id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
dianoia-12719	Valdez, Noah	Full Text	2020	68	.pdf	application/pdf	27816	1107	51	[T]he relevant [ethical] reasons for acting, on occasions when they co- exist with considerations that on their own would be reasons for acting otherwise, as, not overriding, but silencing those other considerations—as bringing it about that, in the circumstances, they are not reasons at all.25 I interpret these lines to mean that when a virtuous person is faced with the choice between different moral considerations, there are two possible ways in which he can perceive a situation: a) the non-virtuous considerations are silenced such that they stop being reasons for acting at all; therefore, such non-virtuous considerations stop being considerations (morally speaking, that is) at all and b) the competing non- virtuous considerations are moral considerations, as far as the agent is concerned; nonetheless, they are so implausible, in that they go against the virtuous nature of the agent, that his will silences them and he never takes such considerations seriously— let alone chooses them. 15Issue VII ◆ Spring 2020 δι αν οι α VIRTUE, SILENCING, AND PERCEPTION1 ABHI RUPARELIA Over the course of several influential articles, philosopher John McDowell describes the practical reasoning of the virtuous agent using an appeal to his distinctive perceptual abilities.2 McDowell argues that when such an agent deliberates about a course of action, he never sees any conflict between the demands of virtue and other competing non-virtuous considerations, because for him, the requirements of virtue silence the other competing reasons for action.	cache/dianoia-12719.pdf	txt/dianoia-12719.txt
