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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

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HEROES OR VILLAINS?: 
         A Lockean Approach to Justifying Vigilantism  

REBEKAH LOCKE

§1 Introduction
It has long been argued that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence and imposition of sanctions.  But what happens in cases where the state 
fails to e!ectively carry out its duties of punishment and protection?  "at is where 
vigilantes come in. Many philosophers deny that vigilantism can ever truly be 
justi#ed. I disagree, and I believe more people agree with me than they know. "ink 
of the vigilantes we see in movies and television. We call these people heroes, or 
even superheroes (just look to the massive success of the recent superhero “Avengers” 
movies). As an audience, we laud these rogue crime-#ghters: the lonely cop against 
a crooked police force, a man seeking justice for a murder that was dismissed due to 
negligence or corruption, a serial killer who hunts and kills other serial killers. As an 
audience, we seem to accept vigilantism. Why then, are we so loath to accept it as 
politically justi#able? "at is what I aim to explore. 

Vigilantism refers to the non-state sanctioned punishment of criminals and is 
justi#ed in certain speci#c instances, namely in a “pseudo-state of nature.” A pseudo-
state of nature is a state in between the chaos of a full-blown state of nature (the state 
into which man is born and exists until some form of order or government is put 
in place) and the order of an established socio-political state. "is is a state wherein 
the established order has failed in some critical aspect, such as apprehension or 
punishment of criminals. I will elaborate on the concept of a “pseudo-state of nature” 
in section three. Using a Lockean approach to governmental rights (which I explain in 



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Heroes or Villains

section two), I apply the “Natural Executive Right”—a right to punish transgressions 
that philosopher John Locke believed belonged to all people in a state of nature—in 
these “pseudo-states of nature,” the end result of which is a philosophical justi#cation 
for vigilantism. I believe that vigilantism is a reasonable and justi#able response to 
wrongdoings when the state fails to uphold its duties of punishing criminals and 
protecting its citizens. "at is what I seek to prove in this paper.

§1 Defining the Phenomenon
In this paper I aim to justify only the speci#c phenomenon known as crime-control 
vigilantism. Crime-control vigilantism is what we normally think of when we think 
of vigilantism.  As H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter Sederberg de#ne it, crime-control 
vigilantism “is directed against people believed to be committing acts proscribed 
by the formal legal system1.” Vigilantes are concerned with the same criminals with 
which the state normally would be concerned.  "is type of vigilantism occurs 
especially when the state or establishment fails or is seen to be ine!ectual:

 "e primary causes of these activities [crime-control vigilantism] are  
 disillusionment with the government’s ability to enforce the laws and,  
 apparently, the belief that the police are corrupt.  "ese cases are examples  
 where groups normally classi#ed as potential participants in dissident  
 violence share certain values with the established legal system and are  
 attempting to extend the enforcement of these shared norms into their  
 neglected communities.2 

Crime-control vigilantism is characterized by actions that ultimately coincide with 
the norms of the state even though they may involve the transgression of those same 
norms. 

Speci#cally, the term vigilante, as I use it, refers to a person or group of persons who 
protect and restore the establishment (except in cases where the establishment has 
enacted evil laws, but more on this later) through the use of extralegal actions in 
situations where the state or legal system has failed to function properly in some crucial 
way. In their essay “Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence,” Rosenbaum 
and Sederberg classify vigilantism as “establishment violence.”  Establishment violence 
is violence with the goal of maintaining or defending the established order.3 It is 
not violence aimed at the establishment but rather at restoring the establishment.  
Vigilantes are concerned with the ideals and motives of the established order but 
feel they must resort to actions that violate the formal boundaries of that order to 
protect it.  "e idea that they must act outside of the established order to protect 

1 Jon Rosenbaum and Peter Sederberg. "Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence." In Vigilante Politics. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, (1976). 3-29. 10.

2 Ibid, 3.
3 Ibid, 4.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

that order—the feeling that the existing order is so corrupt that one cannot feasibly 
correct it from within—is what makes “establishment violence” true vigilantism.

Moreover, for actions to be considered vigilantism they need to be both voluntary 
and completely divorced from the state; the vigilante cannot be accountable to the 
state in any way.  Vigilantism occurs when the state has been rendered ine!ective, or 
at the very least, when the state appears ine!ective. Vigilantism, as I will use it for the 
remainder of my argument, is the use or threat of violence by voluntary agents acting 
without regard for state approval and directed toward protecting the reasonably 
just morality of a given community and maintaining objective security within that 
group.4 Furthermore, and most importantly, vigilantism is a reaction to crime or 
transgressions of an established order, especially when that order has been rendered 
ine!ective in some way5. I believe it is the “Natural Executive Right”—our individual 
right to punish all transgressors in the state of nature—that justi#es vigilantism.

§2 The Natural Executive Right6

Before we discuss Locke’s “Natural Executive Right,” we must #rst explain his concept 
of a “state of nature.” A state of nature is the state into which all men are born and 
in which there is no socio-political order. All men are free from laws and governance 
until some overarching order is formed. In his Two Treatises of Government, Locke 
argued that all men are naturally free—that they are born into a state of nature—and, 
as such, have certain inherent rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property7. It 
is only in the formation of a social or political order or government that man leaves 
the state of nature. In this formation, man voluntarily transfers his natural rights to 
the state. It is through this voluntary transfer of man’s natural rights that the state 
gets its own rights, such as the right to make and enforce laws. "erefore, when the 
state fails or is disbanded, man is returned to a state of nature and his natural rights 
are returned. 

Among the natural rights that Locke believed man to have is the “Natural Executive 
Right,” which includes the right to punish any and all transgressions of the law 
of nature.  Let us begin this discussion of Locke’s “Natural Executive Right” by 
examining why he argued that it is a right belonging to all people in a state of nature. 
In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke claims:

4 "is de#nition is derived from two articles on the subject of vigilantism: Travis Dumsday’s "On Cheering Charles 
Bronson: "e Ethics of Vigilantism" and Les Johnston’s "What Is Vigilantism?"

5 Travis Dumsday, "On Cheering Charles Bronson: "e Ethics of Vigilantism." "e Southern Journal of 
Philosophy XLVII (2009): 49-67. 60.

6 "e existence of the natural executive right is a contentious one, with many detractors arguing that such a right is 
even paradoxical in nature. For a full yet ultimately unconvincing argument against the Natural Executive Right, 
see Je!rie Murphy’s "A Paradox in Locke's "eory of Natural Rights." For the purpose of this paper, however, 
because I am focusing on arguing for the legitimacy of vigilantism, I urge the reader to simply take the existence 
of the NER as a conditional; if the natural executive right as I argue for it exists then vigilantism is justi#ed.

7 Alex Tuckness,"Locke's Political Philosophy", "e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/locke-political/>



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Heroes or Villains

 To justify bringing such evil [punishment] on any man two things are  
 requisite. First that he who does it has commission and power to do  
 so.  Secondly, that it be directly useful for the procuring of some greater  
 good . . . Usefulness, when present, being only one of those conditions,  
 cannot give the other, which is a commission to punish. 8

Locke believed that punishment is only acceptable when those who execute it have 
the commission and power to do so. "is authoritative power to punish comes from 
what Locke calls the “Natural Executive Right.” "is right gives all individuals in a 
state of nature the “right to punish the transgressors of that law [of nature] to such 
a degree as may hinder its violation9.”  It is from the transfer of this right from the 
individual to the state, Locke contends, that the government attains the power to 
punish its citizens.  As the #rst of his three arguments for the “Natural Executive 
Right” has no bearing on my concept of vigilantism, I will skip directly to his second 
and third arguments.

Locke’s second argument for the existence of a natural executive right links the 
natural executive right with the right to preserve humankind. Locke argues that it 
is an inherent right in a state of nature to protect and preserve humankind through 
punishment. Broadly construed, the right to preservation could include the right 
not only to defend others when they are under attack but also the right to create a 
“deterrent climate” through punishment and preemptive attacks10.  For the right to 
preserve humankind through proper punishment, it must be construed in the broad 
sense because punishment involves much more than defense during an attack: “[P]
unishment begins where defense leaves o!11.” It is to this broad construal of the right 
to preserve humankind that Locke appeals.  Punishment of crimes, in the sense that 
it deters future criminals from acting, becomes a form of protection against future 
attacks, a protection in which all people have an interest12. "is is how our natural 
right to protect mankind validates the “Natural Executive Right.”

"e third argument Locke gives for the “Natural Executive Right,” the right that all 
people are endowed with to punish any and all transgressions in a state of nature, 
comes from an examination of the government’s right to punish.  "e government 
has a right to punish criminals, but as the government gets its power solely from the 
voluntary transfer of natural rights from the citizens who agree to be governed,13  
individuals must have the natural right to punish before there is a government. 
It follows that individuals in a state of nature—existing before or outside of 

8 Jon A. Simmons. ""e Right to Punish." In "e Lockean "eory of Rights. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, (1992). 121-66. 122.

9 John Locke. "e Second Treatise of Government. (1689). Reprint, New York: "e Liberal Arts Press, (1956). 6.
10 Simmons, 136.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, 137.
13 Ibid, 123-4.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

government—have the right to punish wrongdoers themselves. It is from the transfer 
of our natural rights that Locke believes the government gains the commission and 
power to punish. However, in situations where the state has failed or does not exist, 
the rights of the people return to the individual. "is gives individuals the right to 
punish when there is no state or when the state has failed in some critical manner 
(a “pseudo-state of nature”). "is is why I believe that what Locke calls the “Natural 
Executive Right,” applied in a “pseudo-state of nature,” justi#es vigilantism14.

§3 The Pseudo-State of Nature 
Having established the possibility15 of a natural executive right that would allow 
individuals in a state of nature to punish wrongdoers, what impact does this have 
for our attempts to justify vigilantism? It seems quite obvious that most humans do 
not exist in a “pre-political” state; only rarely can one #nd individuals living without 
some form of socio-political structure, and states of complete political dissolution do 
not last long.  But when the state ceases to function properly in important aspects 
such as punishment and crime-deterrence—if it fails partially with respect to some of 
its duties while still functioning in every other aspect—it becomes, in a very relevant 
sense, like a state of nature.  I call these situations “pseudo-states of nature.”  "ese 
pseudo-states of nature are akin to a full-blown state of nature in the sense that the 
state or socio-political order in such a pseudo-state has failed in some critical way.  It is 
not that a state or established order does not exist in these circumstances. Rather, the 
state or established order is so ine!ective in certain aspects that it is as if it were absent 
in those respects.  As I argue, crime-control vigilante justice is permissible in these 
“pseudo-states of nature” precisely because they are instances where the state fails in 
some ways but still maintains a semblance of governance in other ways.  "e relevant 
state failures for this discussion on vigilantism are the failure to punish those who 
transgress the laws (or morality in the case of a corrupt government) of the society it 
governs and the failure to protect its citizens from danger and loss of security. 

"e crucial characteristic of a pseudo-state of nature is that it is a state that has not 
yet degraded into chaos—there is still an overarching structure, the skeleton of the 
state.  "e laws, procedures, and all other facets of the establishment still exist in a 
pseudo-state of nature.  "e only thing that is missing, in the cases I am focusing on, 
is a properly functioning system of punishment, or, in some situations, a properly 
working legislative body.  In these situations, the state simply fails in one or two 
aspects.  As the state gets its right to punish from our right to punish others (Locke’s 

14 Together, all three of Locke’s arguments for the natural executive right (including the one I have not addressed) 
make as strong a case as any competing explanation of the natural executive right, the right to punish 
wrongdoings in a state or pseudo-state of nature.  What I have aimed to do here is make a case for the natural 
executive right as at least as plausible as any other theory. 

15 "ere are still a great many detractors toward the “Natural Executive Right,” and as I do not have room in this 
paper to argue all of these points, from here on my argument is conditional, operating under the assumption that 
the “Natural Executive Right” is real and that, applied in a pseudo-state of nature, justi#es vigilantism.



23Issue IX ɢ Spring 2022

Heroes or Villains

conception of the “Natural Executive Right”), when the state cannot or does not 
punish, we can, and should, temporarily take back that right and punish wrongdoers 
ourselves.  In these pseudo-states of nature vigilantes #ll the gap, so to speak, stepping 
in, in many cases, for the state but also for the community as a whole. States that are 
only temporarily without a properly functioning system of punishment can survive 
if someone—a vigilante—takes over that one function until the state is working 
properly. 

Although he does not speci#cally call them pseudo-states of nature, Travis Dumsday, 
in his article “On Cheering Charles Bronson: "e Ethics of Vigilantism,” outlines 
four situations in which vigilantism is permissible.  I believe that all of these situations 
are examples of pseudo-states of nature and cover most, if not all, pseudo-state of 
nature circumstances relevant to vigilantism.  "e four situations are: 1) "e state 
has enacted good laws but is failing to enforce them; 2) "e state has failed to enact 
certain good laws; 3) "e state has enacted evil laws; and 4) "e state has enacted 
good laws and is enforcing them16. 

In the #rst circumstance, when the state has enacted good laws but is failing to enforce 
them, the legislative aspect of the state is functioning properly but the executive 
branch is not punishing transgressions of these laws.  "is can happen for a number 
of reasons.  If the police force or other players in the justice system are corrupt,17  have 
ulterior motives (such as racist agendas), or are simply inept, then they will ultimately 
fail to uphold the system of punishment the state has put in place.  In such cases, 
individuals not only have the right to protect themselves from criminal activities, they 
also have the right to punish transgressors because the state has failed to do so.  Such 
instances seem to be fairly clear examples of pseudo-states of nature in that the state 
is functioning properly in some aspects but has failed completely in others, mainly 
the punishment of criminals. Vigilantes are concerned with the same criminals with 
which the state should normally be concerned.  Instances of grievous injustice, such 
as when a murderer is acquitted because evidence was obtained illegally or because 
he bribed or intimidated jurors, should be considered failures of the state under this 
conception of pseudo-states of nature.  In such cases, the state is unable to punish 
wrongdoers and protect its citizens e!ectively.  "e state itself may not be corrupt or 
willfully blind, but, because of forces out of the state’s control or mistakes made along 
the way, the state has failed to completely uphold its duties, becoming a pseudo-state 
of nature. 

"e second situation in which the state has failed to enact good laws is slightly more 
di$cult to justify.  Dumsday explains these circumstances as ones where a state has 
failed to prohibit actions that, from a rational point of view, would have been deemed 

16 Dumsday, 58.
17 Ibid.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

wrong or breaches of natural law18.  For example, if a theoretical state did not prohibit 
murder or rape, or, in a more realistic example, excluded certain races, religions, or 
creeds from protection, then it has not enacted good laws19.  Dumsday also includes 
under this category instances of a state enacting good laws but failing to endorse 
su$cient punishment20.  In this case, a government may prohibit murder but attach 
a grievously insu$cient punishment to its transgression—Dumsday uses the example 
of a one week jail sentence21.  It is helpful, in defending Dumsday’s argument, to use 
the idea of the morality of a state.  If we look to the general morality of the citizens 
in a corrupt state as establishing the proper norms, it becomes easier to argue that the 
state has failed in some way by not enacting certain laws or su$cient punishment.

"e same principle applies to Dumsday’s third category, instances where the state has 
enacted evil laws22.  It would seem impossible, to some degree, for a state to enact 
“evil” laws if the laws are merely a construct of the state alone.  But if the state enacts 
laws that go against the overall morality of its community, such as the sterilization 
of mentally ill individuals or the prohibition or limiting of African American voting 
rights, when the community feels these actions are unethical, then the state has 
failed. Also, if the state itself is evil, such as in Nazi Germany, and is enacting laws 
that do not align with the majority morality of its community, then such laws can be 
considered evil, and the state has failed in its duties to protect its citizens.  

"e fourth and #nal situation in which vigilantism is permissible according 
to Dumsday is when the state has enacted good laws and is enforcing them23.  
Dumsday begins his explanation of these situations by noting that this is the hardest 
circumstance in which to justify vigilantism24.  "is last category does not clearly 
describe a pseudo-state of nature and is therefore an exception, but a very small one.  
"e only types of vigilantism that are permissible in cases where the state has enacted 
good laws and is enforcing those laws properly, according to Dumsday, is when the 
vigilante has a certain skill that can aid law enforcement25.  In these situations, the 
vigilante in question has some ability that the state does not.  It is important to 
note, however, that the vigilante is not willingly accountable to the state; he is not 
working with law enforcement, hired by the state, or in any other way responsible 
to the state.  "e most prominent example of this would be superheroes with special 
powers that law enforcement o$cers do not have.  Another more realistic example 
is the specialized skill of hunting and trapping runway criminals26.  In either case, if 
the vigilante uses his skills to help the police but does not hold himself accountable 

18 Ibid, 61.
19 Ibid, 61-2.
20 Ibid, 62.
21  Ibid.
22 Ibid, 64.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.



25Issue IX ɢ Spring 2022

Heroes or Villains

to the state and does not need the state’s approval then this would be, according to 
Dumsday, an acceptable use of vigilantism. 

§4 Objections to Vigilantism
"e conception of vigilantism as “establishment violence” stemming from the 
“Natural Executive Right” and only applying in a pseudo-state of nature still does 
not satisfy some theorists. Alon Harel, an opponent of vigilantism, argues that the 
state has a monopoly on the use of force to punish or protect27. Harel argues that 
criminal sanctions are legitimate only because they are state in%icted.  Although Harel 
gives three arguments against privately-imposed sanctions, only his integrationist 
argument pertains to vigilantism as I have de#ned it. In this section I will examine 
Harel’s integrationist condition for the right to punish as it applies in a pseudo-state 
of a nature, and, as a result, will prove that it does not preclude vigilantism as I have 
argued for it.  

Harel’s most important argument for the legitimacy of state-exclusive criminal 
punishments comes from his integrationist, or state-centered, argument.  "is 
roughly means that the power to punish is an “agent-dependent” power; only the 
state can punish because state-imposed sanctions are designed to realize speci#c goals 
and perform speci#c tasks28.  Another way to explain Harel’s argument is to say that 
criminal sanctions are, fundamentally, an expression of the community’s disapproval 
of criminal acts29. As such, only the state can in%ict legitimate punishment because 
only the state, and not private entities or other individuals, speaks for the community.  
Privately in%icted sanctions may serve some of the other functions of punishment, 
such as deterrence or retribution, but they will never embody the symbolic signi#cance 
that state-imposed sanctions do30.  "is view—that state-exclusive punishment is the 
only legitimate form of punishment because it is part of the duties and powers of the 
state—is what Harel calls an integrationist justi#cation31.  "e state’s right to punish, 
then, is entirely tied to its power to issue prohibitions in the #rst place32. 

"is integrationist justi#cation for state in%icted sanctions relies on the premise 
that punishment of criminal transgressions is part of the state’s network of rights 
and duties. To take this away from the state—to allow for the privatization of 
punishment—would fundamentally disrupt its proper functioning33.  "e state sets 

27 Harel has three arguments against the “Natural Executive Right”—instrumental, normative, and integrationist. 
Only his integrationist argument is germane to my premise and so that is what I will focus on. For Harel’s 
full argument against the natural executive right see Alon Harel. "Why Only the State May In%ict Criminal 
Sanctions: "e Case Against Privately In%icted Sanctions," Legal "eory 14 (2008): 113-33. 

28 Alon Harel, "Why Only the State May In%ict Criminal Sanctions: "e Case Against Privately In%icted 
Sanctions." Legal "eory 14 (2008): 113-33. 118.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, 123. 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, 125.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

the prohibitions, and so it must also set and consequently enforce the punishments 
attached to these prohibitions if these punishments are to be just34.  Harel goes as far 
as to say that a society without a system of state-issued punishments for the violation 
of norms or laws is “tantamount to . . . a stateless existence35 36.”  For the state to be 
e!ective—for it to govern justly—it must have the power to set norms as well as 
enforce them.  I have no qualms with this claim.  In fact, I agree with Harel for the 
most part.  A state without the power to enforce sanctions is tantamount to a stateless 
existence in many respects: it is a pseudo-state of nature.  But what Harel neglects to 
account for is an improperly functioning state.  Harel’s integrationist justi#cation of 
state sanctions does have force in the situations in which it applies, but this theory 
of punishment justi#cation simply does not pertain to actions in a pseudo-state of 
nature. Vigilantism is only permissible in those circumstances where the state cannot 
punish e!ectively, where the state’s proper functioning has already been disrupted.  
In these circumstances, non-state in%icted sanctions would not strip the state of its 
power to punish, as Harel argues,37 because the state has already lost this power some 
other way.  "erefore, my argument for the legitimacy of vigilantism in pseudo-states 
of nature does not con%ict with Harel’s ultimately valid integrationist justi#cation for 
state in%icted sanctions.

While Harel is unconvincing in his argument for the state’s express right to punish, 
he does raise some very important concerns regarding non-state-imposed sanctions, 
concerns that frequently appear in the discussion of vigilantism.  One of the #rst 
objections he raises toward privately in%icted sanctions is that when a punishment is 
not state-imposed it loses its ties with the state-imposed laws; there is a disconnect 
between the law being transgressed—a law imposed by the state—and the punishment 
for that transgression38.

In response to Harel’s argument that extralegal punishment severs the link between 
the body enacting the laws and the individuals enforcing them, I would argue that 
this is true to a small degree.  But most often vigilantes enforce those very same laws 
of the state (except in cases where the laws are evil, but this di$culty is cleared when 
“state” is replaced with “morality of community”).  Vigilantes are more than capable 
of enforcing the same or analogous punishments for criminal transgressions.  And 
because the vigilante, under the speci#c paradigm laid out in section one, strives to 
uphold the morality of his community, he is likely to mimic state sanctions as best he 
can.  "erefore, the vigilante is acting as a substitute for the state, enforcing the state’s 
laws and, in most cases, keeping to the state’s designated sanctions. 

34 Ibid, 130.
35 Surprisingly, Harel’s remarks re-enforce my classi#cation of an ill-functioning state as a pseudo-state of nature.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, 114.



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Heroes or Villains

However, even when a vigilante acts as a substitute for the state, he is still only human, 
and so subject to extreme bias.  "is leads to the next problem Harel mentions, the 
same one that Locke notes in the Second Treatise of Government: non-state in%icted 
punishment is highly susceptible to the whims and fancies of the individuals doling 
out the punishments39.  Extralegal punishment can quickly become excessive 
or too lenient, based on the interests of the punishers.   Furthermore, who metes 
out sanctions for the non-state punishers in this situation?: Quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes? Who watches the watchmen?  It seems unrealistic to expect all humans 
to judge themselves objectively.  As Locke says, “[I]t is unreasonable for men to be 
judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves40.”  

"e di$culty of bias and human error is the basis for another problem extralegal 
punishment faces: privately in%icted sanctions are grounded in private judgments41.  
When an individual imposes punishment for any transgression—whether a state 
issued prohibition or a moral transgression—he is governed by his own judgments of 
wrongness.  "is individual is also subject to his own conceptions of proper degrees 
of severity of punishment for any given transgression.  Even if the vigilante is acting 
as a substitute for the state and his judgments coincide with those of the state, those 
judgments simply are not the same as the state’s. 

Both of these concerns are easily solved.  "e question of who watches the watchman 
is answered through appeal to Locke’s original construction of the “Natural Executive 
Right.”  Because every individual in the (pseudo) state of nature has the right to 
punish all wrongdoers, any other individual can thus punish the vigilante if he should 
do something wrong42.  If a vigilante oversteps his bounds and begins to punish 
indiscriminately and contrary to the morality of the community to which he belongs, 
he can be punished, too.  In these situations, the vigilante himself has become a 
“wrongdoer” and can consequently be punished by another vigilante or the state, 
if it is functioning properly in that respect.  "is proviso also helps solve the other 
problem—that the vigilante, as a human, is subject to his own whims and may be 
driven by his own sel#sh motivations to committing undeserved vengeance.  Together 
with the condition that in order for vigilante actions to be legitimate they must 
conform to, or at least tend toward, those actions of a maximally rational agent—the 
“system of vigilante checks and balances,” so to speak—greatly diminishes the risk 
of unjust or unwarranted punishment. It is true that no human being is a maximally 
rational agent, nor can any person divorce himself from his emotions and personal 
motives, but neither can the state be completely unbiased and totally fair. If the 

39 Ibid, 118.
40 Locke,  9.
41 Harel, 127.
42 Establishing what a vigilante could do that deserves punishment is somewhat di$cult, as he is already operating 

outside of the con#nes of the law, so his simply breaking the law is not enough to warrant sanctions; in this 
case, we can again appeal to the idea of a general morality.  When the vigilante transgresses the morality of the 
community then he  can and shall be punished.



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Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

vigilante should fail to punish in a way that tends toward a maximally rational agent, 
slipping into vengeance and unnecessary and unnecessarily harsh punishments, then 
he is no longer a proper vigilante and should be subject to punishment.

Aside from the objections Harel raises, vigilantism is often charged with several 
other extreme di$culties.  One such di$culty is an epistemic di$culty: how can any 
one individual know that another individual is guilty of committing a crime? "is 
problem is inextricably linked with another di$culty facing vigilantism: the lack of 
procedural systems of justice and due process. Because vigilantes do not have to abide 
by the legal procedures that the state must follow, it seems that there is no standard 
of judgment for who is guilty in such pseudo-states of nature. 

"is is where I disagree.  It is true that a vigilante is not subject to the same rules as the 
state, but this does not mean he should be allowed to make rash, uninformed decisions.  
In fact, vigilantes should be held to a higher level of certainty of guilt precisely because 
they do not have to deal with procedural red tape and legal technicalities. "is is why 
I would like to add one last condition for legitimate vigilante actions: vigilantes must 
be certain of the guilt of whomever they seek to punish.  "ey must have evidence 
or #rm knowledge that a crime has been committed. A vigilante may even follow his 
own procedural process, collecting evidence (both legally and illegally), interviewing 
witnesses, and even giving the accused a chance to confess or make a case for his 
innocence.  "is stipulation—that a vigilante must have absolute certainty that an 
individual has committed some wrongdoing—solves the epistemic and procedural 
problems faced by vigilantism and precludes impulsive or reactionary violence as 
legitimate vigilante actions. Furthermore, I believe that the fact that a vigilante is 
not held to any procedural standards before acting saves him from the trappings of a 
corrupt state.  For it is during this practice of “due process” that corruption is most 
likely to occur; crucial evidence gets thrown out on technicalities, witnesses lie under 
oath, judge and jury are bribed or threatened to give a sentence of not guilty.  "e 
vigilante, acting on his own and not tied to these procedural measures, is better able 
to assess guilt and assign punishment in a pseudo-state of nature.

"ere still lies the problem of what justi#es the proclamation by the vigilante that 
a person is guilty. Without any procedural system in place to ensure justice, what 
makes the vigilante’s judgment a correct one?  Here is where I look again to the 
epistemic constraints put on vigilantism.  Before he can act, a vigilante must know 
for certain that the o!ender has committed some wrong.  As for what makes the 
vigilante’s judgment just, I turn back to the “Natural Executive Right.”  In a state 
of nature, or pseudo-state of nature, everyone has the right to assess and punish 
transgressions of the laws of nature or the mores of his community.  We all have an 
equal right to confer judgments on others.  As John Simmons writes:



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Heroes or Villains

 Neither one’s general level of virtue nor one’s talents in the area of   
 punishment (e,g,, special aptitude for being a judge, jailer, or executioner)  
 are normally taken to establish any special claim to be the one who should  
 punish others43.

Everyone is equal in his or her right to judge others in a state, or pseudo-state, of 
nature. 

Additionally, because vigilantism must coincide with the morality of a community 
and tend toward the actions of a maximally rational agent, the vigilante cannot 
simply punish what he believes is wrong but must punish what the community he 
represents believes is wrong. "e vigilante must punish in a way that coincides with 
his community’s beliefs. Simmons, quoting Locke, agrees:

 While “every man in the state of nature has a power to kill a murderer”  
 (II, 11), “lesser breaches” of the law of nature must be punished less 
  severely (II, 12). "e executive right is a right only to retribute to him,  
 so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his  
 transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint44.

It is here that we must remember that while a vigilante is not beholden to the state, he 
does not operate completely free from the state. He is not isolated from the legislation 
and punishments of the state but, rather, is a free entity working outside the bounds 
of the state in order to protect and restore that same state.  "e vigilante acts outside 
the con#nes of a non-working state in an attempt to protect or improve the state and 
uphold the values of his community. Vigilante actions, going back to Rosenbaum 
and Sederberg, are establishment violence, violence aimed at protecting or correcting 
the existing establishment. "at is why a vigilante’s judgment of wrongs, in a pseudo-
state of nature, is valid and can lead to the just imposition of sanctions while still 
being free from the state.

Conclusion
"e goal of this paper has been to justify the highly speci#c phenomenon of crime-
control vigilantism in a Lockean pseudo-state of nature.  Ultimately, I hope to have 
proven that “Crime-Control Vigilantism” is a legitimate and just recourse when the 
state has failed to e!ectively ful#ll its functions because of John Locke’s conception of 
the “Natural Executive Right” applied in “pseudo-states of nature.”  My goal was to 
give credence to our intuitions of vigilantes as good guys, heroes, or even superheroes, 
while #nding a proper foundation for extralegal punishment.  I believe that Locke’s 
“Natural Executive Right,” the individual’s natural right to punish, applied in a 
pseudo-state of nature, a situation in which the state has failed in some crucial aspect 

43 Simmins, 312.
44 Idid, 318.



30

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

but exists in all other aspects, presents a solid philosophical justi#cation for “Crime-
Control Vigilantism.”

REFERENCES
Abrahams, R. G. Vigilant Citizens: Vigilantism and the State. Malden, Mass.: 

Polity, 1998. 

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http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/personal-autonomy/

Dumsday, Travis. "On Cheering Charles Bronson: "e Ethics of Vigilantism." 
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Harel, Alon. "Why Only the State May In%ict Criminal Sanctions: "e Case 
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Pojman, Louis P. "A Critique of Ethical Relativism ." In Ethical !eory: Classical 
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Rosenbaum, Jon, and Peter Sederberg. "Vigilantism: An Analysis of 
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Sederberg, Peter, and Jon Rosenbaum. "Vigilante Politics: Concluding 
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Heroes or Villains

Shotland, R. Lance, and Lynne I. Goodstein. ""e Role of Bystanders in Crime 
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