

proportion. These efforts must focus on examining the various aspects of self-management practice and the problems being encountered by self-management socialist forces in daily life instead of abstract opinions, generalized declarations and principles.

### SADAŠNJA FAZA U RAZVOJU IDEJA I POKRETA RADNIČKE PARTICIPACIJE I SAMOUPRAVLJANJA

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R e z i m e

Ideje radničke participacije i samoupravljanja prožimaju celu istoriju socijalizma i radničkih pokreta. Dosadašnji razvoj ovih ideja i pokreta ima izrazito ciklički karakter — posle uspona dolazila su razdoblja stagnacije.

Od sredine šezdesetih godina počinje nova istorijska etapa u razvoju ovih ideja koja je u mnogo čemu jedinstvena. Kao nikad ranije ove ideje dobile su podršku u skoro svim važnijim strujama i grupacijama savremenih radničkih i socijalističkih pokreta. Podrška je ne samo šira već je i snažnija nego ikad ranije. Specifično je obeležje ove etape u tome, što su ove ideje sada, opet prvi put u svojoj istoriji, dobile snažnija uporišta i u mnogim zemljama u razvoju. Rasprave o ovim idejama više nisu isključiva preokupacija evropskog prostora i zemalja koje predstavljaju »produžetak« evropske civilizacije. Značajno je i to, što ideje participacije sada imaju širu podršku i u nekim socijalnim i političkim sredinama izvan granica radničke klase i radničkih pokreta.

Snažan uspon ideja i snaga koje se bore za afirmaciju koncepta neposrednog radničkog sudelovanja u procesu upravljanja stavio je protagoniste ovih ideja pred nove probleme i zadatke. Jedno važno novo saznanje glasi, da više nije osnovno pitanje da se dokazuje poželjnost i vrednost ideja participacije i samoupravljanja. Kada je reč o organizovanim snagama radničke klase, ovaj deo bitke uglavnom je dobijen. Ostaje mnogo važniji i složeniji zadatak: potrebno je teorijski dokazivati i u praksi potvrđivati mogućnost ostvarenja ovih ideja. Ovo je neophodno i zbog toga što veliki deo podrške koja danas dolazi sa raznih strana ima, u manjoj ili većoj meri, deklarativni karakter. Ideje se podržavaju »u principu«. Ne retko formalna i deklarativna podrška skriva stvarno suprotstavljanje ostvarenju ovih ideja. Vladajuće društvene i političke snage nastoje da delimičnim ustupcima otupe oštricu radikalnijih zahteva. U pojedinim, osobito razvijenim zemljama, čine se ustupci u oblasti participacije da bi se na taj način zaprečio put onim snagama koje traže samoupravljanje.

Porast uticaja ideja, zahteva i pokreta radničke participacije i samoupravljanja izaziva povećane otpore vladajućih društvenih i političkih snaga koje nastoje da zadrže svoju moć i privilegije. Mobilisu se značajni naučni, politički i propagandni potencijali kako bi se suzbilo napredovanje ideja i snaga neposredne radničke demokratije.

U vreme velikog uspona ideja i snaga radničke participacije i samoupravljanja sve su vidnija nastojanja da se ovim idejama manipuliše. To je razlog više da protagonisti radničke participacije (stvarne) i samoupravljanja ulože što više napora, da bi u mnoštvu projekata i predloga identifikovali one koji označavaju pokušaj stvarnog napredovanja u pravcu uspostavljanja neposredne moći radničke klase od onih koje služe manipulativnim svrhama vladajućih klasnih snaga.

U borbi protiv radničkog učešća u upravljanju, a osobito samoupravljanja, ističu se brojni i raznovrsni prigovori, od kojih neki pretenduju na karakter proverenih naučnih argumenata. Ističe se, na primer, da su radnici »nezainteresovani« za probleme upravljanja, pošto ih zanima samo visina ličnih dohodaka, zatim, da oni ne poseduju stručna znanja neophodna za sudelovanje u donošenju odluka ili, pak, da je samoupravljanje moguće samo u malim, tehnički jednostavnim i slabo opremljenim proizvodnim jedinicama. Kao »krunski dokaz« protiv samoupravljanja iznosi se teza da je ono nespojivo sa imperativom planiranja. U izboru između samoupravljanja i planiranja savremeno društvo, ukoliko želi da se uspešno i skladno ekonomski razvija, mora se opredeliti za ovo poslednje.

U osporavanju ovih i sličnih teza naročito veliku ulogu uimaju organizovane socijalističke snage ove zemlje. Jugoslavija je još uvek jedina zemlja u kojoj je samoupravljanje osnovni princip celokupnog sistema društvenih odnosa. U ovoj zemlji su sakupljena najveća iskustva u praksi samoupravnih društvenih odnosa. Po svoj prilici i društvena teorija samoupravljanja je razvijenija nego u mnogim drugim sredinama. To su i razlozi posebnih odgovornosti vodećih snaga socijalističkog samoupravljanja u Jugoslaviji.

Od Jugoslavije se, sasvim razumljivo, očekuju najozbiljniji doprinosi u razvijanju celovite teorije socijalističkog samoupravljanja. Što je još važnije, svojom praksom Jugoslavija mora pokazivati i dokazivati da se razni otvoreni problemi socijalističkog samoupravljanja mogu uspešno rešavati. Zastoji i neuspehi u rešavanju ovih problema imaju negativne posledice ne samo na razvoj samoupravljanja u ovoj zemlji — oni usporavaju porast ovih snaga i tendencija u svetskim razmerama.

### ESTABLISHING SELF-GOVERNING SOCIALISM IN A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY

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Two fully-developed social systems coexist in the contemporary world. One is capitalism, which has reached its organized stage. This stage is called — depending on the ideology one is imbued with — state-monopoly capitalism or welfare state. The other system is characterized by central ad-

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ministrative planning and may be denoted as etatism because of the absolute dominance of an all-pervasive and powerful state. It is, somewhat mistakenly, also called socialism. This term is inappropriate because, traditionally, one of the basic tenets of socialism was the withering away of the state. In this traditional sense, therefore, etatism and socialism are incompatible and mutually exclusive.

It is generally believed that the less developed countries have only these two social models to choose from. Perhaps a middle way, a mixture of some ingredients from both systems, is also possible. In this paper I shall argue that a third, fully distinct and more desirable alternative exists. It is represented by a society based on labour management in the productive sphere. It attempts to overcome alienation, implicit in capitalism and etatism, by self-determination. This society, which Marx and Engels described as "an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (*Communist Manifesto*), I call self-governing socialism.<sup>1)</sup>

The fundamental question to which I wish to address myself is the following one: Can a less developed country bypass capitalism and etatism and proceed to build a socialist society straight away?

#### (a) The Conquest of Political Power

In the social order which is denoted as organized capitalism, political democracy is more or less established. To be sure, it is not a genuine democracy; it is rather — in the words of Maurice Duverger<sup>2)</sup> — plutocracy since political power is based on people (demos) and on wealth (plutos). Yet, certain basic political liberties are quite effectively guaranteed. In such countries, the main problem of transition consists in establishing economic democracy.

In the etatist countries, certain welfare preconditions of socialism are quite well-fulfilled. Here the main problem of transition consists in safeguarding political liberties, in establishing an effective political democracy.

The undeveloped countries know neither political nor economic democracy. They were either colonies — and so dominated and exploited by foreigners — or independent states — which implied domination and exploitation by domestic reactionary oligarchies. In either case, the established regimes were politically and economically utmost oppressive. Besides, their peoples were poor and uneducated.

We see how extremely difficult it is to build socialism in advanced capitalist and etatist countries. If that is so, building socialism in an underdeveloped country must look hopeless. President Nyerere of Tanzania, who has to face this hopeless situation, summarized the problems involved: "With few socialists we are trying to build socialism; with few people conscious of the basic requirements of democracy we are trying to achieve change by democratic means; with few technicians we are trying to effect a fun-

<sup>1)</sup> For the theoretical foundation underlying the classification of the contemporary social system see my: "On the Political Economy of Socialism" in E. Pusić, ed., *Participation and Self-Management* Vol. 6, Institute for Social Research Zagreb, 1973. Cf. also B. Horvat, M. Marković, R. Supek, eds., *Self-Governing Socialism*, Int. Arts and Sciences Press, New York, 1975.

<sup>2)</sup> M. Duverger, *Janus — Les deux faces de l'Occident*, Fayard, Paris, 1972, p. XIII.

damental transformation of our economy. And with an educated elite whose whole teaching encouraged motives of individualistic advancement, we are trying to promote an egalitarian society".<sup>3)</sup>

If socialism in a politically and economically backward country is an obvious impossibility, why try? The answer is that the question, as formulated, is a false question. If socialism cannot be established overnight, this does not mean that there is no chance of different routes and that some of them do not lead to socialism much faster than do the others. Once we discard the deterministic theory of successive stages, we can begin to think in terms of developmental shortcuts. A new African or Asian country may, but need not, follow the path of capitalist or etatist development. It may choose a path which leads to socialism much more directly.<sup>4)</sup> It is our task now to explore the possible design of such a path. Because of the extreme diversity of the countries involved, the discussion can only be very general.

Unlike the advanced countries, in undeveloped countries violent revolutions are possible, even quite likely. Colonial people fight national liberation wars which transcend into social revolutions. Vietnam, Yemen, Algeria, Mozambique and Angola are perhaps the most conspicuous examples. Antiquated monarchies are destroyed by civil wars or by the rebellions of young officers. China, Ethiopia and some Arab countries exemplify this case. The peaceful, "parliamentary" transfer of power is an exception. Tanzania and Guinea succeeded (so far), Chile failed.

Socialism cannot be obtained as a present; if at all, it is achieved as a result of prolonged struggle. As the example quoted indicates, this struggle is likely to involve violence, often very brutal. Socialists cannot choose the conditions under which to fight. They can only adapt their tactics and strategy. If violence is imposed upon them, they cannot withdraw. Yet the unavoidability of violence does not imply that violence ought to be advocated. The more violence there is, the lesser the chance that the victory will be followed by socialist reconstruction. Julius Nyerere sums up the reasons: "Even the most successful and popular revolution inevitably leaves behind it a legacy of bitterness, suspicion and hostility between members of the society. These are not conducive to the institutions of equality, and make it difficult to build a spirit of cooperation between the whole people. In particular, there is always a fear that those who suffered during the revolution may be looking for an opportunity of revenge; there is a memory of injury and bereavement deliberately inflicted, which poisons the relations between men within the society. A violent revolution may make the introduction of socialist institutions easier; it makes more difficult the development of the socialist attitudes which give life to these institutions.<sup>5)</sup> A feudal or fascist autocracy, toppled in a civil war — since the mechanisms of a peaceful transfer of power did not exist — may be replaced by a regime which will nationalize the productive capital but which is unlikely to be able to introduce socialist democracy. The dictatorship of reactionaries

<sup>3)</sup> Quoted from *What Now*, The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, 1-2/1975 issue of *Development Dialogue*, p. 9.

<sup>4)</sup> In 1967, out of 60 African parties, 43 opted for socialism in their programmes, (J. Hadži-Vasileva), *Afrika i socijalizam*, IMRP, Beograd, 1973, p. 33. In many cases, however, socialism stood merely as a proxy for nationalism and economic growth.

<sup>5)</sup> J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, Oxford Un. Press., Dar es Salaam, 1968, 1974, pp. 24-25.

is replaced by a dictatorship of revolutionaries, and the latter tends to degenerate into a counterrevolution from within. The history of Soviet power is illuminating in this respect. This is, obviously, not the reason for refraining from fighting the autocracy. But it does demonstrate the vested interests of socialists in a peaceful transfer of power.

Since the transition starts from the existing order, the institutions of that order must be used. Thus, a political party will be indispensable. It will often have to achieve a double task: national liberation and social transformation. For that it must be composed of dedicated political activists. The party needs strict discipline and strong leadership. Consequently, it must be centralized. If the party is driven underground, these conditions apply with even greater force. The type of party which is best suited for the task is the "organization of revolutionaries" as conceived and created by Lenin.<sup>6)</sup>

The party is organized by the revolutionary intelligentsia. The movement it creates has a broad social base. It starts in the city, the springhead of economic progress. In order to succeed, the movement must conquer the countryside. The peasants represent 70—90 per cent of the population and so they are the main revolutionary — or counterrevolutionary — force. When (in capitalism) the peasants own land, they tend to be conservative, loyal to the church and the established authority, and resistant to change. That is generally true for twentieth century West European peasantry, but not for the peasants in the undeveloped countries (nor for European peasants in former centuries). Here the peasants are economically exploited, politically oppressed, saddled with debts, losing their land to the money lender and the landlord. The salesmen and mass media inform them of a different world and the teacher explains to them that their fate can be changed.<sup>7)</sup> As a result, peasants, with the possible exception of a tiny fraction of rich peasants, are ready for revolution. Contemporary revolutions, as different as the Chinese and the Yugoslav ones, demonstrate that very persuasively.<sup>8)</sup>

The working class revolutionary potential is considerably smaller. Workers are few in number, they earn income several times higher than that of the peasants and represent a privileged group in a poor society. Unlike the nineteenth century European workers, the workers in contemporary underdeveloped countries are unionized,<sup>9)</sup> and the unions take care to integrate them into the existing society. While the landless peasant has to attack the ownership of the landlord in order to improve his position, the unionized worker only insists on the proper share in the income of the firm. A socialist party exerting influence on the unions can substantially raise the socialist consciousness of the workers.

<sup>6)</sup> V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done*, 1902, chps. II and IV.

<sup>7)</sup> For 66 countries, the correlation between the proportion of children in primary schools and the frequency of revolution was 0.84 (S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1968, p. 47.)

<sup>8)</sup> In the more passionate language of Frantz Fanon the ideologue of the Algerian revolution, "In the colonial countries the peasants are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays. For him, there is no compromise, no possible coming to terms; colonization and decolonization are simply a question of relative strength." (*The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, New York, 1968, p. 61).

<sup>9)</sup> In the 1950's and 1960's some 37 Asian, African and Latin American countries had larger proportions of unionized labour force than the United States (Huntington, op. cit., p. 284).

The lumpenproletariat consists of poor peasants who moved into the cities and could not find permanent jobs. They live in slums and shanty towns, and in Latin America they may represent more than one-quarter of the urban population. They are poor and deprived but this does not make them, progressive. They are often attracted by conservative leaders. Samuel Huntington quotes four reasons for their lack of radicalism: 1. by leaving the village the migrants feel that they have advanced socially; 2. they bring with them rural values and attitudes such as social deference and political passivity; 3. they are primarily interested in immediate gains in food, jobs and housing which they cannot secure by working against the system, and 4. in the fight for survival they distrust each other, which prevents them from forming organizations.<sup>10)</sup> Although not radical in themselves, the slum dwellers may be radicalized by a popular and determined socialist party.

Mao Tse-tung found in China that artisans, small traders, white-collar employees and professionals represented a "reliable ally" of the revolution.<sup>11)</sup> That is probably more generally true. In Latin America, for instance, the unions of bank employees proved to be radical strongholds. Mao also includes the national bourgeoisie as a temporary ally. Thus, it is only a small oligarchy which opposes national independence and social transformation. It consists of large landowners and wealthy businessmen and politicians acting as the agents of international capital. They have to be removed from the position of power. For that task the party can mobilize the support of virtually the entire population.

Where an appropriate Leninist party does not exist, the task may be accomplished by the army. The army is an organization with strict discipline and singlemindedness of purpose. An enlightened leadership may turn this organization into an instrument of progress. Students and officers are the two most modern groups in the society. If students fail to organize the party, the military officers may take over. By their training, the officers are nationalists. By its function, the army is the most modern section in the society. Consequently, the officers will assail backwardness and corruption and will advocate efficiency and national integration. If they happen to be involved in the socio-political conflicts of the country, they may quickly develop social consciousness, become politicized, challenge the oligarchy and take the lead in political and economic reforms. The counter-insurgency operations in the countryside had awakening effects on the Peruvian military. They acquired a firsthand experience of the appalling conditions of peasant life. The horrible experience of a bloody colonial war induced the Portuguese officers to overthrow the dictatorship. Thousands starving from hunger while the emperor's court continued with its festivities moved the conscience of Ethiopian officers. Even if the officers do not have a programme of social reforms prior to the ascendance to power, the new responsibilities may turn them into socialist reforms. A number of Asian and African military coups passed through that experience.

<sup>10)</sup> Op. cit. pp. 279—80. See also Joan Nelson in B. Ward et al. eds, *The Widening Gap*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1971, pp. 141—43.

<sup>11)</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China*, December, 1939.

## (b) Political Stability

The conquest of political power is the first problem to be solved. The choice of the political system is the next. This choice is predetermined by the need for the system to be stable. As Bertrand Russell remarked a long time ago: "We must... seek first to secure government, even though despotism, and only when government has become habitual can we hope successfully to make it democratic."<sup>1)</sup> Consequently, "the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order."<sup>2)</sup> Though it is possible to have order without liberty, it is impossible to have liberty without order.

An orderly government is not at all an easy task. A democratic government is even more difficult. High labour productivity cannot be achieved overnight; neither can stable political democracy. Both need gradual accumulation; the former requires accumulation of capital, the latter that of political experience. In fact, if anything is a common feature of undeveloped countries, apart from their being poor, it is political instability. In the process their fragile democratic structures are destroyed and then replaced by dictatorships of one kind or another. One of the great achievements of bourgeois development is political democracy. Let us, however, have a quick look at what happened in the larger part of bourgeois Europe a century and a half after the French Revolution. I have in mind the two decades preceding the Second World War.

The interwar political history of Europe consists of military and fascist coups, the continuous sequence of failures of parliamentarism, and the wholesale replacement of democracy by dictatorship in most European countries. In the process, European capitalism produced the following gallery of dictator and dictatorships; in 1919 Admiral Horthy in Hungary; in 1922 Mussolini's march on Rome; in 1923 the murder of Stambolinski in Bulgaria and the overthrow of his government, followed by the military coup of Zvenov in 1933 and of King Boris in 1934. In 1923, General Primo di Rivera established a military directorate in Spain followed, after several years of parliamentary democracy, by a military uprising of the notorious General Franco in 1936. After two attempted military coups in Greece in 1923 and 1925, in 1936 General Metaxas established his dictatorship. In 1926, Marshal Pilsudski engineered his presidential coup in Poland, and after his death in 1935 the dictatorship was continued under the regime of the colonels. In 1927-28, Salazar rose to power in Portugal; in 1929, King Alexander removed the constitution and established his dictatorship in Yugoslavia. It was only in 1933 that Hitler joined the gallery of European dictators. In the same year, Dollfuss assumed power in Austria only to be killed by the Nazis in the next year, 1934, and in 1938 Austria lost its independence through Anschluss. Formally, the last to establish his dictatorship was King Carol of Rumania in 1938; yet, in fact, the Rumanians lived under conditions of political dictatorship throughout the entire period, whatever the name of the party in power. Apart from England and France — which emerged victorious from the war — parliamentary democracy survived al-

<sup>1)</sup> B. Russell, *Power*, Unwin, London, (1938), 1957, pp. 18.

<sup>2)</sup> Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

most without exception only in those countries (Scandinavia and Benelux) where the socialist parties exerted some influence on political life and primitive capitalist impulses were curbed by the state intervention which was about to produce the so-called welfare state. And in Germany, which was defeated in the war, even the socialist influence did not prove sufficient to prevent the catastrophe.

What has just been said is not the whole story. Even the countries in which political democracy survived experienced great political instability. In the period 1919-1933, cabinets lasted between one and two years in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands. French cabinets lasted less than six months in the entire interwar period. No wonder economic development came to a standstill.

The interwar experience of the less developed Europe was repeated in the entire less developed world after the Second World War. In the first three decades, successful coups were engineered in nineteen out of twenty Latin American countries. In other words, all surrendered except Mexico, which could build its political system on the reliable basis of a genuine social revolution. The African and Asian political scenes are hardly different.

The reasons are not difficult to find. Economic development and the ensuring mobility destroyed old values and social structures without necessarily replacing them immediately by new ones. The first national impulse of every ethnic and social group is to pursue its own interests. Political demagogues have a fertile ground for their activities. Disintegrating forces are strong. And so are tensions. The inequality of income distribution is much greater in the city than in the countryside and so industrialization increases the overall inequality. But the population is less prepared to accept this inequality as legitimate. Education increases the aspiration level. But the satisfaction of new wants is underlying. Political participation develops faster than the institutionalization of the political process. It was only around the First World War that the most advanced countries achieved universal suffrage, and that was the result of a century-long development. Nowadays, universal suffrage is taken as a matter of course, but it does not work everywhere as a matter of course. The strains imposed on the polity are simply too great. And so bargaining and liberal arrangements which do not work are replaced by orders and autocratic arrangements which do.

It will not come as a surprise that under such conditions the one-party system best serves the purpose of stability.<sup>3)</sup> If the party in question leads

<sup>3)</sup> Type of political system                      Successful Coups in Modernizing Countries 1945 or Date of Independence through 1966

	Number of countries	Countries with coups	
		Number	Percent
One Party	26	6	25
Dominant Party	18	6	33
Two Parties	16	7	44
Multiparty	20	17	85

No coup succeeded in communist countries. Huntington, *op. cit.* pp. 408 and 423.

the struggle for independence, it will command practically universal popular support, which is a precious political capital with which to start.

It is rather obvious that a one-party system represents both a danger and an opportunity. The former is described by Frantz Fanon, the latter by Julius Nyerere. Fanon points out that "the party plays understudy to the administration and the police, and controls the masses, not in order to make sure that they really participate in the business of governing the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from them obedience and discipline... The incoherent mass of the people is seen as a blind force that must be continually held in check either by mystification or by fear inspired by the police force. The party acts as a barometer and as an information service. The militant is turned into an informer. He is entrusted with punitive expeditions against the villages. The embryo opposition parties are liquidated by beatings and stonings. The opposition candidates see their houses set on fire... In these conditions... the party is unchallenged and 99.99% of the votes are cast for the government candidate".<sup>14)</sup> Such a party, clearly, cannot serve as an instrument of socialist reconstruction.

Nyerere, on the other hand, explores the possibility of making the one-party system more democratic than its rivals. If the dominant party behaves in the traditional way, the leadership will choose the candidates and they will be automatically elected. The people have effectively no choice. "This means that our procedures are, in practice, endangering both democracy and unity; if the people always acquiesce in the... candidate who is submitted to them by the Party machinery, they are losing their effective power over the representative and his actions. If they oppose him, they are in danger of giving sustenance to the enemies of our national unity and bringing into jeopardy the future of the principles which they wish to defend. We have thus come to a position where the maintenance of institutions and procedures which were supposed to safeguard the practice of democracy, and which are appropriate to a multiparty system, in fact eliminates the people's choice of the representative".<sup>15)</sup> The solution was found in establishing a one-party system by law and giving the citizens full opportunity to choose their own candidates. In preliminary elections party delegates at regional conferences screen the list of candidates. The two who received the largest votes become (in principle) candidates for the general election. Their election campaign is financed by the state. They are free to advocate their own ideas but they must not attack certain established values of the society such as national unity, religious, ethnic and racial tolerance and the like.

A one-party system may be misused. It may be turned into Fanon's rather than Nyerere's type of political system. Yet the choice is not between the one-party and the multiparty system. The choice is between a political system dominated by a bourgeois or etatist party and that dominated by a socialist party.

### (c) Economics of Transition

Political stability is one of the basic preconditions for fast and continuous economic growth. Yet it will not lead to growth automatically. In

<sup>14)</sup> F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, New York, 1968, pp. 181—82.  
<sup>15)</sup> J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*, Oxford Un. Press, Dar es Salaam, (1968), 1974, p. 36.

fact, a politically-stable society may have a slowly growing economy. Fast growth requires a purposeful design. However, fast growth generates forces of instability. On the other hand, there is no hope that socialism will be established if economic growth is slow. There seems to be an inherent contradiction in the pursuit of these various objectives. Our task is to explore the possibility of making the objectives consistent and mutually reinforcing.

Growth means industrialization. In a country with peasants comprising 70—90 per cent of the population, industrialization means the transfer of the labour force from agriculture to the urban occupations. Historical experience indicates — with Yugoslavia perhaps keeping the record<sup>16)</sup> — that this transfer can proceed at a rate of up to two per cent annually. Thus, it will take between five and twenty years before the share of the agricultural population is reduced to some 60 per cent and the country enters the industrialization phase of rapid growth.

In the initial phase, at the lowest level of development, growth is likely to be slow. The rate of accumulation is low, 10—15 per cent, while capital-output ratio is high, perhaps even increasing. The industry mix is unfavourable; the slowly expanding agriculture predominates, the fast expanding manufacturing industry participates with only a few percentage points in the gross domestic product. After a while, the basic productive infrastructure has been built and the country reaches what Rudolf Bičanić called the threshold of economic growth.<sup>17)</sup> There are at least four different reasons why economic growth accelerates in the industrialization phase:<sup>18)</sup>

(1) The capital-output ratio decreases, the decrease being faster as the rate of growth increases. In the first two decades of the post-war development of Yugoslavia — to illustrate the order of magnitude — the average capital-output ratio was reduced from 7.5 to 5. Most of this reduction was due to changes in the industry mix: the share of capital-intensive industries declined.

(2) Capital cost per unit of output decreases for yet another and very different reason. In a stationary economy, all investments are used for the replacement of the worn-out capital goods. The faster the rate of growth, the smaller the share of replacement in investment and the lower replacement cost per unit of output. If the rate of growth is 10 per cent per annum, practically all gross investment (more than 95 per cent) is used to generate additional output, and replacement cost per unit of output is reduced to one-seventh of its stationary value. The economy behaves as if capital cost were close to zero.

(3) The growth of global factor productivity seems to be correlated with the growth of factor inputs: The faster the inputs expand, the faster is the growth of combined factor productivity ("technological progress"). The effects seem to be substantial.

<sup>16)</sup> After the revolution, in 1945, the agricultural population represented 75 per cent of the total population in Yugoslavia. By 1971, this per centage was reduced to 36.4 (B. Horvat, *The Yugoslav Economic System*, Int. Arts and Sciences Press, New York, 1976, p. 77).

<sup>17)</sup> R. Bičanić, »Kapitalni koeficijent, tehnički napredak i teorija praga ekonomskog razvoja«, *Ekonomski pregled*, 1961, pp. 251—300.

<sup>18)</sup> B. Horvat, »The Relation between Rate of Growth and Level of Development«, *Journal of Development Studies*, 1974, p. 382—94.

(4) The increase of the share of the easily expanding manufacturing industry increases the investment absorption capacity of the economy. In other words, the economy can absorb more investment productively, the marginal efficiency of investment increases (given the rate of investment), and so the economy can achieve a higher rate of growth.

The four effects (some of them partly overlapping) work in the same direction: the faster an economy grows, the easier it is to accelerate growth even further. In the industrialization phase, the share of investment in gross national product may be raised to 30—40 per cent, in which case the rate of growth will be around 10 per cent per annum.

Not unexpectedly, the most difficult is the very beginning. When agriculture is by far the largest producing sector, economic growth depends primarily on what happens in agriculture. The first step is to carry out a land reform which will eliminate parasitic owners and will give the land to those who wish to till it. Large estates ought to be generally preserved as commercial producers for home and export markets and as nuclei of technological progress. Organizationally, they will be transformed into state or labour-managed farms. Apart from that, the redistribution of land ought to enable all peasant households to become viable producers. Agricultural extension services, the price support arrangements, the provision of marketing facilities which will eliminate exploitative middlemen, a cooperation programme and agricultural credit complete the first set of policy measures.

The first priority is to ensure productive employment of the agricultural labour force which will result in food self-sufficiency and will possibly generate some surpluses. The substantial share of available investment resources will also be used in connection with agriculture. Irrigation and melioration projects will increase the arable area and improve the yields. Investments into plants producing agricultural implements, fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides represent the natural beginnings of industrialization. The emerging purchasing power of formerly subsistence peasant households will provide a mass market for simple consumer goods. The expanding consumer goods industry, together with the industry providing agriculture with capital and intermediate goods, and the building of roads and railways will provide the market for building materials, metallurgical products and other producer goods. The increasing output will have to be accompanied by expanding energy production. Industrialization will gradually gain momentum.

In order to exploit all the growth potentials of the country, central planning machinery will have to be established. Its main instruments are a National Investment Fund and physical allocation of available resources to key projects. Central planning is complemented by regional and local development initiatives utilizing local resources.

If a market economy is to be properly guided and controlled, the government must control financial flows and foreign trade. The latter requires strict general supervision and some system of licencing strategically important import and export flows. The former requires full nationalization of banks and insurance companies.

By contrast, a full-scale nationalization of the productive sector of the economy is not at all necessary. Neither is it feasible. Many of the owners, the national bourgeoisie as they are by Mao, have actively cooperated with the socialist party, possess the otherwise extremely scarce know-how and ought not to be antagonized by nationalization. The buying out of foreign-

-owned corporations requires financial means which the country needs for development purposes. On the other hand, it may be indispensable to nationalize one or two foreign concerns — such as oil fields or copper mines — which are too profitable and too important for the economic independence of the country as to be left outside full national control. For the rest, the parliament may oblige foreign concerns to appoint citizens of the country to managerial positions, it may introduce codetermination in all firms and use the Danish method of formation of wage earner funds which will generate additional investment resources while at the same time quietly socializing the productive capital. The foreign firms could hardly protest since the same process will be taking place in their native countries as well.

Thus, in the initial stage, the economy will consist of several types of productive enterprises. A small number of large firms and manufacturing, mining and transportation firms will be owned by the state. There will be a certain number of producer and consumer cooperatives. The former private estates, not taken over by the state, will be managed by peasants. A number of small labour-managed firms outside agriculture will be spontaneously created by the workers out of the failing private firms. Most of the firms will remain private but socially transformed by means of codetermination and wage earner funds. Family enterprises — peasants in the countryside, artisans and small tradesmen in the city — which are by far the most numerous, complete this chequered initial property structure.

The coexistence of five different ownership sectors makes the task of running the economy extremely complicated and very delicate. The socio-economic equilibrium is obviously very unstable. The aim of economic policy is not to preserve the equilibrium of coexistence but to control the dynamics of change. The preponderant corporate and family-owned private sector will tend to impose capitalist development. If this is checked by repressive measures, etatism is the most likely outcome. The state sector is its property base. The labour-managed sector is not only the smallest but the most fragile. It will take a certain number of years before the peasants learn how to run their farms and the workers learn how to run their firms. In the meantime, their efficiency will not be high. Wages will be lower than in the private and state sectors which will tend to drain the best workers and organizers to the latter two sectors. The building of socialism can survive only if the party organization works well. The "red experts" will be sent to farms and worker firms to help them run their businesses while working and living together with their fellow workers and peasants. Party members will keep codetermination alive in the private firms. And, of course, party members will run the state enterprises.

The dynamics of the system ought to be clear by now. The resources of the National Investment Fund are used primarily to develop old state firms and create new ones. Codetermination is introduced into these firms and helps to check etatist tendencies. Codetermination is gradually extended and develops towards full-fledged worker management. The general manager is appointed by the government and he may be given a restricted veto power, but the rest of the organization is based on labour management. The private sector also develops, and new firms may be established. But the faster the corporate firms grow, the faster they are socialized. Codetermination is also extended and follows, with a lag, the developments in the state sector. Finally, the labour-managed sector expands, is supported

technically and financially and increases its relative efficiency. The three sectors are oriented to converge institutionally towards one single labour-managed economy. In a generation or so, the task may be achieved.

Worker management is an indispensable basis for socialism. It is, however, not yet socialism itself. The other two ingredients are appropriate political institutions and a certain minimum level of economic development or productivity. Assuming that the latter is a limiting factor, let us see what kind of time perspective an underdeveloped country faces. If it starts with the 80 per cent share of agricultural population, it will need about 15 years before the phase of fast industrialization is reached. In the meantime, the output per capita will expand at an average rate of, say, three per cent annually and by the end of the period will have increased by some 60 per cent. If the population increases by 2.5 per year, the total gross national product will have increased by about 120 per cent. In the industrialization phase, the rate of growth may increase to about 7 per cent per capita.<sup>19)</sup> If we can take that a 1939 West European level of economic development makes politically and socially meaningful socialism possible,<sup>20)</sup> with the assumed rate of growth it will take about 30 years to reach this level. Thus, under somewhat favourable conditions the transition to socialism in a poor Asian or African country will take about 45 years. International aid may shorten this interval. The main conclusion one can draw from these tentative calculations is that even for the poorest countries in the world socialism is not a distant and unattainable utopia. Those who initiated the transition process may hope to see it completed.

#### (d) Politics of Transition.

In an undeveloped country primordial loyalties are high and the consensus is low. The possible alternatives are hardly known to the population. The socio-political integration of the country is the only task to be undertaken. Economic and political systems have only to be built. The authority needs legitimacy. In a *laissez-faire* situation, it may take a century of political instability, coups and counter-coups, brutal class conflicts and, perhaps, civil wars before a stable bourgeois political democracy is achieved. Latin America is a case in point. The social costs involved are far too great, the period of time far too long to be tolerated. And the final result falls short of the historical possibilities of our epoch. There is an alternative route available: the creation of a vanguard party. Its main instrument is socialist ideology. Every society has its ideology. The only — though basic — difference is that in this case, the ideology is a product of purposeful design. By socialist ideology I mean a combination of some fundamental human values and a social theory which makes it possible for these values to be realized. Socialist ideology enables the party to create broad movement, to

<sup>19)</sup> Japan achieved 9 per cent.

<sup>20)</sup> I base this assumption primarily on my analysis of the Yugoslav economic and social processes. (Cp. B. Horvat, *An Essay on Yugoslav Society*, IASP, New York, 1969; *The Yugoslav Economic System: The First Labour Managed Economy in the Making*, IASP, New York, 1978). This level of development makes possible full literacy, universal 10-year education, egalitarian income distribution and political democracy. It may be remarked that West European countries have left the 1939 level of development far behind and have not built socialism. The answer is that they were trying to preserve capitalism, not to build socialism. They were not using shortcuts but detours.

bind the community together, to give it the purpose and self-consciousness necessary for socialist reconstruction. Since an ideology cannot be easily changed, once firmly established socialist ideology becomes an automatic controlling force for the activities of successive governments and party leaderships. Psychologists claim that childhood experiences exert a fundamental influence on later adult life. History seems to indicate that the ideology of a successful revolution moulds the consciousness of many later generations.

A socio-political system achieves the overall societal orientation and conflict resolution in four different ways. Loyalty produces identification with the system and the proclaimed goals. Laws regulate the routine behaviour of the citizens. Differences in interests are settled by bargaining. In excess situations, only exceptionally, the political authority uses force. In this sequence, loyalty is crucial because it gives legitimacy to all other procedures. And loyalty is the outcome of the common ideology. If the sequence is reversed, the building of socialism is bound to fail.

In a more technical sense, the initial phase requires strict centralization. Human and material resources are extremely scarce. Economic and political choices are few and simple. The targets are known and the problem to be solved is how to catch up with the more advanced countries as fast as possible. What is needed to succeed are political resources called self-reliance and determination. The obvious strategy is to concentrate those few trained people in the government agencies and let them initiate the process of economic growth and educational-cultural development. Yet, the very moment that the new centralized apparatus begins to work and the system is set in motion, the policy ought to be reversed and a long-run decentralization trend inaugurated. Centralization is a temporary expedient, not a permanent framework. Local and individual initiative work best in a decentralized setting. Socialist arrangements can and ought to make full use of efficiency gains so generated.

It is notorious that economic and political centralization create vested interests and it may be extremely difficult to reverse the trends once the bureaucracy becomes entrenched in its positions. The social planners have at least three safeguards at their disposal. The first is local self-government. Centralization at the national level means centralization of important decisions. This is fully consistent with the local autonomy in day-to-day business. And local self-government, once established, has its own vested interests which will act as a countervailing force.

The second is codetermination. From the very beginning it will be made clear that codetermination is only the first step. Here unions may play an important role. A programme of gradual organizational transformation is worked out and every social plan contains a step further towards self-management. In general, the organizational framework in the transitional period is not a framework of institutions but a framework of change. It is the existence of the ruling vanguard party, consisting of persuaded socialists and dedicated activists, which makes the change easier.

The third safeguard is education. Fast growth requires a rapid increase in educational standards. Socialist ideology insists on education for its own sake. Thus, the two requirements reinforce each other. It is historically known that relatively high educational levels were compatible with political autocracy, with fascism in Germany and Stalinism in the Soviet

20:00	<p>Union But these workers' different social environments. In an environment of worker-management, education reinforces decentralization and decentralization tendencies have earlier mentioned in fact that in underdeveloped countries education has a generally destabilizing effect. In a country building socialism, education works in the direction of proclaimed social goals and therefore has stabilizing effects.</p> <p>The chief danger which an underdeveloped country building socialism faces is the class polarization. Rapid growth generates social stratification. If it proceeds unchecked, after a while socialism will become an empty word. In the countryside, rich peasants will begin to hire their fellow villagers, money lenders will acquire land in exchange for debts and a new landowning class will emerge. This process is, however, relatively easily checked. There is no need to nationalize land or to forbid the purchase of land. All that has to be done is to establish a landholding maximum which is determined by the amount of land an average peasant household can till without permanently hiring outside labour. The land maximum is gradually increased as the application of new technology increases the productivity of labour. This, of course, releases redundant agricultural labour, but industrialization creates new jobs elsewhere. As a result, the distribution of income in the countryside may be made almost ideally egalitarian.<sup>21)</sup></p> <p>In the city, income distribution will be more unequal because of a threatening brain drain. A socialist country cannot close its borders. And if the salaries of highly-educated personnel are too low, they will tend to emigrate. By socializing the managers, worker-management makes them more ready to accept relatively low salaries. The same pressure is transferred upwards to government bureaucracy.</p> <p>Factory owners and bankers do not represent a great social danger because they hardly exist. Besides, banks are nationalized and in factories</p>	15:00	40min	20min	14:00	40min	20min	13:00	40min	20min	12:00	40min	20min	11:00	40min	20min	10:00	40min	20min	9:00										
	<p>pages. And, finally, the mass media must fulfil the function of objective information documented confrontation of various views and social criticism. Admittedly, a formidable list of requirements. But neither impossible nor unknown. If a revolution starts with such a programme, it has a chance to carry it out. Historical failures and deviations that can be pointed at have all been associated with revolutions in which some vital elements of the programme were missing.</p> <p>Once we abandon the laissez-faire approach and opt for a purposeful design of social development, we cannot expect that the goals will be accomplished automatically, by a spontaneous play of social forces. We need a reliable instrument of social steering. This is the vanguard party. Such a party was necessary for a successful struggle for national independence and for the conquest of political power. It was also found necessary for the maintenance of political stability. It is now seen as necessary for socialist reconstruction. Without it, an underdeveloped country cannot hope to build socialism. Thus the theory of the vanguard party plays a crucial role in the theory of the transition period.</p> <p>Akin to other institutions of the transition period, the vanguard party is subject to rapid change. Unlike the traditional political parties, its main purpose is to render itself superfluous as quickly as possible, to destroy itself in order to create a society in which political parties, as power contesting organizations, will disappear. It starts as a Leninist party, develops into an association of political activists and eventually disappears. The party does not have a ready-made formula for socialism which only needs to be put into effect by crushing the resistance of various hostile forces. It is the job of social practice and science — therefrom scientific socialism — to constantly revise, control, improve and reconstruct the socialist theory.</p>																													
18:30	<p>worker-management develops under conditions of gradual socialization. The main source of enrichment in the underdeveloped countries is corruption and the private appropriation of public funds. High government officials receive enormous salaries which may be 200 times higher than the average income in agriculture. Thus, the main social danger comes from the government bureaucrats and political leaders. What can be done to mitigate this danger?</p> <p>It has already been pointed out that a one-party system does not imply the absence of political choice. Each parliamentary seat must be contested. Ministerial posts must be rotated. Government must be separated from the party. Political leaders must refrain from such activities as renting houses or land and exploiting wage labour; they must have no interests, or keep directorships, in the existing private firms.<sup>22)</sup> Salaries of the leading personnel ought to be determined by the parliament and linked to the workers</p>	14:15	Tel:	13:30	Tel:																									
	<p><sup>21)</sup> In Yugoslavia the land maximum is set at 10 hectares. Personal consumption in 1967 per member of peasant household was, for various categories of households, as follows:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="425 1308 739 1388"> <tr> <td>up to 2 ha</td> <td>100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2-3 ha</td> <td>100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3-5 ha</td> <td>94</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5-8 ha</td> <td>97</td> </tr> <tr> <td>more than 8 ha</td> <td>100</td> </tr> </table> <p>Source: B. Horvat, „Jugoslovenska agrarna teorija i politika u posleratnom razdoblju“, Pregled, 74—92, 97—1002, p. 757.</p> <p><sup>22)</sup> This was the position taken by the ruling Tanzanian party in its 1967 Arusha Declaration.</p>	up to 2 ha	100	2-3 ha	100	3-5 ha	94	5-8 ha	97	more than 8 ha	100																			
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herited and acquired systems of evaluations and ideas about ethical and existential components of human life, by personal experience and mode of interpretation of symbolic communication. Even when the objective interests of the individual social groups are not in opposition, it is easy in a heterogeneous society for the possibility of communication to be lost, a condition that may then be exploited in various demagogic ways. This possibility becomes a certainty when the interests are actually contradictory or the groups perceive them as such.

Social behaviour is determined by social character. "For any society to exist — Erich Fromm observes — it must mold the character of its members in such a way that *they want to do that they have to do*; their social function must become and be transformed in them into something that they perform out of an internal need, and not by compulsion".<sup>23)</sup> Social character internalizes external needs and thus orients the physical, intellectual and emotional energy of man in such a way as to satisfy the needs of the given socio-economic system.<sup>24)</sup> In this context it may be useful to distinguish four different character types. We find a *traditionally* — oriented character in the countryside, in those small settlements where everybody knows everybody else, where the level of education is low, contact with the outside world weak, and people still live in primary groups. The development of capitalism generated *individualistic* character. Individuals are isolated ego-oriented and emotionally impoverished creatures. Bureaucratic etatism and the relatively prolonged political monopoly of the leading cadres, with the conformity imposed by the state security forces, leads to the development of the *collectivist* character and the corresponding mentality. Individuals lack independence and personal dignity, personality is dissolved in the collectivity, obedience and conformity are the chief virtues. In this connection three important facts may be observed:

(a) The transition from one value system to another or, more broadly, from one social character to another, does not take place all at once. During that interval there is a period of anomie in which the previous standards have ceased to apply but the new system of standards have not yet taken hold or is not yet developed. These are the very dangerous periods of "the declining social morality" and of "the loss of social discipline". They are periods that are all the more dangerous, the more radical the social transformations. And social transformations are functions of the rate of economic growth.

(b) Evidently, none of the three types of social character can serve as a basis for the construction of a socialist society. We must therefore look for yet another, fourth type of social character, not historically existing (at least not fully developed) but which can and, therefore, must be realized. Unless subject to conscious social control, the haphazard play of autonomous social forces is likely to produce either individualistic or collectivist social character, i.e., either capitalism or etatism.

Social character compatible with socialism may be termed an *associative* character. The associative personality achieves full integration with the community — not in an unconscious, unthinking and hence enforced way, as individuals do in the primary group of undeveloped societies, but as a

<sup>23)</sup> E. Fromm, *Zen budizam i psihoanaliza*, Nolit, Beograd, 1964, p. 229.

<sup>24)</sup> E. Fromm, *Bekstvo od slobode*, Nolit, Beograd, 1964, p. 259.

free, autonomous personality by means of conscious choice made possible by the fundamental conditions of his or her existence. The institution which spontaneously produces the preconditions for the formation of the associative character is undoubtedly self-government in all fields of human activity.

In a sense, social character is only another name for social relations. The associative personality is only another name for the socialist personality. The formation of socialist social relations may be slackened or accelerated. Chaotic development is certainly not the fastest possibility. Development will be accelerated to the degree that society is able to form an avant-garde of associative personalities. Unlike an elite, the avant-garde is not called on to rule, but to act; it is not differentiated from the "mass" but includes the socially most mature individuals from the various clearly-articulated social groups; it relies not on political authority — least of all on the police — but on moral authority. In this sense the moral standards of the party members play a decisive role in realizing its moral-integrative role.

3. *Overcoming political conflicts on the basis of socialism.* If we examine the history of victorious socialist revolutions, we shall find a conspicuous absence of restoration attempts. There are conflicts and fierce ones at that, but the contesting parties do not question socialism, they question the other group's interpretation of socialism. From the defeated worker opposition group in the early postrevolutionary years in the Soviet Union to the arrested group of four, including Mao's widow, in China, the most dangerous conflicts are within the framework of non-capitalist development. The traditional Leninist parties, oriented exclusively to the conquest of power and believing in one single and simple revealed truth, have been poorly prepared to deal with this sort of conflict. Under the complicated conditions of having won the power, formal unity proves to be quite inadequate. Real unity requires full democracy, and democracy implies freedom of dissent. In order to be effective, the party must make it possible for every member to express his opinion and then oblige all members to implement the decision of the majority. This was the original meaning of the principle of democratic centralism — the taking of decisions democratically and their centralized execution — before it degenerated into autocratic power of the leadership. But even in its original meaning, the principle is not sufficient and its degeneration is almost certain. The *minority must not obstruct the action, but no one can force it to renounce its opinion*. Even more, it must have full possibility to raise the issue again at the appropriate time. All innovating groups — including the revolutionary parties themselves — started as minorities. If the party is to survive as a socialist party, the free exchange of ideas, the debate, must never be stopped.<sup>25)</sup>

In order that the party successfully perform its fundamental function, it must be a firm organization of political activists. In order to be firm, it

<sup>25)</sup> What Marx thought of the minority position in the party is shown by his attitude to the German social democratic party congress in Gotha in 1875. He wrote a critique of the proposed programme. The party leadership suppressed it. In the letter of criticism, that he sent to Bracke (May 5, 1875) he stated that he and Engels would disagree with the congress and added: "... it is my duty not to recognize, even by diplomatic silence, a programme that in my conviction is completely unacceptable and demoralizing to the party." Today the Gotha programme is remembered only because of Marx's Critique!

must be genuinely united. In order to be united, it must be deeply democratic. This conclusion leads us to the fourth function.

4. *Building a democratic culture.* An underdeveloped country does not have centuries of peaceful development behind it as a national state in which the democratic culture of the citizens could be formed gradually. Nor can it tolerate the luxury of extending the process of constructing democratic culture over the coming centuries and thereafter. At the same time it is obvious that democracy cannot function if citizens do not use their democratic rights in an appropriate way. There is either an absence of criticism or criticism degenerates into wild, irresponsible attacks.

Opposition to criticism appeared very early in workers' parties. Characteristic in this respect is a reaction by Engels some eighty years ago: "The labour movement is based on the sharpest criticism of existing society. Criticism is its living element; how can it aim at avoiding criticism itself, forbidding debate? Are we to demand free speech for ourselves only to abolish it within our own ranks?"<sup>14)</sup> At the same time, a party, like every bureaucratic organization, necessarily generates resistance to criticism (explaining it by the general interests of the struggle and the danger of the enemy exploiting our weaknesses). This resistance is intensified the more the organization is centralized. This applied to a legal party, such as Engels had in mind, but it applies even more to an illegal party, which by necessity must reduce criticism to a minimum. What happens then is that the habits formed under conditions of illegality are later carried over under conditions that are radically different.

The absence of criticism is usually explained by saying that nobody likes criticism and that persons who are its potential targets try with all their might to prevent it. However, this is only half of the story. Those mighty individuals influence their milieu much less than they themselves are products of that milieu. The milieu itself is undemocratic and therefore does not tolerate different, i.e., deviating behaviour. If a minister of the government is criticized, this will generally be taken as an attack on the regime and on socialism. If the government does not react to the criticism, it will be believed that the person criticized has ended his political career and that the criticism actually came from official sources and is only the announcement of a replacement. In such an environment, individuals are penalized not only when they really criticize but also when they express some unusual idea which differs from the standard stereotypes.

This does not mean that criticism disappears; it is only transformed. It becomes irresponsible or stays behind the scenes or both. If criticism is discouraged in everyday relations among people then people have no chance to get used to it. This becomes the source of fantastic, destructive, unproven and totally irresponsible criticisms of individuals and institutions that come into the open from time to time. Also, intrigues, secret reports and denunciations replace the open democratic struggle of opinions. Instead of reading in the newspapers what the people think, political leaders must engage police informers to find that out.

In a patriarchal milieu, the critical attitude towards government is regarded as a subversion of authority which cannot be tolerated. The patriarchal milieu is not in the habit of evaluating arguments; it is guided exclusive-

ly by personalities. In logic this is known as the fallacy *argumentum ad hominem*. "The lower the level of logical culture and logical discipline of a man's thinking — the Soviet logician Asmus explains — the less able he is to divorce the probative force of an argument from the feelings, sympathies and prejudices it arouses in him..."<sup>15)</sup> Unfortunately, it is not simply matter of a fallacy due to poor logical culture. The real social situation is such that the authority adds to argumentation such a factual and proved-by-experience weight that the logical content acquires only secondary importance.

There is still another aspect to democratic culture: initiative. The patriarchal milieu creates authorities in order to use them. To the same extent to which the bureaucrat desires power, the patriarchal milieu imposes it upon him. It is a closed and consistent system. Under it the citizen does not wish (or does not know how, which comes to the same thing) to make use of his democratic rights. As he once turned to God, he now turns to a "higher instance" for guidance, help and defense. "I am, for example, forced by the environment to exercise power"; journalist S. Djukić reports the secretary of a Yugoslav communal party committee as saying.<sup>16)</sup> And since the government administration is technically not very efficient in a poor country, the conservative citizen is in fact pretty much in the right. In order to put into effect the rights guaranteed by law, interventions are required.

It turns out that the question of criticism and that of self-governing initiative do not reduce merely to "allowing criticism" or "guaranteeing initiative by regulation", although these of course are crucial preconditions. Since we have to deal with a socio-psychological structure cemented by traditions, little will be accomplished by that passive permission. On the other hand, criticism can do great harm in an uncritical milieu. In a milieu not educated to criticism, even the most reasonable criticism may give rise to erroneous interpretations, making the criticism lose its meaning. Socialism is inconceivable in a milieu where the citizens have not learned to make full use of and take complete responsibility for their civic rights. The exercise of civic rights cannot take place in a milieu in which the cult of authority exists, in which there is no criticism. There can be no criticism in a milieu in which the citizens do not exercise their rights. The bureaucratic patriarchal ring can be effectively broken only by a political force that is at least in part outside of it. That force is the vanguard party.

The furtherance of critical attitudes and of self-governing initiative, as the bases for the development of democratic relationships and the education of citizens in the exercise of their political liberties, is one of the most important tasks of the party. The party members will accomplish this task most effectively if they first develop fully a democratic culture in their own ranks.

<sup>14)</sup> Letter to Herson Trier, December, 1889.

<sup>15)</sup> V. F. Asmus, *Logika*, OGIZ, Moskva, 1947, p. 376.

<sup>16)</sup> *Borba*, October 9, 1966, p. 4.

## PRIJELAZ NA SOCIJALIZAM U NERAZVIJENIM ZEMLJAMA

Branko HORVAT

## Sažetak

U vezi s postavljenom temom autor razmatra četiri problema: (a) osvajanje političke vlasti, (b) postizavanje političke stabilnosti, (c) privredni razvoj i (d) izgradnju društveno političkog sistema.

Izgradnja socijalizma je izvanredno težak zadatak i u razvijenim zemljama. U nerazvijenim čini se da je taj zadatak sasvim nemoguć. Čemu onda i pokušavati? Odgovor je, da je pitanje pogrešno postavljeno. Ako se socijalizam ne može izgraditi preko noći, to ne znači da ne postoje različiti putevi od kojih neki vode do socijalizma mnogo brže nego drugi.

Kako prijelaz započinje od postojećeg uređenja, moraju se koristiti postojeće institucije. Prema tome, bit će neophodna politička partija. Ona dobiva dvostruki zadatak: nacionalno oslobođenje i društveni preobražaj. Da bi izvršila taj zadatak, partija mora biti sastavljena od predanih političkih aktivista. Potrebna je striktna disciplina i čvrsto rukovođstvo. Prema tome, partija mora biti centralizirana. Ukoliko partija bude primorana da prijede u ilegalnost, uvedeni uvjeti vrijeđe u pojačanoj mjeri. Tip partije koji najviše odgovara postavljenom zadatku je »organizacija revolucionara«, kako ju je »svojedobno zamislio i stvorio Lenjin.

Nakon osvajanja vlasti potrebno je ostvariti političku stabilnost. Historijsko iskustvo Europe nakon Prvog svjetskog rata pokazuje da nove i nedovoljno razvijene zemlje upadaju u političku nestabilnost i završavaju u diktaturi ove ili one vrste. To se iskustvo poslije Drugog svjetskog rata ponovilo u oslobođenim zemljama Afrike i Azije. Od svih tipova političkih sistema jednopartijski je pokazao uvjerljivo najveću stabilnost. Mjerimo li stabilnost brojem državnih udara, onda je njih bilo dvaput više u dvopartijskim sistemima i gotovo četiri puta više u višepartijskim sistemima. Prema tome, u praksi se izbor ne postavlja između jednopartijskog i višepartijskog sistema, već između sistema u kom dominira buržoaska ili etatistička partija i sistema u kom je dominantna socijalistička partija.

Politička stabilnost je nužan ali ne i dovoljan uvjet za privredni razvoj. Potrebno je još i sistematsko planiranje. Razvoj implicira industrijalizaciju. U nerazvijenoj zemlji seljaci sačinjavaju 70—90 procenata stanovništva, pa industrijalizacija znači transfer radne snage iz poljoprivrede u gradska zanimanja. Maksimalna brzina tog transfera je otprilike dva posto godišnje. U početnoj fazi razvoja stopa rasta je niska iz niza razloga koji se navode u članku. Kad se učešće seljaka smanji na ispod 60%, zemlja prelazi Bičanićev prag razvoja i rast se ubrzava sve do sedam posto godišnje per capita. Uz taj tempo, nerazvijenoj zemlji bit će potrebno oko 30 godina da postigne zapadno-evropsku razinu razvijenosti iz 1940. godine, što se može smatrati ekonomskom osnovicom za izgradnju socijalizma.

Politička centralizacija i centralno planiranje imaju zadatak da mobiliziraju sve ljudske i materijalne resurse u zemlji za iniciranje ubrzanog dugoročnog razvoja. Čim ta dvostruka centralizacija počne davati prve plodove, tj. čim je osnovna institucionalna promjena izvršena i rast se počne ubrzavati, potrebno je započeti s decentralizacijom i u privredi i u politici. To u stvari

znači postepeno uvođenje i razvijanje radničkog samoupravljanja u privredi i društveno-političkog samoupravljanja u ostalim djelatnostima. Na taj način, kad jedanput bude izgrađena materijalna baza, bit će već pripremljena i društveno-institucionalna baza za puni razvoj socijalizma.

Opisani program ima svojih opasnosti. Uvijek postoji mogućnost degeneracije vlasti koja onda onemogućava razvoj samoupravljanja i dovodi do klasične polarizacije. Zato u sistem treba ugraditi regulatore koji će ga štititi od degeneracije.