




































Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal 2 (2): 21–30, July 2019 

 
THEMATIC ESSAY  
 

Understanding Current Forest Policy Debates through 
Multiple Lenses: The Case of India 
 

Sharachchandra Lele   
 
Abstract: The forest sector in India is in turmoil again as the government proposes 
changes to the National Forest Policy and to the Indian Forest Act, and the 
Supreme Court appears to favour conservation over people‘s rights. This essay 
places India‘s forests in their socio-ecological context and using multiple 
perspectives—from ecology, environmental economics, common property theory, 
and political ecology—to explain the roots of the current controversy and think of 
ways forward. 

 

1. INTRODUCTION 

Across the globe, the 1990s witnessed a distinct trend of nation states 
transferring (or returning) rights over tropical forests to local communities 
(White and Martin 2002). India also followed this trend. After the Chipko 
agitation of the late 1970s in Uttarakhand and similar agitations in 
Jharkhand and elsewhere in the country, the 1988 National Forest Policy 
(NFP88), for the first time, recognised meeting the needs of local 
communities as a policy objective and participatory forest management as a 
policy instrument. The Joint Forest Management (JFM) experiment started 
in 1990 with prompting from the Ford Foundation and much financial 
support from bilateral and multi-lateral agencies and spread to all states. It 
seemed like forest sector reform in India was very much under way 
(Poffenberger and McGean 1996; Sundar, Jeffery and Thin 2001). 

                                                        
 Distinguished Fellow in Environmental Policy and Governance, Centre for Environment 
& Development, ATREE, Bengaluru.; slele@atree.org 

Copyright © Lele 2019. Released under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 
International licence (CC BY-NC 4.0) by the author.  

Published by Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE), c/o Institute of Economic 
Growth, University Enclave, North Campus, Delhi 110007.  

ISSN: 2581-6152 (print); 2581-6101 (web). 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v2i2.71  

https://doi.org/10.37773/ees.v2i2.71


Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [22] 

Yet 30 years later, the forest sector in India seems to be in greater turmoil 
than before. The government‘s proposed revisions to the forest policy 
(MoEFCC 2018) and to the Indian Forest Act (MoEFCC 2019) have drawn 
much criticism. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court‘s order of February 13, 
2019 1  pertaining to The Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA) triggered a wave 
of protests, forcing the government to request a temporary stay. 

Why have these tensions resurfaced? How can we understand these debates 
and conflicts? What academic perspectives might provide useful insights 
into them? After providing a historical overview, I shall argue that 
conventional perspectives from environmental economics and even 
common property resource theory are insufficient to understand the forest 
problem in India. They must be preceded by a socio-ecological 
understanding of the resource, a political ecology analysis of whose rights 
must prevail, and then be complemented by multi-layered environmental 
governance theory.  

 

2. SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF INDIAN FORESTS 

Western ‗scientific‘ forestry treated forests as simply a set of trees to be 
managed for timber, i.e., essentially a privatizable good, to use the 
terminology of environmental economics. This explains the large private 
forests in the USA, a practice that was also prevalent in Europe. It also 
ironically explains the adoption of ‗state forestry‘ in the colonies, as a means 
to privatize the resource in the hands of the colonizers. At the other 
extreme, conservationists see forests only as providers of pure public goods 
such as watershed protection, biodiversity and now carbon sequestration. In 
which case, state management is clearly called for. 

But tropical forests in general, and south Asia‘s forests in particular, are 
complex socio-ecological entities. First, they are highly diverse, requiring 
location-specific ecological knowledge. Second, they have been historically 
settled and used by Adivasi and non-Adivasi communities. Therefore, 
access to forests is not easily controlled, neither by individuals nor by the 
state, making them local-level common pool resources. But local 
dependence and use takes multiple forms: firewood, timber, grazing, non-
timber forest products, and non-use values as well, and involves trade-offs 
amongst different local communities themselves. Third, while these forests 
do provide wider regional or global environmental benefits, these are often 

                                                        
1 In the case of Wildlife First & Ors versus Union of India WP(Civil) 109/2008. 



[23] Sharachchandra Lele 

accompanied by local dis-benefits—such as crop damage or human-wildlife 
conflict. In other words, forest management always involves trade-offs 
between very different stakeholders located at different scales (Lele 2004). 
Thus, the problem of ‗how to manage forests‘ is not just one of ‗how to 
manage a complex common pool resource‘ but also ‗for what purpose‘ and 
therefore ‗for whom‘. The colonial, post-colonial and post-1990s periods 
must be understood in terms of which (whose) goals were prioritised and 
who faced the consequences. 

 

3. ‘NATIONALISATION’ OF INDIAN FORESTS 

Modern day formal forestry in India began with the takeover of majority of 
the country‘s forests by the British government under the aegis of the 
Indian Forest Act of 1878, that was subsequently revised in 1927 
(hereinafter IFA). These Acts created two main legal categories of forests—
Reserved Forest (RF) and Protected Forest (PF)—and empowered the 
Imperial Forest Department to take over, manage and protect them. For 
what purpose? Though not explicitly mentioned in the IFA, the goals were 
clear: for timber and softwood production, and thereby revenue generation. 
A single goal, two levels of protection, and a single manager-cum-protector. 
The third category—Village Forest (VF)—was never seriously deployed. 

This colonial takeover deprived forest-dwellers of much of their livelihoods. 
Shifting cultivation was banned. Timber and many commercially valuable 
non-timber forest products such as pine resin were ‗nationalised‘. Grazing 
fees were imposed, and grazing areas were opened or closed as per the 
needs of timber forestry. Indeed, natural forests were felled on a large-scale 
and replaced with monocultures, further impoverishing the forests in terms 
of locally useful products, diversity, and catchment protection services. The 
beneficiary was the colonial state (Tucker 1983).  

Post-independence, the 1952 agricultural policy still visualised forests as 
providers of raw material for industry and a source of revenue for the state 
(Gadgil, Prasad, and Ali 1983). So, state control of forests continued, and in 
fact the area under RFs and PFs expanded as the forests in princely states 
and under zamindari or other forms of ownership were ‗nationalised‘. 
Following state reorganisation, the newly formed states largely copied the 
IFA in passing state acts, and the imperial FD became state FDs, run by an 
―Indian‖ forest service. Continuity, rather than de-colonisation, was the 
mantra. 

Post-1970s, after a belated recognition that so-called ‗game‘ hunting had 
decimated India‘s wildlife, the Wildlife Protection Act was passed, and 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [24] 

wildlife conservation replaced timber production as the goal of forestry in 
some pockets. But conservation policy was still based on exclusion of local 
communities, and the social cost of this conservation has been high 
(Lasgorceix and Kothari 2009). 

Of course, complete regulation of the activities of millions of forest-
dwellers was never possible. Alienated from the forests that they still 
needed, local communities were forced to resort to ‗theft‘. Giving forest 
officers police powers in a landscape populated by marginalized and 
illiterate communities initially led to punishments, and eventually to rent-
seeking and exploitation. Where communities were able to protest 
vehemently or violently, such as in parts of the Western Ghats, 
Uttarakhand, and Jharkhand, the colonial masters made some concessions. 
Post-independence, under political pressure of a democracy, these 
concessions increased. But in most cases, only access rights were granted, 
without ceding management rights, thereby making forests de facto open 
access and leading to their degradation.  

 

4. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 

The NFP88 was a landmark because it shifted the priorities of forestry from 
production to environmental and local benefits, and the structures of forest 
management by introducing the idea of participatory management. The 
JFM programmes of the 1990s, implemented under pressure from civil 
society groups and lubricated with funds from international donors, were 
supposed to institutionalise this shift. Unfortunately, JFM remained a shift 
on paper. It did not have statutory backing, nor did it mandate that all 
resource use areas be handed over to communities, nor did it give 
autonomy to communities to manage the resource as per their needs. JFM 
committees, areas and implementation extent were all as per the whims of 
the forest departments (Lele 2014). In the meantime, forest departments 
managed to replace revenues lost (due to conservation policies and bans on 
green felling) with international loans. But these loans have been used 
ineffectively (Kumar et al. 1999) and will have to be repaid by future 
generations. 

 

5. BLIND SPOT 

In the discussion so far, we have focused on forests. But for forest-
dwellers, cultivated lands-habitation-forests form a mosaic that provides 
integrated livelihoods. The process of forest ‗nationalisation‘ was 
problematic not only because it deprived communities of access to forest 



[25] Sharachchandra Lele 

but also because in many cases it deprived them of their rights to habitation 
and cultivation. This was obviously the case with shifting cultivation, which 
was banned outright. Less obvious is the case of settled cultivation, which 
as per the IFA was to be recognized and excluded from forest reservation. 
Unfortunately, the hurried expansion of national forests following 
independence led to major deviations from this procedure (Sarin 2005; 
Vasan 2005). RF and PF boundaries were notified without adequate 
enquiry. Overnight, traditional forest-dwellers became ‗encroachers‘ in their 
own lands (Sarin 2014). This ‗unsettled‘ nature of cultivation and habitation 
rights was a blind spot even in the JFM period, till a Supreme Court order in 
February 2002 (WP (Civil) 202 of 1995) triggered widespread evictions, 
leading to nation-wide protests. 

 

6. A LANDMARK LAW 

The idea of the FRA emerged originally to redress the problem of unsettled 
cultivation and habitation rights of forest-dwellers in improperly notified RFs 
and PFs, by allowing them to claim ‗individual forest rights‘ (now section 
3(1)(a)). But eventually the FRA as enacted also included provisions to 
redress the denial of forest access and management rights to forest-dwellers by 
introducing Community Resource (CR) rights (sections 3(1)(b) to (h)) and 
Community Forest Resource (CFR) rights (section 3(1)(i)) that can be 
claimed by village communities and which gives them fairly autonomous 
control. By doing so, and by also giving communities the right to say no to 
forest diversion (even if other state authorities including forest officers have 
approved the diversion), the FRA substantially devolves power away from 
state bureaucracies to communities. At the same time, the FRA requires 
that such community forest management meet sustainability and 
conservation goals—a requirement that even the IFA and the so-called 
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 do not have! Further, section 4(2) of FRA 
requires that communities shall not be displaced from protected areas 
unless it is demonstrated through due process that co-existence of 
communities and wildlife is not possible and there is informed consent for 
resettlement.  

No doubt, the FRA has some limitations. First, the use of a single term 
‗forest rights‘ to refer to two very different tenure regimes—individual 
rights over cultivated or inhabited land (IFRs), and community rights to 
access (CRs) and to manage forested lands as forest (Community Forest 
Resource (CFR) rights)—is confusing. Second, by requiring that claims 
have to be made in order to recognize CFRs, it makes decentralised 
governance voluntary and subject to communities knowing about their 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [26] 

rights and having the courage and ability to stake their claims. Third, it does 
not clarify the role of the forest departments once communities begin to 
manage CFR areas. Fourth, it does not explicitly provide timber rights, 
when JFM was already providing for a share in the proceeds from timber 
harvest. Nevertheless, in addressing the problem of wrongly drawn forest 
boundaries, in giving statutory backing for community-led forest 
governance, and in giving communities a voice in conversion of their 
forests to either protected areas or for non-forestry activities, the FRA 
constitutes a landmark and multi-dimensional reform in India‘s forest 
governance. 

 

7. RESISTANCE TO REFORM AND ITS EXPLANATIONS 

The implementation of the FRA, however, has witnessed much conflict and 
bureaucratic resistance. Not only have forest bureaucracies dragged their 
feet in implementing many provisions, especially the CFR rights, but they 
have (through retired forest officers‘ associations) actively filed petitions 
challenging the constitutionality of the FRA. In this, they have been joined 
by several conservationist groups. These petitions resulted in the 
controversial interim court orders of February 2019.  

Meanwhile, in a similar backlash, the forestry establishment has drafted a 
new policy that reverses the priorities set in NFP88. Worse, it has now 
drafted an amended IFA that inter alia gives forest departments the power 
to set aside rights given under the FRA, promotes the much less 
autonomous Village Forest model over the CFR model, and increases 
police powers rather than addressing the lack of accountability that has led 
to the (extensively documented) exploitation of forest-dwellers. The draft 
amendments will also empower forest departments to take over forests in 
the one region where they hitherto have not been able to ‗nationalise‘ much 
forest land, viz., the Sixth Schedule areas of the northeast.  

Why should forest sector reform generate such bureaucratic resistance and 
backlash? Is the direction of reform incorrect? Which environmental social 
science perspective enables us to identify policy directions and tools, and 
also explains the opposition to reform? Neoclassical environmental 
economics recognises the multiple values of forests, and although the 
concept of total economic value skirted the question of trade-offs, the 
concept of payments for environmental services (PES) is premised on the 
idea that forests may generate positive externalities that local forest-dwellers 
may not care about or provide unless compensated for. But this ‗market-
based solution‘ is in turn based on, among other things, the assumption of 
‗well-defined property rights‘, that is, that forest-dwellers already ‗own‘ the 



[27] Sharachchandra Lele 

forest and may legally choose not to provide these positive externalities if 
they wish. This assumption of private ownership holds in the Americas 
(hence the proliferation of PES schemes there), but not in India. And 
environmental economics is agnostic about how property rights should be 
assigned, as it only seeks economic efficiency and treats distributional questions 
as outside its scope. 

Institutional analysis of the kind developed by Elinor Ostrom focuses on 
the common-pool nature of forests, and argues that community property 
can be a solution under certain circumstances, and can even be a more 
‗cost-effective‘ solution in some cases (Somanathan, Prabhakar, and Mehta 
2009). Community management rights are thus conditional and based on 
efficiency arguments. Both economists and Ostrom-school analysts treat the 
state as a neutral actor, taking (and implementing) decisions in the public 
interest based on information that research may provide. 

It requires one to take a political ecology perspective to foreground a 
different normative concern, that of equity and social justice, and to question 
the assumption of a neutral, undifferentiated, public-minded ‗state‘. The 
core question of ‗whose rights or stakes must get priority‘ cannot be 
answered without asking ‗what is a fair allocation of rights‘. Political ecology 
acknowledges the unfairness (or ‗historic injustice‘, to use the language of 
the FRA) in colonial usurpation of the customary rights of forest-dwellers 
and the further injustice in rendering them encroachers. Devolving rights 
back to local communities is therefore not a matter of efficiency, nor to be 
justified on the grounds of the conservation-mindedness of local 
communities, but as a right to more democratic governance (Lele and Menon 
2014). 

Furthermore, political ecology alerts us to the theoretical possibility of a 
non-neutral state, recognises the largely exploitative intent of the colonial 
state and opens up the possibility that many organs may remain largely 
unaccountable even when the country becomes free and democratic. One 
should therefore not be surprised when a forest bureaucracy resists and 
actively undermines reforms. This organ is the biggest landlord in the 
country (controlling about 23% of the landscape), has remained largely 
unchanged in its style and structure since colonial times and proudly boasts 
of a 150-year old history of ‗scientific‘ forestry in a country that became free 
only 70 years ago! Moreover, it has been resource manager, policeman, 
regulator, funder and de facto policymaker all rolled into one for all this time. 
Naturally, it will not give up these sweeping powers willingly.  

 

 



Ecology, Economy and Society–the INSEE Journal [28] 

8. WAY FORWARD 

Each social science perspective is an almost inseparable combination of 
normative concerns and theoretical understanding of human behaviour, 
making it hard to reconcile with other perspectives. But if one is to find 
solutions, one must figure out a way of integrating across these perspectives 
in analysis and in action. Normatively, the tendency to see forest problems 
as only sustainability or conservation issues has to be resisted, and the 
question of justice (‗forest for whom?‘) must be faced head on. Indeed, the 
justice question is deeper than just the historical injustice perpetrated by a 
colonial and post-colonial state on forest-dwellers: there also exist inequities 
of class, caste and gender within such communities. A normative position 
in which the rights of forest-dwellers (and indeed of everyone) to 
decentralised democratic forest governance are coupled with these other 
societal goals will probably have broader acceptance. 

On the theoretical side, a recognition of the complex multi-stakeholder and 
multi-scale nature of the forest resource makes a case for community-level 
forest governance to be nested under some form of regulation. But the 
generic insight that power needs to be accompanied by checks and balances 
to safeguard against its abuse and a specific recognition of our colonial 
legacy cautions against the automatic insertion of the forest bureaucracy, 
with its unrepudiated colonial baggage, as the regulator. Newer and more 
democratically accountable structures will have to be thought of (see Joint 
Committee 2010, chap.8).  

Communities will also want to make a better living from forests, and will 
need support as they try to regenerate, protect and harvest from degraded 
forests and engage with markets. Fairness in fiscal policy requires that they 
be given access to any forest conservation related funds that were hitherto 
the monopoly of the forest bureaucracy, and even control over eco-tourism 
in their areas. This implies reforming funding mechanisms, such as the 
accumulated compensatory afforestation funds, and granting rights to 
operate and tax tourism. Ensuring equitable sharing within communities 
will require some structural changes to ensure better representation and 
voice for the marginalised, as well as major grassroots efforts to actualise 
these voices. The challenges in bringing about such a transition are of 
course enormous. Framing the problem as multi-dimensional in both its 
normative and analytical aspects may provide a fruitful starting point. 

 

 

 



[29] Sharachchandra Lele 

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