tension between human actions as they tend to be versus how 
they ought to be. While human beings cannot behave as purely rational beings, they 
also “do not behave merely instinctively”;13 thus, it is possible for an individual to 
act according to pure reason, even if it would be unreasonable to expect them to 
do so at all times and for all actions. !is concept helps clarify how Kant views the 
development of reason in the human being: it is not that reason itself increases across 

7 Wood and Kant, “Universal History”, 109.
8 !is is the Leibnizian formulation of the Principle, which was put forth in Monadology.
9 Wood and Kant, “Universal History,” 118.
10 Importantly, Kant does end this paper with a deference to historians and empirical evidence, indicating that 

he considers his propositions to be “up for debate”, in some sense. However, I think it is also reasonable to 
assume that this sort of evidence would have to be pretty massive for him to accept its criticism, especially 
because so many of the fundamental implications of these propositions are based on knowledge that Kant uses 
as a basis for other a priori thought. I would think, perhaps, that the argument put forward in proposition 4 
about the antagonism willed by nature in human beings is one that is “more” up-for-debate than that presented 
in proposition 1, which is more of an analytic statement based on Kant’s undisputed belief in biological 
predispositions. !us, I interpret this statement to mean that Kant is less sure of the application of nature’s will 
and its speci"c processes than the idea that nature has a will, and that it exercises that will on human society.

11 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
12  Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
13 Wood and Kant, “Universal History,” 108.



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generations, or that its capacity necessarily di#ers between individuals, but that the 
laws of nature simply hold people back from exercising their capacity for reason in its 
fullest and most pure form.

!e fourth proposition continues this line of thought in its analysis of how human 
beings actually exercise their capacity for reason. Kant admits that the use of reason 
is not instinctual for human beings, and that it needs “attempts, practice, and 
instruction” in order to progress from stage to stage, and from a mere predisposition 
embedded in human nature to a fully realized capacity.14 Furthermore, Kant argues 
that full realization of this capacity in the individual is impossible; perfect reason will 
only be exercised in a perfect human society, which still contains imperfect human 
wills and inclinations, only now with a structure of knowledge and instruction that 
can help individuals learn how to best exercise their reason.15,16 Even more so, an 
individual’s ability to act morally is inseparable from their cultural context and its 
own moral-rational development. Since reason is the tool for moral action, they 
cannot develop into a perfect moral agent, and should not be expected to do so. Due 
to this, it is important to consider the sociopolitical state of the world when looking 
at ethics from a pragmatic perspective: although the moral actions of individuals 
shouldn’t be expected to always be"t the present state of development, it seems there 
is good reason, from Kant’s perspective, to think that prescriptive ethical suggestions 
should take this into account to be most e#ective.17

Kant’s work regarding humanity does not admit the possibility of things being as 
they are simply because they are, demonstrated by his unquestioned acceptance of 
both a teleological perspective and the Principle of Su$cient Reason. !e Principle 
of Su$cient Reason establishes that human di#erence cannot be arbitrary, and the 
existence of a highest state of humanity, which mirrors the highest state of man 
as an individual, establishes that these di#erences exist on a spectrum of moral 
value. In propositions 5, 6 and 7, Kant describes the concept that the only path 
towards moralization of the species is the development of a “civil society”, which 
follows certain internal and external political rules that are best suited towards the 
development of man’s free will and his capacity for reason.18 One major consequence 
of this idea, that a complete development of reason can occur only on a societal scale, 
is that reason is directly tied to culture. Just as the individual can fail in instances of 
reason, and is even expected to, so can a society. 

14 Wood and Kant, “Universal History,” 109.
15 Wood and Kant, “Universal History.”
16 Kant, Lectures on Ethics.
17  I base this interpretation in part o# Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, in which he asserts that there is some value to 

pragmatic judgements and that actions according to pragmatism can be good (even if they are not morally pure), 
and also on Kant’s argument for the role of warfare and “disagreeability” in “Universal History”: although he 
would presumably consider many aspects of warfare to be morally wrong, the development of culture cannot 
happen without it, which gives it an overall teleological goodness.

18 Wood and Kant, “Universal History,” 112.



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Here, the link between teleology and anthropology becomes vital to understanding 
the meaning of Kant’s history: culture has the distinct power to lock its people 
into certain states of existence if they do not appropriately exercise their capacities. 
!is happens through an undescribed metaphysical process that entirely stops the 
development of speci"c capacities, or “seeds”.19 Furthermore, the development 
of this capacity can be completely stopped: when this happens regarding reason, 
a manifestation of human culture is completely locked out of participation in 
humanity’s "nal destiny.20 A society that stops men from using reason stops men 
from being men. So, for Kant, it is of vital importance that human beings live in a 
culture that appropriately develops and instructs them toward the moral ideal, even if 
it does not instruct them perfectly, in order to move the whole of humanity forward. 
!e seed must not be locked away.

Inherent in a call for forward movement is the claim that it is better to be closer to 
an ideal than farther from it. By establishing the development of reason as the one 
good path for humanity, Kant demonstrates that a hierarchy is fundamental to his 
vision of human development. An object simply must evolve toward something, 
since that something is already determined by another thing outside of the object 
itself. Furthermore, that something contains a moral worth, also determined 
externally. !us, there have to be developments of human predispositions— which 
are now inextricably linked to manifestations of human culture— that are simply 
closer to the goal than others. !is is the perfect breeding ground for hierarchical 
prejudices to %ourish, exactly how we see in Kant’s thought.21 Fundamentally, Kant’s 
form of racism— although searching for some biological justi"cation— is a cultural 
racism, and he ultimately sees race as a physical manifestation of a people’s culturally 
conditioned capacities.

 It is not necessary that this hierarchy be expressed as racism and sexism, the way Kant 
does; nevertheless, such an expression makes sense in the context of the predominant 
beliefs in Kant’s time. He was racist before he conceived of this teleological world, 
and he made no e#ort to escape this racism at any point; rather, he simply developed 
a system that worked in accordance with the beliefs he already held. !is can also 
be seen in Kant’s ethical system in the context of what exactly he de"nes as moral 
goodness. It is not necessarily the case that a teleological perspective will lead to the 
conclusion of a reason-based moral goodness, like Kant’s, but it again makes sense 
in the context of Kant’s other beliefs and those who in%uenced him that it would 
develop in this way. Overall, although none of these concepts rely on each other, 

19 Wood and Kant, “Universal History.”
20 Immanuel Kant, “On the Di#erent Races of Human Beings,” essay, in Anthropology, History, and Education, 

translated by Zöller Günter and Robert B. Louden, 82–97, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 
86-87.

21 !is is also evidenced in his proposition that all men must have a master, even though that master is a man who 
also needs a master. !is is related to his political beliefs, and is also seen in the relationship between government 
and citizen that he puts forward in “What is Enlightenment?”.



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it is better supported in the text to understand Kant’s racism and Kant’s ethics as 
developed through a teleological lens, rather than through some other prevenient 
and incompatible bias, because the teleology can be found to entail in itself the basic 
assumptions that Kant’s work operates upon, whether those be religious inclinations, 
prejudices, or even value judgements. It is not that any of these beliefs precede each 
other in time, but rather that Kant’s idea that a purpose to humanity not only goes 
unquestioned but is necessary to explain why these other previous beliefs are correct, 
that proves the higher importance of teleology to Kant’s system than his concepts 
that are explained through it.22

THE IMPORTANCE OF TELEOLOGY TO THE 
REALATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
!e given assertion that Kant’s system of thought is a teleological one is hardly 
controversial—after all, he makes frequent explicit references to teleology and 
purpose across many of his critical and non-critical works. However, I argue that 
the importance of these teleological views should take precedence as the underlying 
ideology to Kant’s system of thought. I have established the importance of these 
teleological principles to Kant’s moral theory and its relationship to his theory of 
history; in this section, I explain how these principles also underlie the relationships 
between the di#erent parts within Kant’s ethical system. In Kant’s ethics, teleological 
principles determine not only the methodology by which ethical thought should 
occur, but also serves as the actual source of moral value. 

A central characteristic of Kant’s ethics is its division into two distinct parts. 
In the Groundwork, Kant de"nes ethics as a study of freedom and the laws “to 
which [freedom] is subject”; from this, ethics is divided into an empirical part, 
called anthropology, and a rational part, called moral theory.2324 More speci"cally, 
anthropology is de"ned as a “science of the subjective laws of the free will”, and moral 
theory as a science of the objective.25 For Kant, moral theory and anthropology must 
also be preceded by a pure metaphysics derived from a priori principles— speci"cally, 
the pure principles of a good will— in order to contain any real epistemological 
value.26 !is metaphysics of morals is determined by the nature of human beings as 
being both rational and causal beings, and thus Kant posits that it would be equally 
valid for any other non-human being that also has rational cognition.27 Because 

22 !e necessity in this claim comes from Kant’s adherence to the Principle of Su$cient Reason.
23 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 3.
24 For the purposes of this paper, I will only use these particular terms to describe this division, in order to 

accommodate for translation inconsistencies across Kant’s works.
25 Kant et. al., Lectures on Ethics, 3.
26 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
27 For Kant, a rational creature possesses reason and acts accordingly, not just to instinct; a causal creature recognizes 

themselves as being actors in the world.



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these qualities are pure and non-empirical, a moral theory built upon them can be 
considered a priori and universal. Using this a priori moral theory, philosophers 
should then be able to derive prescriptive, universal moral laws for all rational 
creatures including human beings.

!e basis on which Kant’s metaphysics of morals is built is the concept of the free 
will and its predicates, which all rational-causal beings possess. Kant understands free 
will in Man to be inseparable from his nature as a rational being, who ascribes his 
judgment to his reason rather than to an “impulse”.28 So, in doing a metaphysics of 
morals, one must engage with the idea of reason in its purest form; this is what Kant 
does in the Groundwork, as well as in the later Metaphysics of Morals. However, as 
was shown in the previous section, human behavior only rarely seems to be guided by 
pure reason. !e possession of the faculty of reason by human beings is not subject 
to improvement, but the ability to exercise it appropriately is. If one took human 
society as existing in some kind of “state” of reason, the highest of which would have 
all individuals ruled purely by their reason and acting only according to duty, then 
it would be clear that humanity does not currently exist in this state. Furthermore, 
the world of behavior that Kant describes through his analysis of pure reason must 
be understood as an ideal, and not easily accessible to human beings who must also 
contend with the sensible half of their nature.

In Kant’s philosophy of a universal history, it is clearly established that human nature 
will hold back individual agents from moral perfection. In Universal History, he 
writes:

In the human being … those predispositions whose goal is the use of 
his reason were to develop completely only in the species, but not in the 
individual. Reason in a creature is a faculty of extending the rules and aims 
of the use of all its powers far beyond natural instinct, and it knows no 
boundaries to its projects.29

!is is due "rst to the fact that human beings are animals, and thus have inclinations, 
and second to the fact that they have a free will with which to follow whichever 
inclinations they desire.30 Man’s capacity for reason makes him capable of acting 
according to duty, but at the same time it is unrealistic to expect him always to do so. 
Despite the powers of reason beyond nature, man’s actual understanding and actions 
will always be limited by his sensible nature and inclinations.

Despite this, Kant does maintain that it is possible for human beings as a society 
to learn to exercise their reason in such a way that they can achieve a state of 

28 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 58.
29 Wood and Kant, “Universal History,” 109.
30 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.



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moral perfection.31 Although the Groundwork focuses mostly on individual 
actions (maxims), the principles that a morally worthy maxim must ascribe to 
are fundamentally social: the Categorical Imperative demands consistency across 
individuals and situations, and thus it makes sense that Kant would see moral actions 
as easier in a moral society than an immoral one. So, Kant’s metaphysics of morals 
describes what moral value looks like for both individual actions and on a societal 
scale: all individuals must be seen as ends in themselves, and only societies and 
actions that adhere to this principle have real moral value. !is becomes possible 
when both are governed by pure reason. !e case of the individual is di#erent: he is a 
participant in society, and his actions can either be moral or immoral, but he cannot 
ever be ruled exclusively by his reason; he cannot himself have perfect moral worth, 
even if he tends to act according to duty. However, the more perfect his society is, 
the more easily he can exercise his reason without interference, and act according to 
consistent and duty-based maxims.

Finally, the process of human moralization culminates in Kant’s emphasis on the 
necessity of moral instruction. Kant’s discussion of moral instruction provides the 
clearest understanding of his view of a perfect moral state of humanity in his work 
and demonstrates the manner by which the capacity for reason and good moral 
action operates. For Kant, virtue is not inherent, and also cannot be learned through 
examples; knowledge of virtue must be taught to individuals through the moral 
rule of duty, and only then will the individual have the necessary knowledge to live 
in best accordance with it.32 In this way, it is easy to see the progression of moral 
development in a society: the instructor has knowledge of moral truths, and passes 
on this knowledge to his students. In turn, his students have the time and knowledge 
to use their own reason to build upon and re"ne this knowledge, gradually increasing 
the moral capabilities of each generation.33 Each individual will have to “actively 
struggle” against his instincts to “make himself worthy of humanity”, but the state 
of moral knowledge has no inclinations and will continue to develop in the memory 
of a society until it "nally reaches truth.34,35 At this point, the instructed members 
of said society are still wrestling against their human nature, but they have the real 
a priori knowledge that they need in order to act as perfectly and virtuously as their 
nature allows them.

!is is the point at which it is crucial to classify Kant’s racism as a cultural racism 
rather than phenotypic (i.e., inherently tied to skin color). !e development of 
the races is inseparable from cultural development, as demonstrated, and the 
fundamentally cultural nature of the realization of human beings’ predispositions 

31 Kant, “Lectures on Ethics.”
32 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
33 Wood and Kant, “Universal History.”
34 Kant et. al., Lectures on Ethics, 252.
35 Immanuel Kant, “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” essay, in Anthropology, History and Education, 

translated by Zöller Gunter and Robert B. Louden, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 420.



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marks culture as the basic determiner of racial di#erentiation. Kant, as many of 
his Enlightenment contemporaries, is particularly interested in reason, and thus 
the cultural development of reason exists at the forefront of his analysis of the 
development of the species as a whole. Outlined in “Universal History”, there are two 
paths of development that are available to mankind: "rst, there is one ordained by 
nature and evident in his predispositions, which strive towards the ideal application 
of reason; and there is another which happens if man fails to develop this reason 
in the species— if we “allow nature unfettered sway, the result is savagery.”36 Kant 
holds that there are “savage” people existing in the world, and he de"nes them by 
their failure to exercise their capacity for reason.37 At the same time, he has faith in 
the Enlightenment and the possibility of an ideal humanity, which he sees existing 
in the culture of Europeans.38 If this group continues to exercise their reason, and in 
a su$ciently good way, then they will bring about a world in which it is possible for 
them to live according to pure moral laws. In his more pragmatic writings on what 
people or political groups ought to do in the real world, Kant’s apparent deviations 
from the categorical imperative make sense if one assumes that, even though the 
Enlightenment is the correct path towards perfection, it may not yet be possible to 
live in true accordance with the ideal principles of moral theory.

Ultimately, all of these factors come together to demonstrate the teleological basis of 
Kant’s ethics. Just as Kant argues in the Groundwork that the actions of some agent 
who acts morally according to some impulse or natural inclination contain less moral 
value than one who does so purely out of duty, the moral state of all of humanity 
holds value because it must be achieved through rational moral cognition. If human 
inclinations and desires were compulsively moral, like the divine will seems tobe, then 
they would be devoid of any real moral worth.39 It is not only that man is destined 
to achieve moral perfection, but that he “is destined to achieve his fullest perfection 
through his own freedom”, making that perfection in"nitely more worthy.40 So, 
man’s destiny cannot be untangled from the very qualities that allow him to pursue 
moral worth; functionally, the possibility of perfect moral worthiness is the same as 
the predisposition to achieve it. !is concept creates a slightly di#erent framework 
by which to understand the relationship between anthropology and moral theory 
for Kant: while universal moral theory describes the ideal, that which ought to be, 
this ought is only meaningful because of the limits placed upon it by what is, i.e., 
anthropology. 

In describing the possibility of universal practical philosophy, Kant writes that 
“[ethics and anthropology] are closely connected, and the former cannot subsist 

36 Kant et. al., Lectures on Ethics, 249.
37 Kant, “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,” 60.
38 Kant, “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.”
39 Kant et. al., Lectures on Ethics.
40 Kant et. al., Lectures on Ethics, 252, emphasis mine.



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without the latter”— no study of what man is capable of can be correctly done 
without an idea of what man is.41 While the universal moral imperatives of practical 
philosophy should not change, as they are contained in complete predispositions, the 
"ndings of anthropology can change as man develops and re"nes his nature towards 
something closer to the ideal. Finding meaning in a struggle towards something 
against what is is a distinctly teleological way to de"ne meaning, and thus Kant’s 
system of ethics is teleological—not necessarily because it is founded on explicitly 
teleological claims, but because its de"nition of value is one that constantly posits an 
eventual ideal against what is real. It is precisely this value that matters in the cultural 
hierarchy that Kant’s racism is built upon: since culture is moralized, it holds relative 
value; since people are constrained by what their culture instructs, that relative value 
is passed on to them.

THE NECESSITY OF A TELEOLOGY!FIRST FRAMEWORK 
IN INTERPRETATION OF KANT'S MORAL WRITINGS 
From the above discussion, it should be evident that Kant’s teleological approach 
to understanding human history and human nature underlies his assumptions in 
both his ethical thought and his work in anthropology. With this established, should 
also be clear that interpretation of Kant’s moral and anthropological thought should 
always be done with resepct to the centrality of his teleological impulse. Within this 
discussion, the particular debate surrounding Pauline Kleingeld’s claim in her essay 
“Kant’s Second !oughts on Race” that Kant abandoned— or at least lessened— his 
racist views somewhere in the 1780s or 1790s stands out as particularly interesting, 
and also particularly fruitless.42 Kleingeld interprets Kant’s anti-colonial statement 
in “Perpetual Peace” as an explicit rejection of racism. But shouldn’t a racist person, 
especially one who had previously supported colonial actions on other continents, 
have an interest in defending the national rights of those he deems inferior? Leaning 
heavily on this interpretation of “Perpetual Peace”, Kleingeld attempts— but 
ultimately fails— to produce a temporal account of Kant’s personal prejudices in 
order to account for the presumed contradiction.

In my reading, Kleingeld fails to produce a satisfactory account of Kant’s contradictions 
due to her interpretation of “Perpetual Peace” as a fundamentally moral document 
and her con"dence that Kant’s racial and moral theories are ultimately incompatible. 
While she fully accepts that Kant “did defend a racial hierarchy until at least the 
end of the 1780s,” she views his later assertion in “Perpetual Peace” that nations of 
color are deserving of equal “hospitality” as a complete reversal of that hierarchy.4344 

41 Kant et. al., Lectures on Ethics, 2.
42 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second !oughts on Colonialism,” essay, in Kant and Colonialism: Historical and 

Critical Perspectives, edited by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi, 43–67, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
43 Kleingeld, “Second !oughts,” 575.
44 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 82.



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Fundamentally, this interpretation asserts that Kant’s Anthropology and other racist 
claims are essential, and incompatible with his universalist moral theory in that they 
restrict moral humanity from non-white peoples. !us, if nations of color can be 
recognized as sovereign nations, they must no longer be restricted from humanity, 
meaning Kant must have changed his mind.45 However, in the very same paper that 
Kleingeld heralds as evidence of Kant’s changed views, he writes that Europeans “view 
with great disdain the way in which savages cling to their lawless freedom.”46 !is 
indicates that the place of race theory in “Perpetual Peace” may be more complex 
than Kleingeld’s interpretation, which can be understood through the teleological 
principles that I have discussed.

Firstly, “Perpetual Peace” is certainly a pragmatic document— its maxims work 
towards the end of having peace, which does exclude it from being a work of pure 
moral principles.47 It also can be seen as potential evidence of a step forward for 
humanity’s moral development; whereas the “Universal History” suggests a purpose 
to war in the process of civilizing man, “Perpetual Peace” calls for a new era in history 
that prioritizes rational and Enlightened interaction between peoples. It maintains the 
exact teleological principles that I described in Section 1— one could even say that it 
functions as part of the pragmatic moral and political instruction that Kant believes 
will lead to the full moral development of humanity. !is also explains the somewhat 
vague relationship the essay has with non-white societies: they are less developed than 
European society, even worthy of disdain, mirroring the exact cultural development 
of predispositions in “Universal History”; simultaneously, non-white nations are still 
equally equatable to an end as more-civilized European nations, which maintains the 
moral rule.48 When the teleological principles are applied, the presence or absence of 
racial hierarchy in “Perpetual Peace” becomes irrelevant, which signi"cantly weakens 
Kleingeld’s argument.

On the other side of the debate, Allais argues against Kleingeld’s interpretation of 
the meaning of “Perpetual Peace” in regards to his racism, viewing her evidence as 
too weak and citing the fact that Kant still published his deeply racist Anthropology 
into the 1790s as proof that he could not have changed his opinion so much as to 
disagree with those claims. Allais argues instead that Kant’s inconsistencies simply are 
inconsistencies, and that this makes sense in the context of the psychological e#ects 
of racism. Allais proposes a distinction between empirical racism, which would 
be based in mistaken thought, and disrespectful racism, which aims to humiliate 
or dehumanize the object of its disrespect, and is rooted in “normative-emotional 
attitudes” tied up with willing.49 She believes that Kant himself demonstrates this 

45 Kleingeld, “Second !oughts,” 55.
46 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 79.
47 Kant, “Lectures on Ethics.”
48 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 68.
49 Allais, “Kant’s Racism”, 22.



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Kantian disrespect in his racism. On this point, I must disagree— Kant’s racism, 
although frequently disrespectful, doesn’t aim to disrespect or dehumanize; instead, it 
exists as the result of choosing to understand humanity through cultural comparison, 
especially one that aims to understand the teleological goal of human life.

So, Allais’s paper is also ultimately unsatisfying in its attempt at generating an 
understanding of how Kant’s seemingly contradictory thoughts relate to each other. 
First, Allais’s implication that Kant’s pragmatic moral theory exists as a justi"cation for 
his racism ignores the actual distinctions within his ethics, as I described in section 2. 
It takes Kant’s racism to be something born purely of prejudice, and not teleological 
in itself. !is leads to a reading that feels almost dismissive of a valid insight withing 
scienti"c racisms like Kant’s, and the role that they play in a worldview that aims 
towards a teleological purpose. Overall, Allais’s paper is not a satisfying response to 
either Kant’s own racism or Kleingeld’s interpretation of it because it ignores the very 
conscious and intentional role that cultural comparison plays in Kant’s construction 
of the teleological purpose of humanity itself.

Ultimately, Kleingeld and Allais’s papers both fail because they place too much emphasis 
on Kant’s ethical theory without enough regard for his underlying teleological views. 
!is shared interpretive lens, despite the vastly di#erent conclusions that it can lead 
to, perpetuates this debate unnecessarily and leads scholarship in circles. By refocusing 
the question on the placement of “Perpetual Peace” in a progressive and purposed 
history, it is much easier to see how Kant’s racial, moral, and political theories actually 
interact with each other towards his philosophical goals. !us, when writing about 
the relationship between parts of Kant’s thought or the possibility for change across 
time, it is important to place all of his thought inside the teleological framework that 
he himself operated in.

CONCLUSION 
It is clear that Kant’s "rst priority in his work is his teleology; it is evident in the end 
goal of humanity being something that individuals have a duty to work towards, as well 
as the more subtle ways that it grants value to morality in human beings and human 
culture. If this is not su$ciently recognized in interpretation of Kant’s work, especially 
that which is empirical or pragmatic, then many of the threads between ideas are lost, 
and it is di$cult to "nd satisfying answers to his inconsistencies. Furthermore, I think 
that is is actually reasonable to consider that Kant was willing to have inconsistencies 
between his empirical anthropological work and his a priori moral theory— since we 
know that the pure principles of the latter cannot be based on the former, and the 
former is intended to be an observational empirical study of what is currently, not 
necessarily what must be, we can accept their contradictions as a manifestation of 
the complicated path towards realization of pure moral goodness in human society. 
After all, one individual— or even an entire culture— failing to embody these pure 



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principles does not have any e#ect on what makes them pure in the "rst place, or 
on whether they can or will be embodied in the future. It is not the job of a moral 
theorist in the Kantian tradition— especially one outlining pragmatic rules, as Kant 
aims to do in “Perpetual Peace” — to consider who is or is not worthy of receiving 
moral treatment, but how to construct rules that best sustain the moral rule while 
still being useful in the current reality of life.50 !e point, for Kant, is to make the 
world better;51 at the same time, it is undeniable that his idea for how this is to be 
done is deeply embedded with racial and cultural hierarchy.

While both Kleingeld and Allais make compelling interpretations on the controversial 
nature of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”, both ultimately fail to provide a satisfactory answer 
to the ambiguity of Kant’s ethical stance on colonization. It is reasonable, especially 
from the more contemporary view of colonization as an inherently racialized form 
of violence, for their interpretation to be entirely entwined with Kant’s writings on 
race; however, their focus on Kant’s ethical and anthropological works leaves out a 
wealth of textual evidence that provides much needed context to “Perpetual Peace.” 
!e cultural hierarchy and unequivocal teleology demonstrated in Kant’s “Idea 
for a Universal History” provide this context to the texts that Kleingld and Allais 
engage with, and particularly reveal a more nuanced interpretation of Kant’s moral 
theory that can close the ideological gap that they see between Kant’s racism and 
“Perpetual Peace.” !eir papers serve as examples of the importance of recognizing 
this teleology in Kant’s system, taking the time to evaluate its in%uence on all of his 
system of thought, and reminding ourselves as scholars to be careful to be as accurate 
as possible when speculating what, precisely, Kant is focused on when making value 
judgements. !e inconsistencies in Kant’s thought between the “Anthropology”, 
“Perpetual Peace”, and his ethical writings are much better understood in the context 
of his teleology, which demonstrates a much more consistent value basis across his 
entire body of work.

50 In this case, “worthiness” of moral treatment would be universally the end-status of an individual or nation, which 
is universal. Even a person or culture that themselves do not exhibit sophisticated moral thought— or even, 
potentially, recognize themselves according to the same moral rule— should not be excluded, as that would 
violate the universalizability of the principle.

51 Kant engages with this optimistic goal in a 1793 essay called “On the Common Saying: !is May Be True in 
!eory, but It Does Not Hold in Practice,” writing: “I rely here on my innate duty to a#ect posterity such 
that it will become better (something the possibility of which must thus be assumed) and such that this duty 
will rightfully be passed down from one generation to another—I am a member of a series of generations, and 
within this series (as a human being in general) I do not have the required moral constitution to be as good as 
I ought, and therefore to be as good as I could be… however uncertain I am and may remain about whether 
improvement is to be hoped for the human race, this uncertainty cannot detract from my maxim and thus from 
the necessary supposition for practical purposes, that it is practicable.”



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REFERENCES
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