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CONVERSATIONS 1: Climate Change 

 

Reflections on International Climate Diplomacy 
 

Nitin Desai  
 
The origins of climate diplomacy lie in the alarm bells rung by climate scientists at 
Villach in 1985. This led to the convening of two influential climate conferences 
and to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 
1988 and the call for a climate convention (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, or UNFCCC). Negotiations for the UNFCCC ran parallel to 
the preparatory process for the Rio Earth Summit and the Convention was opened 
for signature at Rio. It was merely a framework that did not impose any binding 
obligations on emission reductions on the parties, except for the indicative goal of 
holding emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. 

The negotiations were a battle between Europe, which wanted mandatory 
commitments, and the US—led at that time by a president beholden to oil and coal 
interests—which resisted this. Within the G-77, interests were widely divided—
small islands argued for immediate and strong action; oil producers resisted action, 
to protect their economic prospects; and large emerging economies, led by India, 
did not want constraints on their development ambitions. The principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ was enshrined in the UNFCCC, and has 
now become central to the negotiating stance of China, India, and other developing 
countries. 

When it became clear that the indicative targets would not be met, the pressure for 
stronger action led finally to the Kyoto Protocol, in which industrial countries 
accepted binding obligations on emission reductions by 2008–2012. That also 
brought developing countries indirectly into the mitigation effort through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). The Kyoto Protocol was not a mitigation plan 
worked out on the basis of goals for allowable temperature increase and related 
emission targets—it was a bazaar bargain, with the distribution of mitigation effort 

 
 (former) Under Secretary General, Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, B63 
Defence Colony,1st floor, New Delhi 110024; desaind@gmail.com  

Copyright © Desai 2018. Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 
4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.  

Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic 
Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.  

ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web). 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v1i1.17  

https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v1i1.17


Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [74] 

 

between industrial countries reflecting negotiating skills and nerves rather than 
objective criteria. 

Towards the end of the Kyoto period, a fresh round of negotiations was launched 
at Bali in December 2007. But by this time, the dynamics of climate diplomacy had 
changed substantially. The focus had shifted to China, where the combination of 
rapid growth and coal dependence has led to a rapid increase in emissions. The 
pressure on India is a consequence of this concern over the growth in China’s 
emissions. The basic argument is that any reasonable goal for allowable 
temperature increase is unattainable unless the large emerging economies join in the 
mitigation effort. Concerns about global competitiveness reinforced this pressure 
from the West. 

Climate diplomacy is now dominated by what could be called a 40:40:20 power 
structure, the unit of measure being each country’s contribution to GHG 
emissions. The first 40 per cent includes the two largest emitters, the US and China, 
who have de facto veto power, because any mitigation agreement would become 
pointless if both of them stay out. The second 40 per cent consists of  the  EU, a 
10 per cent power; Russia, Japan and India, each of them a 5 per cent power; and a 
string of 2 per cent powers like Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, etc. The last 20 per cent covers the smaller states, whose 
influence comes from their membership in some larger group, like the Association 
of Small Island States or the African Group. 

Ratifying governments welcomed the Paris Climate Summit of December 2015 as 
pathbreaking, and the media and lay opinion found it reasonably good, but activists 
considered it inadequate. Now with Trump in power in Washington, the elation 
that greeted the agreement is perhaps seen as premature.  

An effective agreement on climate change should include a goal for the acceptable 
limit for the increase in temperature. The Paris Agreement does that, with its 2 °C 
goal and 1.5 °C aspiration. It should include a greenhouse gas (GHG) budget for 
the distribution of allowable global emissions between countries and a time profile 
of GHG emissions consistent with the accepted goal. That the Paris Agreement 
does not do, as it leaves mitigation effort to the voluntary pledges of each country. 
As a corollary, the agreement has moved away from the flexibility mechanisms that 
existed earlier. But it does have some of the other ingredients required, like the 
treatment of forestry and land use changes, support adaptation actions, and 
financial and technology transfer commitments. 

In terms of outcomes, do the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDC) meet the tests of effectiveness and equity?  

The Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2016) suggests that the INDCs do present a 
significant reduction compared to a projection of current policies, but the proposed 
mitigation contributions are far from enough to keep us on the 2 °C pathway. The 
estimated gap between the unconditional promises and the 2 °C path is 14 gigatons 
of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030 and 7 GtCO2e in 2025. 



[75] Nitin Desai 

 

The INDCs are meant to be fair and adequate. There is no agreed metric for 
INDCs, and evaluation has been left to non-governmental organizations (NGO). 
According to one such report (Climate Equity Reference Project 2015), the pledges 
from poorer countries amount to 10.1 GtCO2e, well in excess of their estimated 
fair share of 6.6 GtCO2e, while rich country pledges amount to only 5.5 GtCO2e, 
against their fair share of 24.2 GtCO2e. This assessment is based on production 
emissions; the gap would widen if the assessment were based on consumption 
emissions. 

The INDCs that have been submitted are basically energy policy plans. The key to 
averting the worst consequences of climate change lies in incentivizing a shift to 
low-carbon strategies for energy use through technology development, pricing 
reforms that reflect the social cost of carbon reform, and a reconsideration of 
regulatory policies from a carbon perspective. The future will belong to those who 
move most rapidly to this reorientation of development. 

 

REFERENCES 

Climate Equity Reference Project. 2015. “Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity 
Review of INDCs.” November. Accessed online at 
http://civilsocietyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CSO_FullReport.pdf 

UNEP. 2016. “Emissions Gap Report.” November. Nairobi: United Nations 
Environment Programme. Accessed online at 
http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/10016/emission_gap_re
port_2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 


