




































Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 4 (1): 71–88, January 2021 

 
SPECIAL SECTION: The Commons: A Revisit  
 

The Economics of Common Pool Resources: A Review 
 

Bhim Adhikari  
 
Abstract: The paper analyses open access and common property resource systems 
drawing insights from new institutional economics, especially property rights theory 
and policy analysis. This analysis of common pool resources (CPRs) under 
common property regimes indicates that local communities devise formal and 
informal institutions in managing the local commons. The paper further discusses 
how N. S. Jodha‟s empirical work on the economics of CPRs has enhanced our 
understanding of the role of CPRs in the livelihood strategies of the poor in the 
developing world. Devolution of authority to local resource users is emphasized as 
an institutional imperative in designing appropriate forms of governance structures 
for CPR management. 

Keywords: Common Pool Resources; Institutions; Collective Action; Resource 
Users; Economics. 

 

1. INTRODUCTION 

In the late 1980s, there was a strong push to protect common pool 
resources (CPRs) in developing countries because of their impact on local 
livelihoods, local-level economic development, and biodiversity 
conservation. Transferring resource management authority to local 
communities was a major policy thrust in CPR management in areas such as 
water resource management (especially irrigation), forests, rangelands, 
fisheries, and other village commons (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999). 
These changes aligned with the shift from centralized economic planning 
toward a reduction in governmental intervention and control of the 
economy accompanied by increased democratization (Agrawal and Gibson 

                                                           
 International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 150 Kent Street, Ottawa, K1G3H9, 
ON Canada; badhikari@idrc.ca. 

Copyright © Adhikari 2021. Released under Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.  

Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic 
Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.  

ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web). 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v4i1.377  

https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v4i1.377


Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [72] 

1999). Many governments, international agencies, and non-governmental 
organizations have increasingly accepted the institutional imperative of 
devolving greater power to village communities in managing the local 
commons (Agarwal 2001).  

Establishing well-defined property rights over these resources is considered 
a cornerstone in generating incentives for internalizing externalities in the 
management of CPRs. Scholars have highlighted several underlying factors 
for environmental degradation: market failures (externalities), government 
failures (environment adverse policies), population growth, and property 
rights failures (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955; Hardon 1968; Ostrom 1990; 
Pearce and Turner 1990; Ostrom 1999). Market failure broadly refers to 
conditions under which the free market does not produce optimal welfare. 
Important examples of such failures include external effects (externalities), 
public goods and CPR problems, poorly defined property rights, non-
competitive markets, and imperfect (or asymmetric) information, to name a 
few. Policy failure occurs either when the state fails to take action to correct 
market failures or when policies further distort prices and act as 
disincentives for sustainable natural resource management (Davies and 
Richards 1999). Common examples include forest nationalization without 
an adequate institutional arrangement, insufficient knowledge and 
recognition of traditional management institutions, undervaluation of the 
price of ecological services, adverse land tenure policies, and perverse 
incentives that lead to the over-exploitation of CPRs. Commons scholars, 
therefore, advocate for an appropriate property rights structure as CPRs are 
characterized by a range of pervasive market and policy failures. In the 
absence of well-defined property rights or in conditions of open access, 
individual rational behaviours often result in collective irrational behaviours 
(Ostrom 1999).  

Three different schools of thought have been proposed as potential 
solutions for managing the commons and avoiding the “tragedy of the 
commons” situation. In the first solution, the property rights school argues 
that only creating and enforcing private property rights can help prevent the 
over-exploitation of the commons. The main thesis is that private property 
is the most efficient way to internalize the externalities associated with 
resource use and consumption. An open access, unregulated common pool 
regime does not give individuals the proper incentives to act in a socially 
efficient way (Baland and Platteau 1996). Thus, the property rights school 
contends that private property rights will immediately increase economic 
efficiency (Demsetz 1967). The second option involves the allocation of full 
authority to an external agency to regulate the CPRs. Since the main goal of 
managing natural resources is maximizing long-term economic rent, until 



[73] Bhim Adhikari 

recently, many scholars believed that community-based management 
generated little or no rent. Therefore, scholars have long questioned the 
efficiency of CPRs under common property arrangements (Gordon 1954; 
Scott 1955); solutions such as state control and management (Hardin 1968) 
and privatization of the commons (Demsetz 1964) have been proposed.  

The third possibility is that local communities manage CPRs. Communities 
not only understand the problems well, but they also create solutions to 
them since their livelihoods depend on these resources. They will have 
greater incentives to manage these resources sustainably over time. 
Historical and contemporary evidence shows that resource users often 
create institutional arrangements and management regimes that help them 
allocate benefits equitably over a long period and with only limited 
efficiency losses (McKean 1992; Ostrom 1992). Privatizing CPRs may cause 
distributional problems or ecological concerns that lead to the reoccurrence 
of negative externalities because of imperfect or absent markets. Moreover, 
in some ecological settings, the transaction costs associated with assigning 
private property rights are greater than the potential benefits to be derived 
due to the spatial scale involved. An increasing number of scholars, 
therefore, advocate for decentralized collective management of CPRs by 
their users (Ostrom 1990; Berkes 1989; Wade 1988; Jodha 1986; Baland and 
Platteau 1996). In recent years, resource management under a common 
property regime has emerged a major policy agenda in land reform; land 
titling; conservation of forest, grazing, and wildlife resources; fisheries 
management; water management, and so on. According to a report by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in the 62 countries assessed 
across the world, 732 million hectares (about 28% of forests) are currently 
managed under a community forestry system or common property regime 
(FAO 2016). 

 

2. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION FOR CPRs UNDER 
COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES 

In an economic sense, it is difficult to manage CPRs at the individual or 
household level because of their spatial scale as well as the externalities 
involved. Externalities occur as a result of both consumption and 
production activities; they cause market failures, which in turn lead to sub-
optimal resource allocation. Open access CPRs will eventually cease to be 
sustainable or optimal because of the temptation to free ride (Ostrom 
1999). Free riding and other mechanisms that lead to the undersupply of 
public goods may also cause the overuse of CPRs unless institutions are 
strong enough to limit access to their users. Under these conditions, it is 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [74] 

difficult to assign rewards and punishments that provide individuals with 
incentives that ensure their contribution towards the management of 
environmental resources.  

The assurance problem in CPR management suggests that interdependent 
choice creates incentives to establish and maintain institutions that 
coordinate expectations based on rules of fair-mindedness (Runge 1984). 
Common property institutions are generally able to tackle the assurance 
problem and make resource users confident that their efforts will be 
reciprocated by other users and therefore will be privately optimal in the 
long run. CPRs are like public goods in the sense that it is difficult to 
exclude anyone from their use and they are subtractable. However, it is 
possible to create defined user groups for the utilization of CPRs to avoid 
free riding. In fact, evidence suggests that such options are even better than 
state or private property solutions, as compliance with these institutional 
arrangements is higher as they are devised by community members.  

Many early scholars have also emphasized the effectiveness of local 
management institutions as basic units from which one can build efficient 
CPR management systems. Gibbs and Bromley (1989) demonstrated that  

a well-functioning common property regime will probably be distinguished by i) 
a shared perception of fairness among the members with respect to inputs and 
outcomes, i.e., the regime will be equitable; ii) a minimum (or absence) of 
disputes and limited effort necessary to maintain compliance, i.e., the regime 
will be efficient; iii) a capacity to cope with progressive changes through 
adaptation, such as the arrival of new production techniques, i.e., the regime 
will be stable; and iii) a capacity to accommodate surprise or sudden shocks, i.e., 
the regime will be resilient. (1989, 22–32) 

Combining these economic, social, and ecological dimensions of CPRs is, 
therefore, critical for the performance of a resource under common 
property arrangements. Economic measures focus on the extent to which 
the best economic outcome is produced through a combination of inputs at 
the lowest cost (Hanna, Folke, and Maler 1995). A broader economic 
measure of performance would also consider an economic outcome that 
accounts for the depleting and damaging effects of resource use (Daly and 
Cobb 1989). Social measures of performance focus on the equity properties 
of the regime and reflect social definitions of fairness in the distribution of 
benefits and costs across beneficiaries (Hanna et al. 1995). Ecological 
performance deals with the context in which stocks of natural capital are 
maintained over time (Costanza 2003).  

The failure of CPR institutions to incorporate the diverse interests and 
values of stakeholders is often reported to be one of the main constraints 



[75] Bhim Adhikari 

for equity and efficiency in a common property regime (Hanna et al. 1995). 
Effective management of CPRs requires the compliance of resource users. 
A good resource management process must represent the range of user 
group interests and have a clear purpose and transparent operations to be 
equitable. The extent to which participants‟ expectations are homogenous, 
with respect to the process and its objectives, influences perceptions of 
fairness and, consequently, the equity and efficiency of management 
regimes (Hanna et al. 1995). Hence, there is a need to understand CPR 
management from a structural perspective to maximize the equity and 
efficiency of collective action arrangements.  

Ostrom (1990) formulated eight design principles for CPR management 
that she considered prerequisites for the success of local institutions. These 
principles include clearly defined boundaries; congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; collective choice 
arrangements; monitoring; graduated sanctions; conflict-resolving 
mechanisms; minimal recognition of rights to organize; and nested 
enterprises. Clear boundaries and the exclusion of outsiders is one of the 
most important preconditions for any kind of community-based resource 
management (Condition 1). There is also is a need to recognize that 
resource exploiting rules that are appropriate in one setting may be 
inappropriate in another (Condition 2). Resource users should be able to 
participate in modifying the operational rules of the common property 
regime (Condition 3). The remaining design principles concern the internal 
“sociology” of decision-making and focus on democracy, legitimacy, and 
institutional effectiveness.  

Ostrom later elaborated on the attributes of resources and resource-using 
communities for self-governing associations to be formed. Resource 
attributes include the possibility of feasible improvement of the resource, 
availability of reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource 
system, predictability, and sufficiently small spatial extent for the 
appropriators to have knowledge of external boundaries. Attributes of user 
groups include an awareness of the salience of the resource, common 
understanding, low discount rate, trust and reciprocity, autonomy, and prior 
organizational experience and leadership. Researchers later proposed two 
additional variables: the cost–benefit aspect of resource management and 
historical inequalities within households, which may create incentives or 
disincentives for the management of commons at the local level (Sekher 
2001). Design principles focus primarily on internal and external variables, 
such as the key attributes of the resource and community, but not on 
household socio-economic characteristics in a dynamic context, giving less 
attention to the distributional inequality inherent in property rights 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [76] 

transformation (Adhikari 2005; 2008). Cox et al. (2010) examined the 
validity of the design principles and assessed if they are inherently part of a 
blueprint approach to CPR management. They concluded that the design 
principles, although not complete, are empirically well supported. The 
general conclusions from these studies show that local user groups are 
instrumental in determining the rules for the allocation of resources 
between different users in a way that the users themselves deem equitable 
(Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999). 

 

3. EQUITY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES: SOME LESSONS 

Participatory approaches to natural resource management have received 
much attention following the Rio Earth Summit, which established that 
resource users have the greatest stake in the sustainability of resources and 
institutions (World Bank 1996; Dearden, Carter, Kowalski, and Surridge 
1999; Agrawal 2001). Governments in more than 50 countries have already 
ceded some control over resources to local users (Agrawal 2000). The FAO 
actively supports community forestry (CF) in several countries through its 
Forests, Trees and People Program. In Nepal, community forestry started 
in the late 1970s, when national forests were handed over to the local 
community. This programme was certainly one of the most important 
attempts to convert open access forests to common property by devolving 
ownership and control of forests to their historic users. Forest user groups 
(FUGs) were granted usufruct rights to forests. Similarly, joint forest 
management (JFM) was initiated in India in the late 1990s to involve local 
people in forest management. JFM, in which communities have access to 
non-timber forest products (NTFPs) as well as a share of timber products, 
is being increasingly applied in many states of India. Chopra and Dasgupta 
(2002) explored the CPR–poverty relationship in India and found that 
CPRs play an important role as a safety net for the poor. The devolution of 
CPR management enhances environmental outcomes and empowers 
community members in India in the context of forestry, irrigation, and 
wildlife management (Shyamsundar 2008). In Southeast Asia (e.g., 
Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), partnerships between local 
communities and the government are instrumental in protecting and 
regenerating degraded forests while meeting people‟s needs in a sustainable 
manner.  

Despite these successes, research shows that the socio-economic and 
livelihood implications of common property regimes are mixed (Soussan et 
al. 1998; Malla 2000; Branney and Yadav 1998; Richards, Kanel, Maharjan, 



[77] Bhim Adhikari 

and Davies 1999), particularly the distributional aspects of common 
property regimes within communities (Adhikari, Di Falco, and Lovett 2004; 
Adhikari 2005). Some empirical studies found that formalized systems of 
property rights have led to the gradual but systematic exclusion of the poor 
from CPRs (Beck and Nesmith 2001). The structured form of common 
property arrangements is not always inclusive and equitable compared to 
traditional institutions (Hobley and Wollenberg 1996). For example, Cooke 
(2000) found that the imposition of common property management 
institutions in villages in Nepal resulted in a reduction in the consumption 
of key products from forests and questioned whether significant welfare 
gains were generated after the institutional change.  

Common property research has so far largely focused on the institutional 
arrangements by which communities act collectively (Saxena 2000); the 
decisions and actions of individuals have been given less attention. In the 
context of participatory forest management in South Asia, there is a 
tendency to assess impact in terms of biophysical and institutional changes 
rather than the effect on villagers‟ livelihoods (Das 2000). For example, 
Adhikari (2005) found that the CF programme in Nepal was primarily 
motivated by the timber and intermediate forest products oriented 
management regime that can be utilized by households with large land and 
livestock holdings, consequently marginalizing poorer households whose 
livelihoods depend on NTFPs. While this does not suggest that the benefits 
generated by intermediate forest products do not support the poor, the 
assumption is that NTFPs and cash-oriented management regimes prompt 
poorer people to participate in and benefit from collective action. Other 
studies suggest that well-off group members, such as with larger land and 
cattle ownership, are often likely to gain a larger share of benefits from a 
resource than those who are worse off (Agrawal 2001). Davies and Richards 
(1999) conducted an extensive review of economic analyses of community-
based forest management to understand stakeholders‟ incentives for 
participatory forest management. They concluded that most of these studies 
tend to be biased towards i) reviewing valuation studies as opposed to 
providing clear methodological guidance; ii) non-market valuation for 
global and national stakeholders as opposed to adding marketable value for 
local stakeholders; iii) benefits in general as opposed to ones such as 
transaction costs; iv) ex ante studies for project preparation as opposed to 
ex post monitoring and impact analyses; v) treating forestry as a separate 
enterprise as opposed to adopting a more holistic livelihood focus; vi) 
efficiency and profitability as opposed to equity, gender, and institutional 
issues; and vii) returns to land and capital as opposed to returns to labour. 
The major concerns revolved around the real costs and benefits of 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [78] 

participation and how they are distributed among various actors (Hobley 
and Wollenberg 1996). 

A large body of literature has demonstrated the success of common 
property regimes in conserving local resources (Wade 1988; Berkes 1989; 
Ostrom 1990; Berkes and Folke 1998). Early research efforts, however, 
mainly focused on the rules, mechanisms, and institutions that rural 
communities adopted in managing CPRs, without examining the 
distributional implications of these institutions. It is commonly assumed 
that, under common property armaments, local communities are capable of 
collectively managing resources and ensuring egalitarian access and 
distribution of benefits among their co-owners (Appasamy and Menon 
2000). Many of these studies focus on communities as opposed to 
households, and the stated objectives of inter-household equity were often 
not met (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999). Meinzen-Dick and Knox (1999) 
argue that common property resources have not always been used 
efficiently, nor have the benefits been equitably distributed. In many cases, 
common property regimes have failed to recognize that resources often 
have multiple uses and that there tend to be sub-groups of users with 
different use patterns. 

Several past studies explored the institutional arrangements for managing 
the commons at the local level (Nugent 1993; Uphoff 1993). Significant 
studies have identified key variables that support the self-organization of 
user groups for participatory resource management, such as the physical 
and technical attributes of the resource, characteristics of user groups, and 
attributes of institutional arrangements (Wade, 1988; Bromley and Cernea 
1989; Ostrom 1990; Oakerson 1992; Tang 1992; Bardhan 1993; Nugent 
1993). Some efforts have also been made to empirically examine the 
conditions under which user groups organize and the impact of such local 
organizational presence on the management of CPRs (Pender and Scherr 
1999; Meinzen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2000). Another recent area of 
research focus is the contested role of group heterogeneity and the 
performance of collective action. This body of literature has initiated a 
discussion on whether socio-economic inequalities among resource users 
hinder or enhance the performance of collective action (Bardhan and 
Dayton-Johnson 2000; Baland and Platteau 1996;1999; Varughese and 
Ostrom 2001). One group of studies argue that cooperative solutions for 
the management of CPRs may be difficult to implement in an economy 
with highly heterogeneous agents. Asset inequality within a community 
makes the implementation of collective action more difficult since higher 
income and asset endowments make some sections of the community more 
productive in terms of resource utilization as well as influential in the 



[79] Bhim Adhikari 

sphere of public decision-making; this may undermine the equity property 
of CPR institutions. For example, Chopra, Kadekodi, and Murthy (1990) 
found that endowments of cultivable land, cattle, and machines and 
harvesting tools determined household use of CFs and grazing lands in 
India. The very notion of a single, identifiable “community” for 
“community-based resource management” may be a fallacy when users are 
from diverse social backgrounds and while varied socio-economic positions 
often result in diversified interests in resource management. Much of the 
rhetorical weight of community comes from papering over differences that 
usually prevail within existing communities; such homogeneity help 
enhance cooperative efforts, reduce hierarchical and conflictual interactions, 
and promote better resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). 
Nonetheless, quite a few studies that explore CPR management at the local 
level recognize that there are different subgroups, and within these 
subgroups, there are individuals with varying preferences for resource use 
and management (Kant 2000). 

A high degree of heterogeneity within communities may hinder collective 
action due to the presence of different interests in resource management, 
which substantially increase the transaction costs of coordination. 
Moreover, in heterogeneous societies, members often have a lower level of 
trust in each other, giving rise to higher transaction costs. Zak and Knack 
(2001) posit that heterogeneous societies, especially those with weak formal 
and informal institutions, have lower trust levels and slower economic 
performance that less heterogeneous societies with higher trust levels. The 
transaction costs of resource management reduce with an increase in the 
level of trust levels between actors and institutions that provide incentives 
for lasting cooperation. Transaction costs may be significantly higher in 
communities with a high level of socio-economic differentiation. In such 
communities, a failure to address complex social factors such as 
institutional and political realities, gender issues, caste differences, and 
economic disparities may lead to inequitable access to the resource base and 
result in social conflicts. Inequality in power, for example, may mean that 
equal division would be unacceptable to the powerful, while any other 
distribution may be subject to conflict. As Somanathan, Prabhakar, and 
Mehta (2002, 2) point out, “heterogeneity removes a natural focal point for 
agreements, and, simultaneously makes one subgroup uncertain about other 
group‟s preferences, thus making agreement less likely as each group tries to 
drive a hard bargain, one that may be unacceptable to the other groups”. 
Runge (1986) shows that greater heterogeneity in a community makes 
cooperation more difficult because it increases the costs of working 
together. Ghate (2008) also highlighted how social stratification and ethnic 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [80] 

heterogeneity in Indian villages matter with reference to JFM. 
Mukhopadhyay (2008) explored the impact of heterogeneity on asset 
ownership and cooperation in the context of agrarian transitions in Goa, 
India, and offers several insights to ensure the sustainability of village 
commons. 

Olson (1965) suggests that in a heterogeneous group, a dominant member 
who enjoys a large part of the benefits from collective action is likely to 
ensure its provision even if they have to pay all of the costs themselves, 
with the smaller players free riding on the former‟s contribution. Thus, 
Olson holds that inequality may favour collective action. In a similar vein, 
Ostrom (1992) claims that heterogeneity in asset structure can favour 
collective action, especially where there is a need for leadership and 
entrepreneurship. However, despite impressive advances in our 
understanding of the impact of institutional form on the performance of 
commons-using communities, the role of socio-economic heterogeneity 
and its impact on collective action and equity of resource distribution are 
still under-researched. Dasgupta (2008) offers several underlying theoretical 
insights on the management of CPRs under common property regimes and 
warns us by presenting both the pros and cons of collective relationships. 

Despite common property regimes having some weaknesses, evidence of 
successful self-governance of natural resources by users has engendered 
considerable optimism that turning responsibility over to organized user 
groups will improve the efficiency, equity, and sustainability of the resource 
base. The devolution of power engenders a deep sense of ownership over 
natural resources and creates incentives for investment in management. 
There have been significant advancements in commons research over the 
past two decades. Policy interventions in many countries are geared towards 
crafting mechanisms and procedures to represent disadvantaged groups in 
decision-making and to support local livelihoods through more scientific 
methods in the management of CPRs. 

 

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 

This review demonstrates that the absence of well-defined property rights 
results in open access to the resource system that is unregulated and free to 
everyone interested in resource appropriation and exploitation. Rent 
completely dissipates under an open access equilibrium. There is an overuse 
of resources that results from resource users ignoring the effects of their 
consumption on the costs that other users bear. Similarly, there is also 
overuse resulting from users ignoring the effect that their consumption in 
the present year will have on the costs they will face in the following years. 



[81] Bhim Adhikari 

On the supply side, open access CPRs are like public goods. Individuals 
cannot enjoy the benefits of their investments in these resources, and as a 
result, investments are inefficiently low, resources are misallocated, and 
there is under-investment in information to resource users (Wallace 1981). 
Since individual interests are unlikely to lead to the sustainable management 
of CPRs in an open access condition, institutional arrangements for 
resource management must be designed in such a way that they ensure 
long-term incentives for the individual resource user. 

The review has highlighted that economic gains from the community-based 
system of resource management are among the most important factors 
contributing to the success of collective action. Scholars unequivocally 
emphasize that these gains (institutional change) should be distributed 
among all user groups in a manner that benefits everyone. The economics 
of CPRs have advanced quite a bit since the late nineties. Dr Jodha‟s 
contribution to this line of scholarly enquiry is commendable as he was one 
of the pioneers of CPR research in relation to rural poverty and the 
management of village commons in South Asia. Jodha‟s (1986) study of 80 
villages in 21 districts in India demonstrates the importance of CPRs for 
rural livelihoods (e.g., 15–25% of the total income of poorer households 
comes from collection and gathering activities). His work also offers ample 
evidence of extensive use of CPRs by rural households for key economic 
activities such as consumption, production, and asset formation. His work 
emphasizes the need for the provision of equal opportunities in all aspects 
of CPR management and decision-making processes as well as in sharing 
costs and benefits. As a strong researcher and practitioner, he advocated for 
the right policy intervention in managing local commons by creating a set 
of synergies such that different sections of the community can benefit from 
common property resources management. 

The relationship between resource degradation and CPRs is another 
dimension of Jodha‟s work (Jodha 1985a; 1986; 1990; 1995). Some early 
studies on the poverty–environment nexus demonstrate the empirical 
linkages between population growth and resource degradation (Jain 1988; 
Mabogunje 2001). Another stream of literature explores the dependency of 
both poorer and better off households on local commons, and some of 
these studies report a higher degree of reliance among poor community 
members on CPRs (Chambers 1994). These studies establish that poverty is 
among the principal sources of environmental damage across countries 
(Masron and Subramaniam 2019). Jodha (1995; 1985b) demonstrates that 
although poorer households are relatively more dependent on these 
resources (if there are fewer restraints imposed by local management 
institutions), the better-off sections of society appropriate more benefits 

https://www.tandfonline.com/author/Mabogunje%2C+Akin+L
mailto:Masron%20School%20of%20Management,%20Universiti%20Sains%20Malaysia,%20Penang,%20MalaysiaCorrespondencetams@usm.my
https://www.tandfonline.com/author/Subramaniam%2C+Yogeeswari


Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [82] 

from the commons. Further, he convincingly shows that these communities 
can limit the overuse of resources for subsistence and use CPRs as an 
insurance mechanism. A few years prior to Elinor Ostrom‟s famous book 
Governing the Commons (1990), Jodha had already made the case that 
decentralized collective management by local users could be an appropriate 
system for addressing the over-exploitation of CPRs (Jodha 1986). Jodha 
(1997) demonstrates how changes in institutional arrangements, such as the 
legal status of CPRs, contributed to the decline of CPRs in India. 

Consistent with the theoretical insights presented earlier, Jodha‟s work 
reminds us that the management of CPRs is influenced by a the local socio-
economic, legal, political, cultural, and ecological variables of the 
community within which it operates. Because of the enormous variability in 
the resource base, socio-economic conditions, and history of cooperation, 
no single blueprint is appropriate for all situations. To this end, Jodha‟s 
(1992) work describes the key role of donors in sensitizing national agencies 
to the importance of CPRs and supporting policies that enforce local 
institutional arrangements. Policy insights emanating from Jodha‟s work 
help inform forest policy–related legislations in South Asia and elsewhere. 
Many of these policy changes have stipulated a strategy to hand over the 
authority to conserve and use forest resources to local people; this 
engenders a deep sense of ownership over forests and creates incentives for 
investment in forest management. Jodha‟s work rightfully emphasizes the 
importance of capacity building among various stakeholders involved in 
common property management, such as forest officials, NGOs, and the 
local community, which would facilitate a forward-looking and anticipatory 
approach to forest management (Jodha 2000). Jodha (2008) offers several 
useful policy insights for managing CPRs in South Asia, especially in 
situations where there has been a rapid disintegration of the community‟s 
collective stake in the village commons. In a nutshell, Jodha‟s work has 
contributed immensely to the economics-related and institutional aspects of 
CPR management and poverty alleviation in South Asia. 

 

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