67Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology δι άν οι α A NATURAL INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTE- LIAN TELEOLOGY JORDAN SMITH §1: AN OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES At several key points throughout his works, Aristotle presents his understanding of the causal mechanisms affecting all-natural sub- stances.1 In this view, there are four distinct types of causes: material, r e ien n n ug i is i p ssi e u e p i e any of these modes of causation in isolation from the others,2 some basic distinctions between them can nonetheless be drawn. To start, the material cause refers to “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists.”3 That is to say, it is the matter of which the thing being explained is composed. In contrast to matter, the formal cause is “the e ni i n e essen e 4 in e sense i e nes er in su way as to make a substance what it is. Next, Aristotle explains that the e ien use is the primary source of the change or rest” in the way 1 E.g. Aristotle, R. K. Gaye, and R. P. Hardie, “Physics,” essay, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), II.3, 194b24-195a3. Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” essay, in The Works of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, vol. 8 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1908), I.3, 983a24-32. 2 D.C. Schindler helpfully describes Aristotle’s four causes as “interdependent.” See D. C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013), 145-148. 3 Aristotle, Physics II.3, 194b24-194b26. 4 Id., 194b27-194b29. 68 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College that “the father is cause of the child.”5 Finally, and most interestingly for current purposes, Aristotle affirms the existence of the final cause “in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about.”6 i en n us i n es not only pertain to humans but all-natural substances, Aristotle’s talk of “ends” and actions being “for the sake” of goals may give the impres- sion that he is projecting anthropomorphic categories onto the natural r espi e rs ppe r n es n e in i n is en s n n us i re i in e r er n e is e p si worldview reveals that this interpretation completely inverts Aristotle’s priorities. For the Stagirite, human intentions are, in fact, teleological (i.e. directed to an end or telos) in a merely derivative manner. Rather than human intentions and desires, the primary sense of teleology for Aristotle is the movement of natural substances to their pre-given natu- ral ends. §2: PROBLEMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOT- LE’S TELEOLOGY In order to demonstrate that the primary point of reference for understanding teleology in Aristotle’s thought is nature, a few common isin erpre i ns ris e i n e e g us rs e e p un e n su se uen re u e e rs n s si ng ese is- readings are those models that attempt to reduce Aristotle’s teleology s e er e us i n su s e ien r eri n un ris e s e e g u e s u n uses ne es- sarily presupposes that he did r uni ue e n us i r su e r s is re uire e esis e e g is the movement of substances to their natural ends, therefore requires re u i nis i in erpre i ns ris e s n uses s e other form of causation be rejected. Second, to determine if Aristotle’s understanding of teleology is grounded in his theory of nature, it will be necessary to discern what he means by the term “nature” (phusis). i en ris e s se er s e en s n erning e r e ne character of nature, it is somewhat surprising how many have restricted his use of the term to merely mean the sum total of biological organ- isms. This interpretation will be shown to be far too narrow to account for all the situations in which Aristotle makes use of the concepts of 5 Id.,194b30-194b32. 6 Id.,194b33-195a2. 69Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology nature and teleology as causal factors. Lastly, any anthropocentric interpretation that claims all things in the universe exists for the sake of n in s eir en runs up g ins e i e n uses in ris- totle, are primarily grounded in the nature of each individual substance and are therefore logically before any consideration of human beings in particular. As shall be demonstrated, the anthropocentric interpre- tation of Aristotle’s teleology goes against his broader metaphysical isi n i r s e ne essi r s e n ure use u r mankind. Refuting these three inaccurate understandings of teleology in Aristotle shall constitute the majority of this essay. Once the ground has been cleared, a positive case for a more robust understanding of Aristotelian teleology that is grounded in nature shall be presented. §3: REDUCTIONISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF FINAL CAUSES Several scholars have, in one way or another, argued that Aris- e s n ep i n n us i is re u i e s e er r us i n u r e s in uen i n s p is i e un this sort is provided by Allan Gotthelf.7 He asserts that his understand- ing n uses in ris e e su ri e s e irre u i e potential’ interpretation.”8 Gotthelf chooses this description because, in his view, “[p]rocesses for the sake of something are distinguished from 7 See Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” essay, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 204–42. This seminal work has birthed other reductionistic interpretations, sometimes even more reductionistic than Gotthelf’s own. E.g. Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, no. 2 (April 1984): 133–46, esp. 142. Cf. Susan Sauve Meyer, “Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction,” The Philosophical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1992): 791–825, https://doi. org/10.2307/2185925. Meyer takes a more epistemological approach to the issue or teleological reducibility: “My conclusion is not that something›s e ien use is i s n use n r is i n ing i n in rinsi e ien use ere s r is n use er n usi n is si p s e in rinsi e ien us i s re su ien r e ru n us i s e pr e i is re ing is r Aristotle, each type of cause is an “objective factor in nature,” as Balme puts it. David Balme, 3“Teleology and Necessity,” essay, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 281. Aristotle’s discussion of causes, therefore, fundamentally concerns ontology (as opposed to merely epistemology, as Meyer’s interpretation suggests). 8 Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251. 70 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College those that are not by the presence in the one case, and the absence in the other, of a potential for form.”9 In is in erpre i n n use is the actualization of a potential that something possesses to take on a certain form. Hence, as Gotthelf explains, “For a living organism of a certain form to come to be for the sake of something is precisely for it to result from a sum of actualizations of potentials, one of which—and the most explanatorily important of which—is an irreducible potential for an organism of that form.”10 What Gotthelf means is that, for Aris- totle, the matter out of which, say, a moose is made had the potential to take on many different forms, whether that be the form of some other animal or even a race car. To explain why this matter takes on the form that it does (e.g. that of a moose), one must have recourse to form, i pr i es e ni i n er n inue i e se example, some of the matter composing this animal has its potential to be an antler actualized while other material has the potential to be eyes, hooves, or intestines actualized. What Gotthelf wishes to emphasize is that there is one form which unites together all these parts of the moose together so that it is one organism, and there must therefore be a corresponding potential to be a moose in all the matter that makes up its various parts (in addition to the potentials the matter has to be each part of the moose). Because the form of moose interpenetrates all of the p r s e se n n ne p r i n su e e se the potential to be a moose cannot be reduced to any one or even any collection of the moose’s parts. Final causality, for Gotthelf, is the actualization of this irreducible potential for form. This account con- nects to Aristotle’s teleological language insofar as all the parts of the moose are “for the sake of” the moose as a whole. This whole, in turn, is an “end” in the sense that the organism develops into a fully grown moose, and this stage of development marks its completion. Gotthelf, therefore, presents a respectable interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology es in un n n e ngu ge e uses es ri e n causes but also his broader metaphysical system. Despite the positive qualities Gotthelf’s interpretation pos- sesses, it must ultimately be rejected because of its (admittedly subtle) reductionism. Before Gotthelf’s theory in particular is addressed, some general preliminary remarks concerning the problems with reduction- is i in erpre i ns n us i in ris e us e e ri facie, it would be strange for Aristotle to systematically distinguish 9 Id., 250. 10 Ibid. 71Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology e een n n e ien uses n r e r er e re u i e to the latter.11 As D. M. Balme puts it, “Aristotle always presents the four causes as four separate factors in a causal explanation… They are not one factor plus three alternative descriptions or views of it.”12 Sec- ond, and more to the point, there are multiple places at which Aristotle e p i i enies n us i is re u i e e ien us i as Gotthelf implies. To take only the clearest example, in one of his enumerations of the four causes and their distinctions, Aristotle says e ir pe use is e e ien use r e s ur e e nge n e n use r e purp se n e g is pp se is i e e e ien use 13 These considerations render implau- sible any reductionistic interpretation of Aristotelian teleology based on e pre ise n us i is si p es ri e p r i u r pe e ien us i re ins e e ns r e is Gotthelf’s argument does in fact attempt such a reduction. e re re e ing e re u i n rue n uses ere e ien uses in e s r i s u e n e ge he does avoid a particular type of reduction. Indeed, Gotthelf him- self clearly believes his theory is wholly non-reductionistic (or even anti-reductionistic), as the self-designation of his interpretation as one of “irreducible potential” clearly indicates.14 He certainly has some claim to the title of non-reductionist insofar as he refuses to let matter’s potential to be some organism be reduced down to matter’s potentials to be each of said organism’s parts. That being said, as Rich Cameron rightly notes after conceding this same point in his critique of Gotthelf, “his analysis does count as a form of reduction to the material cause in virtue of the fact that the analysans refers primarily to potentialities and potentialities are material elements in Aristotle’s ontology.”15 Though 11 r ris e s e ni i e is in i n e een e ur uses see ris e Physics II.3, 194b24-195a3. 12 Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 281. Emphasis mine. 13 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.3, 983a30-32. This example as well as less e p i i e p es ris e s is in i n e een n n e ien causes are explicated in Robert Bolton, “The Origins of Aristotle’s Natural Teleology in Physics II,” essay, in Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, ed. Mariska Leunissen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 121–43, esp. 122-125. Michael Bradie and Fred. D. Miller also rgue r e is in i eness n uses is is e ien uses in Aristotle’s thought in Bradie and Miller, “Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle,” 137. 14 E.g. Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251. Emphasis mine. 15 Rich Cameron, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause,” Apeiron 35, no. 2 (June 2002): 173, n. 43 and 44, https://doi.org/10.1515/ 72 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College er n sees e s re u ing n us i n eri us i n in virtue of matter’s status as potential in Aristotle’s thought, it seems that, in addition to this account, one must also acknowledge that form n e ien us i n s p r e in is re u i n er Gotthelf is proposing an irreducible potential (the material cause) for r e r use us e u i e n e ien use in r er r e n i i ns n use in is i eren e between Cameron’s critique and my own, of course, does not detract from the main issue, namely that Gotthelf’s interpretation does not presen n u un n uses u ere re u es e some other form(s) of causation. Indeed, it seems Gotthelf is willing to acknowledge the reality of every type of cause Aristotle presents, ex- ep r n uses is e ns e s rgu en es in fall victim to the critiques of reductionistic arguments presented above and that his interpretation, though coherent, is not true to the thought ris e i se in ins r is in i n e een ur types of causes. §4: RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF TELEOLOGY The claim that Aristotle’s teleology is intrinsically grounded in the natures of the various entities that populate the cosmos necessar- ily entails that anything that has a nature (including everything from ir e s rs u n eings n e e up n n use But there are many alternate readings of Aristotle, which preclude such a broad understanding of nature and, by extension, teleology. The primary mistake made when restricting the scope of Aristotle’s pp i i n n uses is ssu ing is n ep i n e e g entails a transposition of anthropomorphic categories onto the natural world.16 This mistake can be seen in the work of E. Zeller who claims that “Aristotle cannot conceive of regulated and orderly events except under the analogy of human action directed towards an end.”17 Similar apeiron.2002.35.2.153. 16 Gotthelf, though he does restrict teleological explanation to biological en i ies n ne e ess i en i es is s ne un en misinterpretations of Aristotle. Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 251, n. 52. 17 Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. 1, 2 vols. (London, UK: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 459. Zeller additionally claims that Aristotle explicitly states that the natural world, including the eri e e en s re in s e sense i e Spe i e i es Physics VIII.1, 250b10-250b14, the relevant part of which asks, “Is it [i.e. motion] in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life 73Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology reasoning leads several other scholars to make the mistake of maintain- ing ris e e n us i n e pp i e i gi organisms, which likewise evince some degree of desire and intention- ality. This path is taken, among others, by D. M. Balme who argues for is res ri i e in erpre i n spe i e e usi n eri e e en s e su un r e e en s ir e r re n er e e- ologically only when they are part of a living body; outside that (for ins n e in e urren e r ins r s ere is n n use ing n e ris e n nes n ur e e g su un r i e 18 Compared to Balme, John M. Cooper is more attentive to Aristotle’s numerous claims that, in addition to biological entities, the elements re s su e n us i e in e en e e p ies n uses n re e s e is isses ris e s i s n ern- ing e i e en s r e e e en s s ing is us re ers e g re s tendency to heat things up.”19 On this reading, elemental teleology is reduced simply to a way of expressing the way the elements happen to behave without providing an explanation of why such behavior occurs regularly. Finally, the most powerful argument in favor of the view that Aristotle holds teleological explanations only to pertain to biological organisms is certainly Gotthelf’s observation that “in almost every passage in which Aristotle introduces, discusses, or argues for the ex- is en e n us i is en i n is use n e gener i n n development of a living organism.”20 There is, therefore, a strong case to be made for a restrictive reading of teleology in Aristotle such that n i ing eings n e e e n uses Despite the multiple lines of evidence pointing towards a restrictive interpretation of teleology, such an understanding is sim- p n pre ensi e en ug p ure e uses n uses in the Aristotelian corpus. Though the various interpretations of the as it were to all naturally constituted things?” This one question out of e en ire ris e i n rpus r su es e ns r e ris e maintained a sort of universal animism, especially when one considers the possibility that Aristotle here refers to “a sort of life” because he associates eternity with the divine, which is alive in some sense (This, and not anthropomorphism, is incidentally why Aristotle attributes life to the stars, which he believes are eternal). The point being conveyed, as the context clearly shows, is the eternity of motion, not the animacy of matter. 18 Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 277. 19 John M. Cooper, “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology,” essay, in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 268, n. 26. 20 Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” 229, n. 7, which refers back to his citations in n. 2 and 5. 74 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College res ri i e ie n uses e n in eir n p r i u r s all sides of the debate agree that Aristotle attributes teleology to those things which possess a nature.21 The contested issue, therefore, is spe i pes en i ies p ssess n ure phusis) according to Aristotle. The views presented above generally ascribe a nature only to biological beings,22 but an analysis of Aristotle’s explicit comments on the subject reveal that he certainly had a much broader understand- ing of the concept of nature. At the opening of Metaphysics VIII, for e p e ris e is s re e r er ir s e pri e e p es “natural substances,” which are “recognized by all thinkers.”23 Aristotle provides further corroborating evidence of this broad understanding of nature in De Caelo III where he introduces the following distinction: “Now things that we call natural are either substances or functions and ri u es su s n es s su s n es I ss e si p e ies re earth, and the other terms of the series—and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven as a whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts.”24 Both of these passages make it clear that, on Aristotle’s account, substances with natures are not limited to plants and animals but also includes the four elements and the heavenly bod- ies. Though Aristotle’s explicit statements as to what is included un er e s pe n ure su e un er ine e res ri i e in erpre- tations presented above, these basic observations still leave open the question of precisely why these incomplete understandings fail. That is to say, what has been dealt with so far are merely conclusions, not premises and reasoning. To see why the reasoning behind the restric- tive interpretations of nature fails, one must understand the criterion that Aristotle uses to include something under the category of nature. 21 E.g. Balme, “Teleology and Necessity,” 275; Cooper, “Hypothetical Necessity and Natural Teleology,” 244; Zeller, Aristotle and Earlier Peripatetics, 459. 22 Zeller is an exception to this as he believes Aristotle attributes teleology n ing i in en i ns n e er g es n r ris e teaches everything has at least some low-level of conscious intentionality. Zeller, Aristotle and Earlier Peripatetics, 459-461. For a refutation of this interpretation, see n. 17. 23 Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII.1, 1042a6-12. 24 Aristotle, De Caelo, trans. J. Stocks (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1922), III.1, 598a29-32. See also De Caelo I.1, 268a1-6 where Aristotle e nes e s pe e s u n ure s r i n in u e e whole material world, except man-made artifacts. For an analysis of this passage, see Monte Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2008), 133. 75Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology He holds that natural and non-natural substances “plainly differ” since every case of the former “has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration).”25 For Aristotle, nature is this principle of motion and rest. His standard of what constitutes a natural substance therefore clearly presents a disjunction where any one of various conditions is satisfactory, but it seems that the restrictive theories of nature take the “growth and decrease” characteristic of organisms to be a necessary condition for naturalness. If Aristotle’s own standard is applied, how- ever, then the elements are manifestly teleological for Aristotle, since he believes they have a natural tendency to move “in respect of place.” Earth has a tendency to move down, followed by water, and air tends to e up n surp sse re 26 Thus, Aristotle holds that the motion of elements to the place they usually rest is the result of a natural tele- ological movement, and this means both nature and teleology extend to all substances that possess a tendency to change in some consistent manner. ug e spe i i n e ris e e ns 25 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 192b12-15. 26 Christopher Byrne argues that the movement of the elements to their respective usual places is not driven by a teleology grounded in nature. His reasoning is that Aristotle claims the elements will not move teleologically if placed in a void, which implies that the teleological motion of the elements is not grounded in the substances themselves but in their mutual relations. Byrne concludes from this that natural motion refers to physically necessary motion (as opposed to teleological motion), and in this he seems to stand alone among scholars. I believe this is for good reason, since in addition to claiming that teleological motion is not possible in the void, Aristotle also says that physically necessary motion is impossible, which means one could wage the same critique concerning the non-intrinsic character of the type of motion in question against Byrne’s claim that physically necessary motion is natural motion. Aristotle’s express point is that no motion is possible in a void because all motion requires the ability to go, say, up or down, but these categories make no sense in the context of a void which lacks a point of reference. Additionally, in the very passage to which Byrne refers, Aristotle says that natural motion is prior to all other types of motion and makes them possible. Aristotle then says that natural motion is not possible in the void because there is neither up nor down. The ngu ge up n n n ur i n is re e i e ris e s r er discussions of elemental teleological motion (as opposed to physically ne ess r i n i e ni i n is n ire e r s n ire i n in particular). This implies that teleological motion is in fact natural motion, n p si ne ess r i n is s ris e s s e se ere e ne s the deviation from this natural motion. Christopher Byrne, “Aristotle on Physical Necessity and the Limits of Teleological Explanation,” Apeiron 35, no. 1 (March 2002): 19–46, https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron.2002.35.1.19. Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV.8, 215a1-13. 76 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College nature implicitly shows that most arguments for a restrictive interpre- tation of teleology fail to adequately account for elemental motion, the question still remains why Aristotle puts so much emphasis on biolog- i e p es en is ussing n uses p ring is issue s helps clarify why so many scholars mistakenly restrict the purview n uses p n s n ni s in ris e espi e e irresis - ible” conclusion (to use Robert Wardy’s description) that Aristotle believes elemental motion is teleologically driven.27 Though certain scholars, such as Rich Cameron, have claimed that the constriction of n us i in ris e e pure i gi sp ere is i e ern u s n erning e eren e n us i 28 the ubiquity of biological examples in Aristotle’s presentations of teleolo- gy provides a more generous interpretation of the restrictive teleology reading. To see how, one must turn to Physics II.8 where Aristotle ex- plains that “the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which.”29 That is to say, wherever a formal cause is present, so too i n use 30 r urren purp ses e re e n e is is - n uses re s e si i en i e s r uses sin e n use is present wherever a formal one is. If form is more apparent in plants and animals, then it follows that teleology is similarly more obvious in these cases. As Joseph Owens explains, the variegated character of the cosmos in Aristotle’s thought allows “form to play a proportionately greater role in the inanimate, plant, and animal kingdoms respectively, with corresponding increase in the obviousness of the teleology.”31 e pre en e i gi e p es in ris e s is ussi n n causality can, therefore, be explained in terms of pedagogical purposes. Aristotle uses the examples that are most obvious and easiest to discuss to demonstrate his points so as to avoid confusion. The restrictive in erpre i n e e g in ris e s r s is us re e i e e 27 Robert Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” Phronesis 38, no. 1 (1993): 20, https://doi. org/10.1163/156852893321052433. 28 Cameron, “The Ontology of Aristotle’s Final Cause,” 153. Cf. Margaret Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8,” essay, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. David Sedley, vol. 34 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 149. 29 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a30-32. 30 e re s n ris e es n ire i en i r n n use ppe rs e r i s e en s n ere re n uses u sin e they are not natural substances, they do not have a form. Final causes, therefore, are a broader category than formal causes. 31 Joseph Owens, “Teleology of Nature in Aristotle,” Monist 52, no. 2 (April 1968): 173, n. 51, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist196852215. Owens rightly cites Aristotle’s Meteorology I 2 0 2 2 n r is p in 77Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology Stagirite’s predilection for biological examples, which is grounded in his hierarchical ontology of form and matter. This being said, Aristot- le’s preference for explaining teleology in terms of biological processes s u n e en e e usi n er e s n uses s is done by those who support the restrictive interpretation of teleology. §5: THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC INTERPRETATION OF TELEOLOGY r n ne e s in uen i presen i n e n r p - centric reading of teleology in Aristotle is that of David Sedley. Unlike those guilty of anthropomorphism who claim that the world possesses some low level of intentionality, Sedley argues that everything (even elements devoid of consciousness) in the universe is for the sake of n in is u ns re e n use n en ings is si presen i n e er re uires n i p r n u i er Se e correctly notes that Aristotle draws a distinction between two ways one thing can be for the sake of something else. This distinction is that “between the beneficiary of a process or state of affairs, and its aim or object of aspiration.”32 The essence of this distinction is that something n e n en ei er in e sense eing ene e r ing ers i i e i se i is i r es is e Se e is e to clarify that “Nature is anthropocentric to the extent that man is the ultimate beneficiary.”33 If this is true, then Aristotelian teleology would not be grounded in the nature of each substance, as I have claimed, but in human nature in particular. Sedley’s interpretation, therefore, must be dealt with in detail prior to constructing a positive interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology grounded in the natures of each substance. Sedley presents two main arguments in support of his anthro- p en ri re ing ris e i n e e g e rs ng ese is simply conveying what Aristotle, himself, explicitly states concern- ing the issue. At one point, Aristotle claims: “For the arts too make their material: some of it they make simpliciter, some of it they make workable. And we use it on the ground that everything exists for our sake. For we ourselves too are, in one sense, an end.”34 Sedley would, urse in erpre e in ne sense e n in e sense ene - 32 David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” Phronesis 36, no. 2 (1991): 180, https://doi.org/10.1163/156852891321052778. 33 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. 34 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. 78 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College ciary.35 On this reading, it is hard to ignore the presence of a universal anthropocentrism in Aristotle’s thought. Furthermore, in a passage in the Politics, Aristotle expresses a similarly broad understanding of the scope of entities that are for the sake of mankind: Hence it is equally clear that we should also suppose that, after birth, plants exist for the sake of animals, and the other animals for the sake of men — domesticated animals for both usefulness and food, and most if not all wild animals for food and other assistance, as a source of clothing and other utilities. If, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of men.36 According to this passage, in virtue of their ability to provide food, clothing, and assistance, animals are for the sake of humans. Addition- ally, plants are for the sake of animals since the former can be eaten by e er n p n s in urn re e ene i ries e e e en s e g er use er r r i n us i u see e n ur r is in ire i p i e in e n r p en ris n causality. In addition to direct textual evidence, Sedley also presents an argument for his anthropocentric reading on the basis of an oft-dis- cussed passage concerning the teleology of winter rain. In his refuta- tion to Empedoclean natural philosophy, which denies the reality of n uses ris e pr p ses n e i n is n ie e by his response: i u presen s i se s u n n ure r n for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?... Yet it is impossible that this should be the true view…. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer 35 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. 36 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in David Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. Aristotle’s caveat that it is “most if n i ni s re ene i s u e ne suspi i us how precise Aristotle’s statements of the universality of anthropocentric teleology are intended to be. 79Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology we do; nor heat in summer but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coinci- dence or for the sake of something, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for the sake of something.37 The relevance of this passage is that Aristotle claims winter rain is not solely the result of blind mechanical forces; rather, it is for the sake of something. Additionally, Aristotle claims that summer rain is attributed to chance, since it usually does not rain in the summer in Athens. Sedley nicely summarizes his thoughts on this topic: “Clearly, then, he [i.e. Aristotle] thinks that winter rainfall is for a purpose, and natural, and that it is only summer rainfall that is accidental, and, strictly speaking, unnatural.”38 In virtue of this distinction, Sedley is able to claim that the spe i se e e gi in er r in e s is n e resu water’s movement towards its own natural place (down to the earth).39 If it were, then rainfall in both the winter and the summer would be considered teleological. But, so Sedley claims, Aristotle’s distinction be- tween winter and summer rain implies that only the former is teleolog- i i en is ssu p i n e n use in er r in nn be its proclivity to return to its natural place, Sedley concludes: “It rains [in the winter] in order to make the crops grow.”40 The growth of crops, urse is ene i r e pe p e pr u ing e s is re ing ris e s in er r in rgu en ur er n r s Se e s n r p en- tric interpretation of teleology. When addressing Sedley’s arguments, some problems immedi- ately arise. For starters, there is a grammatical ambiguity in the Greek of the passage Sedley translates as “everything exists for our sake.”41 Sed- ley acknowledges that the passage is usually rendered in a counterfactu- 37 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 198b17-199a8. 38 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 183. 39 Id., 4 Se e es i ris e r s e re i e e g grounded in the movement of elements to their natural places, but he limits the scope of this type of causality such that it is not applicable to winter r in I is un e r Se e u n r i r ins in e in er both for the sake of crop growth and for water to reach its natural place or that winter rain is solely for the sake of crop growth but winter rain can still be for the sake of water attaining its natural place. By ignoring these options, Sedley is forced to maintain that summer rain cannot be teleological at all, which seems to run up against his concession that the elements can be teleologically driven to their natural place. 40 Ibid. 41 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s e e g n r p en ri e igui in spe i is 80 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College al manner such that Aristotle’s meaning would be “It is as if everything e is s r ur s e u Se e r er ipp n is isses is ern e r ns i n s ing i us ere re e n in erpre i e pre u i e 42 Robert Wardy concedes that Sedley’s “grammatical observation is correct—so long as one appends the caveat that the construction does not preclude the counterfactual reading either,” since the expression used “is the ideal Greek construction for not making a commitment.”43 The issue, therefore, cannot be solved solely at the grammatical level. One must interpret the expression in context to determine its meaning. Sedley does so, but he fails to appreciate the variety of interpretations the passage welcomes. Interpreting Aristotle’s claim in light of the broader context concerning the arts, Sedley states that “Aristotle’s clear meaning is that the assumption underlying our practices of cooking, pottery, sculpture, and all such arts is that the raw materials of those r s e e r n e s ne n e is r ur ene 44 But this interpretation is by no means “clear,” or at least this reading does not exclude equally clear alternative ones. Indeed, it seems quite likely that Aristotle has in mind here that everything exists for our sake in e sense i is p e eing ere r ur ene ri us arts. If, as Sedley suggests, Aristotle believes all things do exist for our sake in a direct sense, then the purpose of art becomes unintelligible. I e er ing is n ur rien e r s e ene n in en why do people need to use art to “make workable”45 natural materials? Indeed, as shall be further elaborated below, Sedley’s singular failure seems to be this underestimation of the importance of art in the Aristo- e i n s s e r ing n ur en i ies ene i r u ns Aristotle’s claim that animals exist for the sake of men, plants r e s e ni s n s n es n su e pr e Se e s conclusion concerning a universally anthropocentric teleology. Aristo- e en s e p ss ge ere e r s is see ing n r p en ri e r n us i s s I en n ure es n ing incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all the construction plus participle can connote uncertainty. Cf. Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 27. 42 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. 43 Wardy, “Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages,” 27. Emphasis in original. 44 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 189. Emphasis in original. 45 Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194a33-36. 81Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology for the sake of men.”46 Sedley obviously takes this to mean Aristotle is r ing ings re in r e s e n n e i - mediate context does admittedly lend itself to such an interpretation. However, Aristotle’s general comments on nature actually require the rejection of the conditional’s antecedent, thereby leaving the conclu- sion dubious. That is to say, Aristotle elsewhere claims that nature does make some things incomplete, which means nature does not necessarily act for the sake of mankind. That some things in nature are incomplete according to Aristotle is manifest in his discussion of the need for art, of which he says “generally art in some cases completes n ure nn ring nis 47 I n ure nee s e nis e by art, it follows that nature is in the relevant sense not complete. The re e n sense n ure s e ien is in pre ise Se e mistakenly claims constitutes the perfection of nature, namely its being ene i r n in In ris e s e re e i us empirical fact that art is often necessary to make natural substances useful to mankind, as in the case of the arts of hunting, farming, etc. Aristotle’s claim that “[i]f, then, nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it is necessary that nature has made them all for the sake of men”48 must therefore be read in the sense of insofar as nature is com- plete, it is for the sake of mankind, but this does not exclude the fact that the intervention of art is frequently necessary to bring nature to its completion. Finally, Sedley’s use of the winter rainfall example fails because it relies on the premise that only winter rain, which is bene- i u ns is e e gi ere s use ess su er r in is n teleological.49 The distinction Aristotle draws between the two types of rain, however, is between what is regular and irregular, not teleological and non-teleological, and the reason Aristotle employs this distinction is because of the dialectical character of the passage. He is trying to prove to his Empedoclean objectors that teleology is a real phenome- non, so he naturally chooses the easiest examples to prove this, and the teleology of winter rain is more obvious than summer rain, not because it happens for the sake of mankind but because it happens consistently. But, as Aristotle clearly believes, water in general consistently returns 46 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. 47 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a9-19. 48 Aristotle, Politics I.8, 1256b10-22. Quoted in Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 180. 49 Sedley, “Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?,” 183. 82 Dianoia: The Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Boston College to the ground in virtue of its nature. Though, as a broader metaphysical claim, this is harder to prove and would therefore detract from his main point. Hence, Aristotle chooses to focus his argument on winter rain in spe i Even if this dialectical reading of Aristotle’s intentions is mistaken, Sedley’s interpretation is not only unsupported by Aristotle’s ri ings i is ire re u e Se e r s ris e s n usi n his discussion of winter and summer rainfall: “Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature.”50 Aristo- e us es is es eing n ur su s n e s su ien n i i n for being teleological. Since Sedley wishes to say that summer rain- fall, which does not aid in crop growth and is therefore not helpful to mankind, is not teleological, Sedley is therefore forced to maintain that summer rainfall is “unnatural.” However, as Monte Ransome Johnson has observed, “rainfall is not a substance,”51 which means it does not possess a nature at all. On the other hand, “[w]ater is a substance, and so it can be teleologically explained.”52 This means that, given that teleology applies to all natural substances, if winter rainfall qua water is su e n us i s su er r in u er us e teleological. Aristotle’s metaphysics does not allow for the division Sedley attempts to introduce when he claims that winter rain is natural and therefore teleological, but summer rain is unnatural and therefore n sus ep i e n uses er is e n ure r in reg r ess of when it falls, so all rainfall insofar as it is water must be teleological. Since water must be treated as an irreducible category when discussing i s re i n n uses Se e nn i er s e is for the sake of mankind, since his whole argument presupposes that er in pe er n e su er r in is n ene i r people. One is thus left wondering what is the true end of water, and this raises the more general question of to what are all natural sub- stances teleologically oriented. Answering this question will require a full elaboration of an interpretation of teleology in Aristotle’s works as grounded in the natures of substances. §6: THE NATURAL INTERPRETATION OF TELEOLOGY Several lines of evidence converge on the conclusion that, for Aristotle, teleology is grounded in the nature of each particular type of 50 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a1-8. 51 Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 156. 52 Ibid. 83Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 A Natural Interpretation of Aristotelian Teleology substance. The notion that nature is the driving force behind Aristot- le’s teleology is apparent in the opening line of Physics 2.8, where he states that “Nature belongs to the class of causes which act for the sake of something.”53 Nature, as has already been established, refers to the totality of the nature of substances, ranging from the dirt below to the stars above, and all the organisms in between. Though Aristotle seems to identify nature as a subclass within the broader category of causes for the sake of something, his additional indirect statements concerning e re i n e een n uses n n ure re e e er n- s i u e e ri e r er e n er pe n uses i re en is en en s e p r ig n us i in Aristotle, are the arts. Artistic creativity is not central to Aristotle’s understanding of teleology. This notion has already been implicitly demonstrated in the refutation of the biological interpretation of teleol- g i p si s in en i n i is e essen e n us i n r Aristotle. Since the totality of biological organisms does not exhaust e s pe en i ies su e n uses i s r i ri artistic creativity, a very narrow type of animal intentionality, does not pr i e su ien pre ensi e e un ers n ris e s e r n uses e ns r e i is n ure s pp se e r s i s e en r p e ng ris e s n uses i i e ne ess r ser e pre ise e e ie es e re n causes at all. ris e s i en i i n n ure n r i p ies n - tures are the ends in the fullest sense of the term. This comes out most clearly in Physics II.8: “And since nature is twofold, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which.”54 ere s e s s e se ere ris e r s n ure can be spoken of as either the matter of something or as its form. Na- ture, however, is more properly spoken of as form because “a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when it exists potentially.”55 Whereas matter has the potential to take on all s r s i eren s pes r is gi es e ni i n er n makes it what it is. Hence, the nature of a substance is in the strictest sense i en i i s r i en e i en i i n r n n ure it becomes clear that nature is for the sake of which things exist, since 53 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 198b10-16. Cf. Scharle, “Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics 2.8,” 152-154. 54 Id., 199a25-33. 55 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 193b7-12. 84 Aristotle clearly states that form is the end towards which substances s ri e ur er re e ire i en i es n ure u r s n cause. Since the form is the actualization and therefore perfection of matter, all matter in a natural substance is for the sake of its nature qua form. Contrary to the restrictive interpretations of Aristotelian e e g i re uire i r ni e e p en r s n en such that the end is only achieved at the very end of a process (e.g. a baby moose is for the sake of the adult moose that will not emerge in i e un i e rs er ris e r s in e n e er en matter is wholly striving for its form in all substances. If Aristotle really does believe that teleology refers to the ac- tualization of a substance’s nature, then it is unclear why he insists on using the seemingly anthropomorphic language of actions performed “for the sake of” some “end.” This problem is resolved, however, when one realizes that for Aristotle, in order for something to qualify as an end, it must be good. More precisely, Aristotle argues that each substance has its own particular good. For example, in the chap- ter immediately preceding the winter rainfall example, he explains something can count as an end “because it is better thus (not without u i i n u i re eren e e su s n e in e se 56 Monte Ransome Johnson sums up the implications of this and several similar remarks made throughout the Aristotelian corpus: “The good i e e gi e p n i ns e re eren e is spe i e natural kind being explained. The good is not the same for all kinds ings r s es ir s n p n s n en i n s rs e e en s households, cities, etc.).”57 Finally, a clearer image of Aristotle’s conception of teleology emerges. All substances possess a nature, which is an internal prin- ciple of motion and rest. These natures are what allow substances to move to their respective ends, which vary according to the substance in question. In moving towards these ends, substances are moving towards their nature qua form, which is their actuality. When this full actuality is obtained, a nature qua principle of rest is in a state of full actualization, and the being has reached its perfection, both in the sense of completion and goodness. Because of the intrinsic moral character of these natural ends, Aristotle speaks appropriately when he says that non-conscious entities act for the sake of ends, just as 56 Aristotle, Physics II.7, 198b8-9. 57 Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 278. 85Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 human beings always seek out their own good and perfection. §7: CONCLUSION It is certainly easier to see the problems with alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s conception of teleology in retrospect. For e p e ris e s i n uses re r er eg r encompasses all formal causes shows that the former is not reducible to the latter. None of those who promote a reductionistic interpretation n uses in ris e i r uses re re u i e n er pe use en e ins r s n uses re r uses n e en e ee e n us i si i r nn e re u e to any other mode of causation. With respect to the claim that natural substances capable of teleological explanation are merely coextensive with biological organisms, this is patently untenable in light of the e p si un i n n uses in e u i r s Sin e teleology is the movement of a substance’s nature to its form, any entity with an internal principle of motion-oriented towards a consis- en g en is su e n uses r ris e is in u es n only plants and animals but also the elements, which reach their fullest actuality when in their natural places. Revisiting Sedley’s anthropo- centric interpretation, one can see that making mankind the end of all substances ignores Aristotle’s claim that the good towards which each su s n e s ri es is spe i in su s n e e es re u - tion of these rival theories is therefore the establishment of Aristotle’s actual view that teleology is grounded in substance’s natural movement r s pre e ne en s It is understandable why so many scholars wish to propose alternative solutions to the problem of teleology in Aristotle. His un- derstanding of causality can seem foreign and even paradoxical. After all, in Aristotle’s account, nature is both the principle of motion and the form towards which this principle strives. But this paradox ought n e i e s ris e pen r s i ure in e sense of a coming-to-be proceeds towards nature.”58 For Aristotle, nature is in some sense self-transcending, such that it is both what strives and what is striven after. This is part of his answer to the question, which plagued earlier Greek philosophers: How is change possible at all? Any non-paradoxical answer to this question runs the risk of creating either a static universe of eternal forms or an unintelligible world of matter 58 Aristotle, Physics II.1, 193b13. 86 moving about randomly. If we are to take Aristotle’s metaphysics and the philosophical tradition he inherited seriously at all, therefore, we must make a central place for his account of teleology grounded in the natures of substances. 87Issue XI ◊ Spring 2024 REFERENCES Aristotle. De Caelo. Translated by J. Stocks. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1922. Aristotle. “Metaphysics.” Essay. In The Works of Aristotle, translated by W. D. Ross, 1 st ed. Vol. 8. 12 vols. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1908. Aristotle, R. K. Gaye, and R. P. Hardie. “Physics.” Essay. In The Complete Works of Aristotle 1, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 1:315–446. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. 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