

































38

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

δι
άν

οι
α

A SYMETRICAL ARGUMENT FOR PERSON-
HOOD AND ABORTION

ARTHUR DECARLE

This paper will be concerned with the moral status of abortion, 
e ne  in is ins n e s e un r  er in i n  r ing ere-

of, of a woman’s pregnancy. In my opinion, to satisfactorily defend a 
woman’s right to an abortion, one must display that a fetus is unworthy 
of moral consideration. In this paper, I will craft an argument to dis-
p   r  nsi er i n is gr n e   e rs  en  ns i us 
experience is possible. Further, I will suggest that fetuses before proper 
brain development are unworthy of moral consideration, morally justi-
fying a woman’s right to abortion. 

 e u e  ssess  i  e i  rs  nee   is inguis  
between a human and a person. The traditional argument against abor-
tion is a perfect example of the necessity to distinguish these terms. 
The traditional argument, as recounted by Warren is as follows: 

It is morally wrong to kill an innocent human being, fetuses 
are innocent human beings, then it is morally wrong to kill a 
fetus.1 

1 Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS 
OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/27902294, 12.



39Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion

e s e  e r i i n  rgu en  res s n e e ni i n  u n  
u n eing  in e p i s p i  sense  is  er  i   e ni-

i ns  e rs  is se e i en  n in i i u  e nging  e spe ies 
Homo Sapien n  n ining e u n gen e  is e ni i n n 
be referred to as the genetic human.2 The moral human, or person for 
the intent and purpose of this paper, is a completely developed member 
of the moral community and is thus granted full moral consideration. 

u  s I i  n  e p   isp  e e ni i n  use  u n  
begs the question. Premise one is simply a restatement of one of our 
most basic moral truths, assuming it is specifying a “moral human.” 
If it is the case that a fetus is an “innocent human”, then by necessity, 

ere us  e  ne  e ni i n  u n  s i  is i gi   ssign 
moral judgment to an individual based solely on genetics. If premise 

 is per ing n e gene i  e ni i n  u n  en i  egs e 
question, what makes a genetic being morally innocent? If that is the 

se  en  ne  e ni i n  u n  us  e use   i  ur er 
gi  ies  ere re  ei er e rgu en  u i i es ne e ni i n 
 u n  n  egs e ues i n  r i  uses  e ni i ns  u-

man”, and the argument becomes unsound. The argument fails to prove 
 e presen e  u n gene i s is ne ess r  n  su ien  r 

inclusion into the moral community and therefore fails due to the lack 
 e u e e ni i ns  is p per i  e p   i  e pi s  

the traditional argument by further exploring the difference between a 
genetic human and a moral one.

 I  eser es e p sis  e e usi e n ure  e e ni i n  
a person is central to the debate over a fetus’ personhood status. Phi-

s p ers e n ri us  s rugg e   re e  e ni i n   pers n 
and none to this date has been generally accepted. That being said, one 
cannot act immorally to someone else on the grounds that “person” is 
n  e r  e ne  i ing e  n is re   pers n r e   n  
n  e e ni i n  ne  e    e ni i n es n  en i  e 

non-existence of the concept. One may ask, how can I assert a claim re-
g r ing pers n  i u  e er e ning e er  e ns er see s 

 ie in e   ne n ri u e su ien  n i i ns r  pers n 
i u  su   e ni i n  I  I en un er n in i i u   u s s e 
 e n  n i i ns pr p se  in e re  r  I n e n en  I 

am interacting with a person. 

First, to outline our understanding of personhood, we must 

2 Id., 15.



40

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

start with the moral community. While I will not attempt to lay out a 
p e e n sis  r  uni  I i  e e p i  su ien  

enough to make my argument. The moral community, used descriptive-
ly in this context, is a group owing to a recognized moral philosophy 
that serves to govern their pursuits.3 It consists exclusively of people, 
with all people being included in the moral community. People are 
individuals who, alone, are granted full moral consideration from the 
moral community.4 It is the case that all persons are human, it is not 
the case that all humans are persons are human. To illustrate the point, 
I present an example: a man has his head surgically removed and 
discarded while his headless body is kept alive using medical equip-
ment. The headless body is still living and still retains its homo sapien 
status, therefore, it is human. Can the same be said for his personhood? 
Our intuitions suggest that his lack of head, the part of the body that 
contributes to every attribute we hold to be like that of a person, is 
now severed and dead. This example, and others like it are intended to 
display our intuitive belief that “human” and “person” are not synony-
mous. 

Second, to understand personhood as it is commonly under-
s  ne us  ress e ep e  su ien  n i i ns  rren 
and Dennett both formulate almost identical conditions following the 
sophisticated cognitive capacity school of thought. In their respective 
works, entitled On The Moral And Legal Status of Abortion and Condi-
tions of Personhood, they assert the following: 

1) consciousness of the objects and events external and/or 
internal to the being;

2) reasoning: the developed capacity to problem-solve relative-
ly complex issues;

3) self-motivated activity: activity independent of genetic or 
direct external control;

4) a capacity to communicate, by whatever means;

5) the presence of self-identity and self-awareness. 5

3 Babst, G.A. (2011). “Moral Community”. In: Chatterjee, D.K. (eds) 
Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5_328.

4 Dennett, Daniel. “CONDITIONS OF PERSONHOOD.” Identities of 
Persons, 1976, 175–96. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520353060-008. 

5  Id., 5; Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS 
OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/27902294, 17.



41Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion

 Now that both the moral community and personhood have 
been crudely described, I suggest that only consciousness (1) and the 
presence of self-identity (5) are required for a being to be regarded as 
 pers n  ns i usness ne is n   su ien  es rip i n i u  

the distinction of human self-identity. A phenomenon that seems to be 
unique to the human species is the idea of self-identity and how it feels 
to be a self. An emergent property occurs within humans that permits 
us to develop from a simple creature, a fetus, to a complex creature 
capable of advanced consciousness and the subjective experience of 
what it is like to be oneself. It is hard to dispute that a cat is conscious, 
but much harder to prove that the cat has the experience of feeling like 
a self and recognizing that same feeling in others in the way a human 
undoubtedly does. This conscious awareness and “feeling like a self” 
are the key factors to personhood and will be referred to as one term: 
conscious experience.

 ns i us e perien e  in  ie  is e rs  n  s  ru i  
deciding factor in distinguishing a being’s status in the moral commu-
nity. That is to say, conscious experience serves as a precursor to all 
other conditions presented by Warren and Dennett. To display the value 
that modern society places on the conscious experience, I will deploy 
yet another example. Let us imagine a man who gets in an extremely 
traumatic accident and is rushed to the hospital. Let us also assume 
that before his accident, he was healthy and, by all accounts, deploying 
a conscious experience. Due to his injuries, his heart stops for a few 
moments and he goes unconscious. Anyone even remotely familiar 
with modern science would reject the notion that this man is no longer 
a person, but why? I would contend that his prior conscious experience 
coupled with the medical capabilities of restarting his heart would 
allow for possible future conscious experiences. Now let us imagine 
that, tragically, all attempts to restart the man’s heart failed, his brain 
has ceased to function, and restoring his original condition is beyond 
the assistance of medical care. Yet again, I would contend that anyone 
familiar with personhood could not argue, in good faith, that this man 
is a person any longer. His current conscious experience has ended and 
the future conscious experiences are no longer possible (it comes as a 
given that if future medical advancements allow for the full restoration 
of brain functions then the hypothetical would simply need to take one 
step further). Therefore, if death is the ending of brain function, and 
ostensibly, a conscious experience no longer exists nor is one possible, 
a human has lost its personhood. This assertion is also borne out in 



42

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

ern s ien i  i er ure s e  s ere e is s nsensus i in e 
community that the cessation of brain functions constitutes death. 6 

The concept of death itself in the semantic sense separates the 
gene i  u n r  e r  ne   u n rpse  e ni i n is 
still a genetic human, the species and genome don’t change after one 
dies, but intuitively we treat corpses differently than living humans. 
A moral individual could never in good conscience bury a “moral 
human”, but could certainly bury a genetic one, assuming it is not a 
person, with no qualms at all. 

 Asserting that death is the end of personhood is as innocuous 
a claim as “a fetus is a human”. If we are to accept that a person no 
longer exists when a future conscious experience is impossible, i.e. the 
full and irreversible cessation of the brain’s functions, then it logically 
follows that a person exists as long as a prior conscious experience 
exists and future experiences are possible. 

Thus, if a person exists as long as a prior conscious experience 
exists and future experiences are possible, then a person starts existing 

 e rs  en  ese e perien es re p ssi e  r e s e  ri-
ty, the argument is as follows:

1) If a person stops existing when a conscious experience 
ends and future experiences become impossible then, 
A person exists as long as a prior conscious experience 
exists and future experiences are possible;

2) If a person exists as long as a prior conscious experi-
ence exists and future experiences are possible, then 
 pers n s r s e is ing  e rs  en  ns i us 

experiences are possible;

3)  A person stops existing when a conscious experience 
ends and future experiences become impossible;

4) ere re   pers n s r s e is ing  e rs  en  
conscious experiences are possible.

e p ssi i i  r  rs  ns i us e perien e is s e ri  i  
the ending of a conscious experience. If the cessation of the brain ends 
such an experience, the formation of all of the brain’s parts and the 

6  Burkle, Christopher M., Richard R. Sharp, and Eelco F. Wijdicks. 
“Why Brain Death Is Considered Death and Why There Should Be No 
Confusion.” Neurology 83, no. 16 (2014): 1464–69. https://doi.org/10.1212/
wnl.0000000000000883.



43Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion

harmonious interaction between them would seem to be the beginning. 
First, it is generally acknowledged that consciousness is only possible 
following the development of thalamocortical connections from the 
sensory organs. These connections are developed from 20-24 gestation-
al weeks, after this period a newborn is aware of itself and minimally 
of its surroundings.7 Before this period, the fetus may react to pain and 
other basic external stimuli, although the fetus is likely unaware due 
to the lack of said connections. Following the developmental period, 
biological structures are now developed enough to deploy conscious-
ness (assuming that the fetus is developing in a healthy manner with no 
traumatic defects) and the fetus has the possibility of future conscious-
ness. From this time frame, a fetus should be regarded as a person and 
gr n e  r  pers n   ep  e s ien i  uni  i s  
rejecting a fetus’ personhood after the emergence of its consciousness 
is akin to justifying the killing of an “innocent human” in the words of 
the traditional argument.

  For there to be a person to speak of there must be an un-
derlying conscious experience. To argue that the potentiality of x is 
equally as valued as x itself is to work against all ontological notions 
of existence. This argument is akin to claiming that a blueprint, wood 
beams, and concrete blocks are the same as a house, as the wood and 
concrete can potentially become a house, assuming the proper steps 
occur to realize the change. The same holds true for the potentiality 
of consciousness. Given the proper nutrients and environment, a fetus 
has the potential for consciousness and therefore, has the same val-
ue as one who has already realized such a development. In nearly all 
countries, children are restricted from a multitude of rights afforded to 
adults (they cannot legally consent, drive, or drink alcohol, for exam-
ple). All children also have the potential to develop into fully grown 
adults, given proper nutrients and environment. By this logic, children 
should be afforded all rights granted to adults because they possess the 
potential to develop into adulthood. An acceptance of this argument 
would point out the incongruence between the proponents of potential-
ity and accepted ontological understandings. It cannot be the case that 
the potentiality for an attribute in the future constitutes the same as the 
actuality of that attribute.

Other objections commonly raised by critics tend to fall into 

7 Lagercrantz, Hugo. “The Emergence of Consciousness: Science and 
Ethics.” Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 19, no. 5 (2014): 
300–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.siny.2014.08.003. 



44

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

two general tropes:

1) Claims that personhood valuing the stage of develop-
ment in which the brain is capable of consciousness is 
arbitrary;

2) Claims that the levels of consciousness exerted by a 
fetus are incompatible with the general understanding 
of the term. 

e i ns  e rs  rie  en    in    e s ip-
per s pe rgu en  ri i s i ing r  e rs  p re n  
proponents of personhood at the moment of conception. It appears to 
be evident that the development of a human being from conception 
through adolescence and onto adulthood is continuous; therefore the 
critic would contend that choosing any point on that continuum in 
which personhood begins is necessarily arbitrary. From this assertion, 
the conclusion follows that the fetus must be a person from conception 
as it is the only nonarbitrary position on the continuum.  If it were the 
case that 20-24 gestational weeks were arbitrary, then so would the de-
velopmental period for puberty and similarly the growth of a seed into 
a tree. It certainly does not follow that a seed is a tree or a prepubescent 
child a fully developed adult. If one was tasked with execution and the 
sole parameter was to cut the condemned head clean off, taking none of 
his neck with it, the execution would never take place. The executioner 
could not go on to claim that the neck is arbitrary because there exists 
no perceptible line.

Similarly, their line of reasoning can also be utilized against 
the critic’s argument. Past the point of conception, the sperm or the 
ovum alone certainly could have the potential to become a human life; 
therefore, their existence would place them further back on the contin-
uum of development.  The delineation from sperm and ovum to zygote 
is seemingly arbitrary as to when the potential for personhood starts 
and ends. From this realization, contraception and birth control would 
both constitute the killing of a potential person with moral consider-

i n  re u ing e r i n ues i n  sur i  e n  e e er 
for the slippery slope argument is to assert that the change from sperm 
and ovum to zygote is that of form and not degree, that being that the 
change is so drastic that the resulting entity is entirely separate. To 
agree to this point would be to concede that there exists pivotal chang-
es that occur along human development that permanently alter the pre-
vious entity. From this concession, it can be argued that the transition 
from a fetus without consciousness to one with consciousness is drastic 



45Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

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enough to constitute a change of form. 

 e e e ine  ri i ues  e rs  r pe  ere  e 
critic utilizes a slippery slope argument, to demonstrate the arbitrary 
nature of valuing one stage of development over another. Critiques of 
the second form are far more challenging, as the proponents claim that 
the level at which a fetus is conscious is incompatible with the general 
understanding of the term consciousness. Proponents of this argument, 
such as Robert Larmer, assert a claim along the lines of the following:

The argument that it is not the potential to become conscious, but 
rather the potential to resume consciousness, that confers a right to 
life proves too strong, inasmuch as it threatens to justify not only 
abortion but infanticide since newborn infants are not yet conscious 
in the sense in which we normally use the term.8

Larmer suggests that consciousness, as we are familiar with the term, is 
n  ri u e    u n in i i u  e  se en n s er ir  

He expands on this claim by asserting that even newborn fetuses have a 
level of consciousness lower than most newborn animals.9

 Objections of this nature are certainly more stout, but for sev-
eral reasons, I believe it fails. The argument logically entails that since 
the valued consciousness of a fetus is diminished by comparison to an 
adult human, it is necessary to grant personhood to all creatures that 
embody a level of consciousness akin to or greater than the fetus.

 irs  r er s us i i n r ns i usness e e ping 
 ges e  se en n s is gr un e  in u e  s u ies n  runs 

contrary to more modern assessments of the development of conscious-
ness. That being said, the major contention lies in the suggested levels 
of consciousness embodied by different creatures. It is a fact that a fe-
tus and even a newborn’s level of consciousness is of a “lower mental 
level” than that of a plethora of other animals. To discredit the claim I 
believe a thought experiment is an order. 

Imagine that conscious experience is like a bucket of water 
and with each new day in one’s development a splash of water is added 
to the bucket. The level of water in each bucket suggests the level at 
which you are conscious, a developed adult human having the fullest 
bucket (human in the genetic human sense). For this thought experi-

8  Larmer, Robert. “Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for 
Consciousness.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1995): 241–51. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24354127, 7.

9 Ibid.



46

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

ment, a fetus at 20-24 gestational weeks is given a bucket with just a 
small splash of water in it. Next to the fetus’ bucket lies a lizard, an 
adult dog, and an adult chimpanzee’s bucket. The lizard has the same 
amount of water as the fetus, while the dog has a one-third-full bucket, 
and the chimp a half-full bucket. There is no debate that both the dog 
and the chimp are more conscious than the human fetus by orders of 

gni u e  s e e us e e ps in  n es en  i s u e  is e  
to two-thirds, now undoubtedly more full than the other animals. Is it 
the case that the fetus’ development, started with a lizard’s conscious 
e perien e  en e g  n  n  e i p e re ssu ing  
u n ne   i  is n  e se  e e us e  e i r  u -

et, then the dog, and so forth. It is not the case, in my argument, that 
one’s consciousness rises to a level deemed worthy of personhood, it 
is the animal in kind and its own genetically unique kind of experience 
which is valued. A fetus’ conscious experience is diminished from that 
of a human adult, but that statement alone entails that each species has 
its continuum of conscious development that can be compared but is 
simply not analogous.

The critic would retort, “Is it not the case that dogs can learn 
complex tricks and chimps can solve rudimentary puzzles, but a 
fetus cannot?”. Although this is true, these animals are not exerting 
a sapiens’ conscious experience of how all conscious homo sapiens 
in rinsi  un ers n  e e ni i n r e p n i n   i  ee s 
to experience a sapiens’ conscious experience is in fact impossible, 
there is no other conscious experience we can analytically compare it 

 e er  us  i e in e se  e e ni i n   person, the lack 
  e ni i n es n  e n e re un e  i en i  n  re gni e 

the existence in others. It seems to be the case that a dog does not have 
the same sense of self, if it has one at all, that a human does. If that is 
the case, then the value I assign to both consciousness and sense of self 
separates a human conscious experience from that of any non-human 
animal. Therefore, a fetus’ conscious experience is by a degree less 
than an adult’s but, by kind, greater than that of a dog.

Larmer proposes a thought experiment to challenge the asser-
tion that the resumption of consciousness is superseded by the potential 
to become conscious (his central anti-abortion claim) as follows:

Suppose someone is in a serious car accident and lapses into a coma 
as a result of her injuries. Upon arriving at the hospital, doctors ascer-
tain that her injuries will heal, but that she will be in a coma for nine 
months, after which time she will become conscious. Unfortunate-



47Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion

ly, she will have suffered total amnesia and there is no chance that 
she will regain any previous memories or knowledge of past plans, 
Indeed, the amnesia is so complete that she, like a newborn child, 
will have to learn how to use language and develop motor skills. Her 
relatives and friends, for whatever reason, express the desire that 
her existence be terminated and that she not be allowed to become 
conscious.10

Larmer utilizes this hypothetical to assert that there is a clear obligation 
to protect the life of the individual that is not accounted for unless the 
potential to become conscious is the valued condition of personhood. 

 Although the thought experiment is challenging, it fails to 
exclude my argument from protecting the injured. It is the case that 
the injured woman deserves protection as her right to life has not been 
forfeited by the nature of her personhood. That being said, it is not 
the potential for her to become conscious that grounds this belief. The 
prior conscious experience of the woman before her accident is what 
grants her personhood for the duration of her coma, as it is the case that 
her future experiences remain possible. The total amnesia as a result of 
her accident does not create a lack of prior experience, it only serves to 
remove them from her retrievable memory. It is not debatable that she 
was not conscious beforehand, the suggestion that she cannot recall the 
experiences does not refute their existence. This claim is akin to stating 
that a particularly zealous partygoer is not deploying a conscious expe-
rience for the duration of their blacked-out drunkenness. The partygoer 
in this case experiences total amnesia during the period of their drunk-
enness but the conscious experience exists nonetheless.

My goal throughout this paper has been to outline my position 
on the beginning of personhood and to defend the claim that since a 
fetus, before the development of the thalamocortical connections, does 
not have the capabilities to deploy a conscious experience, it is not 
granted personhood. Therefore, abortion is morally permissible for 
any reason before the 20-24 gestational week period. Thus the limit 
to acquire a legal abortion should be the twentieth gestational week to 
prevent the undue killing of persons.

 Second, to avoid any dispute over abortions in which the child 
was consummated through rape or incest or in cases in which the 

er s e  is in nger  I n  i  ne ess r   ri  e p si i n  

10 Id., 8.



48

Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College

Personhood and the right to life that is granted with it entails that it 
is not by any means the right not to be killed, rather it only serves to 
pr e  g ins  e un us i e  i ing   pers n  In ses in i  e 
mother’s life is in serious and imminent peril, the rights of the unborn 
may be surpassed by those of the living. Similarly to cases in which 
a prisoner is sentenced to capital punishment, the right to life of an 
individual can only be usurped when accompanied by a just reason. For 
cases of rape and incest, the fetus may be aborted prior to 20-24 weeks, 
the same being the case for any other reason as the fetus is not yet a 
person. Following this period, the fetus is granted full moral person-
hood, and abortion for any reason other than the mother’s health is not 
permissible, in the same way, that killing a 1-year-old child conceived 
by incest is not permissible. 

 Lastly, as technology advances at an ever-increasing rate it is 
also worth clarifying the position with regards to non-human beings 
with equal, if not greater, forms of conscious experience than our 
own. Due to the necessity for the human conscious experience to my 
rgu en  r pers n  r i i  in e igen  pu ers u  n  

be granted personhood, and therefore, would have diminished moral 
consideration. The only caveat is if the creators of these machines were 
capable of perfectly replicating the human consciousness.



49Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024

A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion

REFERENCES
Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL 

STATUS OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www.
jstor.org/stable/27902294.

Babst, G.A. (2011). “Moral Community”. In: Chatterjee, 
D.K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Springer, Dordrecht. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5_328.

Dennett, Daniel. “CONDITIONS OF PERSON-
HOOD.” Identities of Persons, 1976, 175–96. https://doi.
org/10.1525/9780520353060-008. 

Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
STATUS OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www.
jstor.org/stable/27902294.

Burkle, Christopher M., Richard R. Sharp, and Eelco F. 
Wijdicks. “Why Brain Death Is Considered Death and Why There 
Should Be No Confusion.” Neurology 83, no. 16 (2014): 1464–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1212/wnl.0000000000000883. 

Lagercrantz, Hugo. “The Emergence of Consciousness: Sci-
ence and Ethics.” Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 19, no. 5 
(2014): 300–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.siny.2014.08.003. 

larmer, Robert. “Abortion, Personhood and the Potential 
for Consciousness.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1995): 
241–51. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24354127.


