































36

δι
αν

οι
α

SOUND AS SILENCE:
Nothingness in the Music of Anton Webern and 

John Cage

CHENYU BU

When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in an eternity 
before and after, the little space I fill engulfed in the infinite immensity 
of spaces whereof I know nothing, and which know nothing of me, I am 
terrified. The eternal silence of these infinite spaces frightens me.1

—Blaise Pascal, Pensées

1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the rise of modern science, the world has no longer been experienced 
as an ‘enchanted garden,’ where nature was meaningful and governed by intrinsic 
value-filled orders. Evoked by this disenchantment with the world, the senses of 
loneliness and homelessness are well-captured in French philosopher Blaise Pascal’s 
writings, which—centuries later—are escalated further by existential ideology’s 
disenchantment with being. In Being and Nothingness, inspired by the question 
concerning being raised in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, Sartre presents 
nothingness as the foundation for being and the origin of its nihilation, i.e. the 
non-being. The experience of nothingness makes possible being’s encounter with 
its non-being through the consciousness of freedom. The realization that there is 
nothing other than the nothingness separating being from non-being is the source of 
forlornness—anguish2 in Sartre’s terminology—inherent to being itself.

1 Blaise Pascal, and Thomas Stearns Eliot, Pascal's Pensées; Introduction by TS Eliot, (EP Dutton), 1958.
2 Charles B. Guignon, and Derk Pereboom, Existentialism: Basic Writings, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 325.



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Sound as Silence

The notion of the silence of the infinite space invoked by Pascal, however, sheds light 
upon a broader interpretation of Sartrean nothingness beyond the paradigm of being; 
namely, to the world of sound. In this essay, I extend the notion of nothingness to 
silence in contrast with sound and discuss silence as an act of expression and artistic 
interrogation in contemporary classical music. I propose beginning our discussion 
with a reconstruction of Sartre’s deduction for nothingness through a regressive 
course of arguments that traces back to being’s relation to the world. From there, I 
provide an exposition of sound based on the concept of a total sound-space3—bound 
by our pure auditory experience while silence as the non-being of sound originates 
from Sartrean nothingness. I then distinguish between absolute and relative silence, 
being primarily concerned with the latter, and further explicate the relation of sound 
to silence as analogous to that of being to non-being. Observing, of course, that 
varying techniques in music approach silence differently, I focus specifically on 
contemporary repertoires and analyze the role of silence in the third movement of 
Five Pieces for Orchestra by Anton Webern and 4’33” by John Cage as an embodiment 
of nothingness in the sound-space.

2. NON-BEING AND THE ORIGIN OF NOTHINGNESS

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre introduces his discussion of being with the 
recognition that being—as the totality “man-in-the-world”4—is a synthetic relation 
between man and world.5 This relation can only be established in the being by a 
self-interrogating question,6 but even the question presupposes both “a being who 
questions and a being [that] is questioned,”7 and an expected reply from the being 
in question of either an affirmation of yes or a negation of no (hence, the question 
itself permits the possibility of a negative reply).8 In the case of being, such a negation 
would imply the objective existence of a non-being, that is, an absence of a synthetic 
self-relation between being and the being-in-the-world, be it non-knowing with the 
interrogative attitude, non-existence of a transcendent being, or the non-being of 
limitation.9 The permanent possibility of non-being conditions the inquiry about 
being by limiting its reply (i.e. being is but nothing outside of being, and is, therefore, 
encompassed with non-being). 

The negation is not merely a quality of judgement following a pre-judicative attitude, 
but rather, a consequence of the apprehension of nothingness that always appears 
3 The phrase “total sound-space” refers to John Cage’s discussion of sound: John Cage, Silence: lectures and writings, 

(Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 9.
4 Charles B. Guignon, and Derk Pereboom, Existentialism: Basic Writings, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 310.
5 Ibid, Pg. 310.
6 The term “being” here refers to Heidegger’s Dasein in Being and Time, i.e. the being to whom the meaning of 

being is concerned: Charles B. Guignon, and Derk Pereboom, Existentialism: Basic Writings, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2001), 216-217.

7 Guignon and Pereboom, Existentialism: Basic Writings, 310.
8 Ibid, Pg. 310.
9 Ibid, Pg. 311. 



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

within the limits of expectation.10 For instance, a café is full positivity by itself, but 
when Sartre enters it with the expectation of meeting Pierre there only not to find 
him, the café recedes into nothingness as the undifferentiated ground in his search 
for Pierre.11 In seeking Pierre out, Sartre adopts the attitude of interrogation in 
expectation of one reply of two possibilities; that is, the presence or the absence of 
Pierre such that nothingness is not subjective, but rather, a “real event” objectively 
grounding the negation. Therefore, nothingness is the origin and foundation for the 
negation.

The negation presupposed by the question concerning being necessitates the objective 
existence of nothingness. Nothingness, however, is neither causa sui—since it does 
not nihilate itself—nor derived from being (which in its own right possesses full 
positivity and lacks structure, thereby making it non-relational to nothingness). From 
this deduction it follows that nothingness originates only from the being for whom 
the nothingness of being remains in question.12 In the state of self-detachment, the 
being whose questions could nihilate nothingness in relation to himself disassociates 
from the causal series, and then nihilates himself from nothingness anticipating the 
possibility of non-being from its own being.13 In other words, nothingness comes to 
things through their own being, which then, logically, means that their nothingness 
must belong to them.

3. SILENCE AS NON-BEING OF SOUND

Given that being is such that nothingness comes to the world as the origin of its 
own non-being, a parallel relation can be reasoned to the auditory world, wherein 
nothingness can be elicited from sound as the origin of silence. To begin with, sound 
exists as a particular relation to the total sound-space, bound by our pure auditory 
experience. The relation of a particular sound to the sound-space is defined by five 
specific determinants: frequency (pitch), amplitude (loudness), overtone structure 
(timbre), duration, and morphology (how the sound begins, goes on, and dies 
away).14 Since even one alteration of at least one of the five determinants changes 
how sound is perceived, the relation of sound to the sound-space must be fluid. 
Therefore, sound could be regarded as a continuum within the total sound-space for 
which the five determinants are limited by our own sense of audibility. 

Now that sound has been presented as a relation to the sound-space, a question 
concerning sound—corresponding to the question concerning being—could be 
formulated as follows: is there any five-determinant combination that can determine 

10 Ibid, Pg. 313. 
11 Guignon and Pereboom, Existentialism: Basic Writings, 316.
12 Ibid, Pg. 319.
13 Ibid, Pg. 320.
14 John Cage, Silence: lectures and writings, 9.



39Issue VII ◆ Spring 2020

Sound as Silence

a particular sound in relation to the sound-space? Following the deduction, the 
question itself permits a reply that entails the possibility of a negation: no, such a 
relation does not exist. What gives rise to such a negation is silence, i.e. the sound 
lacking the five-determinant relation to the sound-space. In the auditory world, 
this negation implies the objective existence of silence, and it thus follows that 
sound encompassed with silence in that sound—as a continuum— is defined by its 
(changing) relation to the sound-space (but nothing outside of it). Hence, silence 
is the non-being of sound with three possible forms: the non-being of knowing if a 
relation exists, the possibility of non-being of the sound in question, and the non-
being of limitation.15 As previously discussed, a negation is not simply a quality of 
judgement, but a consequence of the apprehension of nothingness due to the limits 
of expectation.16 Therefore, silence, as the negative reply to the question concerning 
sound has its origin and foundation in Sartrean nothingness.

From here, I would like to pause the regressive deduction to distinguish between two 
types of silence: absolute silence and relative silence. Silence characterized by the lack 
of relation seems to imply an absence, or the non-existence of the five-determinant 
combination, which is the clearly defined opposite of the presence or the existence 
of such without any quantifiable parameter, which in turn, could scale the “level 
of existence”. Therefore, silence as the lack of relation to the sound-space seems to 
be dialectically absolute. In reality, however, we cannot perceive any such sound as 
absolute silence. Even if one enters into a sound-proof or anechoic chamber, he can 
still hear at least two kinds of sound produced by himself: his nerve’s systematic 
operation and his blood’s circulation,17 which both have their own relations to the 
sound-space—“[t]here is always something to listen to.”18 However, we do perceive 
silence, or the absence of perceivable sound on various occasions; for example, at a 
concert between two movements of a symphony, or simply when we enter a quiet 
library from a busy street. At those moments, no sound from the five-determinant 
relation comes into the presence of our auditory experience (at least temporarily) 
because the sounds presented to, and expected by, us—the orchestra or the street 
sound—disappear, and the sounds outside of our expectation have not yet come 
into our awareness. It is not difficult to notice that the brief pause of the orchestral 
sound between movements is filled with the audience’s breathing, or perhaps the 
rustling of clothes, and even a quiet library might be filled with the sound of air flow 
produced by the ventilation system. Just as the room tone in a movie scene, these 
sounds normally fall into the background of our unconsciousness where we fail to 
map them into the sound-space by the five-determinant relations and take them as 
the silence—the lack of relation to the sound-space. The notion of relative silence, 

15 I made a reference to Sartre’s characterization of three types of non-being: Guignon and Pereboom, Existentialism: 
Basic Writings, 311.

16 See note 10 above.
17 John Cage, Silence: lectures and writings, 13.
18 Samuel Beckett, Stories and Texts for Nothing, (New York: Grove P, 1967), 35/155.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

therefore, describes sounds that we are unaware of, all of which characterized by the 
absence of a perceivable relation to the sound-space whereby they manifest themselves 
as silence in our auditory experience. Note that any sound categorized as relative 
silence always has the potential, given that we are able to adjust our expectation and 
actively hear it, to become sound to our ears with its own relation to the total sound-
space. Since it is the relative silence that we hear as silence, the rest of this paper only 
concerns itself with relative silence. 

Given that silence has its origin and foundation in nothingness, nothingness must 
objectively exist in order to make our apprehension of silence possible. Similar to the 
case of being, I argue that nothingness comes into the sound-space as the origin of 
silence, or of the non-being of sound, precisely through sound itself. On one hand, 
silence cannot be derived from sound. It would be inconceivable that a particular 
sound of full positivity in its five-determinant relation at the same time maintains in 
our awareness a representation of silence as its non-being.19 The notion of (relative) 
silence asserts that silence by nature has the potential to possess a relation to sound-
space as a continuum. As a result, every heard sound becomes based on a subjective 
situation constructed essentially by the relationship between sound and another 
sound (i.e. the sound of relative silence, rather than an objective situation where 
sounds are the negative of silence or vice versa20). One should be able to think of 
sound “without considering it negatively,”21 that is to say, sound is not conceived 
as an absence or nihilation of silence. Rather, a particular sound is heard against its 
(relative) silence in that our perception distinguishes it with the full positivity by our 
awareness of it. This distinction asserts that we cannot both perceive and be unaware 
of a particular sound; ergo, it is non-relational to silence, or to its non-being. 

On the other hand, silence is not causa sui. The property of “nihilating itself ”22 cannot 
be granted to silence because silence cannot be perceived alone—we always listen to 
something whose existence as a continuum establishes our expectation, such as the 
sound of our nerve’s system operation and the blood’s circulation in an anechoic 
chamber. Even when all sounds actively heard by us suddenly disappear, what has 
blended into the background of silence immediately emerges in our awareness as 
the new continuum in the sound-space. Therefore, a sound that recedes to silence, 
as soon as it is left by itself, will be heard as the sound of full positivity with a 
specific relation to the sound-space. The interrelation of sound and silence can be 
considered bi-directional, where silence allows sounds to appear, yet, at the same 
time depends on the presence of sound to remain its non-existence to our perception. 

19 I made a reference to Sartre’s argument that non-being is not derived from being: see note 12 above.
20 “Subjective situation” and “objective situation” are the phrases used by John Cage in the discussion of silence: 

John Cage, Silence: lectures and writings, 14.
21 Eric De Visscher, "'There's no such thing as silence...': John Cage's Poetics of Silence", in Interface 18.4 (1989), 

259.
22 Guignon and Pereboom, Existentialism: Basic Writings, 318.



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Sound as Silence

This “symbiosis of opposites”23 can be simplified to the fact that something requires 
nothingness in order to appear and that nothingness requires something in order to 
maintain its nothingness. The deduction reveals that silence is neither derived from 
sound nor self-caused, and it follows that nothingness as the origin of silence must 
be embodied in sound itself as a potential or possibility of becoming its non-being 
(i.e. the silence). 

4. SILENCE IN WEBERN, FIVE PIECES FOR ORCHESTRA, III 
AND CAGE, 4’33”

In modernist music repertoires, silence is considered to be state of “a sonic and/
or conceptual ideal”24 to which a work aspires. The purity, complexity and 
fragmentary in the sonic state of silence becomes a new compositional focus. Drawn 
by the perishability of sound and the proximity to nothingness that is feared and 
simultaneously aspired to, in silence, modernist composers aim to achieve such a state 
through musical languages. Now given that silence as the non-being of sound has its 
origin and foundation in Sartrean nothingness, in this section, I discuss the approach 
to silence in contemporary classical music; specifically, in the third movement of Five 
Pieces for Orchestra by Anton Webern25 and 4’33” by John Cage26 as a way of evoking 
an experience of Sartrean nothingness.

In his works, Anton Webern appeals to nothingness not by patches of quietness 
gapped in rests and pauses as the Classic and the early Romantic composers do, 
but rather, in relying on musical means to evoke the sense of silence as in the third 
movement of Five Pieces for Orchestra (which depicts a mountain vista). With the 
dynamic marking pianississimo,27 the opening Campanella28 creates a sense of stillness, 
which swells with the shimmering sound made by mandolin, guitar, harp, and celesta. 
Each individual tone in the opening sound’s chromatic cluster29 is struck repeatedly 
or rolled on strings, and creates in effect a sustained, yet vibrating sonority.30 Since 
all but one of the tones of the cluster are a semitone apart from each other, the sound 
creates a seemingly chaotic silence, but accurately conveys the sound of nature and 
the serenity residing in the mountain. The violin enters later with a slightly louder 
dynamic playing a fragmented four-note melody, which is then echoed by a muted 

23 “Symbiosis of opposites” is a phrase Deborah Weagel uses in the discussion of Cage’s notion of silence: Deborah 
Weagel, and John Cage. "Silence in John Cage and Samuel Beckett: 4' 33" and "Waiting for Godot"." Samuel 
Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui 12 (2002), 6.

24 David Metzer, "Modern Silence," The Journal of Musicology, vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 333.
25 Anton Webern, “Sehr langsam und ausserst zart”, track 15 on Webern: Passacaglia / Symphony / Five Pieces, Ulster 

Orchestra, Takuo Yuasa, Naxos 8.554841, 2001, compact disc.
26 John Cage, “4’33””, track 14 on CAGE, J.: Primitive / In a Landscape / A Room / Variations I / Waiting / 4' 33'' / 

Dream / Suite for Toy Piano (Happy Birthday John!) (Cage, Sacchi). John Cage. Floraleda Sacchi. Amadeus Arte 
AAP12001, 2012, compact disc.

27 Musical term, meaning “very very softly”.
28 A percussion instrument, meaning “little bell”.
29 Musical term, referring to a chord made of several tones in a pitch class.
30 David Metzer, "Modern Silence," The Journal of Musicology, vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 340.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

horn. As the echo fades away, the previous sonority of stillness gradually converges to 
silence. The rest of the movement is a continuation of the dwindling of soft sonority 
with the nothingness. Webern creates the sounds that appear to be fragile in the 
beginning—with their softness and extreme instability due to the semitones—but 
as they keep vibrating as the only sound in the piece, we hear them struggling to 
escape from silence before finally give in. In this piece, the silence is heard with sonic 
density. The musical means used by Webern to capture the quality of silence become 
interpreted as stillness, softness, hush, and fragmentation.31 When something elicits 
nothing, silences itself becomes the act of expression itself.32 Webern’s piece (1913) 
premiered much earlier than the publication of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943), 
but it demonstrates at the very least that the once clear distinction between sound and 
silence had already been blurred well before the French philosopher’s investigation 
of the phenomenon. Retrospectively, Webern’s approach to silence through sound 
could be regarded as a way to evoke the nothingness that Sartre later systematically 
derives from his notion of being. As a proximity to nothingness, the dwindling soft 
sonority in the music can easily fall out of our awareness along with silence, but 
they could always be dissected from silence by its constantly vibrating and changing 
texture. However, whether it is heard as sound or silence, the nature of the sound 
itself does not change, since it either possesses or has the potential to possess the 
definite five-determinant relation to the total sound-space. Therefore, this particular 
piece by Webern alludes to the later recognition that nothingness as the origin of 
silence comes from nowhere else but sound itself. 

Silence, as realized in later modernist styles, transcends from an act of expression to 
an attitude of interrogation. John Cage, for example, was the first composer who 
sought the state of pure silence in his works, and his legendary piece 4’33” (1952)33 
does not contain even a single note—ushering in four minutes and thirty-three 
seconds of essential silence as its title indicates. In the text Silence, Cage makes a 
distinction between the intentional and unintentional sound.34 For a listener, what 
we traditionally regard as intentional is the sound heard with a particular relation 
to the sound-space, while what regarded as unintentional we are unaware of (and 
it consequently recedes into silence). The sound made by the orchestra at a concert 
according to the notes on music sheets is the intentional making, while the other 
sounds, for instance, breathing and clothes rustling, are the unintentional. In 4’33”, 
by excluding the instrumental sounds that are normally conceived as intentional, 
Cage alters the audience’s expectation by switching the unintentional sound in the 
surrounding environment to the intentional—he invites the silence into our auditory 
31 Ibid, Pg. 334.
32 Ibid, Pg. 336.
33 The title of this work is the total length in minutes and seconds of the performance. At Woodstock, N.Y., August 

29, 1952, the title was 4’33” and the three parts ware 33”, 2’40”, and 1’20”. It was performed by David Tudor, 
pianist, who indicated the beginnings of parts by closing, the endings by opening, the keyboard lid. However, the 
work may be performed by any instrumentalist, or combination of instrumentalists and last any length of time.

34 John Cage, Silence: lectures and writings, 14.



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Sound as Silence

experience as sounds. Since silence cannot be perceived by itself, the audience are 
encouraged to listen actively to those sounds that might otherwise be silence for 
them. Here, standing on the borderland between sound and silence, Cage captures 
their structural alteration by being conscious of their intimate relationship, thereby 
demonstrating the relation between being and non-being. Just like the consciousness 
of being, the consciousness of sound in this piece suspends the presupposed distinction 
between the intentional and unintentional sound, and in that act, the supposedly 
unintentional sounds that once were the non-being of sound are now made aware by 
us and determined by their specific relation to the sound-space as the new continuum 
in our auditory experience. Since there is nothing that separates sound from silence, 
as illustrated in this piece by Cage, nothingness slips into the cleavage introduced 
by the suspension of consciousness. The notion of nothingness, then, elucidates the 
(non-)identity of silence with sound: silence is the being of sound, in the mode of 
not being it.

5. IMPLICATION

What are the implications of the abstract dialectic of nothingness in the world of 
sound to our auditory experience in daily life? Can the interplay between sound and 
nothingness go beyond the notion of silence? I would like to offer some preliminary 
sketches to answer these questions in this final section.

In the history of western music, silence has never been equal to sound until the 
rise of modernism in the early twentieth century. The moments of silence in music 
had been generally considered as “supposed non-sound”, which inevitably served as 
the backdrop against which ‘real sound’ could be presented and dissected.35 Those 
silent moments in music tend to be experienced as expressive quietness; for example, 
the tense pauses in the opening measure in Haydn’s String Quartet, Op. 76, No. 5 
“Finale,” or the quiet stillness in Introit of Berlioz’s Requiem. Later, as composers 
gradually shifted away from the conventional musical elements—such as harmony, 
melody, or texture—that the classical and romantic period exploited, music was 
taken to a broader sonic aspect, where silence as the previously supposed absence 
of expressive utterances became an act of expression itself. With the realization that 
sound is inseparable from silence, modern composers began to welcome silence 
in their works. As the boundary between sound and silence is blurred, so does the 
boundary between what is music and what is not—from Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring 
to Schoenberg’s twelve-tone theory to the later serialism led by Boulez. Composers 
constantly challenged these originally absolute binary distinctions, all of which 
arguably relate to the existential notion of nothingness, which derived an even broader 
implication: there is nothing separating something from nothing. As a result, in terms 

35 David Metzer, "Modern Silence," The Journal of Musicology, vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 336.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

of our own auditory experience, music seems to become an arbitrary limitation to 
how we perceive the sound in the world. Cage describes music as “an organization 
of sound,”36 but what is organization? When we contemplate the question, it seems 
that everything could be an organization; for example, nature, industry, society, and 
therefore, anything could be heard as music—as Cage writes himself:

Wherever we are, what we hear is mostly noise. When we ignore it, it 
disturbs us. When we listen to it, we find it fascinating. The sound of a 
truck at fifty miles per hour. Static between the stations. Rain. We want to 
capture and control these sounds, to use them not as sound effects but as 
musical instruments.37

All sounds, including “noise,” are music. The notion of noise, however, has not been 
mentioned or discussed in this paper. It is not normally active in our perception 
because it is too disturbing to be aware of constantly, so it lacks a definite relation to 
the sound-space, (at least for most of us). At the same time, it is not part of relative 
silence either because we might find it disturbing even if we are not completely 
aware of it. Thus, “[n]oise is the last thing that separates us from silence.”38 Given 
the analogy between the dialectic of being and nothingness and that of sound and 
silence, an interesting topic left for future discussion might be centered around the 
notion of noise (an unescapable element from our normal auditory experience) and 
how it fits into this essay’s conceptual scheme of sound and silence, relates to Sartre’s 
understanding of nothingness, and whether or not there is a defining quality to noise 
such that it does not fall into pure value judgement. ◆

36 John Cage, Silence: lectures and writings, 3.
37 Ibid.
38 David Metzer, "Modern Silence," The Journal of Musicology, vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 369.



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Sound as Silence

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beckett, Samuel. Nouvelles et Textes pour rien. Paris: Minuit, 1955.

Beckett, Samuel. Stories and Texts for Nothing. New York: Grove P, 1967.

Cage, John. “4’33””, track 14 on CAGE, J.: Primitive / In a Landscape / A Room / 
Variations I / Waiting / 4' 33'' / Dream / Suite for Toy Piano (Happy Birthday John!) 
(Cage, Sacchi). John Cage. Floraleda Sacchi. Amadeus Arte AAP12001, 2012, 
compact disc.

Cage, John. 4’33”. Second Tacet Edition EP6777. Edition Peters No. 6777, 1953.

Cage, John. Silence: lectures and writings. Wesleyan University Press, 1961.

De Visscher, Eric, "'There's no such thing as silence...': John Cage's Poetics of 
Silence", in Interface 18.4 (1989), 257-268. 

Guignon, Charles B, and Derk Pereboom. Existentialism: Basic Writings. Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2001.

Link, Stan. "Much Ado about Nothing." Perspectives of New Music, vol. 33, no. 1/2 
(1995): 216-72. www.jstor.org/stable/833707.

Metzer, David. "Modern Silence." The Journal of Musicology, vol. 23, no. 3 (2006): 
331-74. doi:10.1525/jm.2006.23.3.331. 

Pascal, Blaise, and Thomas Stearns Eliot. Pascal's Pensées; Introduction by TS Eliot. EP 
Dutton, 1958.

Sartre, Jean-Paul, and Hazel Estella Barnes. Being and Nothingness. London: Methuen, 
1966.

Weagel, Deborah, and John Cage. "Silence in John Cage and Samuel Beckett: 4' 33" 
and "Waiting for Godot"." Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui 12 (2002): 249-62. 
www.jstor.org/stable/25781422. 

Weber, Max. “Science as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1919/1946.

Webern, Anton. “Sehr langsam und ausserst zart”, track 15 on Webern: Passacaglia / 
Symphony / Five Pieces. Ulster Orchestra. Yuasa, Takuo. Naxos 8.554841, 2001, 
compact disc.


