D I A N O I A The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College Spring 2024 - Issue XI Featuring an Interview with Gadamer Chair Professor Jean-Luc Marion (page 7) διάνοια ISSN 2476 - 1818 (print) ISSN 2476 - 1826 (online) διάνοιαDIANOIA The UndergradUaTe PhilosoPhy JoUrnal of BosTon College Spring 2024 ISSUE XI Managing Editors: Meriel Zhao, Yitian (Sky) Lyu, Aniella Zaslavsky, Elliott Jones General Editors: Jacob Chapelear, Gabriel Margolies, Thomas Wilkins, Christopher Casale, Kenneth Goetz, Qitai Zhu Graphic Designer: Madeline Townsend Graduate Advisors: Sean Haefner Faculty Advisor: Ronald Tacelli, S.J. Cover Featuring: Bradford, William. Shipwreck off Nantucket (Wreck off Nantucket after a Storm). ca. 1860-1861; obtained via Wikimedia Commons. Jean-Luc Marion Photo Source: By Aymeric De La Toune, June 7, 2016; obtained via Wikimedia Commons. The materials herein represent the personal opinions of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Dianoia or Boston College. If you have questions regarding the Journal, would like to submit your work for review, or if you’d be interested in joining next year’s staff, please contact the Journal at dianoia@bc.edu. Dianoia The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College Spring 2024 Issue XI Boston College 140 Commonwealth Avenue Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 https://www.dianoiabc.org https://www.bc.edu/bc-web/schools/mcas/departments/philosophy/undergraduate/dianoia.html © 2024 The Trustees of Boston College CO N TE N TS 4 Acknowledgements 5 A Letter From an Editor Elliott Jones, Boston College 7 Interview with Gadamer Chair Professor Jean-Luc Marion 17 The Human Synthesis: An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power Daniel Andrews, Boston College 38 A Symetrical Argument for Personhood and Abortion Arthur deCarle, University of Central Florida 50 Against Evolutionary Ethics Roberto Ureña, SUNY New Paltz 67 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology Jordan Smith, Colby College 89 Contributors 4 The Editorial Staff of Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College would like to extend our sincerest thanks to the following individuals for their assistance in making this issue of Dianoia possible: Sean Haefner, Philosophy Department Jeffrey Bloechl, Philosophy Department Gabriel Feldstein, BC Libraries We would also like to thank Dr. Ronald Tacelli, S.J., of the Boston College Philosophy Department, for his invaluable assistance as our advisor and editor of this issue's faculty interview. AC KN O W LE D G M EN TS 5Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 δι άν οι α A LE TT ER F RO M A N E D IT O R Dear Reader, May 5, 2024 With great pleasure I present Issue XI of Dianoia: the Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College. This year we received over 40 submissions and following a great shortage of editors from the editorial board of Issue X, we are proud to present this journal as the consistent work of the few for the enjoyment of many. This year, we were fortunate to be able to publish four thoughtful papers, all of which are examples of the excellence of undergraduate scholarship and philosophical inquiry from around the country. As a short preview of the contents of the papers, we offer a work of anthropological and existentialist philosophy, two pieces in moral p i s p ne rguing r ug e ni i n pers n us i i n r r i n n e se n rguing g ins e rise evolutionary ethics. Lastly, we offer a rigorously defended paper of Aristotle’s notion of Final Cause or teleology. We hope that these p pers inspire ug u re e i n enge ur se e ie s n s of all spark questions. Thanks to the support from Department Chair, Professor Jeffrey Bloechl, two of our General Editors were able to conduct an interview with the Gadamer Chair of Philosophy, Professor Jean-Luc Marion. This interview offers an introduction to Marion’s phenomenology as e s n in ep is ussi n is s in uen i n r i i e s such as “saturated phenomena”, “the gift”, and the possible end of metaphysics. The editorial board chose William Bradford’s Shipwreck off Nantucket for the cover art of this year’s issue. We felt this represented the initial struggle of the editorial board to get Issue XI into the publication process. It was only with the help of our faculty and graduate advisors, and inner department supporters-represented by Bradford’s life boats- that we acknowledge with great gratitude that Issue XI was able to be published. Furthermore, we believe that as Professor Marion in our interview remarks, the desire of all philosophers should be to “go in the regions you have never visited before”, just as we see in the ambitious drive of Bradford’s portrayal of the 19th century whaling industry. The chance encounter I had this spring in meeting one of the cofounders of Dianoia is a testament not only to the far-reaching in uen e is urn u s e pe p e se supp r es it possible. On this note, we must offer our thanks and gratitude to 6 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College δι άν οι αthe relentless support of former Editor-In Chief Tanner Loper, our faculty advisor, Fr. Ronald Tacelli, S.J., and our graduate advisor, Sean Heafner. Lastly, I offer thanks to those consistent members of the editorial board by whose diligence and passion this issue has been able to be published. I hope that you, our reader, continue to offer your support as we prepare Issue XII next spring. Until then, enjoy this issue. Sincerely, On Behalf of the Editorial Board of Dianoia Elliott Jones, Managing Editor 7Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College δι άν οι α AN INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-LUC MARION, GADAMER CHAIR AT BOSTON COLLEGE §1: INTRODUCTION ABOUT PROF. MARION'S TEACHING AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF GIVENNESS Sky Lyu, Managing Editor Prof. Marion, you were appointed Gadam- er chair in 2020 and during the past four years, have given lectures and taught courses. One of the most interesting and common comments from my peers about your philosophy is that it is very “healing,” since it offers a philosophical hope for them. So did you expect this impact to students and what would your mission be through your teachings here? Jean-Luc Marion I’m sorry some students had suffered some intellec- tual disease. But I would be glad that my philosophy may heal, because (bad) philosophy can harm as well as a good one may help. But this was not intended: I am doing philosophy, without predetermined outcomes or any apologetic intention. However, a clear distinction could be drawn between what we may call metaphysics, and what we may call phenom- enology, that is, between a priori or closed philosophy (closed as once it was spoken of the “closing of the American mind”) and phenomenol- ogy—which has a long history because it started around the beginning of the 19th century—which today is perhaps the opening, or reopening of philosophy. Perhaps, perhaps it is a positive experience for those who are interested in that [reopening]. That’s the difference: in the perspec- tive of phenomenology, as Heidegger said once, higher than the effec- tivity, stands the possibility. On the opposite, metaphysics—in analytical philosophy, formal philosophy, systematic idealism—the possibility is 8 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College left behind the effectivity, encapsulated within objectivity. Elliott Jones, Managing Editor For our introductory readers, what is the role phenomenology has had in the history of philosophy? More particularly: your work is frequently cited in theological discussions. What do you believe your work can offer theology in contemporary di- alogue? JLM You understand that it is impossible to answer that kind of question shortly. What I can tell, is that I started by asking questions about the questions: philosophy should proceed that way, by asking new ques- i ns S in rs s u e ues i n n The Idol and Distance and God without Being, I questioned the question, very wide- spread in the seventies, whether we can truly think that “God is dead”. And I made the point that the death of God means that what dies was by e ni i n n n i n s i I s n i S ing that, I was just repeating what Nietzsche had already said. Idols are the main concepts of philosophy—including the concepts of being, cause, consciousness, free will, and so on. And you can verify it easily provided you are an historian of philosophy (which is what I started out trying to be, studying Descartes and Aristotle). And we have to destroy idols, whatever they are. And curiously, in that case, God does not stand on the side of the idols. In fact, “God is dead” means only that what we thought as a dead God was simply no God at all. And so, to some extent, e e re pene e ues i n s e rs paradox. How far this is connected with phenomenology? It may be absolutely no connection in so far as this is a theological argument. But phenomenolo- gy means a kind of philosophy which allows you to ask whether concepts supposed to be completely beyond ordinary question within philosophy might not be questioned as well. Another example: even if to know is to know an object (limited and certain), knowledge is not only the subjec- tive construction of the object. The opposition, subjectivity/objectivity, though admitted by roughly everyone, does not stand. If you study the history of philosophy, you discover that the object is always connected with the subject and that both concepts were born at the same period. For the ancient Greeks, there was no object, and there was no subject. n is e ern e ni i n e e S e ing i n be perfectly well known by the subject—because, in the sciences, for example, it was built by the subject. So the fact that any object is consti- 9Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College tuted by a subject means that nothing is more subjective than objectivity. S e ing is s i e e i e i s e e e s e e i e uni u i e su e s S e i i un s n n intersubjectivity. And all philosophers today will agree to that. There- fore the idea that science is objective means only that within science ere is n gree en e een su e s u in er e s e is er other different agreements between subjects which lead to other kinds of intersubjectivity: in art, in morals, in politics, and in religion. So there is no absolute border. The question lies in understanding how we reach non-objective knowledge about what cannot nevertheless be constituted by us. And so the divide between objective science and subjective sci- ence appears problematic. EJ What you said about idols leads to the next question. You spoke about the history of philosophy and these metaphysical constraints or “idols”, and how they limit our understanding—limit us from talking about certain phenomena. What are these metaphysical idols and why is phenomenology and your work a solution beyond them? JLM I think that metaphysics was and remains a very successful en- deavor. Being hard to produce intelligibility, the achievement of meta- physics was to say: we may know in advance everything certainly by using the same set of concepts and of principles, categories, and deter- in i ns in e er e e r in r ins n e ne e s us prin ip es e use i n r i r e ni i ns e prin ip e of identity. Or again: we should always be able to give a reason for what- ever we claim to exist or be thought; any sentence has to be proved by re s ns en e e prin ip e su ien re s n ing se prin ip es (and all sciences use those standards), we have to stick to them and reject any other knowledge which could not yield to them as non-objective–a non-object for science. The problem is that we quite often meet with phenomena which contradict those standards, and does appear without doubt. Should we not, in those cases, modify our standards? De facto, from time to time, we can’t not modify those standards. So we have in modern fundamental physics. So the today question amounts to when n i e s n r s s e p en en r e er r e re e i e p en en i e n e standards. And in phenomenology, we deal with the same question: are there phenomena which don’t yield to any previously known paradigm and nevertheless impose themselves beyond question. Among them, r is n e ep i n e ni i n u i n e e se this “god” would not be God. Let us consider, for instance, the impos- 10 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College sible. We universally admit that nothing is impossible, because, were something impossible to a God, then this “god” would not deserve to be admitted as God. si i r re r n e e presse u n ere is n e ni i n of man, not of man-hood, nor of the humanity of man; not only is ere n e ni i n u ere should be n e ni i n n r n e ni i n n i p se r e p e p i i e er r p - i i regi e is e s i ri nis i ri n e - nition of man would be a threat? Not only because it will prove very likely wrong e ni i n n se r e s i ss re- igi n n s n u e use n e ni i n uld result in an exclusion by a persecution. In other r s en n i e ni i n n is s e is u i i n n e e usi n se individuals who doesn’t apply to it, by constraint or even terror. Activists use the word “genocide” too easily; however genuine genocide means more the mass murder, it means suppressing human beings as non-human being, n e sis e ni i n what is human and what is not. This is genocide, which kills all the more, kills the body because it enies rs e s u n in S r i se is not yet a real genocide, though violent and mortal, remaining in some cases unavoidable. This leads to a remark about history: history is not a sci- en e er seri us e s u u i is n s ien e because it cannot make any prediction and prove any law by rehearsing any experience…And why not? Because history means either the study of the past or what is going on in the present; however what is going on never pertains to a chain of objects occurring by strict determinism. There is properly no determinism in history. Not because there is no cause— on the opposite, there are too many of them — but because no one can predict it. There was someone who made himself famous by predicting that we have reached the end of history, the whole humanity having agreed about free market, global capitalism and democracy… SL Fukuyama? JLM No name dropping, please. But we are aware that this was not the case, for history refers only to the unexpected, the unpredictable, to the events in time, not to objects in determinism. And the event comes 11Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College as what is not yet, afar of any strict chain of objects. I would not say it comes out of the blue, but dare say that it comes from elsewhere. And it is why we should not master the event, but only to face it and answer it. Another case that is central to my work: is the question of the “gift”. At least, provided that we do not interpret it as a mere exchange, which alone pertains to economy (do ut des), transferring the possession of an object from one owner to another through the mean of money, which is enough an objective interpretation of the exchange. But the gift is not an e nge e use i s n su ien re s n n g r re s n give. It needs no reason at all, and it is why it remains always possible always. No reason, because it is based on inequality and non-reciprocity. Expecting no fair return, it frees itself from any possibility of being paid back, and, admitting no condition of possibility, it has not condition of possibility, To that extent the gift appears always unequal, unfair, not about justice, but beyond it. Those cases, the unknowability of man, the incomprehensibility of God, the gratuity of the gift, or the unpredictabil- ity of history— all of these become intelligible, if to some they may be explained, only by contradicting the usual understanding of the beings, produced by metaphysics. §2: PHENOMENOLOGY OF GIVENNESS AS A BREAKTHROUGH. WHAT DOES IT OPEN FOR US, AND WHAT IS THE RISK? SL e n ge e gi I in ur p en en g r e phenomenology of “givenness” is somehow a breakthrough of tradition- al phenomenology. So, to facilitate discussion, let’s situate ourselves in a context. I want to bring in here the dialogue between you and Derrida, conducted by Prof. Kearney. It was a fascinating dialogue of course. But during the dialogue Derrida made a heavy critique saying that your phe- nomenology is without “as such”; and you responded by pushing back even further, stating: “A real phenomenology would be to give up the concept of the horizon”—which is opposed to Levinas. To this extent, your phenomenology of “givenness” is a radical breakthrough, depart- ing from traditional phenomenology. But the question remains, to what extent is it still a phenomenology? JLM Because there is nothing like a phenomenology as such—I agree on this point with Derrida, as well as with Heidegger. There is neverthe- 12 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College less an ongoing tradition of thinkers who each time claimed to make a breakthrough against their predecessors, but on the same track. So Hus- serl made a breakthrough by enlarging the realm of intuition, and he made similar breakthroughs during all of his lifetime. So Heidegger ad- mitted that he has killed the father again with a breakthrough to the ques- tion of Being. Likewise Levinas made a breakthrough against Heidegger by saying that ontology is not fundamental, and ethics is. And Derrida make a breakthrough with deconstruction, and so on. So each phenome- nology is made by those who disagree with the previous phenomenolo- gists by relying on them. And that’s why phenomenology keeps going. I don’t know whether I deserve to be listed among them, but, anyway I kept going that way. If you dare to criticize Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Levinas or Michel Henry, it is because you agree with the questions and only intend to go a step forward. To criticize a philosopher is not to contradict him, but to jump beyond his last jump. If you break a record in sports, you don’t erase the previous one, but improve it; in philosophy we do the same. Real philosophers don’t properly disagree, but try to use, in a better way, the result of the previous one. So now, let’s go to the question of horizon. Indeed there is a horizon for regular phenomena: each phenomenon makes sense in the horizon of other related phenomena, within which a new one can be situated and seen. However there are cases where there is no horizon, because any comparison remains impossible—for instance, with the case of the event, the case of God. There is no horizon to the question of God because God is unconditioned, cannot be compared; for, if it could be compared, it would not mean God. Otherwise, God is incomprehensible, because, would it be comprehended by us, it would not mean God. And so on. So, in that case, we have no horizon. And, when Derrida told e e gi is i p ssi e e use s s n s gi is i en i e as a gift, it is cancelled as a gift, and reduced to an exchange— he was absolutely correct. But, nevertheless, the “gift” can be done, possible for us or not. So, the impossibility of the gift means that the gift has no su ien re s n nn e re u e n e n e nge u provided it is reduced to givenness, includes its own impossibility. And Derrida and I agreed about that— the impossibility of the gift—, but we disagreed about its meaning: far from erasing the phenomenon of the gift, I acknowledge that this very impossibility enacts the “gift”. In other words, the intersection between the possible in the impossible cannot apply here. SL If the “gift” is possible, does it have risks? Just as John J. Caputo 13Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College remarks: “Do we not come into a universal indebted-ness to God the giver, even though the gift has been released from a causal economy?”. Would the “gift” then be dangerous? JLM The gift is indeed dangerous, it even may be seen as the most dangerous, the deinotaton [of Sophocles’]. About God, if meant as the Christian God, indeed we are all indebted to God, if only because God has loved (i.e. created) us before we even were. SL Already? JLM Already. It’s done, to late to be denied. We try to deny our indebt- ness because we are obsessed by it, and this denial appears as its con- r i n is si u i n s e e en rig ening and comforting, I fully agree. So, I understand quite well why so many people want practically to be atheists, just in order to get rid of this – this what? This opening of the horizon. Yes, willingly or not, we are com- pletely in debt to God. SL I love your analysis of the excessive, saturated phenomenon—for example, revelation. And it seems to me a key to solve Derrida’s impos- sibility. Do you think this kind of excessiveness exists in other areas, for example, psychoanalysis, or hermeneutics, or even aesthetics? Do you think the analysis of such excessiveness in other areas could open new possibilities? JLM Indeed, there is no question about that. Saturated phenomena or excessiveness, if you prefer, identify themselves by an excess of intu- ition with no matching concept; this provides us with the only expla- nation about the question of aesthetic beauty, where we all agree on the in ui i n en e n us un e e p in gree en n concepts. And in regular psychoanalysis, many people use the word “ob- ject”, although clearly desire has no object and “object” sounds like an appropriate word. So when I say “given” or “saturated” phenomenon, that means something, which can be better used. As indeed it can be used in e in eres p i s p In p i s p e es ge n r- mation that something you thought and you’ve discovered is right is that i n e use n n p i s p ers in eir n e n s I er glad to see that “saturated phenomenon” is used in theology, in aesthet- ics, in music—for instance, “saturated sound”— as well as the distinc- tion, say, between icon and idol is used in the theory of painting today. S e i n p i s p is n rs e is usse pr essi n philosophers alone (they are living doing their job, doing their trade in 14 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College their discussion, which looks good). But real achievement in philosophy consist in working out notions, concepts, arguments which can be used by non-philosophers. §3: QUESTIONS FROM DIANOIA READERS SL I’m sure you are tired of our philosophy questions. So here is a ques- tions from one of our readers. Janice is a freshman at Boston College in the philosophy department. And she learned from one of your interviews that in your youth, when the academy was full of big names like La- can and Derrida, you secretly received instruction of theology, outside the campus. She is actually doing the same thing. She has founded a Lacanian psychoanalysis group called “Sinthome” outside the campus and they are doing lectures to teach themselves every week. So how do you view this kind of off-campus group—interest- or even faith-based study? And do you have any advice for her? JLM I think that any serious study is self-taught study. When you go to the university you have tutors, but you study by yourself. As I’ve told my students at the Sorbonne and elsewhere: What matters is how n i u s u e re e s i u re e es S my classes, the classes I and my colleagues give, are just to help you to read those books. If you can read them without sitting in my class, please don’t take my class. Read! And this is what I have done. There were many boring classes at my university. I skipped them. Or I was reading during the class. And it is the best thing the professor could expect from me. SL Great, I will tell her the same thing! §4: PROF. MARION’S ADVICE FOR UNDERGRADU- ATE PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS EJ So our last question, which you’ve partly already answered: You say to your students “we should only read books we don’t understand,” be- cause it allows us to philosophize about what we don’t understand. Now besides your books, of course, do you have any advice on other books or questions that the next generation of philosophers ought to philosophize 15Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion, Gadamer Chair at Boston College about or read. And secondly, what about the vast history of philosophy n u u gi e i e rising p i s p rs r n ing their niche in this two-thousand-plus year history? JLM To study philosophy is to read—if possible in the original languag- es—Plato, Aristotle’s Metaphysics and his treatise On the Soul, some Augustine, Descartes, Kant, as well as those around Kant (like Hume), Husserl, Heidegger and so on. SL Not Hegel? JLM Yes, but only after reading Kant. Don’t start with Hegel, because Hegel is based on Aristotle and Kant,…and on theology. So don’t try r e eginning n s ni e r ur r s e ing i e that. Try to go into the regions you have never visited before. And then you will see. EJ Professor Marion, we thank you very much for your time, it has been a real gift. 16 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College REFERENCES Marion, J.-L., & Derrida, J. (2014). On the gift: A discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion moderated by Rich- ard Kearney. On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, Moderated by Richard Kearney. 66;77. Woodward, K. (2022). Marion & Francis: Love of God & phi- losophy. Commonweal Magazine. ‘We Are Not Yet Christians’ | Com- monweal Magazine 17Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 The Human Synthesis δι άν οι α THE HUMAN SYNTHESIS: AN EXPLORATION OF ANXIETY, LOVE, AND SELFHOOD UNDER THE DOMAIN OF THE WILL TO POWER DANIEL ANDREWS “This, my Dionysian world of the eternally self- creating, the eter- nally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself— do you want a name for this world? A solution for all of its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?— This world is the will to power— and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power— and nothing besides!”1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power §1: INTRODUCTION The will to power leaves us with a fascinating question re- garding the nature and purpose of the individual. If life is this will of “eternally self-creating, eternally self-destroying” force, and “[we ourselves] are also this will to power”, are we not destined to annihi- late ourselves for the sake of creating beyond ourselves? Correlatively, 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, 432. 18 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College and perhaps more importantly, why is there an individual at all? In er r s i i e is e ne s is i pe us se es ru i n n re-creation, what is the purpose of sentient life that is individuated, i.e., a myriad of different egos and individuals coexisting as opposed to a single, undifferentiated, God-like intelligence?2 There must be a reason as to why such a singularity3 cannot exhibit the will to pow- er itself. In reading Nietzsche, and other philosophers whom I will discuss in the paper, it is never able to be expressly understood as to why this ever-striving will to power manifests itself in the ego, in the human being. In this paper, I will attempt to examine the ego through the Nietzschean lens. First, I will expound the concept of the will to power more painstakingly. Next, I will outline why a being exhibiting the will to power must be self-conscious and, under a Sartrean analysis of consciousness, examine why a singularity alone cannot do this. After that, I will examine the human condition in our affections of anxiety and love to investigate the nature of selfhood and offer a solution to the fundamental question of “why” under the domain of the will to power. §2: BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF THE WILL TO POWER AND OUR ROLE WITHIN IT Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra is centric around the idea of the “Ubermensch”. Translated into English as “overman” and symbolized by the main character Zarathustra, it represents what humans will one day evolve into: “Man is something that shall be over- come… What is the ape to man? A laughing stock or a painful embar- rassment. And man shall be just that for the overman: a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment.”4 Crucially, becoming an overman is not achievable by anyone in this epoch; it is frequently misinterpreted as an exalted individual who stands out from a crowd in their excellence. Rather, Zarathustra is a symbol for the distant future of intelligent life’s evolution. Before I analyze man’s role as a “rope tied between beast and 2 Importantly, this is not a paper questioning the existence of a God; further, my investigation of why there are a multiplicity of egos isn’t denying the existence of a God. Rather, I am exploring why the will to power isn’t just a singularity and manifests in the individual as well. 3 Throughout the rest of the paper, what I will refer to as “singularity”, in ni e eing r n er re e er is n e g in n re r n “God”. It is simply to offer a point of comparison to an individual. 4 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 124. 19Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power overman,”5 it is worth elucidating in further detail the concept of life as the will to power. This is best explained in Zarathustra’s recollecting i gue e i i e n i e i se n e is se re me: ‘Behold’, it said, ‘I am that which must always overcome itself… where there is perishing and a falling of leaves, behold, there life sacri- es i se r p er I us e s rugg e n e ing n n end and an opposition to ends.”6 We see once again, as in the quotation from Will to Power, i e is p si e s se s ri ing se nni- hilating machine. Fittingly, Nietzsche construes man in a similar vein. One of the central tenets of our role in begetting the overman is the r er r n i n se s ri e e i s is gre in n is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that is n er ure n g ing un er I e se n rs see e- in e s rs r re s n g un er n e s ri e u s - ri e e se es r e e r e e r s e e e e overman’s.”7 This idea is expressed virtually everywhere in the book. Speaking of our inner “spirit”, he says, “Spirit is the life that itself cuts into life: with its own agony it increases its own knowledge. Did you know that? And the happiness of the spirit is this: to be anointed and through tears be consecrated as a sacrificial animal.”8 And, speaking to his disciples, Zarathustra says, “I have found you out, my disciples: you strive, as I do, for the gift-giving virtue. What do you have in com- mon with cars and wolves? This is your thirst: to become sacrifices and gifts yourselves.”9 Only through our suffering and “going under” do we gi e e er n ur s ri e is pr p g i n n gi r ur future. Humans, in Nietzsche’s eyes, are tools for the beautiful machine of life. Manifestations of life’s will to power, we act in congruence with it by destroying ourselves for the purpose of self-overcoming. As dark as this may appear, there is a purpose for our self-annihilation: creation. Nietzsche believed that creating is the best way to give rise to the overman and succeed in “cutting into life”. He thought that in order re e ues us rs e es r e in gi ing rise ne nes “Change of values - that is a change of creators. Whoever must be a creator always annihilates.”10 Novel creation requires annihilation of 5 Id., 126. 6 Id., 227. 7 Id., 127. 8 Id., 216. 9 Id., 186. 10 Id., 171. 20 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College the old. Just as a demolition unit is required to construct a new build- ing, man must demolish himself in order to recreate himself; he must is nsu e i se in is n e u u is e e ne un ess u rs e e s es I e i n s to create over and beyond himself and thus perishes.”11 All this to say, and this is a crucial point, that the ego appears to be set up for annihilation. This is done for the purpose of and as a manifestation of life’s will to power, which man is a piece of. Through- out the paper, I will investigate how and why this process unfolds through an analysis of anxiety and love. In doing so, this conclusion will not seem as vague and dark as it does at this juncture. Crucially, this is Nietzsche’s view of the overman, human beings, and their place in life’s will to power. I am not proclaiming the will to power to be true, nor explicitly endorsing this conception of the role of humans; what I will aim to do in this paper is elucidate the fundamental affections of anxiety and love in the context of the will to power. §3: JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AND HUMAN CONSCIOUS- NESS The reason for this begins with an understanding of intention- al consciousness and nothingness, outlined by Jean-Paul Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness. Following Edmund Husserl, Sartre de- nes ns i usness s eing in en i n r about something12. Further, the object of consciousness must transcend consciousness itself. For example, if I am conscious of the computer that I am typing this paper on, the object of my consciousness transcends my consciousness in that it is posited as something other than it. This is best explained by Sartre himself: “Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof.”13 This, as Sartre master- fully examined, raises interesting questions about the notion of being. If a requisite to consciousness is predicated on transcendence, then “nothingness” becomes an integral part of being: “In our introduction e e ne ns i usness s eing su in i s eing i s eing 11 Id., 176-77. 12 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, li, lxi-ii. 13 Id., lxi. 21Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.’ But now that we have examined the meaning of ‘the question,’ we can at present also write the formula thus: ‘Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being.’”14 Sartre has discovered something crucial, and here is where we begin to examine the problem of individuality under the domain of the will to power. If the will to power coined by Nietzsche manifested in a sing e en p ssing in ni e in e igen e i would not be able to be conscious of the nothingness of its being and therefore would not be able to execute the will to power. How could the idea of a singularity i is i se e ns i us i ns i usness is e ne s being that is conscious of the nothingness of its being? Correlatively, how could this singularity execute the will to power? If will to power is e ne s se er ing i e r e is singu ri u n be able to self-overcome; it would not be able to envisage “a being er n i se e use i is e ni i n en p ssing There is no being that it is not. It is every being to have existed, is existing, and will exist. Sartre claims that we are able to transcend because time separates us from our future selves: “The being which is what it is must e e e e eing i is n i is n u in e rs p e this negation, like all others, comes to the surface of being through hu- man reality, as we have shown, and not through a dialectic appropriate just to being.”15 He is saying my point exactly: to become what it is not, to exhibit the will to power, a being needs to take form in humans and nothing else. To further establish this point, we must distinguish between what Sartre terms a “being-in-itself” and a “being-for-itself”. A be- ing-in-itself “is what it is” in that there is no distance between its con- sciousness of itself and itself. An example of a being-in-itself is a chair; i is ir ere is n re e i n r ns i usness ns i u e by an object-subject distance, as in intentionality. More perplexing and relevant to the focus of the paper, another example of a being-in-itself u e n in ni e singu ri sin e In e in i se ere is n particle of being which is not wholly within itself without distance.”16 Further, a singularity would be characterized as a being-in-itself be- use e ensi eing e in i se is in ni e I is u ness 17 14 Id., 47. 15 Id., 77 16 Id., 74. 17 Ibid. 22 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College If all intelligent life to ever exist across all time were concentrated to a single being, there would not be an iota of that being which is not being; it wholly and unequivocally constitutes itself. Since, as I stated, it is every being that exists, has existed, and will exist, it is wholly and u eing I is ere re eing in i se e S r re e ne consciousness as “a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.”18 Further, a conscious being “does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence [...] The distinguishing characteristic of consciousness, on the other hand, is that it is a decompression of being.”19 Nothingness is a requisite for consciousness, which is a requisite for the will to power. This, a singu- larity does not have. It is worth summarizing at this juncture what we have posited s r irs e e ne e i p er s n e ern se re ing eternally self-destroying, eternally self-overcoming force of life. Then, we questioned why life, in exhibiting this will to power, manifests in p ur i in i i u s s pp se singu r in ni e in e igen e er es i se en using e S r re n e ni i n ns i us- ness, we posited the reason why a singularity would not be able to ex- hibit the will to power. We found that since consciousness requires an aspect of nothingness, a singularity cannot envisage a being other than itself because there is no being that it is not. There is no being which is n e ni i n n in ni e singu ri n e use in r er en is ge eing er n i se i re uires eing ni e eing is affected by time. Now, I will posit that life must be in anxiety to exhibit the will to power, which it is unable to do if it is not individuated into r g en s ese r g en e in i i u s re u n eings I i rs elucidate how human beings are unique in that they are able to exhibit the will to power. Then, I will offer some commentary on life’s fall into individuality and a multitude of self-aware egos. §4: ANXIETY EXCLUSIVE TO HUMANS AS A CATA- LYST FOR THE WILL TO POWER As Sartre claimed, and as I outlined at the end of [§3], a being who is able to become the being that is not what it is not is unique ex- clusively to “human reality [...] and not through a dialectic appropriate 18 Id., 47. 19 Id., 74. 23Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power to just being.”20 We now know that a being who wishes to be what it is not, i.e., to exhibit the will to power, must be a human. A singularity, as Sartre would say, is unable to be conscious of a being it is not. But how do humans go about becoming a being which they are not? The answer to this is that humans are in a state of anxiety. Also called angst, it is an affection felt exclusively by humans and analo- gously has the power to elucidate our condition. Sartre claims that in humans, “there is already a relation between my future being and my present being. But a nothingness has slipped into the heart of this relation; I am not the self which I will be. First I am not that self because time separates me from it. Secondly, I am not that self because what I am is not the foundation of what I will be. Finally I am not that self because no actual existent can determine strictly what I am going to be.”21 is rs re s n is s r ig r r I am, for example, not the self that I was in 2017 because that was seven years ago. Correlatively, I am not the self because my past conduct doesn’t determine my present self, and I can’t control or determine my future self with my current actions.22 Nothingness is constitutive of being human and analogously allows us to have an ambiguous rela- tionship with ourselves. Our past selves are not us; they are objects for us. Sartre uses the example of a recovering gambler who once again faces the gambling table. His past resolution is not him since “it has become an object for [his] consciousness.”23 However, despite us not being our past or future selves for the aforementioned reasons, we at the same time are our past and future selves: “Yet as I am already what I will be (otherwise I would not be interested in anyone being more than another), I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it. It is through my horror that I am carried toward the future, and the horror nihilates itself in that it constitutes the future as possible.”24 There is a distance within us and between our past, present, and future selves rendering the human experience fragmented and ambiguous. As mentioned, our past is not us but an object for us. My future self is not me because I am not it yet; however, “Decisive conduct will emanate 20 Id., 77. 21 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 31-32. 22 Otherwise, we would not be free. If my future self was constituted solely by my current actions, my actions and character in the future would be determined by my present self and congruently unfree. 23 Id., 33. 24 Id., 32. 24 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College from a self which I am not yet.”25 Therefore, “I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it.”26 This is precisely Sartre’s conception of anguish. A singularity does not have this ambiguity for the reasons outlined in §3. Because humans have this distance between ourselves - a concomitant of which is our anxiety - are we able to exploit the gap between our past self or future self and become anew, thereby exhib- iting the will to power? Only in anguish is the ambiguity and nothing- ness of our existence posited. Further, anguish is tightly intertwined with freedom: “What we should note at present is that freedom, which manifests itself through anguish, is characterized by a constantly re- newed obligation to remake the Self which designates the free being.”27 I italicized the words “remake the self” in order to stress its importance in relation to the will to power. Once again, the will to power is de- ne s se er ing se re ing n se es r ing i e force. Only when there is a distance existing in the individual between himself and his consciousness of himself can he become something he is not. Nietzsche describes the will to power as self-overcoming. For the “self” to be a self in “self-overcoming”, it must become fragment- ed: “The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the imma- nence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity-in short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between identity as abso- lute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of a multiplicity.”28 Individuated human selves are their future selves in the mode of not being them. A singularity is its future self in the mode of being it. Therefore, it can’t create beyond itself because it is already that which it wants to create; it’s like a paradox. To solve it, life must be in- dividuated in the forms of humans29. Existential philosophy has strug- gled for decades with the notion of anxiety and a feeling of ambiguity, 25 Id., 56. 26 Ibid. 27 Id., 34-35. 28 Id., 77. 29 Interesting similarities here can be drawn to a singularity splitting itself up in an act of Sartrean “bad faith”. A singularity cannot self overcome, r e re s ns p si e s r i i n s i is in ni e ere re i us e ei e i se in ni u e r ug s r en r pi n r g en i n in u ns re igu us in ni e n ni e is e er is presupposing there is a “life” that is doing the “splitting up”; hence, this is mere speculation. 25Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power of homelessness, within ourselves. I posit the reason for this being that life needs these fragmented multiplicities characterized by anxiety as opposed to a complete singularity in order to self-overcome. How, though, is anxiety born? §5: ANXIETY BEFORE THE FALL For Soren Kierkegaard, this begins with a perspicuous anal- ysis of anxiety itself in The Concept of Anxiety. Anxiety is a clue that is utterly crucial in elucidating the fundamental human question of “why” and “what”. Before diving into the text, a few preliminary re r s us e es is e s e s s e e ni i ns e rs is ier eg r uses e e ris i n i e spe i e fall of Adam, to elucidate the concept of anxiety. A concomitant of this is that much of the language he uses falls under the domain of Chris- tian mythology; however, he claims that “the myth gives an outward expression of something that is inward.”30 In other words, the myth of the bible is practical and correlatively used for the purpose of illustrat- ing a fundamental truth about humans that may otherwise be opaque. The myth, therefore, should not be viewed exclusively about Adam but interpreted as a metaphor for every human being; spe i eir “fall” into a state of “spirit” from a state of “innocence”. This leads me to my next preliminary remark: much of the lan- guage used by Kierkegaard may feel esoteric to those unfamiliar with is p i s p ere re s e rie e ni i ns us rs e u ine “Synthesis”: The concept of human beings as syntheses is arguably the most crucial tenet of Kierkegaard’s anthropology. He e nes s n esis s s e u n eing s en s n esis of soul and body, but also is a synthesis of the temporal and eternal.”31 Humans are, in Kierkegaard’s description, intermediate beings in that we are not purely “physical” nor purely “psychical”. We are not purely body, like animals, nor purely mind. Analogously, we are a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. Our predisposition to and conception e in ni e s us re i e ur ni u e i e ise r ug ur reness eing ni e re e e n ei e s e ing is n ni e e in ni e “Spirit”: Kierkegaard refers to spirit as a sort of glue that 30 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 57. 31 Id.,104. 26 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College makes this synthesis possible. Spirit can also be conceived of as our self-awareness and consciousness. He says that “the human being is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical, but a synthesis is unthink- able if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit.”32 Further, in his The Sickness unto Death, he claims that “A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to itself.”33 “Innocence” and “the qualitative leap”: Innocence can be characterized as a state of immediacy, before the “qualitative leap” into spirit. Though he compares the state of innocence to that of Adam be- fore his fall into sin, it can be compared to every human’s state of being before they are self-aware, before they are characterized by “spirit”. The qualitative leap is the fall into self-awareness itself. With this framework, we can now undergo a brief synopsis of Kierkegaardian anxiety. There are two main characterizations of anxi- ety: the anxiety felt before our qualitative leap into self-awareness and that after; for now, the former will receive most of the analysis. Kierke- gaard begins by describing the human experience of anxiety before we become self-aware: “Innocence is ignorance. In innocence the human being is not characterized as spirit but is psychically characterized in imme- diate unity with its natural condition. Spirit is dreaming in the human being… In this state there is peace and repose, but at the same time there is something else, something that is not dissension and strife, for there is nothing against which to strive. What, then, is it? Nothing. But what effect does nothing have? It begets anxiety. This is the profound secret of innocence, that at the same time it is anxiety. Dreaming, spirit projects its own actuality, yet this actuality is nothing, but innocence always sees this nothing outside itself. Anxiety is an attribute of the dreaming spirit[...] The concept of anxiety is hardly ever seen treated in psychology, so I must point out that it differs altogether from fear and si i r n ep s re er s e ing e ni e ere s n ie is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.”34 e rs p r is u i n isse is e in 32 Id., 53. 33 Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, 13. 34 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 50-51. 27Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power state of innocence, humans are not yet characterized by spirit.35 Here, the human is not yet a self; no ego is posited. Innocence is further explicated later in this analysis: “In innocence, the human being is not merely animal, for if at any moment in his life he were merely ani- mal, he would never become a human being. So spirit is present but as intermediate, as dreaming.”36 Kierkegaard asserts that in a state of innocence our spirit is “dreaming”. Spirit “projects its own actuality” to the being who feels this projection outside of itself as a nothing. Put ambiguously, anxiety is “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility”. It discloses itself before itself in time. Before humans become free, they feel anxiety in the sense that they have an inkling within them that communicates that they may become free, become a “self” whose actions are free. The reason the being in innocence feels this call as a nothing is because what is pulling us (spirit) is nothing to us; we are not it yet. Self-awareness and spirit exists in the future but is a nothing now. Why, then, can humans feel what is not yet posited as anxiety? The answer lies in our conception of ourselves as a synthesis. Life, characterized by the will to power, needs to self-over- come. Life needs to be in anxiety to self-overcome. We now know this. Recall the discussion in §3 of the distinction between a being-in-it- se n eing r i se ir r n ni in pure ni u e is being-in-itself insofar as it is what it is; there is no consciousness of the distance that exists between itself because there is no distance. n in ni e singu ri is eing in i se r e s e re s n ere is no consciousness of itself and therefore no gap to exploit in con- sciousness. There is no intentional distance between the object and the subject because the singularity is wholly itself and nothing else. u ns e er re uni ue u ns re s n esis e in ni e n e ni e I e ere s ri in ni e e u e eings in e - se es e in r u i n in ni in ns i usness si e r e i es e p en en n n s ures i is n n e p i i e theory expressly designed to reduce the being of consciousness to that of the in-itself.”37 n g us i e ere s ri ni e s ri we would also be beings-in-themselves. We would be no different than a chair or a dog, which is what it is and is incapable of self-conscious- ness that manifests as a result of any distance within itself. Humans, then, need to be a Kierkegaardian synthesis constituted by ambiguity 35 Recall that this is congruent with being characterized as self-aware and ing un er e e ni i n S r re n ns i usness 36 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 53. 37 Sarte, Being and Nothingness, 76. 28 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College - what Sartre similarly fashioned a “being-for-itself”: “The self refers, but it refers precisely to the subject. It indicates a relation between the subject and himself, and this relation is precisely a duality [...] The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity-in short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between identity as absolute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of a multiplicity. This is what we shall call presence to itself. The law of being of the for-itself.”38 This “duality” within a human is precisely what Kierkeg- aard calls the “synthesis”. By being an ambiguous temporal synthesis, we can be what we are not and not be what we are. We can be the self from which our past actions originated while simultaneously viewing our past as an object to be negated. We can be the self from which future conduct will emanate despite being separated from that self through time. Only in this ambiguity unique to being a human synthesis of the temporal and eternal can the will to power be achieved. Spirit is the glue that posits this ambiguous synthesis. Spirit, too, is itself ambiguous: “[spirit] is in a sense a hostile power, for it constantly upsets the relation between soul and body, a relation that does have subsistence but then doesn’t have it, because it receives it rs r ug spiri i is n e er n rien p er is es precisely to constitute the relation.”39 The relation between soul and body is described as hostile because through its synthesizing soul and s u n re i e e re n uni e Spiri gi es e e relation only to posit that they are separate. However, this act also is a friendly power since it wishes to reconcile the two. As a result of this ambiguity, the result of this synthesis, the human, is in a state not only of ambiguity but of anxiety: “What then is the human being’s relation to this ambiguous power; how does spirit relate to itself and to that which conditions it? It relates as anxiety.”40 Spirit allows life to be conscious of itself and become a being it is not. If spirit did not exist: one of two states would exist that would prevent the will to power from manifesting: one, that which seeks to execute the will to power would be infinite; or two, that which seeks to execute the will to power would be finite. Both are beings-in-them- selves for the reasons outlined above, and both are unable to be con- 38 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 76-77. 39 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 53. 40 Ibid. 29Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power scious under the Sartrean conception of consciousness as a being able to be what it is not. Spirit creates an amorphous human that is neither one nor the other, positing that all-crucial distance within the self that allows for self-overcoming. For the “self” in self-overcoming in ie s e s e ni i n e i p er e se us represen n ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to him- self, a way of not being his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity-in short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilib- rium between identity as absolute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of a multiplicity.”41 i is e ni i n spirit and self, we can arrive at a crucial point: If spirit is the conglutinating force positing the conscious syn- thesis of temporal and eternal as a self, and humans, as this synthesis, relate to spirit in anxiety, this shows that anxiety can thereby be char- acterized as a pull into ambiguous selfhood away from a being-in-itself in innocence. This explains the feeling of anxiety accompanying the all-too-human affection of homelessness, experiencing oneself as “oth- er” and “fragmented”. As humans “fall” into selfhood, their synthesis renders them anxiously aware of their ambiguity and nothingness. We desperately want to be beings-in-themselves, whose existence is a given, who have no internal tension. This explains much of our other fundamental affection, love, which will be expounded in further detail er e er ue ur eing s n eses e ni e n e in ni e which both constitute beings-in-themselves, our existence is a constant project, a constant ambiguity, and a constant striving. We are constantly in a state of inner homelessness, of not being at peace and whole with ourselves. Only in this turbulent and intermediate state as a synthesis of temporal and eternal, however, can we be consciously aware of and exploit the distance wedged between ourselves by time. This anxiety surrounding selfhood also explains why humans attempt to negate their selfhood through conformity or bad faith. It is worth once again summarizing the ground we have cov- ere is un ure irs e e ne e i p er s e eter- nally self- creating, the eternally self-destroying” force of life. With is e ni i n e re i e in r er se er e n re e e n i se i e us rs e ns i us i se e er in r er for a being to be conscious, it must be “a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than 41 Sarte, Being and Nothingness, 77. 30 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College itself.”42 With this, we posited that a singularity would not be able to be conscious of itself because there is no being other than itself. An in ni e singu ri is eing in i se e e re i e u ns are conscious in that we are, through our ambiguous character, able to become beings which we are not. This stems from the conception of a self, which is never a “whole” whose being is a given; rather, selfhood implies a distance and incompleteness existing within the self which is made possible through its being in Sartrean consciousness. This ambiguous character is lent to us in tandem with our being syntheses held together by spirit, which we relate to in anxiety. If we relate to spiri in n ie n ie n ere e e ne s pu in se If anxiety is a pull into selfhood, and selfhood allows for creation through its unique condition as a being-for-itself, and the will-to-power requires a being-for-itself in order to envisage and self which it is not, then anxiety is a catalyst for the will to power. Here, we seem to have arrived at the answer to the question of individuality. Only through a fragmented ego who can become what it is not by virtue of its ambig- uous being is the will to power manifested. Life, in order to become what it is not, must have a relationship to a self which it is not in the future, something it cannot do if it is an unindividuated singularity. Such a being would be all beings to exist and ever exist and in no way could envisage a being that it can be because it is that being. To exhibit the will to power, a being must take form in an ambiguous, paradoxi- cal, individuated human form: one that is in a state of anxiety due to its incompleteness. In a human, selfhood and being are never a state but a continuous striving, a continuous consciousness of itself and transcen- dence of itself into a new self. §6: SELFHOOD IS SELF-ANNIHILATION eing igu us se es r ns e in i e r ug ns n negation and becoming, we are in a state of continuous self-annihila- tion and self-creating. This means that the ego is, in every sense of the word, set up to be destroyed. Here we arrive at the Nietzschean notions se s ri e se nni i i n n g ing un er u ine in 2 virtue of us being syntheses are we never a whole; we are amorphous in that we are beings-for-themselves who can exploit the distance engendered by consciousness and therefore continuously become anew. Nietzsche believed that “Whoever must be a creator always annihi- 42 Id., 47. 31Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power lates.”43 The ego, in this characterization of continuous self-annihila- tion, can be conceived of as a piece of wood making the flame burn brighter by being destroyed. Like fuel to an engine of the monstrous will to power is the ego. To execute the will to power, we must do as Zarathustra did: “I overcame myself, the sufferer; I carried my own ashes to the mountains; I invented rig er e r se 44 Only through our destruction can we become anew. Nietzsche told us that “And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing be- sides”. Not only are we the will to power - and this is the crucial point of this paper and what Nietzsche never expressly stated - the will to power is nothing without us. To self-overcome and create, it needs the human. §7: SELF-ANNIHILATION AND FATAL LOVE If humans are characterized as ambiguous syntheses, and con- sequently in a state of self-annihilation, it is worth expounding in more e i is i e se s ri e s e ing is in eres ing un in our conception of love. The Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont offers a fascinating commentary on the myth of Tristan and Iseult in his work Love in the Western World; one that, independently of the concept of the will to power, paints the individual in a similar fashion as Nietzsche. De Rougemont begins his analysis by emphasizing the prominence of love and death as intertwined themes through European literary history: “Love and death, a fatal love—in these phrases is summed up, if not the whole of poetry, at least whatever is popular, whatever is univer- sally moving in European literature, alike as regards the oldest legends and the sweetest songs. Happy love has no history.”45 Already we can see overlaps with Nietzschean thought: “Love and perishing: that has rhymed for eternities.”46 Further, De Rougemont claims that “What s irs ri p e s eir nes ig s is nei er e e ig e senses nor the fruitful contentment of the settled couple; not the satis- faction of love, but its passion. And passion means suffering. There we have the fundamental fact.”47 Here, we see the theme of annihilation already intertwined with - and seemingly paradoxically - love. What 43 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 171. 44 Id.,143. 45 De Rougemont, Love in the Western World, 15. 46 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 235. 47 De Rougemont, Love in the Western World, 15. 32 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College has moved human beings for centuries are not stories of happy endings and contentment in our love; rather, we crave the suffering and striving accompanied by the act. The point of departure De Rougemont takes in his analysis of the Tristan Myth is the mechanics of the plot; to avoid summarizing the entire story, he argues that the two lovers, Tristan and Iseult, do everything in their power not to be with each other. Every small ob- s e eir uni i n is e i u er e e i n is p in e Rougemont proclaims that “Objectively, not one of the barriers to the u en eir e is insuper e n e e i e e gi e up It is not too much to say that they never miss a chance of getting part- ed. When there is no obstruction, they invent one, as in the case of the drawn sword and of Tristan’s marriage. They invent obstructions as if on purpose, notwithstanding that such barriers arc their bane. Can it be in order to please the author and reader?”48 The act of striving towards each other, the act of overcoming barriers to their love, is paramount to the object of their love. In short, Tristan and Iseult love the act of loving more than the object of their love; they love striving toward one another. The same can be said of the reader following along. What es e s r in eres ing n igni es e e i in us is i gining the lovers overcoming the obstacles to their love, not their union. With this established, De Rougemont proceeds to make a larger claim about what this reveals about human nature; after all, “It is only ‘silly’ questions that can enlighten us; for behind whatever seems obvious lurs something that is not.”4950 A myth, he says, discloses a secret. This secret is that we “love love more than the object of love, to love passion for its own sake, has been to love to suffer[…] passionate love, the longing for what sears us and annihilates us in its triumph - there is the secret which Europe has never allowed to be given away.”51 e ues i n en re ins u ns r s s ries passionate suffering? Why do we crave this suffering, this love whose “effulgence culminates in [our] self-destruction?”52 The answer, and if the similarities with Nietzsche are not already apparent, is that “Both passion and the longing for death which passion disguises are connect- ed with, and fostered by, a particular notion of how to reach under- 48 Id., 37. 49 Id., 38. 50 Interestingly, Nietzsche had a strikingly similar quote on page 144 in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “Is not the strangest of all things proved most nearly?”. 51 De Rougemont, Love in the Western World, 50. 52 Id., 51. 33Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power standing [...] man reaches self-awareness and tests himself only by risking his life.”53 Here, we see the will to power in the individual not only in anxiety but in love54 as well. The reason why we love loving more than the object of our love is that “Whatever I create and however much I love it - soon I must oppose it and my love; thus my will wills it.”55 In eing e ne s rp us n rre i e se nni i ing creatures substantiating the will to power, we must be in a continual state of striving towards, becoming and overcoming. This tendency of creation in self-destruction is so fundamental that it takes root in - at least a part of - our conception of love. In passionate love, we cannot e s is e i i s uni e need the constant opposition, the inces- sant overcoming of barriers to love. This is precisely the reason the myth of Tristan and Iseult has gripped us for centuries: because we ourselves are characterized by the will to power’s continuous striving. We are drawn to stories such as Romeo and Juliet in which the lovers “can never be united till, bereft of all hope and of all possible love, they reach the heart of utter obstruction and experience the supreme e i n i is es r e in eing u e 56 De Rougemont is, of course, referring to death as the “heart of utter obstruction”. The lovers in such stories, whether Tristan and Iseult or Romeo and Juliet, much to our enthrallment, obsess in the ecstasy of what it means to be a human - to constantly overcome obstacles - to the point that they reach unity in the ultimate obstacle of death. This craving for death is indic- ative of the point proved in §8, that the self is set up, by its ambiguous e ni i n e ns n nni i e ris n n Iseu r e e just as Nietzsche proclaims we do: “Spirit is the life that itself cuts into life: with its own agony it increases its own knowledge. Did you know that? And the happiness of the spirit is this: to be anointed and through tears be consecrated as a sacrificial animal.”57 Just as the will to power is ns n su ering n se s ri e p ssi n e e is su ering something undergone [...] To love love more than the object of love, to love passion for its own sake, has been to love to suffer [...] passionate love, the longing for what sears us and annihilates us in its triumph - 53 Ibid. 4 I p r n in p ssi n e e ere re n pes n ssi i ns of love, and at this juncture I am only analyzing this one (not to say that the i p er is n presen in er ssi i ns e 55 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 227. 56 De Rougemont, Love in the Western World, 53. 57 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 216. 34 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College there is the secret which Europe has never allowed to be given away.”58 §8: SYMPOSIUM LOVE Passionate love, however, is not the only type of love that elucidates the human condition; we are given another interpretation of love by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. In Diotima’s dialogue with Socrates at the end of Symposium e g ess e nes e s e r e in ni e s e ing e ie e r ug pr re i n r re i n is everlasting and immortal as far as is possible for something mortal. Eros necessarily desires immortality with the good, from what has been agreed, since its object is to possess the good for itself forever. It necessarily follows from this account, then, that Eros is also love of immortality.”59 In ur nguis e r g en e ni e s e e re painfully aware of our mortality; this is the negative concomitant of executing the will to power. In becoming syntheses through spirit do we become conscious of the nothingness of our being. The self, as outlined in §6, is set up for annihilation. As a result, the human self, in i s nguis e re i i n i s ni u e see s s r s i n e is forever and be immortal. It can do so only in this way, by giving birth, ever leaving behind a different new thing in place of the old, since even in the time in which each single living creature is said to live and to be the same—for example, as a man is said to be the same from youth to old age— though he never has the same things in himself, he neverthe- less is called the same, but he is ever becoming new while otherwise peris ing in respe ir n es n ne n n e en ire body.”60 Although individual humans are mortal, the will to power of life is immortal. Through our procreation, driven by love, by striving towards one another, we immortalize life. In addition to infantilizing life through physical procreation, we can also achieve a sort of me- ta-immortality of our knowledge through our unique ability to gain knowledge iteratively through generations: “Study, by introducing again a new memory in place of what departs, preserves the knowledge so that it seems to be the same.”61 The individual will not be around forever, and nor will the human race. Some day, and hopefully, humans will evolve into what Nietzsche calls the “overman” just as humans evolved from apes. To 58 De Rougemont, Love in the Western World, 50-51. 59 Plato, Symposium, 207a. 60 Id., 207d. 61 Id., 208a. 35Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power the overman, humans will be apes.62 No being, in its ambiguity, can er e e e s ing re i i s ni u e I n e er e er- nalize the will to power through love. Through procreation and the it- erative passing down of knowledge through generations, intelligent life immortalizes itself. The will to power is real; life continually dies only to create something new; in this process, it has discovered amazing things about itself. While the concept of a human as merely a kindling r e e ern e e i p er see isp r ging I p si that it is beautiful beyond words. Though everything is transitory and ni e e ns i u e n e inspiring e ern i p er i i says that “it is in this way that all that is mortal is preserved: not by being ever completely the same, like the divine, but by leaving behind, as it departs and becomes older, a different new thing of the same sort as it was.”63 r e i p er e in ni e se er ing be preserved, it cannot be a singularity. It needs life to be a synthesis that can exploit the nothingness between itself through its ambiguous relationship with time. §9: CONCLUSION Humans are intermediate beings. We are made so by spirit in anxiety, rendering us insatiably craving wholeness in love either r ug se nni i i n r ppe r s e in ni e e u n however, can never be a being-in-itself. Yet another reason that our existence is ambiguous is that we did not ask for self-consciousness, yet the self is our responsibility. Knowing that selfhood is what drives the will to power and can beget the overman, let us not hide from it. Let us not subjugate our “self” by hiding from it in conformity. We must embrace the ambiguity of our existence rather than seek some objective truth external to us. Only through self-exploration, suffering, and self-overcoming can we do what is most beautiful: create beyond ourselves. Humans have, throughout time, gradually adopted more and more de-centering outlooks on the world. It began with geo-centric decentering: humans realize their planet is not the center of the uni- verse. Then, in horror, we realized that man was not specially created and rather is a result of billions of years of evolution. Next, we realize 62 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 124. 63 Plato, Symposium, 208b. 36 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College that even our own egos, our own selves, are mysteries to us.64 Perhaps now it is time for another de-centering. Let us realize that humans have an ethical duty to safeguard our distant future, and that we must ensure the being into which we will evolve is both something we are proud of and capable of thriving. Humans are not the end of the evolutionary ladder of life. It would be a shame to throw away the gift of the will to p er e u ni e en e er r ug ur se s ness Nietzsche believed that it is time for humanity to set itself a goal. It is time to look at humanity’s purpose and future more practically. After all, isn’t the most disenfranchised being that which isn’t born yet?65 64 Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. 65 This is an aspect of “longtermism”, which endorses ethical consideration for beings who are not yet born, i.e., a being such as the overman. 37Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 An Exploration of Anxiety, Love, and Selfhood under the Domain of the Will to Power REFERENCES De Rougemont, Denis. Love in the Western World. Translat- ed by Montogomery Belgion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Freud, Sigmund. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Herts, UK: Wordsworth Editions, 2012. Kierkegaard, Soren. The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psy- chologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin. Edited by Alastair Hannay, Translated by Alastair Hannay. NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2014. Kierkegaard, Soren. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian s gi p si i n r i i n n ening i e Alastair Hannay, Translated by Alastair Hannay. NY: Viking Pen- guin Inc., 1989. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Edited by Walter A. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, Translated by Walter A. Kaufmann. NY: Random House, 1968. Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” in The Por- table Nietzsche. Edited by Walter A. Kaufmann, Translated by Walter A. Kaufmann. NY: Viking Penguin Inc., 1968. Plato. Symposium. Translated by R.E. Allen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel Estella Barnes. London: Routledge Classics, 2003. 38 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College δι άν οι α A SYMETRICAL ARGUMENT FOR PERSONHOOD AND ABORTION ARTHUR DECARLE This paper will be concerned with the moral status of abortion, e ne in is ins n e s e un r er in i n r ing ere- of, of a woman’s pregnancy. In my opinion, to satisfactorily defend a woman’s right to an abortion, one must display that a fetus is unworthy of moral consideration. In this paper, I will craft an argument to dis- p r nsi er i n is gr n e e rs en ns i us experience is possible. Further, I will suggest that fetuses before proper brain development are unworthy of moral consideration, morally justi- fying a woman’s right to abortion. e u e ssess i e i rs nee is inguis between a human and a person. The traditional argument against abor- tion is a perfect example of the necessity to distinguish these terms. The traditional argument, as recounted by Warren is as follows: It is morally wrong to kill an innocent human being, fetuses are innocent human beings, then it is morally wrong to kill a fetus.1 1 Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/27902294, 12. 39Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Personhood and Abortion e s e e r i i n rgu en res s n e e ni i n u n u n eing in e p i s p i sense is er i e ni- i ns e rs is se e i en n in i i u e nging e spe ies Homo Sapien n n ining e u n gen e is e ni i n n be referred to as the genetic human.2 The moral human, or person for the intent and purpose of this paper, is a completely developed member of the moral community and is thus granted full moral consideration. u s I i n e p isp e e ni i n use u n begs the question. Premise one is simply a restatement of one of our most basic moral truths, assuming it is specifying a “moral human.” If it is the case that a fetus is an “innocent human”, then by necessity, ere us e ne e ni i n u n s i is i gi ssign moral judgment to an individual based solely on genetics. If premise is per ing n e gene i e ni i n u n en i egs e question, what makes a genetic being morally innocent? If that is the se en ne e ni i n u n us e use i ur er gi ies ere re ei er e rgu en u i i es ne e ni i n u n n egs e ues i n r i uses e ni i ns u- man”, and the argument becomes unsound. The argument fails to prove e presen e u n gene i s is ne ess r n su ien r inclusion into the moral community and therefore fails due to the lack e u e e ni i ns is p per i e p i e pi s the traditional argument by further exploring the difference between a genetic human and a moral one. I eser es e p sis e e usi e n ure e e ni i n a person is central to the debate over a fetus’ personhood status. Phi- s p ers e n ri us s rugg e re e e ni i n pers n and none to this date has been generally accepted. That being said, one cannot act immorally to someone else on the grounds that “person” is n e r e ne i ing e n is re pers n r e n n e e ni i n ne e e ni i n es n en i e non-existence of the concept. One may ask, how can I assert a claim re- g r ing pers n i u e er e ning e er e ns er see s ie in e ne n ri u e su ien n i i ns r pers n i u su e ni i n I I en un er n in i i u u s s e e n n i i ns pr p se in e re r I n e n en I am interacting with a person. First, to outline our understanding of personhood, we must 2 Id., 15. 40 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College start with the moral community. While I will not attempt to lay out a p e e n sis r uni I i e e p i su ien enough to make my argument. The moral community, used descriptive- ly in this context, is a group owing to a recognized moral philosophy that serves to govern their pursuits.3 It consists exclusively of people, with all people being included in the moral community. People are individuals who, alone, are granted full moral consideration from the moral community.4 It is the case that all persons are human, it is not the case that all humans are persons are human. To illustrate the point, I present an example: a man has his head surgically removed and discarded while his headless body is kept alive using medical equip- ment. The headless body is still living and still retains its homo sapien status, therefore, it is human. Can the same be said for his personhood? Our intuitions suggest that his lack of head, the part of the body that contributes to every attribute we hold to be like that of a person, is now severed and dead. This example, and others like it are intended to display our intuitive belief that “human” and “person” are not synony- mous. Second, to understand personhood as it is commonly under- s ne us ress e ep e su ien n i i ns rren and Dennett both formulate almost identical conditions following the sophisticated cognitive capacity school of thought. In their respective works, entitled On The Moral And Legal Status of Abortion and Condi- tions of Personhood, they assert the following: 1) consciousness of the objects and events external and/or internal to the being; 2) reasoning: the developed capacity to problem-solve relative- ly complex issues; 3) self-motivated activity: activity independent of genetic or direct external control; 4) a capacity to communicate, by whatever means; 5) the presence of self-identity and self-awareness. 5 3 Babst, G.A. (2011). “Moral Community”. In: Chatterjee, D.K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5_328. 4 Dennett, Daniel. “CONDITIONS OF PERSONHOOD.” Identities of Persons, 1976, 175–96. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520353060-008. 5 Id., 5; Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/27902294, 17. 41Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Personhood and Abortion Now that both the moral community and personhood have been crudely described, I suggest that only consciousness (1) and the presence of self-identity (5) are required for a being to be regarded as pers n ns i usness ne is n su ien es rip i n i u the distinction of human self-identity. A phenomenon that seems to be unique to the human species is the idea of self-identity and how it feels to be a self. An emergent property occurs within humans that permits us to develop from a simple creature, a fetus, to a complex creature capable of advanced consciousness and the subjective experience of what it is like to be oneself. It is hard to dispute that a cat is conscious, but much harder to prove that the cat has the experience of feeling like a self and recognizing that same feeling in others in the way a human undoubtedly does. This conscious awareness and “feeling like a self” are the key factors to personhood and will be referred to as one term: conscious experience. ns i us e perien e in ie is e rs n s ru i deciding factor in distinguishing a being’s status in the moral commu- nity. That is to say, conscious experience serves as a precursor to all other conditions presented by Warren and Dennett. To display the value that modern society places on the conscious experience, I will deploy yet another example. Let us imagine a man who gets in an extremely traumatic accident and is rushed to the hospital. Let us also assume that before his accident, he was healthy and, by all accounts, deploying a conscious experience. Due to his injuries, his heart stops for a few moments and he goes unconscious. Anyone even remotely familiar with modern science would reject the notion that this man is no longer a person, but why? I would contend that his prior conscious experience coupled with the medical capabilities of restarting his heart would allow for possible future conscious experiences. Now let us imagine that, tragically, all attempts to restart the man’s heart failed, his brain has ceased to function, and restoring his original condition is beyond the assistance of medical care. Yet again, I would contend that anyone familiar with personhood could not argue, in good faith, that this man is a person any longer. His current conscious experience has ended and the future conscious experiences are no longer possible (it comes as a given that if future medical advancements allow for the full restoration of brain functions then the hypothetical would simply need to take one step further). Therefore, if death is the ending of brain function, and ostensibly, a conscious experience no longer exists nor is one possible, a human has lost its personhood. This assertion is also borne out in 42 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College ern s ien i i er ure s e s ere e is s nsensus i in e community that the cessation of brain functions constitutes death. 6 The concept of death itself in the semantic sense separates the gene i u n r e r ne u n rpse e ni i n is still a genetic human, the species and genome don’t change after one dies, but intuitively we treat corpses differently than living humans. A moral individual could never in good conscience bury a “moral human”, but could certainly bury a genetic one, assuming it is not a person, with no qualms at all. Asserting that death is the end of personhood is as innocuous a claim as “a fetus is a human”. If we are to accept that a person no longer exists when a future conscious experience is impossible, i.e. the full and irreversible cessation of the brain’s functions, then it logically follows that a person exists as long as a prior conscious experience exists and future experiences are possible. Thus, if a person exists as long as a prior conscious experience exists and future experiences are possible, then a person starts existing e rs en ese e perien es re p ssi e r e s e ri- ty, the argument is as follows: 1) If a person stops existing when a conscious experience ends and future experiences become impossible then, A person exists as long as a prior conscious experience exists and future experiences are possible; 2) If a person exists as long as a prior conscious experi- ence exists and future experiences are possible, then pers n s r s e is ing e rs en ns i us experiences are possible; 3) A person stops existing when a conscious experience ends and future experiences become impossible; 4) ere re pers n s r s e is ing e rs en conscious experiences are possible. e p ssi i i r rs ns i us e perien e is s e ri i the ending of a conscious experience. If the cessation of the brain ends such an experience, the formation of all of the brain’s parts and the 6 Burkle, Christopher M., Richard R. Sharp, and Eelco F. Wijdicks. “Why Brain Death Is Considered Death and Why There Should Be No Confusion.” Neurology 83, no. 16 (2014): 1464–69. https://doi.org/10.1212/ wnl.0000000000000883. 43Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Personhood and Abortion harmonious interaction between them would seem to be the beginning. First, it is generally acknowledged that consciousness is only possible following the development of thalamocortical connections from the sensory organs. These connections are developed from 20-24 gestation- al weeks, after this period a newborn is aware of itself and minimally of its surroundings.7 Before this period, the fetus may react to pain and other basic external stimuli, although the fetus is likely unaware due to the lack of said connections. Following the developmental period, biological structures are now developed enough to deploy conscious- ness (assuming that the fetus is developing in a healthy manner with no traumatic defects) and the fetus has the possibility of future conscious- ness. From this time frame, a fetus should be regarded as a person and gr n e r pers n ep e s ien i uni i s rejecting a fetus’ personhood after the emergence of its consciousness is akin to justifying the killing of an “innocent human” in the words of the traditional argument. For there to be a person to speak of there must be an un- derlying conscious experience. To argue that the potentiality of x is equally as valued as x itself is to work against all ontological notions of existence. This argument is akin to claiming that a blueprint, wood beams, and concrete blocks are the same as a house, as the wood and concrete can potentially become a house, assuming the proper steps occur to realize the change. The same holds true for the potentiality of consciousness. Given the proper nutrients and environment, a fetus has the potential for consciousness and therefore, has the same val- ue as one who has already realized such a development. In nearly all countries, children are restricted from a multitude of rights afforded to adults (they cannot legally consent, drive, or drink alcohol, for exam- ple). All children also have the potential to develop into fully grown adults, given proper nutrients and environment. By this logic, children should be afforded all rights granted to adults because they possess the potential to develop into adulthood. An acceptance of this argument would point out the incongruence between the proponents of potential- ity and accepted ontological understandings. It cannot be the case that the potentiality for an attribute in the future constitutes the same as the actuality of that attribute. Other objections commonly raised by critics tend to fall into 7 Lagercrantz, Hugo. “The Emergence of Consciousness: Science and Ethics.” Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 19, no. 5 (2014): 300–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.siny.2014.08.003. 44 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College two general tropes: 1) Claims that personhood valuing the stage of develop- ment in which the brain is capable of consciousness is arbitrary; 2) Claims that the levels of consciousness exerted by a fetus are incompatible with the general understanding of the term. e i ns e rs rie en in e s ip- per s pe rgu en ri i s i ing r e rs p re n proponents of personhood at the moment of conception. It appears to be evident that the development of a human being from conception through adolescence and onto adulthood is continuous; therefore the critic would contend that choosing any point on that continuum in which personhood begins is necessarily arbitrary. From this assertion, the conclusion follows that the fetus must be a person from conception as it is the only nonarbitrary position on the continuum. If it were the case that 20-24 gestational weeks were arbitrary, then so would the de- velopmental period for puberty and similarly the growth of a seed into a tree. It certainly does not follow that a seed is a tree or a prepubescent child a fully developed adult. If one was tasked with execution and the sole parameter was to cut the condemned head clean off, taking none of his neck with it, the execution would never take place. The executioner could not go on to claim that the neck is arbitrary because there exists no perceptible line. Similarly, their line of reasoning can also be utilized against the critic’s argument. Past the point of conception, the sperm or the ovum alone certainly could have the potential to become a human life; therefore, their existence would place them further back on the contin- uum of development. The delineation from sperm and ovum to zygote is seemingly arbitrary as to when the potential for personhood starts and ends. From this realization, contraception and birth control would both constitute the killing of a potential person with moral consider- i n re u ing e r i n ues i n sur i e n e e er for the slippery slope argument is to assert that the change from sperm and ovum to zygote is that of form and not degree, that being that the change is so drastic that the resulting entity is entirely separate. To agree to this point would be to concede that there exists pivotal chang- es that occur along human development that permanently alter the pre- vious entity. From this concession, it can be argued that the transition from a fetus without consciousness to one with consciousness is drastic 45Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Personhood and Abortion enough to constitute a change of form. e e e ine ri i ues e rs r pe ere e critic utilizes a slippery slope argument, to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of valuing one stage of development over another. Critiques of the second form are far more challenging, as the proponents claim that the level at which a fetus is conscious is incompatible with the general understanding of the term consciousness. Proponents of this argument, such as Robert Larmer, assert a claim along the lines of the following: The argument that it is not the potential to become conscious, but rather the potential to resume consciousness, that confers a right to life proves too strong, inasmuch as it threatens to justify not only abortion but infanticide since newborn infants are not yet conscious in the sense in which we normally use the term.8 Larmer suggests that consciousness, as we are familiar with the term, is n ri u e u n in i i u e se en n s er ir He expands on this claim by asserting that even newborn fetuses have a level of consciousness lower than most newborn animals.9 Objections of this nature are certainly more stout, but for sev- eral reasons, I believe it fails. The argument logically entails that since the valued consciousness of a fetus is diminished by comparison to an adult human, it is necessary to grant personhood to all creatures that embody a level of consciousness akin to or greater than the fetus. irs r er s us i i n r ns i usness e e ping ges e se en n s is gr un e in u e s u ies n runs contrary to more modern assessments of the development of conscious- ness. That being said, the major contention lies in the suggested levels of consciousness embodied by different creatures. It is a fact that a fe- tus and even a newborn’s level of consciousness is of a “lower mental level” than that of a plethora of other animals. To discredit the claim I believe a thought experiment is an order. Imagine that conscious experience is like a bucket of water and with each new day in one’s development a splash of water is added to the bucket. The level of water in each bucket suggests the level at which you are conscious, a developed adult human having the fullest bucket (human in the genetic human sense). For this thought experi- 8 Larmer, Robert. “Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1995): 241–51. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24354127, 7. 9 Ibid. 46 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College ment, a fetus at 20-24 gestational weeks is given a bucket with just a small splash of water in it. Next to the fetus’ bucket lies a lizard, an adult dog, and an adult chimpanzee’s bucket. The lizard has the same amount of water as the fetus, while the dog has a one-third-full bucket, and the chimp a half-full bucket. There is no debate that both the dog and the chimp are more conscious than the human fetus by orders of gni u e s e e us e e ps in n es en i s u e is e to two-thirds, now undoubtedly more full than the other animals. Is it the case that the fetus’ development, started with a lizard’s conscious e perien e en e g n n e i p e re ssu ing u n ne i is n e se e e us e e i r u - et, then the dog, and so forth. It is not the case, in my argument, that one’s consciousness rises to a level deemed worthy of personhood, it is the animal in kind and its own genetically unique kind of experience which is valued. A fetus’ conscious experience is diminished from that of a human adult, but that statement alone entails that each species has its continuum of conscious development that can be compared but is simply not analogous. The critic would retort, “Is it not the case that dogs can learn complex tricks and chimps can solve rudimentary puzzles, but a fetus cannot?”. Although this is true, these animals are not exerting a sapiens’ conscious experience of how all conscious homo sapiens in rinsi un ers n e e ni i n r e p n i n i ee s to experience a sapiens’ conscious experience is in fact impossible, there is no other conscious experience we can analytically compare it e er us i e in e se e e ni i n person, the lack e ni i n es n e n e re un e i en i n re gni e the existence in others. It seems to be the case that a dog does not have the same sense of self, if it has one at all, that a human does. If that is the case, then the value I assign to both consciousness and sense of self separates a human conscious experience from that of any non-human animal. Therefore, a fetus’ conscious experience is by a degree less than an adult’s but, by kind, greater than that of a dog. Larmer proposes a thought experiment to challenge the asser- tion that the resumption of consciousness is superseded by the potential to become conscious (his central anti-abortion claim) as follows: Suppose someone is in a serious car accident and lapses into a coma as a result of her injuries. Upon arriving at the hospital, doctors ascer- tain that her injuries will heal, but that she will be in a coma for nine months, after which time she will become conscious. Unfortunate- 47Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Personhood and Abortion ly, she will have suffered total amnesia and there is no chance that she will regain any previous memories or knowledge of past plans, Indeed, the amnesia is so complete that she, like a newborn child, will have to learn how to use language and develop motor skills. Her relatives and friends, for whatever reason, express the desire that her existence be terminated and that she not be allowed to become conscious.10 Larmer utilizes this hypothetical to assert that there is a clear obligation to protect the life of the individual that is not accounted for unless the potential to become conscious is the valued condition of personhood. Although the thought experiment is challenging, it fails to exclude my argument from protecting the injured. It is the case that the injured woman deserves protection as her right to life has not been forfeited by the nature of her personhood. That being said, it is not the potential for her to become conscious that grounds this belief. The prior conscious experience of the woman before her accident is what grants her personhood for the duration of her coma, as it is the case that her future experiences remain possible. The total amnesia as a result of her accident does not create a lack of prior experience, it only serves to remove them from her retrievable memory. It is not debatable that she was not conscious beforehand, the suggestion that she cannot recall the experiences does not refute their existence. This claim is akin to stating that a particularly zealous partygoer is not deploying a conscious expe- rience for the duration of their blacked-out drunkenness. The partygoer in this case experiences total amnesia during the period of their drunk- enness but the conscious experience exists nonetheless. My goal throughout this paper has been to outline my position on the beginning of personhood and to defend the claim that since a fetus, before the development of the thalamocortical connections, does not have the capabilities to deploy a conscious experience, it is not granted personhood. Therefore, abortion is morally permissible for any reason before the 20-24 gestational week period. Thus the limit to acquire a legal abortion should be the twentieth gestational week to prevent the undue killing of persons. Second, to avoid any dispute over abortions in which the child was consummated through rape or incest or in cases in which the er s e is in nger I n i ne ess r ri e p si i n 10 Id., 8. 48 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College Personhood and the right to life that is granted with it entails that it is not by any means the right not to be killed, rather it only serves to pr e g ins e un us i e i ing pers n In ses in i e mother’s life is in serious and imminent peril, the rights of the unborn may be surpassed by those of the living. Similarly to cases in which a prisoner is sentenced to capital punishment, the right to life of an individual can only be usurped when accompanied by a just reason. For cases of rape and incest, the fetus may be aborted prior to 20-24 weeks, the same being the case for any other reason as the fetus is not yet a person. Following this period, the fetus is granted full moral person- hood, and abortion for any reason other than the mother’s health is not permissible, in the same way, that killing a 1-year-old child conceived by incest is not permissible. Lastly, as technology advances at an ever-increasing rate it is also worth clarifying the position with regards to non-human beings with equal, if not greater, forms of conscious experience than our own. Due to the necessity for the human conscious experience to my rgu en r pers n r i i in e igen pu ers u n be granted personhood, and therefore, would have diminished moral consideration. The only caveat is if the creators of these machines were capable of perfectly replicating the human consciousness. 49Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Personhood and Abortion REFERENCES Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www. jstor.org/stable/27902294. Babst, G.A. (2011). “Moral Community”. In: Chatterjee, D.K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5_328. Dennett, Daniel. “CONDITIONS OF PERSON- HOOD.” Identities of Persons, 1976, 175–96. https://doi. org/10.1525/9780520353060-008. Warren, M. A. (1973). “ON THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF ABORTION”. The Monist, 57(1), 43–61. http://www. jstor.org/stable/27902294. Burkle, Christopher M., Richard R. Sharp, and Eelco F. Wijdicks. “Why Brain Death Is Considered Death and Why There Should Be No Confusion.” Neurology 83, no. 16 (2014): 1464–69. https://doi.org/10.1212/wnl.0000000000000883. Lagercrantz, Hugo. “The Emergence of Consciousness: Sci- ence and Ethics.” Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 19, no. 5 (2014): 300–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.siny.2014.08.003. larmer, Robert. “Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1995): 241–51. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24354127. 50 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College δι άν οι α AGAINST EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS ROBERTO UREÑA The theory of evolutionary ethics suggests that the biological process of natural selection can supply a foundation for morality. I will argue that evolutionary ethics is incapable of providing such a foundation, because it lacks empirical and rational evidence to support it, because it yields unacceptable moral outcomes, and because it cannot overcome the ‘is-ought’ problem. §1: THE PLACE OF EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS IN CONTEMPO- RARY SCHOLARSHIP The theory of evolutionary ethics, once dormant, is stirring in academia again—not so much among professional philosophers as among the biologists and psychologists. More and more, the natural sciences tout their assurance that the origins of moral sentiment, and perhaps of mo- rality itself, are to be found in evolutionary biology.1 More and more, there is a sense that, as de Waal expresses it, “morality requires and probably has an evolutionary explanation.”2 At the present time, such talk is largely relegated to the natural sciences. Philosophically, evolutionary ethics has long been considered n e p e i e r ing een s i is supp se su ien - 1 See, for instance, Dennis L. Krebs, “Morality: An Evolutionary Account,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3, no. 3 (2008): 149-172, https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00072.x. 2 Frans B. M. de Waal, et al, “Evolved Morality: The Biology and Philosophy of Human Conscience,” Behavior 151 (2014): pp. 137-141; p. 137. See also de Waal’s book by the same name. 51Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics ly dealt with by Thomas Huxley, and G. E. Moore.3 This discrepancy between the opinions of the philosophers and the metaethical specula- tions of natural scientists, especially at a time when natural scientists are brazen in their claims of a coming explanatory omnipotence,4 casts philosophers skeptical of such claims in a poor light.5 There are, howev- er—as I will argue—good reasons to be skeptical. The natural sciences are fully capable, it will be admitted, of describing all natural phenom- ena—that is, of explaining how things are. The natural scientist, how- ever, must ‘remove the sandals from their feet’ when approaching the subject of ethics—for ethics is not the study of how things are, but of how things ought to be. S i ere re ig pes n ur s ien is s e e e i s i e e e s p si s i g n ps g i su u e re en ess r s ien i pr gress e r e rs ago, biologist E. O. Wilson wrote that “the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologi- cized.”6 Slowly, steadily, biologists have been marching to the drumbeat of Wilson and others, advancing on the subject of morality. The purpose of this paper is to check these advances. To that end, it will be important to understand precisely what evolutionary eth- ics is, before considering the problems with this theory. §2: DEFINING EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS The theory of evolutionary ethics has been generally divided into three distinct categories: descriptive evolutionary ethics, prescriptive evolu- tionary ethics, and evolutionary metaethics.7 Descriptive evolutionary ethics is concerned with the question of why human beings consider 3 For a brief discussion of Huxley and Ruse on the subject, see Doris Schroeder, “Evolutionary Ethics,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Accessed 15 Nov 2023), https://iep.utm.edu/evol-eth/#H2. 4 Consider, for instance, a quote from Peter Atkins’ provocatively titled chapter, ‘The Limitless Power of Science’: “There is no reason to suppose that science cannot deal with every aspect of existence.” Peter Atkins, “The Limitless Power of Science,” in Nature’s Imagination: The Frontiers of Scientific Vision, ed. John Cornwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 125. 5 The late Stephen Hawking argued as much in his much-acclaimed book on the interplay between philosophy and science, cited below: “Philosophy is dead,” he pronounced, because it “has not kept up with modern developments in science.” Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design. New York, NY: Bantam Publishing, 2012. Quotes are from page 5. 6 E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, 562. 7 William FitzPatrick, “Morality and Evolutionary Biology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato. stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/morality-biology/. 52 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College certain actions to be moral or immoral. Prescriptive evolutionary ethics is concerned with grounding ethical theory in the biological evolution of the human being. Evolutionary metaethics is concerned with the ues i n e er n e u i n r e r per ins e e of ethics as a whole. For the present purposes, this paper will not consider the ques- tion of evolutionary metaethics, and will deal solely with the descrip- tive and prescriptive aspects of evolutionary moral theory. Thus, there are only two claims which this paper will consider with regards to evo- u i n r e i s e rs i i is e es rip i e e u i n r ethics claim, is that moral sentiments are grounded in natural selection. In other words, the reason why human beings consider any particular action to be morally ‘good’ or morally ‘evil’ is because nature has selected for human beings with those particular moral sentiments. For example, on this theory, human beings consider the act of murder to be wrong because human beings with an aversion to murder—both to murdering others and to seeing others murdered—are more likely to survive and pass on their genes than human beings without such an aversion. As such, over time, human beings have nearly universally come to consider the act of murder as something which ‘ought not to be done.’ It should be noted, of course, that the question of whether or not moral sentiments can be explained by natural selection is largely a matter of empirical inquiry. While there may be immediate objections to the idea of moral sentiments as a product of natural selection—for instance, on the grounds that such would seem to suggest an equal- ization of ‘moral sentiment’ and ‘morality’—it is beyond the scope of this paper to address these concerns. Rather than engage in biological in es ig i n r e e i spe u i n I i ins e re is rs claim as a given. The second claim of evolutionary ethics, which is the prescrip- tive claim, is that the summum bonum is to pass on one’s genes—that is, to reproduce.8 In other words, “actions that increase the long-term capacity of survival in evolutionary terms are good and actions that decrease this capacity are bad.”9 As this second postulation made by e u i n r e i s is n e piri si e u is r er p i - osophical statement, the focus of the present paper will be on the validity of this aspect of evolutionary ethics. Henceforth, for the sake of simplicity, when I use the term ‘evolutionary ethics,’ it will be in ref- erence to this second claim. To that end, it will be important to consider 8 Throughout this paper, for the sake of simplicity, the terms ‘pass on one’s genes,’ ‘reproduce,’ and ‘procreate’ will be used synonymously. 9 Doris Schroeder, op. cit. 53Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics the arguments made in favor of reproduction as the summum bonum by the proponents of evolutionary ethics. §3: SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS FOR EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS Perhaps the chief argument made in favor of evolutionary ethics is that—unlike most other moral theories—evolutionary ethics grounds ethics does not require a metaphysical framework, and requires few ambiguous terms. In particular, evolutionary ethics avoids the some- pr e i s ing e ne n e p in e e is en e ‘moral facts.’10 On an evolutionary ethical basis, what makes a moral statement ‘true’ or ‘false’ is not the correspondence of that statement to some moral fact, such as a standard of perfection, but whether or not natural selection has so inclined human beings to believe such a moral statement. As stated by John Teehan and Christopher diCarlo: The notion that ethical truths are “out there” waiting to be is ere is i se e re n n pre s ien i e thought. It stems back to a time when not only ethics, but sci- ence itself was under the magisterium of religion. The progress of modern science can be viewed as a process of freeing the study of nature from religious/metaphysical constraints and establishing its own magisterium.11 In an age when all that is not directly established in mathemat- i s r e n ur s ien es is i e e es 12 evolutionary ethics enables the moral theorist to avoid metaphysical entanglements pr i ing signi n re n re e gr un ing r r s A second argument in favor of evolutionary ethics is its capac- ity to answer a number troubling moral questions in a more satisfying manner than many other moral theories. For instance, it has been gen- erally observed that, across cultures and ages, most human beings share similar moral codes.13 Such a fact presents a problem to moral theories which maintain that moral codes—or, at least, moral sentiments—are a product of individual, family, or societal decision. From an evolu- tionary moral perspective, however, this phenomenon has a simple and 10 See Michael Klenk, “Evolutionary Ethics,” in Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics, ed. George Matthews and Christina Hendricks (Montreal, QC, Canada: Rebus Press, 2020), 76-89; 85. 11 John Teehan and Christopher diCarlo, “On the Naturalistic Fallacy: A Conceptual Basis for Evolutionary Ethics,” Evolutionary Psychology 2, no. 1 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1177/147470490400200108. 12 A paraphrase of David Hume’s famous statement in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 13 See, for instance, John C. Gibbs, et al, “Moral Judgment Development Across 54 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College empirical explanation: Human moral sentiments are encoded in the common gene pool of humanity, thus accounting for the similarities in moral codes across societies. Richard Dawkins—though not a propo- nent of evolutionary ethics14—seems to agree with this explanation of moral sentiments when he says: “We have a moral sense which is built into our brains, like our sexual instinct or our fear of heights.”15 Another problem which is readily resolved by the evolutionary moral theory is the question of where the compulsion to act in a morally good es r ressing e ues i n r s s ien i rather than philosophically, evolutionary moral theorists avoid abstract speculation regarding the mechanics of how morality ‘works.’ Without having to posit any transcendent basis of moral compulsion—such as a God who punishes wrongdoing, or a karmic system—evolutionary e i s n s e s ur e r r pu si n in e n ur pr i i ies of human beings, which are ultimately rooted in the natural desire to procreate and pass on one’s genes.16 §4: OBJECTIONS TO EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS A. Responding to the Positive Arguments Before considering potential arguments against evolutionary ethics, I wish to assess the validity of the evidences presented in favor of evolu- tionary ethics. First, there is the assertion that evolutionary ethics does not require a metaphysical framework, and, in particular, does not need to posit the existence of moral facts. I grant that this is true of descrip- tive evolutionary ethics, but it is not true of prescriptive evolutionary ethics. The instant that evolutionary ethics moves from attempts at explaining moral sentiments to explaining what our moral sentiments ought to be, the evolutionary ethicist must posit some reference point— such as a moral fact—by which to judge what ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ mean. Natural selection cannot, in and of itself, provide a foundation for morality. Something else besides ‘The behavior X is ultimately a product of natural selection’ must be posited before arriving at the con- clusion ‘X is a moral good.’ This will be further explored in a moment, in the discussion on the ‘is-ought’ problem, and so I will refrain from further comments on this point until then. The second point made by Cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s Universality Claims,” Developmental Review 27 (2007), 443-500, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.001. 14 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 3. 15 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion s n ug n i in, 2006, 214. 16 See Robert J. Richards, “Evolutionary Ethics: A Theory of Moral Realism,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics, ed. Michael Ruse and Robert J. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 144- 145 and 148-149. 55Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics evolutionary ethicists—namely, that the broad explanatory power of evolutionary ethics is evidence in its favor—is only a half-truth. To use the example mentioned earlier, it is true that the commonalities in mor- al codes across ages and cultures is a fact in need of explanation, and it is likewise true that evolutionary ethics provides a powerful solution to this problem. The answer of evolutionary ethics, however, is not the only plausible answer. For instance, quite independent of passing on one’s genes is the seemingly universal human goal of maximizing plea- sure and minimizing pain.17 It should, therefore, be at least as plausible to say that all human beings act so as to maximize pleasure and min- imize pain as it is to say that human beings act so as to stand a better chance of procreating. On the question of moral compulsion, once again, evolutionary ethics, if true, would provide a strong answer to the question of why most individuals feel morally compelled to act one way as supposed to another. But the fact that one feels an instinctual compulsion to act in a particular way is by no means an indication that such a person morally ought to act that way. By what means does the evolutionary ethicist declare of any one instinct, ‘That is the moral instinct’? Take n in i i u n s e se in e e rgu en i i er n n i us neig r e ins in rises up n s e un e and batter the neighbor’s skull in. In the moment, such a thought feels right—the thought may even be pleasurable to the individual’s mind— and yet the individual refrains from doing so, not from lack of instinc- tual drive to commit the act, but from a sense of moral duty. Indeed, if this hypothetical individual were to follow through with their desires and commit their act of violence, most of society would be morally outraged, and condemn such an individual. It is true, one might argue, that one feels the moral instinct not to batter another’s skull in, and it is this which holds our hypothetical individual back—but this does not answer the question: Why ought our hypothetical individual to follow the ‘moral’ instinct rather than the ‘immoral’ instinct? Once again, the rejoinder may come that it isn’t a matter of ‘ought’—it is simply a fact that human beings generally, as a matter of their evolutionarily-in- grained instincts, follow their ‘moral’ instincts rather than their ‘im- moral’ ones.18 Let it be so—it yet remains a fact that some people do not follow their ‘moral’ instincts, and one must ask why such a person 17 See, for instance, Ruut Veenhoven, “How Universal Is Happiness?” in International Differences in Well-Being, ed. Ed Diener, John F. Helliwell, and Daniel Kahneman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 328-350. See also Irwin Goldstein, “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Values,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1, no. 2 (1989), 255- 276, https://doi.org/10.2307/2107959. 18 This, at least, is the argument made by Richards. See Robert J. Richards, op. cit., 144. 56 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College ought to be condemned. After all, society does not normally condemn individuals who act counter to the instincts of the majority. For exam- ple, it is a fact that most human beings predominantly use their right hand when holding and using objects.19 Must society, then, condemn those who are left-handed, for not possessing the same instincts as the majority of their right-handed counterparts? The notion seems prepos- terous—there appears to be, in this case at least, a clear and qualitative difference between a ‘moral instinct’ and an ‘amoral instinct.’ The theory of evolutionary ethics can explain why human beings feel moral compulsion—it may even serve to explain what the ‘qualitative differ- ence’ between a moral feeling and an amoral feeling consists of—but to claim that the compulsion is a reason in itself to be ethical is a leap of logic. B. Unacceptable Moral Outcomes Besides the weaknesses of the positive arguments in favor of evolu- i n r e i s ere re in se er enges e n ese e rs of these objections is that acting based on an evolutionary moral theory will lead to unacceptable moral outcomes. Now, the word ‘unaccept- able,’ of course, carries a moral connotation, and, as such, this objec- tion immediately runs the risk of circular reasoning. This, however, can be avoided: I will use ‘unacceptable moral outcomes’ to mean outcomes which the majority of individuals would feel to be morally wrong. Thus, ‘unacceptable’ refers not to morality itself, but to the moral sentiments of ‘normal’ individuals. An interesting example of the unacceptability of evolution- ary morals can be found in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, wherein Fyodor Karamazov and his son Dmitri are engaged in a violent competition to marry the same woman, named Grushenka. In the midst is n i I n r e s n r r n Dmitri’s half-brother—is asked to comment on the situation, to which he gives the somewhat apathetic reply of: “One reptile will devour the other. And serve them both right, too.”20 Here, in Ivan’s comment, it seems, is an application of the evolutionary moral theory which—I suspect—yields an outcome which most people would consider to be unacceptable. There is a common moral sentiment that individuals, 19 It should be noted, tangentially, for the sake of the argument, that handedness is largely a biological trait, and thus a product of natural selection. Thus, the instinct for right-handedness is analogous to the instinct for morality for the purposes of the present example. See Shan Shan Jing. “Hand Dominance: Nature, Nurture, and Relevance for Hand Surgeons,” Journal of Hand and Microsurgery 14, no. 1 (2022), 111-112, DOI: 10.1055/s-0040-1713557. 20 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, tr. Constance Garnett, (New York, NY: The Lowell Press, 1880), 153. 57Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics especially individuals sharing familial ties, should strive to cooperate n e e ruis i r ne n er r er n see n i Nonetheless, on an evolutionary moral basis, where the greatest pos- si e g is p ss n ne s genes i see s i pe i i n in this particular case is the inevitable—and perhaps morally favorable— outcome. Cooperation in this situation, after all, is impossible: father and son cannot both ‘pass on their genes’ through Grushenka—and even if they did, that, too, would grate against typical moral sensibili- ties. The question then arises: Who ought to marry Grushenka? On an evolutionary moral basis, the answer, as Ivan Karamazov suggests, is: Whichever one can physically dominate the other. From a ‘survival of e es perspe i e in se ere r n i ri us - pe e repr u e e er e s u e e ne pr re e is u e u i e ene s u ni s e s i ser es ‘strengthen’ the human gene pool. Thus, perhaps the evolutionary ethi- cist can even declare, alongside Ivan, ‘Serve them both right’! Of course, the case of The Brothers Karamazov is not the only conceivable instance in which evolutionary ethics may lead to unac- ceptable outcomes. For instance, it seems plausible that one might be able to justify rape in certain cases, or slavery, on an evolutionary mor- al basis. Both involve the subjugation of other human beings against their will—usually considered to be morally wrong—and yet both increase the moral offender’s chances of passing on their genes. That this, at times, happens to be to the detriment of other human beings is irrelevant to the question, since all that is important is that the individu- al passes on their genes, irrespective of how the individual’s reproduc- tive strategy affects the reproductive success of others. Against this charge, the evolutionary ethicist may counter that each of these cases portrays evolutionary ethics in an unfair light. Returning to the case of Fyodor and Dmitri, it may be argued that there is, in fact, no correct answer to the question of who should marry Grushenka. As the situation is both morally ambiguous and morally outrageous from the outset, it would seem that any moral theory would struggle to produce a morally ‘acceptable’ outcome, and so to attack evolutionary ethics’s failure in this case is essentially ‘hitting below the belt.’ This argument, however, fails to recognize that—while the situation is morally ambiguous and morally outrageous—yet there are possible resolutions to the problem, as long as the summum bonum is not passing on one’s genes. For instance, Fyodor and Dmitri might settle their contest with a game of chess to avoid bloodshed, or they ig ppe ir p r e p e is uss eir i u ies r perhaps best of all, Fyodor and Dmitri might allow Grushenka herself 58 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College to choose between the two of them.21 While, from an evolutionary per- spe i e n i see s e e n p ssi e p i n ere re i e alternatives from other moral theories, and so the failure of evolution- ary ethics in this case is a legitimate challenge to the theory. All in all, however, the case of The Brothers Karamazov is a i n e p e n su ses i e ur re r re n s likely never reach the point showcased in Dostoyevsky’s novel. The cases of rape and slavery, however, are much more serious, as they are certainly not hypothetical. Against the charge that evolutionary ethics cannot address the moral wrongs of rape or slavery, the evolutionary ethicist may point out that human beings have evolved to be a social species, and as such, an evolutionary moral theory must take this into consideration.22 Seen us r s ie perspe i e s ie s e ene s s en human beings cooperate, rather than forcibly subdue one another. After s i gr ups i in r gr up n i re ess i e n s i gr ups i u su n i sur i e n p ss n eir genes is is also to say nothing of potential societal sanctions which may be levied against those considered to be morally aberrant, thus making it more i u r en ing in i i u s p ss n eir genes in e u ure Therefore, while on an individual level, it would seem that there are certain cases when evolutionary ethics yields ‘unacceptable’ moral outcomes, on the societal level such problems are avoided. This counter-objection, however, forgets that natural selec- tion—the underlying process which provides the basis for evolutionary ethics’ summum bonum—should theoretically select for individuals se r sen i en s re pri ri in ine eir n ene Even from a societal perspective, natural selection will favor individu- als who seek their own individual good, rather than the good of society. 21 Someone may comment that this is actually the evolutionarily preferable outcome. I will simply observe that I see little evolutionary reason for either male party to concede defeat to the other simply on the basis of the female’s preference. Furthermore, while mating competitions in nature are, of course, for the purpose of winning the right to pass on one’s genes with a female or a group of females, I can think of few if any instances in which the female herself decides the contest. Even if such an instance did occur in nature, however, it remains to be seen that this is the ‘right’ way to settle a dispute, as opposed to merely ‘a’ way. 22 It should be noted that there are two schools of thought with regards to e u i n r i g e rs s in ins n ur se e i n operates predominantly on the individual level, while the second holds that natural selection operates predominantly on the group level. This, of course, creates two schools of evolutionary ethical thought. The anticipated objection here would presumably come from a proponent of the latter school of thought. See Michael Klenk, op. cit., 83-84. 59Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics nsi er r ins n e in i i u s in s ie e rs in i i u seeks the wellbeing of society only insofar as increasing societal well- being increases their own reproductive success. The second individual seeks the welfare of society even at their own reproductive expense. Because the individual who seeks their own reproductive success will have a greater chance of passing on their genes than the individual who is i ing s ri e e se es r e s e eir e s ie members, natural selection will select for the former type of individual over the later type. Seeing as those moral sentiments which are favored n ur se e i n re s e ni i n s r egi se e e for their ability to promote the individual’s procreative success, and as procreative success is the supreme ethical goal for any individual on the theory of evolutionary ethics, it stands to reason that individuals ought not to consider societal welfare in their moral decision-making if it is to their reproductive disadvantage. Thus, the evolutionary ethicist ppr e e r pis s ng s e r pis n i su ien discreetness, so as to not attract the reproach of society—as well as the slaveholder—so long as the slaveholder holds their slaves with the approval of their society. But all of this, the evolutionary ethicist might maintain, pre- supposes that the moral sentiments of individuals are inclined toward such acts as rape and slaveholding. Yet moral sentiments, as they are observed in actuality, are not so inclined—rape and slaveholding are considered to be morally unacceptable, after all—which would seem to undermine the previous counter-argument. All that this fact shows, however, is that the moral sentiments of human beings—whether or not they are products of natural selection—are at least not solely oriented toward the alleged summum bonum of passing on one’s genes. A second potential objection to the assertion that evolution- ary ethics yields unacceptable moral outcomes is that, while there are select occasions in which morally unacceptable acts, such as rape or slaveholding, might be condoned on an evolutionary moral theory, ac- i ns su s ese re in gener n n ene i r e in i i u r the sake of simplicity, let us only consider the case of rape as it pertains to this line of argument. While in certain circumstances a rapist may ‘get away’ with their act without any societal consequences, this is not often the case—more often than not, the rapist is caught and punished. Thus, one ought not to commit the act of rape, as the future conse- uen es su n re re i e e r u n ene i to the individual. Another similar, though somewhat distinct, form of this argument might be to take a more Kantian route: While rape may ene ne p r i u r in i i u ne p r i u r en in i e i u n eings s r pe ne n er ene er e se e result would be a net detriment to the species. Thus, one ought not to 60 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College commit the act of rape, because of the moral ‘non-universalizability’ of the act.23 These two objections, however, can be dealt with simulta- neously. In both cases, the argument shifts the focus away from the in i i u s ene s ie r e spe ies e ri en u n grounds does the evolutionary ethicist make such a move? It has already been established that nature selects for self-concerned indi- viduals over individuals who are not self-concerned. Thus, in the moment of moral decision—that is, when the individual must consider for themselves whether or not an action which they are to undertake is morally right or morally wrong—the individual must not be concerned about the societal consequences of their decision, or about the hypo- thetical scenario of all human beings acting as they are acting. Rather, the individual must judge for themself, in their particular moment and in their particular circumstance, whether or not their action will serve to facilitate the passing on of their genes or not. If so, then—irrespec- tive of the means—that action is good. If it be by rape, then by rape; if by marriage, then by marriage. On an evolutionary moral basis, the two would appear to be morally indistinguishable. C. The Is-Ought Problem24 The second attack against the theory of evolutionary ethics is the ‘is-ought’ problem, as made famous by David Hume.25 The prob- lem involves the question of what kind of argument would be required to be able to conclude that passing on one’s genes is, in fact, the summum bonum. It is true that human beings, generally speaking, pass on their genes and desire to do so—and, moreover, that if all human beings ceased to pass on their genes, then the human species would cease to exist. But this does not answer the question of why one ought to pass on their genes. Why, after all, should the cessation of human existence be considered a moral wrong? One may multiply facts about what is the case ad nauseum—for instance, one may point out that human beings have a natural instinct to pass on their genes and pre- serve the existence of the species. This, however, still does not answer the challenge. One need only ask: But why ought human beings to act 23 The logic is paraphrased in part from Kant’s Categorical Imperative. See e rs se i n n s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. 24 It may be noticed that I choose to address the more general ‘is-ought’ pr e r er n e re spe i n ur is i s pu r r most famously by G. E. Moore. This is because several—and, in my opinion, persuasive—counter-arguments have been made against the naturalistic fallacy. See, for instance, Oliver Curry, “Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?” Evolutionary Psychology 4, no. 1 (2006), https://doi. org/10.1177/147470490600400120. 25 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature; Book III, Chapter I. 61Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics based on their natural instincts? As philosopher William FitzPatrick points out: “Regardless of why one has a given [instinct], the question for a rational agent is always: is it right for me to exercise it, or should I instead renounce and resist it as far as I am able?”26 There is no biological fact for the evolutionary ethicist to fall back upon which can justify the idea that human beings ought to consider passing on their genes as the greatest possible good. Perhaps the strongest reply available to the evolutionary ethi- cist is to appeal to teleology.27 While it may be true that no biological fact can justify the summum bonum of passing on one’s genes, the evolutionary ethicist may maintain that, from a biological perspec- tive, the purpose of human life is survival and genetic propagation. As Richard Dawkins once famously put it: “We are machines built by DNA whose purpose is to make more copies of the same DNA. That is exactly what we are here for… It is every living object’s sole reason for living.”28 The argument may now run as follows29: For any thing with a given purpose, the ‘goodness’ of that thing consists in its accom- plishing that purpose. For example, if the purpose of a knife is to cut, then the ‘goodness’ of the knife consists in its ability to cut. A knife that cuts well is a ‘good’ knife, whereas a knife which does not cut well is a ‘bad’ knife. Likewise, for all living things: If the purpose of all living things is to pass on their genes, then the ‘goodness’ of a living thing consists in its ability to pass on its genes—and, as human beings are living things, then the ‘goodness’ of human beings also consists in their ability to pass on their genes. As all human actions may thus be measured against this ultimate human goodness, it may thus be safely asserted that the summum bonum is to pass on one’s genes. In this way, by positing the idea of a biological ‘purpose for life,’ the evolutionary ethicist may diffuse the is-ought problem. There are three problems with this defense. First, it seems arbitrary to choose ‘passing on one’s genes’ as the purpose for the existence of living things. On a biological level, after all, reproduction is merely one of a plethora of functions performed by any living thing. As there is nothing inherently value-laden about reproduction, one may justly ask: Why choose ‘passing on one’s genes’ as the essential life-purpose, rather than some other life function? The evolutionary 26 William FitzPatrick, op. cit. 27 This teleological appeal is a common method of overcoming the is-ought problem, perhaps most famously espoused and defended by Alasdair MacIntyre in his 1981 book After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press). 28 Richard Dawkins, “The Ultraviolet Garden,” Royal Institute Christmas Lecture, No. 4 (1991). 29 This argument is largely derived from Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 62 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College ethicist may respond that reproduction, as the mechanism by which natural selection operates, constitutes the most essential life-function, and as such, opting for ‘reproductive success’ or ‘passing on one’s genes’ as the summum bonum is not arbitrary. This, too, however, has a problem: It is not a priori obvious that passing on one’s genes—even from a biological perspective—constitutes the most essential life-func- tion. For instance, by the same line of argumentation presented above, it could be argued that ‘survival’ is the teleological aim of humanity and all living things—and that as such, the ‘goodness’ of human beings consists in their capacity to survive. On what grounds does the evolu- tionary ethicist claim that reproduction is more essential than survival? Without resorting to some external value system, it seems an impos- sible task for the evolutionary ethicist to non-arbitrarily determine whether or not reproduction—or any other life-function—is ‘most essential.’ Absent a non-arbitrary purpose for humanity, the is-ought problem remains for the evolutionary ethicist. The second problem with the teleological defense for evo- lutionary ethics stems from the source of this teleology. It may be asked: From whence does the evolutionary ethicist derive the notion of purpose? One can speak about the purpose of a knife because the knife was made by some individual who designed the knife for the intended purpose of cutting. Indeed, apart from some intention or design on the part of an individual, a thing cannot be thought of as having a purpose. A body of water, for instance, cannot be thought of as existing for the purpose of swimming in, unless some individual had prepared that body of water with that purpose in mind. But if—as most evolutionary biologists maintain—living things were not made, but are the products of the ‘blind forces’ of natural selection, then the evolutionary ethicist us n s e er s ur e r e purp se u n eings ne possible means of doing this might be to understand the purpose of an individual as existing not within the individual, but in a community of individuals.30 Consider that a single cell has no purpose, unless it is connected to a community of similar cells into an organ—say, a heart. But the heart itself has no purpose, unless it likewise is connected to a community of organs in an organism, for the purpose of facilitating genetic propagation. But even genetic propagation is itself impossible apart from a community of organisms—at least, for sexually repro- ducing organisms, such as human beings. Thus, one might still, in this ier r purp ses n u si r ns en en s ur e r e purp se u n e is en e is rgu en e er see s n e pr - tical function’ with ‘teleological purpose.’ The two are entirely distinct. 30 This argument is put forward by Yoshimi Kawade, “On the Nature of the Subjectivity of Living Things,” Biosemiotics 2 (2009), 205-220, https://doi. org/10.1007/s12304-009-9041-9. 63Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics A heart, it is true, may be practically functionless absent the rest of the organism, but this does not necessarily mean that it is teleologically purposeless. Likewise, the heart may be teleologically purposeless, and yet serve a practical function. This attempt too, then, fails to establish reproduction as a real teleological end capable of overcoming the is- ought problem. e ir n n pr e i p si ing p ssing n ne s genes’ as a teleological end for humanity is that the ‘ought’ which such a teleology produces is an ‘ought of adequacy,’ not a ‘moral ought.’31 Returning to the example of the knife: It is true that the ‘goodness’ of the knife consists in its capacity to cut, and so one ‘ought’ to use the knife for cutting. It would be strange, however, if this ‘ought’ were construed to be a moral ‘ought’—as though cutting into something with a knife was a moral good. The same argument can be applied to human beings: It may be true that the biological ‘goodness’ of a human being consists in their capacity to reproduce, and so, perhaps, one ‘ought’ to use one’s body for that purpose. This, ‘ought,’ however, like the previous ‘ought,’ is merely an ought of adequacy. It would be strange, merely on this basis, if one were to suggest that reproduction was a moral good. Here the evolutionary ethicist might object that there is—at least, with regards to human beings—no distinction between an ‘ought of adequacy’ and a ‘moral ought.’ In other words, it may be that what is called an ‘ought of adequacy’ for other things is what human beings consider a ‘moral ought’ in themselves. Hence, there appears to be an essential difference between the statements ‘A knife ought to cut,’ and ‘A human ought to reproduce,’ simply because the latter involves a human being. This argument, however, does not consider that all ‘ought’ statements refer implicitly to human beings. There is no ‘ought’ inherent in a knife, or in any other object, if that object bears no rela- tionship to a human being. This is because, by nature, the concept of ‘ought’—whether it be an ought of adequacy, or a moral ought—exists only in tandem with an agent possessing a will. Furthermore, the ought of adequacy and the moral ought are entirely distinguishable in this ‘willing agent,’ so that the ought of adequacy cannot be equated with the moral ought. For example, a human being may use a knife to cut rr s r e use e s e ni e u u n ngers - er people’s hands. Both situations involve the ought of adequacy—in fact, both involve the ‘good’ of the knife—but only the latter situation in es r ug is ne ug n u u n ngers even if ‘cutting’ is the ‘good’ of the knife. Here the ought of adequacy 31 I develop this argument from Shalina Stilley, “Natural Law Theory and the ‘Is’--‘Ought’ Problem: A Critique of Four Solutions.” Dissertations (2009-) (2010), Paper 57, https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/57/. 64 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College and the moral ought are neatly distinguished for the human being. But if the ought of adequacy and the moral ought can be so distinguished, then it cannot be argued that the ought of adequacy produced by the evolutionary ethicist’s teleological appeal is equivalent to a moral ought. It can thus be seen that—in light of the three problems high- lighted here—the theory of evolutionary ethics cannot demonstrate that reproduction constitutes a meaningful teleological end for humanity. Without this teleology, the is-ought problem remains for evolutionary ethics to solve. Satisfying answers are not forthcoming. §5: CONCLUSION Ultimately, the lack of strong evidence in favor of the evolu- tionary ethical viewpoint, as well as its inability to reasonably resolve either the ‘unacceptable’ moral outcomes of its theory or the is-ought pr e ren ers i n i p ssi e e r us i supp r In candidness, the evolutionary moral perspective is an overreach of the natural sciences into the ethical sphere. Insofar as there is real content in e r r i e n ur s ien es e n p e in e e morals. It is the role of the natural sciences to describe behavior, and to explain the causal connections between natural phenomena, not to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘evil.’ Of course, the evolutionary ethicist may, in response to all of the arguments here presented, simply reply that morality does not exist anyway—that is, they may adopt the metaethical view that the biolog- ical theory of evolution disposes of the possibility of morality in the rs p e is p per e er s n s ug ress su n- cerns, and they must be dealt with separately. With regards to the descriptive aspect of evolutionary ethics en i ne pre i us su e s u pr e rui u s long as the distinction between ‘moral sentiment’ and ‘morality’ is maintained. Let descriptive evolutionary ethics demonstrate that my aversion to lying is the result of natural selection. The question of why lying is actually wrong, apart from my—or anyone else’s—believing it to be so, remains. 65Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Against Evolutionary Ethics REFERENCES Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Martin Oswald (London: Library of Liberal Arts, 1999). Atkins, Peter. “The Limitless Power of Science,” in Nature’s Imagination: The Frontiers of Scientific Vision, ed. John Cornwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 122-132. Curry, Oliver. “Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fal- lacy?” Evolutionary Psychology 4, no. 1 (2006). https://doi. org/10.1177/147470490600400120. Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. Boston, MA: Hough- n i in 200 Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2016. Dawkins, Richard. “The Ultraviolet Garden.” Royal Institute Christmas Lecture, no. 4 (1991). De Waal, Frans B. M, et al. “Evolved Morality: The Biology and Philosophy of Human Conscience.” Behavior 151 (2014): 137- 141. Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov, tr. Con- stance Garnett, (New York, NY: The Lowell Press, 1880). FitzPatrick, William. “Morality and Evolutionary Biology.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021), ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/morality-biology/. Gibbs, John C., et al. “Moral Judgment Development Across Cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s Universality Claims.” De- velopmental Review 27 (2007): 443-500. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. dr.2007.04.001. Goldstein, Irwin. “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrin- sic Values.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1, no. 2 (1989): 255-276. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107959. Hawking, Stephen, and Leonard Mlodinow. The Grand De- sign. New York, NY: Bantam Publishing, 2012. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Penguin Classics, 1986. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understand- ing, ed. Stephen Buckle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 66 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College Jing, Shan Shan. “Hand Dominance: Nature, Nurture, and Relevance for Hand Surgeons,” Journal of Hand and Microsurgery 14, no. 1 (2022): 111-112. https://doi.org/10.1055/s-0040-1713557. Kawade, Yoshimi. “On the Nature of the Subjectivity of Liv- ing Things.” Biosemiotics 2 (2009): 205-220. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s12304-009-9041-9. Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3rd Edition, tr. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1993). Klenk, Michael. “Evolutionary Ethics,” in Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics, ed. George Matthews and Christina Hendricks (Montreal, QC, Canada: Rebus Press, 2020), 76-89. Krebs, Dennis L. “Morality: An Evolutionary Account.” Per- spectives on Psychological Science 3, no. 3 (2008): 149-172. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00072.x. MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: Universi- ty of Notre Dame Press, 1981. Richards, Robert J. “Evolutionary Ethics: A Theory of Moral Realism,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics, ed. Michael Ruse and Robert J. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2017), 143-157. Schroeder, Doris. “Evolutionary Ethics.” Internet Encyclope- dia of Philosophy. Accessed 15 Nov 2023. https://iep.utm.edu/evol- eth/#H2. Stilley, Shalina. “Natural Law Theory and the ‘Is’--‘Ought’ Problem: A Critique of Four Solutions.” Dissertations (2009-) (2010), Paper 57. https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_ mu/57/. Teehan, John, and Christopher diCarlo. “On the Naturalistic Fallacy: A Conceptual Basis for Evolutionary Ethics.” Evolutionary Psychology 2, no. 1 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704904002 00108. Veenhoven, Ruut. “How Universal Is Happiness?” in Inter- national Differences in Well-Being, ed. Ed Diener, John F. Helliwell, and Daniel Kahneman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 328-350. Wilson, E. O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975. 67Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of δι άν οι α A NATURAL INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN TELEOLOGY JORDAN SMITH §1: AN OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES At several key points throughout his works, Aristotle presents his understanding of the causal mechanisms affecting all-natural sub- stances.1 In this view, there are four distinct types of causes: material, r e ien n n ug i is i p ssi e u e p i e any of these modes of causation in isolation from the others,2 some basic distinctions between them can nonetheless be drawn. To start, the material cause refers to “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists.”3 That is to say, it is the matter of which the thing being explained is composed. In contrast to matter, the formal cause is “the e ni i n e essen e 4 in e sense i e nes er in su way as to make a substance what it is. Next, Aristotle explains that the e ien use is the primary source of the change or rest” in the way 1 E.g. Aristotle, R. K. Gaye, and R. P. Hardie, “Physics,” essay, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), II.3, 194b24-195a3. Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” essay, in The Works of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 8 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1908), I.3, 983a24-32. 2 D.C. Schindler helpfully describes Aristotle’s four causes as “interdependent.” See D. C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 145-148. 3 Aristotle, Physics II.3, 194b24-194b26. 4 Id., 194b27-194b29. 68 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College that “the father is cause of the child.”5 Finally, and most interestingly for current purposes, Aristotle affirms the existence of the final cause “in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about.”6 i en n us i n es not only pertain to humans but all-natural substances, Aristotle’s talk of “ends” and actions being “for the sake” of goals may give the impres- sion that he is projecting anthropomorphic categories onto the natural r espi e rs ppe r n es n e in i n is en s n n us i re i in e r er n e is e p si worldview reveals that this interpretation completely inverts Aristotle’s priorities. For the Stagirite, human intentions are, in fact, teleological (i.e. directed to an end or telos) in a merely derivative manner. Rather than human intentions and desires, the primary sense of teleology for Aristotle is the movement of natural substances to their pre-given natu- ral ends. §2: PROBLEMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE’S TELEOLOGY In order to demonstrate that the primary point of reference for understanding teleology in Aristotle’s thought is nature, a few common isin erpre i ns ris e i n e e g us rs e e p un e n su se uen re u e e rs n s si ng ese is- readings are those models that attempt to reduce Aristotle’s teleology s e er e us i n su s e ien r eri n un ris e s e e g u e s u n uses ne es- sarily presupposes that he did r uni ue e n us i r su e r s is re uire e esis e e g is the movement of substances to their natural ends, therefore requires re u i nis i in erpre i ns ris e s n uses s e other form of causation be rejected. Second, to determine if Aristotle’s understanding of teleology is grounded in his theory of nature, it will be necessary to discern what he means by the term “nature” (phusis). i en ris e s se er s e en s n erning e r e ne character of nature, it is somewhat surprising how many have restricted his use of the term to merely mean the sum total of biological organ- isms. This interpretation will be shown to be far too narrow to account for all the situations in which Aristotle makes use of the concepts of 5 Id.,194b30-194b32. 6 Id.,194b33-195a2. 69Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology nature and teleology as causal factors. Lastly, any anthropocentric interpretation that claims all things in the universe exists for the sake of n in s eir en runs up g ins e i e n uses in ris- totle, are primarily grounded in the nature of each individual substance and are therefore logically before any consideration of human beings in particular. As shall be demonstrated, the anthropocentric interpre- tation of Aristotle’s teleology goes against his broader metaphysical isi n i r s e ne essi r s e n ure use u r mankind. Refuting these three inaccurate understandings of teleology in Aristotle shall constitute the majority of this essay. Once the ground has been cleared, a positive case for a more robust understanding of Aristotelian teleology that is grounded in nature shall be presented. §3: REDUCTIONISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FINAL CAUSES Several scholars have, in one way or another, argued that Aris- e s n ep i n n us i is re u i e s e er r us i n u r e s in uen i n s p is i e un this sort is provided by Allan Gotthelf.7 He asserts that his understand- ing n uses in ris e e su ri e s e irre u i e potential’ interpretation.”8 Gotthelf chooses this description because, in his view, “[p]rocesses for the sake of something are distinguished from 7 See Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” essay, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 204–42. This seminal work has birthed other reductionistic interpretations, sometimes even more reductionistic than Gotthelf’s own. E.g. Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 2 (April 1984): 133–46, esp. 142. Cf. Susan Sauve Meyer, “Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction,” The Philosophical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1992): 791–825, https://doi. org/10.2307/2185925. Meyer takes a more epistemological approach to the issue or teleological reducibility: “My conclusion is not that something›s e ien use is i s n use n r is i n ing i n in rinsi e ien use ere s r is n use er n usi n is si p s e in rinsi e ien us i s re su ien r e ru n us i s e pr e i is re ing is r Aristotle, each type of cause is an “objective factor in nature,” as Balme puts it. David Balme, 3“Teleology and Necessity,” essay, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 281. Aristotle’s discussion of causes, therefore, fundamentally concerns ontology (as opposed to merely epistemology, as Meyer’s interpretation suggests). 8 Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251. 70 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College those that are not by the presence in the one case, and the absence in the other, of a potential for form.”9 In is in erpre i n n use is the actualization of a potential that something possesses to take on a certain form. Hence, as Gotthelf explains, “For a living organism of a certain form to come to be for the sake of something is precisely for it to result from a sum of actualizations of potentials, one of which—and the most explanatorily important of which—is an irreducible potential for an organism of that form.”10 What Gotthelf means is that, for Aris- totle, the matter out of which, say, a moose is made had the potential to take on many different forms, whether that be the form of some other animal or even a race car. To explain why this matter takes on the form that it does (e.g. that of a moose), one must have recourse to form, i pr i es e ni i n er n inue i e se example, some of the matter composing this animal has its potential to be an antler actualized while other material has the potential to be eyes, hooves, or intestines actualized. What Gotthelf wishes to emphasize is that there is one form which unites together all these parts of the moose together so that it is one organism, and there must therefore be a corresponding potential to be a moose in all the matter that makes up its various parts (in addition to the potentials the matter has to be each part of the moose). Because the form of moose interpenetrates all of the p r s e se n n ne p r i n su e e se the potential to be a moose cannot be reduced to any one or even any collection of the moose’s parts. Final causality, for Gotthelf, is the actualization of this irreducible potential for form. This account con- nects to Aristotle’s teleological language insofar as all the parts of the moose are “for the sake of” the moose as a whole. This whole, in turn, is an “end” in the sense that the organism develops into a fully grown moose, and this stage of development marks its completion. Gotthelf, therefore, presents a respectable interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology es in un n n e ngu ge e uses es ri e n causes but also his broader metaphysical system. Despite the positive qualities Gotthelf’s interpretation pos- sesses, it must ultimately be rejected because of its (admittedly subtle) reductionism. Before Gotthelf’s theory in particular is addressed, some general preliminary remarks concerning the problems with reduction- is i in erpre i ns n us i in ris e us e e ri facie, it would be strange for Aristotle to systematically distinguish 9 Id., 250. 10 Ibid. 71Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology e een n n e ien uses n r e r er e re u i e to the latter.11 As D. M. Balme puts it, “Aristotle always presents the four causes as four separate factors in a causal explanation… They are not one factor plus three alternative descriptions or views of it.”12 Sec- ond, and more to the point, there are multiple places at which Aristotle e p i i enies n us i is re u i e e ien us i as Gotthelf implies. To take only the clearest example, in one of his enumerations of the four causes and their distinctions, Aristotle says e ir pe use is e e ien use r e s ur e e nge n e n use r e purp se n e g is pp se is i e e e ien use 13 These considerations render implau- sible any reductionistic interpretation of Aristotelian teleology based on e pre ise n us i is si p es ri e p r i u r pe e ien us i re ins e e ns r e is Gotthelf’s argument does in fact attempt such a reduction. e re re e ing e re u i n rue n uses ere e ien uses in e s r i s u e n e ge he does avoid a particular type of reduction. Indeed, Gotthelf him- self clearly believes his theory is wholly non-reductionistic (or even anti-reductionistic), as the self-designation of his interpretation as one of “irreducible potential” clearly indicates.14 He certainly has some claim to the title of non-reductionist insofar as he refuses to let matter’s potential to be some organism be reduced down to matter’s potentials to be each of said organism’s parts. That being said, as Rich Cameron rightly notes after conceding this same point in his critique of Gotthelf, “his analysis does count as a form of reduction to the material cause in virtue of the fact that the analysans refers primarily to potentialities and potentialities are material elements in Aristotle’s ontology.”15 Though 11 r ris e s e ni i e is in i n e een e ur uses see ris e Physics II.3, 194b24-195a3. 12 Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 281. Emphasis mine. 13 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.3, 983a30-32. This example as well as less e p i i e p es ris e s is in i n e een n n e ien causes are explicated in Robert Bolton, “The Origins of Aristotle’s Natural Teleology in Physics II,” essay, in Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, ed. Mariska Leunissen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 121–43, esp. 122-125. Michael Bradie and Fred. D. Miller also rgue r e is in i eness n uses is is e ien uses in Aristotle’s thought in Bradie and Miller, “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle,” 137. 14 E.g. Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251. Emphasis mine. 15 Rich Cameron, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause,” Apeiron 35, no. 2 (June 2002): 173, n. 43 and 44, https://doi.org/10.1515/ 72 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College er n sees e s re u ing n us i n eri us i n in virtue of matter’s status as potential in Aristotle’s thought, it seems that, in addition to this account, one must also acknowledge that form n e ien us i n s p r e in is re u i n er Gotthelf is proposing an irreducible potential (the material cause) for r e r use us e u i e n e ien use in r er r e n i i ns n use in is i eren e between Cameron’s critique and my own, of course, does not detract from the main issue, namely that Gotthelf’s interpretation does not presen n u un n uses u ere re u es e some other form(s) of causation. Indeed, it seems Gotthelf is willing to acknowledge the reality of every type of cause Aristotle presents, ex- ep r n uses is e ns e s rgu en es in fall victim to the critiques of reductionistic arguments presented above and that his interpretation, though coherent, is not true to the thought ris e i se in ins r is in i n e een ur types of causes. §4: RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF TELEOLOGY The claim that Aristotle’s teleology is intrinsically grounded in the natures of the various entities that populate the cosmos necessar- ily entails that anything that has a nature (including everything from ir e s rs u n eings n e e up n n use But there are many alternate readings of Aristotle, which preclude such a broad understanding of nature and, by extension, teleology. The primary mistake made when restricting the scope of Aristotle’s pp i i n n uses is ssu ing is n ep i n e e g entails a transposition of anthropomorphic categories onto the natural world.16 This mistake can be seen in the work of E. Zeller who claims that “Aristotle cannot conceive of regulated and orderly events except under the analogy of human action directed towards an end.”17 Similar apeiron.2002.35.2.153. 16 Gotthelf, though he does restrict teleological explanation to biological en i ies n ne e ess i en i es is s ne un en misinterpretations of Aristotle. Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251, n. 52. 17 Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. 1, 2 vols. (London, UK: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 459. Zeller additionally claims that Aristotle explicitly states that the natural world, including the eri e e en s re in s e sense i e Spe i e i es Physics 73Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology reasoning leads several other scholars to make the mistake of maintain- ing ris e e n us i n e pp i e i gi organisms, which likewise evince some degree of desire and intention- ality. This path is taken, among others, by D. M. Balme who argues for is res ri i e in erpre i n spe i e e usi n eri e e en s e su un r e e en s ir e r re n er e e- ologically only when they are part of a living body; outside that (for ins n e in e urren e r ins r s ere is n n use ing n e ris e n nes n ur e e g su un r i e 18 Compared to Balme, John M. Cooper is more attentive to Aristotle’s numerous claims that, in addition to biological entities, the elements re s su e n us i e in e en e e p ies n uses n re e s e is isses ris e s i s n ern- ing e i e en s r e e e en s s ing is us re ers e g re s tendency to heat things up.”19 On this reading, elemental teleology is reduced simply to a way of expressing the way the elements happen to behave without providing an explanation of why such behavior occurs regularly. Finally, the most powerful argument in favor of the view that Aristotle holds teleological explanations only to pertain to biological organisms is certainly Gotthelf’s observation that “in almost every passage in which Aristotle introduces, discusses, or argues for the ex- is en e n us i is en i n is use n e gener i n n development of a living organism.”20 There is, therefore, a strong case to be made for a restrictive reading of teleology in Aristotle such that n i ing eings n e e e n uses Despite the multiple lines of evidence pointing towards a restrictive interpretation of teleology, such an understanding is sim- p n pre ensi e en ug p ure e uses n uses VIII.1, 250b10-250b14, the relevant part of which asks, “Is it [i.e. motion] in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all naturally constituted things?” This one question out of e en ire ris e i n rpus r su es e ns r e ris e maintained a sort of universal animism, especially when one considers the possibility that Aristotle here refers to “a sort of life” because he associates eternity with the divine, which is alive in some sense (This, and not anthropomorphism, is incidentally why Aristotle attributes life to the stars, which he believes are eternal). The point being conveyed, as the context clearly shows, is the eternity of motion, not the animacy of matter. 18 Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 277. 19 John M. Cooper, “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology,” essay, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 268, n. 26. 20 Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 229, n. 7, which refers back to his citations in n. 2 and 5. 74 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College in the Aristotelian corpus. Though the various interpretations of the res ri i e ie n uses e n in eir n p r i u r s all sides of the debate agree that Aristotle attributes teleology to those things which possess a nature.21 The contested issue, therefore, is spe i pes en i ies p ssess n ure phusis) according to Aristotle. The views presented above generally ascribe a nature only to biological beings,22 but an analysis of Aristotle’s explicit comments on the subject reveal that he certainly had a much broader understand- ing of the concept of nature. At the opening of Metaphysics VIII, for e p e ris e is s re e r er ir s e pri e e p es “natural substances,” which are “recognized by all thinkers.”23 Aristotle provides further corroborating evidence of this broad understanding of nature in De Caelo III where he introduces the following distinction: “Now things that we call natural are either substances or functions and ri u es su s n es s su s n es I ss e si p e ies re earth, and the other terms of the series—and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven as a whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts.”24 Both of these passages make it clear that, on Aristotle’s account, substances with natures are not limited to plants and animals but also includes the four elements and the heavenly bod- ies. Though Aristotle’s explicit statements as to what is included un er e s pe n ure su e un er ine e res ri i e in erpre- tations presented above, these basic observations still leave open the question of precisely why these incomplete understandings fail. That is to say, what has been dealt with so far are merely conclusions, not premises and reasoning. To see why the reasoning behind the restric- tive interpretations of nature fails, one must understand the criterion 21 E.g. Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 275; Cooper, “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology,” 244; Zeller, Aristotle and Earlier Peripatetics, 459. 22 Zeller is an exception to this as he believes Aristotle attributes teleology n ing i in en i ns n e er g es n r ris e teaches everything has at least some low-level of conscious intentionality. Zeller, Aristotle and Earlier Peripatetics, 459-461. For a refutation of this interpretation, see n. 17. 23 Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII.1, 1042a6-12. 24 Aristotle, De Caelo, trans. J. Stocks (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1922), III.1, 598a29-32. See also De Caelo I.1, 268a1-6 where Aristotle e nes e s pe e s u n ure s r i n in u e e whole material world, except man-made artifacts. For an analysis of this passage, see Monte Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2008), 133. 75Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology that Aristotle uses to include something under the category of nature. He holds that natural and non-natural substances “plainly differ” since every case of the former “has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration).”25 For Aristotle, nature is this principle of motion and rest. His standard of what constitutes a natural substance therefore clearly presents a disjunction where any one of various conditions is satisfactory, but it seems that the restrictive theories of nature take the “growth and decrease” characteristic of organisms to be a necessary condition for naturalness. If Aristotle’s own standard is applied, how- ever, then the elements are manifestly teleological for Aristotle, since he believes they have a natural tendency to move “in respect of place.” Earth has a tendency to move down, followed by water, and air tends to e up n surp sse re 26 Thus, Aristotle holds that the motion of elements to the place they usually rest is the result of a natural tele- ological movement, and this means both nature and teleology extend to all substances that possess a tendency to change in some consistent manner. 25 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 192b12-15. 26 Christopher Byrne argues that the movement of the elements to their respective usual places is not driven by a teleology grounded in nature. His reasoning is that Aristotle claims the elements will not move teleologically if placed in a void, which implies that the teleological motion of the elements is not grounded in the substances themselves but in their mutual relations. Byrne concludes from this that natural motion refers to physically necessary motion (as opposed to teleological motion), and in this he seems to stand alone among scholars. I believe this is for good reason, since in addition to claiming that teleological motion is not possible in the void, Aristotle also says that physically necessary motion is impossible, which means one could wage the same critique concerning the non-intrinsic character of the type of motion in question against Byrne’s claim that physically necessary motion is natural motion. Aristotle’s express point is that no motion is possible in a void because all motion requires the ability to go, say, up or down, but these categories make no sense in the context of a void which lacks a point of reference. Additionally, in the very passage to which Byrne refers, Aristotle says that natural motion is prior to all other types of motion and makes them possible. Aristotle then says that natural motion is not possible in the void because there is neither up nor down. The ngu ge up n n n ur i n is re e i e ris e s r er discussions of elemental teleological motion (as opposed to physically ne ess r i n i e ni i n is n ire e r s n ire i n in particular). This implies that teleological motion is in fact natural motion, n p si ne ess r i n is s ris e s s e se ere e ne s the deviation from this natural motion. Christopher Byrne, “Aristotle on Physical Necessity and the Limits of Teleological Explanation,” Apeiron 35, no. 1 (March 2002): 19–46, https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron.2002.35.1.19. Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV.8, 215a1-13. 76 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College ug e spe i i n e ris e e ns nature implicitly shows that most arguments for a restrictive interpre- tation of teleology fail to adequately account for elemental motion, the question still remains why Aristotle puts so much emphasis on biolog- i e p es en is ussing n uses p ring is issue s helps clarify why so many scholars mistakenly restrict the purview n uses p n s n ni s in ris e espi e e irresis - ible” conclusion (to use Robert Wardy’s description) that Aristotle believes elemental motion is teleologically driven.27 Though certain scholars, such as Rich Cameron, have claimed that the constriction of n us i in ris e e pure i gi sp ere is i e ern u s n erning e eren e n us i 28 the ubiquity of biological examples in Aristotle’s presentations of teleolo- gy provides a more generous interpretation of the restrictive teleology reading. To see how, one must turn to Physics II.8 where Aristotle ex- plains that “the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which.”29 That is to say, wherever a formal cause is present, so too i n use 30 r urren purp ses e re e n e is is - n uses re s e si i en i e s r uses sin e n use is present wherever a formal one is. If form is more apparent in plants and animals, then it follows that teleology is similarly more obvious in these cases. As Joseph Owens explains, the variegated character of the cosmos in Aristotle’s thought allows “form to play a proportionately greater role in the inanimate, plant, and animal kingdoms respectively, with corresponding increase in the obviousness of the teleology.”31 e pre en e i gi e p es in ris e s is ussi n n causality can, therefore, be explained in terms of pedagogical purposes. Aristotle uses the examples that are most obvious and easiest to discuss to demonstrate his points so as to avoid confusion. The restrictive 27 Robert Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 20, https://doi. org/10.1163/156852893321052433. 28 Cameron, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause,” 153. Cf. Margaret Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8,” essay, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. David Sedley, vol. 34 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 149. 29 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a30-32. 30 e re s n ris e es n ire i en i r n n use ppe rs e r i s e en s n ere re n uses u sin e they are not natural substances, they do not have a form. Final causes, therefore, are a broader category than formal causes. 31 Joseph Owens, “Teleology of Nature in Aristotle,” Monist 52, no. 2 (April 1968): 173, n. 51, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist196852215. Owens rightly cites Aristotle’s Meteorology I 2 0 2 2 n r is p in 77Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology in erpre i n e e g in ris e s r s is us re e i e e Stagirite’s predilection for biological examples, which is grounded in his hierarchical ontology of form and matter. This being said, Aristot- le’s preference for explaining teleology in terms of biological processes s u n e en e e usi n er e s n uses s is done by those who support the restrictive interpretation of teleology. §5: THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC INTERPRETATION OF TELEOLOGY r n ne e s in uen i presen i n e n r p - centric reading of teleology in Aristotle is that of David Sedley. Unlike those guilty of anthropomorphism who claim that the world possesses some low level of intentionality, Sedley argues that everything (even elements devoid of consciousness) in the universe is for the sake of n in is u ns re e n use n en ings is si presen i n e er re uires n i p r n u i er Se e correctly notes that Aristotle draws a distinction between two ways one thing can be for the sake of something else. This distinction is that “between the beneficiary of a process or state of affairs, and its aim or object of aspiration.”32 The essence of this distinction is that something n e n en ei er in e sense eing ene e r ing ers i i e i se i is i r es is e Se e is e to clarify that “Nature is anthropocentric to the extent that man is the ultimate beneficiary.”33 If this is true, then Aristotelian teleology would not be grounded in the nature of each substance, as I have claimed, but in human nature in particular. Sedley’s interpretation, therefore, must be dealt with in detail prior to constructing a positive interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology grounded in the natures of each substance. Sedley presents two main arguments in support of his anthro- p en ri re ing ris e i n e e g e rs ng ese is simply conveying what Aristotle, himself, explicitly states concern- ing the issue. At one point, Aristotle claims: “For the arts too make their material: some of it they make simpliciter, some of it they make workable. And we use it on the ground that everything exists for our sake. For we ourselves too are, in one sense, an end.”34 Sedley would, 32 David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” Phronesis 36, no. 2 (1991): 180, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852891321052778. 33 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. 34 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. 78 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College urse in erpre e in ne sense e n in e sense ene - ciary.35 On this reading, it is hard to ignore the presence of a universal anthropocentrism in Aristotle’s thought. Furthermore, in a passage in the Politics, Aristotle expresses a similarly broad understanding of the scope of entities that are for the sake of mankind: Hence it is equally clear that we should also suppose that, after birth, plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the sake of men — domesticated animals for both usefulness and food, and most if not all wild animals for food and other assistance, as a source of clothing and other utilities. If, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of men.36 According to this passage, in virtue of their ability to provide food, clothing, and assistance, animals are for the sake of humans. Addition- ally, plants are for the sake of animals since the former can be eaten by e er n p n s in urn re e ene i ries e e e en s e g er use er r r i n us i u see e n ur r is in ire i p i e in e n r p en ris n causality. In addition to direct textual evidence, Sedley also presents an argument for his anthropocentric reading on the basis of an oft-dis- cussed passage concerning the teleology of winter rain. In his refuta- tion to Empedoclean natural philosophy, which denies the reality of n uses ris e pr p ses n e i n is n ie e by his response: i u presen s i se s u n n ure r n for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?... Yet it is impossible that this should be the true view…. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence 35 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. 36 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. Aristotle’s caveat that it is “most if n i ni s re ene i s u e ne suspi i us how precise Aristotle’s statements of the universality of anthropocentric teleology are intended to be. 79Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in summer but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coinci- dence or for the sake of something, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for the sake of something.37 The relevance of this passage is that Aristotle claims winter rain is not solely the result of blind mechanical forces; rather, it is for the sake of something. Additionally, Aristotle claims that summer rain is attributed to chance, since it usually does not rain in the summer in Athens. Sedley nicely summarizes his thoughts on this topic: “Clearly, then, he [i.e. Aristotle] thinks that winter rainfall is for a purpose, and natural, and that it is only summer rainfall that is accidental, and, strictly speaking, unnatural.”38 In virtue of this distinction, Sedley is able to claim that the spe i se e e gi in er r in e s is n e resu water’s movement towards its own natural place (down to the earth).39 If it were, then rainfall in both the winter and the summer would be considered teleological. But, so Sedley claims, Aristotle’s distinction be- tween winter and summer rain implies that only the former is teleolog- i i en is ssu p i n e n use in er r in nn be its proclivity to return to its natural place, Sedley concludes: “It rains [in the winter] in order to make the crops grow.”40 The growth of crops, urse is ene i r e pe p e pr u ing e s is re ing ris e s in er r in rgu en ur er n r s Se e s n r p en- tric interpretation of teleology. When addressing Sedley’s arguments, some problems immedi- ately arise. For starters, there is a grammatical ambiguity in the Greek of the passage Sedley translates as “everything exists for our sake.”41 37 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 198b17-199a8. 38 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 183. 39 Id., 4 Se e es i ris e r s e re i e e g grounded in the movement of elements to their natural places, but he limits the scope of this type of causality such that it is not applicable to winter r in I is un e r Se e u n r i r ins in e in er both for the sake of crop growth and for water to reach its natural place or that winter rain is solely for the sake of crop growth but winter rain can still be for the sake of water attaining its natural place. By ignoring these options, Sedley is forced to maintain that summer rain cannot be teleological at all, which seems to run up against his concession that the elements can be teleologically driven to their natural place. 40 Ibid. 41 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s e e g n r p en ri e igui in spe i is 80 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College Sedley acknowledges that the passage is usually rendered in a coun- terfactual manner such that Aristotle’s meaning would be “It is as if e er ing e is s r ur s e u Se e r er ipp n is isses is ern e r ns i n s ing i us ere re e n in erpre - tive prejudice.”42 Robert Wardy concedes that Sedley’s “grammatical observation is correct—so long as one appends the caveat that the construction does not preclude the counterfactual reading either,” since the expression used “is the ideal Greek construction for not making a commitment.”43 The issue, therefore, cannot be solved solely at the grammatical level. One must interpret the expression in context to determine its meaning. Sedley does so, but he fails to appreciate the variety of interpretations the passage welcomes. Interpreting Aristotle’s claim in light of the broader context concerning the arts, Sedley states that “Aristotle’s clear meaning is that the assumption underlying our practices of cooking, pottery, sculpture, and all such arts is that the raw materials of those arts—the meat, clay, bronze, stone, and wood—ex- is r ur ene 44 But this interpretation is by no means “clear,” or at least this reading does not exclude equally clear alternative ones. Indeed, it seems quite likely that Aristotle has in mind here that every- thing exists for our sake in the sense that it is capable of being altered r ur ene ri us r s I s Se e sugges s ris e e ie es all things do exist for our sake in a direct sense, then the purpose of art becomes unintelligible. If everything is naturally oriented towards e ene n in en pe p e nee use r e workable”45 natural materials? Indeed, as shall be further elaborated below, Sedley’s singular failure seems to be this underestimation of the importance of art in the Aristotelian system for making natural entities ene i r u ns Aristotle’s claim that animals exist for the sake of men, plants r e s e ni s n s n es n su e pr e Se e s conclusion concerning a universally anthropocentric teleology. Aristo- e en s e p ss ge ere e r s is see ing n r p en ri e r n us i s s I en n ure es n ing the construction plus participle can connote uncertainty. Cf. Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 27. 42 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. 43 Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 27. Emphasis in original. 44 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. Emphasis in original. 45 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. 81Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of men.”46 Sedley obviously takes this to mean Aristotle is r ing ings re in r e s e n n e i - mediate context does admittedly lend itself to such an interpretation. However, Aristotle’s general comments on nature actually require the rejection of the conditional’s antecedent, thereby leaving the conclu- sion dubious. That is to say, Aristotle elsewhere claims that nature does make some things incomplete, which means nature does not necessarily act for the sake of mankind. That some things in nature are incomplete according to Aristotle is manifest in his discussion of the need for art, of which he says “generally art in some cases completes n ure nn ring nis 47 I n ure nee s e nis e by art, it follows that nature is in the relevant sense not complete. The re e n sense n ure s e ien is in pre ise Se e mistakenly claims constitutes the perfection of nature, namely its being ene i r n in In ris e s e re e i us empirical fact that art is often necessary to make natural substances useful to mankind, as in the case of the arts of hunting, farming, etc. Aristotle’s claim that “[i]f, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of men”48 must therefore be read in the sense of insofar as nature is com- plete, it is for the sake of mankind, but this does not exclude the fact that the intervention of art is frequently necessary to bring nature to its completion. Finally, Sedley’s use of the winter rainfall example fails because it relies on the premise that only winter rain, which is bene- i u ns is e e gi ere s use ess su er r in is n teleological.49 The distinction Aristotle draws between the two types of rain, however, is between what is regular and irregular, not teleological and non-teleological, and the reason Aristotle employs this distinction is because of the dialectical character of the passage. He is trying to prove to his Empedoclean objectors that teleology is a real phenome- non, so he naturally chooses the easiest examples to prove this, and the teleology of winter rain is more obvious than summer rain, not because it happens for the sake of mankind but because it happens consistently. 46 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. 47 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a9-19. 48 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. 49 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 183. 82 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College But, as Aristotle clearly believes, water in general consistently returns to the ground in virtue of its nature. Though, as a broader metaphysical claim, this is harder to prove and would therefore detract from his main point. Hence, Aristotle chooses to focus his argument on winter rain in spe i Even if this dialectical reading of Aristotle’s intentions is mistaken, Sedley’s interpretation is not only unsupported by Aristotle’s ri ings i is ire re u e Se e r s ris e s n usi n his discussion of winter and summer rainfall: “Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature.”50 Aristo- e us es is es eing n ur su s n e s su ien n i i n for being teleological. Since Sedley wishes to say that summer rain- fall, which does not aid in crop growth and is therefore not helpful to mankind, is not teleological, Sedley is therefore forced to maintain that summer rainfall is “unnatural.” However, as Monte Ransome Johnson has observed, “rainfall is not a substance,”51 which means it does not possess a nature at all. On the other hand, “[w]ater is a substance, and so it can be teleologically explained.”52 This means that, given that teleology applies to all natural substances, if winter rainfall qua water is su e n us i s su er r in u er us e teleological. Aristotle’s metaphysics does not allow for the division Sedley attempts to introduce when he claims that winter rain is natural and therefore teleological, but summer rain is unnatural and therefore n sus ep i e n uses er is e n ure r in reg r ess of when it falls, so all rainfall insofar as it is water must be teleological. Since water must be treated as an irreducible category when discussing i s re i n n uses Se e nn i er s e is for the sake of mankind, since his whole argument presupposes that er in pe er n e su er r in is n ene i r people. One is thus left wondering what is the true end of water, and this raises the more general question of to what are all natural sub- stances teleologically oriented. Answering this question will require a full elaboration of an interpretation of teleology in Aristotle’s works as grounded in the natures of substances. 50 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a1-8. 51 Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 156. 52 Ibid. 83Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 Aristotelian Teleology §6: THE NATURAL INTERPRETATION OF TELEOLOGY Several lines of evidence converge on the conclusion that, for Aristotle, teleology is grounded in the nature of each particular type of substance. The notion that nature is the driving force behind Aristot- le’s teleology is apparent in the opening line of Physics 2.8, where he states that “Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake of something.”53 Nature, as has already been established, refers to the totality of the nature of substances, ranging from the dirt below to the stars above, and all the organisms in between. Though Aristotle seems to identify nature as a subclass within the broader category of causes for the sake of something, his additional indirect statements concerning e re i n e een n uses n n ure re e e er n- s i u e e ri e r er e n er pe n uses i re en is en en s e p r ig n us i in Aristotle, are the arts. Artistic creativity is not central to Aristotle’s understanding of teleology. This notion has already been implicitly demonstrated in the refutation of the biological interpretation of teleol- g i p si s in en i n i is e essen e n us i n r Aristotle. Since the totality of biological organisms does not exhaust e s pe en i ies su e n uses i s r i ri artistic creativity, a very narrow type of animal intentionality, does not pr i e su ien pre ensi e e un ers n ris e s e r n uses e ns r e i is n ure s pp se e r s i s e en r p e ng ris e s n uses i i e ne ess r ser e pre ise e e ie es e re n causes at all. ris e s i en i i n n ure n r i p ies n - tures are the ends in the fullest sense of the term. This comes out most clearly in Physics II.8: “And since nature is twofold, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which.”54 ere s e s s e se ere ris e r s n ure can be spoken of as either the matter of something or as its form. Na- ture, however, is more properly spoken of as form because “a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when 53 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 198b10-16. Cf. Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8,” 152-154. 54 Id., 199a25-33. 84 it exists potentially.”55 Whereas matter has the potential to take on all s r s i eren s pes r is gi es e ni i n er n makes it what it is. Hence, the nature of a substance is in the strictest sense i en i i s r i en e i en i i n r n n ure it becomes clear that nature is for the sake of which things exist, since Aristotle clearly states that form is the end towards which substances s ri e ur er re e ire i en i es n ure u r s n cause. Since the form is the actualization and therefore perfection of matter, all matter in a natural substance is for the sake of its nature qua form. Contrary to the restrictive interpretations of Aristotelian e e g i re uire i r ni e e p en r s n en such that the end is only achieved at the very end of a process (e.g. a baby moose is for the sake of the adult moose that will not emerge in i e un i e rs er ris e r s in e n e er en matter is wholly striving for its form in all substances. If Aristotle really does believe that teleology refers to the ac- tualization of a substance’s nature, then it is unclear why he insists on using the seemingly anthropomorphic language of actions performed “for the sake of” some “end.” This problem is resolved, however, when one realizes that for Aristotle, in order for something to qualify as an end, it must be good. More precisely, Aristotle argues that each substance has its own particular good. For example, in the chap- ter immediately preceding the winter rainfall example, he explains something can count as an end “because it is better thus (not without u i i n u i re eren e e su s n e in e se 56 Monte Ransome Johnson sums up the implications of this and several similar remarks made throughout the Aristotelian corpus: “The good i e e gi e p n i ns e re eren e is spe i e natural kind being explained. The good is not the same for all kinds ings r s es ir s n p n s n en i n s rs e e en s households, cities, etc.).”57 Finally, a clearer image of Aristotle’s conception of teleology emerges. All substances possess a nature, which is an internal prin- ciple of motion and rest. These natures are what allow substances to move to their respective ends, which vary according to the substance in question. In moving towards these ends, substances are moving 55 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 193b7-12. 56 Aristotle, Physics II.7, 198b8-9. 57 Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 278. 85Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 towards their nature qua form, which is their actuality. When this full actuality is obtained, a nature qua principle of rest is in a state of full actualization, and the being has reached its perfection, both in the sense of completion and goodness. Because of the intrinsic moral character of these natural ends, Aristotle speaks appropriately when he says that non-conscious entities act for the sake of ends, just as human beings always seek out their own good and perfection. §7: CONCLUSION It is certainly easier to see the problems with alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s conception of teleology in retrospect. For e p e ris e s i n uses re r er eg r encompasses all formal causes shows that the former is not reducible to the latter. None of those who promote a reductionistic interpretation n uses in ris e i r uses re re u i e n er pe use en e ins r s n uses re r uses n e en e ee e n us i si i r nn e re u e to any other mode of causation. With respect to the claim that natural substances capable of teleological explanation are merely coextensive with biological organisms, this is patently untenable in light of the e p si un i n n uses in e u i r s Sin e teleology is the movement of a substance’s nature to its form, any entity with an internal principle of motion-oriented towards a consis- en g en is su e n uses r ris e is in u es n only plants and animals but also the elements, which reach their fullest actuality when in their natural places. Revisiting Sedley’s anthropo- centric interpretation, one can see that making mankind the end of all substances ignores Aristotle’s claim that the good towards which each su s n e s ri es is spe i in su s n e e es re u - tion of these rival theories is therefore the establishment of Aristotle’s actual view that teleology is grounded in substance’s natural movement r s pre e ne en s It is understandable why so many scholars wish to propose alternative solutions to the problem of teleology in Aristotle. His un- derstanding of causality can seem foreign and even paradoxical. After all, in Aristotle’s account, nature is both the principle of motion and the form towards which this principle strives. But this paradox ought n e i e s ris e pen r s i ure in e sense 86 of a coming-to-be proceeds towards nature.”58 For Aristotle, nature is in some sense self-transcending, such that it is both what strives and what is striven after. This is part of his answer to the question, which plagued earlier Greek philosophers: How is change possible at all? Any non-paradoxical answer to this question runs the risk of creating either a static universe of eternal forms or an unintelligible world of matter moving about randomly. If we are to take Aristotle’s meta- physics and the philosophical tradition he inherited seriously at all, therefore, we must make a central place for his account of teleology grounded in the natures of substances. 58 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 193b13. 87Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 REFERENCES Aristotle. De Caelo. Translated by J. Stocks. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1922. Aristotle. “Metaphysics.” Essay. In The Works of Aristotle, translated by W. D. Ross, 1 st ed. Vol. 8. 12 vols. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1908. Aristotle, R. K. Gaye, and R. P. Hardie. “Physics.” Essay. In The Complete Works of Aristotle 1, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 1:315–446. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. Balme, D.M. “Teleology and Necessity.” Essay. In Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, edited by Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox, 275-286. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Bolton, Robert. “The Origins of Aristotle’s Natural Teleology in Physics II.” Essay.In Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, edited by Mariska Leunissen, 121–43. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Bradie, Michael, and Fred D. Miller. “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 2 (April 1984): 133–46. Byrne, Christopher. “Aristotle on Physical Necessity and the Limits of Teleological Explanation.” Apeiron 35, no. 1 (March 2002): 19–46. https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron.2002.35.1.19. Cameron, Rich. “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause.” Apeiron 35, no. 2 (June 2002): 153– 79. https://doi.org/10.1515/ apeiron.2002.35.2.153. Cooper, John M. “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology.” Essay. In Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, edited by Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox, 243-274. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Gotthelf, Allan. “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality.” Essay. In Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, edited by Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox, 204–42. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Johnson, Monte Ransome. Aristotle on Teleology. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2008. Meyer, Susan Sauve. “Aristotle, Teleology, and 88 Reduction.” The Philosophical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1992): 791–825. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185925. Owens, Joseph. “Teleology of Nature in Aristotle.” Monist 52, no. 2 (April 1968): 159–73. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist196852215. Scharle, Margaret. “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8.” Essay. In Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, edited by David Sedley, 34:147–83. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. Schindler, D. C. The Catholicity of Reason. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013. Sedley, David. “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?” Phronesis 36, no. 2 (1991): 179–96. https://doi.or g/10.1163/156852 891321052778. Wardy, Robert. “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages.” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 18–30. https://doi.org/10.116 3/156852893321052433. Zeller, Eduard. Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics. Vol. 1. 2 vols. London, UK: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897. 89Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 DANIEL ANDREWS Boston College Daniel (Danny) Andrews is a rising senior at Boston College, where he is majoring in philosophy and writing an honors thesis in the upcoming year. In addition to existentialism and ontology, he is interested in how phenomenology intersects with environmental ethics. Danny also has interests in comparative philosophy e een e s ern n es ern r i i ns p i s p e n g n r i i intelligence, and embodied cognition. Outside of philosophy, he loves being active in the outdoors by skiing and hiking. In his free time he likes to practice yoga, read, and listen to music - Pink Floyd, The Strokes, Red Hot Chili Peppers, and Grateful Dead are some of his favorites. After graduating, he hopes to pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy. ARTHUR DECARLE University of Central Florida Arthur deCarle is from Sarasota, Florida, and is currently attending the University of Central Florida as an incoming Senior. He is majoring in both Political Science and Philosophy and intends on applying to law school in the upcoming Spring. Arthur is a both a member of the Dean’s and President’s list for three consecutive years and is attending UCF on an academic scholarship. Arthur is active in UCF debate, both political and philosophical, with a special interest in Constitutional law and applied ethics. ROBERTO UREÑA SUNY New Paltz Roberto Ureña is a recent graduate of SUNY New Paltz, having studied Philosophy, Political Science, and Economics. His philosophical interests include studies on ethics—in particular, the grounding of ethical theories—and metaphysics. He is also interested in Ancient Near Eastern speculative thought and mythology, and on the potential for the integration of ancient ways of thinking into modern society. In the hopes of becoming a lifelong academic, he plans to pursue a PhD in Philosophy. JORDAN SMITH Colby College Jordan Smith is a junior at Colby College in Waterville, Maine where he is double majoring in philosophy and computer science. He is primarily interested in the history of Western philosophy, ranging from the ancient to early modern periods. In particular, he enjoys studying the interactions between theology, philosophy, and science as well as the practical implications these ideas have on the structure of society. Outside of his academic interests, Jordan also enjoys going on runs and whittling. After college, he intends to pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy. CO N TR IB U TO RS Dianoia fosters open philosophical discussion and writing among undergraduate students. The journal is committed to pr i ing e pp r uni r in e e u re e i n ri ges the academic disciplines in pursuit of holistic understanding. e n ien ree r r ns es s ug u connotes a discursive direction or search for a higher form of knowledge. We thus hope to direct philosophical discourse toward an intellectually rigorous level of thinking. Dianoia is sponsored by The Institute for the Liberal Arts and the Philosophy Department of Boston College