

































7Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College

δι
άν

οι
α

AN INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-LUC MARION, 
GADAMER CHAIR AT BOSTON COLLEGE

§1: INTRODUCTION ABOUT PROF. MARION'S 
TEACHING AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
GIVENNESS

Sky Lyu, Managing Editor Prof. Marion, you were appointed Gadam-
er chair in 2020 and during the past four years, have given lectures and 
taught courses. One of the most interesting and common comments from 
my peers about your philosophy is that it is very “healing,” since it offers 
a philosophical hope for them. So did you expect this impact to students 
and what would your mission be through your teachings here?

Jean-Luc Marion I’m sorry some students had suffered some intellec-
tual disease. But I would be glad that my philosophy may heal, because   
(bad) philosophy can harm as well as a good one may help. But this was 
not intended: I am doing philosophy, without predetermined outcomes 
or any apologetic intention. However, a clear distinction could be drawn 
between what we may call metaphysics, and what we may call phenom-
enology, that is, between a priori or closed philosophy (closed as once 
it was spoken of the “closing of the American mind”) and phenomenol-
ogy—which has a long history because it started around the beginning 
of the 19th century—which today is perhaps the opening, or reopening 
of philosophy. Perhaps, perhaps it is a positive experience for those who 
are interested in that [reopening]. That’s the difference: in the perspec-
tive of phenomenology, as Heidegger said once, higher than the effec-
tivity, stands the possibility. On the opposite, metaphysics—in analytical 
philosophy, formal philosophy, systematic idealism—the possibility is 



8

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

left behind the effectivity, encapsulated within objectivity.

Elliott Jones, Managing Editor For our introductory readers, what is 
the role phenomenology has had in the history of philosophy?  More 
particularly: your work is frequently cited in theological discussions.  
What do you believe your work can offer theology in contemporary di-
alogue?

JLM You understand that it is impossible to answer that kind of question 
shortly. What I can tell, is that I started by asking questions about the 
questions: philosophy should proceed that way, by asking new ques-
i ns  S  in  rs  s u  e ues i n   n  The Idol and 

Distance and God without Being, I questioned the question, very wide-
spread in the seventies, whether we can truly think that “God is dead”. 
And I made the point that the death of God means that what dies was by 
e ni i n n   n  i  n    s i  I  s n i  S ing 

that, I was just repeating what Nietzsche had already said. Idols are the 
main concepts of philosophy—including the concepts of being, cause, 
consciousness, free will, and so on. And you can verify it easily provided 
you are an historian of philosophy (which is what I started out trying 
to be, studying Descartes and Aristotle). And we have to destroy idols, 
whatever they are. And curiously, in that case, God does not stand on 
the side of the idols. In fact, “God is dead” means only that what we 
thought as a dead God was simply no God at all. And so, to some extent, 

e e    re pene  e ues i n    s e rs  
paradox. 

How far this is connected with phenomenology? It may be absolutely no 
connection in so far as this is a theological argument. But phenomenolo-
gy means a kind of philosophy which allows you to ask whether concepts 
supposed to be completely beyond ordinary question within philosophy 
might not be questioned as well. Another example: even if to know is to 
know an object (limited and certain), knowledge is not only the subjec-
tive construction of the object. The opposition, subjectivity/objectivity, 
though admitted by roughly everyone, does not stand.  If you study the 
history of philosophy, you discover that the object is always connected 
with the subject and that both concepts were born at the same period. 
For the ancient Greeks, there was no object, and there was no subject. 

n   is e ern e ni i n  e e  S e ing i  n 
be perfectly well known by the subject—because, in the sciences, for 
example, it was built by the subject.  So the fact that any object is consti-



9Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College

tuted by a subject means that nothing is more subjective than objectivity. 
S e ing is s i   e e i e i  s e e e s e e i e  

  uni   u i e  su e s  S  e i i  un s n   n 
intersubjectivity. And all philosophers today will agree to that. There-
fore the idea that science is objective means only that within science 

ere is n gree en  e een su e s   u  in er e s e is er 
other different agreements between subjects which lead to other kinds of 
intersubjectivity: in art, in morals, in politics, and in religion. So there 
is no absolute border. The question lies in understanding how we reach 
non-objective knowledge about what cannot nevertheless be constituted 
by us. And so the divide between objective science and subjective sci-
ence appears problematic.

EJ What you said about idols leads to the next question.  You spoke 
about the history of philosophy and these metaphysical constraints or 
“idols”, and how they limit our understanding—limit us from talking 
about certain phenomena. What are these metaphysical idols and why is 
phenomenology and your work a solution beyond them?

JLM  I think that metaphysics was and remains a very successful en-
deavor.  Being hard to produce intelligibility, the achievement of meta-
physics was to say: we may know in advance everything certainly by 
using the same set of concepts and of principles, categories, and deter-

in i ns  in e er e  e r  in  r ins n e  ne  e s  
us prin ip es e use  i  n r i r  e ni i ns  e prin ip e 

of identity. Or again: we should always be able to give a reason for what-
ever we claim to exist or be thought; any sentence has to be proved by 
re s ns  en e e prin ip e  su ien  re s n  ing se prin ip es 
(and all sciences use those standards), we have to stick to them and reject 
any other knowledge which could not yield to them as non-objective–a 
non-object for science. The problem is that we quite often meet with 
phenomena which contradict those standards, and does appear without 
doubt. Should we not, in those cases, modify our standards? De facto, 
from time to time, we can’t not modify those standards. So we have in 
modern fundamental physics. So the today question amounts to when 
n    i  e s n r s   s e p en en  r e er r 

 e re e   i  e p en en  i  e  n   e  
standards. And in phenomenology, we deal with the same question: are 
there phenomena which don’t yield to any previously known paradigm 
and nevertheless impose themselves beyond question. Among them, 

 r  is n e ep i n  e ni i n  u  i  n  e e se  
this “god” would not be God.  Let us consider, for instance, the impos-



10

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

sible. We universally admit that nothing is impossible, because, were 
something impossible to a God, then this “god” would not deserve to be 
admitted as God. 

 si i r re r  n e e presse  u  n  ere is n  e ni i n 
of man, not of man-hood, nor of the humanity of man; not only is 

ere n  e ni i n  u  ere should be n  e ni i n  n  r n  
e ni i n  n  i p se   r e p e   p i i  e er r p -
i i  regi e  is e s  i ri nis    i ri n e -

nition of man would be a threat? Not only because it will prove very  
likely wrong   e ni i n n se  r e  s i  ss  re-
igi n  n  s  n  u  e use n  e ni i n  

uld result in an exclusion by a persecution. In other 
r s  en n  i  e ni i n    n is 

s e is u i i n n  e e usi n  se 
 individuals who doesn’t apply to it, by constraint or 
even terror. Activists use the word “genocide” too  
easily; however genuine genocide means more the 
mass murder, it means suppressing human beings 
as non-human being, n e sis   e ni i n  
what is human and what is not. This is genocide, 
which kills all the more, kills the body because it  
enies rs  e s u   n in  S  r i se  is 

not yet a real genocide, though violent and mortal,  
remaining in some cases unavoidable. 

This leads to a remark about history: history is not a sci-
en e   er  seri us e   s u  u  i  is n   s ien e  
because it cannot make any prediction and prove any law by rehearsing 
any experience…And why not?  Because history means either the study 
of the past or what is going on in the present; however what is going 
on never pertains to a chain of objects occurring by strict determinism. 
There is properly no determinism in history. Not because there is no 
cause— on the opposite, there are too many of them —  but because no 
one can predict it. There was someone who made himself famous by 
predicting that we have reached the end of history, the whole humanity 
having agreed about free market, global capitalism and democracy…

SL Fukuyama? 

JLM No name dropping, please. But we are aware that this was not 
the case, for history refers only to the unexpected, the unpredictable, to 
the events in time, not to objects in determinism. And the event comes 



11Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College

as what is not yet, afar of any strict chain of objects. I would not say it 
comes out of the blue, but dare say that it comes from elsewhere. And it 
is why we should not master the event, but only to face it and answer it. 

Another case that is central to my work: is the question of the “gift”. 
At least, provided that we do not interpret it as a mere exchange, which 
alone pertains to economy (do ut des), transferring the possession of an 
object from one owner to another through the mean of money, which is 
enough an objective interpretation of the exchange. But the gift is not an 
e nge  e use i  s n  su ien  re s n  n  g  r  re s n  
give. It needs no reason at all, and it is why it remains always possible 
always. No reason, because it is based on inequality and non-reciprocity. 
Expecting no fair return, it frees itself from any possibility of being paid 
back, and, admitting no condition of possibility, it has not condition of 
possibility, To that extent the gift appears always unequal, unfair, not 
about justice, but beyond it.  Those cases, the unknowability of man, the 
incomprehensibility of God, the gratuity of the gift, or the unpredictabil-
ity of history— all of these become intelligible, if to some they may be 
explained, only by contradicting the usual understanding of the beings, 
produced by metaphysics.

§2: PHENOMENOLOGY OF GIVENNESS AS A 
BREAKTHROUGH. WHAT DOES IT OPEN FOR US, 
AND WHAT IS THE RISK?

SL e n  ge   e gi  I in   ur p en en g  r e 
phenomenology of “givenness” is somehow a breakthrough of tradition-
al phenomenology.  So, to facilitate discussion, let’s situate ourselves in 
a context. I want to bring in here the dialogue between you and Derrida, 
conducted by Prof. Kearney. It was a fascinating dialogue of course. But 
during the dialogue Derrida made a heavy critique saying that your phe-
nomenology is without “as such”; and you responded by pushing back 
even further, stating: “A real phenomenology would be to give up the 
concept of the horizon”—which is opposed to Levinas. To this extent, 
your phenomenology of “givenness” is a radical breakthrough, depart-
ing from traditional phenomenology.  But the question remains, to what 
extent is it still a phenomenology?

JLM Because there is nothing like a phenomenology as such—I agree 
on this point with Derrida, as well as with Heidegger. There is neverthe-



12

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

less an ongoing tradition of thinkers who each time claimed to make a 
breakthrough against their predecessors, but on the same track. So Hus-
serl made a breakthrough by enlarging the realm of intuition, and he 
made similar breakthroughs during all of his lifetime. So Heidegger ad-
mitted that he has killed the father again with a breakthrough to the ques-
tion of Being. Likewise Levinas made a breakthrough against Heidegger 
by saying that ontology is not fundamental, and ethics is.  And Derrida 
make a breakthrough with deconstruction, and so on. So each phenome-
nology is made by those who disagree with the previous phenomenolo-
gists by relying on them.  And that’s why phenomenology keeps going.  
I don’t know whether I deserve to be listed among them, but, anyway I 
kept going that way. If you dare to criticize Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, 
Levinas or Michel Henry, it is because you agree with the questions 
and only intend to go a step forward. To criticize a philosopher is not to 
contradict him, but to jump beyond his last jump. If you break a record 
in sports, you don’t erase the previous one, but improve it; in philosophy 
we do the same. Real philosophers don’t properly disagree, but try to 
use, in a better way, the result of the previous one. 

So now, let’s go to the question of horizon.  Indeed there is a horizon 
for regular phenomena: each phenomenon makes sense in the horizon 
of other related phenomena, within which a new one can be situated 
and seen. However there are cases where there is no horizon, because 
any comparison remains impossible—for instance, with the case of 
the event, the case of God. There is no horizon to the question of God 
because God is unconditioned, cannot be compared; for, if it could be 
compared, it would not mean God. Otherwise, God is incomprehensible, 
because, would it be comprehended by us, it would not mean God. And 
so on. So, in that case, we have no horizon.  And, when Derrida told 

e  e gi  is i p ssi e e use  s s n s  gi  is i en i e  
as a gift, it is cancelled as a gift, and reduced to an exchange— he was 
absolutely correct. But, nevertheless, the “gift” can be done, possible 
for us or not.  So, the impossibility of the gift means that the gift has no 
su ien  re s n  nn  e re u e   n e   n e nge  u  
provided it is reduced to givenness, includes its own impossibility. And 
Derrida and I agreed about that— the impossibility of the gift—, but we 
disagreed about its meaning: far from erasing the phenomenon of the 
gift, I acknowledge that this very impossibility enacts the “gift”. In other 
words, the intersection between the possible in the impossible cannot 
apply here.

SL  If the “gift” is possible, does it have risks?  Just as John J. Caputo 



13Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College

remarks: “Do we not come into a universal indebted-ness to God the 
giver, even though the gift has been released from a causal economy?”. 
Would the “gift” then be dangerous?

JLM The gift is indeed dangerous, it even may be seen as the most 
dangerous, the deinotaton [of Sophocles’]. About God, if meant as the 
Christian God, indeed we are all indebted to God, if only because God 
has loved (i.e. created) us before we even were.

SL Already?

JLM  Already. It’s done, to late to be denied.  We try to deny our indebt-
ness because we are obsessed by it, and this denial appears as its con-

r i n   is si u i n    s e e en   rig ening 
and comforting, I fully agree. So, I understand quite well why so many 
people want practically to be atheists, just in order to get rid of this – this 
what? This opening of the horizon. Yes, willingly or not, we are com-
pletely in debt to God.

SL I love your analysis of the excessive, saturated phenomenon—for 
example, revelation. And it seems to me a key to solve Derrida’s impos-
sibility. Do you think this kind of excessiveness exists in other areas, for 
example, psychoanalysis, or hermeneutics, or even aesthetics?  Do you 
think the analysis of such excessiveness in other areas could open new 
possibilities?

JLM  Indeed, there is no question about that. Saturated phenomena or 
excessiveness, if you prefer, identify themselves by an excess of intu-
ition with no matching concept; this provides us with the only expla-
nation about the question of aesthetic beauty, where we all agree on the 
in ui i n  en e n  us un e  e p in  gree en   n 
concepts. And in regular psychoanalysis, many people use the word “ob-
ject”, although clearly desire has no object and “object” sounds like an 
appropriate word. So when I say “given” or “saturated” phenomenon, 
that means something, which can be better used. As indeed it can be used 
in e in eres   p i s p  In p i s p  e es    ge  n r-
mation that something you thought and you’ve discovered is right is that 
i  n e use   n n p i s p ers in eir n e  n  s  I  er  
glad to see that “saturated phenomenon” is used in theology, in aesthet-
ics, in music—for instance, “saturated sound”— as well as the distinc-
tion, say, between icon and idol is used in the theory of painting today. 
S  e i n  p i s p  is n  rs   e is usse   pr essi n  
philosophers alone (they are living doing their job, doing their trade in 



14

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

their discussion, which looks good). But real achievement in philosophy 
consist in working out notions, concepts, arguments which can be used 
by non-philosophers.

§3: QUESTIONS FROM DIANOIA READERS 

SL I’m sure you are tired of our philosophy questions. So here is a ques-
tions from one of our readers. Janice is a freshman at Boston College in 
the philosophy department. And she learned from one of your interviews 
that in your youth, when the academy was full of big names like La-
can and Derrida, you secretly received instruction of theology, outside 
the campus. She is actually doing the same thing. She has founded a 
Lacanian psychoanalysis group called “Sinthome” outside the campus 
and they are doing lectures to teach themselves every week. So how do 
you view this kind of off-campus group—interest- or even faith-based 
study? And do you have any advice for her?

JLM I think that any serious study is self-taught study. When you go 
to the university you have tutors, but you study by yourself.  As I’ve 
told my students at the Sorbonne and elsewhere: What matters is how 

n  i u  s u e re  e s  i u  re e es  S  
my classes, the classes I and my colleagues give, are just to help you to 
read those books. If you can read them without sitting in my class, please 
don’t take my class. Read! And this is what I have done. There were 
many boring classes at my university. I skipped them. Or I was reading 
during the class.  And it is the best thing the professor could expect from 
me. 

SL Great, I will tell her the same thing!

§4: PROF. MARION’S ADVICE FOR UNDERGRADU-
ATE PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS

EJ  So our last question, which you’ve partly already answered: You say 
to your students “we should only read books we don’t understand,” be-
cause it allows us to philosophize about what we don’t understand. Now 
besides your books, of course, do you have any advice on other books or 
questions that the next generation of philosophers ought to philosophize 



15Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College

about or read. And secondly, what about the vast history of philosophy 
n   u  u gi e i e  rising p i s p  rs r n ing 

their niche in this two-thousand-plus year history? 

JLM To study philosophy is to read—if possible in the original languag-
es—Plato, Aristotle’s Metaphysics and his treatise On the Soul, some 
Augustine, Descartes, Kant, as well as those around Kant (like Hume), 
Husserl, Heidegger and so on.

SL Not Hegel?

JLM Yes, but only after reading Kant.  Don’t start with Hegel, because 
Hegel is based on Aristotle and Kant,…and on theology. So don’t try 
r  e eginning  n   s  ni e r ur  r s e ing i e 

that.  Try to go into the regions you have never visited before.  And then 
you will see.

EJ Professor Marion, we thank you very much for your time, it has been 
a real gift.



16

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

REFERENCES
Marion, J.-L., & Derrida, J. (2014). On the gift: A discussion 

between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion moderated by Rich-
ard Kearney. On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and 
Jean-Luc Marion, Moderated by Richard Kearney. 66;77.

Woodward, K. (Year). Marion & Francis: Love of God & phi-
losophy. Commonweal Magazine. ‘We Are Not Yet Christians’ | Com-
monweal Magazine


