TOWARDS AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE


Submitted 09/22/2010 
Revisions Received 01/29/2011 

Accepted: 02/28/2011

education policy analysis 
archives 
A peer-reviewed, independent,  
open access, multilingual journal  

 
 Arizona State University

Volume 19  Number 13  10th  of May 2011 ISSN 1068-2341 

School's strategic responses to competition in segregated urban  
areas: Patterns in school locations in Metropolitan Detroit 

Charisse Gulosino 
University of Massachusetts Boston 

Christopher Lubienski 
University of Illinois 

Citation: Gulosino, C., Lubienski, C. (2011) School's strategic responses to competition in 
segregated urban areas: Patterns in school locations in metropolitan detroit. Education Policy Analysis 
Archives, 19 (13). Retrieved [date], from http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/829 
 
Abstract: School choice is intended to leverage competition between schools to produce better 
educational opportunities for disadvantaged students.  Yet we know very little about how 
competition impacts entire populations of schools of different types in distributing educational 
options across segregated social landscapes.  We draw on theories from the literatures on 
institutional environment, organizational behavior, and positioning strategies to investigate how 
different types of schools (public, private, and charters) respond to market competition within 
Metropolitan Detroit's highly competitive and segregated environment.  Mapping illustrates patterns 
of school types that have opened, relocated, and closed relative to socioeconomic and demographic 
neighborhood contexts. Our analysis explores the location incentive of high vacancy rate as proxy 
for affordable spaces suitable for new schools.  Findings suggest that competitive incentives have 
similar effects on different types of organizations.   
Keywords: GIS; mapping; choice; competition. 

Respuestas estratégicas de las escuelas a la competencia en áreas urbanas segregadas: 
Evolución de la localización de las escuelas en el área metropolitana de Detroit 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 2 

Resumen: La libre elección de escuelas tiene la intencionalidad de aprovechar la competencia entre las 
escuelas para obtener mejores oportunidades educativas para estudiantes con desventajas. Sin 
embargo, sabemos muy poco acerca de cómo la competencia impacta poblaciones enteras de escuelas 
de diferentes tipos en la distribución de opciones educativas en espacios sociales segregados. 
Basandonos en las teorías sobre medio ambiente institucional, comportamiento organizacional, y 
estrategias de posicionamiento investigamos cómo los diferentes tipos de escuelas (públicas, privadas y 
charter) responden a la competencia de mercado en el entorno altamente competitivo y segregado del 
área Metropolitana de Detroit. El mapeamiento ilustra los patrones de tipos de escuelas que abrieron, 
se mudaron, y cerraron en relación a los contextos socioeconómicos y demográficos barriales. Nuestro 
análisis explora la noción de incentivo de tasas elevadas de vacancia como una aproximación a la 
existencia de los espacios adecuados para nuevas escuelas. Los resultados sugieren que los incentivos 
competitivos tienen efectos similares en los diferentes tipos de organizaciones. 
Palabras clave: SIG; la cartografía; elección, competencia; orientación. 
 
Respostas estratégicas da Escola à concorrência em áreas urbanas segregados: Padrões na 
localização das escolas na Região Metropolitana de Detroit  
Resumo: A escolha escolar tem como intenção a concorrência entre as escolas para gerar melhores 
oportunidades educacionais para alunos desfavorecidos. No entanto, sabemos muito pouco sobre 
como a competição impacta populações inteiras de escolas de diferentes tipos na distribuição de 
opções educacionais em contextos segregação social. Baseados nas teorias da literatura sobre o 
ambiente institucional, comportamento organizacional e estratégias de posicionamento para 
investigar como os diferentes tipos de escolas (públicas, privadas e “charter”) respondem à 
concorrência no mercado dentro da area Metropolitana de Detroit que é um ambiente altamente 
competitivo e segregado. O mapeamento ilustra os padrões de tipos de escolas que abriram, 
mudaram, e fecharam em relação ao bairro contextos socioeconômicos e demográficos. Nossa 
análise explora o incentivo da localização de taxas altas de vacância de espaços como proxy sobre 
espaços acessível adequados para novas escolas. Os resultados sugerem que os incentivos à 
competitividade têm efeitos similares em diferentes tipos de organizações. 
Palavras-chave: SIG;  mapeamento; escolha;  concorrência. 
 

Introduction 

School choice is one of the most popular school reform movements of the last two decades, 
with efforts such as charter schools, vouchers for private schools, and open-enrollment plans 
providing families with new educational opportunities. Market populists see this as a key step toward 
more equitable distribution of opportunity, since school choices — especially access to the “better” 
and more highly desirable educational options — were previously limited only to those who had the 
financial means to pursue alternatives to their local public schools, including purchasing a home on 
another district (Henig & Sugarman, 1999). Thus, some have argued that school choice is the new 
civil rights issue of our time, since it provides access to more and presumably better educational 
options, particularly for disadvantaged communities (Bennett et al., 1998; Holt, 1999; Will, 2003). 

Furthermore, not only is choice expected to open up access to existing, high quality schools 
for families in need of alternatives, but the competitive effects of choice — as schools compete for 
the choices of consumers — are also expected to generate new and better options for poor families. 
This is thought to happen in two ways. First, pre-existing schools will be forced to improve. They 
will have to adopt more effective educational processes in order to attract and retain students, or risk 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 3 

going “out of business” (Gilder, 1999; Ladner, 2000; Stossel, 2006). Second, in areas underserved by 
appropriate educational options, new schools (or campuses of existing schools) will emerge as 
supply responds to market demand of consumers for higher quality options in different areas 
(Friedman, 1994). If, as education economists have suggested, liberating the supply and demand 
sides will unleash the market forces needed to pressure schools to respond to the needs of 
underserved populations, then we should expect to see a private marketplace of schools offering 
alternatives for families who are the most dissatisfied with the quality of their current schools and 
therefore have the most to gain from different and presumably better educational options. We know 
that competition is shaping incentives for individual schools; for instance, some schools add all-day 
kindergarten to attract families (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999). Others have noted a beneficial impact 
of competition on academic outcomes, as in the comprehensive review by Belfield and Levin (2002) 
on the impact of competition on educational outcomes such as test scores, post-school wages, 
educational expenditures/efficiency, graduation/attainment, and teacher quality (see also Hoxby, 
2002). Yet we know very little about how competition impacts whole populations of public and 
private schools in distributing different educational options across varied, and often segregated, 
social landscapes. This is critical because parents report geographic proximity as a central 
consideration in choosing schools (Henig & MacDonald, 2002; Kleitz, Weiher, Tedin, & Matland, 
2000; Schneider & Buckley, 2002; Witte, 2000). Yet, as with some other choice-driven goods and 
services, competition between schools may cause some organizations to “cherry-pick” clients by 
offering services in some areas, while not in others, exacerbating overall inequalities in proximity to 
preferred options.  

School choice is intended to generate competition between schools largely to leverage new 
and better educational opportunities for students attending failing schools. This notion is a form of 
what Frank (2000) calls “market populism” where competition-based reforms such as charter 
schools and vouchers can provide equitable opportunities for disadvantaged groups (Chubb & Moe, 
1990; Friedman, 1962; e.g., Holt, 1999; McGroarty, 1996). Yet, we do not know how competition 
between schools actually generates and arranges quality options for families across urban areas. 
Specifically, how does choice and the consequent competition amongst schools for those choices 
influence organizational behavior in the education sector in creating options for those disadvantaged 
students most in need of alternatives?   

This paper examines this issue by mapping educational options for families, as different 
types of schools respond to market competition in a racially segregated urban area. It draws from an 
ongoing project on the “Social Geography of School Choice” in examining school and 
organizational strategies in “positioning” themselves and/or their services within a highly 
competitive environment, as we seek to measure the overall impact of these strategies on alternatives 
for disadvantaged students. While the larger project is studying school choice across public, private 
and charter school sectors in metropolitan Detroit, the District of Columbia, and New Orleans, this 
article focuses on physical location of different types of schools (charter schools, the most mobile of 
the three sectors) in and around Detroit — the most racially segregated metropolitan area in the 
nation.  

The dearth of school transportation services in Detroit highlights the importance of 
proximity for parents choosing different options. Therefore, this is a significant issue because the 
distribution of different choice options is directly related to the educational opportunities of various 
communities as defined by both demographic and spatial characteristics. In this study, we frame 
competition in terms of “positioning strategies” — specifically, the opening, moving, and closing of 
different types of schools relative to the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
surrounding neighborhoods. We formulate and operationalize the school’s response to market 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 4 

competition in terms of its physical proximity to neighborhood characteristics and in relation to 
other schools nearby. By mapping the physical location of schools over time vis-à-vis demographic 
and socioeconomic measures of communities, this study determines the extent to which educational 
options are equitably available to disadvantaged students in the Detroit metropolitan area.  

One of the most crucial decisions a start-up school makes is where it will locate. Although 
numerous studies of the locational patterns of nonprofit and for-profit firms have been made, 
location for different types of schools has been less studied. This is unfortunate, because schools 
also need to locate where they will have access to resources (affordable real estate), labor (supply of 
high-quality teachers), and consumers (students). To date, most research on school location has 
examined variables such as the racial and ethnic composition of the school's student population, 
student performance in standardized tests and other observed noncontextual neighborhood 
characteristics. Among those relevant for this analysis, Lubienski, Gulosino and Weitzel (2009) use 
industrial location literature to study the locational patterns of types of schools across local 
education markets. They made the point that geography is important, because different types of 
schools and educational organizations will locate where potential clients (students with particular 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics) are to be found in a metropolitan region. This 
article uses such analysis to spatially relate education providers and needs within a highly segregated 
urban landscape. The use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) techniques illuminates the 
kinds of schools that have opened, relocated, and closed relative to the demographic and 
socioeconomic distributions in neighborhoods, providing the supply-side view of market 
competition since the emergence of choice policies.  

In the section that follows, we offer a brief outline of the policy context, considering the 
equity impetus for choice, and the intended effects as they are expected to reverberate through the 
organizational behavior of schools. Then we present a more complex, alternative theoretical 
framework for understanding likely strategic responses from organizations in competitive education 
markets. In doing this, we draw on theories from the literatures on organizational and locational 
theories as they apply to what we are calling “local education markets.” Next we provide an 
overview of our methodology and data, concentrating on the tools used in a geographic analysis 
such as this. In the penultimate section we lay out the results of the geo-spatial analyses, providing 
descriptive maps to represent the patterns evident in this case. The concluding discussion offers a 
brief overview of the equity implications for employing the profit motive to expand educational 
access. 

Institutional Environment, Organizational Behavior, and Positioning 
Strategies 

While theories and policies endorsing school choice generally assume static consumer-
provider relationships (as supply responds to demand), emerging evidence indicates more dynamic 
interactions between supply and demand, as schools formulate responses not only to other schools, 
but also to differentiated consumers (Lauder et al., 1999; Lubienski, 2005; Taylor, 2002). Although 
market-populists see students as a leveled client-pool for schools to pursue (for the per-pupil 
funding they bring), research indicates that schools competing in uneven social landscapes perceive 
students as differently-valued clients (Fiske & Ladd, 2000; Lacireno-Paquet et al, 2002; Lubienski, 
2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b). Given the difficulties of enhancing organizational effectiveness 
(Rothstein, 2004), schools can improve their market position by adopting “positioning” strategies 
not to produce, but to attract, “better” students.  



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 5 

This analysis draws on organizational and locational theories in outlining possible strategic 
responses for different organization types in competitive environments. Profit-oriented competitors 
introduced into a traditionally non-profit sector give non-profit organizations incentives to behave 
more like for-profits, with firms accounting for costs and profit potential in situating services for 
potential or preferred clients (McCann, 2002; Sinitsyn & Weisbrod, 2003; Smithies, 1941).1

Literal positioning—where schools (especially new ones) locate relative to particular 
student types 

 
Consequent “positional warfare” in sectors such as education (e.g., Kirp, 2003) can take two forms:  

Figurative positioning—how schools position their services in the market, through image 
management, to enhance their relative status 

Both strategies have implications for disadvantaged students’ access to quality educational 
options. However, for the purpose of brevity, we focus here on literal, geographic or physical 
positioning of school options, with particular emphasis on private schools, for-profit charter 
schools, and not-for-profit charter schools.2

The logic of strategic competition typically posits relatively generic patterns of organizational 
behavior, where rivals can quickly copy any market position and the incentives operating within an 
institutional environment shape organizational responses (Porter, 1998). Indeed, there is a strong 
theoretical basis for this logic. Neoinstitutional theory is particularly important in conceptualizing 
organizational responses within broader institutional environments. Theorists hold that formal 
organizational structure is, in varying degrees, a symbolic phenomenon, designed to demonstrate 
legitimacy and rationality rather than simply to achieve efficiency (Meyer, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983; 
Meyer et al., 1981, 1994). This theory has been leveled at education, where neoinstitutionalists argue 
that institutional environments cause educational organizations to become isomorphic — to become 
increasingly similar to one another — largely by shaping societal and professional assumptions about 
the technical core of schooling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978; Peterson, 1990). Especially for new 
entrants entering a strong institutional environment, there is a high priority placed on achieving 
legitimacy to enhance their chances of survival and resource acquisition, particularly in environments 
characterized by risk and uncertainty (Brown, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) — such as in 
emerging education markets.  

 These types of schools, operating in local education 
markets (LEMs), have more freedom of choice to locate in preferred neighborhoods compared to 
regular public schools. As a case in point, charter schools regardless of their organizational 
orientation are often new, and therefore exemplify the advantage of having been recently located in 
particular neighborhoods as a result of conscious decisions by managers and founders, in light of 
local contextual factors.  

However, while this logic is cogent, it is also important to consider the different 
organizational types at play in LEMs and how those types may influence the behavior of education 
organizations in various circumstances. For instance, theorists often distinguish between mission- 
and profit-oriented organizations, which can extend choice and competition in public services such 
as education (Osborne, 1999; Osborne & Gaebler 1992). The question, then, is whether a school’s 
organizational type may distinguish its unique organizational behavior or whether, as incentivist logic 

                                                 
1 An emerging literature focuses on social patterns around school choice in Britain, (Parsons, Chalkley, & 
Jones, 2000; Taylor, 2002), and on charter school location in the US (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999; Cobb & 
Glass, 1999; Glomm, Harris, & Lo, 2001; Henig & MacDonald, 2002). 
2 For analyses of figurative positioning in these and other local education markets, see Lubienski (2005, 
2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b). 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 6 

posits, education organizations will respond to market-like pressures in ways that serve students in 
disadvantaged areas.  

Because of the importance of location in business and real estate analysis, theories used to 
investigate locational decisions are producing useful hypotheses of the distribution of organizations 
relative to market demand (e.g., Smithies, 1941). Strategic factors that influence the locational 
choices of organizations include the need to compete on either low costs or by differentiating their 
products to meet specific client needs. Michael Porter (1998) addresses the role of location in 
competition using competitive advantage theory, arguing that location choice involves rediscovering 
the competitive advantages of high-need neighborhoods as a means of spurring development in 
these areas. To understand the competitive advantage of low-income neighborhoods, Porter (1995, 
1998) notes that organizations build on the advantage of strategic location through local orientation. 
His competitive theory suggests that firms are locally oriented, and neighborhood's customer base 
(local market demand) and cost savings drive location and investment decisions. For example, 
location plays a role in organizational behavior within LEMs, including helping organizations to 
define feasible strategies for competing across different metropolitan areas. Spatial questions of 
location within and across segregated urban areas are particularly salient for more autonomous and 
newly created schools, as in the case of many charter schools, and representative of a crucial option 
for schools in competitive LEMs.  

In view of the institutional structures, incentives, and positioning strategies at play in 
competitive local education markets (LEMs), we can work from the following hypotheses with 
regard to the organizational behavior of LEMs: 

1) As competition emerges, many schools will embrace competitive strategies that provide 
access to students with more preferred demographic characteristics, to enhance the schools’ market 
position.  

2) In these competitive environments, both mission- and profit-oriented organizations will 
adopt positioning strategies associated with for-profit behavior in shaping enrollment.  

In this analysis, competitive pressures exist when multiple, separate providers are located in 
neighborhoods — providing families with different viable options. Regarding the first hypothesis, 
we examine the role of competition in generating and arranging educational options, as different 
types of schools locate themselves in a racially segregated urban area. The studies by Cobb and Glass 
(1999) and Lacireno-Paquet et al. (2002) explored in what ways charter schools are serving different 
demographic groups. The exploratory study by Cobb and Glass presented a significant question: to 
test whether demographic data reflect the racial and ethnic composition of students enrolled in 
charter schools. Lacireno-Paquet et al, on the other hand, provided interesting empirical evidence on 
a useful theoretical distinction between market-oriented and mission-oriented charter schools. These 
studies, however, did not assess where different types of schools locate as a matter of strategy, the 
contextual attributes of school location, as well as the relationship between schools and educational 
opportunities. A study by Henig and MacDonald (2002) examined this issue using statistical 
approaches. Although their study shed some light on political considerations in the distribution of 
equitable opportunity, the lack of geo-spatial analysis limited the ability of the study to consider 
multiple local contextual and competitive factors. Understanding how different types of schools are 
spatially located relative to the socio-demographic characteristics of their neighborhoods, and 
relative to one another, offers some illumination on the appropriate role of market forces in 
supporting the goals of public education. 

To investigate the second proposition, we consider a school’s essence as either a mission or 
profit-oriented entity in shaping its educational options in attracting competitors and clients 
(Weisbrod, 1998; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser, & Henig, 2002). Organizational theory and 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 7 

economic models of industrial organization offer some insights into the dynamics of locational 
behavior. In terms of their orientation to the market, their missions, and their alliances with various 
organizations such as EMOs and social welfare agencies, different types of schools may recognize 
incentives or a calling specifically to address the needs of underserved communities, where current 
educational opportunities are deficient or are inadequate. Mission-oriented charter schools and 
private, parochial schools might seek to operate on behalf of poor families to reduce racial and 
social-class isolation from community to community, to promote a particular value system, or to 
offer quality academic options where few are otherwise available. Profit-oriented schools — those 
with ties to corporate entities and those with private, entrepreneurial ambitions — might avoid 
students in poorer neighborhoods to maximize profits by shirking risks associated with 
disadvantaged communities.  

It is possible that both profit- and mission-oriented schools considering entry into the 
competitive marketplace may sense incentives to avoid localities perceived to be risky, costly, or 
detrimental to the school’s market position. This may indeed be the case in communities where the 
resources available to nonpublic providers are insufficient to seek out a higher proportion of 
“difficult-to-educate” students and to compete with public schools on the basis of cost and quality. 
Thus, the marketplace competition may in fact generate disincentives to increase the aggregate range 
of educational opportunities for students in disadvantaged communities. Indeed, the equity 
consequences of geographic or physical positioning of school options are largely an open question. 
We know little about institutional structures and incentives at play that guide positioning strategies. 
The locational attributes of schools have been a relatively underdeveloped area of research, but 
clearly have a very important role in understanding how the physical location of schools is mediated 
by organizational responses to competitive incentives within social and institutional contexts.  

In regards to the second proposition, we examine the kinds of schools that have opened, 
relocated, and closed relative to the demographic and socioeconomic distributions in Detroit 
neighborhoods, providing a comprehensive picture of the locational aspects of schools in 
competitive local education markets. If a pattern of needs governs the geographic distribution of 
schools, then schools will attend to the needs of underserved communities, where current 
educational options are limited or are unsatisfactory. The existence of a private marketplace of 
schools (i.e., corporate entities, parochial schools, and mission-oriented organizations) calls our 
attention to investments that address the growing disparities in the social conditions of children and 
the continuing negative impact on educational performance of students with limited access to social 
and human capital. Such detailed spatial analyses of local environments are useful for assessing 
whether the competitive marketplace will produce greater incentives to improve options for students 
in economically and racially segregated public schools. 

It is important to note that positioning strategies in competitive local markets are not 
expected to be the sole determinants of school locations in LEMs. A number of other factors may 
influence locations, including: issues of neighborhood stability, differences in public service 
amenities such as public safety or social structures/services, access to high-quality teachers or 
volunteers, unmeasured crime, zoning regulations that prevent schools from operating in certain 
areas or on particular streets, and availability of space on which to build or renovate a school. In 
addition, charter schools may rely on social networks and access specialized commercial space 
(office or industrialized) or multifunctional space near partners, business and community sponsors, 
or funders. Regardless, none of these factors preclude schools from engaging in positioning 
strategies within certain constraints. Unlike traditional public schools, many new and autonomous 
schools are not constrained by geographic boundaries and attendance zones and, if properly 
positioned, may compete for students across multiple neighborhoods. Leveraging these advantages 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 8 

to pursue preferred clients (students) is an appropriate and, in fact, expected response to 
competition in the urban education marketplace. 

The article's geospatial analyses examine the confounding impact of other variables to 
explain the presence of public schools, private schools, and charter schools in disadvantaged 
communities. Specifically, we examine rent levels or real estate costs separately from the level of 
disadvantage as context variables. Although anecdotal reports suggest that charter schools are likely 
to seek lower cost inputs such as cheaper rental space for their operations, few empirical studies 
have attempted to explicate the real estate aspects of school locational decision. Housing vacancy, as 
defined by the US Census, is the measure of unoccupied housing units in 2000. We use the vacancy 
rate as a proxy for demand in the real estate market. Considering the housing vacancy rate in terms 
of supply and demand, high vacancy rates would indicate low demand and thereby resulting in lower 
rents. On the other hand, high rents can be driven by strong demand and, thus, a low vacancy rate. 
This simple supply-demand dynamic can be seen in many metropolitian areas where the 
interconnectedness between housing market and commercial market is exhibited in a symbiotic mix 
of residential and commercial uses, particularly in high-density urban centers such as Detroit. A 
growing body of work has explored the spatial patterns of land use in urban centers in terms of 
mixed-use zoning (i.e., residential and commercial, commercial within residential, housing and non-
housing within the same area, and housing units in close proximity to school sites; Howland & 
Lindsay, 1997; Song & Knapp, 2003). 

The study assumes that housing vacancy can be an important measure to LEMs as it 
provides location incentives for organizations searching for affordable spaces for education. This 
assumption is supported in empirical studies that show residential housing, commercial real estate, 
and school site options within the metropolitan area are affected by a common set of conditions 
such as space utilization, growth in households and employment, and local economic structure 
(Atack & Margo, 1998; Immergluck, 1999; Marzluff et al, 2008). Fluctuations in commercial real 
estate tend to mirror the activity of the housing market (Frew & Wilson, 2002). Similarly, school site 
options in urban areas inherit, by virtue of their close proximity, the market characteristics of 
residential housing units. A study by Gribe (1973) highlights the similarity of markets in housing 
units and school sites in his analysis of the economic influences of well-developed and undeveloped 
elementary school sites that are located in close proximity to residential housing units. Previous 
research also confirms that there is no readily observed explicit real estate market for educational 
spaces, hence certain housing characteristics are useful to capture the less tangible attributes that 
affect the positioning of schools in urban areas (Bogart & Cromwell, 2000). The overall aim of this 
study is to spatially examine the aggregate response of different types of schools to market 
competition in terms of their physical proximity to socioeconomic and demographic neighborhood 
indicators while exploring the location incentive of high vacancy rate as proxy for affordable spaces 
suitable for new schools. 

Research Context 

Detroit represents an illuminating case for studying competition and the distribution of 
education options. Often described as a rusted out and dying industrial city, racially segregated, with 
a poor central-city ringed by a wealthier suburbia. The Detroit Public Schools district (DPS), which 
has been in a state of administrative turmoil for over a decade, has been losing about ten percent of 
its students a year to charter schools and other forms of choice, so that the city — which in the 
1950s had almost two million residents — now has fewer than 100,000 students in DPS, while over 
50,000 attend charter schools in the city or surrounding suburbs. With more locational freedom, 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 9 

charter and open-enrollment options are putting pressure on Michigan’s public schools, as well as 
private schools (Miron & Nelson, 2003). Several Catholic schools in the city have recently closed, 
merged, and/or moved to more affluent suburbs, and as urban public and parochial schools are 
closing, charter schools have opened. Choice reforms there have created a competitive education 
market across public and private sectors in which: (1) charter school policies have encouraged entry 
of new schools into the market, particularly those administered for profit; (2) policies allow students 
to choose schools across district boundaries; (3) those choices bring per-pupil funding; and (4) an 
over-supply of seats forces public and private schools to compete for students and funding.  

Our geographical approach allows us to see aggregate school responses to competition, and, 
therefore, the potential of competition across school sectors for providing equitable educational 
opportunities for disadvantaged students. Moreover, Detroit, the most racially segregated 
metropolitan area in the nation, provides an excellent study site for how competition is arranging 
school options for different students. The Detroit metropolitan area is by the far the largest in 
Michigan, with over three million people in the region and about a third of them within the Detroit 
city limits. African-Americans make up over 85% of the school-age population in the city of Detroit, 
yet a small minority of the student population in most suburbs. 

Methods & Data 

This article uses geo-spatial and content analyses to delineate positioning strategies of 
schools, focusing on educational options for neighborhoods across metropolitan Detroit, the largest 
urban area in one of the leading states for school choice. Geo-spatial or “GIS” (geographic 
information systems/science) methods represent an intriguing approach to questions such as these 
involving data with spatial characteristics. GIS computer mapping programs produce geographic 
“layer” data, allowing researchers to perceive spatial relationships and patterns (Haining, 1990; 
Cobb, 2003). Rather than de-contextualizing data, as with traditional statistical methods, programs 
such as ESRI’s ArcGIS situate school-level data within contextual maps of broader data. While 
relatively new to educational research, GIS is quite established in other fields, and has great potential 
for illuminating some key issues of school policy and reform (Cobb, 2003). Using geo-spatial 
approaches offers an advantage in analyzing data, not only in that it sets data within context, but in 
that it allows researchers to both test hypotheses as well as to discern unanticipated patterns in the 
data that might not be apparent using traditional statistical approaches.  

Data for this study are drawn from multiple sources. First, longitudinal school-level data 
encompassing school location are taken initially from the Common Core of Data (CCD) and the 
Private School Survey from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for Oakland, 
Macomb and Wayne counties in Michigan for the decade following the emergence of charter school 
legislation in Michigan in 1993. These data are then checked against state and other sources, and 
geo-coded to get a match rate of 95% for the 1,934 public, charter and private schools in the K-12 
range in the three-county metropolitan area.3

Orientation as a profit- or mission-driven charter school is a key variable in this analysis. 
Charter schools are classified as mission-driven if they met the following criteria: they are managed 
by an independent or non-profit group such as a community organization, or if they are chartered by 
a local chartering authority. This second criteria is deemed to be an important consideration under 
the logic that local chartering agencies in Michigan (e.g., local or county-level school districts) are not 

  

                                                 
3 Efforts to include a layer of data on individual students are confounded by unreliable data sources from the 
state, due by unsystematic collection methods at the school level, and are therefore not reported here. 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 10 

predisposed to grant a charter to a competitor within their own boundaries; instead, charters 
authorized by these organizations will be granted to non-adversarial schools, typically those serving a 
particular need that supports the mission of the district/chartering authority (for instance, a school 
for students at risk of dropping out of the district’s regular educational programs). Schools are 
classified as profit-oriented if they are managed by one of the several for-profit education 
management organizations (EMO) active in the area. 

Community-level data are drawn from the 2000 US Census tract data SF3 table for Oakland, 
Macomb and Wayne counties. We chose variables that would offer insights into the demographic, 
economic, and social characteristics of neighborhoods, and used the following variables for mapping 
those characteristics: 

percentage population age 0-17 years 
female headed households with children under 18 
unemployed population over 16 not in school or military 
percentage population African American 
percentage population over 25 with less than a high school education 
percentage population with public assistance income 

The percentage values for the above variables are calculated in MS Excel. All tabular data are 
imported into MS Access geodatabases for mapping purposes. Next, we used the following 
shapefiles (from ESRI): Michigan county polygons, Michigan census tract polygons. The software 
used for the maps in this paper is ESRI’s ArcGIS 9.3 ArcMap. For geo-coding by street address, the 
compiled table of all charter school addresses opened by 2003 is mapped. The resultant point 
features for charters include in their attribute table their start date, and type.  

Census tract data are mapped using the census tract polygons. Census socioeconomic 
variables are summed with MS Excel to form a socioeconomic need index at the census tract level. 
Thus, the need index is the unweighted sum of the average percentages for each of the 
socioeconomic need variables at the census tract level. Map 1 shows the polygonal boundaries of 
census tracts shaded by the summed percentage values of socio-economic need or the socio-
economic need indices. The shades of color represent the range from the lowest (light) to the 
highest (dark) need index values. These values are distributed into ten equal interval ranges (light to 
dark) of socio-economic need.  

Maps are an assembled with several layers. One or more are points or polygons representing 
data. School-level data (i.e., charter school orientation as mission- or profit-oriented) are represented 
with different point symbol shapes (circles, triangles). The variables used in geospatial analyses 
include school type (private, public, and charter), charter school organizational/orientation types 
(profit-oriented and mission-oriented) and the location movements of the foregoing school types 
where they opened, moved to, and closed at. Other layers serve as a contextual background such as 
polygon features outlining Detroit area counties. The points representing charter, public, and private 
schools are overlaid on this context map, showing the socioeconomic need indices of their census 
tract locations (see Maps 1-4). These maps are a necessary contextual background for the meaningful 
exploration of the literal positioning of schools vis-à-vis their surrounding neighborhoods and 
nearby schools. For example, profit-oriented and mission-oriented charter schools that opened in 
new locations (herein called new school entrants) are examined within one mile of closed private 
schools. Data for mission-oriented and profit-oriented charter schools that opened, moved, and 
closed are mapped over the spatial layer of socio-economic need indices.     

To capture the quantitative values of socio-economic need index for school locations, the 
overlay technique is taken a step further. The school locations are overlaid on the tract polygon map 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 11 

of socio-economic need indices with each tract’s discrete value. In the process of spatial join, the 
index value for the census tract for each school falls inside is added to the school’s attributes. By a 
similar method, analysis of real estate demand or rent levels is created with census tract attributes of 
the percentage of vacant housing units as the proxy attribute value assigned to the census tracts. 
Table 1 is derived from the analysis of the census need and housing variables for various categories 
of Detroit area schools. 

Results 

The geographic variations of socio-economic and demographic characteristics in charter 
schools within metropolitan Detroit are illustrated in Map 1. When the census tract need indicators 
are added, the result is the base layer shown in Map 1 and the subsequent three maps. As shown in 
Map 1, the overall range of census tract need indices is displayed from low to high in graduated 
shades ranging from .07 to 3.11. Table 1 also describes the socioeconomic need index and real estate 
demand context values for the different types of schools by spatially joining the school location 
points to the census tract in which they are located.  

Table 1 illustrates that private schools that close are more often found in higher-need areas 
(mean need index of 1.08), than privates overall (mean need index of .85) in the Detroit 
metropolitan area between 1995 and 2003. Nearly all of the closed private schools are religious city 
schools. Map 1 shows nine mission-oriented charter schools that opened within one mile of closed 
private schools. Map 2 shows that ten opened profit-oriented charter schools are in closer proximity 
to the locations of closed private schools, suggesting that these charters may be occupying the same 
building once vacated by the privates that shut down. Both maps would suggest that many 
neighborhoods are seeing their tuition-funded private schools replaced by charter schools. As Table 
1 shows, the locations of closed private schools have a mean need index is 1.08 while the mean need 
indices for locations of charter that opened (generally referred to as new school entrants) are, 1.26 
for profit-oriented and 1.90 for mission-oriented charter schools. It appears that the charters 
opening near closed privates are in a lower-need market than the mean for mission- and profit-
oriented charter schools. These results reveal that the closure of some private schools in Detroit is 
giving mission- and profit-oriented charter schools a market opportunity to capture the private 
schools’ share of the education market, to gain the benefit of better prepared students from closed 
privates, and in the case of some profit-oriented benefit from the availability of the private schools’ 
real estate. 

Taken together, the results are consistent with the competition hypothesis espoused earlier, 
that is, many new charter schools will identify locational opportunities that provide access to 
students with preferred socioeconomic and demographic characteristics to enhance the schools’ 
market position. Viewing locations choices as business opportunities connects location decisions to 
competition in the market. Thus, we could interpret the location of mission- and profit-oriented 
charters in proximity to closed private schools as reflecting incentives to use their autonomy to 
respond to a market opportunity — “better” students and enhanced applicant pool from which they 
are required to randomly select students.



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Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 14 

Map 1. Detroit mission-oriented charter school locations relative to closed private schools and socio-
economic need index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Common Core Data (1995-2003) and 2000 US Census 
Bureau, F3 Data.  

 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 15 

Map 2. Detroit profit-oriented charter school locations relative to closed private schools and socio-
economic need index.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Common Core Data (1995-2003) and 2000 US Census 
Bureau, SF3 Data.  

 
 
Maps 3 & 4 analyze the sequence in which both mission-oriented and profit-oriented charter 

schools opened, moved, and closed during a period of rapid expansion from 1995 and 2003 across 
the metropolitan Detroit area.4
                                                
4 Initially we began the analysis by disaggregating not only mission- and profit-oriented schools, but also with 
a sub-category of profit-oriented schools that were authorized by local public universities (the primary 

  Of the 80 profit-oriented charters that opened, a total of twenty-one 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 16 

charters moved once, two charters moved twice, and two charters closed down (Table 1). The 
distribution of charter schools appears to be more-or-less randomly arranged across the 
metropolitan region. The maps show that though there are many more profit-oriented charter 
schools than mission-oriented charter schools, the former are also more dispersed over most need 
levels. Profit-oriented charters show need index values between .07 and 7, suggesting their presence 
both in higher-need areas and lower-need areas. But over time, profit-oriented charter schools as a 
whole appear to be increasingly avoiding areas with more disadvantaged student populations. Map 3 
reveals three profit-oriented charters closed down in high-need areas. The mean need index is 1.26 
for all opened, 1.25 for moved, and 1.78 for closed (Table 1). The black arrows reveal that profit-
oriented charter schools appear to move from higher-need areas to lower-need areas (Map 3).  

The movement of mission-oriented charter schools that opened, moved, or closed is shown 
in Map 4. The analysis of the map summarized in Table 1 suggests that mission-oriented schools 
may be more likely to be located in areas with higher concentrations of high-need populations. 
Indeed, the only charter schools located in the area of higher need (need index values between 1.29 
and 2.5) are mission-oriented. Although they make up 32% of the charter school market share in the 
area (consistent with the state-wide average),5

The breakdown of socioeconomic and demographic variables composing the need index is 
shown in Table 1. Across all variables, mission-oriented charter schools as a whole demonstrate 
greater attention to high-need areas than do profit-oriented charter and private schools. Mission-
oriented charter schools appear to locate in census tracts where 72 percent of the population is 
African-American, compared with profit-oriented charter and private schools that locate where there 
are lower percentages of African Americans (46 and 25 percent, respectively). Mission-oriented 
charter schools appear to gravitate toward census tracts with the highest percentage of children (27 
percent) but also to areas with relati vely greater disadvantage in general, characterized by less-than 
high school education (27 percent), unemployment (7 percent), public assistance income (11 
percent), and single-headed households with children (54 percent). 

 mission-oriented charters have a disproportionately 
higher mean need index than private schools, public schools, and profit-oriented charter schools. In 
the case of mission-oriented charters, the mean need index is 1.90 for all that opened, 1.68 and 2.11 
for those that moved, and 1.69 for those that closed (Table 1). The black arrows reveal that mission-
oriented charter schools appear to move from medium-high (1.29 need index) to higher-need areas 
(2.5). 

Finally, it is useful to consider the locations of school types and their census tract rent levels 
in order to explore the most likely alternative explanation for the patterns we are seeing: the 
availability of affordable physical space for schools. Vacancy rates also serve as a generalized proxy 
for the economic cost of schools moving to a particular location, and examining patterns by school 
type can shed light on how they respond to market incentives. Table 1 summarizes the vacancy rate 
(percent) for Detroit metropolitan area census tracts as a proxy for demand and rent levels in the 
real estate market. The mean vacancy rate in metropolitan Detroit is 5.99%. Profit-oriented charter 
schools appear to locate in higher rent areas (6.88% vacancy) compared to mission-oriented charter 
schools that locate in lower rent areas (10.99%). The former move to rent areas with similar ranges 
of values for higher rent areas (5.58% and 3.65%) and close down in areas with high-rental property 
(4.36%). Private schools, behaving like profit-oriented charters, appear to occupy similar locations 
                                                                                                                                                             
mechanisms for authorization in the state), as opposed to those authorized by public universities in other 
regions of the state. These last two categories were later combined since no noticeable patterns emerged. 
5 This may also represent part of a gradual state-wide decline in authorization of mission-oriented schools. It 
may be that authorizers sought to reduce risk as time went on by authorizing only profit-oriented schools that 
had the backing of management companies, and the private resources they could bring to the table. 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 17 

— that is to say, areas with low vacancy rates indicating higher rental property because of higher 
demand. Private schools open in higher rent areas (5.99% vacancy) and move and close in similar 
range of values for higher rent neighborhoods (5.46% and 5.80%, respectively).  

 
Map 3. Detroit profit-oriented charter school locations relative to socio-economic need index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Common Core Data (1995-2003) and 2000 US Census 
Bureau, SF3 Data.  



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 18 

Map 4. Detroit mission-oriented charter school locations relative to socio-economic need index.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Common Core Data (1995-2003) and 2000 US Census 
Bureau, SF3 Data.  

Roughly the inverse of the above results, the mission-oriented charter schools appear to 
locate in lower rent areas (10.99% vacancy). They also move to similar range of values for lower rent 
areas (17.77% and 9.60%) and close down in areas with particularly low-cost rental property 
(12.03%).  



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 19 

Of note are the financial tradeoffs in considering rent levels or real estate costs in a school 
locational decision. It appears that profit-oriented charter schools and private schools are more 
willing to pay a premium for a good location in areas where they may serve more advantaged 
students. Both profit-oriented charters and private schools are serving areas of low social need (1.26 
and .85 need indices, respectively in Table 1) but paying a higher premium for real estate. In 
contrast, mission-oriented charter schools appear to target needy areas (1.90 need index) in exchange 
for paying a lower premium for real estate.  

On the whole, the results are consistent with the organizational and locational theories 
discussed earlier, that is, profit-oriented and mission-oriented charter schools appear to be adopting 
positioning strategies to gain market advantages — an organizational adaptation to business 
opportunities promoted by the marketplace. The above findings are notable because these charter 
schools are some of the more financially successful profit-oriented charters (EMOs) and mission-
oriented charters, and they appear to be adopting strategies through which they reduce risk by 
utilizing the incentives that arise from choice and competition.  For profit-oriented charter schools, 
key decisions about where to locate appear to be driven by the willingness to pay high real estate 
costs in exchange for “cherry-picking” students in more affluent neighborhoods. While profit-
oriented charters have an equal presence in high-need areas (i.e. locate in need areas with need index 
values from .07 to 2.2 in Map 4), they essentially avoid areas with students who may be most likely 
to damage the school’s market position.  

 On the other hand, the physical locations of mission-oriented charter schools suggest that 
they are driven by business opportunities in areas with disadvantaged socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics and where the cost of real estate is low. Mission-oriented charters, 
however, are more inclined to locate in nearby closed private schools, mostly areas vacated by 
parochial schools. Similar to profit-oriented charter schools, schools that opened in new locations 
(the new school entrants) that are mission-oriented may be less likely to serve some high-need 
populations than other mission-oriented charter schools and traditional public schools that never 
moved. These patterns over time (Maps 3 and 4) suggest that, not only are profit-oriented charter 
schools avoiding areas with more disadvantaged students, but that the increasingly competitive 
climate created through behaviors such as this may also be impacting the locational decisions of 
mission-oriented schools. In other words, the new entrants in the education marketplace may likely 
identify business opportunities that provide access to students with more preferred socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics to enhance the school’s market position. 

Discussion 

Although our study does not allow us to delve into causal factors, the underlying premise for 
charter school locational decisions specified for the analysis is that similar values for nearby features 
(i.e., need indices and vacancy rates) occur because of similar conditions. A limitation of this 
approach is that the data at the census tract level date to 2000. For this reason, although school 
movement data is available over time, in this article it is overlaid on to a statistical “snapshot” of 
selected economic, social, demographic, and geographic census data for the entire Detroit 
metropolitan area. Vacancy rates and property values are not collected over time to coincide with the 
opening, moving, and closing of charter schools in specific locations. Also, with these data, we 
cannot infer strategic motivations for school locational choices. Nonetheless, the census tract-level 
data serve as the best available proxy measures for describing a variety of neighborhood-level 
variables between 1995 and 2003 — a period of rapid expansion of charter schools. The geospatial 
patterns uncovered in this study may have significant implications and should be investigated 
further.  



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 20 

A major challenge to this purely geo-spatial approach is that it assumes that the market 
positioning of different types of schools flows primarily across space, but cannot account for other 
factors (both spatial and a-spatial) that can independently explain the physical patterns of school 
location. For example, considering the unique space requirements of building and operating a 
school, it is entirely logical for new entrants to the school market to search for a vacant school 
building and locate in the physical space of closed private schools. While the analysis cannot rule out 
the possibility that some of the variations in the physical location of schools is attributable to the 
pragmatic features of the physical plant needs, there is still strong reason to suspect that schools 
enjoy advantages (or suffer consequences) from their proximity to the socio-economic profile of 
different neighborhoods. Nevertheless, further research should explore a variety of site, structural, 
and locational attributes such as the commercial or even light-industrial zoned buildings with a range 
of use-group types such as garages, warehouses, retail stores, factories or churches as a possible 
alternative explanation to the literal positioning of schools in emerging educational markets.  

Another important area for future research involves a careful examination of mission-
oriented charter school location behavior. It is plausible to suggest that the spatial arrangement of 
mission charters in high-need areas is not necessarily driven by altruistic motives at the center of 
their organizational behavior, but by other conditions independent of the nonprofit sector response 
to competitive LEMs. Two of several possible explanations are particularly worth exploring in future 
research. First, local school boards may encourage district-chartered schools (i.e., mission-driven) in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods to complement and expand upon other models of alternative 
education or dropout recovery schools. This arrangement is advantageous to high-need districts 
because mission-oriented charters may serve as place-based partners to expand educational 
opportunities for at-risk students while creating a competition-induced “ripple-effect” to other 
traditional public schools. In other words, key policy and instititutional players offer a multi-faceted 
analysis of mission-oriented charters' spatial patterns. Second, further work should concentrate on 
validating our geo-spatial findings by examining the reasons why mission-oriented charters 
(including profit-oriented charters) have chosen to leave one place and move to another, and 
developing an empirical model of the relationship between location choice and organizational 
characteristics.  

Our findings are suggestive of literal positioning and competitive strategies that indicate a 
high level of market acumen among charter schools. We find that most charter schools locate in 
areas where they have a competitive advantage, including the opportunity to target students with 
less-risky socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds. Ultimately, the GIS findings suggest that 
charter schools may most effectively engage in educational markets not by improving educational 
practices, but by locating in areas with preferred student enrollments. Specifically, new charter 
schools may target students in more advantaged neighborhoods where they can maximize business 
opportunities, but avoid neighborhoods of particular demographic mix or socioeconomic 
background. The GIS findings on the whole illustrate the market savvy of charter school operators, 
and once again, raise the importance of locational context in charter schools’ locational decisions.  

While this analysis represents only one part of a larger effort to understand schools’ 
organizational responses to competition, the focus on different types of charter schools illuminates 
some important patterns closely associated with equitable educational access.  

Current themes and future research from this project includes analysis of several important 
factors, including: 

overall arrangement of different types of educational options, including different types of 
district, charter, and private schools 

the types of curricular programs available to different communities 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 21 

internal characteristics of schools, including student demographics and academic 
outcomes 

non-locational strategic responses in areas such as curriculum and marketing 
the nature of different types educational markets. 

Yet the current analysis, despite its limits, points to some interesting implications. It appears 
that efforts to harness the profit motive to promote equitable educational opportunities may not 
only be off target, but may in fact undercut efforts around such goals. While Michigan is somewhat 
unique in the extent to which it encourages the participation of profit-oriented organizations in 
managing charter schools, that unique attribute offers us an interesting case from which to study the 
impact of the profit motive. Organizational theorists have predicted that the introduction of 
competitive incentives can re-shape a sector, often leading to sorting of clients as organizations 
gravitate toward desirable clients, while minimizing risk by avoiding others. Moreover, these 
competitive incentives may be recognized initially more by profit-oriented organizations, which are 
more attuned to such incentive structures. However, as competition advances, mission-oriented 
organizations will also begin to recognize such incentives, and those pressures may also shape their 
behavior as well. The preceding analysis of different types of charter schools in the Detroit 
metropolitan area appears to lend some support to these hypotheses. Furthermore, while others 
have noted a tendency for some charter schools to serve more advantaged students, this analysis 
may illuminate one of the primary mechanisms by which this happens: location.  Further study is 
needed in other contexts in order to determine the extent to which this is the case. A number of 
enhancements may be made to the procedure outlined here and to the geospatial methods adopted 
for its analysis; for example the use of a predictive GIS model for capturing meaningful differences 
in the character of urban neighborhoods that could well have direct impacts on the locational 
decisions of different types of schools. 

Despite the questions that remain regarding the determinants of school locations in local 
education markets, the supply-side response to greater competition via literal positioning is an 
important area of inquiry. The integration of socio-economic and housing vacancy analysis into the 
locational patterns of schools over time affords us a unique view of the changing availability of 
schooling options across a segregated urban area. Our geospatial findings have broad implications 
for current legislative and administrative efforts to fine-tune the current rules governing charter 
school expansion, particularly among coalition of states awarded Race to the Top funds. For charter 
school proponents, this study helps to determine the competitive incentives that govern a school’s 
organizational behavior, much of it targeted to encouraging charter school expansion and growth. 
For those concerned about equity, our findings suggest a need for close monitoring of the 
distributive patterns of enrollment, racial/ethnic and income groups, and the net effect of charter 
school location on neighborhood characteristics. As states continue to pursue aggressive education 
reform through charter schools, policymakers should focus on how market-like incentives may 
influence the aggregate range of educational opportunities available to underserved students and 
communities. 

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School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 25 

About the Authors 

Charisse Gulosino 
University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
Email: Charisse.gulosino@umb.edu 
 
Charisse Gulosino received her doctorate in education from Columbia University and is currently 
an Assistant Professor in the Leadership in Urban Schools Doctoral Program at the University of 
Massachusetts-Boston. Prior to that position, Charisse was a Postdoctoral Research Associate and a 
faculty member of the Alfred Taubman Center for Public Policy and American Institutions at 
Brown University. She currently serves as Chair of the American Educational Research Association 
(AERA) SIG for Charter School Research and Evaluation. 
 
Christopher Lubienski 
University of Illinois 
 
Email: club@illinois.edu 
 
Christopher Lubienski is an Associate Professor of education policy, and a fellow at the Forum on 
the Future of Public Education at the University of Illinois. His current work examines 
organizational responses to competitive conditions in local education markets, including an analysis 
of choice patterns in New Zealand, where he is currently a Fulbright Senior Scholar. After earning a 
PhD in education policy and social analysis at Michigan State University, Lubienski held post-
doctoral fellowships with the National Academy of Education and with the Advanced Studies 
Program at Brown University. Lubienski recently published The Charter School Experiment: 
Expectations, Evidence, and Implications (co-edited with Peter Weitzel, Harvard Education Press). 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 26 

 

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School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 27 

education policy analysis archives 
editorial board  

Editor Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Associate Editors: David R. Garcia & Jeanne M. Powers (Arizona State University) 

 
Jessica Allen University of Colorado, Boulder Christopher Lubienski University of Illinois, 

Urbana-Champaign 
Gary Anderson New York University  Sarah Lubienski University of Illinois, Urbana-

Champaign 
Michael W. Apple University of Wisconsin, 

Madison  
Samuel R. Lucas  University of California, 

Berkeley  
Angela Arzubiaga Arizona State University Maria Martinez-Coslo University of Texas, 

Arlington  
David C. Berliner  Arizona State University  William Mathis University of Colorado, Boulder 
Robert Bickel  Marshall University  Tristan McCowan  Institute of Education, London  
Henry Braun Boston College  Heinrich Mintrop University of California, 

Berkeley  
Eric Camburn  University of Wisconsin, Madison  Michele S. Moses University of Colorado, Boulder 
Wendy C. Chi* University of Colorado, Boulder Julianne Moss  University of Melbourne  
Casey Cobb  University of Connecticut  Sharon Nichols  University of Texas, San Antonio  
Arnold Danzig  Arizona State University  Noga O'Connor University of Iowa  
Antonia Darder  University of Illinois, Urbana-

Champaign 
João Paraskveva  University of Massachusetts, 

Dartmouth  
Linda Darling-Hammond Stanford University  Laurence Parker University of Illinois, Urbana-

Champaign 
Chad d'Entremont Strategies for Children Susan L. Robertson Bristol University 
John Diamond Harvard University  John Rogers University of California, Los Angeles 
Tara Donahue Learning Point Associates  A. G. Rud Purdue University 
Sherman Dorn University of South Florida  Felicia C. Sanders The Pennsylvania State 

University 
Christopher Joseph Frey Bowling Green State 

University  
Janelle Scott University of California, Berkeley  

Melissa Lynn Freeman* Adams State College Kimberly Scott Arizona State University  
Amy Garrett Dikkers University of Minnesota  Dorothy Shipps  Baruch College/CUNY  
Gene V Glass  Arizona State University  Maria Teresa Tatto Michigan State University  
Ronald Glass University of California, Santa Cruz  Larisa Warhol University of Connecticut  
Harvey Goldstein Bristol University  Cally Waite  Social Science Research Council  
Jacob P. K. Gross  Indiana University  John Weathers University of Colorado, Colorado 

Springs  
Eric M. Haas  WestEd  Kevin Welner University of Colorado, Boulder 
Kimberly Joy Howard* University of Southern 

California 
Ed Wiley  University of Colorado, Boulder 

Aimee Howley  Ohio University  Terrence G. Wiley Arizona State University  
Craig Howley  Ohio University  John Willinsky  Stanford University  
Steve Klees  University of Maryland  Kyo Yamashiro  University of California, Los Angeles 
Jaekyung Lee  SUNY Buffalo  * Members of the New Scholars Board 

 
 

 



Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 19 No.13 28 

archivos analíticos de políticas educativas 
consejo editorial 

Editor:  Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Editores. Asociados Alejandro Canales (UNAM) y Jesús Romero Morante  (Universidad de Cantabria) 

 
Armando Alcántara Santuario Instituto de 

Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la 
Educación, UNAM  México 

Fanni Muñoz  Pontificia Universidad Católica de 
Perú 

Claudio Almonacid  Universidad Metropolitana de 
Ciencias de la Educación, Chile 

Imanol Ordorika   Instituto de Investigaciones 
Economicas – UNAM, México 

Pilar Arnaiz Sánchez Universidad de Murcia, 
España 

Maria Cristina Parra Sandoval Universidad de 
Zulia, Venezuela 

Xavier Besalú  Costa Universitat de Girona, España Miguel A. Pereyra Universidad de Granada, España   
Jose Joaquin Brunner  Universidad Diego Portales, 

Chile 
Monica Pini Universidad Nacional de San Martín, 

Argentina 
Damián Canales Sánchez  Instituto Nacional para 

la Evaluación de la Educación, México 
Paula Razquin UNESCO, Francia   

María Caridad García  Universidad Católica del 
Norte, Chile 

Ignacio Rivas Flores Universidad de Málaga, 
España      

Raimundo Cuesta Fernández  IES Fray Luis de 
León, España 

Daniel Schugurensky Universidad de Toronto-
Ontario Institute of Studies in Education, Canadá   

Marco Antonio Delgado Fuentes Universidad 
Iberoamericana, México 

Orlando Pulido Chaves Universidad Pedagógica 
Nacional, Colombia 

Inés Dussel  FLACSO, Argentina José Gregorio Rodríguez Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia   

Rafael Feito Alonso Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid, España 

Miriam Rodríguez Vargas Universidad Autónoma 
de Tamaulipas, México 

Pedro Flores Crespo Universidad Iberoamericana, 
México 

Mario Rueda Beltrán Instituto de Investigaciones 
sobre la Universidad y la Educación, UNAM  
México   

Verónica García Martínez Universidad Juárez 
Autónoma de Tabasco, México 

José Luis San Fabián Maroto Universidad de 
Oviedo, España 

Francisco F. García Pérez Universidad de Sevilla, 
España 

Yengny Marisol Silva Laya Universidad 
Iberoamericana, México 

Edna Luna Serrano  Universidad Autónoma de Baja 
California, México 

Aida Terrón Bañuelos Universidad de Oviedo, 
España 

Alma Maldonado  Departamento de Investigaciones 
Educativas, Centro de Investigación y de 
Estudios Avanzados, México 

Jurjo Torres Santomé Universidad de la Coruña, 
España   

Alejandro Márquez Jiménez Instituto de 
Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la 
Educación, UNAM  México 

Antoni Verger Planells University of Amsterdam, 
Holanda   

José Felipe Martínez Fernández  University of 
California Los Angeles, USA 

Mario Yapu Universidad Para la Investigación 
Estratégica, Bolivia   

 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 29 

arquivos analíticos de políticas educativas 
conselho editorial 

Editor:  Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Editores Associados: Rosa Maria Bueno Fisher e Luis A. Gandin  

(Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul) 
 

 
Dalila Andrade de Oliveira Universidade Federal de 

Minas Gerais, Brasil 
Jefferson Mainardes Universidade Estadual de 

Ponta Grossa, Brasil 
Paulo Carrano Universidade Federal Fluminense, 

Brasil 
Luciano Mendes de Faria Filho Universidade 

Federal de Minas Gerais, Brasil 
Alicia Maria Catalano de Bonamino Pontificia 

Universidade Católica-Rio, Brasil 
Lia Raquel Moreira Oliveira Universidade do 

Minho, Portugal 
Fabiana de Amorim Marcello Universidade 

Luterana do Brasil, Canoas, Brasil 
Belmira Oliveira Bueno Universidade de São Paulo, 

Brasil 
Alexandre Fernandez Vaz Universidade Federal de 

Santa Catarina, Brasil 
António Teodoro Universidade Lusófona, Portugal 

Gaudêncio Frigotto Universidade do Estado do Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasil 

Pia L. Wong California State University Sacramento, 
U.S.A 

Alfredo M Gomes Universidade Federal de 
Pernambuco, Brasil 

Sandra Regina Sales Universidade Federal Rural do 
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil 

Petronilha Beatriz Gonçalves e Silva Universidade 
Federal de São Carlos, Brasil 

Elba Siqueira Sá Barreto Fundação Carlos Chagas, 
Brasil 

Nadja Herman Pontificia Universidade Católica –
Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil 

Manuela Terrasêca Universidade do Porto, Portugal 

José Machado Pais Instituto de Ciências Sociais da 
Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal 

Robert Verhine Universidade Federal da Bahia, 
Brasil 

Wenceslao Machado de Oliveira Jr. Universidade 
Estadual de Campinas, Brasil 

Antônio A. S. Zuin Universidade Federal de São 
Carlos, Brasil 

  
 



School’s Strategic Responses to Competition in Segregated Urban Areas 

Submitted 09/22/2010 
Revisions Received 01/29/2011 

Accepted: 02/28/2011