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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

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A SUPERIOR NATURAL LAW THEORY IN 
THE WORKS OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS 

 Alison Vaughan

Johannes Althusius’s third edition of his Politica,1 published in 1614, presents a 
systematization of communal associations in his structuring of a political society. 

Be!tting a thinker living in the complicated politics of the Holy Roman Empire, 
his ideas—borrowing heavily from Aristotle’s Politics,2 and re"ecting his Calvinist 
background—sought universal applicability both in Catholic and Protestant 
countries. Behavioral guidelines and the tenets of associational happiness cement 
both public and private life in his polity, and Althusius underpins these discussions 
with a theory of natural law. Readers encounter two versions of such a theory within 
Althusius’s body of work containing slight yet signi!cant variations. One is found 
in his Politica and the other in his !eory of Justice,3 published three years prior in 
1607 as a juridical systemization seeking the same universal applicability.4 #ough 
!eory of Justice seems to set forth a confusing mix of secular and religious sources 
of behavioral morals, this model presents a more philosophically sound system and 
compelling !t than the Politica version within Althusius’s entire schema of thought.

Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) was a Calvinist political theorist trained in both 
civil and ecclesiastical law, born in Westphalia in modern northwestern Germany. 

1 Politica methodical digesta atque exemplis sacris et profanis ilustra, translated as “Politics Methodologically Set 
Forth With Sacred and Profane Examples,” commonly referred to as Politica. #is paper refers to the only 
completed English translation available, Frederick Carney’s 1964 abridgement.

2 Aristotle, Politics: A New Translation, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
2017), 2-5.

Althusius adopts the Aristotelian idea of community arising by necessity in nature as the only mechanism by which an individual can 
satisfy his needs. #e smallest division of such associations, namely, the conjugal relationship within the household, also forms the base 
of Althusius’s schema. #e bestial nature of man without community also appears within this text, as does the idea that subjugation 
and hierarchy within political orders of men is not only necessary, but natural, as it mirrors similar structures in the animal and natural 
world. 
3 Dicaeologicae Libri Tres…, translated as “#ree volumes of a #eory of Justice…, hereby referred to as #eory of 

Justice. Any information from this text referred to by this paper comes from the portion translated in On Law 
and Power. 

4See On Law and  Power’s “Althusius in Context: A Biographical and Historical Introduction” p. xxii-xxvi.



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#e widespread attention generated by the !rst edition of Politica facilitated his 
transition to serve as Syndic of Emden in East Friesland, a position he held until his 
death.5 His works fell out of academic interest until the 1800s with Otto Gierke’s 
rediscovery of the material and placing of the works as seminal in the development 
of modern Western political thought,6 a position perhaps unjustly overshadowed 
by his contemporary, Hugo Grotius. However, a growing number of scholars has 
devoted considerable attention to Althusius’s work in recent years,7 exploring its 
features of constitutionalism, jurisprudence, popular sovereignty,8 covenants, and 
integration of philosophy and political theory situated squarely in the transition from 
Medieval to Modern. Emerging from relative obscurity, he has been deemed the 
“father of modern federalism”9 for Politica's striking !t within the canon of modern 
thought.10,11 Discovery of the impact and fundamentality of this author’s scholarship 
only grows with time, and there is much to be gained from an investigation into the 
theory of natural law he employs in his body of work. His particular conception is 
made all the more curious for its strange philosophical inconsistencies, pitfalls, and 
unique use of the Decalogue. 

#e philosophical purpose, or even intentionality, of the core di$erences in 
Althusius’s two models that this paper will discuss is not made explicitly clear by 
the author. Given his profound connection to modern political ideas, scholars will 
undoubtedly also examine, reference, and synthesize his philosophical material with 
an eye towards the development of the contemporary natural law canon. Recognizing 
that his principle works in fact contain two di$erent theories must be stressed in 
such endeavors. As such, there is no single “Althusian Natural Law.” While both 
Politica and !eory of Justice rely heavily on the Christian canon, the latter !nds a core 
legal basis in Roman Law. Readers will !nd this more logically sound in its deriving 
personal duties than the technique of deriving double-sided duties employed in 
Politica, but this also represents an internal inconsistency: the use of positive law as 
the foundation in a natural law system. 

#is paper will guide the reader through a comprehensive understanding of 
Althusian terminology, the key philosophical components of his natural law theories, 

5 For more information on his education and public service, see Politica's “Translator’s Introduction” p. xi-xii.
6 Politica, “Translator’s Introduction” ix.
7 On Law and Power, “Series Introduction” xvi.
8 In discussing modern natural law, Sabine describes this element of Althusius’s works as, comparative to 

contemporary texts, “#e clearest statement of popular sovereignty that had so far appeared” (p. 418).
9 Brian Duignan, “Johannes Althusius: German Political #eorist,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, last modi!ed August 

8, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Johannes-Althusius. 
10 Althusius’s political theory is described as the “!rst modern theory of federalism.” His vanguard conception is 
based on a subsidiary notion of the power to rule where sovereignty originates in the smallest societal associations 
and expands outwards and upwards. #e lowest layers can properly exist as independent units, but the larger are not 
valid in their own right. Each tier has its own purpose, integrity, and jurisprudence. #is contrasts heavily with the 
conception of the absolute sovereignty of individual territories of the time and with the statism of later centuries.
11 Malan, “Johannes Althusius’s Grand Federalism, the Role of the Ephors and Post-Statist Constitutionalism,” pp. 

2–8, 24. 



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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

and !nally, a discussion of the merits of each model weighed against one another. 
Before moving beyond the context of his life to these following steps, it is notable to 
mention his thorough use of Ramist logic in Politica, a method in which extensive 
proper categorization and subdivision of the topics under consideration are said to 
illuminate both study and clari!cation.12 #is method permeates the entirety of 
Politica with, as translator Frederick Carney states, “tiresome regularity throughout 
the whole volume.”13 #e reader ought to keep in mind the implicit framework of 
subdivision and tiered classi!cation in both of Althusius’s natural law theories.

Politica is primarily a political work, and the majority of prior attention paid to 
this text has been to its components under this umbrella, but this paper approaches 
its philosophical elements. #erefore, a summary of a few of Politica's key 
methodological components will equip the reader with su%cient context to approach 
the complexities of the natural law theory that appears alongside discussions of 
associational order. First, the base unit of political society in Politica is not the 
individual of many contemporary accounts, but instead, the conjugal and kinship 
associations. Examples of these include the nuclear family and clans made up of 
the paterfamilias of each family, respectively. #ese marital and familial groupings 
come together to constitute “collegia”14 and then larger associations such as the city, 
province, and commonwealth. Regarding Althusius’s use of the Decalogue (Ten 
Commandments) of the Christian tradition, following Protestant convention, he 
designates the !rst table, or tablet, as commandments 1-415 and the second table as 
5-10 (see Appendix A, Figure 1).

We now begin examining the theory of natural law found in Politica with a de!nition 
of its central philosophical terms. Althusius’s distinction between what he calls 
common law (lex communis) and proper law (lex propria) illuminate his starting point. 
In contrast to the three categories most commonly used in this era—natural law, law 
of nations (jus gentium), and civil/positive law16—Althusius boxes law into only these 
two above categories. According to common law, natural law behavioral guidelines 
arise at a basic level from knowledge, notitia, and from inclination, inclinatio.17 
Citing Romans 1:19,18 Althusius otherwise calls this law “conscience,” and says it 
is “naturally implanted by God in all men.”19 His citation of Romans 2:1420 gives 

12 Politica, “Translator’s Introduction” xiii.
13 Id., xv.  
14 #e paterfamilias of a family enters society to form these, e.g. guilds, corporations, voluntary associations
15 Politica, 141.
16 For more information on these three categories, see Witte, “A Demonstrative #eory of Natural Law.” 
17 Politica, 139.
18 All biblical citations in this paper use the New International Version unless otherwise speci!ed.
(19) “... since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. (20) For since the creation of 
the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been 
made, so that people are without excuse.”
19 Politica, 139.
20 (14) “Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for 

themselves, even though they do not have the law. (15) #ey show that the requirements of the law are written 



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further depth to the concept he has in mind. By conscience, we are compelled to do 
what we understand to be just and to avoid the unjust. He does, however, limit the 
reach of this law, which is said to encompass “nothing more than the general theory 
and practice of love, both for God and for one’s neighbor.”21

Most importantly, when it becomes necessary to translate this natural law inclination 
into a legal system, common law is said to be unequally written on the hearts of 
everyone according to the design of God. Althusius continues to cite biblical sources 
as evidence, and from this we understand he has in mind the blindness and clouded 
hearts of the wicked and the in"uence of man’s sinful nature as deterrents for 
recognizing and adhering to conscience’s demands. Also, limits in individual capacity 
make the exercise of applying these general principles to particular situations di%cult 
for some. Furthermore, even if this innate knowledge of just and unjust behavior is 
recognized, it is insu%cient in compelling some to actually act on it.22 Here, we arrive 
at the need for Althusius’s second category of law: proper law. 

Proper law is common law adapted to particularities: the place, time, circumstances, 
and people of a given polity.23 #is law serves to teach and compel the “symbiotes”24 
to follow the common law; the insu%cient compulsion and speci!city of common 
law is addressed here through the threat of punishment provided by a proper law 
system. To highlight the di$erence between the two, by common law, we understand 
that evil is to be punished, and by proper law, we determine what the punishment 
will be.25 To be su%ciently distinct from common law as to constitute something 
new, proper law adds or subtracts from it, though it cannot ever be completely 
contrary to common law. It gains its legitimacy from its base in the common law 
inclinations.26 Both of these types of law share a purpose of “justice and piety, or 
sanctity, and the same equity and common good in human society.”27 #eir common 
starting point is “the right and certain reason upon which both laws rely.”28 Proper 
law is changeable, common law is not.29 Proper laws are “fences,” as Althusius 

on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other 
times even defending them.”

21 Politica, 140.
22  On Law and Power, 11. Politica, 144. 
23 Politica, 144.
24 #is is Althusius’s term for the individual members of an associated body.
25 For more information on the purpose and exercise of public punishment provided by law, see Politica, Ch. X-XVII 

“Secular Communication” p. 83.
26 Id., 144. One of Althusius’s tools for demonstrating this inclination-in-common is to cite in the original 

Latin Politica hundreds of sources of legal and historical texts with shared ideas and conclusions during 
each discussion, presumably to give credit to the idea that thinkers were all working with more or less the 
same conscience. In “A Demonstrative #eory of Natural Law,” Witte aptly terms this characteristic “intense 
eclecticism.”

27  Id., 145.
28 Ibid.
#e curious reader might wonder as to whether these terms will play a signi!cant future role in Politica. #ey will not, right/proper 
reason make few and far between appearances in the Politica and are without de!nition or expansion, leading to the conclusion these 
function primarily as nods to the intellectual language of natural law discussions of the time more than as key components of his theory 
itself. Indeed, Politica deals with politics !rst and foremost.
29 Id., 145.



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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

describes them, guiding us along the “appointed” way when we cannot divine the 
path completely for ourselves.30 #erefore, the di$erences he saw between the legal 
systems of England, Germany, and France, for example, were to him di$erences in 
manifestations of proper law rather than in the basic human common law. Notably, 
Roman law is listed as proper law, though when interpreted and applied equitably in 
line with common law, it can be said to exude natural law.31 

To understand the Decalogue’s central role in Politica and subsequent use in 
Althusius’s theories, we must establish why he deems it an appropriate source of 
natural law precepts. At a cursory glance, one might mistake it as the source of moral 
guidelines. However, Althusius importantly clari!es that the Decalogue is not natural 
law/common law in and of itself, but rather “agrees with and explains” the urges 
and inclinations experienced by every person.32 #e “general theory and practice of 
love of God and one’s neighbor,” the natural law already written on our hearts, is 
merely expressed as a more concrete set of guidelines through these commandments. 
#ough some deem this natural law purely theological, Althusius insists upon the 
importance of its inclusion within politics.33 He concludes that piety and justice are 
necessary components of a well-ordered political society, and thus are essential to 
preserve when building a healthy life in common. In his eyes, the Decalogue is an 
instrument to help foster these qualities since it communicates how people ought to 
live and behave, infusing a “guiding light” into politics.34 It only becomes theological 
when its commands are carried out with a heart toward pleasing God but can be 
secular and useful in its provisions for a just life.35 

With knowledge of these foundational pieces, we now approach the intriguing feature 
of Althusius’s body of works– the aforementioned natural law theory in Politica and 
the con"icting one in !eory of Justice. Both deal with duties owed by each person to 
various recipients. In Politica, which will be examined !rst, Althusius provides a “"at” 
interpretation of the Decalogue where duties to self and duties to others (subdivided 
into duties to one’s neighbor and duties to God) both arise from its ten precepts. #e 
perfection, encapsulation, and furthest extension of these duties is the Golden Rule, 
or treating others as one would like to be treated (see Appendix A, Figure 2). 

Politica's introduction of duties to others appears in the discussion of duties that ought 
to be imparted to one’s neighbor. “#e precepts of the Decalogue,” Althusius states, 
“are both a%rmative and negative,”36 so from each can be derived speci!c actions and 
inactions. He begins by determining what duties we owe to our neighbor, and from 

30 Id., 139.
31 Id., 148. Witte, “A Demonstrative #eory of Natural Law.”
32 Politica., 144.
33 Such a categorical justi!cation is all the more necessary given his adoption of the methods of Ramist logic.
34 Politica, 11.
35 Id., 147.
36 Id., 80.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

there we can also know what ought not to be done to our neighbor. #ese things 
owed, which are “his so that he rightly possesses them,”37 are his life, the liberty and 
safety of his body, his dignity, reputation, good name, and honor, chastity of body, 
the right of family and citizenship,38 and external goods. Althusius then explains 
how the second table of the Decalogue prescribes duties relating to safeguarding 
these very features.39 Again, since not all men can divine and act on inclinations to 
owe such duties to others, “through the law comes knowledge of things to be done 
and to be omitted.”40 Here, Althusius quotes from Romans 3:20.41 #e second table 
thus teaches us of justice, of “the use of the body and of this life, and the rendering 
to each his due.”42

Duties to others are broken down in Politica into “special” and “general” duties.43 
Special duties come from the !fth commandment and deal with what is owed by 
inferiors to superiors, namely, respect and obedience. Extrapolating from obedience 
to parental !gures to obedience to all authority !gures everywhere might seem too far 
a leap, but this aligns with Althusius’s treatment of the conjugal association as part of 
the “seedbed of all private and public associational life.”44 Parental authority serves as 
a foundational model for larger scale political authority. 

#e rest of the commandments house general duties owed by each symbiote to 
everyone. #is is the theory’s key feature. Althusius breaks each commandment 
down into both duties owed to others and corresponding duties owed to oneself. 
For example, regarding the sixth commandment, he interprets its instructions as 
“defending and preserving from all injury the lives of one’s neighbor and oneself,” and 
for the seventh, “guarding by thought, word, and deed one’s own chastity and that 
of the fellow symbiote, without any lewdness or fornication.”45 When addressing this 
topic again in a later chapter, Althusius declares that within the sixth commandment, 
protection of one’s own life comes !rst and consists of “the defense, conservation, 
and propagation of oneself.”46 In a political system, these duties serve to promote the 
utility and welfare of the associated body.47

37 Id., 80.
38 Althusius distinguishes between citizens and “foreigners, outsiders, aliens, and strangers whose duty it is to mind 

their own business.” Id., 40.
39 Nowhere else in Politica does Althusius argue that the speci!c duties owed to others come from ideas of objective 

possession of goods or qualities, so here, it can be interpreted he starts o$ going down this route most likely to 
highlight the Decalogue’s role as a device that coincides with the natural law inclinations of man.

40 Id., 82.
41 “#erefore no one will be declared righteous in God’s sight by the works of the law; rather, through the law we 

become conscious of our sin.”
42 Politica, 75.
43 Id., 52.
44 Id., 31.
45 Politica, 52. For full discussions of the positive and negative duties of each commandment of the second table, see 

Ch. VII-VIII “#e Province” p. 52, Ch. X-XVII “Secular Communication” p. 81, and Ch. XXI-XXVII “Political 
Prudence in the Administration of the Commonwealth” p. 142-143.

46 Politica, 142.
47 Id., 75.



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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

Fostering piety and justice is a consistent theme in the body of Politica with the 
former always tied to the !rst table of the Decalogue and the latter to the second 
table.48 While duties to neighbors and the corresponding duties to self constitute 
justice, duties to God in commandments one through four are devices to promote 
piety and the glory of God.49 #ese break down into private internal worship, private 
external worship, and public worship.50 Notably, the second table is said to yield to 
the !rst as a higher law.51 Again, while some might deem the supposed virtue of these 
behaviors to be solely theological, Althusius claims they are necessary for any natural 
law, since, “if symbiosis is deprived of these qualities, it should not be called so much 
a political and human society as a beastly congregation of vice-ridden men.”52 He 
even goes as far as to say that religion is the fountain of all symbiotic happiness, since 
true piety is linked to belief in eternal salvation.53

#e !nal step in this system of ought and ought-not behaviors is the Golden Rule. 
#ough less emphasis is given to this topic than to justice and piety, Althusius 
describes it as the summation of the principles of justice. While the Decalogue 
embodies common law inclinations, the Golden Rule must be of supernatural origin, 
for such a standard cannot be reasoned to or deduced from the natural world. Instead, 
its existence and binding moral authority arises from divine revelation through 
scripture. For this reason, Althusius places it in the third and !nal tier. To explain 
this concept, he cites Matthew 22:39,54 7:12,55 Shabbat 31a,56 and, interestingly, the 
Digest.57 #e Golden Rule seems to be the ultimate culmination and perfection of 
justice, and to that e$ect Althusius states, “Above all, we vouchsafe and do to our 
neighbor what we wish to be done to ourselves.”58 

When moving from Politica, a theory of a political system, to !eory of Justice, a 
comprehensive work on law and justice, one might expect a more in-depth discussion 
of this same natural law theory. Instead, one !nds intriguing di$erences at the core 

48 Id., 12, 74.
49 Id., 75
50 Id., 52. For further discussion of a%rmative and negative commands of each commandment of the !rst table, see 

Ch. XXI-XXVII “Political Prudence in the Administration of the Commonwealth” p. 141-142.
51 Id., 141.
52 Id., 147.
53 Id., 161.

54  (37) “Jesus replied: “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ 
(38) #is is the !rst and greatest commandment. (39) And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’” 

55 “So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.”
56 (6) “#at which is hateful to you do not do to another; that is the entire Torah and the rest is interpretation.”
57“Justice is a steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right. (1) #e basic principles of right are: to live 

honorably, not to harm any other person, to render to each his own. (2) Practical wisdom in matters of right is 
an awareness of God’s and men’s a$airs, knowledge of justice and injustice.” D 1.2.

Althusius’s inclusion of Roman law on seemingly the same level of moral authority as general scriptural verses appears puzzling at 
!rst, but the reader might refer back to his strategy of citing ideas in common in legal systems and also the idea that proper law, when 
interpreted in line with common law, can be treated as a legitimate extension as such. #is is not such a problematic use of Roman law 
as that in !eory of Justice since here, this citation is supplementary to biblical texts and does not function as the sole source of the most 
primal common law urges.
58 Politica, 81. Althusius sums his entire system on id., 74 stating, “We should live temperately towards ourselves, 

justly towards others, and piously towards God.”



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level meriting further exploration. Althusius breaks down natural law obligations 
in Book 1, Chapter 13 “On Common Law,” which can be understood as a system 
of three tiers (see Appendix A, Figure 3). First, there exists duties to oneself in the 
form of three impulses: self-defense, self-preservation, and self-promulgation. #is 
initial tier can be understood as the most basic, and Althusius derives authority 
for his claims about the personal duty of self-defense from Roman law, citing the 
Institutes,59 Codex,60 and Digest.61 For legitimizing self-preservation, Althusius cites 
biblical sources. #ough, when he pulls from the Christian canon in Ephesians 
and Colossians, the verses he cites either have little to do with self-preservation62 or 
merely speak of men nourishing their bodies, so what exactly he is referring to there 
is unclear.63 While this implies, at the very least, the bene!ts of self-preservation, 
the only direct instructions for doing good to oneself come from citations of the 
apocryphal book of Sirach.64 With respect to self-propagation, Althusius again refers 
to the Institutes, referencing a chapter on the Law of Nature being those urges that 
are shared between animals and humans, such as the desire to procreate.65 #ese 
laws of nature are said here to be those “… which all nations observe alike, being 
established by a divine providence, and remain ever !xed and immutable.”66 #e 
basis of Althusius’s !eory of Justice natural law system, or that which constitutes this 
!rst tier, is partly these animalistic traits, the inclinations common to everyone by 
virtue of being a human. #is mix of biblical and Roman behavioral guidelines also 
presents a less rationalist origin than the notio and inclinatio of common law.

#e theory then expands outward to the second tier of duties to others, which breaks 
into duties to God and duties to our neighbor. #e knowledge and worship of God 
(piety) is said to come from the !rst table of the Decalogue while protecting one’s 

59 “To kill wrongfully is to kill without any right; consequently, a person who kills a robber is not liable to this 
action, that is, if he could not otherwise avoid the danger with which he was threatened.” (3) “Nor is a person 
made liable by this law, who has killed by accident, provided there is not fault on his part, for this law punishes 
fault as well as wilful wrongdoing” For more examples, see the rest of Title III De Lege Aquilia. I 4.3.2-3.

60 Althusius refers to part of a collection of imperial decrees expanding basic self defense to the integrity not just of 
one’s body, but also of one’s property, speci!cally through recompense for private property damages. C 3.35.

61 “You see, it emerges from this law (jus gentium) that whatever a person does for his bodily security he can be held 
to have done rightfully; and since nature has established among us a relationship of sorts, it follows that it is a 
grave wrong for one human being to encompass the life of another.” D 1.2.

62 See Colossians Ch. 2.
63 Ephesians 5:29- “After all, no one ever hated their own body, but they feed and care for their body, just as Christ 

does the church—”
64 Sirach 4:5-6 (Douay-Rheims 1899 American Edition)- “To whom will they be generous that are stingy with 

themselves and do not enjoy what is their own? (6) No one is meaner than the person who is mean to himself, 
this is how his wickedness repays him.”

#is section also claims the associated citations will direct the reader to sources pertaining to protection of one’s property, but the only 
subjects in them remotely approaching such protection are warnings against coveting and adultery. (see Sirach 23:21, Sirach 30:26) One 
wonders why Roman law, if deferred to regarding other duties to self, is not also cited here given its abundance of instruction as regards 
property law. 
65 “#e law of nature is that law which nature teaches to all animals. For this law does not belong exclusively to 

the human race, but belongs to all animals, whether of the air, the earth, or the sea. Hence comes that yoking 
together of male and female, which we term matrimony; hence the procreation and bringing up of children. We 
see, indeed, that all the other animals besides man are considered as having knowledge of this law.” I 1.2.

66 Ibid.



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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

neighbor (justice) comes from the second just as in Politica.67 Finally, duties to others 
are said to ultimately teach us “whatever you wish to be done to you, you should also 
do to another,” or the Golden Rule. #ese outward tiers re"ect an identical structure 
to that of Politica. It is in the !rst tier that the di$erences emerge. 

Now able to weigh these two theories against one another, it becomes clear that 
the !eory of Justice model, though not without certain muddied elements, presents 
the more philosophically grounded theory. #is is a result of the weakness of the 
argument of duties to self in Politica. For example, as regards the duty of “defense, 
protection, and conservation of one’s own life and that of the neighbor” within the 
sixth commandment, Althusius argues protection of one’s own life is primary,68 
but fails to provide solid ground for this claim. He even changes course in Ch. 
I, discussing the bene!ts of prioritizing others over oneself with references to 1 
Corinthians 10:2469 and Philippians 2:4.70 In searching for some semblance of an 
explicitly stated right to self-defense in Politica like that provided by !eory of Justice, 
Althusius determines, “No one can renounce the right of defense against violence 
and injury.”71 He also names “defense of liberty and of one’s rights, and the repulsion 
of a launched attack” as a possible cause for a just war.72 However, in the same section 
he delineates “defense” as “either of your own nation or another,” so it is unclear 
whether this discussion is applicable to the personal level. Indeed, the defense of life, 
honor, reputation, and goods is entrusted to the Supreme Magistrate.73 Following 
Althusius’s schema,74 this implies that these rights of defense, in order to have been 
conceded to the magistrate, did at one time belong to the conceding unit, but as we 
have discussed above, the smallest unit of this system is the family and the collegia, 
not the individual. #ese statements o$er no illustration of any individual right to 
protection, leaving the Politica theory without legs. 

#e only other mention of self-defense in Politica appears in Chapter XXXVIII 
“Tyranny and Its Remedies,” but readers will see this also is not an indication of this 
personal right in Althusius’s schema. He begins by asserting that the proper course of 

67 On Law and Power, 10.
68 Politica, 142. 
69 “No one should seek their own good, but the good of others.”
70 “... not looking to your own interests but each of you to the interests of the others.” Behavioral commands 

Althusius provides from scriptural passages in the New Testament would have likely been regarded by him as 
compulsory and legitimate given his Calvinist background. However, readers ought to keep in mind that within 
his system, only the Decalogue represents common law. #e rest of Scripture can be understood as an expansion 
on these general principles. 

71 Politica, 125.
72 Politica, 187.
73 #e administrator and steward of the rights of sovereignty in the association; the highest political !gure. Id., 168, 

178, 190.
74 Power, authority, and sovereignty of leaders is theirs only by a concession on the part of the people, with whom 

the right to sovereignty ultimately and originally lies. In order for a leader to have possessed a certain right to an 
action, it must have at one time belonged to and been conceded by the people. Id., 72-73.



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action when faced with a “tyrant by practice”75 is to "ee since individuals do not have 
the “right of the sword,”76 e.g. David hiding from Saul in the mountains.77 Notably, 
he follows that when “manifest force” is applied by the tyrant to individual symbiotes, 
“then in the case of the need to defend their lives resistance is permitted to them.”78 
However, this resistance is limited; these private people must await the commands of 
the ephors79 before acting. #ough natural law is said to be the giver of this right,80 
Althusius o$ers little grounding. In essence, self-defense is a highly quali!ed right, far 
from an automatic remedy, and included as more of an afterthought in a later chapter 
rather than as a core component of the natural law theory in Politica.81 #ough both 
models argue the primacy of self-defense, it is only !eory of Justice that o$ers a clear 
source of the right from Roman law. 

Another shortcoming of Politica is its di%culty grounding any duty to oneself at 
all. In this work, Althusius places corresponding duties to self alongside the duties 
a symbiote owes to others via each of the Ten Commandments. As e%cient as it 
is to pull all of these prescriptions from a single source, readers must nevertheless 
ask themselves, can duties to self be said to clearly follow from a list of prescribed 
treatment of others? Perhaps it might be said that the fact these duties are owed by 
others to us implies we ourselves are worthy of the same treatment, and thus owe 
it to ourselves. However, the Decalogue ultimately says absolutely nothing in and 
of itself regarding what we self-re"exively owe. #erefore, as Althusius has elected 
to utilize the Decalogue as the clari!cation of natural law and his only source of 
behavioral guidelines in Politica, the choice of this particular device limits him and 
does not properly allow for the duties to self he prescribes to it. #ough raising the 
ever-present question of whether Roman law is actually a legitimate source to back 
up claims of duties to self in !eory of Justice, the model manages to o$er evidence 
for them. 

For a !nal complication, the order of the !rst tier of duties is a$orded no clear 
hierarchy in Politica. #e !rst table (duties to God) is said to be primary to the 
second table (duties to others), but if duties to others are at the bottom, which is the 
utmost priority, self-defense or piety? If duties to self are slightly superior correlatives 

75 Tyranny performed by an accepted member of o%ce in the associated body in which one “neglected the just rule 
of administration, acts contrary to the fundamentals and essence of human association, and destroys civil and 
social life.” For a discussion of special and general tyranny, see Id., 192-193.

76 Lit., “usus et jus gladii.” Althusius appears to use this term to refer to violent force exercised by public authority.
77 Id., 196.
78 Ibid.
79 Public ministers of the associated body at the same level as the Supreme Magistrate, elected by the people, and 

designed to serve as a power check. 
80 Politica, 196.
81 George H. Sabine, A History of Political #eory, #ird Edition. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 

1962), p. 382.
Additional evidence that Althusius is not arguing for an individual right of self-defense and, instead, is arguing for the right to collective 
resistance through the ephors can be found by examining contemporary texts based on the same Calvinist principles. In Vindiciae contra 
tyrannos, published forty years prior to Althusius’s Politica by Huguenots (French Calvinists in the 1500-1600s), a right to resistance is 
given to inferior magistrates as a counteraction against royal power. Notably, “Its rights were the rights of corporate bodies and not of 
individuals.” 



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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

of duties to others in the second table, duties to God could be interpreted to be above 
them. #e careful reader again asks why. #is also marks a stark contrast to the !eory 
of Justice model where duties to self exist in the !rst tier, followed by duties to others 
and to God, with no explicit priority given to one over the other. #is second model 
makes more sense given duties to others– to neighbors and to God– come from the 
same source, so are indeed equal in priority. In essence, in !eory of Justice, we !nd 
a far more satisfying and cohesive breakdown of duties owed, beginning with the 
individual to himself and extending to others, both to God and to men, and !nally 
reaching fully outward with the Golden Rule. 

As another advantage of the !eory of Justice model, this theory situates itself 
cohesively within Althusius’s Calvinist perspective. It begins with base urges and 
extends outward with each layer requiring more intervention on the part of the 
supernatural. For example, in tier 1, one does not need to be taught a duty of self-
propagation common even to animals. Duties to self via a connection to the same 
urges experienced by animals lines up well as the most base form of what is innate 
to every person, or the notio and inclinatio. Speci!c treatments of others and acts of 
worship to God are based on inclinations but are given more speci!city in tier 2. A 
!nal tier 3 standard of treating others as one might like to be treated is not found in 
the state of nature, and thus requires supernatural intervention and guidance. #is 
natural law system justi!es and upholds the necessity of Althusius’s own religious 
beliefs. #is model also !ts well within the schema of other sections of Politica 
with the family as the natural unit and the need for authority. In such discussions, 
Althusius states that, since hierarchies of inferiors submitting to superiors exist in 
the animal world, subjugation is also natural in the political order. “Common law,” 
he states, “indicates that in every association and type of symbiosis some persons are 
rulers (heads, overseers, prefects) or superiors, others are subjects or inferiors.”82 If 
the legitimacy of authority mirrors those models found in nature, the same can also 
be said of law.

#ough more cogent in its tiers and evidence, !eory of Justice is not without its 
own limitations as a natural law theory. #ere remains the problem of Roman law, a 
proper law system, appearing at the center of a theory whose second and third tiers 
are common law and the perfection/supernatural extension of common law. During 
the High Middle Ages, Roman law was seen by Althusius and his contemporaries as 
a sound and excellent legal system,83 but an appeal to the Roman canon is lacking 
in explicitly evidenced legitimacy within the entire schema of Althusius’s thought. 
Perhaps he would claim the Roman law he cites for duties to self is su%ciently in 
alignment with common law to be considered natural law. Even if this interpretation 
was indeed his intention, one questions its arbitrary nature and propensity for self-

82 Politica, 20.
83 Witte, “A Demonstrative #eory of Natural Law.” 



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selection bias. Especially with a system designed to be universally applicable like 
Politica's, readers might consider that not every thinker mixing religion, philosophy, 
and politics has so agreed on the validity of a right to self-defense that its existence 
can be presumed a settled matter.84 

Worthy of mention is a problem pertaining to both theories– the practicality of the 
inclusion of the Golden Rule within a schema of natural law reasoning. Along with 
the Politica cited verses previously mentioned, In !eory of Justice, we can understand 
this rule to be Matthew 7:2-12,85 1 John 2:11,86 and Romans 2:1387 among others.88 
#is rule is included more as an afterthought in discussions of duties to others, but 
jurisprudentially, such a component being ascribed to a natural law behavioral system 
has signi!cant rami!cations for a legal system. Are punishments to be meted out for 
people who do not love their neighbors as themselves? While vices such as sel!shness 
are not strictly forbidden in the Decalogue, with the inclusion of the Golden Rule, 
this act and others like it fall into a prohibited category. Since Althusius is attempting 
in Politica to build a system of associations that would be compatible across time and 
place in the fragmented medieval Germany he occupied, no concrete "eshing-out is 
done to his proposed behavioral system, and the general is favored over particular 
application. #e reader is left wondering whether it would be possible, or in any sense 
practical, to include the Golden Rule as anything more than a lofty ideal. 

Althusius’s cogent systematization of a polity theoretically applicable to all in 
Politica is made more e$ective by the underpinned idea of natural law arising from 
inclinations possessed by every human being. #ough the two models of this theory 
in his works share the majority of their features, the !eory of Justice use of Roman 
law in justifying duties to self is far more coherent than attempting to derive both 
these and duties to others via only the Decalogue in Politica. #e commandments 
of this artifact itself limit how far Althusius can take it, perhaps unsatisfactorily so 
that he simply had no choice but to rely on an overextension in Politica. Rising in 
attention and importance, Althusius’s philosophical thought will likely be a$orded 
much upcoming analysis. #e existence of two distinct theories within his body of 
works and their philosophical merits and downfalls must be recognized, especially 
with an eye towards comparing his schema to his contemporaries and placing him 
within the development of the modern canon. 

84 Augustine, notably, denies such a right.
85 “For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to 

you… (12) So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and 
the Prophets.”

86 “But anyone who hates a brother or sister is in the darkness and walks around in the darkness…”
87 “For it is not those who hear the law who are righteous in God’s sight, but it is those who obey the law who will be 

declared righteous.”
88 For a comprehensive list, see On Law and Power p. 16, n 59.



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A Superior Natural Law Theory in the Works of Johannes Althusius

APPENDIX A ! FIGURES
Figure 1. !e Ten Commandments, Exodus Ch. 20 (NIV)

Table 1.

1. “You shall have no other gods before me.”

2. “You shall not make for yourself an image in the form of anything in 
heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the waters below. You shall not 
bow down to worship them…”

3. “You shall not misuse the name of the LORD your God.”

4. “Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days you shall labor 
and do all your work, but the seventh day is a sabbath to the Lord your 
God. On it you shall not do any work, neither you, nor your son or 
daughter, nor your male or female servant, nor your animals, nor any 
foreigner residing in your towns.”

Table 2.

5. “Honor your father and mother…”

6. “You shall not murder.”

7. “You shall not commit adultery.”

8. “You shall not steal.”

9. “You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor.”

10.  “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house. You shall not covet your 
neighbor’s wife, or his male or female servant, his ox or donkey, or any-
thing that belongs to your neighbor. 

Figure 2. !e Politica Model            Figure 3.  !e !eory of Justice model



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REFERENCES
Althusius, Johannes. On Law and Power. Translated by Je$ery J. Veenstra. Grand 

Rapids: Acton Institute, 2013.

Althusius, Johannes. Politica. Edited and translated by Frederick S. Carney. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

“Annotated Justinian Code.” George W. Hopper Law Library. University of 
Wyoming. Accessed on December 23, 2023. https://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/
blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/books/book3/index.html.

Aristotle. Politics: A New Translation. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2017. 

Bible Gateway. HarperCollins Christian Publishing. Accessed on December 23, 2022. 
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Duignan, Brian. “Johannes Althusius: German Political #eorist.” In Encyclopedia 
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#e Digest of Justinian: Volume 1. Translated and edited by Alan Watson. 
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Malan, Koos. “Johannes Althusius’s Grand Federalism, the Role of the Ephors and 
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Sabine, George H. A History of Political #eory, #ird Edition. New York: Holt, 
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#e Institutes of Justinian. Translated by #omas Collett Sanders. Westport, 
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“Shabbat: Talmud: #e William Davidson Edition.” Sefaria. Sefaria, 2021. https://
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Witte, John Jr. “A Demonstrative #eory of Natural Law: Johannes Althusius and the 
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