18 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice abstract this paper examines the concept of human dignity and its relation to justice in the society. it argues that in order to ensure that human dignity is protected and given due recognition, human beings should be treated with respect that is intrinsic to their existence and not simply as a means to an end. the paper establishes the relationship between human dignity and justice. it asserts that dignity and justice are closely linked. the paper then argues that protecting human dignity and according a person his/her dignity are ways of guaranteeing justice. that respect for human dignity brings about the realization of justice for members of the society. keywords: human dignity, justice, person, respect, autonomy. introduction the way in which human beings are treated determines any society. there has been much attention given to the concept of human dignity in recent decades for a number of reasons. one major reason for this relatively recent phenomenon would certainly be the horrors of the 20th century that have occurred on such grand scales. such thinkers as john paul ii, avery, dulles, vaclav havel, immanuel kant, and other have tried to elevate the problem of human dignity (or lack thereof) to the consciousness of the general public. this paper argues that the answer to the problem of human dignity is in exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice | 19 treating all people and the world with the respect that is intrinsic to their existence and not simply as a means to an end. much of the history of ethics is marked with literature on various teleological, deontological, and consequential ethical systems and their superiority or inferiority. the thinkers that are most concerned with the concept of human dignity are attacking ethical systems that dominate modern society. there is a calling back to concepts that have seemingly been lost, forgotten or simply discarded. pope john paul ii is certainly one who has called all christian and non-christians alike to recognize basic truths about the human person that are absolute in every age and culture. such absolute truths about each human person would be that all have a right to life, the right to be free, and the right to be treated back to fundamental truths by the pope resonates to the depths of our being and somehow have come to influence what we experience in the world on a daily basis. the idea of human dignity, he says, is impossible to divorce from this truth.1 in this paper, we shall be discussing the notion of human dignity as a moral concept whereby showing that human dignity should not be used as a means to an end, but an end in itself. we shall start by giving conceptual analysis of what we mean by the human person and the bases of human dignity where human choices play an important role. this will then lead us to the relationship between human dignity and justice. the next ethical theory to be considered in this work is utilitarianism that has reduced the human person to a means and not an end in itself. many philosophers criticized this theory but immanuel kant will be our point of reference. after this, we move on to show why the human dignity is not a means to an end, but an end in itself, and this will serve as our critique. after which we shall have an evaluation and then the conclusion. conceptualizing the human person and dignity: the human person what, then, is the human ego? whatever in man is bodily and mental, physical and psychical, material and spiritual, is referred by the ego to itself: the physical and the psychical represent the whole 20 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 man. the ego therefore is the whole man. body and soul are integrated into one thing, the whole man, the ego. the ego, therefore, “is not the body, not the soul, not the intellect, not the will, not consciousness, not life. all these things “belong” to the ego as constituting ‘the whole man”.2 the ego is a substance. a “substance” “is an individual being whose nature it is to exist in itself and not in another as in a subject. a being whose nature it is to exist, not in itself, but in another as in a subject, is called, in philosophical terminology, an accidents”.3 shapes, color, motion, thought, feelings, etc. are modifications of some ultimate reality; they do not exist in and for themselves, but exist in the substance, which they modify. man, considered as a totality, is a self-contained being with a naturally independent existence of its own; man, therefore, is a ‘substance’ and since the ego is the whole man, the ultimate reality, which possesses everything, pertaining to man’s being. it is evident that the ego is substantial and not merely accidental. the individual has an innate tendency or drive to fulfill its potential. this is termed the actualizing tendency. the actualizing tendency is “holistic in its mechanism, constant in its state and directional in its process”.4 it is a tendency towards autonomy and at the same time is vulnerable to environmental circumstances. the ego (man) is a person. boethius has given us the following definition of a ‘person’ naturae rationalis individual substantia -an individual substance of a rational nature. a ‘person’ is, therefore an individual, complete, subsistent, rational (intellectual) substance. a moment’s consideration will reveal the fact that the human ego, or whole man, is indeed a substance, which is individual and complete and subsistent and rational. consequently, the human ego, or man in his totality is a ‘person’.5 to give a final analysis of the human person we can say that, man synthesizes the sense data, imagines, remembers and performs instinctive actions. man strives for sensuous good, avoids sensuous evil, and experiences various emotions. man forms ideas, judgments, and processes of reasoning. man exercises free will and desires spiritual values. man is conceived, lives and dies. the exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice | 21 immediate principles of functions are powers or faculties, but the ultimate agent is man, the person, the ego.6 any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person, that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will to make choices. indeed, precisely because he is a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and simultaneously from his very nature. basis of human dignity the word dignity is used in different contexts and with different issues. what is human dignity? can it be defined? is dignity an arbitrary cultural construction conditioned by the times and pragmatically tied to preferences for this or that agenda? certainly not, for dignity touches on something more profound. there really is such a thing as human dignity. from a christian perspective, dignity is defined because of god. we are all created in the image of god and that fundamentally is the source of our dignity. for secular societies that presupposition is not accepted. so where do we go in this debate? two major senses in which the term is mostly employed are, firstly, as moral status, in particular, the inalienable right to be treated with basic level of respect and autonomy. secondly, is defined as the “state of being worthy of honour and respect.” it can also be “quality of being worthy or honourable”.7 but the important question of why to respect people, of what to respect about them, remains open. what is to be referred to here is their dignity. insofar as there is a philosophical conventional wisdom on dignity at all, however, it seems badly in error in tracing an individual’s dignity to his capacity for choice. for example, pico della mirandola in his oration on dignity of man set the ball rolling when portraying god as boasting to adam: i have given you, adam, neither a predetermined place nor a particular aspect nor any special prerogatives in order that you may take and possess these through your own decision and choice. i have made you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, 22 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 so that like a free and sovereign artificer you might mold and fashion yourself into that form you yourself have chosen..8 kant, buttressing this ancient link between dignity and autonomy, holds that “a man leads a dignified existence worthy of moral respect because he is self-legislating, overcoming natural necessity and willing his own actions”.9 this analysis largely dominates contemporary discussions of human dignity and the respect for persons it requires. taking a critical look at the phrase ‘respect for person’, benn for example gives capacity for choice a central role: to conceive someone as a person is to see him as actually or potentially a chooser, as one attempting to steer his own course through the world… to respect someone as a person is to concede that one ought to make account of the way in which his enterprise might be affected by one’s own decisions.10 kant’s intention as they may, it has now become commonplace to substitute “capacity for choice” for “dignity”. this makes the injunction to “respect the dignity of people” very close to the injunction to “respect the choices of people”. the point of the former principle was just the opposite, that we should respect people rather than their choices. if the capacity to choose is what we respect about people, the two principles become virtually equivalent. we can all agree with skinner that people without freedom of choice deserve no blame or credit for their performances. to say one is dignified for his freely chosen actions is not how the word is being used. the man who saves drowning children may be ‘heroic’ or ‘virtuous’ but is not necessarily dignified or noble. dignity refers to “what one is rather than what one does”.11 this is to say that we respect people’s choices because we respect people, not the other way round. according thomas hill; a person must, at an absolute minimum, have a right to ‘respect as a person’, which he cannot alienate or waive. he also has a further unqualified claim (a right, if you will) to those social and economic advantages, which are somehow central to his leading a dignified existence.12 exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice | 23 autonomy on the other hand is not an important element of dignity. what is important is indicated by kantian aphorism: “the fact that man can have the idea of an ‘i’ elevates him immeasurably above all other living beings on this earth. this is what makes him a person…”13 man is, at least potentially, a self-conscious being capable of possessing a self-image and self-respect. the fact that man can respect himself provides a reason for us to respect him in turn. what is important here is self-respect and this can be achieved with the aid of others. this is to say that human dignity should be respected at all time. according to spiegelberg, “human dignity is the kind of intrinsic worth which attaches to a human being in his capacity of being a responsible person”. 14 if spiegelberg is referring to one’s capacity for being a morally responsible person, he is offering a very kantian-sounding basis for human dignity. but “respect human dignity is different because the thing to be respected is created by the act of respecting it”.15 the notion of human dignity has not fared well in contemporary moral philosophy. but philosophers on their daily lives can synthesize with migrant workers who complain that: they cannot live with dignity in the squalid, overcrowded shacks provide by their employers. they can admire and respect the dignity of those american indians who refuse to leave their reservations because they do not want to become assimilated into the society that has treated them so shamefully. they can understand why blacks feel it is so important for their children to develop black pride. they can feel indignation at oppression, exploitation, degradation, and injustice in any of their forms. in short, there is a striking lack of parallel between their philosophical and their practical concern for human dignity.16 it is not entirely clear why this is so. for some, the notion of human dignity may seem too unempirical to withstand philosophical analysis. for others it may conjure up theological specters or the rigorism of kant. but before we move on with the connection between human dignity and justice, we need to know what justice is or the sense it is being used. what pritchard has in mind resembled john rawl’s ideas of ‘the sense of justice’ . rawls paraphrased rousseau saying: “: the 24 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 sense of justice is no mere moral conception formed by the understanding alone, but a true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason.”17 . rawl’s point is that a reasonably well-developed sense of justice involves more than an ability to discuss matters of justice intelligently. there must also be a genuine concern to do what is just and fair. to have a sense of dignity includes concern to achieve and maintain various forms of integrity, as well as attitude of selfrespect, self-esteem, pride, shame, resentment and indignation. therefore, whoever tries to formulate substantial principle of justice should reserve a prominent place for human dignity. if this is not done, the moral aspect of dignity will be absent; and the claims of justice will be best legalistic and at worst arbitrary. the connection of justice and dignity it should be clear to us that one has dignity merely by virtue of being a person that is by virtue of having self-consciousness. at this point the notion of justice and dignity can be brought into relationship with each other. there are some people with broken spirit and consequently have been unable to maintain their sense of dignity. for example, a slave sees himself as inferior to his master. it can be seen that such feeling of inferiority has a serious effect on one’s sense of justice. this inferiority complex will not let the slave feel the injustices done to him. what we are saying in effect here is that the lower a person’s regard for his worth, or dignity, is the less sensitive he will be to injustices done to him. to imagine someone wholly lacking a sense of his own dignity is to imagine someone who regards nothing as an injustice to him. apart from slavery, there are various forms of oppression that can impoverish one’s selfesteem and his sense of justice. we have things like “housing and employment discrimination; being born in poverty; being a black child in a white man’s world of television heroes and advertising”.18 aside from the injustices done to an individual, the notion of dignity also enters into the concern that one not being an agent of injustice. there are ways those with a sense of justice can show regard for the dignity of others. one’s genuine conviction that others are entitled to fair treatment in itself sows that he regards others as exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice | 25 having dignity, as being worthy of respect. taking positive steps to promote justice for others (and prevent injustice) can indicate respect for their dignity. at this point a parallel can be drawn about one’s sense of justice and the regard he has for his own dignity. the lower one’s regard is for dignity of another; the less sensitive one will be to injustices done to him. if one has no regard or whatsoever for the dignity of another, regarding him as at best an instrument or means to some end, he will not regard anything as an injustice to him. considering the familiar and seemingly unchallengeable maxim of justice, “treat equals equally” can further illuminate the connection between justice and dignity. this maxim applied only to persons and not things. but what is so special about persons that such a maxim applies to them? here, some people try to compare persons to machines, but they are different. for example, when persons talk about fair wages, machines cannot say the same thing. also, a person has the right to complain if he is underpaid, and to talk of the injustice being done to him. but what is the reason for this acknowledgement? is it that persons, unlike machines, have certain basic trights? this may be true, but what makes it true? as long as an employer regards his employee only as rather complicated means to ends, it will seem perfectly arbitrary to insist that persons, but not machines, have such rights. if people think of themselves as having only instrumental values, they will not know when their dignity is being infringed upon. thus, “it is one’s sense of his intrinsic worth, or dignity, that is the basis of his moral demand for just treatment”.19 even if it is conceded that having a sense of justice involves having a sense of dignity, one might still wish to know that relevance, if any having a sense of justice has to actually having dignity. john rawls makes a very strong claim in this regard: one may hold that the sense of justice is a necessary part of the dignity of the person, and that it is this dignity ,which puts a value upon the person distinct from and logically prior to his capacity for enjoyment and his ability to contribute to the enjoyment of others through the development of his talents.20 26 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 what rawls is trying to say here is that someone with a sense of justice is to some extent willing to view his practical problems from a standpoint that can be shared by others, in that he takes into consideration the interest of others as well as his own. insofar as he is willing to show others the respect he desires others to have for him, he has moral worth, or dignity. the problem with this view is that it requires one to have a sense of justice in order to be viewed as having dignity. but the most to be required is that one has a capacity for developing a sense of justice. rather than an appeal to the capacity for a sense of justice, pritchard prefer to appeal to the capacity for developing a sense of dignity as a basis for attributing dignity to persons. now we move on to the next ethical theory known as utilitarianism utilitarianism is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of ethics and was really founded and developed in the late 19th century. the conventional person associated with this ethical theory is john stuart mill. utilitarianism, as a moral theory that bases the morality of action on their consequences, is that “we ought to act in accordance with the greatest happiness principle”21 we can perhaps best indicate this by listing the various steps in mill’s argument: “firstly, people ought to do what produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number (the utility or greatest happiness principle). secondly, we can discover what produces happiness by examining what people in fact do to bring happiness. therefore, people ought to do what they in fact do”.22 this position was strongly criticized by many philosophers. the philosophical concept of a categorical imperative is central to the moral philosophy of immanuel kant. in his philosophy, it denotes an absolute, unconditional requirement that allows no exceptions, and is both required and justified as an end in itself, not as a means to some other end; the opposite of a hypothetical imperative. what is hypothetical imperative? a hypothetical imperative, in the philosophy of immanuel kant, is a command that applies only conditionally: if a, then b, where a is a condition or goal, and b is an action. for example, if you wish to remain healthy, then you should not eat spoiled food. thus, a exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice | 27 hypothetical imperative is not justified in itself, but as a means to an end; whether it is in force as a command depends on whether the end it helps attain is desired (or required). the opposite of a hypothetical imperative is a categorical imperative, which is unconditional and an end in itself.23 from kant’s point of view, utilitarianism would be based on hypothetical imperatives, but he does not think that morality could be based on assessment of consequences. the kind of command kant thought proper for morality was the categorical imperative. there is one thing, and one thing only, kant thought, that is, the proper end of actions, and that is to treat humanity whether your own or that of another person always as an end in itself. we should never use another person merely as a means but should treat everyone as worthy of respect and dignity.24 to treat people with respect and as an end can pass for a universal law as against the utilitarian principle. the main basis of a categorical imperative is that “we must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. the formular of the categorical imperative is to act so that the maxim can be applied as a universal law. one must act on the maxim of the action as if it were a universal law of nature. the principle that determines the action is not based on the goal of the action but on the ability of the maxim to be universal. evaluation at this point it might seem tempting to say that it is one thing to treat persons as if they had dignity and another to be committed to the view that persons actually have dignity. however, aside from the air of perversity such a stance has, it seems to over intellectualize what it is to treat a person as if he has dignity. is it genuine or only feigned indignation that one is to feel in behalf of injustices done to others? is it that one only says, but does not feel, that certain ways of treating others are degrading? does one only say, but does not really believe that others should not be treated as mere means to another’s ends? and what of oneself? how is one’s own resentment, indignation, shame, self-esteem, and self-respect to be understood? if these attitudes show that one does not genuinely feel that he has dignity, 28 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 consistency and sensitivity, how should they lead him to feel similarly about others? aside from all these, the claims about the connection between dignity and justice are right, to challenge the reasonableness of our concern for justice. having a sense of dignity is not merely contingently connected with those attitudes and feelings that express our sense of justice. rather, indignation, resentment, remorse, guilt and shame are themselves expressions of our concern for human dignity. finally, vaclav havel has argued that the attempt of those (mostly scientists) who wish to dominate the world by science and therefore not respecting nature as created by god has dangerous consequences. this attitude of taking nature personal can lead to the destruction of societies. havel points in particular to totalitarian political systems as being the best examples of what happens when this logic is followed to its ethically absurd conclusion because all things are subjected to the end of utility including freedom, life and human dignity. the only way havel sees out of this dilemma of the radical degradation of human dignity in the modern world is to go back to being human again. he puts it saying that, we must not be ashamed that we are capable of love, friendship, solidarity, sympathy, and tolerance, but just the opposite: we must set these fundamental dimensions of our humanity free from their ‘private’ exile and accept them as the only genuine starting point of meaningful human community. jean bethke elshtain buttressed this point on human dignity by looking at it from the social teaching of the cathoolic church. it started with ditgnitatis hunanae which begins by proclaiming “the dignity of human person” and goes on to insist that dignity involves “enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motivated by a sense of duty”. duty and the rightful exercise of rights cannot be served one from the other. conclusion the only suitable conclusion to the crisis concerning human dignity is to be convinced that human beings are not to be treated as a means exploring the nexus between human dignity and justice | 29 to whatever end we determine, be it pleasure or anything else. totalitarian governmental structure reduces the individual to what he can produce to help the economy, as do extreme forms of materialism. ones worth dignity or dignity is therefore determined by what he can produce. what about the child? what about the unborn? indeed, havel, pope john paul ii, and others have attempted to awake in the minds and hearts of everyone this inner conviction that there is more to life than simply the natural, seen world and its allurements. i think that peter singer has done this with regard to utilitarian ethical systems. singer has taken the arguments of john stuart mill to a conclusion that is not easily accepted. the initial shock and uneasiness that often accompanies singer’s conclusion should cause us to wonder what an alternative is to using human dignity as a means. our human nature will not allow such blatant attacks on human dignity to continue. it is the hope of thinkers that see these injustices that the world will recognize that true freedom includes every human being and treating each one with the dignity and respect that is intrinsic to their very existence as a person. endnotes 1. a dulles, ‘truth as the ground of freedom: a theme from john paul the ii’, in a recent encyclical veritatis splendor, 1993. 2. c.n. bittle, “the human person: a study and critique”, an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 1995, 106. 3. ibid. 4. t. abdulezer, “the actualizing tendency: the foundation block”’ journal of social behaviour and personality, 1997, 1. 5. c.n. bittle, the human person: a study and critique”, an international journal of social political and legal philosophy, 1995, 106. 6. ibid. 7. j. a. simpson and e. weiner, eds. the oxford english dictionary, 2nd ed., oxford: oxford university press, 1989. 8. r. e. goodin, ‘the political theories of choice and dignity’; american philosophical quarterly, vol. 18, 1981, 95. 9. ibid. 10. ibid. 11. ibid.96. 12. t.e. hill, ‘servility and self-respect’, monist, vol. 57, 1973, 87. 13. kant, anthropology, quoted in spiegelberg, “human dignity”, 60. 30 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 14. m.s. prichard, ‘human dignity and justice’, ethics, u.s.a.: western michigan university, 1971, 306. 15. r.e. goodin, op. cit., 97. 16. m. s. pritchard op. cit., 299. 17. ibid., 300. 18. ibid., 307. 19. ibid.,310. 20. ibid.,310. 21. d. stewarts and h.g. blocker, fundamental of philosophy 2nd ed. new york: macmillan publishing company,1987, 322. 22. ibid..323. 23. m. martin, a utilitarian kantian principles, philosophical studies indianapolis: hackett, 1970, 90. 24. d. stewarts and h.g. blocker, fundamental of philosophy 2nd ed. (new york: macmillan publishing company, 1987, 331. introduction and problem as earlier pointed out in my book entitled, the idea of spirit in african philosophy, “the life experiences of african people are multidimensional and multifaceted, revealing and manifesting the nature of reality to african people in their own peculiar way. while many experiences are readily comprehensible some others may seem inexplicable, 1particularly to non africans.” in the book, we paid particular attention to one of those seemingly inexplicable experiences of spirits and world of spirits in african philosophy. we shall endeavor in this paper to focus on one of those apparent and controvertible problems of our time that bothers on human and national security challenges that has caught the attention of all concerned citizens of the world today. and as one whose area of special interest, is integral development of the human person, and knowing fully well that there cannot be meaningful development without security, one cannot close his eyes and ears to the national quest for immediate remedies to our security quagmire. 153 nigeria's national and human security problematic as a crisis of values: a philosophical reflection gregory e. ogbenika this paper studies in a conversational manner some key elements of the human and national security problem facing nigeria. it seems imperative that we intensify the process of expanding the depth and scope of our national dialogues so as to stem the tide of violence, frustration, chaos, disunity, intolerance and needless fear that appears to have taken over the society. on this particular occasion we could have a dialogue on the reasons why nigeria faces a serious problem of insecurity, violence, fear, instability, conflicts, inequity and social disorder. we may argue that the fundamental problems confronting nigeria's nation-state project have not altered significantly in the past decades. the disorder can be summarized in the inability to tackle the basic problems of unity, security and social justice at the personal and institutional levels within the dynamics of the state. the security problem in nigeria is easily seen in the inability of the nigerian government and the country at large, to ensure the protection of its core values; its territories, infrastructure, officials, citizens, laws and institutions. this has ensured that the various governments and the state agencies have been unable to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well being of the generality of the citizens. scholars have aptly captured the essentials of the security challenge facing nigeria. for instance, philip ujomu argues that the problem of security in the nigerian nationstate is seen in the fact that the idea of security was reduced to the personal security of the ruler and that of his immediate 2supporters. the security calculus of the nigerian state failed because it was over militarized and there were conflicts of interest, undue competition and overlap of functions as well as a crisis of professionalism among the security forces. the nigerian security paradigm did not securitize and include vital aspects of social existence in a multi-ethnic society such as social justice which correlates especially institutionalized dialogue, equity in resource distribution, anti-corruption and the provision of basic social amenities. the security problem is linked to a crisis in the system of values given that the statist militarist paradigm of nigerian security gives so much room to the proliferation of military and militia forces and the use of brute physical force and psychological intimidation as a first choice in managing any conflict. so the statistcorporatist 154 paradigm or value system is a combination of values such as fear, force, violence, corruption, insensitivity, lack of social 3 justice and inequity as directing principles of the society. the deficits in these critical areas have triggered feelings of neglect and abandonment by the bulk of the citizens hence creating alienated consciousness as a core value. what are values? why are values important to human existence? the problem of value has been well discussed in the domain of economics, politics and philosophy with special reference to ethics and aesthetics which some philosophers have called axiology. “axiology is the branch of practical 4philosophy which studies the nature of value in general.” put simply, value is a word that covers the whole gamut of aspects such as interest, importance, desire, choice, norms and so on. the issue of “the nature of value is one of the central and most 5persistent problems of human existence.” value concerns the worth of something and the way we come to attain that worth, valuation is based on the decided weighted cost-benefit of the placement of a price or primacy on something as important, desirable or interesting. in either of these ways the concrete concern is to discover how people can live in peaceful cooperation, obedience to laws, and amenability to organization and loyalty to the state. we can understand the nature of values better when we realize that every society sets for itself “an ideal form of life or an image which it seeks to attain and to which it constantly refers to in the process of 6 going through life. more importantly, values form the basis of all cultural life, the foundation of all cognition and the 7categorical structure of the human consciousness.” to capture the essence of the notion of value, perry affirms that a thing or anything has value when it is the object of an interest, which is a train of events determined by an expectation of its 8outcome. singer, on his part, adds an extra dimension to the conceptual analysis of values when he suggests that a “person's values are what the person regards as or thinks 9 important.” the same is applicable to the society insofar as a society's values are what it considers important. according to 10ackermann. “values must, then, be considered in intimate connection with what could be called the “collective interests 155 of the very social groups that hold them.” if values are intended to make life meaningful and worthwhile, then it means that there is a need to zero in on the human person as 11 the creator and carrier of values. according to koch values always involve some references to the human person, and thus are concerned with human ends. values are understood in terms of features such as “human needs, instincts, powers to act, the natural environment, and the surrounding peoples 12and cultures.” as dewey says every adult has acquired in the course of his experience and education certain measures of 13 the worth of various sorts of experience. he has learned to look upon qualities like honesty, amiability, perseverance, loyalty as moral goods. for munker, the core values of social responsibility, caring for others are other dominant values that can make a difference in the human search for a better 14 existential situation. a value system is a combination of values that come together to form a holistic way of life. for instance, capitalism is a value system built around the values of profit, exploitation of natural and human resources, private ownership, use of surplus labour dividends and other elements. deficits in corporate values as threats to collective security in nigeria security has to do with freedom from danger or peace and tranquility. yet every human being or human system faces danger from real and potential events as well as threats. national security focuses on the classical view of protecting the country or state: its territory, assets, government, etc. sometimes national security attempts to protect these values but does not succeed in protecting the population and other subsidiary interests hence there is a conflict because the actions of a government can threaten its own population or even the interests of neighboring states. hence there could be internal or external intervention. one important realm of the manifestation of the problem of national security has been the generally overlooked, but extremely important aspect of values. it is interesting to note that insecurity in nigeria manifests in the form of competing values, beliefs and attitudes. thus, central to the problem of national security in nigeria has been that 156 situation in which there existed a fundamental conflict of personal and social values among various interests and groups with regard to the proper meaning of, and the proper approach to national security, national integration, peace and stability within the polity. this conflict of values and the various abuses and injustices arising from it, ensured that there were no clearly defined and established rules for harmonizing the diverse interests, needs and values of the different groups and sectors in the society in view of achieving the urgent task of national development and the sustenance of security, peace and prosperity in the country. in short, the lack of shared beliefs, attitudes and values among the rulers and the ruled, as well as between the various segments of the nigerian society ensured that conflicts remained endemic in the nation. recent comments on the pervasive insecurity and disorder in nigeria are frightening. in tracking the fundamental, perennial levity, laxity, aversion and indifference of the nigerian state to social justice and development we note the local contexts of the incapability and lack of power of the state to eradicate poverty, corruption, ineptness, authoritarianism, abuse of human rights, tribalistic 15exclusiveness dictatorship, poor public service delivery, unreliable courts, unreliable transport and power, inefficient 16 education, health. according to the center for constitutionalism and demilitarization 2012 annual report (cencod annual report) “the harsh economic policies foisted on the people by the ruling elites underpin the rising social violence in the country and were accountable for the upsurge of violence and violations recorded. the boko haram sect insurgent activities increased. the northern half of the country became a battle front with waves of suicide bombing and killing of innocent citizens culminating in the total collapse of governance and institutions of government in the affected 17states.” all of these constitute a threat to national survival. in nigeria in the last couple of years crime and criminality have reached a crescendo. the combined activities of armed robbers, hired assassins, arsonists, political thugs and abductors have unleashed terror on the civil populace, 18 making life extremely unbearable.” 157 vulnerability and marginality in the postcolonial nigerian state insecurity and disorder are simply the real consequences of alienated consciousness. the threats to national security arising thereof, indicate that nigeria, as it exists, may not have fully articulated the conditions for establishing a truly humane and progressive society. the reality of a system lacking in enduring principles of trust, social justice and moral action, which can promote genuine social reconciliation, suggests that nigeria remains a terrain of conflicting identities after decades of independence. the state remains a battleground where individuals fight for whatever resource or power they can capture. this situation is worrisome because the long period of co-existence among various groupings has not yielded genuine mutual respect, understanding and common purpose. this is a significant pointer to the potential continuation of insecurity in the 19country. we should note that certain levels of marginality are now beyond the merely ethnic factor. the insecurity of the ordinary peoples is seen in their marginality, which makes them highly vulnerable to various forms of vulnerability. the marginal peoples include the aged and neglected pensioners, the handicapped persons and poor people who have no hope of justice, the unemployed educated and uneducated youth, some of the ethnic minority groups especially of the southern niger delta of nigeria and even those ravaged by religious violence and terrorism in the north, among others. the fact is that these peoples are usually disadvantaged, exploited and oppressed and their lives are associated with hardship. evidence of the defeat of national consciousness is seen in the increasing attacks on national leaders and citizens by violent mobs, armed robbers and other criminals. gaps in nigeria's good governance and human security policy as inadequacies of the state the nigerian state could not meet the social, economic, as well as the military conditions of national security. the failure of the state and security organs to maintain national security in the country can be seen in the 158 inefficiency of the police force and its abysmal failure to maintain law and order and provide security for the citizens continues to create a vacuum that is being filled by auxiliary ethnic militia, vigilante groups and militant civil society vanguards. the state has employed its repressive instruments, especially the army and the police, in order to regulate and regiment the political, social and economic freedom and space for the other subordinate groups in the society. gaps in the establishment of good governance and security reform mechanisms have opened the floodgates to terrorists, armed robbers, assassins and kidnappers, ethnic militia groups, as well as the invading rebel forces from neighboring countries to the north of nigeria to perpetrate their acts. central to the crisis of security confronting the nation has been the general trend towards the misconception of the foundations of security. this has led to difficulties. the most pronounced is the deterioration of the quality of human personal and social life in nigeria. the reality of alienated consciousness and the threats to national security arising thereof, indicate that nigeria, as it exists, may not have fully articulated the conditions for establishing a truly humane and progressive society. the reality of a system lacking in enduring principles of social justice and moral action, which can promote genuine social reconciliation, suggests that nigeria remains a terrain of conflicting identities after decades of independence. the state remains a battleground where individuals fight for whatever resource or power they can capture. this situation is worrisome because the long period of co-existence among various groupings has not yielded genuine mutual respect, understanding and common purpose. shortfalls in trust and tolerance and the role of social capital in the quest for security the lack of trust between the rulers and the ruled in nigeria ensured that there was an obstruction of national development at all levels of social existence. furthermore, we can say that the absence or lack of operation of some core social values such as trust, cooperation, compassion, justice, tolerance, etc, among the different interests and segments in the society, ensured that the country achieved little or no 159 sustainable development and that the various levels of national government could not effectively and responsibly manage the nation's resources for the overall security, peace, prosperity and well being of all. t h e r o l e o f r e l i g i o n i n n i g e r i a ' s development and the challenge of terrorism at another level, religion is a powerful tool for fostering peace and corporate existence among the members of the society. but with reference to most parts of africa, the influx of different religions has created the fertile grounds for conflicts and instability. the abuse of religion in order to serve ethnic or political purposes has often led to severe consequences for the society and its members. this point is more significant in a multi-religious society such as nigeria. the perversion and exploitation of the religious sentiments of the people can eventually lead to malice, disarray and violence. the reality on ground is that the problems of religions and social tolerance facing the society have been worsened by the elite, often motivated by violent struggles for benefits, power and influence within the society. this situation has led to the vitiation of the nigerian state in the social, political and economic realms of life. the mistrust and hatred emanating among groups, and the heightened intolerance have led to the proliferation of religiously conscious militia groupings that ostensibly claim to be social liberators. in actual fact, these militia committed to religious violence have opened the opportunity for individuals to foment tension in the society and to violate the vital laws necessary for the sustenance of order, peace and stability. this circumstance has created problems for national development and social reconciliation. terrorism is more than anything else an attack on our sense of trust and feeling of confidence as human beings in ourselves and in the institutions that we have built to protect us and ensure our safety. it is a challenge to our values and the idea of being human. it is an attempt to place a different price on our individual and collective humanity. these threats are struggles between the forces of order and disorder, freedom and tyranny, tolerance and repression, hope and fear. they 160 threaten not just peoples and nations but values and ideas”. this is a very important and sensitive issue for the survival of humanity and human institutions. in fact, it is the question of whether we are in need of a redefinition of civilization, security and its associated values. recommendations; 1. we strongly suggest that schools that were taken over by government should as a matter of urgency, be returned back to their original owners so that as a nation we shall once again experience the revival of moral instructions that will help in no small measure in inculcating moral and religious values into our children and our future generations. 2. adherents of all religions should be enlightened on the need for constant dialogue, and religious tolerance considering the multifarious nature of religion and our multi ethnic society in order to promote peace, harmony and mutual coexistence. 3. different religions in nigeria should identify a common ground and common values that could form the nucleus of religious and moral instructions at all levels of our education system to minimize if not eradicate the decadence and suspicion that is prevalent in our country today. 4. there should be a de-emphasis on the use of religion as an instrument or tool for wealth and prosperity, with a renewed emphasis on the values of conversion, repentance, reconciliation, holiness, love and salvation that are fundamentally parts of the major values of religiosity. 5. on the part of government, modern day military equipment and ammunitions should be procured in an 20appropriate manner to arrest and combat the increase wave of terrorism and radical extremism in our country 6. occasional seminars and conferences should be organized by government at all levels and religious bodies to enlighten leaders of various religions and their followers of the need to promote their unity despite their diversities on doctrinal issues and faith. 7. private individuals, corporate bodies and governmental 161 parastatals should create employment opportunities for all cadres of our labour force to avoid idleness that could lead to these class of people being used for violent crimes like terrorism, kidnapping, armed robbery, political thuggery with 2015 elections close at hand. 8. government should closely monitor the movement and flow of hard currency within and outside the country through the appropriate agencies in order to avoid money laundering that could lead to the misuse of such money for illegal purchase of arms and mercenaries to promote terrorism and similar crimes. 9. we would also like to reiterate the need for axiology (the science concerned with the study of values) should be introduced into the curriculum of our senior secondary schools and tertiary institutions of learning. conclusion in setting up a framework for the critical and discursive analysis of the national security problem in nigeria, we are in need of seeking a new idea or vision of security that can effectively ensure the redemption and rectification of the nigerian situation. apart from the aforementioned recommendations, at the heart of the study of national security in nigeria is the urgent and persistent search for the rules and patterns of action that will guarantee human survival and national integration in the nigerian nation. this reconstructive task is more significant, owing to the failure of existing approaches to national security employed within the country. the failures of these approaches have led to insecurity. the real context of the spectral insecurity that has continually plagued the nigerian state which is an indication of the urgent need for a conceptual and theoretical examination of the core visions and values embedded in the idea of national security in nigeria. as an example, there is a need to determine the unique approaches to security such as are relevant to the needs of a particular country. the good society aims at its own notion of the common good through the provision of greater opportunities for participation and responsibility among citizens. underlying this feeling of mutual responsibility is presumably, the attitude of trust or faith in a unique pattern of 162 political administration and social conduct that seeks the inclusion of as many as possible in the management of its affairs. the question then is: how can we establish and sustain rules and values that can propel human actions for positive ends? this issue is more significant in the context of organizations that centre on cultural, educational and expressive functions. finally, behaviour is modified as a result of experiences. as individuals go through life, they strive to attain certain goals and avoid some situations. they associate many objects in the environment with either success or failure. hence, they develop positive attitudes to objects that serve their purpose, while showing negative attitude to objects that thwart their needs. the main conditions for the change of attitudes revolve around the definition and redefinition of threats or actual deprivation of needs, creation of new needs or new levels of aspirations. attitudinal change depends on reviewing the scope of social adjustment, the means of control, the attractiveness of the project, the courage, the reward system and credibility that go with the new vision. this essay has attempted a theoretical and conceptual interrogation of the idea of national security using the typological, philosophical and prolegomenon approaches. it has situated the problem in the context of a postcolonial setting and has tried to engage the core ideas and values required for a proper methodologica l conceptualization of security. endnotes 1. gregory. e. ogbenika, the idea of spirit in african philosophy, ibadan: safmos publishers, 2011, p. x1v. 2. ujomu p. o, “the bounds of security theorizing: envisioning discursive inputs for the rectification of a postcolonial situation.” d. adelugba d and p. ujomu (2008); rethinking security in nigeria: conceptual issues in the quest for social order and national integration. (dakar: senegal codesria). isbn 286978-211x. 2008. 3. ibid 4. concise routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, london: routledge, 2000. s.v. “axiology” by barry smith and allan thomas. 5. titus harold., living issues in philosophy. new york: van nostrand, 1970. p. 313. 163 6. sogolo godwin., foundations of african philosophy. ibadan: ibadan university press. 1993. 119. 7. brunner. a. and raemers s., fundamental questions of philosophy. london: herder books. 1937. pp. 87-88. 8. perry 1968, p. 336 9. singer marcus., “value judgements and normative claims” in a. p. griffiths edited key themes in philosophy. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1989. p.145. 10. ackermann, werner., “cultural values and social choice of technology” international social science journal. vol. xxxiii, no. 3. 1981, p. 451 11. koch, adrienne., 1958, “the status of values and democratic theory” ethics. vol. lxviii. no.3. (april). p. 166. 12. mcinerney peter., introduction to philosophy. new york: harper collins, 1992. p. 154. 13. john dewey, “reconstruction in moral conceptions & morality is social” mann, jesse & kreyche, gerald (eds.) approaches to morality. (new york: harcourt, brace & world). 1966. p. 234. 14. st munkner hans. h., “which values for africa of the 21 century?” africana marburgensia special issue 17, 1998, p.87. 15. samatar abdi ismail and samatar ahmed .i. (eds.) the african state, portsmouth: heinemann 2002. p. 4. 16. collier paul and gunning jan willem. “why has africa grown slowly” journal of economic perspectives. vol.13. no. 3. (summer). 1999. p. 10-11. 17. cencod center for constitutionalism and demilitarization 2012 annual report. state of human rights in nigeria. lagos: cencod. 2012, pp. 10-11 18. ozohu-suleiman abdulhamid and baba samuel. crime prevention and control in nigeria: institutional failure and the option of food security. the constitution, vol.9.no.4. december. 2009. p. 47. 19. ujomu p. o, “the bounds of security theorizing: envisioning discursive inputs for the rectification of a postcolonial situation.” professor d. adelugba d and dr p. ujomu (2008); rethinking security in nigeria: conceptual issues in the quest for social order and national integration. (dakar: senegal codesria). isbn 286978-211x. 2008. pp. 35-36. 20. governments should use recognized and licensed arms dealers in the procurement of military equipment and ammunitions to avoid mutual suspicion among members of various religious groups and affiliation. a case in point is the recent 9.3million us dollar scam involving the president of can which has generated a lot of controversies in our polity today. 164 the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 31 the ethics of folktales in edo culture abstract this essay examines the significance of traditional folktales in the moral development of the individual person and laments the near extirpation of this tradition in contemporary family life and the attendant toll on the moral values that are characteristically african. in an attempt to investigate this issue critically, this paper employed the critical analytic approach to situate folktales in the edo thought system. from the analysis, part of the reason why there is deficit in our value system was attributed to the disappearance of folktale, that acted as a veritable vehicle for transmitting life`s lessons that guaranteed a humane society. it called attention to the danger of departing from such a phenomenon and ruminated on the cultural splendour of keeping the folktale tradition. it concluded by recommending ways of revamping the folktale culture. keywords: folktales, edo, morality, culture. introduction as a young boy growing up in the city of benin, it was a common custom that in the evenings, usually after supper, we gathered round the elder ones, this time our uncles, aunties, and some of our elder cousins, who told us a lot of fanciful stories and the impact above all was the great lessons that were part of the story itself. for example, it was through this medium that we learnt why the tortoise had such a rough back, why the nose of the dog was black, cold and wet or moist, why the sky is so far from the earth; but above all why 32 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 it was good to be morally upright, and so on. though education later clarified certain knowledge we had but one area that remained constant in terms of relevance and importance is morality. we always looked forward for those moments of storytelling, to the extent that whenever we had visitors coming to the house, especially the elderly ones, the first thing we would demand was a folktale, after the exchange of pleasantries. the excitement was even more when the visitors were from the countryside. it was as if a new movie was out in the market, and people are enthusiastic to get a view. this robust tradition is now moribund even in a typical rural setting that was thought to be the fertilizing ground and the storage bank of such tales. the lamentable aspect of the current situation is the attendant toll it has had on moral and ethical values. the only one that has not suffered significant setback in this aspect is the parables that are still prevalent in everyday discussions. while parables could be seen as quintessential of such folktales, and a vital aspect of the entire folklore tradition, it must be noted that the interpretation and deeper meaning and explanation would be more favourable to adults. however since formation of minds starts as toddlers the import of folktales cannot be over emphasized, and this is the main focus of this essay. the task of this paper is to critically examine the impact of folktales in the overall building up of moral and ethically responsible beings who make up the larger society. why is this tradition that added so much value to the african personality no longer fashionable? what is its impact in terms of the moral value deficit? could this revival help in the overhauling of the present state of affairs, especially as we have it in africa? how can we make it more attractive once again? the meaning of folktales: this is a general term for different varieties of traditional narrative. the telling of stories appears to be a cultural universal, common to basic and complex societies alike. even the forms, folktales take are certainly similar from culture to culture, and comparative studies of themes and narrative ways have been successful in showing these the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 33 relationships. also it is considered to be an oral tale to be told for everybody. tales, overtime that become the collective consciousness of a people and an essential part of their culture. though folktales vary from one culture to the other but generally are recognizable because of some basic features. etymologically folk refers to people, so the things being told are those of everyday life and common experiences of people. they are usually very simplified and could be understood by children. this is why many scholars believe that folktales originated among peasants and very common people. the last point that is also very relevant to this discourse is the fact that they usually contain some moral lessons. folktales are very prevalent in africa and among the negro world, and they cover a whole range of inspirational and fanciful stories. on the other hand, the term "folklore" can label a figurative narrative which has no sacred or religious content. traditional stories or folklores could be told in form of apologue, fairy tale, parable, myth, legend and allegory. each of these forms is a story passed down orally from generations and has become part of the tradition of a community.1a folk narrative can have both a moral and psychological scope, as well as entertainment value, depending upon the nature of the teller, the style of the telling, the ages of the audience members, and the overall context of the entertainment. sometimes there is a very tiny line between folktales, myths, legend, etc and what becomes of higher importance would be the particular significance of the story. in whichever case the message being communicated, is usually more important than the facts of the story being told. this particular point is very important so that one does not abandon the substance of the story and begin to argue over the shadows and the other less important details. the sumerian elish, for example was significant in explaining the origin of man and the world. the subject matter of literature is as wide as human experience itself. myths, legends, and folktales lie at the beginning of literature, and their plots, situations, and allegorical (metaphorical narrative) judgments of life represent a constant source of literary inspiration; 2 that continue to pass on lessons that would help in the sound and moral development of the individual. 34 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 edo culture: the term edo has an historical background. according to j.u. egharevba, edo was the slave that saved oba ewuare (1440-1473) from being killed.3so as to immortalize him, edo became a name for benin indigenes. on the other hand, ‘benin’ is a name that serves as territorial name (e. g. benin city, benin empire or benin kingdom) and its usage predates edo.4apart from serving as the indigenous name of benin city, edo can be used today equivocally: it is referred exclusively to the language spoken by the benin, who historically are the edo people as distinct from the other inhabitants of benin empire. it can also be used as a linguistic label comprising all the languages and dialects spoken in various communities, whose inhabitants have migrated from benin, many years ago. in this thesis the researcher shall be referring to the people who call themselves, their capital city and their language, ‘edo.’ the origins of the people are lost in myths and antiquity, while some hold that they migrated from sudan many centuries ago;5 the people themselves believe that the kingdom was founded by one of the sons of osanobua the supreme being.6this is precisely the point why the oba is regarded as a demi-god; as a direct descendant of the son of the supreme being. worthy of note is that today they occupy the edo south senatorial district of edo state, nigeria. folktales and edo moral values most of the knowledge we have of the rights and wrongs in the collective patrimony of the edo people are contained, sustained, and transmitted in folktales. unfortunately, this tradition of transmission via oral tradition is fast eroding, and this has its effect on the morality of the people. it is eroding not so much because of interaction with other value systems, but because the people are becoming less conscious and more ignorant of their own value system and moral matters. the reason for this is because the natural pedagogical school wherein all learnt via the folktale tradition is fast being neglected and no longer seem fashionable. if what samuel huntington prognosticated as the clash of civilization and the remaking of the world order7 is anything to go by, then the the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 35 domineering effect of western civilization is sure to swallow some of these smaller ones that have not found their feet in the world`s stage (globalization), that tends to promote everything and anything western. however, this would be at the point of convergence that chardin referred to as the omega point, which inspired senghor to speak of the civilization of the universal.8 but before we get to that table of discussion where all these cultures would cross fertilize each other, there is need to sustain one`s own culture and hence the need to revive the folktales that are almost extirpated. no doubt a lot of epistemological facts abound to evince the moral plenitude in these folktales. the more we forget about the tales the more we forget the root and the raison d’etre why certain things should be done the way they are done and why it would be wise and profitable to do those things; and to draw aspirations from the many lessons drawn and designed to be learnt and taught by these folktales. looking at the vast array of the so many folktales prevalent in the edo cultural milieu, one could notice and deduce a lot of saturation of her philosophical depths; her traditional and customary depths; her ethical and moral depths; her religious and metaphysical depths; there are a lot we find in the maxims and idioms and above all in the parables but they are not worth comparing to the ones we find in the entire folktales. in fact the parables came as a deep reflection on the folktales that have been told and established. the parables and maxims are the quintessence of the folktales and the moral lessons of the tales. they are if you like, the summary of these folktales; the essence or lessons from the tales. it is within this contest that we can appreciate the values of honesty, respect for elders, care for the poor, respect for truth, respect for hard work, care for the elderly, love for children, good parental upbringing, esteem for virginity and decency, sanctity of the human life, esteem for elderly counsels, love for the red colour and its symbolism, kinship ties, history of the ancestral lineage, the origins of the cosmos and of the land, the origins of the peoples of the land and the world, the origin of particular places, the origin of various customs and traditions, the origins of taboos, the origins of festivals, etc. there is hardly any aspect of the socio, religious and cultural life of the 36 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 people that are not explainable or buttressed by one or more of the folktales that are prevalent in the culture. in all of these one thing stands out clearly that virtue has its own profitable reward, while vices attract a regrettable recompense as far as morality was concerned. within the scope of this essay one cannot afford to accommodate all the folktales that are sources of these moral norms and values, we have outlined above; one cannot even exhaust the entire moral philosophy, but suffice it to say that the entire moral code of the edo people is distributed in these folktales with a very deep and far reaching implications for oneself, the family, the society in general, against the cosmic and karmic balance in nature that tends to ensure that whatever is sown would be reaped, good or evil. it was also within this tradition that we got to know more about nature, both plants and animals and the pattern of their behaviour. in the folktales you would find an abundance of aspects of edo moral codes, edo philosophy, edo religion, laws and customs, penal codes, rituals whether of initiation age grade, marriages, burial, and even entertainment, etc. our focus however is limited to the moral implications in the folktales, that are fast being forgotten, whether in terms of myths, legend, fable, parables, fairy tale, animal tales, etc. moral lessons of three key folktales here for purpose of illustration, we shall examine three folktales, of the thousands we have in edo repertoire: the first folktale we shall be considering is the story of omonsiuwa, the only child of the parents. she was a very beautiful girl and could be considered as the most beautiful girl in the village. many children were very fond of her and wanted to be in her company when they were recreating. the parents however were not favourably disposed to this interaction and would always drive away the lads. they did this just to make extra effort for her not to get corrupted. on one faithful day, the parents were about to go to the farm, and in order to keep her at home, gave her a sizable piece of rock to cook, and warned her sternly not to live the house until the rock was cooked and soft. when they left, as usual the kids came the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 37 calling her to follow them to pluck some fruits. she informed them that the parents asked her not to live the house until the rock was cooked. then the kids assisted her in fanning the flames and while she was not watching, they plucked the leaves of the cocoyam plant and put them inside the pot. very soon the leaves became very soft and cooked; and they informed her that the rock was cooked. she went to feel the leaves and thought it was the rock that had become cooked. she then followed them to the farm area to pluck some fruits. when they got there the first child was asked to climb the tree, but he complained that the legs were too fragile. the second child also refused to climb complaining the hands were too fragile. the third one complained that the stomach was protruded. the onus then fell on omonsiuwa to climb. it was the tree of the pepper fruit. now while up, whenever she plucked any ripe fruit, she put it in her pocket and threw only the unripe ones to the colleagues below. this made the other children very angry and they decided to punish her. they gathered a heap of dried leaves and wood under the tree and set fire on it. the smoke choked omonsiuwa, and she fell into the fire and was burnt to ashes. when the parents were returning from the farm, they happened to have passed through the scene, the mother saw the beautiful ashes and she said to herself that her daughter would be very happy to play with the ashes and decided to take some for her. as she was about to take some of the ashes, she heard a song coming from the ashes; and through the song the parents became aware of the sad event and that it was actually the ashes of their beloved daughter. they reported the matter to the village elders who subsequently penalized the children for murdering their colleague, the pride of the village. the moral lessons here would include: obedience to parental admonitions and constituted authority, the evil of keeping bad friends, and the evil of greed and cheating. another folktale we shall be considering is the story of edamwen (i am not pained, irritated or provoked). he was born into a peasant family and in the struggles of life lost the parents and managed to marry a wife. very soon the village folks took interest 38 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 in him particularly because of his name and especially his character that was a reflection of his name. sometimes they purposely would try to provoke him to see his reactions, but he always maintained a calm personality. things escalated when they forcefully took his wife from him thinking he would not be able to bear the humiliation, but he maintained his calm. the folks finally planned and to give him the last test of provocation, they took him to the forest and tied him to a tree and used a very sharp object to destroy his eyes and abandoned him there in excruciating pains. edamwen remained there in acute pains but did not complain or curse anybody. as luck would have it the tree he was tied, was the very tree where witches around the village came to hold their nocturnal meetings. as usual they came in the dead of the night, and edamwen could hear them debating and struggling over the leaves of a particular tree. the reason for the struggle was that the presenter had told the other members that it was therapeutic for any kind of blindness. it was in the cause of struggling for it that some of the leaves fell and rested on the head of edamwen who managed to use his hand to take the leaves to touch his eyes. immediately, his sight was restored and he freed himself from the stake and returned to the village that night. when it was day break he took his bath dressed properly and went round the village to the amazement of his persecutors, who began to imagine that perhaps he possessed some supernatural powers. not quite long, the village king of a neighbouring village became blind. it was in the cause of sending emissaries to look for doctors who could cure his blindness that the messengers came to edamwen, as one who had the powers to cure blindness. edamwen went with them and applied those same leaves on the eyes of the blind king and immediately, his sight was restored. in gratitude, the king gave the administration of half of his kingdom to edamwen and gave his daughter to him in marriage. the moral lessons would include: patience, as a virtue could be very profitable, and also the fact that there is always a reward for being good. the last folktale, we shall be considering is concerning a particular age group (okpolugbe) of young men whom the king of the village sent to hunt for wild pigs, to be used as part of their end the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 39 of year ritual celebrations. on their way they passed a group of elders, and with total disregard for them did not bother to observe respect by greeting them. later on when one of the young men who was not in the original company, because he had to meet the daily chores of his sick mother came by hurriedly, but by the time he came to the place where the elders were, greeted them respectfully. they were attracted to him, because he was different from the rest of his colleagues and beckoned on him to come to them. upon inquiry, they discovered the mission of the young men and advised this late comer not to join, them that there was going to be trouble. not too long they saw the young men returning, some injured some dead all wailing, as a result of a ferocious attack by a band of wild pigs. the elders then asked the other late arrival to join them back home. the moral lesson here will include: respect for our elders, and to always heed the advice of the elders. even the christian bible has it in the fourth commandment god gave to moses on mount sinai: honour your father and mother that your days may be long….9 from the foregoing, the link between folktales and morality, as far as the edo culture; and by extension african culture, is concerned; is very clear. the moral codes and what ought to be done are contained in these folktales. they also go as far as explaining the reason why things are done the way they are done. here the motive for morality is given, since there is always a recompense for every act or inaction. in other words for one to know the reason why certain customs are encouraged, why there are certain things that are forbidden, then we should go back to the folktales were these things are very explicit. it therefore means that the more we are unfamiliar with these folktales, the more also we become unfamiliar with our moral codes, at a time of great crisis in terms of trying to establish vital links with the past, it becomes very worrisome that the implication may likely be that there is going to be grave moral set back, as we already have. the current situation as we have it, has had its toll on morality and moral values for the edo people. no wonder more than five decades ago jacob egharevba already expressed this fear, when he wrote in 1965: 40 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 ke omuhen ghade ore emwiniremwin nidinmwinhia keg ha re domwande evbo vbe otoagbon, domwande evbonirhanro vbevbokegben emwinirenmwin oghe evboiraneso ye ebeni ma tie ugbugbehia. rhunmwundoni o kere ne imavbegharhieeso ma kherhe, kherhe vbe oghe evbomwanke ban ghakhian.10 what should have acted as the base for good moral conduct has thoroughly been neglected, and whatever that could be developed, had to also contend with the so many values, especially the negative ones that may not be at home to the african, hence some have spoken of the crisis of the african conscience.11 from the three folktales above, one could decipher the moral values of obedience to parental admonitions, respect for elders, patience, avoiding bad friends, avoidance of cheating (greed), etc. taking a closer look at the last story, and especially the behaviour of those young men; it would seem that if those young men had observed the simple courtesy of greeting the elders they passed on the way, perhaps the mishap that happened to them may not have happened. the fact that the one who greeted the elders was asked not to proceed on the journey implies that the elders had a premonition of what was about to take place. again the likelihood surely could have been that the elders themselves, through certain metaphysical prowess actually orchestrated the attacks by the wild pigs. in our time when the communal touch is fast giving way to the individualistic disposition, it is very possible for us not to greet anybody, no matter the age, as far as we have no business with such a person. in this connection we shall experience more often the culture of not showing courtesy to anybody we do not know. however this is contrary to the spirit and the morality of showing respect for elders as enshrined in african communalism in general. it is in this regard, that nwoko would averred: african traditional society is a society where the individual is always considered a free, integrated member of his community, a communion person. it is a society where individualism is considered the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 41 a taboo, where each member takes the interest of the community as his own. his pride is community is power. the more united he is to the community, the more he sees the community as a mere extension of the family12 here the community is seen generally as the family extension and the respect and courtesy one shows to the elderly members of the family is also extended to other members of the community. some of our people have also imbibed the slogan of respect is reciprocal. but from the folktale respect is the due we pay to elders. in our advancement into the realm and era of modernity, we must bring along into it the great values we have, as epitomized in the so many folktales in our culture. otherwise the fear of fanon13 would become very evident in our time. in this situation what would be there would be a very confused personality. this is just the issue of respect, and no doubt a small microcosm of the entire issues as regards the morality in our society. the example is just to show that there is urgent need to revive this tradition as it gives a better foundation for right conduct than we can get even from other western or religious sources. it is my highly considered opinion that with this tradition of folktales revamped there is going to be a serious development in terms of self-assertion and the gradual elimination of the inferiority complex that is felt by the average black man. the inferiority here lies in the fact that the average african feels inferior to the westerner and everything western. in this connection, the values in this folktales would become assets for the society and would help to revive an ailing society, and in resolving the problems of vices and the challenges of the future. the resuscitating of the folktales tradition would certainly act as a philosophy for ameliorating the current state of affairs with regard to high level of immorality on the part of africans. in this case it could really act as a remedy designed to improve the current existential situation particularly of a society coming to terms with so many problems like corruption, bad leadership, acute greed for wealth, and all other forms of exploitation of man by man and other related vices. folktales would certainly help as far as morality is concerned, to re position africans to a kind of primordial mode that 42 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 gives possibility to that desired change in their present ontological conditions. by its existential approach to reality, our folktales, mediated by the high moral content would become a philosophy of social action and societal rejuvenation. conclusion in bringing this essay to a close it is good for us to see some ways our folktales that carry within them our moral code, could as a matter of urgency be revived and enhanced. the urgency here lies in the early target of the young. so that once brought up in this robust tradition, with high moral value, it would be hard for them to lose grip of their personality when confronted with future challenges from other malevolent systems. the first recommendation in this regard is the documentation, as much as possible, of all the folktales that we have in the various cultures and a robust articulation of the moral codes they convey; for things written they say remain. this would enable none to be lost in this regard. the second recommendation would be the work of scholars to do in-depth analysis of these folktales and bring out the undercurrent. this would enable us to improve upon the patrimony of our ancestors given the fact that we live in a fast changing world. these analyses would enable the moral codes to accommodate the current trend of work and the changing face of societies. it would also take care of the challenge of globalization and all the attendant effects it has on modern african life. knowledge is dynamic and we know there are certain things we know now, that were unknown to our ancestors. eboh captures this point when she averred that “it behoves us to reconstruct and philosophise on as many stories and witty sayings as possible. they may prove useful in future. we ought to produce knowledge because we are the venerable ancestors of tomorrow.”14 another recommendation is the formalization of these folktales in terms of injecting them into school curriculum. children learn very fast and those whose environment makes it hard for them to benefit from the oral transmission could still benefit from them in the schools. this is with the presumption that all the children would the ethics of folktales in edo culture | 43 have access to quality education at least at the primary and secondary levels. for most african countries and cultural societies, political independence has been attained, but not cultural, economic and ideological independence. this has given possibility to a moral crisis. the moral crisis comes from the fact that africans have shifted away from their own value system and the moral values that go with it, to other value systems underpinned by other metaphysical foundations. the consequence of the shift in values is that the african is no longer defined by who he is, but by what he has acquired by whatever means. the task, therefore, is how the moral crisis caused by this shift can be dealt with in reviving our folktale. our folktales no doubt emphasizes a virtue ethics, with a capacity of redeeming the african value system and is geared towards the formation of the concept of the human being as a `being-with-self` and a `being-with-others. by revamping our folktale heritage, this could be a kind of formalization of a beginning of cultural independence, a potential opening, if not a total breakthrough for our moral value system. when all these have been attained then, in the words of frantz fanon, there will be "not only the disappearance of colonialism, but also the disappearance of the colonized man.”15 endnotes 1. marie paulin eboh, socio-cultural mode of knowledge production: folklore –a tapestry of principles, inspiration and proverbs in asiegbu, m. f. & chukwuokolo, j.c. (eds) truth knowledge and society. (abakaliki: pacts gm press, 2012), 14. 2. bradford morrow, world outside the window: the selected essay of kenneth rexroth, (new york: new directions publishing, 1987), 286. 3. jacob egharevba, a short history of benin, (ibadan: ibadan university press, 1968), 2. 4. ibid. 5. osemwingie ebohon, cultural heritage of benin, (benin city: midwest paper corporation, 1972), xvii. 6. ibid., 5. 7. samuel huntington, the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (new york: simon and schuster paperbacks, 1996), 103 8. leopold senghor,., on african socialism, (stanford: pall mall, 1964), 152. 44 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 9. exodus 20:12 in the jerusalem bible (london: darton, longman and todd, 1985), 106 10. ero eweka, we are because he was in institute of benin studies, monograph series 4, (benin city: 2006), 15. (since the beginning of time all deep knowledge (philosophy) has existed among different peoples of the world. various civilized peoples have written books which we always read about their deep knowledge. therefore it is proper that we reveal bits and pieces of our own deep knowledge from now on.) 11. kwame nkrumah, consciencism, (london: heinemann education books, 1964), 78 12. m. nwoko, the rationality of african socialism (rome: 1985), 72. 13. l. a. jinadu, fanon in search of the african revolution (enugu: fourth dimension publishers, (1990), 160. 14. eboh, socio-cultural, 40. 15. frantz fanon, black skin white mask (new york: groove press, 1967), 10. philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 1 philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world abstract this paper seeks to examine the relevance of philosophy to human development and in extension, the contemporary world. this is premised on the ground of the misconception about the discipline of philosophy. the paper develops by drawing on the meaning of philosophy with which it was clearly stated that it is a rational quest for wisdom. this preoccupation of philosophy clearly negates the wrong way with which philosophy is regarded. the paper elicits further, that philosophy is essential for human development in that it helps the individual to reason and think correctly, helps to facilitate selfknowledge and equally helps in the interpersonal relationship with people of other cultures. thus, man is said to be freed from the imprisonment of prejudice. the paper further argues that philosophy gives clarity to some theological concepts. this means that philosophy has answers to almost all the mysteries in reality. it, however, concludes that the contemporary world which is characterized by science and technology will only thrive because of the tools of philosophy. this means that science and technology, which people see as the ‘messiah’ of this present age, will only achieve its desired goal if the methods of philosophy are adhered to and this will be the basis for authentic human development. keywords: philosophy, human development, coherency, logicality. 2 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 introduction following social contract theories, there is the notion that the state of nature was characterized by barbarism and anarchism. however, in order to solve this problem, the likes of thomas hobbes, john locke and jean jacque rousseau came up with their social contract theories. although all three have different approaches, yet one thing that is common to them, is the need for a state to be organized for the protection of its members. from plato’s political utopia, the one that must be a leader must be a philosopher-king. commenting on the position of plato, a. s. fotiou says that “the member of this group (guardians) form a deliberative and a legislative body of the state. this is because their predominant virtue is wisdom, which they use as the basis for law and order”.1 this is due to plato’s notion of class stratification of the ideal state which is bifurcated into three as evident in his republic: the guardians (rulers), the auxiliaries (soldiers), and artisans (workers). these guardians or rulers are the people in the society whose duty is to steer the ship of the state. the notion of the philosopher-king or the ruler is based on the conviction that the philosophers have knowledge, intellect and are trained to govern. plato, however, believes that an elaborate and rigorous education of the guardians is a pre-requisite for the possible realization of the ideal state. this ruling class must necessarily exercise strict control over education, art, war and even marriages so as to keep away corrupting influences and promote social harmony according to philosophical principles.2 the above assertions of the contracterians and plato, underscore the thought of francis bacon that “ideas rule the world”. this is because a firm grasp of philosophical tools which is wisdom-centered will help in the fostering the society. philosophy trains human mind to reason correctly and rationally. when this irrevocable truth is put in the right perspective the society becomes a better place. be that as it may, there is this popular belief by some persons that philosophy does not bake bread. this is because for them it is a waste of time to study philosophy or to be a philosopher since it has no relevance to humanity. for some, the only thing that philosophy is capable of doing is that it has turned people into atheists. some see philosophy as that which is out of touch with reality. for them, philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 3 philosophy cannot thrive in the wake of science and technology. j.o. ndubisi captures more of this misconception when he says that: there is no discipline that is generally misunderstood and misconceived as being irrelevant to human society as philosophy… some said that philosophy is a study in futility … often times, people think that the students of philosophy are wasting their precious time in studying philosophy. some nonstudents of philosophy do not understand what philosophy students do in their philosophy classes”.3 the task of this paper therefore, will be to argue for the importance of philosophy to humanity and society. the thesis to be pursued will be that of spelling out the relevance of philosophy to human development in this contemporary world while addressing the misconceptions that have been there over time. this essay adopts the analytic, prescriptive and critical method. however, it is important to note from the outset that the attempt of this paper is not to construct a rigid, perfect and all-embracing relevance of philosophy to the world as this would be a futile and impossible mission. rather, the goal is to provide a framework that will foster on-going research on this area of study. meaning and nature of philosophy: a general overview h.s. staniland says that a question which takes only three words to ask is, one might think, a question which a presumed expert ought to be able to answer in three well-chosen words of his own. but, as every philosopher knows, ‘what is philosophy?’ is not such a question. professional dignity forbids any of us to reply ‘i don’t know’.”4 the implication of this, therefore, is that philosophy we all know has no univocal definition. this is because, giving any formal definition of philosophy presupposes some conceptions not likely to be shared by all philosophers. the implication of this is that different philosophers define it from different ideological ambience, orientations, schools of thought, socio-political bents or even personal convictions. despite the distinctiveness of thought as regards the meaning and definition of philosophy, one thing that all philosophers generally agree to, is that philosophy is a critical enterprise, something dynamic or a 4 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 quest to find out. this means that philosophy is a search for, or indeed a spirit of evaluative exploration. it is a term that is derived from two greek words philoslove and sophia –wisdom. this means that philosophy is the love of wisdom. it is a search for truth of reality. in other words, the essence of philosophy is to gain insight into reality and gain knowledge of reality and truth. it is from this perspective william lawhead sees philosophy as a “human attempt to systematically study the most fundamental structures of our entire experience in order to arrive at beliefs that are conceptually clear, experientially confirmed, and rationally coherent as possible.5 for him, philosophy seeks clarity of all our basic beliefs and assumptions. philosophy for matthew izibili, is regarded as “a process in which the individual is consciously engaged in the activities of a rigorous thinking process or deep reflective method with a view to establishing orderliness”.6 this definition shows that philosophy is goal-oriented and its goal is to seek orderliness in the society and world at large. a close look at the different definitions of philosophy shows that man is placed at the center of it all. this is as a result of man’s quest to know more about reality. williams aso captures this clearly when he says that “man as the subject of philosophy has unquenchable thirst for knowledge not only for empirical realities alone but also phenomenal realities and everything that concern human experience and the universe in general”.7 kolawole owolabi says philosophy is conceived as the critical reflection of human beings on the problem of their existence and essence”.8 olayinka opafola sees philosophy as an attempt to resolve problems of man, his nature and the universe.9 a close look at most of the definitions of philosophy, shows that it has to do with giving answers to the reality of man’s ontology. philosophy is said to have two orders. the first order and the second order. philosophy of the first order embraces among others, the following philosophy of life, culture, traditions, customs and worldviews, religion, beliefs, music, aesthetics, proverbs and folktales, et cetera. the second order of philosophy, is seen as something deeper and more involving, it is a rational venture, philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 5 critical and detailed in outlook, a reflective approach, an inquiry that truly involves the commitment of the enquirer. philosophy is known to have four major branches metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and logic. metaphysics is the study of reality. sylvester enomah captures this clearly when he writes “metaphysics is that branch of philosophy, which studies and investigates that principle that pervades all reality.10 this simply means that metaphysics as a branch of philosophy studies reality as a whole and not just a portion of it. corroborating this point enoch stumpf says that metaphysics refer simply to the subject matter or reality beyond physical nature or beyond the things we see.11 pantaleon iroegbu defines metaphysics as that branch of philosophy that studies reality as such, i.e., in its most comprehensive scope and fundamental principles.12 metaphysics gives the deepest meaning to reality. this further underscores the fact that metaphysics extends to all reality both those perceptible to the senses which we come to know by empirical investigation and those realities that we cannot experience or know experiencially but through abstraction, apriori and aposterori reasoning. it is derived from the greek expression ta meta ta physica (after the physics).13 it is a title that is credited to andronicus of rhodes. consequently, the subjects of metaphysics were then called “the treatise after the physical treaties”, which is the literal meaning of the word metaphysics. simply put, it means over and beyond the physical.14 epistemology as a branch of philosophy seeks to evaluate our knowledge claims. this is as a consequence of the sceptics who deny the possibility of knowing. it is derived from the greek word episteme which means knowledge and logos which means theory or study.15 it therefore means that epistemology is the theory of knowledge. in other words, it is the study of human knowledge, the study of the nature of human knowledge, its origin, its scope, its limits, its justification, its reliability or otherwise, its certainty or otherwise.16 in the same vein, anselm jimoh sees epistemology as a theory that deals with the analysis of sets of facts as principles that guide our understanding of issues that relate to knowledge.17 this means that as a theory, epistemology investigates the nature and possibility of knowledge by asking questions relating to whether we 6 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 can have knowledge as we describe and understand it. as the study of the nature of knowledge and justification, blessing agidigbi says epistemology attempts to provide answers to: in particular, (a) what knowledge is? (the defining components) (b) how do we get it? (the substantive conditions of sources) and (c) can our means of getting it be defended against skeptical challenge? (the limits of knowledge and justification). these questions are all aimed at explicating the nature of knowledge and how to establish the claim that one actually knows what he claims to know.18 it is not in doubt that the whole idea of philosophy deals mainly with knowledge. there are different sources of knowledge, they include empiricism, rationalism, and so on. ethics as a branch of philosophy deals with the ought and the ought not of human relationship. on this anthony asekhauno and gregory ogbenika write ‘ethics is all about the morality of the actions of human beings. it has to do with ‘ought’ of human behavior and life’.19 williams aso sees it as “the study of the basic principles about what is right and wrong in human relationship with others and ecosystem”.20 this is because etymologically, it is derived from the greek word ethica having its root in ethos i.e., custom which means the fundamental orientation and inner disposition of an individual about life. following the notion that the actions of man can be both instinctive and deliberate, there exists the difference between acts of man and human acts. higgins holds that a human act is a free and deliberate act with three main known elements: motion of the will, previous intellectual knowledge of the purpose of the act and freedom.21 the ethical implication here is the assumption that man is the master of his act. hence, he can be held responsible for his actions or inactions. acts of man on the other hand, are actions that are natural to the human person (blinking, sneezing, farting and so on). however, there exists different ethical principles with which human conduct is judged. these principles form the various aspects of ethics. they include normative ethics (teleological and deontological), descriptive ethics and meta-ethics (naturalism and anti-naturalism).22 there is no doubt then, that the basic concern of ethics is that it is the area of philosophy that reasons about morality, philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 7 particularly the meaning and justification of claims concerning right or wrong actions, obligation, moral rules, right, virtue, the good life and the possibility of objective morality. logic is derived from the greek word logos which simply means word that is spoken and the consequence of this meaning later on developed to imply human thought or human order of reason.23 logic is concerned with the principle of valid inference. the concept of validity has to do with the logical assessment of arguments. this is because validity as a formal concept, is mainly concerned with the formal connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument.24 an argument cannot be both deductive and inductive, and the quest for every logical argument is to bring about rational proof for validity and soundness. this further strengthens the fact that the task of logic is philosophically characterized with the skill of recognizing valid and fallacious inference so that one can distinguish logical and illogical arguments. williams aso argues that logic is a critical thinking directed at distinguishing valid from invalid arguments or reasoning. logic deals with the question, nature and forms of human inferences.25 on the issue of the validity or invalidity of an argument, an argument is said to be valid when there is the logical connection between the premises and the conclusion. while it is said to be invalid when the truth of the premises does not entail the truth of the conclusion. when the premises are true and the conclusion is false, the argument is invalid. other sub-branches that emanate from the above main branches of philosophy, include, axiology, socio-political philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of art, philosophy of science, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of education, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of economics and so on. philosophy, however, is known to have three main methods or approaches as some authors will put it. they include: the speculative, the prescriptive and the analytic. where the speculative tool consists of the mental reflection about the universe, the prescriptive seeks to establish a workable standard for placing values, judging conduct and art appraisal. while, the analytic focuses attention on the meaning words and expression. it also goes 8 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 further to show that the meaning of words are relative depending upon prevailing circumstances. all of these three put together makes philosophy methodologically structured. the discipline called philosophy has lingered on in history from the ancient era, down to this contemporary world. philosophy and the essentials of human formation: towards liberating the human person from the clogs of ignorance human formation is all about the development of a well-rounded and competent man, possessing personal maturity. the basis of this is the fact that we human beings are physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, social, intellectual and spiritual ...”26 this development can only flourish when there is a firm grasp of the tools of philosophy. “this means that one needs to grow in this aspect of humanity because “growth in one’s personal humanity is therefore the foundation of ones spiritual, pastoral and intellectual formation.”27 in order not to be swayed by the demagogue of acute deceit, illogicality and irrationality, it is expected that philosophy forms a major part in the terminus ad quem and the terminus a quo of man’s existence. this is because the failures due to lack of rationality and criticality in our world is almost indiscernible. on the necessity for philosophical education for an authentic human formation, the concillar fathers writes: “philosophical subjects should be taught in such a way as to lead the students gradually to a solid and consistent knowledge of man, the world and god. the student should rely on the philosophical patrimony which is forever valid, but should also take account of the modern philosophical studies, especially those which have greater influence in their own country, as well as recent progress in the sciences. thus, by correctly understanding the modern mind, students will be prepared to enter into dialogue with their contemporaries”.28 this means that for the fathers of the second vatican council, the goal of philosophy must be in such a way that it must lead to a better knowledge of man and the reality of his existence which will be connected to the one who is his primary cause, god. this will not exclude an acceptance of scientific findings after its objective evaluation. philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 9 the document went on to state that, “the history of philosophy should be taught in such a manner that students may grasp the fundamental principles of the various systems, retaining those elements which are proved to be true, while being able to detect and refute those which are false. the teaching method adopted should stimulate in the students a love of rigorous investigation, observation and demonstration of the truth, as well as an honest recognition of the limits of human knowledge.”29 this explains why the different histories and epochs of philosophy are exposed to the students from year one to four in the bachelors level down to masters and doctoral level. the essence of these historical surveys is to be able to understand better the background or system through which other philosophical trends were explicated. for instance, the theme of the ancient philosophy is speculation on the universe, the medieval era saw the need to marry religion with philosophy, the modern era which started with descartes was to apply scientific cum mathematical principle to philosophy thereby breaking away from the faith-based philosophy of the medieval era, the contemporary or post-modernist is more of a deconstruction from traditional philosophy like the thought of james ladyman’ naturalized metaphysics, jacque deridda and the binary opposite, emmanuel levinas alterity and a host of others. all of these history according to the conciliar fathers will help the student develop a thorough search for the truth and apply it in his day-to-day living. this is where the student’s own effort comes in. they are expected to draw useful implications from the wealth of philosophical speculation because the riches or gain of philosophy is when it makes humanity to take rational decisions in life. these essentials of philosophy to human formation can be summarily outlined as follows: 1. philosophy helps the individual and some religious leaders to analyze dogmatic issues in theology; dogmas in theology are not totally devoid of reason. this explains why the medieval thinkers and other early fathers of the church used the methods and logical techniques of the ancient philosophers to address difficult theological questions and points of doctrine like the trinity, holy 10 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 eucharist, and incarnation and so on. thomas aquinas following peter damian argued that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology (ancilla theologiae). st. augustine’s credo ut intelligiam (believe so that you may understand), which st. anselm also adopted in his faith seeking understanding. commenting on this, ratio fundamentallis institutionis sacerdotalis states that “philosophy is at the service of faith seeking understanding for the ultimate aim of carrying out the mission of christ on earth”30 on this view, reason by itself is not good enough to give us proper religious knowledge, instead, we have to begin with faith to set us in the right direction and, once we believe in god through faith, we can seek to understand the foundations of our belief through reason. it is not new that the early church faced intellectual and cultural ridicule from the romans and the greeks. these ridicules threatened internal cohesion within the church and its evangelistic boldness towards unbelievers.31 with the help of the rich tools of philosophy they were able to scale through. 2. philosophy helps the individual to reason correctly and to apply their thoughts coherently and logically. the study of philosophy helps the individual to be critical in his dealings and also to avoid errors in speech and in writing. it is this character of criticality of philosophy that makes us question everything before accepting it as true knowledge. in this regard, philosophy helps to remove ambiguity, thereby bringing out the clarifications of thought. 3. philosophy facilitates self-knowledge. the worst thing that will happen to a person is when he lacks self-identity. self-knowledge matters a lot. this is what necessitates his ambition to set up the goals he wishes to achieve. following the socratic imperative ‘man know thyself’, knowing oneself, means examining oneself; for the unexamined life is not worth living. philosophy will help the individual to constantly ask the following existential questions ‘who am i? where have i come from and where am i going? philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 11 4. philosophy helps the individual in ecumenical dialogues/interreligious dialogues. in his encyclical, fides et ratio, pope john paul ii made it clear that philosophy is of incalculable importance. he speaks of the influence philosophy has on the development of culture, and on personal and social behavior. he declared, “philosophical thought is often the only ground for understanding and dialogue with those who do not share our faith.”32 epistemic justice calls for an understanding of the faith of others so as to be able to relate with them. it will be an epistemic injustice to judge other religious groups from afar. 5. philosophy enables the individual to prudently change or enhance some fundamental beliefs. it is an existential fact that most of the things we do or even the way we interpret our experiences are based on our fundamental beliefs. it is therefore the task of the priest using the rich tools of philosophy to question those beliefs that are not in agreement with the rationality of the human person. any belief that is found guilty before the ‘court of reason’ is bound to be discarded or improved upon. philosophy, therefore, helps to shape and sharpen our mental faculty33. 6. philosophy frees the individual from dogmatism. by dogmatism, i mean being imprisoned by thought or narrowmindedness. philosophy disposes us not to accept anything without rational justification. in this sense, philosophy frees the human person from the imprisonment of the prejudices derived from common sense, from habitual beliefs of our age and our environment, from culture and from our spontaneous convictions. one important aspect of philosophy is that it makes us to stand out in the midst of the crowd. it provides us with intellectual independence.34 the relevance of philosophy to the contemporary world the relevance of philosophy to our contemporary world cannot be over emphasized since its importance is geared towards making the society a better place. now, every state is characterized by its economic, social, religious and politics. philosophy can helped to 12 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 cushion some horrendous effects. of all those who explain the relevance of philosophy to the society, j.o. ejikemeuwa ndubisi is more wholistic because his thought on the matter bothers on both the social, religious, economic and the political sphere of the society.35 the assertions below are products of his findings. philosophy and cross-culturalism: the reality of numerous cultures with their idiosyncrasies more often than not causes rift. however, philosophy is necessary to combat actions of war and conflict among people of different backgrounds. in our world of today where there are people of different races and nationalities, different ideological and religious orientations, there is the need to make sense of the whole quagmire. it is unfortunate that the society in which we live in recognizes those they feel are from their locality. for instance, where the white man feels at home with only his fellow white man, or a black man feeling same about his fellow blacks. there is a kind of natural hatred of one race or group against another. this is where the study of philosophy plays a major role. our knowledge of substance and accidents in metaphysics (a branch of philosophy) shows that every human person shares one substance – the humanity of the human person. the humanness of the white man or the black man or as evident in the different ethnic groups in nigeria, the hausa, igbo, yoruba, efik or ijaw is not lesser or higher than the humanness of the fulani, tiv, idoma, esan or egede as the case may be. we all share one humanity. the fact that one is a white man or a black man or igbo, yoruba or hausa is simply accidental to the being of the individual person. in this regard, therefore, the study of philosophy will certainly play a vital role to unite all communities of the world together. philosophy and the political sphere of the society: the society cannot be devoid of political influence. in fact, some scholars say everything is politicized. with this they mean that one cannot separate politics from the happenings of the world. be that as it may, it is important to state that in history the world has experienced different political dispensations. it is true that the human person is a political animal but it is also true that politics as it is being practiced philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 13 in the different countries cannot grow or even develop without the aid of philosophy. our politicians need at least a little dose of philosophy in order to be truly rational in all their dealings. j. ndubisi affirmed that “in the political sphere, a dose of philosophy, especially, is necessary to enable us to appreciate our political heritage. the fact that “ideas rule the world” points to the practical role philosophy plays or should play in the politics of the world. it takes a good dose of philosophy for one to understand and evaluate the essential needs of one’s people”.36 the role of philosophy in the political sphere will be much more appreciated in the area of policy-making. philosophers or rather those who have had some training in philosophy are better equipped to help the government to articulate good polices that will touch the lives of the people positively. philosophy can help nigerian politicians to desist from the politics of acrimony and bitterness. since philosophy upholds the dignity of human nature, politicians will certainly benefit from it given that it will dispose them to be fair in all their dealings. ndubisi holds that philosophy certainly will help all to be true citizens and to have regard for the constituted authority.37 philosophy and religious pluralism: philosophy has a major role to play in the way and manner religion is understood and practiced in our world. ndubisi holds that from our knowledge of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, we learnt that everything that is, derived its being from the being that is by necessity. this being that is by necessity is what religious people call god. this is a simple philosophical knowledge. the implication of this understanding is that there is only one supreme being that is approached differently38. he went further to state that, the knowledge of philosophy will help the contemporary world to appreciate the fact that each of us is unique and as such every religion is unique. it is philosophy that should help us to respect the views of others, be it religious or otherwise. basic philosophical knowledge will make christians, moslems and traditional worshipers in the world to tolerate each other without any form of violence or hatred. since philosophy is 14 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 the love of wisdom, it will dispose us to appreciate the good aspects of each religious group in the world. in this regard, christians and moslems are to see themselves as collaborators and not as enemies.39 philosophy and economic development/viability: ndubisi holds that economic development has to do with the production and distribution of goods and services for the good of human society. philosophy has what it takes to develop the economy of every state. philosophy, we must recall, is a reflective activity. it takes only a reflective mind to bring about economic growth and development. it will not be an overstatement to say, for instance, that nigerian economic problem is hinged on the lack of philosophical training. it is clear that when the mind is developed, it will certainly affect other aspects of human endeavor. according to him (ndubisi), ‘philosophy may not be a practical study or of immediate practical utility, but it contains what is finest and noblest in human life, because it is concerned not with the production of material wealth, but with the advancement of the wealth of the mind. one thing that is clear is that a developed mind translates to developed economy.40 he went further to state that there is a close relationship between a philosopher and an entrepreneur. a good philosopher is a good entrepreneur. entrepreneurship has to do with the process of generating ideas and venturing into business risks for the purpose of making profits. it takes only a reflective mind to generate ideas; and it also takes a reflective mind to actualize these ideas. philosophy has to do with creativity. this is what the society needs. we need philosophy to sharpen our creative minds for the purpose of economic growth and development in the world. this will bring us to philosophy of economics which has to do with inquiries concerning rational choice, appraisal of economic outcomes, institutions and processes and the ontology of economic phenomena.41 philosophy and scientific inventions: the contemporary world is said to be a digital world. many scientific inventions have been explored to bring about ease in the society. this explains why people philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 15 feel the sciences are the ‘saviour’ of the society. indeed, the sciences have been seen as the redeemer of mankind. however, it is important to note that the sciences are able to thrive because they employed philosophical tools. in other words, philosophy asks the questions for which sciences or scientists find the answers and thrive. there is no scientific invention that is devoid of speculation, there is none that does not require analysis, and there is none that is devoid of prescription. these are important methods of philosophy. i guess this is why in the ancient times philosophers were called scientists. conclusion it suffices to state therefore that the relevance of philosophy to nation building will help to jettison the erroneous belief that philosophy does not bake bread. for me, philosophy does not only bake bread but also, butters the bread. the misconception of philosophy that we see and hear these days are wont to be dismissed and discountenanced as abstruse and recondite. philosophy, as traditionally understood, is the study, by the use of reason, of the deepest realities. it deals with the nature of the material world, the nature of man, the existence of god. it defends our capacity to know the truth and explores the transcendental of truth, goodness, and beauty. it explains the way of life that rational beings should follow. in the study of logic, it prepares and strengthens the mind to analyze arguments, and distinguish truth from falsity. endnotes 1 fatiou a. s. “plato’s philosopher king in the political thought of the sixth century byzantine”. florilegium vol. 7 1985 p. 3 2 monday l. igbafen. foundation issues in social and political philosophy: an introductory reader, ekpoma: a. inno printing press, 2013, p.30. 3 ndubisi j.o ‘the role of philosophy in contemporary society: the nigerian experience’ humanity & social sciences journal 10 (1): 2015. 40 4 staniland h. s. “what is philosophy” issues & problems in philosophy, kolawole owolabi, (ed.). ibadan: stevart graphics 2000 p. 3 5 lawhead, william. the voyage of discovery: a historical introduction to philosophy, 2nd edition america 2002 print xxv 6 izibili, matthew. readings in philosophy, ekpoma: zibnice press, 2009, p. 4 16 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 7 aso william. rudiments of philosophy for undergraduates; lagos. fropiel international ltd 2018, p. 3 8 kolawole owolabi ‘the nature and problems of epistemology’ issues & problems in philosophy, kolawole owolabi, (ed.). ibadan: stevart graphics 2000 p 49 9olayinka opafola ‘basic problems in philosophy” ” issues & problems in philosophy, kolawole owolabi, (ed.). ibadan: stevart graphics 2000 p. 31 10 enomah, sylvester. the nature of metaphysics vol. 1. ibadan bibis press 1997, p. 11 11 izibili, matthew. readings in philosophy ekpoma: zibnice press, 2009, p.13 12 iroegbu pantaleon. metaphysics: the kpim of philosophy. owerri, international universities press 1995, p. 22 13 ibid, p. 21 14 fadahunsi, ayo. metaphysics: a historical and thematic introduction. ibadan: hope pub 2004, p. 9 15 omoregbe, joseph. epistemology (theory of knowledge): a systematic and historical study. lagos joja educational research and publishers 2013, p. vi 16 ibid 17 jimoh, anselm. certitude and doubt: a study guide in epistemology, ibadan: ebony books & kreations 2013, p.8 18 agidigbi, blessing. epistemology: central issues and problems. ibadan kairos publishing 2015, p. 2 19 asekhauno a. & ogbenika, gregory. ‘what ethics is?’ the substance of ethics & morality. benin city. justice jeco printing & publishing global 2017, p. 2 20 aso william. rudiments of philosophy for undergraduates; lagos. fropiel international ltd 2018, p. 107 21 izibili, m. classics in ethical discourses: a selection of figures. benin city: optima quality print limited 2018, p. 3 22 izibili, matthew. professional ethics: a reader. benin city lucosem pub. 2016, p. 2-3 23 aso william. rudiments of philosophy for undergraduates, p.123. 24 adeniyi o. r ‘the nature of logic’ issues & problems in philosophy kolawole owolabi (ed.) stevart graphics 2000 p. 135 25 aso william. rudiments of philosophy for undergraduates, p. 124-125 26 australia catholic bishops conference, programm for priestly formation 2015 n. 1 27 ibid 28 decree on the training of priests vatican ii optatam totius 28 october, 1965. n.15 29 ibid 30 ratio fundamentalis institutionis sacerdotalis: a publication of the catholic secretariat of nigeria. n. 51 31gleghorn, michael, ‘why we shouldn’t hate philosophy’ https://bible.org article. retrieved 29th november 2018. p. 1 philosophy, human formation and the contemporary world | 17 32 john paul ii. fides et ratio: an encyclical. ibadan: pauline publications 14 september 1998, n 107. 33 ndubisi j.o ‘the role of philosophy in contemporary society: the nigerian experience’ humanity & social sciences journal 10 (1): 2015, p40 34 ibid 35 ibid p 40 36 ibid. p. 43 37 ibid. p. 43 38 ibid p.44 39 ibid p.44 40 ibid. p.44 41 ibid. p.44 68 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith abstract this paper attempts a theological reflection on the eucharist, with the aim of reawakening interest in daily participation at eucharistic celebrations. with the gruesome attack on persons during the eucharistic celebrations, a lot of fear and questions have gradually led to a decline in mass attendance. despite the challenges, it must be noted that the eucharist gives meaning and purpose to our everyday existence, putting us in constant communion with god, so the fear and terror, pain and sorrow cannot be compared to the union we have with christ at each eucharistic celebration. using the analytical and expository method, this work tries to delineate basic truths as it pertains to daily participation at eucharist celebrations and its consequent effects upon the lives of individuals. this piece concludes that the eucharist is the remedy for terror as well as the source for the reign of peace and tranquillity. we must all come to an appreciation of this august sacrament with the eyes of faith. keywords: eucharist, the last supper, sacrificial banquet, the word, communion. introduction the church in nigeria, in recent times, has been at the receiving end of many uncoordinated attacks against religion by radical elements of society either to intimidate christians or to diminish their activities. particularly glaring and disturbing was the gruesome murder of reverend father joseph gor, reverend father felix tyolaha, their catechist and sixteen (16) other christ’s faithful, theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 69 including little children, during the celebration of the holy mass in the morning of tuesday, 24th april, 2018 in mbalom, markurdi diocese. the rippling effect of this singular event on the faith of the local church in markurdi has surely gone beyond the locality. ever since this gruesome attack, many persons have been scared to go for morning mass. others may even have questioned the efficacy of the eucharist and the actual presence of christ. regardless of the emotional background of these questions, one cannot but recognize an urgent need to recall and proclaim once again, the truth of the eucharist as handed down by christ himself. that is why this paper, which, for the most part, consists of a series of short theological reflections on the eucharist, is vitally important. it is an attempt to remind ourselves that the eucharist is unquestionably the selfoffering of christ to the father; it is his sacrifice. it is the true body and blood of our lord and savior jesus christ. admittedly, it can be very hard to see the eucharist as described above, especially in difficult times like our own. nonetheless, what we need right now is the peace, the joy, and the power of the holy spirit as well as the medicine and healing of faith, not ruling out what the government should be doing to promptly and responsibly protect all her citizens, especially the most vulnerable. in the meantime, let us ask our father in heaven to send us afresh the holy spirit to console us, defend us, protect us, deliver us from evil. in addition, let us implore our heavenly father to rekindle in us the fire of his divine love, and to reopen our eyes to see the beauty and the wonders of his goodness and faithfulness everywhere, in the church, and especially in the eucharist. clearly, right now, our faith is being tested, and our deep conviction about the eucharist is under heavy pressure, given the present circumstances. but we cannot afford not to longer believe firmly in the eucharist, which is central to all the teachings of the church. faith, which has always done great things in the lives of the saints (cf. hebrews 11), is as important as the air we breathe. that is why, even in very difficult times, “if faith does not take on new life, deep conviction and real strength from the encounter with jesus christ, [everything we do and hope to accomplish may yield little or no fruit at all]”1. 70 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 we need the holy spirit today more than ever to help us to pray in these most difficult times. we cannot forget that whenever we pray as christians, we do not pray alone. the holy spirit does come to our aid, particularly in our weakness (romans 8:26-27), in these senseless and very depressing times, because the lord our god is always faithful (2 timothy 2:13). the eucharist is a mandate, an obligation that one has to understand correctly. when jesus christ said, at the last supper, “do this in memory of me” (lk 22:19), he empowered his disciples and subsequent generations of followers to do what he did that night. thenceforth, the eucharist became their responsibility and a very special privilege. the eucharist is not a mere human invention. in fact, it is doing what jesus christ did, and has commanded his disciples to do, in his memory: namely, 1) to offer to the father the sacrifice that he made of his life for us sinners, and for the whole world; 2) to take bread and wine for the sacrifice, not an animal: 3) to say over the gifts of bread and wine a prayer of thanksgiving and praise to the father; then, 4) to break the bread, rip it, and 4) to give it, share it, and have it eaten by his disciples (by those who believe in it). but the eucharist is not only something that jesus christ has commanded his disciples to do in his memory. he himself is present in his church in all liturgical celebrations, totally and continuously offering himself to the father in thanksgiving and praise, and is particularly present in the eucharistic species, as a unique expression of the very special love of god for mankind. the holy eucharist is fundamentally about sharing in the immortal life of god who gives his people hope that nothing can take away from them. it lifts the eyes and hearts of god’s people beyond the veil; the stronghold of sin and death, the scourge of division and hatred. the uplifting of the eyes and hearts of the people of god enables them to journey enthusiastically and confidently towards their fatherland in heaven in spite of all the disturbing and terrorizing activities of some violent men, women and children. the unchanging light of the gospel message theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 71 contributes greatly in combating the existing problems of our own country and of the world at large such as greed, gross disrespect for human life, violence and destruction. the eucharist equips his people to do this battle effectively. this is why for some people the celebration of the holy eucharist gives life and meaning to their day. it is not therefore uncommon to find many catholics who begin their day, regardless of their occupation, with attending holy mass. they are right. we should never intend to miss the mass, nor should we allow anything to stop us from going to mass. 1. the celebration of the holy eucharist: the reenactment of the event of the last supper on holy thursday and the sacrifice of good friday. the eucharist is a unique celebration in that it is a reenactment of what christ did at the last supper and of his sacrifice on the cross on good friday. even though they are distinct, they are nonetheless the same sacrifice of christ. what the church does when the validly ordained priest and the people of god are celebrating the holy eucharist is truly a continuation and commemoration of the last supper. the celebration of the holy eucharist is the means by which christ and his body the church continues to perform the rite of the last supper; prepare the last supper, and eat the last supper, the unique event through which christ wanted to be remembered. christ wanted to be remembered as one who had a passover meal with his apostles and gave them his own body to eat, and his own blood to drink under the appearances of bread and wine, for the forgiveness of sins.2 in the water and blood that came out of his pierced side on the cross, we the new people of god are generated. the water symbolizes baptism, while the blood symbolizes the eucharist. this is why, far from being like grass, or as deserving to be wasted, which is how some people have erroneously come to perceive us, we christians are the most precious of all of god’s creation, precisely because we are the body of christ. “behold my son, in whom i am 72 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 well pleased”. the blood of christ washes away our sins. and god has forgiven us in christ. the celebration of the holy eucharist commemorates christ the most loving person the world ever knew, and it reminds us that deep seated sins are paid for. actually, our sins are paid for by no other than christ himself, with his own precious life. thus, in the celebration of the eucharist we remember christ who has established a new and eternal covenant, who has given his own blood for our sins, once and for all. 2. christ is the food eaten, the victim (the lamb) of the sacrifice another attentive look at the eucharistic celebration shows that it consists of the actions of christ which are identical with his actions at the last supper in the upper room: at the last supper, christ presides; he takes bread and gives thanks, gives it to his disciples, saying, “take this, all of you and eat of it; this is my body”. the bread truly became the body of christ, and the wine truly became the blood of christ, while the appearances of bread and wine remained unchanged. this is what is called transubstantiation3. 3. christ himself is the priest christ the priest continues in every age to give the faithful his true body and blood for eternal life through the holy eucharist. the eucharistic celebration is “an action of christ the priest and of his body which is the church, [and] is a sacred action surpassing all others; no other action of the church can equal its efficacy by the same title and to the same degree”.4 this is because christ himself is the “high priest of the new covenant; it is he himself who presides invisibly over every eucharistic celebration”5 ensuring a perfect and unparalleled celebration. in the eucharistic celebration the bishop or priest represents christ. he acts “in the person of christ the head (in persona christi capitis) [,] presides over the assembly, speaks after the reading, receives the offering, says the eucharistic prayer”.6 he does all of these in the name of christ, and he is ordained to carry-out these functions over which christ himself presides. theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 73 4. two great moments: the word and the eucharist. the eucharistic celebration is divided into two major parts, namely, the liturgy of the word and the liturgy of the eucharist. these two major parts are related and are “so closely connected with each other that they form but one single act of worship”,7 for jesus christ is the word proclaimed and the eucharist received in the eucharistic celebration. the second vatican council teaches that christ is both present in the eucharistic species and through the word.8 the liturgy of the word and liturgy of the eucharist are one and unbroken action of christ who came into the world not to be served but to serve and offer himself for the salvation of the world. in the liturgy of the word, it is christ himself that is proclaimed, and he it is who speaks. “[w]hen god speaks through the many inspired words of the bible, he communicates to us his one word, his son”.9 5. eucharistic mission and unity in the liturgy of the eucharist, christ, the food of eternal life, effects an ongoing transformation in the faithful and draws them together in the one sacrament of love and unity by giving to them one bread and one cup, his own body and blood. then he sends forth his church into the world to preach and celebrate this mystery of salvation,10 so that “[f]rom listening to the word of god, faith [will be] born [and] strengthened (rom. 10:17); in the eucharist the word made flesh [will continue to give] himself to us as our spiritual food”.11the word of god that is read, proclaimed, listened to and accepted in the heart is not separate from the liturgy of the eucharist since it is the same christ who speaks in the liturgy of the word, gives himself as the word of eternal life, and who, in the liturgy of the eucharist offers himself as the bread of eternal life: “indeed, the word which we proclaim and accept is word made flesh (john. 1:14); it is inseparably linked to christ’s person and the sacramental mode of his continued presence in our midst”.12 the second vatican council teaches: “in his church he [christ] instituted the wonderful sacrament of the eucharist by which the unity of the church is both signified and brought about”13. the bishop, priest and the entire faithful are united in the eucharistic 74 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 celebration. there is one shepherd, one cup, one bread, one sacrifice, one truth, one way, one purpose, one savior of the world, one redeemer of mankind, namely, jesus of nazareth who draws all men and women and children to himself. one can see here vividly why christ commanded that this sacrament of his body and blood be celebrated in memory of him, and in memory of the church too, for the church is his body. in this celebration, one can see clearly the real nature and definition of the church. 6. the holy eucharist as a memorial we get to understand better the eucharist and appreciate it more as a memorial when we realize that in the jewish custom “all memorial is done in obedience to god’s command”14. for instance, the feast of the unleavened bread (the pesach/passover: exodus 12, leviticus 23, numbers 9, deuteronomy 16, ezekiel 45, joshua 5, 2 kings 23, 2 chronicles 30 & 35, and ezra 6), the feast of weeks, also known as feast of ingathering, a convocation of and call at sinai to holiness: exodus 19: 1-6, 34:22, numbers 28:26, deuteronomy 16:10,16), and the feast of booths (sukkoth) and the day of assembly (azaret) (leviticus 23, deuteronomy 16, numbers 29:35, nehemiah 8:18, 2 chronicles 7:9, and ezekiel 43:27). they were all observed in obedience to god’s command. the eucharist is an order to do this in memory of jesus christ. but the eucharist goes deeper than that, for whenever the church celebrates the sacrament of the holy eucharist as a memorial, she does not only fulfill christ’s command, namely, “do this in memory of me”, but also christ himself is present, doing what he did on the night he was betrayed – i.e., the rite and prayers are his. this means, among other things, that the holy eucharist is not just a remembrance or anamnesis of past event of the lord’s passion, death and resurrection, and his glorious return, but rather is “the sacramental re-presentation”15 reenactment of the saving event of christ.16 he took bread (as now he takes bread), said the prayer of thanksgiving (as he does now), broke the bread (and he breaks it now), and gave it to his disciples (as now he gives it to his disciples), and said, take this all of you, and eat of it. this is my body … this theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 75 is my blood. it is all happening right now, thanks to ritusetpreces, i.e., the rite and prayers (sc 48). the holy eucharist as a memorial is not just the recollection of an event but really a reenactment of what happened about two thousand years ago. “ it joins together the past and the present: what happened in the past is happening now”.17 a reenactment is a privileged moment in this perpetuity of his death, the forgiveness of sins, the redemption, the reconciliation and restoration of the world to the father. the people of god re-live that very moment of salvation in the course of the celebration of the eucharist when they participate in the rite and prayers, actively, consciously, and fully (sc 47 & 48). furthermore, the eucharist reminds the faithful of their liberation from slavery to sin and death, and the peace and love jesus brings to the world. bouyer makes the comprehension of liturgical «memorial» even clearer, saying: it [i.e., the memorial] in no way means a subjective, human psychological act of returning to the past, but an objective reality destined to make something or someone perpetually present before god and for god himself… it is an institution, we may say, established by god, given to his people and imposed on them by him, in order to perpetuate forever his salvific interventions. not only will the memorial assure the faithful subjectively of its permanent effectiveness, but above all it will assure this very effectiveness through a pledge which they can and must represent to him, a pledge of his own fidelity.18 the people of god are expected to celebrate and respect this memorial, because it will not only shape their lives but it will guide and guard them. 7. the holy eucharist as a sacrificial banquet the eucharist is also a banquet that has the nature of a sacrifice. g. dalman observes that in the jewish practice, “every meal, especially when bread was used, was looked upon as sacrificial…”19 always or for the most part, the time of meals for the jews was time of thanksgiving, praise, worship of god, for he gives bread to the 76 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 hungry, and protects the widow and the orphan. the eucharist is sacrificial banquet not only because of the bread that is offered in the celebration, but also because it is an offering of christ’s own body and blood on the sacred altar.20 it is a sacrifice of christ’s body and blood in an un-bloody manner. it is a celebration of the one and supreme sacrifice of christ on the cross. it celebrates the anamnesis of his death on the cross21 and of his resurrection from the dead and of his ascension into heaven. there is no new sacrifice of christ in the eucharist. the sacrifice of christ on the cross is unique. in the eucharist what is celebrated is the sacramental memorial (anamnesis) of christ’s sacrifice… it is neither the mental recollection of a past event nor a repetition of the sacrifice of christ offered once for all for our salvation. it is the sacramental or liturgical celebration of that which took place once for all in the past in order that the present community of believers can participate in its redemptive reality.22 none of this would make sense without faith, by means of which, like eyes, christians perceive very profound and great things. faith, like a heart of flesh, makes them able penetrate and understand things of divine nature, including the mind of god. let us go back to talking about the eucharist as a unique sacrifice. the eucharistic celebration paints for us, as it were, a vividpicture of the passion of christ. it plays out for every generation of believers the unique drama of our salvation, is “the sacramental sign of christ’s sacrifice [on the cross]”,23 and is “… the perfect sacrifice that imparts definitive reconciliation on the altar of the cross on golgotha. no one partakes of its fruit of salvation who still clings directly or indirectly to the old order of salvation, fraught with shadows, which is henceforth wholly useless”.24 the sacrifice of christ is not only in and of itself perfect but also it demands that those who appreciate it and celebrate it live a new way of life, a sacrificial life, a reconciling life of selfless love. among the ancient greeks there existed a nexus between sacrifice and banquet as two important aspects of the same event. d. theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 77 e. smith, writes: “indeed, the two were so closely connected that a sacrifice without a feast had to be specifically defined as a “banquetless sacrifice”.25“similarly among the esan people of edo state almost every sacrifice to the gods was made in the context of a meal. the gods were offered some of the meal and wine symbolically, while the people ate and drank merrily…. it was like dinning with the gods”.26 our lord talked about the coming of the kingdom as a great banquet, as a wedding feast (matthew 22). his last supper with his disciples points to that final banquet.27 the celebration of the eucharist brings the faithful here and now to that promised banquet feast of the lamb, in which the goal of salvation history will be definitively perfected. to sum up, in the sacrament of the holy eucharist, the church celebrates (in the context of a sacrificial banquet and in an un-bloody manner) the death of christ on the cross and his victory over sin and death, once and for all. in it, christ the priest, the altar, and the victim offers thanksgiving and praise to god his father, our father for the salvation of the world. understanding the holy eucharist this way, that is, as a perfect indication and full expression of the love of god in christ for the whole of humanity,the eucharist in fact gives christians power that nothing in this world can take away from them. it gives them immortality. and it gives them the grace and power of the holy spirit to desire heaven and eternal life. the eucharist shapes them into living witnesses of the gospel of christ, and of the world to come, that is, the kingdom of god, which is already among us (luke 17:21). 8. the eucharist as an offering the eucharist as a sacrificial banquet already connotes the idea an offering. christ offers himself freely and completely to god the father through the ministry of the ordained priest.28 “no one takes my life from me. i lay it down, of my own accord. no one takes it from me” (john 10:18). besides, christ is always present wherever the eucharist is celebrated not only in the person of the ordained minister, but also in the proclaimed word, and in the praying assembly, but especially in the eucharistic species.29 in the 78 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 eucharistic celebration, christ offers himself to his heavenly father as a sacrifice of praise, for the forgiveness of sins. and he gives his own life, his body and blood to his people as food of eternal life.30 when christ took bread, said the blessing and said: “this is my body”, and then took wine and said the blessing and said “this is my blood”. he transformed ordinary bread and wine into his own body and blood, keeping intact the appearances of the bread and wine, so that his disciples would be able to eat of it and drink of it. this change of the substance (i.e., the transubstantiation) of the bread and wine is continued and sustained in the church through the action of the ordained priest, during the eucharistic celebration, when the ordained priest invokes the holy spirit to infuse the bread and wine. he appeals to god the father to send the holy spirit upon the bread and wine and change them into the true body and blood of christ31. and that is what really happens. the bread and wine change into the true body and blood of christ, respectively., the presentation of gifts in the eucharistic celebration is incomplete without the giving of self, without the submission of one’s entire life to the will of the father who so loved the world that he gave to the world his only begotten son. and his son, in turn, gave himself, that is, laid down his life for the salvation of the world. there is no greater love than that. 9. the eucharist as communion the catechism of the catholic church has it that “the celebration of the eucharistic sacrifice is wholly directed toward the intimate union of the faithful with christ through communion. to receive communion is to receive christ himself who has offered himself for us”.32 this communion, (which is jesus) that the faithful receive, effects a transformation because he, the lamb of god, takes away the sins of the world and at the same time gives to the faithful the grace to live a good and holy life.33 paul uses the world koinonia for the lord’s supper to signify communion that connotes a close relationship, a unity, and harmony among the people of god. he writes: “the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communion in the blood of christ? the bread which we break, is it not a communion in the body of christ?”34 theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 79 these questions are rhetorical. paul firmly believes that the eucharist unites and forms the new people of god into christ’s body, into communion, wherein the full mystery of christ finds expression. in other words, the eucharist forms christians, the new people of god into one body, one spirit in christ. the eucharist enables and encourages peoples of different cultures and different backgrounds to profess one faith in the one and same lord jesus christ, who feeds his sheep with the word of god and with his own body and blood, without any discrimination whatsoever. recall the men that he chose to be his disciples, the men with whom he celebrated the last supper. they were from many different backgrounds.therefore, in that single act of thanksgiving jesus the one great mediator united what is earthly with what is heavenly, that is to say, the sheer goodness of the father with the needs of his people. a brief theological evaluation there are other salient points about the eucharist to pay attention to. but one may deem particularly interesting the following: in the eucharistic celebration, the church continues to remember the marvels of god, and continues to celebrate his great love for mankind in christ jesus our lord, and she continues to ask to be sanctified and to be “brought together in unity by the holy spirit.”35 it is right and fitting not only to give thanks to god for his goodness and love, but also to live appropriately, fittingly and consistently as children of god in this world that appears ever hostile to the gospel of christ. the holy spirit, sent by the father and the son, supplies the grace needed for the new life in christ, and at the same time the holy spirit binds the faithful together as one in christ.36 a. the holy eucharist as a sacrament the holy eucharist is a sacrament that “actually brings about the intimate bonds of communion among all the faithful in the body of christ which is the church (1 cor. 10:16).”37 it is through the spirit that the eucharist becomes communion with god38 and with the faithful. it is through the power of the spirit that “[t]he eucharistic sacrifice is intrinsically directed to the inward union of the faithful 80 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 with christ through communion”.39 through the working of the holy spirit, the eucharist draws all the faithful who receive it into a dialogue of love and service. when the eucharist is being celebrated one can see that, there is “a reflection of this eternal dialogue of love between the father and the son in the holy spirit”40, and one can appreciate how it is, in the holy eucharist, that we enter into divine intimacy with jesus. by active, full and conscious participation in the eucharist the faithful become a holy people, and they grow in holiness, in faith and in unity, and are being knitted into one body of christ, one spirit in christ, into a people who make the mind of christ their own (cf. philippians 2:5). this is why it is particularly fitting to call the eucharista communion, the sacrament of unity. b. passover meal of the new covenant people of god. the eucharist is also the new passover meal. it brings christ’s faithful together in faith and in practice, in every age and in every continent, and makes them the new people of god, the new people of the new covenant by the sacramental signs and by the work of the holy spirit in the eucharistic celebration. the visible structure and perennial nature of the celebration of the eucharist, easily recognizable in and of themselves, form a strong and profound bond among peoples, whose delight has always been the lord, his new law of love and his mighty but gentle work in their midst – local language and customs, time and place notwithstanding. hence, whether one goes to the far east, or to faraway india or to china, to australia or to russia or to ireland, or to nigeria or senegal, one would recognize the eucharistic celebration there, sooner or later, because it has the same structure. the vastly different socio-cultural experiences and backgrounds, the different traditions and local customs of the ordained priests and of the worshipping communities of peoples do not render the eucharistic celebration incomprehensible. regardless of time and place, the celebration always begins with “in the name of the father, and of the son, and of the holy spirit”, followed by the penitential rite, the gloria and/or the collect, the readings, and homily. then follows the presentation of gifts or offertory, the prayer over the gifts, the preface, the theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 81 eucharistic prayer, the great amen, the our father, exchange of sign of peace, agnus dei, communion, and post communion prayer, and almost always ends like this, “go forth, the mass is ended”or: “go and announce the gospel of the lord by the conduct of your life”. and the people respond, “thanks be to god”. other invariable elements are the materials used, namely, bread and wine. in addition and above all, the words and gestures of the ordained priest, during the blessing and consecration of the bread and wine, are always constant and invariable. the ordained priest appeals to god the father to send the power of the holy spirit on the bread and wine and change them into the body and blood of christ. and the bread and wine truly become the body and blood of christ, even though the appearances of the bread and wine remain unchanged. c. the transformation of the people of god the bread and wine are not only change into the body and blood of christ in the course of the eucharistic celebration, but also the transformation of the faithful, the disciples of christ is prayed for: “grant that we, who are nourished by the body and blood of christ, filled with the holy spirit, may become one body, one spirit in christ” (eucharistic prayer iii). it starts with the conversion of the heart. «when the heart is transformed [,] love (koinonia, communion) is established».41 the heart is the garden where virtues can be cultivated, by the help of the holy spirit, so that vices may wither and die. when the heart is transformed by the holy spirit, it bears fruits of righteousness, holiness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control and the fear of the lord. d. the actions of the holy spirit in the faithful the holy spirit is the author of true conversion. it turns the hearts and minds of the faithful toward the father the creator of all in heaven and on earth, and to his only begotten son jesus christ,42 who takes away the sins of the world. by the power of the holy spirit, christians are innocent and serene, all the time, like gentle lambs in the midst of wolves. they are a profoundly happy people, who radiate happiness and joy, all the time. daily they dedicate 82 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 themselves to good works among their fellow men and women. the change, the conversion of heart and of morals, may not be immediately evident, but it surely does occur. take paul for example: he became a changed man on the road to damascus (acts 9). unfortunately, ananias and others were still afraid of him and of his name because they thought that he was the same saul that they knew. saul viciously attacked the church and persecuted the disciples of jesus the way. the lord brought him to his knees. he became one of the greatest champions of the same cause that he sought to eliminate. the sacrament of penance and reconciliation offers us another example of how the change of heart can occur, without necessarily showing on the surface. when the priest absolves penitents from their sins, their sins are forgiven. every so often, however, some penitents still remember their sins, and the scars of their sins still remain, that is, long after the prayer of absolution is said over them. but the truth is that the penitent is indeed a new creation, after the confession, after a good contrition, after the absolution and satisfaction of penance. e. the real presence the real presence of jesus christ in the eucharist is absolutely true, even though nearly always it takes faith to see it. the eucharist is the true body and blood of jesus christ. in the eucharistic celebration, jesus christ, in union with the holy spirit (who helps his disciples to remember and to implement his teachings), speaks and instructs christians with the word of god and feeds them with his own body and blood, while always or for the most part he keeps intact the appearances of bread and wine. in this consists in part the immortality of christians, namely, the fact that jesus christ who was crucified, died, and rose again, and who dies no more, feeds his disciples daily with his incorruptible body and blood. he and his disciples become one body, one spirit, through the rite and prayers. the other constitutive part of the immortality of christians is the knowledge, the revelation of the power of god. “to know your power is the root of immortality” (wisdom 15). those who know the power of the true theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 83 god humble themselves. they do not dare to take a human life, made in the image and likeness of god. they do not play with the name of god, the unquenchable fire. every day and night, they beg the almighty, the immortal to give them of the spirit to drink, in order to become compassionate as their heavenly father. as long as they accept jesus as lord, they are becoming children of god. they are becoming like jesus, the only begotten son of god, the true friend of god, who was and is the face of god, the visible presence of god in the world.“i call you friends”, said he, “because i have made known to you everything that i have learned from the father” (john 15.15). one can see now how it is that the church not only offers a eucharistic prayer, that is, a thanksgiving prayer with jesus to the father, she is in fact always a thanksgiving prayer with jesus to the father. conclusion jesus christ is the common element of all that we have said about the eucharist as memorial, as offering, as sacrificial banquet and as communion. in short, jesus christ is the eucharist. he is the son of god, the second person of the blessed trinity. he is true god and true man. he is the one mediator between god and man, and between man and man. therefore, to believe in the eucharist is to have complete confidence in jesus christ. he is the ultimate revelation of the mind of god. he is the absolute truth about god the loving father. he always acted in complete obedience to the will of god his father, whom he has also revealed to us as our father as well (john 20:17). we have seen that whenever the church celebrates the sacrament of the holy eucharist, christ is truly present with his church, and she fulfils the command given to her by christ: “do this in memory of me”43. paul elucidates this command when he writes, “whenever you eat this bread, then, and drink this cup, you are proclaiming the lord’s death until he comes again”.44in carrying out this divine injunction, the church is in constant communion with christ, and is receiving eternal life, the fullness of life. 84 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 from all that we have seen above, and from all that the eucharist teaches us daily, it becomes imperative to embrace jesus christ and learn from him, who is our eucharist, the bread of life. we learn from him to live no longer for ourselves, but rather for god alone. consequently, missing the holy mass feels like and is indeed like missing the very source of life itself. let us go forward, relying on the help of the holy spirit, consolatory optime, lumen cordium, lux beatissima, the giver of wisdom and knowledge to draw us nearer to jesus christ the only begotten son of god. furthermore, we have a very deep joy that nothing can take away from us, because alive or dead we belong to the lord. endnotes 1 benedict xvi, christmas address to the roman curia, 22 december, 2011. 2 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization, floreat systens publications, benin city 2014,96 3 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization…. 98. 4 sc 7. 5 ccc 1348. 6 ccc 1348. 7 sc 56. 8 sc 7 9 c. e. miller, the celebration of the eucharist, alba house, new york 2oo1, 115. 10 sc 6. 11 benedict xvi, sacramentumcaritatis… 44 12 benedict xvi, sacramentumcaritatis… 45 13 sc 7. 14 d. n. power, «theology of eucharistic celebration» in a. j. chupungco, handbook for liturgical studies. vol. iii, eucharist a pueblo book. the liturgical press, collegeville, mn, 1999, 332. 15edeii. 16 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization…,77 17 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization….,77 18 l. bouyer, eucharist: theology and spirituality of the eucharistic prayer, trans. charles underhill quinn, university of notre dame press, notre dame, indiana 1968, 104. 19 w.r. crockett, eucharist: symbol of transformation…, 63. 20 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization….,80. 21 w.r. crockett, eucharist: symbol of transformation…, 120. theological insights on the eucharist as a strength of faith | 85 22 w.r. crockett, eucharist: symbol of transformation…, 95. 23 w.r. crockett, eucharist: symbol of transformation…, 121 24 j. auer; j. ratzinger, dogmatic theology:a general doctrine of the sacraments and the mystery of the eucharist…, 186. 25 d.e. smith, from symposium to eucharist: the banquet in the early christian world, fortress press. minneapolis 2003, 69. 26 j. okojie, the eucharisti celebration as an act of evangelization….,82 27 r. moloney, problems in theology: the eucharist…, 196. 28 the code of canon law, a text and commentary. edited by james a. coriden et al, theological publications in india bangalore 1995, 899. 29 sc 7. 30 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization…., 86 31 ccc 1375. 32 ccc 1382. 33 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization….,88 341cor. 10: 16. 35 eucharistic prayer ii. 36 gal. 3:28. 37 cl 19. 38«abide in me, and i in you». jn:15:4 39 ede 16. 40 f. stoekcl, john paul ii and the mystery of eucharist, pauline’s publishing, pasay philippines 2006, 129. 41 p. e. fink, «theology of eucharist» in the new dictionary of sacramental worship, ed. p. e. fink, a michael glazier book, the liturgical press, collegeville mn, 1990, 439. 42 j. okojie, the eucharistic celebration as an act of evangelization….,93 43 lk. 22:19. 441 cor. 11:26. reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 179 reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s theory of regeneration abstract reincarnation elicits the notion that the existence of man is beyond the physical life. it emphasizes the possibility of the soul’s birth into another body after death. the goal of this work is to critique echekwube’s naturalization of reincarnation as regeneration. the study employs the philosophical method of exposition and critical analysis. the theoretical framework is founded on the theory of naturalized metaphysics. this theory is the work of two contemporary philosophers: james ladyman and don ross. they postulated that reality which is the subject matter of metaphysics can be explained through the employment of scientific methods. the study locates echekwube’s description of reincarnation as biological regeneration within such a theoretical framework. it however shows that the theory does not stay true to the original objective of metaphysics, which negotiates between two worlds, in the platonic terms, with the first being a reflection of the other. the study presents echekwube not putting an end to the debate and concludes that echekwube’s usage of reincarnation as regeneration is as a tool for the attainment of global harmony and peaceful co-existence. keywords: reincarnation, regeneration and naturalism 180 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 introduction reincarnation is about the possibility of the human soul existing in another body after its death. according to stephen lampe, “reincarnation is the idea that a human spirit is given the opportunity to come to the earth more than once; on each occasion, it takes on a different human body”1. traditional belief in reincarnation holds that an ancestor could be born into another physical body after the death of the former body. unlike transmigration, which portrays rebirth of a soul into another body as a consequence of the sins committed in the former life, reincarnation is believed to be an opportunity for an ancestor to commune with families left behind, perhaps, either for good or bad. in transmigration, the rebirth is seen as an opportunity to atone for one’s offences. the enormity of such offences determines the state into which such souls are reborn. it could be reborn in a cat, a plant or in the human person. it depends on the offence. transmigration is un-african while reincarnation is african. reincarnation is different: the soul can only be born into another body; no one child is a monopoly of the ancestral soul of a deceased parent/grandfather; the spirit of a dead father is believed to exist in the ancestral world and at the same time reincarnate in several children on earth. this same spirit is venerated at will. for ehiakhamen, this ancestral concurrent existence is a philosophical dilemma that remains unsolved in the african philosophical perspective. no matter the irreconcilable issues regarding reincarnation, the living and the living dead surely have something in common2. idowu is right then in saying that, “there seems to be a general belief that communion and communication are possible between those who are alive on earth and the deceased, and that the latter has the power to influence, help or molest the former”3. this is the reason the living dead are remembered and venerated. for mbiti, “...the living dead act as intermediaries between men and god, or between men and important, but more distant, forefathers”4. while they are manifested in the real world, they are at the same time venerated in the ancestral world. in the works of sophie oluwole, succinct justification of the reincarnation theory as enshrined by its proponents has been unable reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 181 to stand the test of time. the justification of reincarnation is usually based on physical manifestation such as: family resemblance, the abiku/ogbanje syndrome and memory transfer. if human family resemblance is a basic for the belief in reincarnation, then we have to rethink since “family resemblance is a phenomenon not restricted to man alone…. the fact that a grandchild resembles a dead ancestor does not therefore constitute conclusive evidence in support of reincarnation”5. what about the abiku/ogbanje syndrome, which is the cult of born-to-die children. how much of the cult of born to die children do we hear of today? very rare! for oluwole: the point is not that children are no more born with missing fingers or toes. the fact is that the great reduction in infant mortality rates makes the talk of abiku almost a piece of nonsense. improved medical facilities, better health enlightenment programmes have helped many africans to realize that no specific group of children is born primarily to die young6. the cases of memory transfer among africans and elsewhere is one that needs special attention. however, the admonition of oluwole is very apt. scientists and philosophers must endeavor to establish the possibility of memory transfer. the modus operandi of memory transfer under which reincarnation is held to occur must be properly understood7. otherwise, we must be deluded either by a demon or an ancient belief from which we must free ourselves. generally speaking, oluwole presents a philosophical admonition for african scholars in their rumination of such concepts as reincarnation and others. however, echekwube, rather than embarking on the perennial debate, decided to employ the term as a panacea to global unrest. in doing this, he substituted the concept of regeneration for reicarnation. many have read echekwube as attempting to put an end to the great debate on reincarnation. to others, that he denied the reality of the belief in reincarnation. however, this paper presents echekwube as naturalizing reincarnation for a greater end rather than its current unending perennial problematique. 182 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 reincarnation as regeneration in his inaugural lecture at ambrose alli university, ekpoma, anthony echekwube delivered a soul piecing lecture on “a metaphysical analysis of the concept of reincarnation: towards global harmony and peace” with a novel perspective. he substituted the term “reincarnation” for “regeneration”. for him, regeneration, derived from generation, a biological term better describes the reality often regarded as reincarnation: “regeneration is derived from generation which is a biological term for prolongation and multiplication of family group and membership”8. it is a term which would wake us from the slumber of the fact of our common ancestry. in another perspective, regeneration “… also connotes a change in spirit, turning from evil to good, a quality which humanity needs today in abundance.”9there are majorly two types of regeneration. they are: physical regeneration and moral or spiritual regeneration. for echekwube, physical regeneration prolongs the numerical strength of human families and is sustained by the clan. echekwube quoted kaluto who corroborated his position when he said that: science has shown that properties of parents are transmitted to their young ones through genes and this is called reproduction and not reincarnation. for this, i subscribe to echekwube who sees reincarnation as a regeneration of mankind. this shows that families reproduce their type which continues to surface in subsequent generations10. the second sense of regeneration is a moral or spiritual kind. in this angle, echekwube argued that humans may choose to be reborn in order to change from their evil ways and behave in a more positive manner. st. paul is cited as a better example of a moral or spiritual regenerated individual: from being the persecutor to being the persecuted, having been converted or metamorphosed. the application of this theory in the philosophical postulations of echekwube would better be understood with this extensive excerpt from his 2002 inaugural lecture at ambrose alli university, ekpoma, nigeria. he writes: reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 183 the ancestors whose characteristics are extended to their surviving family members facilitate the extension and sustenance of the family tree. this is physical but has a moral and spiritual dimension in the demand that the living be well behaved in order to enjoy the support of their departed but living ancestors. their role is manifested in the demands of the elders who are representatives that the customs of the society be strongly upheld. the scenario created is that in which our primogenitors who have physically departed this world are spiritually present by the extension of their psychic and spiritual qualities and at the same time in the spiritual abode catering for our well-being.... thus our ancestors sustain both the physical and spiritual regeneration of their successors, making their earthly homes stable and progressive. 11 this means by physical regeneration, an ancestor could be replicated in a grandchild and by spiritual regeneration, an ancestor could also be spiritually present in their grandchildren by the presence of their psychic and spiritual qualities in them. little wonder then that grandchildren are often seen with the likeness of their primogenitors in physique or in psyche. in which ever case, our primogenitors are biologically able to (perhaps without their knowing) influence our routine life by extending the aforementioned qualities on their grandchildren. the theory of naturalization the perspective of echekwube, who views reincarnation as regeneration is perceived as naturalization of that which is considered spiritual. what then is the theory of naturalization? naturalization is from naturalism, which holds that the method of the natural sciences could be used to study all there is on the grounds that all there is belong to the world of nature12. naturalism is the belief that nature is all that exist; all things supernatural therefore do not exist. 184 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 there are variants of naturalism, these include ethical natur alism; which holds ethics as a sui generis discipline and thereby re jects nonnatural properties, interfering with the domain. the second is dual; these are metaphysical naturalism and e pistemological naturalism. while metaphysical naturalism holds the belief that the universe should be treated as a single sphere without incursions from outside by souls and spirits while epistemological naturalism deals with the methods used to study the objects of philosophy13. for arthur c. danto, naturalism in recent usage is a species of philosophi cal monism according to which, whatever exist or h appens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through methods which although paradi gmatically exemplify in the natural sciences are continuous from domain to domain of objects and invents. hence, naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exist or could exist any entities or invents which lie in principles beyond scope of scientific explanation14. naturalism rejects all supernatural propositions which include nonnatural values. proper reading of naturalism unveils its position that mental properties are casually derived from an ontologically dependent system of non mental properties, powers or things. put d ifferently, allminds: content, powers and effect of minds are caused by natural phenomenon; the supernatural is in fact part of the natur al world15. biological naturalism is understood from the purview of the above. according to john searle, biological naturalism is “the view that mental phenomena such as consciousness and intentionality are natural biological phenomena on a par with growth, digestion or photosynthesis”16. two things are associated with biological naturalism (1) all mental phenomena from pains, tickles and inches are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain. (2) mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain. this means the brain is conscious compartment. for searle consciousness is caused reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 185 by the behavior of lower-level element such as neurons even though no single neuron is conscious. whatever can cause mental phenomena therefore must have such casual powers equivalent to brains17. from the foregone, biological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism otherwise known as ontological naturalism, philosophical naturalism and scientific naturalism is a philosophical view that (1) nature encompasses all that through space and time. (2) non-physical or quasi-physical substances such as information, ideas, values, etc can be reduced to physical account and subject to the laws of physics and explained through science18. it is in this perspective we understand the effort at biologizing ethics by philip kitcher, the effort at naturalising epistemology by w.v.o, quine; the effort at naturalising metaphysics by don ross and james ladyman and; in this purview also, we perceive reincarnation as being naturalized as regeneration by echekwube. kitcher’s “four ways of biologizing ethics” in evolution und ethik perceives that non-scientific approaches to moral questions are indecisive and uninformed. hence, he calls for biologizing the ethical project. for him, it is at the domain of sociobiology to address this problematique. in doing this, kitcher drew a map, which he termed “four ways to biologize ethic”. since it is the task of socio-biologist to address ethical issues. i propose the following: (1.) they are to explain how people have come to acquire ethical concepts to make judgements about themselves and others, (2). they are to teach us facts about human beings vis-a-vis existing moral principles and other unknown normative principles. (3). they are to explain the meaning of ethics and answer traditional questions on the objectivity of ethics. (4). they can lead us to revise our system of ethical principles. this is not far from the effort of w.v.o quine, who naturalized epistemology. for quine, “epistemology naturalized” in ontological relativity and other essays, epistemology should be part of the natural sciences. this way it could be naturalized and its content would be decisive19. quine disagreed with descartes that we can get from reasoning to certain foundations for knowledge of the natural world. quine’s epistemological project focuses on the empirical study of how human beings develop a theory of the natural world on 186 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 the basis of the sensory inputs. quine’s epistemology is a deviation from traditional or classical epistemology as espoused by descartes and others before him. in every thing must go: metaphysics naturalised of don ross and james ladyman, a similar project of naturalizing metaphysics is enacted. they present analytic metaphysics as a failure in its pursuit of the objective truth, and argued that it be discontinued. david hume had earlier called for all unscientific literary endeavors be committed to the flames. the twentieth century vienna circle with its verifiability principle which states that a statement is meaningful only if there is a way to determine its truth. later on, they were accused of being victims of their own reed. ross and ladyman’s position are better regarded as “neopositivism”. its aim is the unification of sciences. that is, making coherent sense of the various picture of the world emerging from physics and spatial science. they admonished that metaphysics should not be based on philosophers’ apriori intuitions and common sense. the question i have asked myself is whether echekwube borrowed a leap from this theory of naturalism. from all indications, yes! he has looked at reincarnation through the lens of genetics: science. for this singular reason many scholars have disagreed with him. those who partially agreed with him agree that there are laws of physics which enable us to explain things scientifically; including reincarnation but also to submit contrary to the possible logical conclusion of some scientist the existence of the unmoved mover or the maker of the laws of physics/laws of nature. critique of reincarnation as regeneration echekwube holds that regeneration is a better terminology, which describes the reality of reincarnation to have children, to respect and honor elders and to have a sense of communal living. for him, “…regeneration ….is derived from generation which is a biological term for prolongation and multiplications of family group and membership”20. regeneration is fulfillment of the ancient and ever new command of god to multiply and to make use of the earth according to its ability21. regeneration explains how we come from reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 187 god who is the source and summit of all there is; in a special way, it describes how we come from god as the creator of creatures. regeneration reveals the truth in humanity: we are of the same root irrespective of our color or nationality. humanity is of the same ancestry. if this is understood, then, there would be a rethink to tribal wars and international unrest as experienced at the moment. with a firm purpose, echekwube became the first to publicly employ the term reincarnation as a substitute of regeneration. he was profoundly acclaimed by oluwole in her work: witchcraft, reincarnation and the god-head: issues in african philosophy. it is argued here, that the term was used as a tool to remind humanity of a common ancestry and a reason to reason together as a family even though diverse. in doing this, echekwube gave room to the myriads of problems bedeviling africa, which could have been curbed if we had seen ourselves as having a common ancestry. this is seen in his thesis statement22. echekwube’s reincarnation as regeneration has been supported and opposed by philosophers. those who have supported his thesis include sophie oluwole and orji kalu; while those who have openly opposed him are justina ehiakhamen. for those who approved of his thesis, sophie oluwole, for example, said: “if one starts by defining reincarnation in the way echekwube does, then very few philosophers would feel worried about it.”23 oluwole reveres the position espoused by echekwube and wished everyone keyed into it. echekwube himself quoted orji kalu to have said of him: “…i subscribe to echekwube who sees reincarnation as a regeneration of mankind. this shows that families reproduce their type which continues to surface in subsequent generations”24. however, for justina ehiakhamen, reincarnation as regeneration is injustice to the long culture and tradition of a people so blessed. in her words, “the concept of regeneration as substitution for reincarnation is somewhat misleading in esan as the two concepts do not mean one and the same thing; and cannot interchangeably be used. regeneration does not show the core evidence for and clear understanding of reincarnation”25. with concrete evidences to justify reincarnation, ehiakhamen gave a 188 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 critical x-ray of echekwube’s concept of reincarnation as regeneration. one thing is clear, while echekwube’s supporters did so having seen a greater course and reason for the substitution, ehiakhamen was vehement on the claims of tradition, much of which oluwole had debunked. while this work appreciates the critical analysis of ehiakhamen, it unveils a perspective unexpressed in the work of ehiakhamen. this veiled perspective is the fact that the work of echekwube did not foreclose the great debate on the reality of reincarnation. even though ehiakhamen recognized this fact, her work left it unstressed that echekwube did not attempt to foreclose the great debate but to employ the term: reincarnation as regeneration to pursue the possibility for global harmony should humanity perceives itself as having a common ancestry. echekwube’s formulation of reincarnation as regeneration must be appreciated as an attempt to proffer solution to the myriads of problems bedeviling africa and the world in general. i perceive regeneration also as a palpable explication of the tradition transmitted down to us in the name of reincarnation. regeneration is a demystification of reincarnation. it presents to us a better understanding especially of the tripartite demonstration of the justification presented by oluwole in her work: “witchcraft, reincarnation and the god-head: issues in african philosophy.” these include as mentioned above: (a. family resemblance, (b. abiku/ogbanje syndrome, and (c. memory transfer. in the first, that is, family resemblance, it was established that it is a biological possibility for likes to beget likes; for parents to give birth to their kinds. this includes the lower animals. the second is the abiku/ogbanje syndrome. this was discussed extensively especially by oluwole as a prevalent medical condition which with advancement in medical technology has reduced considerably. the belief in the reality of abiku/ogbanje syndrome was so strong that sometimes physical deformities and injuries which were purposely inflicted on these children after they died supposedly reflected in their supposed next coming. for oluwole, it is very possible for a mother to give birth to a child with same deformities inflicted in the one considered an abiku. for her, “the answer provided by psychologists in western europe is that a pregnant woman is usually reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 189 so deeply disturbed by both the death and amputation of a part of her baby that the emotional stress is strong enough to create an involvement which is physically capable of affecting the unborn”26. this was often the case until society stopped inflicting physical deformities on children born with special health problems; and especially as modern medicine has reduced much of such ailments. the last; that is, memory transfer has never been properly established by adherents of reincarnation. the transfer of memory to another is usually through a rigorous process of learning. but this is far from memory transfer in this context. adherents of the reincarnation theory have been unable to establish the medium of memory transfer within the human person or between the human persons. it therefore means that until the modus operandi of memory transfer is established we hold onto its impossibility. this naturalized or scientific explication of the theory of reincarnation leaves scholars thinking as to whether an end has been put to the great and perennial debate on reincarnation. i think echekwube has been unable to silence the reincarnation debate. yet the truth remains that he directed our minds to the usage of the term in a better light. conclusion the theory of naturalization upholds the usage of scientific lens in addressing whatever exists. naturalism, in philosophy, relates scientific method or principles to philosophy by affirming that all things in the universe including man are natural and knowable. naturalism holds that our search for scientific knowledge is a possibility because in the universe, there is regularity, unity and wholeness which makes for the objectivity of scientific laws. this has recently been made explicit in different aspects of philosophy. this is how we have discussed and understood the project of biologizing ethics, the project of naturalizing epistemology, and the project of naturalizing metaphysics; of philip kitcher, w.v.o. quine, and don ross and james ladyman respectively. this paper has also delineated echekwube’s concept of reincarnation as regeneration within the parameters of naturalism. for him, “i have opted for regeneration as a substitute for 190 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 reincarnation because it is derived from generation which is a biological term for prolongation and multiplication of family group and membership. it satisfies the biological extension of the family”27. regeneration in this usage is a project of prolongation which defends the position of kitcher who sees ethics as a project and not a final system28. reincarnation as regeneration is a project and not a final system that should be avoided but one that should be considered and reviewed according to scientific rubrics. end notes 1stephen lampe, the christian and reincarnation (ibadan: millenium press, 2008), 34. 2justina ehiakhamen, “a critical analysis of echekwube’s concept of reincarnation as regeneration” in explorations in african philosophy: essays in honour of echekwube, ed. monday igbafen and blessing agidigbi, (ibadan: b wright integrated publishers, 2015), 32. 3idowu, bolaji. african traditional religion: a definition (london: scm press ltd, 1973), 179. 4john mbiti. african religions & philosophy, (london: heinemann educational books ltd, 1969), 161 5oluwole, sophie. witchcraft, reincarnation and the god-head: issues in african philosophy, (lagos: excel publisher, 1992). 6 ibid 46 7 ibid. 51 8echekwube, anthony. a metaphysical analysis of the concept of reincarnation as regeneration: towards global harmony and peace. ekpoma: ambik press, 2002. print. p. 32 9ibid. 10 ibid. 33 11 ibid. 12lacey, alan. “naturalism” the oxford guide to philosophy (united states: oxford university press, 2005), p.640 13 ibid. 640-641 14 arthur danto, “naturalism” in the encyclopaedia of philosophy, ed. edwards paul, vol. 5and 6. new york: mcmillian publishing co., inc. and the free press, 1967),p. 446. 15 luke mastin, “naturalism”. the basics of philosophy, accessed 10 october, 2 016 http/www.philosophybasics.com/branch_naturalism.html 16 searle, john. “biological naturalism”, in the oxford guide to philosophy, ted honderich ed. (new york: oxford university press, 2005), pp. 1996-1997. 17 ibid. p.1997 18the encyclopaedia of philosophy. vol. 5 and 6.,s.v. “naturalism” reincarnation naturalized: a critique of echekwube’s … | 191 19 willard, van orman quine. “epistemology naturalized” in ontological relativity and other essays. (new york: columbia university press, 1969), p. 17. 20anthony echekwube, a metaphysical analysis of the concept of reincarnation as regeneration: towards global harmony and peace (ekpoma: ambik press, 2002), p. 32. 21 bible: revised standard version, genesis 1:28 22ibid. p.4-5. 23oluwole, sophie. witchcraft, reincarnation and the god-head: issues in african philosophy. (lagos: excel publisher, 1992)p.41. 24 op cit. p.33 25op cit. ehiakhamen, “a critical analysis of echekwube’s concept of reincarnation as regeneration”. p. 36 26op cit. oluwole. pp. 46-47. 27 op cit. echekwube, p.32 28 philip, kitcher. “four ways of biologizing ethics.” in evolution und ethik. e d. bayertz. london: reclaim, 1993. 14 march, 2016. web.< http://joelvelasco.net/teaching/167win10/kitcher%20%20f our%20ways%20of%20biologicizin%20ethics.pdf p. 13 abstract this paper examines how women's participation in nigeria politics creates negative popular narratives about women's political participation. it is generally believed that women involved in politics mirror shady sexual objectication. this narrative engenders apathy among women who would have otherwise participated in politics. this narrative also reveals how nigerian women's personal lives shape arguments about their political potentials and also show a deep continuous denigration of women as objects of sex and weak entities, and how these limit political participation among women. using hermeneutical analysis, this paper seeks to understand and interpret these narratives in the construction of gender identity in nigeria, the relationship between individual agency and personal encounters and the power of popular narrative in shaping political behaviour. also, this analysis will broaden our understanding of nigerian women's contributions to the development of politics in nigeria. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis of women's participation in politics in nigeria philip edema, ph.d. department of philosophy and religious studies augustine university, ilara-epe, lagos bells philip.edema@augustineuniversity.edu.ng malachy igwilo, ph.d. centre for foundation education university of technology, ota, ogun state migwilo@gmail.com and key words: hermeneutic, gendered identity, narratives, objectication, politics introduction the purpose of this paper is to look critically at the sexist and discriminatory dimensions of women's participation in politics in the nigerian context. there are many types of sexist stereotypes that are often taken for granted to the extent that the social acceptance of these stereotypes forms the essential parts of the narratives about politics and women in politics. in a patriarchal society like nigeria, women are often spoken of in relation to a man. you see, many people wishing to know whether a particular female politician is married and whether her husband has allowed her to be in politics or who is sponsoring her in this venture and also why they are sponsoring her. these types of questions are invasive and mirror the public perception of women in politics, and essentially saying that a woman cannot be in politics especially becoming a successful politician. central to this public inquiry about a woman in politics is the idea that a woman in politics must be a sex toy to male politicians. no matter how successful a woman politician is, she is often seen as a harlot, a woman that used “bottom power” to get ahead. these social constructs need to be examined philosophically to ascertain their origins, what they say about society and how intellectual engagements will further understand these constructs to better understand women's participation in politics. nigeria is a special case as there has always been a clamour for more women participation in politics, especially as there is an increased feminist consciousness among young women in nigeria. however, there is no sign that as more women show interest in politics and participate, there will be a reduced stereotype against them. if anything has remained unchanged. people have continued to believe that a woman in politics is a slut, a wayward person, and an irresponsible person. amidst all these prejudices, there is no concrete evidence to show that women in politics engage in sexual expeditions to get ahead. but this social myth persists given the overtly rough terrain, politics has become. so there is a need to examine these in order to get to the root sources of sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 81 these beliefs. feminist collective and women participation in politics in recent years discussions concerning women's rights and the lack thereof have become prevalent in the public space. the social media exacerbates these discussions and creates a form of women's collective in which we see increasingly women bonding together to uproot various biologically dependent sexist analyses that is prevalent in society. the women's conference in beijing, which took place in 1995 served as an outpouring of a feminist collective which instilled a certain level of collective action as to what women must do in order to end the ostracism in public service participation. this conference invested great hope in the mass adoption of gender main streaming as a strategy for transforming human development through a more complementary gender role. this has borne fruits worldwide. more and more countries are living up to the afrmative action recommended by the beijing conference and more and more discussions are done in positive light concerning women participating in politics. the beijing conference represents solidarity among women, a collective for a radical reshaping of society in line with feminist conceptions. 'the concepts of feminist solidarity and collective action are founded on beliefs about the role of individuals in engaging with others to bring about radical, visionary change, standing and 1acting together.' this “acting together” as a collective, represents a strongly gendered dimension in women's lives and fosters social action that dovetails into political participation. this means women discussing their lives, analysing their shared experiences of injustice and oppression, and developing common goals. fundamentally, it is about understanding and challenging gender-specic constraints on women's options, which prevent them from achieving their true potential. in gender and development literature on women's empowerment, collective association and action are depicted as 1c. sweetman, “introduction, feminist solidarity and collective action” gender and development, vol. 21, no.2, 2013, 217-22. 82 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 politically essential in supporting them to challenge male 2 oppression. the push towards challenging male-centred oppressions bifurcate society into “us and them” and introduces a power nexus that is designed to challenge the current oppressive and sexist dimensions of women's struggles with men and society in general. the political struggles that ensure as soon as men-centred oppressions are confronted show a completely dysfunctional relations that exist in the male-dominated society which tends to intrumentalise the women and objectify them as tools in the hands of men. this mentality 'points out the complex disadvantage that women face, not only from gender inequality, but from a combination of other identity-based forms of discrimination. they face the fear of losing their livelihoods, of violent reprisals, and of losing their means of survival by alienating those who give them the means to eke out an 3 existence, while exploiting them. therefore, the feminist collective is not only ghting for an equitable society, it is ghting for its own survival in a maledominated construction. in its more radical form, the feminist collective is not about some form of modication of the patriarchal system characterized by power, competition, dominance, and hierarchy, used in oppressing women; it is geared towards its 4 complete elimination. to eliminate this entails a radical modication of the biological underpinnings of women's oppression which has long held that women can't obtain some form of a balancing act in society as long as the biology is perceived as the dening factor in the understanding of women. according to firestone, the sexual imbalance of power was biologically based and is fundamentally described as: 1. women throughout history (before birth control) 2n. kabeer, 'gender equality and women's empowerment', in naila kabeer, gender mainstreaming in poverty eradication and the mdgs: a handbook for policymakers and other stakeholders, london: commonwealth secretariat/ ottawa: idrc/cdri, 2003, 169-196. 3c.sweetman, “introduction, feminist solidarity and collective action”, 222. 4r. tong, “feminist thought: a comprehensive introduction”, boulder, colorado: westview press., 1989, 16. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 83 have been at the mercy of their biology (menstruating, pregnant, giving birth, and breastfeeding) making them dependent upon males for survival. 2. human infants are dependent for a long time after birth, limiting their mothers' options. 3. this basic mother/child interdependency has existed in some form in every society, past or present, and thus shapes the psychology of women and infants 4. the reproductive differences between the sexes led to the rst division of labour based on gender, which is at the origin of all further divisions into economic and cultural classes and cases (i.e., the origin of all discriminations). thus, the inequality between men and women can be traced to the human body and to the women's biologic imperative 5 for childbearing and child-rearing. the feminist collective, therefore, centres on accepting this biological imperative and then modifying society to ignore the biological and existential predicament and focus on the humanity of women. this will require a radical exorcism of society to the extent that the biological underpinnings of gender-based discrimination must now collapse. to achieve this collapsing of the biological imperatives that feed the patriarchal society, the surest way for the feminist collective is to make inroads towards political participation with the view towards engendering social change through this participation. to 6 participate in politics, feminists have rejected the formal/informal 7 notions of political participation. it is generally believed that the informal sphere of political participation has to do with grassroots activism where disempowered citizens easily participate; and this is where women are most effective. the formal political sphere is regarded as where “real” politics takes place and where few women if 5s. firestone, the dialectic of sex: the case for feminist revolution. new york: morrow books, 1970, 45. 6n. naples and m. desai, “women's local and translocal responses: an introduction to the chapters” in nancy naples and manisha desai (eds.) women's activism and globalization. new york: routledge, 2002, 11-33. 7f. miraftab, “invited and invented spaces of participation: neoliberal citizenship and feminists' expanded notion of politics”. wagadu, volume 1, 2004, 1-7. 84 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 any, can venture to. the feminist collective counters these binary assumptions and insist that both the conceptual formal and informal spheres are viable political arenas where women can participate and shape society. however, a simple numerical expansion of women in politics may not translate into the effective representation of feminist collectives' interests in the development of policy-making which can lead to the collapsing of patriarchy. it cannot be assumed that women politicians are necessarily committed to representing women's interests when they join politics. indeed, few of them will have succeeded in politics by promoting a feminist platform in a male8 dominated political sphere. to join politics, women collectively initially ignore the thorny issues of gender and simply focus on the very idea that women ought to be in politics. political participation on the platform of transforming society to collapse patriarchal stereotypes and promote equality will be so problematic that it can be counter-effective. these kinds of topics can be profoundly threatening to men's privileges, individually and collectively, and unsurprisingly arouse considerable resistance. at stake in considerations of developmental democracy from a gender perspective, then, is whether democratic institutions can achieve enough autonomy from dominant gender interests to challenge male privileges and promote the policies necessary for this kind of social 9 change. women joining politics, banks on kick-starting discussions that can engender such autonomy so that in the long run gender-based bias or biologically dependent bias will be a thing of the past. but given the conditions and the deep-rooted stereotypes in society, a woman in politics is regarded, by and large, a bad idea. sexual lives and political women when women do join politics, they face myriad accusations and condescension of the society including from women themselves. 8a. m. goetz, “women in politics & gender equity in policy: south africa & uganda”, review of african political economy, 25:76, 1998, 241-262. 9ibid. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 85 there is a general belief that women in politics are of easy virtue and could not have gotten far in politics without granting sexual favours to men who promote them or those who sponsor them nancially. according to comments from alliance for africa on a workshop about sexual harassment, more women do not enter politics because of sexual harassment or perceptions of it. the participants, especially the women, maintained that it was because of the issue of sexual harassment that many women are deprived and discouraged in politics. they said, “even the men who are not politicians do not allow their wives to participate in the game of politics because it is 10assumed here that women in politics lack virtue.” women 11 themselves agree that politics is a 'dirty game.' according to ugwuegede: in nigeria, women who are actively participating in poli t ics are seen and treated as free women (prostitutes/wayward) of easy virtues, stubborn people, whores, too domineering, cultural rebellions, etc. it is observed that during the campaign, the political opponents (mostly men) use the alleged loose moral standing of these women against them and often insult them directly in public. thus, they are often subjected to public ridicule and are socially stigmatized by both men and women. the use of negative labeling; derogatory names; abusive language and expressions to describe nigerian women in politics discourage many of them 10alliance for africa,(no date) “sexual harassment among others, a continued struggle for women who participate in nigerian politics” seen at https://alliancesforafrica.org/sexual-harassment-among-others-a-continuedstruggle-for-women-who-participate-in-nigerian-politics/ assessed 30th may 2019. 11d. t. agbalajobi, “women's participation and the political process in nigeria: problems and prospects” african journal of political science and international relations vol. 4(2), 2010, 075-082. 86 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 12 from active participation in the nation's politics. this is clearly a representation of the common views of women in politics in nigeria and it is a candidate's idea of a patriarchal society. it is believed that since a woman is a weaker sex, and is dependent on men, there is no way she can muster the resources required to make headway into politics. it has to be through granting sexual favours to her sponsors and being ready to “sleep” with any supporter of important repute. it is believed that without this, a woman has no way of making it in politics. there is ample evidence that this mindset is rife in the political sphere helping to fuel this misogynistic mindset. prominent female politicians are always presented on social media and even in mainstream media as being sex seeking females. there are accusations and a counter-accusation that tends to fuel this wellestablished myth. for example, badmus related the well-publicized accusation made by a female politician against a male politician. this accusation is seen as a norm and the woman is only making it public 13because the affair fell through. what this entails is that women's participation in politics in nigeria has something to do with sex. the sex lives of the women involved are presented in public and judgments are passed on to them. even the state of their families is xrayed. narratives arise about most women politicians. it is said that the women dominate their husbands to the extent that their husbands cannot do anything to prevent their career even though the husbands know that politics is a “dirty game”. the narratives make the husbands victims of powerlessness. the husbands cannot say much since their wives' have other more powerful men than they. social media and public opinion are riddled with such stories. from this, it is taken for granted that successful female politicians got there through having sexual affairs with male politicians or the powers that pilot 12n. p. ugwuegede, “challenges to women active participation in politics in nigeria” sociology and anthropology 2(7): 2014, 284-290. 13see, b. “anisulowo accuses pdp leaders of seeking sexual favors from her, others” in nigerian tribune, wednesday, 28th february 2007, p.1. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 87 political affairs. central to this urban myth is the idea of 'godfather'. in nigerian politics, the 'godfather' is the person that pays the bill. he is the nancial progenitor of the political project. he picks from among the people interested in holding various political positions and sponsors them nancially so that they would be able to scale the hurdles of politics. the godfather provides the background and inuence needed to ensure a successful political career. godfatherism is not strange in nigerian sociological realities. it is a long-accepted tradition that a younger person should learn and prosper under the tutelage and support of a more experienced patron. godfatherism is also used to connote the power and inuence of people who are politically relevant and savvy in deciding who gets nominated to contest elections and who eventually wins the election. godfathers are highly politically mobile and can sway political support to the political party and/or candidate behind which they 14 throw their political weight using various means. according to albert olawale, 'a person of lesser social status attaches himself to another person, usually of higher status, for support, which could be social or economic. the godfather gets something in return from the adopted son for the transactional relationship'. these godfathers are seen in the social and economic spheres in nigeria and have now been transferred to the political 15 spheres. in the political sphere; it gets tricky given the strange dimensions it has taken. most godfathers demand the nearimpossible from their clients. albert olawale also mentioned that 'giving of kola by a client to his patron is also not strange. what is probably strange is the transposition of this social or economic system into the political arena and also the ridiculous nature of what patrons now ask from their clients as compensation for providing them with 'brokerage services'. the present-day godfatherism is a 14n. bassey, and e. enetak, “godfatherism and good governance in nigeria: an appraisal of nigeria's fourth republic” journal of social and policy, vol.3, no4, 2014, 137-143. 15i. o. albert, “explaining “godfatherism” in nigerian politics” african sociological review / revue africaine de sociologie, review 9, vol. 2, 2014, 79105. 88 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 16 primordial tradition taken to a criminal extent'. most male politicians try to give 'kola' and other gratications to their godfathers. in the case of women, it can indeed be tricky as it is believed that the 'kola' given by the females to their own godfathers is nothing but sex even though additional nancial incentives are also imperative if the female wins a 'juicy ofce'. in the public narratives, we see that it is taken for granted that the client will always 'settle' his godfather with nancial gratication while the females settle the godfather with sexual favours. given the dimensions of these narratives about sex being the main currency when a woman joins politics, the women themselves have shunned politics for this very reason. many women agree with the narratives and in order to preserve their integrity, they avoid partisan politics. hermeneutics of women political participation: towards a critical understanding hermeneutics has become one of the alternative voices of contemporary philosophy used in assessing the human intellect and social conditions. it has long become the mainstream in philosophy and has garnered profound inuences. hermeneutics has once again come into use as a response to the totalizing and the perennial nature of epistemology which seeks to assert that knowledge and understanding are indeed a-historical and apodictic entities. but given the rise of postmodernism and also the consequences of gettier's counter examples, hermeneutics have become a viable alternative voice in bypassing the protracted debate about traditional epistemology and kantian ideas of epistemology which has 17characterized twentieth-century philosophy. according to maddox: “the term ' hermeneutics' was originally used to designate a classical discipline that formulated rules for correctly interpreting texts. early forms of this discipline can be found in biblical studies, philology and 16ibid. 17e gettier, “is justied true belief knowledge,” analysis, vol. 23, 1963, 121-123. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 89 jurisprudence. the philosophical discussion of hermeneutics, which began in the nineteenth century, likewise initially engaged in the development of rules for proper interpretation. as the discussion developed, however, its attention shifted to the more basic question of the conditions of the very possibility of understanding. the distinctive characteristic that emerged in this 'hermeneutic' discussion of understanding was a rejection of classical cartesian and kantian epistemology. indeed, hermeneutics has more or less taken the place of epistemology for these philosophers. to be sure, they usually refuse to identify hermeneutics with epistemology, but this is due to the empiricist and reductionist connotations which they sense in the latter term. there are essentially two problems which hermeneutic philosophers have with traditional epistemology. first, they disagree with the reduction of the entire cognitive process to a single model drawn basically from the natural sciences i.e. empirical observation. second, they reject the a-historical conception of the knower as one who stands outside of 18that which is known and imposes meaning upon it”. critical hermeneutics are used to assess tradition in order to correct it based on human interests. in other words, each human idea, in this case, women's participation in politics must be examined as a historical process that has arisen to enhance human life. so its contours and dimensions must be examined to show that there are no personal and sectional appeals inherent in it since if there are such aws, it cannot then serve the human's interests. so critical hermeneutics are humanistic in essence and seeks to use philosophical arguments to remove merely pragmatic or existential components from ideas and enshrine in the idea progress for 18r. maddox, “contemporary hermeneutic philosophy and theological studies”, religious studies, 21, 1985, 517-529. 90 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 humanity if that is possible. the major hermeneutical theorist of this idea was jurgen habermas. habermas articulated the fact that not all 19 tradition is acceptable or desirable. therefore, the project of hermeneutics is to correct tradition, in this case, women's participation in politics. correcting it means inculcating emancipatory cognitive interest in it. in some cases due to historical developments, in some concepts or traditions, it is impossible to have an intersubjective correction of a concept or idea so the concept or idea is discarded as being sectional. the push for the enthronement of women's participation in politics has permeated the world unmolested and has become the key idea for the understanding of today's socio-economic and rights landscape. but the desire for women to participate in politics enthrones a binary position among those who want it and those who reject it. the fact of this debate arises from the cultural perceptions in traditional societies carried over into modern life and which does not augur well with modern life. it is believed in most traditional societies in nigeria that women are to be seen not heard and women are as a matter of biology weak. this particular mindset has continued to entrench sexist dependent stereotypes that limited general progress that women can participate in. its metaphysics remains superiority of the male sex. the conquering spirit entrenched in our understanding of the male sex continues to enrich the males and pauperizing the female sex making the females mostly depend ent on the male. this pauperization creates a hybrid stranger who is outside the protable sphere of human development. the hybrid stranger or the female sex is given crumbs from the table of our patriarchal society since the males decide where the resources and integral existence goes to. these crumbs are used to create a façade as if the exclusion of women is in proper order for society. the patriarchal society continues to create more and more stereotypes pushing these from one generation to another to safeguard a society where female participation is muted. the continuous presence of sexism and stereotyping in society militates against integral development and progress and sabotages 19ibid. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 91 the complete development of the female sex. according to oecd, the fact that women are not given the full power to realize themselves in a nondiscriminatory environment, society is worse off. the more women are not empowered, the more 20 society is poor economically. apart from this, men suffer too because (as) conforming to masculine roles of competitive and ambitious self-seeking can put pressure on them and deprive them of joys that can come from parenting and having intimate respectful relationships. stereotypes and gender discriminations resulting therefrom having high costs in terms of development, impeded democracy, human rights denied and peace and security 21 endangered. so, the critical question that arises is; do women participation in politics serves as a tool for the progress of humanity? here progress is a moral concept that represents a holistic advancement of humanity based on sound morality. the new and emerging concept that seeks to deal with the obvious ostracization of women by the patriarchal society is offered by this paper as a de-feminization. defeminization is indeed a concept that has at its core a countermovement away from the radical insistence of radical feminists towards a more diffused social engagement. in other words, the feminine is redened not just from the point of view of biology, but from the point of view of progressive and necessary contributions. radical feminism and the general feminist collective impose on society a mandatory acceptance of women in politics without waiting for society to accept women as political leaders based on organic and intellectual development. the current stereotypes of our patriarchal 20oecd observer, “fighting poverty means ghting sexism” seen at http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/5556/fighting_poverty_means_ ghting_sexism.html, assessed 30th may 2019. 21un women (2011) “countering gender discrimination and negative gender stereotypes: effective policy responses” seen at http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/7/countering-genderdiscrimination-and-negative-gender-stereotypes-effective-policy-responses, th,assessed may 30 2019. 92 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 society are mythical in nature and arise from the various perspectives about power and control. the society demands that men ought to always be in control of women. this mindset can change if there is a more diffusive understanding of the female sex. the female sex is not seen just from the feminine perspective, but from the contribution, it can offer based on her special nature and from her special experiences. hence de-feminization. de-feminization as a contribution of this paper is not seeking to remove the feminine nature from reality, but to embed it with the male as living being-together. women are not exclusively female given the interactions that embody them daily. so the idea of exclusivity, exclusive female sex bereft of any male dimension in the intellect is mute. men and women's history intertwine and this produces a special knowledge about life and when this understanding is harnessed. according to shetler, 'men and women keep and transmit historical knowledge by the paths that they walk each day and the outside/inside positions that they occupy in the imagined male and female spaces that permeate their world. these sets of knowledge signify separate, though interdependent realms of 22 authority deployed by men and women in their everyday routines'. conclusion this paper is about women's participation in politics and the difculties they face and how if women are truly allowed in politics, they can offer special improvements and progress for nigeria as a country. the current difculties faced by women arise from an entrenched stereotype that derogates women's sexual lives mostly based on biology. women as the receiver sex in a sexual encounter have been exploited to produce a highly damaging urban myth concerning their participation in politics. this is happening in the face of the demands made by the feminist collective who demands 22j. b. shetler, “the gendered spaces of historical knowledge: women's knowledge and extraordinary women in the serengeti district, tanzania” the international journal of african historical studies, vol. 36, no. 2 (2003), 2003, 283-307. sex and politics: a hermeneutical analysis... | 93 that women should as a matter of course or law participate in politics. this feminist demand has become inuential to the extent that some countries made it law and push women into politics without any consideration for the current perceptions of the female sex. most women in politics are seen as lacking virtue or being easy. this mindset has been exploited to prevent a full acceptance of the demands of the feminist collective. this paper is of the view that women participating in politics are highly desirable idea as long as a new understanding of the female is gradually visited on society, especially our patriarchal society. this concept of de-feminization is introduced to mirror a new woman understood from the perspective of embodying society. given the specialness of women, especially in their daily intellectual encounters with the male, it is believed that women offer a special kind of knowledge and presence and these can be used in politics for the progress of society. 94 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 157 a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture abstract this study is a metaphysical inquiry into the phenomenon of death in esan culture. it begins by expositing the esan understanding of death and how it constitutes mystery. it argues that in esan, the question of ‘the why of death’just like ‘the why of life’ and ‘the why of birth’, philosophically speaking, does not admit any satisfactorily answer. thereafter, the study discussed the esanconception of the causes of death. it examined the epistemological and logical status of some of these causal beliefs among the esan people and with reference to some other cultures. it argues that although some claims to afterlife seem rational and convincing; any claim to knowledge of absolute certainty of the hereafter is epistemologically suspicious since there is no valid epistemic intersection of this world and the assumed world after. although the esan do not conceive any contradiction in their beliefs in afterlife and reincarnation, but logically speaking, such belief suffers logical infelicity since it defies the logical laws of thought. however, the study also argues that just like any affirmation, any denial of certain knowledge of afterlife experience conversely rests on logical fallacy of ‘argumentum ad ignorantiam’. it concludes that death and the belief in life after death have practical moral implications on the living. in the course of inquiry, the engagement attempts simultaneously, an 158 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 excursion into comparative discourse with some other cultures. keywords: esan, phenomenon of death, mystery, causes of death, afterlife, philosophical implications. introduction this study is about death, its causes and philosophical implications in esan culture. esan isone of the three major ethnic groups in edo state nigeria. the word ‘esan’refers to the person, the people, the culture, the land and the geography of esan. fundamentally, the concept of death is a metaphysical phenomenon among the people of esan. it is an event which must occur in one’s life without waiver. it is also a game which does not admit any replay. the people of esan, like humans beings in other cultures, have the insatiable instinct of survival. this is why they are perplexed with the mystery and inevitability of death and its final precedence over material existence. they asked questions about birth, life and death. the esan answers to the “why of death”, just like the answers to “the why of birth” and “the why of life” do not yield any holistic ontological satisfaction; attempted answers are maximally quizzed in fables. the answers, just like the questions themselves open pandora’s box. despite these seeming irresolvable puzzles, it is philosophically wise and potent to attempt some intellectual muscle flexing, though not to completely eliminate the bizarre, but at least, to serve as palliative to the inquiring minds with unquenchable thirst for knowledge about these issues at hand. to do this, thestudy attempts a discussion of the esan’s attitude toward death and the dead, and their understanding of the causes of death. the people’s beliefs about death and its causes are subjected to epistemological and logical scrutiny; and despite the limitations, these beliefs influence their moral practice and disposition to both the living and the dead in their daily living. the study adopts expository method as well as the methods of conceptual and critical analyses. we shall begin this analysis with the attempt to understanding the notion of death in esan. a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 159 understanding the concept of death in esan culture death as a phenomenon is an irreversible cessation of life. in esan, it “is regarded as a transition from one state of existence to another. it is the last of the rites of passage that a person has to go through on earth (others being birth, puberty, marriage)”.1 deaths are believed to be caused. this causality is a constitutive part of esan ontology. even for empirical misfortunes, the esan, just like many other african cultures would believe that they are caused by some agents for some purpose(s). and just like some other cultures too, the esan people believe that at any stage an individual dies, it is caused for a purpose. this is why death is not only conceived as bad. it also suggests that one ought not to die. ironically, the esan people like people in some other cultures also believe that death is inevitable. death is an unavoidable experience which awaits everyone. it is therefore onerous for everyone to live a good life here and await the next. although it is an unavoidable phenomenon, the peoples’ belief and attitudes towards death epitomizes their willingness to continue life ad infinitum. this desirability reflects the belief that life is good despite its challenges and death is bad.segun gbadegesin2 argues that in some african societies, using the yoruba as instance, there is no desireto perpetuate all lives ad infinitum. partly because of the conception that life is good, the esan people mourn for the dead grievously and strenuously too. mourning the dead is not premissed on the cessation or forfeiture of benefits derived from the deceased for this would be egoistic, but on feelings. the esan empathize the dead. his or her absence in the scheme of things, the vacuum which his or her demise created, his uniqueness and irreplaceability make his or her death deeply felt. although death is inevitable, people fear death and weep for the dead because of human frailty, fear of the unknown and the agony sometimes exhibited by the dying, and so on. when people see other people die in agony and groaning, they fear the pain of death since it also awaits them. when it comes, no excuse, no appeal, no sympathy is necessary. despite all the beliefs which they 160 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 have about death and the hereafter, epistemologically speaking, no one really knows exactly what lies beyond the physical universe. indeed, philosophically speaking, for the people, death is a mystery. why death? this is a question that deserves answers in the course of this study. death as mystery the esan question of the “why of death” cannot be satisfactorily answered. attempted answers are maximally quizzed in fables. where they are existential, they cannot satisfy any ontological yearning. the attempt to satisfy this yearning requires answers to the why of birth and the why of life? these, like the first question are also bereft of any satisfactory answer outside religious terrain. it may, therefore, be the case that any attempt to unravel the mysteries of birth, life and death are futile and absurd. or it may be that human finitude about knowledge and wisdom is incapacitated in unraveling these meanings or answers to these ‘why’ questions. the wise and the foolish, rich and poor, king and slave, good and evil have death as a common fate awaiting them. the boethius question, in his the consolation of philosophy3,regarding why good people suffer and why evil men flourish, is pre-eminent in esan belief pertaining death. the wise, the good, the strong, the productive may die young while the foolish, evil, weak and counterproductive may die old. this is also a mystery. this mystery is couched in esan dictum as: omon non men bhuunuiseeman. this literarily translates into ‘a sweet soup is never sufficient for pounded yam’.what this means is that‘what is beneficial does not last’. the question again is why death? what causes death? causes of death in esan culture the analyses of the ontological sources of death constitute the focal point of this session. in the african traditional understanding and explanation of the causes of death,even when death results from natural causes, such causes are believed to have ontological underpinnings; hence, they are always ascribed with ontological connotation. on this view, such death occurrences are always a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 161 attributed to some non-natural causes. this is because, among theesan people, the belief that there is nothing without a cause has a firm root. no smoke without fire. for example, there are some physical or accidental sources of death such as death resulting from accidental gun discharges, collapsing toilets, felling from palm trees or other trees, and so on. deaths arising from such occurrences are ascribed with some ontological interpretations. it is only such explanations that remain meaningful and satisfactory among the people. even when death results from fighting or death by deliberate shooting, it is believed that the killer’s sense of reason was distorted or marred to commit such crime, or that his victim was already killed but was only tele-guided for perfection in physical manifestation in the hands of the supposed killer. this is why the esan would either say: eba lulu non – ‘it is what has been done’, or oiyiaboabo – ‘it is not ordinary’. this is partly why people abhorred and eschewed physical fight to avoid a person already killed having his predicament fulfilled in their hands. but when this happens, the esan would say oikayukhe, which means ‘he was dead already’. ontologically, deaths arise from different sources, which among others, include both malevolent and benevolent agents and beings such as: witches and wizards: witchcraft or wizardry is a concrete phenomenon in esan cosmology; it is a constitutive part of her discursive universe. witches and wizards are believed to operate mysteriously at night in coven where they convene, make decision and perfect their plans, and the consequences of which manifest in concrete reality. they are also believed to cause some deaths in esan through the use of evil magic. they prey on human beings for meal or kill them to thwart their foreseen outstanding andexemplary destiny, or as a revenge or punishment to their relatives, or on account of the victim due to malice. the belief in witchcraft and their evil machinations is not limited to esan people; it is a pervasive belief in africa and beyond. while writing about africa, orubu submits that: 162 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 [i]t is believed that witches and wizards can “contribute” fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters to the coven feasts as demanded. it has been suggested (or rather, speculated – mine) that for coven members to get promoted in the hierarchy, they must, as a rule “contribute” a soul for the witch festival….thus, when a person dies, no matter how old he may be, it is believed that a witch or wizard is responsible4 diabolic persons: the existence ofdiabolicpersons seems to be a characteristic phenomenon of almost all existing community in esan. they are usually very few in numbers, and found among the male folks mainly. in most cases,they are wretched but dreaded member in the community. the source of their power remains a mystery. diabolic persons can mysteriously cause death of both innocent people and those whom they believe trespass their boundary. they may also be hired by those who do not have the power to do so, for the same purpose. they are malevolent like witches and wizards. apart from causing death, witches and wizards, and diabolic persons can inflict pains and injuries on their victims and swap or downturn their destinies. while some of these effects can be counteracted, some cannot. they attack their victims with magic, juju and through manipulation of nature. like the esan, the yoruba and ibibio peoples of nigeria, among others, believe that magic powers can be used to harm an individual and also to cause his death. magic manipulations are powerful and potent and are often used or procured by medicine men to achieve evil effects. “magical preparations may be placed on the door steps of an intended victim. similarly, such preparations may be sprayed on his or her garments to achieve the desired results”.5they may also be spread on the footpath of the intended victim or sprayed on air and specifically teleguided to him for intended purpose. according to orubu, “[i]t is also believed that dogs, snakes, and rats may be sent to bite and to inflict death on a person. even lightening may be sent to strike down an enemy”.6other measures can be adopted. in any a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 163 case, some rituals are performed so that the deceased can avenge his death. evil consequences: death may also occur as a result of the evil deed(s) of the individual, to restore the disharmony which his sinful act(s) distorts in the ontological balance in the community or elsewhere. such sinful acts include adultery, incest, murder, contempt of deities and some other acts that are considered sacrilegious and desecrating in the community. in this case, the esan people would say ebo lulu gbo ole, or ole tobolegbeegbole which means, ‘it is what he did that killed him’ or ‘he killed himself’. death may also occur as a result of ontological evil of relatives particularly of parents and of the entire community. deities: deities are also believed to be responsible for some deaths. similar to the point just analysed, the death of an individual may result from the vengeance of deities due to either the wrongdoings of the individual, his family or his community. when such death does not result on account of the sin of the individual, an appeasement is made to the deities for forgiveness to prevent other occurrences. even when it results on the account of the deceased, appeasement can still be made to waive off the consequences for him in the hereafter and to insure other member of the family or community, as the case may be, from committing such crime. the duty of the deities is multi-directional. it is not only to enforce vengeance; they also protect. just like in most african communities, the deities are believed: to protect all the people in the locality. it also takes vengeance on evil doers for offences and crimes committed in secret. people may swear by the deity. in fact, individuals may be tried before the deities for various offences. it may thus be invoked to find out the guilty party. it is believed that the local deities do their work by causing the death of offenders7 164 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 such deities in esan, among the litany of others include idigun, ukhuekhie, omonruare, obiemenandedion. when offence is detected before death, appeasements are made; and when accepted the deity concerned may relent in anger and abort vengeance. whether in esan or elsewhere, some deities are believed to be more lenient or more temperamental than others. the justices of deities can sometimes be perverted to reflect public expectation. this is very common with extra ordinary means of arbitration and vindication, where ordinary human knowledge is defective, such as in the indictment of witchcraft or wizardry, diabolism, blatant denial in the ordinary judicial system, and so on. such cases are referred to, and tried by priests of sasswood, osunene, alamonka, itan, shrines, as well as native doctors and so on. these supernatural judicial means can be manipulated and when not manipulated has no guarantee for true justice. so while the guilty can sometimes be acquitted, the innocent can be penalized with capital or near capital punishment.8 however these practices are not very common in esan. the justices of deities can also be manipulated sometimes by malicious priests for pecuniary gains. though, not in esanland, the attainables in the shrine of the arochukwuoracle in iboland popularly named the long juju by the british (because it pointed vertically to heaven) are typical examples of perversion of justice by human beings in the name of deities.9 here, it was dispensation, not of justice, but of injustice. when cases are brought before this shrine, the priests do accept bribe from the offenders to distort justice. after accepting bribe from the guilty person, the innocent person is led through an underground tunnel from the shrine to the coast to be sold as slave. daron acemoglu and james robinson explain how the arochukwu oracle as a religious institution became perverted by the desire to capture and sell slaves. they write that: [t]he oracle was widely believed to speak for a prominent deity in the region respected by the major local ethnic groups, the ijaw, the ibibio, and the igbo. the oracle was approached to settle disputes and adjudicate on disagreements. plaintiffs who traveled to arochukwu to face the oracle had to descend from a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 165 the town into a gorge of the cross river, where the oracle was housed in a tall cave, the front of which was lined with human skulls. the priests of the oracle, in league with the aro slavers and merchants, would dispense the decision of the oracle. often this involved people being “swallowed” by the oracle, which actually meant that once they had passed through the cave, they were lead away down the cross river and to the waiting ships of the europeans.10 this knowledge was not in public space. then the priests slaughter a cock and sprinkle the blood on a white cloth to show the relatives of the actual innocent person that he or she was the offender and for that reason the gods has taken his or her blood, that is, has killed him or her. this nefarious activity was discovered when slave trade was abolished. those who were purportedly claimed to be killed by the gods returned home to tell their experiences. it is not impossible that these priests have been killing innocent persons in the pretext of dispensation of justice by the gods before they devised the above described mean as an additional source of lucrative business in the shrine. the arochukwu oracle was no doubt the most powerful oracular cult and the most dreadful institution in iboland and its environs. it is believed to have the ability to identify wizards, witches and poisoners, among other powers.11 the people of aro who were deeply feared because of the oracle manipulated the scenario to enhance their economic powers. according to ossai and odunsi, they: lured and sold into slavery unwary persons who came to consult the oracle. more often than not the aropeople create situations which necessitated consultation of the oracle. suspects who were hurried to the oracle to have their innocence or guilt established would mysteriously disappear. the aro 166 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 also used the oracle as a means of blackmailing wealthy persons and dispossessing them of their wealth.12 it is for the gruesome elements contain in the cult that the government suppressed it. in fact, a british expedition was eventually launched to attack the shrine in 1902. the preceding depicts that the supposed justices of the gods may sometimes be the reflections of the whims and caprices of the priests of such gods, just as the acclaimed supposed temperaments of the gods are sometimes the reflections of the actual temperaments of the priests of such gods. spirits: spirits of the dead are also believed to cause some deaths. their influence is mostly limited to the family they departed from. however their influence may extend beyond their family to wherever the cause of their death is. maximally, such influences are predicated on vengeance. they may have felt offended or unjustly treated or killed by person(s) while they were alive. they may also feel offended fornot being properly buried when they died,not accorded befitting burial, or for delay in second burial. they may also be aggrieved when sacrifices are not made to establish or maintain ontological relationship to exact their relevance. ancestors may also cause death; but their actions are not malevolent. such actions are attemptsto forestall impending calamities to befall a people as a result of omission or misdeed which can generate ontological disharmony with the ancestors and the totality of reality. god: god is believed to cause some deaths particularly of those who are old. when an old person dies, the esan people often say god has called him or her. in their language, they would say edolegbale. this means ‘his days are completed’. they say he has gone home to rest. this may suggests that this world is not a permanent home or that it is a place of toil and turmoil. although there is terrific fear of death, there seems to be an exemption of those who are very old, and who probably have children that are also growing old. they would wish to die before their children begin to die of old age in their own a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 167 eyes.the prayer of every esan person is that his or her children should not die before them. they would also want to join the ancestors. another probable reason is that if their children continue to die one after the other before them, not only that they will feel so bad about it, they will have no child(ren) to accord them befitting burial; and that would diminish their relevance in the ancestral realm. in addition, they may die a bad death.very importantly, they may be indicted of killing their children or using them to elongate their life span. in this case, the esan will say o roomon du uhonmon, which mean, “he has used his child to buy or replace his head”, that is, to elongate his life span. this is why when such old people die it is often believed that their death is natural. natural death is the only death caused and ordained by god; and it is the death of the aged. such deaths are least grieved and well celebrated. since they are natural, most cultures call it good death. although they are believed to be natural in esan, but in the deeper yearnings of the people, it is caused by some agent(s) for a purpose; and the principal purpose is to prevent him or her from eating the fruits of his or herlabour, that is, from enjoying being taken care of by his or her children. such opposing beliefs invalidate the idea of a good death. from the foregoing, it is evident that these beliefs concerning the causes of death are not limited to esan people; they are predominant in most other african cultures. the causes of death13 among the igede people of benue state in nigeria do not have significant difference from the esan account. in fact, it is significant replication of it. the replica in belief in most african cultures does not pertain only to causes of death but also to other beliefs about death and some other african spheres of life. however, the contemporary norm has diverged significantly from the traditional norm about some of these beliefs. epistemological concerns the belief in immortality or at least in life of some kind hereafter seems to be ingrained in human consciousness.14literally, 168 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 immortality means freedom from death.15 what this belief means is that death is not the end of human being. it wouldseem difficult to find any human culture or race, even among the most primitive that is without some ideas of an afterlife, which is taken for granted and as certain. for example, the esan and many other societies believe concretely either in reincarnation or in the ancestral world or both. there is the strong cosmological belief among the esan people that after death, the deceased transit into another life. there is also the cosmological belief in reincarnation. the contemporary mind that is critical will conceive this as contradiction. but for the traditional mind there is no contradiction at all, since contradiction only exists where people do not understand the connection between concepts or phenomena. although we shall not go into unending epistemological quizzing here, however, it suffices to ask and answer in a fair detail the questions: how do we know about afterlife and reincarnation? can both beliefs constitute knowledge? can there be any epistemic validity for any or both. since the dead cannot come back after a time to tell their experiences or the attainable in the world beyond the present, then what is the source of our knowledge claim about death experience, the dead and afterlife? orubu’s work16 gave some instances that may tend to sustain afterlife experiences. he writes about some recent scientific research findings which support the existence of life after death. medical and psychological research findings indicate that there is something in human being which survives physical death. the investigation by moody17 concerns those who have experienced the first stage of death and thereafter come back to life. this is near death experience. the reports of the experiences by moody’s respondents were very lucid. they knew all the events which surrounded them, including the attempts to revive them, extraterrestrial experiences and when they came back into their bodies. theodore schick and lewis vaughn write that near death experience is one of the many “extraordinary things that thousands of people experience, believe in, and change their lives because of”.18 according to them, hundreds of people who were near death have told of blissful experiences in the beyond. although their reports vary, certain details keep recurring. in each case, their a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 169 experiences do not seem like dream or fantasy; it seems vividly real. many who have had such experiences hold that such experiences are undeniable proof of life after death. sometimes, some face the difficulty of finding human words adequate enough to describe their experiences of unearthly episodes. nevertheless the experiences affect their lives profoundly, especially their views about death and its relationship to life.19 moody argues that since there was so great similarity in their reports, these reports must reflect reality.20 near death experience seems to be the most impressive evidence that we can survive the death of our physical bodies. although our physical body will certainly die,21but this does not mean we cannot survive death. the fact that the examinations of near death experiences in some parts of the world do not have essential differences from the reports in other parts, laid credence to the credibility of its claim of life after death. similar experiences abound in esan and other african societies. those who were already dead, such as parents, grandparents, other relatives, deities and unknown but describable benefactors, prevent the dying from going beyond a point and they then return back to their physical bodies. in addition, mountains, rivers, ditches, and other obstacles are reported to have obstructed their way. there are claims of physical manifestations of the spirits of the dead to the living, especially to their relatives. they sometimes pass unknown information that conforms to reality upon investigation or confirmation. there are also claims of dead persons who left to where they are unknown to begin another physical life on earth. they may get married and have children. when peradventure they are seen and recognized by those who knew them before they died, they disappear and relocate to another place where they are unknown. sometimestoo, upon persistence or pressure from spouse or children to visit their place of origin, they can lead them half way, but very close to enable them locate their home and then disengage. maximally, it is believed that these are those whose actual time of death was not yet. 170 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 psychologists also found out that under hypnotic regressions, some individuals reported that they have lived before some year ago in distant places. they also tell their career. investigations confirm such information. the investigation conducted by wambach,22 using a wide range of subjects of over 500, indicate that subjects have lived and died many years before coming to this present life.michael shallo23 argued that the human soul is not annihilated at death. he based his arguments on proof fromthe moral law, the sanctity and justice of god, man’s desire of perfect happiness, andthe universal judgement of mankind.relying on these arguments michael shallo settles for the reality of another life. in addition to these, the fact that we dream when we are sleeping, and this dream state is another plane of existence, suggests that there could be another plane of existence at death (a long sleep), and that it is not annihilation that awaits the human being at death. since, philosophically speaking, we do not fully comprehend all the circumstances of dream and dream state (a reality which we have personally and directly experienced during sleep), more so we cannot, at this stage, understand all the circumstances of afterlife experience which we have not yet experienced. although some claims to afterlife seems rational and convincing, epistemologically speaking all sources of knowledge is suspect. even the sources of knowledge that are most philosophically scrutinized, dependable, and reckoned with such as rationalism and empiricism are diametrically opposed on claims, beliefs and methods. if this is so, other sources of claims to knowledge such as intuition, revelation, introspection, authority, necromancy, clairvoyance and so on, will be fraught with more controversies and contradictions, and thus more suspects. the situation is worse when phenomena about which claims are made are not only beyond the physical, but are matters that are completely removed from terrestrial terrain, material existence and human experience such as the attainable in afterlife. this suggests that the supposed knowledge claims to afterlife and its experiences can be countered. some of the evidence we have had are not death experiences but near death experiences. a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 171 some are stories about the manifestations of spirits of the dead, belief in reincarnation and hypnotic regression.24 no one had really died to return to tell the true nature of life there, if there is. there seems to be a chasm such that once oneis here, he cannot be there, and cannot know what lies after death. conversely, once one is dead, he cannot come back to relate with the living, at least physically, about what exactly lies beyond the physical universe. this interactive limitation seems to be forever set between the living and the dead. this means that there is no valid epistemological intersection of the assumed two worlds. the preceding argument seemsreasonable because of the possibility of epistemic perversion. for example, regarding near death experiences, one can ask: if death actually occurs, will these experiences continue? how are we sure they are not mirages of death just like a mistaken pool of water that is not there when we get to the point? for instance, theodore schick and lewis vaughn25 hold that, although researchers generally agree that people do experience such things, but whether their experiences show that they literarily leave their bodies and enter another world is another question. moody was convinced that near death experiencers do have a glimpse of the beyond, a brief passage into a whole other reality, but schick’s and vaughn’s concern is: whether such a belief is justified. they argued that “a claim is justified if it is beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is beyond a reasonable doubt if it provides the best explanation of something”.26since the evidence from near death experiences does not provide the best explanation, it does not establish the belief in life after death beyond reasonable doubt. this mental wrangling by schick and vaughn may signify the danger of reducing reality to logic and epistemological justification. but speaking realistically, reality is beyond these. part of the counterarguments for immortality is that some thought of the notion of disembodied existence as meaningless. according to michael scriven,27 the belief in personal immortality through the survival of a spirit or soul conceived as the essence of personality clearly serves important functions in the psychic 172 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 economy of many people. this makes death seem less frightful, morality more meaningful and life more significant. but speaking uneconomically very little can be said about the truth of this claim. if the belief in personal immortality is divorce from the belief in a divine man-centered creation and redemption, it becomes unintelligible. this belief can slope into the claim that all animals and even plants survive death. speaking realistically, this is a fantasy, unsupportable claim and is contrary to evidence. scriven submitted further that: [f]ascinating though the literature of survival research is, then, it does not provide us with anything more than a thorough education about the experimental investigation of allegedly supernatural phenomena. and there is no other source of evidence to support belief in our survival of bodily death. we die, and then we rot; and that is the only reward or retribution for our life as a whole that we shall ever receive. the meaning of man’s existence lies within his life and not beyond the grave.28 but helen buss mitchell tends to mediate this argument and suspends categorical judgement about it. according to her, “[c]ompelling as the account of life after death may be, we currently have no way of verifying their truth by means of controlled experiment”.29 she argues that near death experience accounts do not establish life after death empirically – that is, through the scientific method of objective data gathering and hypothesis testing. there is simply no evidence for it. looking at it from the other perspective, by listening to accounts of near death experiences, it is also clear that these people feel that they know what they experienced. “children make particularly compelling witnesses because they tell of their experiences so matter-of-factly”.30 to argue against immortality or life after death because it has not been proven to be true is to lean on fallacy of argument from ignorance, since it has not been proven to be false either. to reduce its authenticity to empirical verification is like saying that the debates over the truth or falsity of x being the friend or president of a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 173 y, the availability or otherwise of network services in a place, the rightness or wrongness of abortion, whether it is good to do good and avoid evil, among others, are to be verified only by subjecting them to laboratory analyses. this makes nonsense of value, truth and reality. the over confidence in this empirical sort of a thing is misleading. it poses as if empirical verifiability is the panacea to fathom all reality. for example, some centuries ago any claim to the present state of communication development will be regarded as an abuse of common sense, an empirical cum verification nullity. today, here we are. a piece of information can go round the world in a minute. you can talk to anybody anywhere in the world without public address system and without any connecting wires. you can write a letter or make a write-up and another will receive it in a second or seconds anywhere in the world. this is the present state of information technology, which probably scientists or empiricists would have denied some centuries ago for non-verifiability. perhaps, some hundreds of years to come scientists or empiricists may by laboratory analysis confirm immortality or life after death. we shall not go beyond this stage here, since,to do so, will imply overindulgence in discussing afterlife with respect to the scope of this topic of discourse. we shall now turn our attention to knowledge claim of the pain of dying. part of the reasons people fear death is the pain, which is believed people experience in dying. but how do we know that dying is a painful experience? we may think we know this because, we see the dying agonizing. from his demeanour, we can infer that he is in pain. therefore, when we see many people dying with similar demeanour, weinfer that dying generally is a painful experience. how do we know for sure from their observable manifestations that dying is painful? this raises the problem of other minds in philosophy of mind. how do we know what is in the minds of others? do their demeanours, facial and other expressions grant any legitimacy for valid inference? if it does, does this inferencedepict any truth? but we can answer that since we see ψ in a–c for themto become ϰ , we can be sure that for d–z to 174 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 becomeϰ they must experience ψ. put plainly, since we have seen people expressing signs of pain when dying then it means that dying is painful. but this reasoning pattern is inductive;and it is commonplace knowledge that induction can be dubious. the fact that people’s expressions give the impression that they are in pain when dying does not give the guarantee that dying is inherently painful. has there not been a single instance of dying which did not manifest pain? put differently, has anybody not died without pain? if anyone did, then the sweeping statement that the act of dying is painful is unsupported with such contrary evidence. the dying may actually be expressing the pains of fear of deatha sense of leaving the world, a psychological rather than physiological pain of dying. the beliefsin afterlife and reincarnation, whether in esanor elsewhere also raisedthe problem of personal identity in philosophy of mind. is the reincarnated individual still the same person in ancestral domain? is the reincarnate and ancestor the same person with the deceased? what justify these? this is a problem. the logical flaws the esan belief in afterlife and reincarnation, as it is anywhere, is subject to logical error. it defies the logical laws of thought, that is, the principles of identity, exclude middle and noncontradiction. is it possible for the deceased to be in ancestral world and reincarnate at the same time? the problem is more than that. logically speaking, what is the source of the assumed inference that the deceased is somewhere or is not anywhere beyond the grave after death? there is the claim that “[t]he abode of the dead has no clearly defined geographical location”.31 those who reject life after death on this ground may claim that since the geographical terrain orabode of the dead has not or cannot be discovered, then, it does not exist,because for them, to exist, is to be in a place. the challenge here is that such claimers have not discovered all there is in the material universe. if this is the case, then, they ought not to think of a must discovery of realities outside the universe, and in spiritual matter at that. in whichever way, any claim made so far in this section commits the logical fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam, that is, the fallacy of a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 175 argument from ignorance.32 since fallacy is involved the argument cannot be logically valid. the affirmation and denial of knowledge claim about another plane of existence and of the abode of the deceased are both logical gibberish, an invalid assumption that is beyond demonstration. this isbecause, in logic, there is a specific pattern of occurrence such that given a then b. it will be a logical inconsistency or contradiction for b not to be when a. this is why the claims made about knowledge and experience concerning afterlife in the preceding session do not pass the test of logic. moral import of death in esan culture the consciousness that death is a debt which we must inevitably pay,enhances moral and social order to some extent. the esanperson believes that he or she will die one day. he also believes in life after death. these have tremendous moral signification for the esan people. the realization of the existential fact that we will die one day makes people to be kind to one another. it makes them to live sincerely and abide by the golden rule. their indoctrinated beliefs that ebunuleleimienobhanoghuuholo–‘whatever the mouth eats must without fail, worry the anus’ -, that the evil that men do lives after them, and that a good name is better than riches make them shun evil.33 they therefore lead good lives so that: 1. their good deeds and name will be echoed after their death. 2. they will live long. 3. they can join the ancestors. 4. they can leave good legacy. 5. they can attract befitting burial which is the prelude to joining the ancestors. 6. and very importantly, people will treat their progeny well when they are no longer alive. another way death inform moral behavior among esan people is that the sight of a dying person bring people to the realization of their own situation: that they too will be in that situation one day. this then makes them sober when they see somebody dying. it 176 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 redirects their focus and attitude morally toward the sick, the suffering, the poor, the dying and the dead. it enhances their senses of solidarity toward others as co-potential victims of death. conclusion skepticism can be raised about claims to knowledge and experience of afterlife. but this does not eliminate the possibility of afterlife and its knowledge and experience. a hindu philosopher nikhilananda34 puts it that “experiences of after death cannot be demonstrated by reason”. he also puts it that “the doctrine of rebirth is more probable than improbable”. reality is not all about passing the test of logics and epistemological rigour. what isis and what is not is not independent of intellectual rigour. the beliefs which the esan people have about death help in organizing their individual and community lives meaningfully. but the contemporary norm has diverged significantly from the traditional norm about some of these beliefs. it has perverted it. this has impaired their moral and social conception that enhanced the proper functioning of traditional community life. in contemporary time, people’s attitudes do not show that they will die. but this does not mean they will not die. and this does not exempt them from moral and social responsibilities. what it means is that they are morally callous and insensitive and are thus not using their present to shape their future. endnotes 1. peter alli, esan cosmology and its effects on the social behaviour of the people: bringing all things under christ, (lagos: deocraft communications, 2011), pp. 25-26. 2. segungbadegesin, “culture and bioethics” helga kuhse and peter singer, eds.,a companion to bioethics,2ed., (oxford: wiley-blackwell, 2009), p. 31. 3. see anicius boethius, the consolation of philosophy,v.e. watts, translated and introduced, (london: penguin books, 1969). 4. a.o. orubu, “the hereafter in african traditional religion”, a.o. orubu, ed., african traditional religion, (benin city: institute of education, university of benin, 2001), p. 155. 5. orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, p. 155. 6. orubu,the hereafter in african traditional religion, p. 155. 7. orubu,the hereafter in african traditional religion, p. 156. a philosophical analysis of death in esan culture | 177 8. see christopher okojie, esan laws and custom with ethnographic studies of the esan people,2ed., (benin city: ilupeji press ltd., 1994) pp. 100-101. 9. see details in j.b. webster, a.a. boahen with h.o. idowu, the growth of african civilization: the revolutionary years: west africa since 1800, (london: longmans groups ltd, 1967), pp. 185-186; olumide lucas, religions in west africa and ancient egypt, (lagos: nigerian national press, 1970), pp. 88-89; t.a. osae, and a.t.o. odunsi, a short history of west africa: a. d. 1800 to the present day. (london: university of london press ltd, 1973), p. 98. 10. daron acemoglu, and james robinson, why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty, (london: profile books ltd., 2013), pp. 253-254. 11. see details in g.t. basden, niger ibos, pp. 49-52, cited in olumide lucas, religions in west africa and ancient egypt, p. 88. 12. osae and odunsi, a short history of west africa, p. 98. 13. s.o. oboh, et.al.,igedegedegede: selected essays on igede cultures and language, (makurdi: onaivient. ltd, 1987), p. 14, cited in a. ali and p.o. agogo, traditional african beliefs: the case of igede people of benue state, nigeria, a.o. orubu, ed., african traditional religion, pp. 107. 14. orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, p. 160. 15. michael shallo, lessons in scholastic philosophy, (philadelphia: the peter reilly publishers–importers, 1934), p. 313. 16. see orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, pp. 161-164. 17. see details in raymond moody, life after life, (new york: bantam books), cited in a.o. orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, pp. 153166. 18. theodore schick and lewis vaughn, how to think about weird things: critical thinking for a new age, (london: mayfield publishing company, 1995), p. 6. 19. see schick and vaughn, how to think about weird things, p. 271; also see raymond moody jr., life after life, (new york: bantam books, cited in theodore schick and lewis vaughn, how to think about weird things, 1975, pp. 21-23. 20. schick and vaughn, how to think about weird things, p. 52; also see james alcock, parapsychology: science or magic? (oxford: pergamon press, 1981), p. 76. 21. see details in schick and vaughn, how to think about weird things, pp. 270-272. 22. see h. wambach, life before life, new york: bantam books, 1982; a.o. orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, pp.163-164. 23. see details in michael shallo, lessons in scholastic philosophy, pp.312-317. 24. see orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, pp. 161-164. 178 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 25. schick and vaughn, how to think about weird things, p. 52. 26. schick and vaughn, how to think about weird things, p. 274. 27. michael scriven, primary philosophy, (new york: mcgraw-hill, inc. 1966), p. 175. 28. scriven, primary philosophy, p. 177. 29. helen buss mitchell, roots of wisdom: a tapestry of philosophical traditions,6ed., (belmont: wadsworth cengage learning, 2011), p. 203. 30. mitchell, roots of wisdom, p. 203. 31. orubu, the hereafter in african traditional religion, p. 160. 32. for details of the nature of this fallacy, see morris engel, the study of philosophy: an introduction, (new york: holt, rinehart and winston, 1981), pp. 133-134; stuart hirschberg, ed., strategies of argument, 2ed., (boston: allyn and bacon, 1996), p. 821; irving copi and carl cohen, introduction to logic, 12ed., (new jersey: pearson education, inc., 2005), pp. 140-141. 33. felix airoboman and joseph osagie, “the phenomenon of death and its moral implications among the esan of edo state, nigeria”, higher education of social science, vol. 10, no. 5, 2016, pp. 6-7, also available from: url: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/hess/article/view/8559 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/8559 34. see the watchtower, do you believe in reincarnation? benin city: watchtower bible and tract society of pennsylvania, vol.118, no.10, may 15, 1997, p. 4, citing nikhilananda, hinduism: its meaning for the liberation of the spirit. 86 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament: a historical, theological and ritual approach abstract there is no denial of the fact that the idea of many contemporary catholic christians about confirmation is shaped by the definition in the catechism of baltimore that confirmation is a sacrament through which we receive the holy ghost to make us strong and perfect christians and soldiers of christ (no. 166). this definition tends to emphasise confirmation as a sacrament of christian maturity. the catechism of the catholic church, however emphasizes that confirmation, together with baptism and eucharist are sacraments of initiation whose unity must be safeguarded (ccc. 1212, 1285).how can we possibly consider the notion of confirmation as a sacrament of christian maturity and one whose unity with baptism and eucharist must be kept? is our present ritual practise reflective of the initiation character of the sacrament? when and how did this differentiation in the primary role of the sacrament emerge? this essay responds to these, and some other pertinent questions regarding the true character of the sacrament of confirmation. it assumes that the survey of the historical, theological, and ritual understanding of the sacrament can help to put in right perspective the true character of the sacrament and thus affect the present practice. keywords: confirmation, sacrament, baptism, initiation, catechism. rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 87 introduction the catechism of the catholic church explicitly stated that the sacraments of christian initiation are baptism, confirmation, and eucharist, they lay the foundations for every christian life, and their unity must be safeguarded (ccc 1212, 1285). this affirmation understands ‘initiation’ as a unitary process by which an individual comes to full membership in the christian community. however, the practice of confirmation today reflects little of the initiation character, and consequently raises question about its meaning. when the question is asked about the meaning of confirmation, the most likely answer will be something relating to the holy spirit and not basically initiatory. it may be said to be the sacrament that gives us the holy spirit with all his gifts. or as the catechism of baltimore defines it: a sacrament through which we receive the holy ghost to make us strong and perfect christians and soldiers of christ (no. 166). this notion of confirmation with its link to the holy spirit and strengthening has been over emphasised at the detriment of its initiatory character. but this attitude attracts myriad of questions: is the holy spirit not given in baptism? if it is (and indeed is), is the holy spirit given in baptism different or in little measure to the one at confirmation? are those who have not received confirmation not capable of living the life in the spirit and manifesting the gifts of the holy spirit? do those who receive confirmation always manifest the gifts of the spirit? is it necessary to wait till adulthood to receive the holy spirit and his gifts? if it is a sacrament of initiation, are those who have not received confirmation full member of the church? how and why are those who are not fully initiated, partaking in the eucharistic meal? if it not for its initiation character, why is the request for confirmation of catholics before marriage (cic 1065 §1)? why should those from other christian traditions being received into full communion with the catholic church be confirmed (ccc 1312; cic 884 §2)? and the question can go on and on. one thing that these questions reveal is that confirmation is not as easily understood as it sometimes seems to be. it is a sacrament with complexities and this 88 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 calls for a rethink about what the sacrament is in its history, theology and ritual. confirmation: a sacrament with complexities one of the recurrent features in the writings on confirmation is the acknowledgement that it has multiple complexities in its history, theology and ritual practice. it is arguably one of the most difficult and complex questions in the history of the church.1 for gerard austin, “no other sacrament has had such a checkered history. no other sacrament has changed so frequently in ritual, prayers, and meaning through the centuries.”2 as a liturgical act, there is no other sacrament that has generated so much theological controversy and as a result attracted variety of interpretations.3 regarding its history and origin, “it is one of the most obscured chapters in the origin of christian worship.”4 it is a sacrament shrouded in much ambiguity, not just in its history and theology but also in practice. frank quinn considers it as “one of the most vexing issues in contemporary theology, liturgical reform and practice”.5 both the development and the reform of the rites of the sacrament seem to consistently generate more questions than they hope to clarify. confirmation: a definition to avoid ambiguity, it is important to give a working definition of the object of our discourse – confirmation.6 maxwell johnson gives a comprehensive definition thus: confirmation is the second of the three sacraments of christian initiation in the roman catholic church, the ‘seal of the holy spirit’ completing baptism and connected to the hand-laying prayer for the sevenfold gifts of the holy spirit and an anointing with chrism, both usually performed by a bishop (or by presbyters in the case of adult initiation), leading to the fullness of christian initiation signified by participation for the first time in the eucharist.postbaptismal ‘chrismation’ for both infants and adults, in the eastern orthodox and eastern catholic rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 89 churches is often viewed as equivalent to confirmation. in various protestant traditions, however, the rite of confirmation is not part of ‘initiation’, properly speaking, but is, rather, a rite having to do with a public affirmation of one’s baptism after catechesis, usually during adolescence, with baptism itself understood as constituting the fullness of initiation into christ and the church. and like chrismation in the eastern rites, so confirmation in the roman catholic rite is also used as part of the rites of reception into full communion with the church for those baptised in other christian traditions.7 from the above definition, we can deduce key terms like holy spirit, hand-laying, anointing or chrismation as characterising what confirmation is. in discussing confirmation therefore, these features are the pointers or markers for tracing its history, discussing its theology and shaping its ritual. historical approach to confirmation confirmation is closely linked to baptism both in history and in practice. as such, any attempt to trace the history and development of confirmation, inevitably discusses the practice of baptism as a (perhaps, the) means of christian initiation. the scriptures attest to this link between baptism and confirmation especially in reference to ritual-bath, hand-laying and anointing. while i acknowledge that there are references to spirit of god, ritual bath, hand-laying and anointing in the old testament (cf. gen 1:1-2, is. 11:1-6, 32:15-18, 61:1-2; jer. 31:31-34; ezek. 36:25-27), they are often in relation to renewal, commissioning and foreshadowing of messianic era. therefore, our attention will be more on the new testament which inaugurates the messianic era and provides a clearer foundation for confirmation. 90 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 new testament foundation for confirmation the event of the baptism of jesus in the jordan (matt. 3:13-17; mark 1:9-11; luke 3: 21-22) furnishes us with much to say about baptism and confirmation. this baptism of jesus was not the same as other baptisms by john because something particularly unique accompanied it – descent of the holy spirit and sonship of jesus.8 the evangelists emphasise these two important elements that have marked the understanding of baptism down the history – possession by the holy spirit and adoption as sons and daughters of god. thus, “just as jesus was anointed with the spirit, so his followers will be given the same spirit. just as jesus was declared to be the ‘beloved son’, so his followers will be declared to be sons and daughters of god.”9 the acts of the apostles that narrates the activities of the early church, including how new converts were initiated into the christian fold, also offers insights into the foundation for the origin of confirmation. the events of acts8:14-17 and 19:1-7 are often employed to buttress this point. in these instances, the samaritan converts (acts 8) and others who have received the baptism of john the baptist (acts 19) received the holy spirit through a postbaptismal hand-laying. one will be safe to say that these texts show that the post-baptismal rite of imposition of hand was a sacramental context of the gift of the holy spirit.10 while traditional scholarship sees these texts as the foundation for confirmation, joseph martos cautions that “recent scholarship underscores their exceptional contexts and situations rather than interpreting them as indicative of a singular or nominative practice in the apostolic churches.”11also, j.d crichton added that while considering these texts as ‘proof text’ for confirmation, they are to be seen as acts of the jerusalem church to establish and maintain the unity of the church.12 it was an ad hoc gesture to solve an abnormal situation.13 rather, baptism and reception of the holy spirit should have come together as suggested in acts 2:38. the pauline and johannine literatures give another trajectory into the understanding of the relation of the holy spirit to the baptized. while acts suggests that the holy spirit is imparted through post-baptismal hand-laying, for paul and john the holy rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 91 spirit is conferred by baptism itself and there is no mention of any post-baptismal ritual. john interprets baptism as being born by ‘water and spirit’ (john 3:5). for paul, the stages of proclamation and conversion (the earlier stages of initiation) is regularly consummated by a water birth that was itself the anointing and sealing of one’s adherence to christ in the same spirit (e.g. 2 cor. 1:21-22).14 amidst these different views, “the only thing that the biblical evidence is certain of is that while the water-bath and the gifts of the holy spirit are in some way distinguishable, they can never be totally separated.”15 as much as we do not have testimonies to the mode of initiation and impartation ofthe holy spirit in the immediate century after the apostolic era, we turn to the patristic era in tracing the development of confirmation. the origins of confirmation in discussing the origins of confirmation, one must note that the term ‘confirmation’ was not used until the mid-fifth century. prior to this time, terms such as perfectioor consummatio were used for those final rites of baptism which were associated with the bishop. the terms do not refer so much to specific rites as to the perfecting or completing of baptismal initiation by the bishop.16 as a technical term, confirmatiofirst appears in the fifth century, in documents reporting practices in southeast gaul. but as with perfectioand consummatio, confirmatiodid not refer directly to any particular rite or to the bestowal of the holy spirit. instead, it was juridical, referring to the personal intervention of the bishop in baptismal initiation, especially when the bishop had not been present at the baptism itself.17 the councils of orange and riez used it in the context of hand-laying on heretics and neophytes respectively. we should however be careful not to imply that post-baptismal rite of initiation and admission of heretics are the same, though they both follow the same line of development.18 the initial term that has a link to bestowal of the holy spirit in ‘the seal.’19 gregory dix, captures the essence of the change in terminology thus: 92 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 hitherto, the latin name for baptism of the spirit had been the scriptural term ‘the seal’ – signaculum, consignatio, corresponding to the sphragis which the greeks and the rushma which the syrian churches still retain. in the fifth century the latins begin to use the term confirmation. …. the change of term has its own significance. a document which needs ‘sealing’ is not valid until the seal has been affixed. the ‘confirmation’ of a document, though it may add to its authority, implies that it was already operative before it was ‘confirmed’. 20 confirmation is thus seen as ‘completion of baptism.’ this connotation will eventually have implications for the theology of confirmation, especially in its relation to baptism, in the subsequent era. stages of historical development the historical development of confirmation can be outlined in stages.though the development is not fine-cut, as there are series of overlaps, marsh recognises three stages which i shall adopt in this work.21 these are: a). the early centuries (2nd to 4thcenturies) b). the early medieval period (5th to 11th centuries), and c). the central medieval to modern times and recent developments. the early centuries (2nd to 4th centuries) as paul turner rightly noted, as much as we may not say that confirmation had been in existence since the second century, it suffices to say that the second post-baptismal anointing or/and handlaying “by the bishop, attested in many documents, became the forerunner of confirmation. the term ‘confirmation’ still did not occur, but the ritual was beginning to take shape after baptism and before eucharist.”22 most scholars believe that the apostolic tradition (at) a long thought to be an authentic, authoritative and dependable witness to early third-century roman liturgical practice, composed by hippolytus of rome is the first text in which what we consider as confirmation first appeared.23 the document outlines rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 93 a ritual celebration of baptism for christian initiation. what is relevant for our discussion here is the post baptismal rituals of handlaying and double anointing: afterward, when they have come up out of the water, they shall be anointed by the elder with the oil of thanksgiving, saying, "i anoint you with holy oil in the name of jesus christ." then, drying themselves, they shall dress and afterwards gather in the church. the bishop will then lay his hand upon them, invoking, saying, "lord god, you who have made these worthy of the removal of sins through the bath of regeneration, make them worthy to be filled with your holy spirit, grant to them your grace, that they might serve you according to your will, for to you is the glory, father and son with the holy spirit, in the holy church, now and throughout the ages of the ages. amen. after this he pours the oil into his hand, and laying his hand on each of their heads, says, "i anoint you with holy oil in god the father almighty, and christ jesus, and the holy spirit." then, after sealing each of them on the forehead, he shall give them the kiss of peace and say, "the lord be with you."24 though the model of initiation mentioned in the at referred to double post-baptismal anointing and hand-laying, a common practice in rome, there was no common consensus about the point when people receive the holy spirit during their initiation. the common agreement was that by the conclusion of the ceremony, christians had received the spirit.but for some of the patristics,“this happened during baptismal washing, for others it happened afterward. some did not specify when it happened but only spoke of the anointing or the imposition of hand as a sign that it happened.”25 tertullian, for instance, in de baptismosees the imposition of hand as a rite of inviting and welcoming the holy spirit.26 94 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 unlike in rome where there was both post-baptismal and hand-laying, the eastern churches only had post baptismal anointing for giving the holy spirit. cyril of jerusalem, for instance recognised the anointing, not just as the moment of imparting the holy spirit, but that the anointing is the holy spirit.27 for him, postbaptismal anointing is to ‘instil divinity’ in the one anointed.28 the apostolic constitutions requested that: “you shall anoint with holy oil, then you shall baptize with water, and finally you shall seal with chrism, so that the anointing may be the partaking of the holy spirit, the water the symbol of the death (of christ), and the chrism, the seal of the covenants.”29 the apostolicconstitution however added that: "but if there be neither oil nor chrism, the water is sufficient both for the anointing and for the sealing, and for the confession (of faith) of him who is dying, or rather is dying together (with christ).”30 j.d crichton captured the implications and the sentiments of the compiler of the document so well when he says “the compiler certainly believed that the spirit was given but evidently did not see either hand-laying or anointing as essential. for him, both ‘anointing’ and ‘seal’, which he regarded as important, did not need physical gestures for them to take place.”31 moreover, this period witnessed the separation of confirmation (as expressed in anointing and hand-laying) from baptism (water-birth). this separation is closely linked to the prevailing practice that the second post-baptismal anointing and hand-laying are reserved for the bishop. it gradually became practically impossible for bishops to be present at every baptism as christianity became the official religion of the roman empire. partly, the prevailing teaching of augustine about original sin of which baptism was necessary for its remittance influenced the increased infant baptism at that time.more people request for baptism and dioceses enlarged. also, as missionaries move towards the alps, only few bishops went with them. because of these, so many were baptised but only few were consigned.32 the early medieval period (5th to 11th centuries) in gaul, the fifth century was marked by some developments which will have long effect on the understanding of confirmation. in 416, rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 95 pope innocent i decreed that priest could anoint with chrism but the rite of consignation with chrism is reserved to the bishop since it is only the successor of the apostles that can give the holy spirit. through the council of orange in 441 however, the gallican bishops allowed the priest who celebrated baptism to anoint the people with chrism if it was consecrated by the bishop. also, as noted earlier, this was the first time the term ‘confirmation’ was used for the post-baptismal hand-laying or/and anointing. in 460, faustus of riez delivered a popular pentecost homily which was meant to encourage the people to approach the bishop for confirmation.33 faustus emphasised that confirmation gives graces different from what baptism gives. he preached that through baptism we receive new life through the holy spirit, but we are strengthenedonly in confirmation to battle with sin and evil. though this preaching didn’t yield much positive effect at the time, it doubtlessly will about 400 years later. lastly, though the term ‘confirmation’ was used in the councils of riez and orange in 439 and 441 respectively, and in the pentecost homily of faustus, it was not until 750 that it came to refer to baptismal episcopal rites in rubrical text – ordo romanus xi. moreover, this stage of the development of confirmation was strongly influenced by the germanization of the roman liturgy.34 the roman practices eventually found its way into gallican territory when pepin iii and later charlemagne established the ‘holy roman empire’ in the west. during their reign, they sought to end the rivalry between the roman and gallican liturgies and at the same time “wanted to be in closer contact with the porter of heaven, saint peter, with his tomb, with his city, and with his liturgy.”35 at this time, the roman custom of episcopal confirmation was extended “through all the countries of europe (except milan and some spanish dioceses), and the french explanation for confirmation became the accepted catholic view.”36 though the roman rite was imposed, it met with resistance with the gallican people. several efforts were made to safeguard the gallican autonomy, both politically and liturgically. these 96 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 efforts invariably led to the emergence of false decretals, which was an ingenious piece of forgery combining a collection of letter and decrees from popes and councils with the opinions of the forgers, and given the purported credibility by attributing it to isidore of seville in early 600s. parts of the decretals stated that “…all the faithful must receive the holy spirit after baptism through the imposition of the hand of the bishop so that they may become fully christians.” it taught that “at the baptismal font the holy spirit bestow absolutely all that is needed to restore innocence, but in confirmation he provides an increase of grace. in baptism we are born to new life; after baptism we are confirmed for combat. in baptism we are washed; after baptism we are strengthened.” and “that the sacrament of the imposition of hands was to be performed by no one but the successors of the apostles.”37 this forgery was so successful, accepted as genuine, attained the force of law and became foundational for the theology of confirmation championed by the scholastics. the central medieval to modern times and recent developments. much of what was done during this period was the theological explanations of confirmation and its effects. theologians of this period are largely influenced by the pentecost homily often credited to faustus of riez. this period witnessed the emergence of the use of military imagery with its defensive connotations for, an imagery which hitherto had been restricted to the pre-baptismal anointings. hence, confirmation is foremost considered as the sacrament of being strengthened or empowered by the holy spirit. this was the idea projected by many theologians of the time including alcuin, rabanus maurus, peter lombard, nicholas claivaux and thomas aquinas. there are some other notable pronouncements that shaped the practice of confirmation during this period. based on the teachings of peter lombard in his treatise that confirmation is a sacrament, the second council of lyon (1247) recognizes confirmation as one of the seven sacraments of the catholic church. the council of cologne (1280) declared that children under the age rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 97 of seven were too young for confirmation and various episcopal and conciliar bodies opted for between twelve and fourteen. it was however the council of florence (1439) that canonized the medieval practice and theology of confirmation. it declared that there are seven sacraments, define the form and matter of confirmation, the ordinary minister is the bishop and priest can be delegated provided that the chrism blessed by the bishop will be used. the medieval teachings about confirmation however met with opposition during the modern era. the modern era was the period of the reformations and the understanding and practice of confirmation was so much attacked by martin luther and other reformers. for luther, that confirmation gives the holy spirit is a superstition. at best, confirmation is for him a sacramental at par with ritual of blessing of water. in his 1520 treatise, babylonian captivity of the church, luther rejected confirmation as a sacrament on the ground that it does not have a biblical foundation. calvin on the other hand argues that baptism on its own is perfect without confirmation as against the teaching of the scholastics that confirmation perfects baptism.38the council of trent responded to these accusations, but only by mostly reaffirming the teachings of the scholastics especially, aquinas. in recent times, the reform of the second vatican council has been responsible for the development in the understanding and practice of confirmation today. the conciliar fathers proposed the revision of the rite of confirmation. the revision was done in 1971 and was accompanied by an apostolic constitution, divinae consortium naturae. the new rite sought to respond to the questions of the age for confirmation, the matter and form of the sacrament, the minister of the sacrament and the relationship of the sacrament to baptism. paramount in the task of the reform was to situate confirmation back into the context of christian initiation preceded by baptism and followed by the eucharist. the reform has led to the emergence of different models of confirmation in the roman catholic church: the confirmation of infants, children, adolescents and adults. arguably, the most popular today is the 98 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 adolescent confirmation. in the opinion of turner, this growing practice was enhanced by the “evolution of catechetical theory – or the theory of how people best learn and grow in the faith.”39 he argues that the late twentieth century has experienced a principal shift in theory of learning from being abstract learning to experiential learning, from learning from books to learning for experience, from learning by memorization to learning by reflecting on personal experience. these eventually became the foundation upon which teen or youth catechesis was built. the method is highly productive in fostering spiritual growth and commitment to the faith. but the question remains: does it reflect the theological and ritual meaning of confirmation? theological approach what has mostly engaged the mind of liturgical theologians about confirmation is its theological relationship with baptism. though kavanagh argues that such relationship is more of structure than theology,40 the theological relationship should not be undermined. schmemann argues from the eastern understanding of the ‘seal of the holy spirit’ with which confirmation is celebrated. he argues that confirmation is both the fulfilment of baptism and a new mystery taking the neophyte beyond baptism. in confirmation, christ’s own spirit is given as gift. thus, “prepared and made possible by baptism, which is fulfilled in it, it takes man beyond baptism, beyond ‘salvation’: by making him ‘christ’ in christ, by anointing him with the anointment of the anointed one, it opens to man the door of theosisor deification.”41 it is with this understanding that turner says: “sequence alone does not make confirmation initiation; its conjunction with baptism in the same ceremony drives the point home.”42 for maxwell, problem only arises when confirmation is not connected to baptism at all but added as a separate and self-sustained rite.43 confirmation, together with baptism and orders are regarded as sacraments that impart permanent character and as such cannot be repeated (ccc 1317). while this is an ecclesiastical statement, it constantly begs for theological explanation. theologians differ on what this means. for schmemann, the rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 99 question of character is more of the understanding of the relationship of the holy spirit with the confirmand. one is to ask what is received when we say confirmation bestows the gift of the spirit. schmemann pointed out the scholastic problem when he says that “instead of ‘receiving’ the meaning of the sacrament from liturgical tradition, theologians created, so to speak, their own definition of sacraments and then, in the light of such definitions, began to interpret the liturgy of the church, to ‘squeeze’ in into their own a priori approach.”44 for him, “the sacramental formula is and has always been in the singular, ‘the gift’ (dorea), theologians while ‘defining’ this sacrament almost without exception speak of ‘gifts’ (charismata) in the plural; the sacrament, they say, bestows on the neophyte ‘gifts of the holy spirit’. to them the two words, one in the plural and the other in the singular, seem to be interchangeable.”45 for schmemann, the gifts needed for man’s preservation in christian life is given in baptism, the sacrament of regeneration and, confirmation “bestows on man not any particular gift or gifts of the holy spirit, but the holy spirit himself as a gift (dorea).”46 while the reflection of schmemann seem to have corrected the scholastic idea, one cannot but ask if it is possible to have the gifs (as in baptism) without having the spirit as a gift (as in confirmation)? moreover, apart from the theological relationship of confirmation and baptism, reflections on the various themes of confirmation have contributed to a better theological understanding of the sacrament. among these are initiation, strengthening, more christ-like and witnessing. when the conciliar fathers requested for the revision of the rite of confirmation, it was foremost to situate it in the context of initiation.47 it was observable that the imagery of strengthening that was initially attached to pre-baptismal anointing in the early centuries soon became transferred to the post-baptismal anointing (that grew to be confirmation). the rite of confirmation (rc) in its euchologies constantly pray that those confirmed are conformed more to christ (cf. rc, 9, 22, 24, 58) and to be his witnesses in the world (rc 33, 59). 100 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 ritual approach just as the historical and theological approach to confirmation are complex and difficult, so also is the case for the ritual approach. the difficulty in the ritual approach is largely due to the complex history and varying theologies of confirmation. nevertheless, the rite was set forth to address the relationship of confirmation with baptism and eucharist, and then how this relationship is to be understood and celebrated. annibale bugnini, the secretary of congregation for divine worship (1969-1976), the commission that worked on the reform of the catholic liturgy following the second vatican council wrote: “the path of reform of the rite of confirmation was a long and difficult one because of the many problems connected with the sacrament, the uncertainties and the adversity in theological and pastoral thinking about it.”48 the present rite of confirmation, promulgated by pope paul vi in 1971 and revised at the direction of pope john paul ii, provides a theologically rich resource in its content. in structure, the rite consists of the apostolic constitution divinae consortium naturaeof paul vi. the apostolic constitution offers a synopsis of the history and theology of confirmation. the rite contains an introduction and five chapters. chapter one contains the order for the conferral of confirmation within mass. the second chapter deals with the order of conferral of confirmation without mass. it was the third chapter that discusses those things to be observed when confirmation is conferred by the extra ordinary minister. chapter four considers the confirmation to be administered to a sick person in danger of death. the final chapter offers texts to be used in the conferral of confirmation. the structure of the rite in all cases follow the order of liturgy of the word, homily, renewal of baptismal promises, laying on of hands, chrismation, general intercessions, and at the end solemn blessing. though the roman church has often been accused of not emphasizing the pneumatic dimension of liturgy like the eastern churches, the rite centralizes the role and position of the holy spirit in the celebration of the sacrament. firstly, the rite keeps the two traditional ways of imparting the holy spirit: anointing and handlaying. the apostolic constitution decided to keep the two “in order rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 101 that the revision of the rite of confirmation may, as is fitting, include even the essence of the sacramental rite.”49 secondly the euchology is filled with pneumatic themes, and the suggested scripture readings relate directly with the holy spirit and the pentecost experience. strikingly, the alleluia verses included two options that are not taken from the scriptures but from traditional hymn to the holy spirit (rc. 64).50 furthermore, the centrality of the holy spirit also serves the purpose of linking confirmation to baptism and the eucharist. the apostolic constitution opened by affirming that it is by the same spirit by which the faithful are born anew in baptism that they are strengthened in confirmation and will be fed by the bread and wine transformed by the holy spirit into the eucharist. also, we see the expansion of the renewal of baptismal promises.the usual threefold questions preceding baptism (rcia 316) is expanded into four to accommodate the theme of the holy spirit relating confirmation to baptism: “do you believe in the holy spirit, the lord, the giver of life, who today through the sacrament of confirmation is given to you in a special way just as he was given to the apostles on the day of pentecost?” (rc 23) moreover, the former ritual practice of taking a new (or additional) name at confirmation was dropped in the revised rite. the custom which originated from the imitation of baptismal ritual and signifying a new direction in the life of a christian was now considered unrelated with confirmation. this is largely because the rite emphasises the link of baptism and confirmation as one initiation process. the omission thus “argue for the importance of the baptismal name throughout one’s life, and against the belief that confirmation begins a new decisive moment in the life of the christian.”51 the rite also sheds light on the minister of the sacrament. leaning on the historical evidence of the celebration of the sacrament, the rite acknowledges the bishop as the ‘ordinary’ (or primary or original) minister of the sacrament.52 like the rite of ordination, the rite of confirmation also provides a provisional 102 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 homily that can serve the celebrant as an outline. however, unlike that of ordination, the rite has an intriguing part to emphasise the role of the bishop. it reads: “when confirmation is conferred by an extraordinary minister, whether by concession of the general law or by special indult of the apostolic see, it is fitting for him to mention in the homily that the bishop is the ordinary minister of the sacrament and to explain the reason why even priests receive the faculty to confirm from the law or by an indult of the apostolic see.” (rc, 18). the rite also addresses the ‘matter’ and ‘form’ of the sacrament through the ritual description. the rite acknowledges that rome has the two traditions of anointing and hand-laying and the two are to be kept together though they are different ritual acts. this seems to resolve the medieval practice where the hand-laying is presumed by the anointing on the forehead. the bishop invites the people to pray to god that “he will graciously pour out the holy spirit upon them to confirm them with his abundant gifts.” he then lays hand on each of the candidates and says another prayer that god may send them the holy spirit and his seven gifts. after this, the bishop goes to the candidates for the anointing with chrism. “the bishop dips the tip of the thumb of his right-hand in the chrism and, with the thumb, makes the sign of the cross on the forehead of the one to be confirmed, as he says: n., be sealed with the gift of the holy spirit.” (rc 27). through the prayers, the rite seamlessly unites anointing and hand-laying. we should note that there is no specific prayer for the anointing. the prayer that precedes it is the prayer after laying on of hands. yet, the content of the prayer is in the context of anointing. in this way, the rite shows that the ritual actions are distinct, yet performed to the same effect: impacting the holy spirit with his gifts. thus, while the rite has borrowed the byzantine chrismation ritual, it remains faithful to rome’s hand-laying. furthermore, the change in the sacramental formula in the new rite be sealed with the gift of the holy spirit captures the meaning of confirmation. though kavanagh regards this move as ‘byzantinization’ of the roman rite,53 it was seen by the committee in charge of the revision as the best formula to rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 103 express the ‘mind of the church’ regarding confirmation. it expresses external action of signing, that is sealing the initiation, and at the same time the effect of the sacrament, which is the giving of the gift of the holy spirit.54 hence, johnson remarked that “never before had the roman confirmation anointing been this explicitly pneumatic in language and orientation, and with the omission of the postbaptismal anointing in the rcia in favour of this confirmation anointing alone, an interesting new parallel between roman confirmation and byzantine postbaptismal chrismation has been decidedly established.”55 evaluation the survey of the historical and theological development of confirmation enables us to arrive at some considerations regarding the ritual and pastoral practice of the sacrament in the roman catholic church today. one thing that is persistent, as noted at the beginning of this work, is that there are complexities and ambiguities in the history and theology of confirmation. the most popular reason for the observable liturgical crisis that results from these complexities and ambiguity is the separation of what used to be one single celebration of ‘double sacrament’. the separation is twofold: separation-in-time and separation as distinct sacraments. several scholars argue that the separation-in-time for the celebration of baptism and confirmation is the source of the ambiguity surrounding the sacrament. presently, there are different models for the celebration of the sacrament based on the separation in time. we have the confirmation of baptized children, which often come up while they prepare for their first holy communion. this is an attempt to rescue the supposed harm caused by the 1910 document of pope pius x, quam singularis that decreed that children should receive communion at the age of seven. those who are faithful to the sequence of the sacrament thus celebrate confirmation with the first communion in the same mass. the second model is the adolescent/adult confirmation which is very popular today. its origin lies in the practical experience where those 104 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 who were baptized as infants desire to personally affirm their faith or the christian community desires a reflection of a rite of passage to adulthood (in faith). it takes place after a period of catechetical program aimed at faith growth and commitment to faith, and at the end, “confirmation ritualized their own commitment”.56 on the other hand, there are other scholars who believe that the liturgical crisis of confirmation goes deeper than their separation in time. yarnold, holds this different view that even when baptism and confirmation are brought together into the same celebration, the crisis will still not dissolve. he contends that there will still be question of the effects of the different sacraments. hence, he concluded that the problem lies in the recognition of baptism and confirmation as two distinct sacraments. as long as they are held as two distinct sacraments and are both understood as giving the holy spirit, the rite will keep raising different questions.57 marsh maintains that the deeper problem of the sacrament of confirmation lies in the new testament theologies of the holy spirit.58 in luke-acts’ theology the holy spirit is imparted after baptism while pauline and johannine theologies uphold that the holy spirit is given at baptism. for marsh, to maintain the unity of the sacraments, their liturgical expression must recognize, accept and incorporate this scriptural foundational duality. “not to do so is to commit oneself to a bad methodology which offers little hope for a sound solution.”59 furthermore, we may question further if the problems around confirmation is not imbedded in our understanding of sacrament? andrew mcgowan rightly observed that the catholic church’s unequivocal recognition of seven sacraments has “caused confirmation to attract more meaning than it would if there were more (sacraments).”60 this is obviously an eye opener for us to discover that we may actually be ‘seeing’ problem where virtually there is no problem. possibly, we have created problems by spending time theologizing about something else (perhaps another sacrament) in or with the name of ‘confirmation.’ could it be that if from the early centuries, different terms (like perfectio, consumatio, orconfirmare) have been retained for the hand-laying in reconciling, penitents, heretics and schismatics, or the postbaptismal anointing rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 105 of infants and children or the hand-laying, and anointing of very sick adults, we might be speaking of different sacraments all together? as much as i don’t intend to reduce the complexity to semantics, the problem might possibly not have existed if the use of the same term does not apply to several ritual events. call to return to a unified rite it is obvious that the problems that the rite of confirmation sought to resolve are still there. it is a sign that the responses are not either satisfactory or confusing.as many as those who identify problems in the theology and practice of confirmation, so are attempts to proffer solutions. but in all, it is almost a chorus that there should be a return to the practice of the early centuries, a ‘unified rite’ where baptism, confirmation and eucharist are celebrated together in one liturgy. proponents of this view argue that this is the only way to restore the sacramental dignity of confirmation. while they recognise that there are two main dominant theologies in the practice of confirmation today – as sacrament of initiation and as sacrament of maturity, commitment and mission – they insist that the former is the real essence of confirmation. however, they also recommend that there should be repeatable moments in which to ritualize maturity, commitment and mission. such ritualization does not necessarily need to be a sacrament or the sacrament of confirmation.61 with this, liturgical theologians might stop seeing adolescent confirmation as a misuse of the sacrament of confirmation as a catechetical device, a utilitarian purpose which makes a mockery of the catholic sacramental system.62 for the unified rite to be effective, this will necessarily involve allowing priests to celebrate confirmation along with baptism, especially where the rite of christian initiation of adults (rcia) takes place. it may suffice to presume that the office of the bishop, as the ordinary minister of the sacrament, is not usurped since the oil of chrism to be used would be one that is blessed at the chrism mass presided over by the bishop. the ceremony for the blessing of the oil on holy thursday invariably emphasises the 106 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 ecclesiastical bond that the reservation of the sacrament to the bishop envisaged (cf. ccc. 1318). it is however unfortunate that even in some situations where the bishop celebrates the baptism of adults, confirmation is still deferred to later date. this attitude keeps one wondering what our understanding of confirmation as initiation sacrament is. to better appreciate confirmation as an initiation sacrament, efforts should be made to restore the order of initiation – baptism, cnfirmation and eucharist. we must note that the latin rite recognises that the practice in the east of administering confirmation after baptism and followed by the eucharist highlights the unity of the three sacraments of initiation (ccc 1318), and this is the foremost reason for the reform of the rite of confirmation (lumengentium, 71). it is worth rethinking if our practice today reflects the mind of the conciliar fathers. also, bearing in mind that the church is disposed to priests administering confirmation (cf. ccc 1313, cic, 884§1), giving faculty to priests to administer confirmation neither usurps the bishop’s authority nor diminishes the strengthening of ecclesiastical bond envisaged by the catechism (ccc 1318). on the contrary, it better signifies confirmation as an initiation sacrament, and thus approached for the right reasons. conclusion in conclusion, though the issues considered above presents us with liturgical crisis around confirmation, they also present us with pastoral possibilities as we seek to understand the mission of the church.63 one thing that is certain is that we cannot totally separate the work of the holy spirit from the gift of the spirit. the themes of strengthening and witnessing that are closely linked with the mission of the church should always be kept in view as members are initiated into the church. rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 107 endnotes 1 thomas marsh, “confirmation” in the new dictionary of sacramental worship, ed. peter e. fink, (dublin: gill and macmillan ltd., 1990), 260. 2 gerard austin, anointing with the spirit: the rite of confirmation: the use of oil and chrism, (new york: pueblo publications, 1985), ix. 3 alexander schmemann, of water and spirit, (london: spck, 1976), 76. 4 jean daniélou, the bible and the liturgy, (notre dame: university of notre dame press, 1956), 114. 5 frank c. quinn, “confirmation reconsidered: rite and meaning,” worship 59, no.4 (july 1985): 354. 6 it is striking that the catechism of the catholic church does not really define what the sacrament of confirmation is but makes several allusions to the effects of the sacrament (see ccc. 1285 – 1305) 7 maxwell johnson, “confirmation” in the new scm dictionary of liturgy and worship, ed. paul bradshaw, (london: scm press, 2002), 126. 8 see aidan kavanagh, the shape of baptism: the rite of christian initiation (collegeville: the liturgical press, 1974), 12-13. 9 austin, anointed with the spirit, 4. 10 thomas marsh, “a study of confirmation ii,” irish theological quarterly 39 (1972), 319. 11 joseph martos, doors to the sacred: a historical introduction to sacraments in the catholic church (ligouri: ligouri/triump, 2001), 187. 12 j. d chrichton, christian celebration: understanding the sacraments (new york: geoffrey chapman, 1993), 102. 13 marsh, “a study of confirmation,” 320. 14 kavanagh, the shape of baptism, 25 (emphasis mine). 15 austin, anointed with the spirit, 7. 16 quinn, “confirmation reconsidered,” 360. 17 paul turner, “the origins of confirmation: an analysis of kavanagh’s hypothesis” in living water, sealing spirit: readings on christian initiation, ed. maxwell johnson (collegeville: the liturgical press, 1995), 360-61. 18 austin, 16. 19 for in depth analysis of ‘the seal’ see the chapter on ‘the sphragis’ in jean daniélou, the bible and the liturgy, 54-69. 20 gregory dix, the theology of confirmation in relation to baptism (london: dacre press, 1946), 25. 21 marsh, “confirmation,” 260-261. 22 paul turner, confirmation: the baby in solomon’s court, (chicago: hillenbrand books, 2006), 28. 23see paul bradshaw, maxwell johnson and l. edward phillips, the apostolic tradition: a commentary (minneapolis: fortress press, 2001), 1-6. 108 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 24 e.c whitaker, documents of baptismal liturgy (revised and expanded edition), ed. maxwell johnson (london: spck, 2003), 7-8. [i will henceforth refer to as dbl]. 25martos, doors to the sacred, 190. 26 dbl, 9. 27 dbl 32. 28 paul turner, sources of confirmation: from the fathers through the reformers, (collegeville: the liturgical press, 1993), 30 29 dbl 37. 30 dbl 37 31 j. d crichton, christian celebration, 89. 32martos, 192. 33 gabriel winkler, “confirmation or chrismation”worship 58 (january 1984): 13. 34 edward foley, from age to age: how christians have celebrated the eucharist, (collegeville: the liturgical press, 2008), 133-184. 35 theodore klauser, a short history of the western liturgy: an account and some reflections, transl. john halliburton, (london: oxford university press, 1969), 73. 36see martos, 194. 37martos, 193. 38 gregory dix, 33-34. 39 turner, confirmation, 101. 40 kavanagh, “confirmation: a suggestion from structure,” worship 58:5 (september 1978):386 & 394. 41 schmemann, 80. 42 turner, confirmation, 87. 43 maxwell johnson, the rites of christian initiation, 252-253. 44 schmemann, 76-77. 45 ibid., 78. 46 ibid., 79. 47sancrosanctumconcilium, 71. 48annibalebugnini, the reform of the liturgy 1948-1975, transl. matthew j. o’connell (collegeville: the liturgical press, 1990), 613. 49 apostolic constitution no.9 50 “come, holy spirit, fill the hearts of your faithful, and kindle in them the fire of your love.” and “holy spirit, lord of light, from the clear celestial height, thy pure beaming radiance give.” 51 turner, confirmation, 80. 52 the english translation of icel opted for ‘ordinary’a juridical term to keep with canon 882 and catechism of the catholic church, no.1313. however, bugnini argued that the term ‘originarius’ better translated as ‘natural’ or ‘primary’ is used in lumen gentium 26 and shows that the bishop’s office makes rethinking confirmation as an initiation sacrament… | 109 him the ‘natural’ minister of the sacrament. cf. bugnini, liturgical reform, 621 (footnote 20). 53 kavanagh, confirmation: origins and reform, 93 54bugnini, 625. 55 johnson, 400. 56 see turner, confirmation, 98-103. 57 edward yarnold, the awe-inspiring rite: the origins of rcia, (collegeville: the liturgical press, 1994), 35. 58 marsh, “a study of confirmation,” 335-336. 59 marsh, “a study of confirmation,” 150. 60 mcgowan, 131. 61 see geoffrey robinson, “confirmation: a bishop’s dilemma”, worship 78 (2004): 53-58. nicholas e. denysenko, chrismation: a primer for catholics (collegeville: liturgical press, 2014), 156, 171. 62 frank c. quinn, “confirmation: does it make sense?” ecclesia orans(1988): 322 63 liam bergin, “anointed to proclaim the kingdom” in catholic sacraments: a rich source of blessing, ed john baldovin and david farina turnbloom, (new york: paulist press, 2015), 48. introduction the second vatican council's call for the reform of the liturgy has aroused much discussion and conflicting opinions. a leading voice in this discussion is joseph ratzinger, who became pope benedict xvi in 2005 and resigned from his petrine ministry in 2013. unlike the exceptions he takes to certain formulations of some of the 2 conciliar documents, like gaudium et spes, for example, ratzinger is not known to have expressed any reservation about the conciliar document on the liturgy, sacrosanctum concilium. in fact, in his early and later writings, he is full of praise for this document. however, what becomes increasingly pronounced in his later writings is his criticism of the way the conciliar reform was implemented. he sees the liturgical abuses in post-conciliar times as manifestations of the deficiencies in the implementation of the conciliar reform. he particularly finds the promulgation of the new order of mass and some of the changes it called for problematic because it gave the impression of a break with the past in the 175 idahosa amadasu the reform of the reform: an examination of joseph ratzinger's vision of 1liturgical renewal church's liturgical life. such implementations were informed by a hermeneutics of rupture, that is, a break with past that undermines the organic development of liturgy in the church. for ratzinger, it is this kind of hermeneutics that has given the impression that one could easily formulate the liturgy according to pastoral expediency. such formulations are often based on a selective reading of history that is informed by an antiquarianism which romanticizes the early church in a way that precludes its later historical developments. the consequence of hermeneutics of rupture is that the place of god is marginalized in the liturgy and an undue attention is given to our human actions and creativities. it is from this perspective that ratzinger expressed reservation about the way that the conciliar call for active participation in the liturgy has been understood, for example, the change in the liturgical celebration from ad orientem to versus populum, the use of certain kinds of music in the liturgy etc. in contrast to the traditionalists who reject the conciliar call for reform and the progressives who see the post 3conciliar changes as advancing the conciliar reform, ratzinger's liturgical vision sees some gap between the conciliar call for reform and its implementation. he would, therefore, call for a reform of the reform so that the reform which was carried out after the council can conform to the council's true intention. the purpose of this paper is to examine the plausibility of ratzinger's call for the reform of the reform. his proposal cuts across a range of liturgical issues. but for the limited scope of our presentation, we will briefly examine few of these areas. more specifically, we will examine vatican ii's notion of active participation and the change from ad orientem to versus populum. we will take our discussion further to examine pope benedict xvi's liberalization of the celebration of the mass according to the 1962 missal. from these discussions, our evaluative conclusion will show whether ratzinger's call for the reform of the reform has any hope for the revival of the church's liturgy today. 176 ratzinger's liturgical vision of the reform of the reform in his report on the vatican ii, ratzinger praised the conciliar constitution on the liturgy for its solid achievements. he wrote that the text recommended a profound change which was informed by an integral understanding of the christian faith that did “not restrict itself 4 to mere changes in individual rubrics.” it marked a return to the “sacramental origins” of the faith against a limited 5 “hierarchical narrowness.” he thereafter enumerated some basic traits that characterized the recommended reforms of the conciliar document on the liturgy as follows: i) the ritual rigidity which undermined the meaning of individual actions in the liturgy was defrosted. this restored the priority of sunday liturgy over the feast days of saints and the priority of mystery over devotion. such prioritization would return the church to the origins of the christian faith and prune the accretions that have concealed the nucleus of the liturgy. later in a monograph on the liturgy, he describes these accretions with the metaphor of a whitewash that has overlaid 6a fresco. ii) a stronger emphasis on the liturgy of the word. iii) a more active participation of the laity in the liturgy. iv) a decentralization of the liturgical decision making. v) more place to vernacular in the liturgy against an exclusive use of 7 latin. in 1964, pope paul vi established a committee for the implementation of the conciliar reform called the consiliumadexsequendam constitutionem de sacra liturgia (consilium for the implementation of the sacred liturgy). the committee (which was commonly referred to as consilium) was headed by cardinal giacomo lercaro and the secretary was father annibale bugnini, a vincentian, who later became archbishop. in his account of the activities of the consilium, pierro marini notes that pope paul vi had created the consilium because he was unwilling to entrust the implementation of the conciliar reform to the congregation of rites, which was established to implement the reforms of the council of trent, due to the fact that it was still wedded to an antiquated mode of thought that was unsuited for the implementation of the vatican ii's liturgical reform. in its 177 modus operandi, the consilium allowed for experimentation in some proposed areas of liturgical reforms before a 8definitive missal was promulgated in 1970. in his memoirs ratzinger wrote that he welcomed the promulgation of the new missal, though not without reservation, noting that the church now “had a binding liturgical text after a period of 9 experimentation that had often deformed the liturgy.” his reservation becomes pronounced when he notes that, the publication of the new missal was accompanied by an “almost total prohibition” of the old missal. furthermore, speaking as if the missal was actually prohibited, he adds, “but i was dismayed by the prohibition of the old missal, since nothing of the sort had ever happened in the entire 10 history of the church.” later in an interview he advocated that “the proscription against the form of liturgy in valid use 11up to 1970 should be lifted.” there have been some debates on the canonical and theological status of the old missal. nicola bux makes a distinction between the prohibition and the abolition of the 12old mass. in fact, he notes that pope paul vi never abolished the old mass; rather he only restricted its usage. but there are others who hold that the old mass was abrogated with the promulgation of the new missal. such positions would argue that there would not be any need to promulgate a new missal if 13 the old one was still valid. one could reason from this perspective that if the law of belief and the law of prayer are mutually reinforcing, then it is normal that the renewal of the faith and a renewed ecclesiological understanding should also warrant a new missal that replaces the old. but if the new missal replaces the old, does it then mean that the old missal is no longer valid? for ratzinger, to hold such an opinion is to create a rupture with the past, which also renders the foundation of the present fragile. ratzinger's perspective is informed by his understanding that the liturgical rites are of divine origin and no power, even that of the pope, can abrogate them. thus, he makes a distinction between the renewal of a liturgical book and the abolition of an old 14missal. but critics of ratzinger would tend to see this standpoint as an attempt to place too much emphasis on the 178 church's liturgical tradition in a way that undermines her contemporary needs. his view is also seen as a way of seeking for the solution to the problems of present liturgical abuses 15 only by a return to the past. we will come back to this discussion, but for now, let us see some of the areas that ratzinger thinks are in need of reform and the solution he proposes for the reform. active participation and ad orientem ratzinger holds that there was a need for reform of the pre-conciliar liturgy because like a fresco it had become tainted with a whitewash that needs to be removed. he uses the same metaphor of a fresco to explain how this very reform called for a new reform. the liturgy, like a fresco covered with whitewash, was laid bare by the pre-conciliar liturgical movement, and this uncovering achieved a definitive form in vatican ii. while the colors of the uncovered fresco are captivating, it has again been left exposed and “has been endangered by climatic conditions as well as by various restorations and reconstructions. in fact, it is threatened with destruction, if the necessary steps are not taken to stop these 16damaging influences.” by the metaphor of the fresco, ratzinger meant to explain the way the conciliar reforms have been carried out and the understanding of the liturgy that it gave birth to. one area that he has found often misunderstood is the conciliar call for active participation, actuosa participatio. ratzinger thinks that the word has often been reduced to the external form of participation, as if the liturgy is what we do, rather than what we participate in. the liturgy is first an action of god that we participate in. john baldovin comments that the “greatest strength of his [ratzinger's] analysis of liturgy and sacrament today is his insistence on keeping god at the centre of the liturgical 18 celebration” baldovin continues that this marginalization of god in the liturgy today is often the result of a superficial understanding of the etymological meaning of liturgy, which is sometimes translated as 'work of the people.' but in its true meaning, rather than the work done by the people, the liturgy 19actually refers to the 'work done for the people.' it is the false etymological meaning of the liturgy as 'the work of the 179 people' that ratzinger objects to in the post conciliar liturgical celebrations, which has often led to a reductive understanding of community celebration. the fundamental idea here is that the liturgy is a community celebration, an act in which the community forms and experiences itself as such. in fact this means that the liturgy more and more acquires a 'party' character and atmosphere, as we see for instance in the increased importance attached to the words of greeting and dismissal and in search for elements with 'entertainment' value. a 'successful' liturgical celebration is judged by the effects achieved in this way. liturgy is thus dependent on the 'creativity', the ideas of those .20who organize it in a critical evaluation of ratzinger's monograph on the liturgy, pierre-marie gy raised doubts about the former's faithfulness to the council in the way he understands active participation as autocelebration. he thinks that ratzinger's criticism does not pay adequate attention to article 48 of sacrosanctum conciliumwhich calls on the faithful not to assist at mass as dumb spectators, but to actively take part in the sacred action. gy also questions ratzinger's objection to versus populum in the liturgy. he thinks ratzinger's criticism is based on an incorrect reading of history and an inadequate appreciation of how versus populum spontaneously became a common practice as a consequence of the celebration of mass in the vernacular. it subsequently gained magisterial approval in the first document that was published on the implementation of the conciliar liturgical reform, inter 21 oecumenici. in response to gy, ratzinger denied that he understands active participation as autocelebration. he explains that his criticism was not directed to the conciliar phrase, but rather to its interpretation which simply understands it as “assigning specific active functions to each of the faithful gathered for the celebration of the eucharist.” he thinks active participation as understood by the council means something more. indeed, it primarily refers to an inner participation that informs the external activity. it requires, in the first place, that one is really 180 familiar with the shape of the liturgy and its texts. liturgical formation is what i mean, without which purely external actions remain empty and meaningless liturgical formation is a fundamental prerequisite for, and indeed an essential form of, active participation in the celebration of the mass. but such participation which allows an inner adherence to the liturgy with one's whole being, one's thinking and activity, must of course also be 22expressed externally, with our bodies. on the issue of versus populum, there have been much discussion on whether the council or the documents that heralded the liturgical implementations actually warranted 23the versus populum as gy claims. ratzinger's basic reservation is that versus populum gives the impression that the community is in a closed circle in which the priest presides over the assembly. it has, for him, further helped to 24 reinforce a false understanding of active participation. but when ratzinger does speak of reforming the reform, since the practice of versus populum has become conventional in the celebration of the novus ordo, what then does such a reform call for in this case? does it mean returning to the preconciliar liturgical form of ad orientem, which most current church architectures no longer favor? if the liturgy can be compared to a fresco in which the reform called by the council was meant to remove the whitewash that covered it, and if the fresco has become once more 'endangered' how can it be protected and at the same time made captivating again? for ratzinger, “of course, there must be no question of its being covered with whitewash again, but what is imperative is a new reverence in the way we treat it, a new understanding of its message and its reality, so that rediscovery does not 25 become the first stage of irreparable loss.” hence in calling for a reform of the mistaken impression that versus populum may have created, ratzinger thinks that because the essential element of the ad orientem is its christcenteredness, this christocentricity can be rediscovered even in the versus populum. consequently he proposes three steps for a greater emphasis on this christocentricity in the liturgy: i) a proper space should be arranged around the ambo for the dialogue of proclamation and response that goes with the 181 liturgy of the word. ii) altars should be constructed near the people in churches where they are too far from the people. iii) a visible cross should be placed on the altar that would be the focal point of the priest and the faithful at liturgical 26 celebrations. we now move to examine one more area in ratzinger's program of reform before drawing our conclusion. summorumpontificum this idea of the reform of the reform has also shaped pope benedict xvi's liberalization of the old missal by the 27 motu proprio, summorum pontificum. at the promulgation of the new missal, only the elderly priests who could not easily learn the new form were permitted to still celebrate mass with the old missal. later in 1984, pope john paul ii granted the indult (quattuorabhincanno) in which bishops were to permit those who request to celebrate mass according to the old missal. the establishment of ecclesia dei, with the motu proprio, eccleisa dei adflicta in 1988, was to further strengthen this indult and take care of those who wished to celebrate the mass according to the old missal. summorum pontificum builds upon the foundation of these two documents and describes the celebration of the mass according to the 1962 missal as the extraordinary form of the roman rite, while the celebration according to the novusordo is described as the ordinary form of the rite. these two uses of the roman rite means that any priest could celebrate mass in the extraordinary form without any need for permission, and it also allows it to be offered for any 'stable group of the faithful', coetusfidelium that requests it. in a letter he wrote to bishops on the promulgation of summorum pontificum, pope benedict noted that his intention for the motu proprio was to bring about “an internal reconciliation in the heart of the 28church.” according to nicholas bux, the pope's statement “implies not only healing the formal schism of the lefebvrists, but also overcoming the break brought about during the reform of the liturgy, opposing the new and the old 29 rite” but there are others who doubt whether this reconciliation can be achieved by the motu propio. baldovin finds it troubling that the document does not insist that those 182 who celebrate with the 1962 missal should show due allegiance to vatican ii. he continues that if the mass according to the missal of paul vi is not celebrated with reverence, then the pope should have focused on how to ensure this reverential celebration with the new missal instead of restoring the pre-conciliar liturgy. he adds, “(m)any people have not accepted the second vatican council and the renewal and reform of the church that have sprung from it. this document will only give them hope that 30the last forty years can be reversed.” thus, while pope benedict xvi thinks of bringing about reconciliation within the church with the motu proprio, scholars like baldovin see a potential reversal of council's gains. opinions like those of baldovin might have been informed by the different ecclesiological emphasis that underline the old and the new missal. according to peter jeffery, on the one hand, for those who are more attuned to the new form of the mass, it offers a model of the church as a community, with the priest and people united together in 31prayer. for such people 'tridentine mass' cannot bring out this communitarian aspect of the liturgy, for the architecture of the church effectively demarcates the clergy and the faithful, making the latter look like dumb spectators during 32 liturgical celebrations. on the other hand, jeffery notes that for those who favour the pre-conciliar mass, it depicts a more 33 contemplative model of the church. for such persons, the new mass appears to place a superficial emphasis on the horizontal dimension of our being in a way that virtually 34evacuates the mystery of celebration and the trials of life. considering the fact that the positive dimensions of both celebrations have a legitimate place in christian life and worship, in contrast to baldovin's assessment of summorum pontificum as having little hopes for addressing the problems of the liturgy today, jeffery thinks that the document calls us to widen our hearts (cf. i cor. 6:11-13) so that positive emphases of both forms can enrich our liturgical 35celebration. jeffery's evaluation of summon pontificum shows that the task before us today is to appreciate the strengths of the ordinary and extraordinary forms of the roman rite, and to 183 see how they mutually reinforce each other. since the liturgy is a living reality, it is when both rites are alive that they can grow and learn from each other. it is in this respect that one could perhaps see the positive effects of the liberalization of the extraordinary form of the mass. for the interior reconciliation which the pope calls for to be achieved, it means that those who celebrate in the new order of mass should not see it as a rupture from the old form, just as those who celebrate in the old form as baldovin advocates should also be open to celebrating mass in the new form. this will help to ensure that the liberalization of the extraordinary form of the roman rite promotes the right hermeneutics for interpreting the council. such a hermeneutics would ensure that continuity with the past does not stifle development, just as the development of the liturgy, even as it calls for some discontinuities with the past, is not a rupture. this reconciliation that the pope desires would be further advanced if there are greater efforts made not simply to describe both forms from the abuses one sees in their celebration, but rather to see how they can promote good liturgical celebrations in their authentic meaning. thus the two forms of the roman rite can enrich each other with their different emphases, correct their shortcomings, and bring 36 about a more healthy liturgical celebration in the church. conclusion from ratzinger's proposal of the reform of the reform, it is clear that left to him, some of the changes that came about from the implementation of the conciliar reform should not have been made because they did not represent an organic gradual change that is proper to liturgical development. hence these changes have also resulted in losing some of the precious liturgical practices that the missal of the 1962 mass embodies. this has informed his idea of the reform of the reform so that the lofty values of the past are not lost in the liturgy's openness to changes and development. but the fear that has often been expressed about ratzinger's idea is that it is an attempt to draw the clock back. this is evident in the criticism that greeted the publication of summorum pontificum. however, a careful study of ratzinger's proposal 184 shows two characteristic traits that might suggest otherwise. first, while he regrets the changes that were made in the postconciliar reform, his proposal for a reform of these changes is not always an exact return to pre-conciliar practices, as seen in his proposal to place a cross at the centre of the altar to achieve the ad orientem status of liturgical celebration, rather than reconstructing the church altar according to its prevatican ii architecture. second, while he still desires some past liturgical practices, like the silent recitation of the canon, he is not known to have departed from the current practice of 37the loud recitation of the canon, even as pope. while certain practices like kneeling for communion, reception of communion on the tongue, the use of old vestments were conspicuous during his papal liturgical celebrations, these too, have not been made universal laws. it is for this reason that mariusz biliniewicz comments that the “'reform of the reform' is mainly an educational process consisting of explaining, showing good examples and encouraging good practices. benedict does allow liturgical pluralism and does not impose his style on anyone.” biliniewicz continues, “i think that it is quite clear to those who look closely that the imposition, disciplinary compelling and limitation of postvatican ii liturgical pluralism are not benedict's method in 38 introducing his reform of the reform” in this light, we think that when the reform of the reform is understood as attempt to find a balance between the past and the present, a balance that gives room for liturgical pluralism, then it has much hopes for the revival of the liturgy in the church today. endnotes 1. a shorter version of this paper was presented at the leuven encounters in systematic theology, lest ix, at the catholic university of leuven, leuven, belgium on october 23, 2013. 2. see joseph ratzinger, theological highlights of vatican ii (new york: paulist press, 1966. reprint, 2009), 231-235, joseph ratzinger, principles of catholic theology: building stones for a fundamental theology, trans., mary frances mccarthy (san francisco, ca: ignatius, 1987), 378-393 185 3. for an overview of the different positions of the traditionalists and the progressives on liturgical issues, see thomas kocik, the reform of the reform (san francisco: ignatius press, 2003) 4. ratzinger, theological highlights, 31. 5. ibid., 32. 6. joseph ratzinger, the spirit of the liturgy, trans., john saward (san francisco, ca: ignatius 2000), 7-8 7. ratzinger, theological highlights, 32-37. 8. pierro marini, a challenging reform: realizing the vision of the liturgical renewal. (minnesota: liturgical press 2007), 139-143. for other accounts of the activities of the consilium, see annibalebugnini, the reform of the liturgy (1948-1975), (minnesota: liturgical press, 1990), nicola giampietro, the development of theliturgical reform as seen by cardinal ferdinando antonelli from 1948-1970, (colorado: fort collins, 2009) and laszlo dobszay, the bugnini liturgy and the reform of the reform, (hungary: church music association of america, 2003) 9. joseph ratzinger, milestones: memoirs 1927-1977, trans., erasmo levia-merikakis (san francisco, ca: ignatius 1998), 146. 10. ibid., 146. 11. joseph ratzinger, god and the world : believing and living in our time. a conversation with peter seewald, trans., henry taylor (san francisco: ignatius press, 2002), 417. 12. nicola bux, benedict xvi's reform: the liturgy between innovation and tradition (san francisco: ignatius press, 2012), 104. 13. for peter jeffery, to claim that the old rite was never abrogated “looks like a case of historical revisionism” see peter jeffery, widening our hearts: the latin mass is back.” commonweal 134, (2007): 10. available online at https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/wideningour-hearts.(accessed on january 30, 2014). see also nathan d. mitchell, “the amen corner: summorumpontificum”, worship 81 (2007): 556-558. john baldovin, reforming the liturgy: a response to the critics (minnesota: liturgical press collegeville, 2008), 131. 14. joseph ratzinger, milestones, 147-148 15. see john baldovin, reforming the liturgy, 89 16. ratzinger, the spirit of the liturgy, 8. 17. joseph ratzinger, the feast of faith: approaches to a theology of the liturgy, trans. graham harrison (san francisco ca: ignatius, 1986), 70 18. john baldovin, reforming the liturgy, 67 19. ibid., 68. 20. joseph ratzinger, the feast of faith, 62 21. pierre-marie gy, "is cardinal ratzinger's l' espirit de la liturgie faithful to the council?," doctrine and life 52, no. (2002): 426-429. see sacred congregation of rites, inter oecumenici. published on march 7, 1 9 6 5 . a v a i l a b l e a t www.ewtn.com/curia/cdwinoec.htm.accessed on october 31, 2014. 22. joseph ratzinger, "the spirit of the liturgy or fidelity to the council: a reply to pierre-marie gy, op," doctrine and life 52, no. (2002): 494. 186 23. according to peter jeffery, “the most familiar visual symbol of liturgical renewalthe altar facing the peopleis not mandatory in the new missal, and was not forbidden in the old. both the 1570 and 1962 rubrics expressly permit the early medieval practice of celebrating versus populum.” see peter jeffery, “widening our hearts…” see also uwe michael lang, turning towards the lord: orientation in liturgical prayer, (san francisco: ignatius press, 2005), john baldovin, reforming the liturgy, 108-113 24. ratzinger, the spirit of the liturgy, 80. 25. ibid., 8. 26. see ratzinger, the spirit of the liturgy or fidelity to the council, 497498.ratzinger, the spirit of the liturgy, 83-84. 27. s e e b e n e d i c t x v i , " s u m m o r u m p o n t i f i c u m " http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/motu_proprio/docu ments /hf_ben-xvi_motu-propr io_20070707_summorumpontificum_en.html (accessed september 17 2013). 28. benedict xvi, "letter to bishops accompanying the publication of s u m m o r u m p o n t i f i c u m " http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/letters/2007/docume nts/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070707_lettera-vescovi_en.html (accessed september 17 2013). 29. bux, benedict xvi's reform, 57 30. baldovin, reforming the liturgy, 132. 31. “ the new mass, to many of its supporters, offers a model of the church as a united assembly, priests and laity gathered as one around a central altar, confessing our sins, hearing the scriptures, praying for the needs of the world, greeting each other in peace, receiving the sacrament of the lord's presence, and carrying that graced presence out into the world as we disperse. the congregation participates by listening and responding to the prayers and readings. many of those who yearn for such a “church as community” ideal also hope for greater lay participation in the life of the church: more consultative and collaborative forms of leadership, more responsiveness to the new problems of today's world. from the perspective of a “community” ecclesiology, with clergy and laity united in hearing the word of god (and keeping it!)” peter jeffery, “widening our hearts…” 32. “…the tridentine mass seems to offer a poor substitute: the altar is three steps up from the rest of the church's floor, separated from the congregation by a railing, approachable only by the ordained, who turn their backs to the assembled people and mumble an ancient tongue. the congregation's deepest involvement in the proceedings takes the form of merely looking at the host when it is elevated after the consecration. to some, the whole thing looks like an enactment of monarchical rightwing political values masquerading as the christian gospel.” ibid. 33. “the mass celebrated before vatican ii focused sharply on the central moment of transubstantiation; all that comes before and after is preparation or aftermath. this liturgy depicts a more contemplative model: a church on its knees before the awe-filled mystery the son of god come among us in the broken flesh and spilled blood of an innocent 187 human being who was killed yet lives eternally with the divine life of god he wills to share with us. in the presence of that incomprehensibility, bells tremble, incense smokes, candles burn, hearts quake, choirs echo the heavenly host in the same words that inspired our ancestors in the faith for centuries, suggesting the unchanging quality of eternity.” 34. “for those who desire this kind of church a secret place where almighty god dwells hidden in our world, a foretaste of heaven amid the trials and disappointments of earthly mortalitythe new mass seems a tawdry affair indeed: an undisciplined burst of feel-good spirituality that evades the real difficulties and sacrifices of a committed christian life; a cheap dose of “relevance,” designed to make the mass seem entertaining so that people of little faith will not flee out of boredom; even, to some, a deliberate effort to confuse the faithful by disguising left-wing egalitarian political and social agendas as christian values. many people who favor the more “contemplative” ecclesiology long for clearer structures of authority, more emphasis on doctrinal accuracy, greater trust that contemporary issues can be addressed with the wisdom of tradition.” ibid. 35. “ if the 1970 mass promotes an outward-looking spirituality that cares for the suffering as mother teresa did, the 1962 mass asks us to embrace the suffering human condition with a more inward spirituality like padre pio's. the day may come when all this can somehow be encompassed in a single order of mass, but that day is not yet here, and i think we should expect more liturgical transitions in the years to come. the task now is somehow to recover what was left behind without losing what has been gained, like the householder who brings forth both new and old (matthew 13:52).” ibid 36. perhaps it is in this respect that one could understand ratzinger's statement some years back: “the difference between the liturgy according to the new books, how it is actually practised and celebrated in different places, is often greater than the difference between an old mass and a new mass, when both these are celebrated according to the prescribed liturgical books.” joseph ratzinger, “ten years of motu propio, 'ecclesia dei'” (october 24, 1998). available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020702085721/http://www.latinmass.org/ratzinger.html 37. joseph ratzinger,the feast of faith, 72. 38. mariuszbiliniewicz, the liturgical vision of pope benedict xvi: a theological inquiry. (switzerland: peterlang, 2013), 289-290 188 116 preamble unlike plato and aristotle, bradley is much closer to our time. born in 1846 in england, bradley is one of the most th 1 important philosophers in the 20 century. he contributed to virtually every area of the philosophical discipline. however, he is mostly known for his work in metaphysics which finds a systematic exposition in his magnum opus: appearance and reality: an essay in metaphysics (1893) his other important writings include ethical studies (1876), principles of logic (1883) and essays in truth and reality (1914). bradley's concept of metaphysics is implicit in all his writings, especially in his account of morality as self-realization in ethical studies and of course the theory of judgement and inference he develops in the principles of logic. same is true in respect of his discussion of the problem of truth and allied matters in essays on truth and reality. nonetheless it is in appearance and reality that his concept of metaphysics, receives its explicit articulation. bradley's concept of metaphysics damian ilodigwe bradley holds metaphysics in high esteem, seeing a close 2affinity between religion, mysticism and metaphysics. hence, he regards metaphysics as one of the highest vocations to which a human being is called. no human being can realize his full potentials unless he learns how to think and 3 more importantly to think properly. as a form of thinking, metaphysics provides us with an important avenue for understanding the nature of things as they are in themselves rather than merely in terms of their accidental determinations, 4that is to say, rather than merely as appearances. indeed as bradley makes explicit in his definition of metaphysics in appearance and reality, we may agree perhaps to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles, or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe not as piecemeal but as a whole. (ar, 1) metaphysics and the ideal of knowledge this definition gives us a point of entry into bradley's concept of metaphysics. we should start by making a number of remarks about the definition. first, it is significant that bradley's says that “metaphysics is an attempt to know” (ar, 1). the use of the word “attempt” suggests a note of caution in respect of the possibilities of metaphysics. bradley is certainly not in doubt that the object of metaphysics is knowledge but he is concerned about the extent of knowledge 5that is attainable. bradley's cautious optimism is reinforced also by the fact that he qualifies his statement with the phrase “we may agree perhaps.” (ar, 1) combine this phrase and the word “attempt” as they function in bradley's definition and it becomes immediately clear he has reservations about the 6project of metaphysics. while bradley does not deny the possibilities of metaphysics, he is certainly at pains to underscore its limitations. when we attempt to do anything, or make an effort in respect of any goal, there is the implicit understanding that we may not succeed in what we set out to do. but there is also the implicit understanding that we may 117 succeed. it is a case of we may or we may not succeed. in other words, success is more probable than certain. the probability of success allows for the possibility of failure as far as the project is concerned. in respect of bradley's presentation of metaphysics as an attempt to know we must guard against two possible extremes the extreme of absolute failure and the extreme of absolute success. our attempt at anything can end in absolute failure 7 and it can also end in absolute success. when these two extremes become effective philosophy and skepticism may come across as enemies, but the truth is that there is a common ground between skepticism and philosophy so that one is not necessarily exclusive of the other. one cannot be a true philosopher unless one is a skeptic of a sort, so far as a basic requirement of philosophy is a certain critical attitude in 8 relating with issues. yet to realize the philosophical standpoint, there is need for the philosopher to transcend skepticism. bradley seems aware of this double requirement of the philosophic spirit and all the time his concern is to 9strike a balance between them. consequently, bradley's cautious optimism in respect of the possibilities and limitations of metaphysics lies somewhere in between the two extremes, for while he thinks that the object of metaphysics is the pursuit of knowledge, he does believe that we can attain absolute knowledge of reality in practice. nor does he take the denial that absolute knowledge is possible in practice as a denial that knowledge is not possible at all. the point is that our attempt to know reality always results in knowledge, but because of the gap between reality and our concept, we cannot speak of one to one correspondence between reality and concept, so that there is something of reality that escapes conceptual representation. so, for bradley, we are dealing with a case of success and failure in the same vein rather than a case of outright success or outright 10failure. we should remark the affinity between bradley's definition of metaphysics and that of plato and aristotle. indeed some commentators argue that bradley's definition combines the chief features of plato and aristotle's 118 11definitions. as we have seen plato says that metaphysics is a “science of the supra-sensible” while aristotle says that 12metaphysics is “the science of being qua being”. bradley's contention that metaphysics involves an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance reminds us of plato and aristotle's definition. the pivotal point here is the distinction 13 established between reality and mere appearance. the distinction presupposes that there are levels in reality as well 14as levels in knowledge. moreover a certain hierarchy subsists in respect of the levels of reality and levels of knowledge, so that we can speak of the higher and the lower and indeed the highest. in this context when bradley speaks of reality, he has in mind the category of the highest, not higher or lower. reality is properly understood only in the sense of absolute reality. in bradley's parlance, anything short of absolute reality is nothing but appearance, albeit within this domain of appearance the category of higher and lower realities is effective. nonetheless both the categories of higher and lower 15realities are subsumed under the category of absolute reality. metaphysics and the logic of part and whole another way to make sense of bradley's distinction between reality and appearance is in terms of the logic of part and whole. that which is said to be appearance is not the whole but part of the whole, while only that which is said to be reality is properly designated as the whole. to this extent reality is defined by its completeness while appearance is defined by its incompleteness. reality includes everything while appearance by virtue of its incompleteness is only a part of the whole, meaning that it is essentially one-sided and cannot be taken as the whole without falsifying the nature of 16things. in the sense that appearance is part of the whole of reality, appearance is always appearance of reality, so that we can say that appearance is reality. this emphasis represents the continuity between appearance and reality and it means that 17 appearance cannot be divorced from reality. yet within this continuum there is also the burden of working out the proper 119 18relation that subsists between appearance and reality. it is understandable that appearance always belongs to reality and to this extent cannot be conceived without reference to reality, as a part is inconceivable without reference to the whole in which it subsists. nonetheless in belonging to reality, the question concerns the mode in which appearance belongs to reality. while appearance is always appearance of reality, there is a sense in which appearance is not reality, since appearance is part of the whole and never the whole itself. the gap between absolute reality and appearance forbids a one to one correspondence between appearance and reality, meaning that in the final analysis reality is defined by its absoluteness whereas appearance is 19defined by its relativity. in appearance and reality and essays on truth and reality, bradley distinguishes between three levels of reality with epistemic corollaries, namely, immediate experience, relational experience and supra-relational experience. as the designation suggests the distinction is predicated on the reality of relation. there is a level below relation, there is a 20 relational level and there is a level beyond relation. immediate experience is level of reality below relation, in other words, a pre-conceptual level of reality, whereas relational experience is a level of reality in which relation is effective, a level of reality in which we can conceptually distinguish between object and subject of knowledge and in which an object exists for the subject as object of 21knowledge. supra-relational experience is a level of relation that exceeds relational experience and in which there is a realization of a higher unity in which the subject-object 22 distinction is supplanted. as the highest level of experience it is an absolute experience that includes all the other levels with respect to their possible developments. it is evident that the foregoing levels of experience exemplify the moral of bradley's distinction between appearance and reality which we have presented in terms of the logic of part and whole. in this parlance both immediate experience and relational experience are appearances albeit one is higher than the other. relational experience is higher than immediate experience. but neither of them is the whole 120 given that each suffers from a basic incompleteness as a consequence of its appearance status. supra-relational experience is the all-inclusive reality and contains everything. it includes both immediate experience and 23 relational experience. indeed as bradley maintains there is a dialectical principle at work in each level such that in quest of completeness, each level of experience finds its fulfilment in the next level of experience with its incompleteness made up for by the succeeding level of experience. such is the case with respect to the relation between immediate experience, which is a lower form of experience and its successor, relational 24experience which is a higher form of experience. the same is true of the relation between relational experience and supra-relational experience and by implication immediate experience and supra-relational experience. the breakdown of immediate experience in search of completion witnesses the emergence of relational experience just as the breakdown of relational experience also witnesses the emergence of 25supra-relational experience. consequently, properly understood, both immediate experience and relational experience are appearances and not reality, whereas only supra-relational experience is properly designated as reality. so too is any other thing that bradley designates as appearance such as self, space and time, causality, philosophy, morality, religion and indeed anything that is infected with relation. they are all appearances of the absolute as all other realities designated as appearances are 26 appearances of the absolute. notice however that it not just that a certain hierarchy subsists within the kingdom of appearances but there is a dialectic of appearance relative to which the incompleteness that infects one appearance is overcome by another appearance. the dialectic issues in a metaphysics of the absolute so far as the absolute is the ultimate point of reference for mediating the incompleteness that bedevils the 27kingdom of appearances and its constituents. levels in reality: bradley, plato and aristotle 121 bradley is certainly not alone in dividing reality into several levels. as noted a similar categorization of reality into levels can be found in plato and aristotle. in structuring reality into two basic tiers, the world of forms and the world of sensible particulars, plato installs a hierarchy between the two levels such that the reality of the world of sensible particulars is tied to the world of forms as derivatives are bound to their original to the extent that one is said to participate in the other as its 28imitation. yet beyond this hierarchical structure that binds the world of forms and the world of particulars, certain hierarchy similarly subsists within the domain of forms that allows us to categorize one form as higher than another form until we reach the peak of the hierarchy occupied by the form of the 29good. the hierarchical ordering of the forms within the world of forms is without prejudice to the fact that all the forms belong to a community of originals that are variously instantiated in the world of sensible particulars. just as it is the case with the forms, there is also logic of hierarchy at work within the kingdom of sensible particulars that enables us to categorize particulars hierarchically, even though they all belong to the kingdom of derivatives and so are not 30originals. in jettisoning plato's metaphysical dualism of universal and particular, aristotle says that every particular thing is a substance, so that the universal does not exist separately but 31inheres in the sensible particular. aristotle's division of reality into several levels takes the form of recognition of various categories of substance. essentially aristotle recognizes three divisions of substance. first, there is the sensible and the perishable substance. second, there is the sensible and eternal substance and third, there is the nonsensible and eternal substance. aristotle does not just divide substance into categories but a certain hierarchy subsists within the division so far as the category of higher and lower is operative. sensible and perishable substances occupy the lower strata. sensible and eternal substances occupy the middle strata while non-sensible and eternal occupy the 32 highest strata. 122 the point of aristotle's division of reality into three categories of substance becomes evident, once we consider his metaphysics of motion. the governing presupposition of course is that there is causal interaction between communities 33 of substances as no substance exists in isolation. yet in accounting for the motion in the universe, aristotle recognizes that we cannot persist in an infinite regress of causes as it will mean that we cannot account for the original cause of motion in the universe and to this extent nothing is 34accounted for in the end. in view of this consideration he is impelled to postulate a first cause, the unmoved mover which itself is uncaused as the original cause of the motion in the universe. unlike other substances which are made of matter and form, the uncaused cause is pure form, the understanding being that given that matter is the principle of potentiality, if the uncaused cause was to contain matter it would be invariably open to further determination which will undermine its status as uncaused cause and does render superfluous the explanation it 35guarantees in respect of metaphysics of motion. from our account of bradley's distinction between appearance and reality it is evident that bradley basically appropriates plato and aristotle's division of reality into various levels. bradley's theorization is somewhat a synthesis of plato's theory of forms and aristotle's metaphysics of substance. plato's world occupies a position akin to aristotle's third division of substance, that is, non sensible and eternal, with the highest substance at the peak just as the platonic form of the good. following aristotle in jettisoning plato's dualism, bradley recuperates both schemes in his metaphysics of the absolute with three basic divisions, nonrelational, relational and supra-relational experience, which levels in the end collapse into the distinction of reality and appearance, with the all inclusive reality serving as point of reference for the mediation and constitution of the kingdom 36 of appearance. just like plato and aristotle bradley locates metaphysics in the domain of absolute reality and not in the domain of particular reality. this is what he means by saying that 123 metaphysics involves knowledge of reality rather than mere appearance. understood in terms of his peculiar use of the term appearance, metaphysics seeks the whole rather than the partial. of course it does not mean that metaphysics cannot start with appearance but while it engages with appearance its concern is with the reality that reveals itself in appearance. metaphysics can do this since in truth every appearance is 37appearance of reality. thus by interrogating appearance the goal is to transcend appearance and attain reality. to be engaged with mere appearance therefore does not represent the preoccupation of metaphysics. in its engagement with reality, the sort of knowledge that metaphysics seeks is also important. here we must distinguish between forms of knowledge. we can speak of metaphysical knowledge of reality as contradistinguished 38 from scientific knowledge or historical knowledge. compared to the latter, the former represents a higher form of knowledge and is the sort of knowledge involved in the metaphysical interrogation of the nature of reality. this emphasis become evident once we consider a further element from bradley's definition of metaphysics, namely, the claim that “metaphysics is the study of first principles or ultimate truths.” (ar, 1) both points are not really new points if we consider as we have seen that aristotle says in the metaphysics the concern of metaphysics is to investigate the fundamental causes of being. it is in this respect in fact that he 39says that metaphysics is first philosophy. bradley's use of the term “first principles” immediately invites the distinction between first principles and secondary principles just as his use of the term “ultimate truth” also invites the distinction between ultimate truth and proximate truths. both distinctions can hardly be understood except in the light of bradley's concept of reality. the point is that the principles in question as well as truth are functions of reality. first principles are on the side of reality, while secondary principles are on the side of appearance. if one's concern was with secondary principles this does not count as metaphysical pursuit since one is preoccupied with a lower reality, appearance and not reality. the same is true of the distinction between ultimate truth and proximate truth. ultimate truth is 124 on the side of reality while proximate truth is on the side of appearance. the point of metaphysics in investigating reality is the ultimate truth of reality. were we to be concerned with the proximate truth of things, we could not say we are engaged in metaphysical investigation. without spurning proximate truths the point of metaphysics is to transcend it and penetrate 40 the ultimate truth of things. the question of the pre-eminent status of metaphysics: possibilities and limits of reason so like plato and aristotle bradley will also regard metaphysics as the queen of sciences so far as in preoccupying itself with first principles and ultimate truths, metaphysics presupposes other sciences. what entitles metaphysics to pre-eminence therefore, is that its province is the province of reality, while other sciences are preoccupied with appearance. in view of the dialectic of appearance that drives his metaphysics of the absolute it means that the interrogation of the foundation of the other sciences will end up in a full blown metaphysics of absolute since as appearances the sciences cannot ground themselves but must look up to metaphysics for their grounding, so far as the principles which define the foundation of the sciences fall to metaphysics to investigate. there is a further element in bradley's definition of metaphysics we need to examine in order to come to terms with his concept of metaphysics. i refer to the claim that metaphysics involves an “effort to comprehend the universe not as piecemeal but as a whole” (ar, 1). this element, as it were, further elaborates the contributions of the earlier elements in bradley's definition by clarifying the scope of metaphysical knowledge. metaphysics is not only preoccupied with knowledge of first principles or ultimate truth, but the ideal of knowledge it pursues is one that is as 42comprehensive as possible. the basic point here is that “truth is whole”; moreover in interrogating the truth of reality, metaphysics wants to see how everything fits together. it may begin with the 125 determination of truth of reality as appearance but its goal is 43to understand the nature of things as they are in themselves. of course, partial determination is always possible. but the truth is that metaphysics is not content with partial determination. on the contrary only a full determination of the truth of things can satisfy the metaphysical consciousness. it is not satisfied with half-truths, but is keen 44to uncover the whole truth. this demand for comprehensiveness in respect of the understanding of the truth of reality is one of the key features that distinguish metaphysics from other disciplines. in its pursuit of knowledge of reality, the sphere of the particular sciences is limited. but this is not the case with metaphysics 45which specialises in every department of reality. its sphere is seemingly unrestricted. as it were metaphysics is jack of all trades, claiming membership of every community of being as its legitimate object as far as its quest for knowledge is concerned. fundamentally metaphysics claims that its findings are valid in respect of all possible worlds and not 46only in respect of this or that particular world. the holistic nature of the metaphysical knowledge that metaphysics guarantees concerning the nature of ultimate reality is what confers pre-eminence on metaphysics. but this feature of metaphysics has also been one of the chief points in respect of which metaphysics is attacked by its critics. the complaint is that this ideal of knowledge presupposes a 47concept of reason that is rather too grandiose. it is not denied at all that there a basic identity between the structure of reason and the structure of reality. of course, without such identity, we can hardly vouch for the possibility of metaphysical knowledge and this in turn would mean outright that the project of metaphysics is impossible. as it were, therefore, the very possibility of metaphysics depends on the claimed identity between the structure of reason and the structure of reality. on the contrary what critics of metaphysics deny is that the claimed identity between the structure of reason and 48 reality is an absolute identity. of course if it were an absolute identity, the implication is that nothing of reality could be hidden from reason in the end. in other words, it means that reason would be sovereign over 126 being and there is no aspect of being that would resist conceptual schematization. in this respect therefore not only can reason determine things as they are in themselves, but it can secure full determination of the nature of things as they 49 are in themselves. given that bradley says that metaphysics involves an “effort to comprehend things not in piecemeal but as a whole” (ar, 1), we may be tempted to associate him with this position. but that would be a mistake for while bradley in principle accepts that metaphysical knowledge is as comprehensive as it can possibly be, he is quite hesitant in affirming the view on which there is no difference between 50existence and reality. given his confidence in reason, he certainly believes that if our metaphysical capacities are properly exercised we can understand the nature of reality as 51 it is in-itself. yet as desirable as it is to know everything about the nature of reality, bradley believes that the metaphysical ambition to fully determine the nature of reality through the agency of pure reason is doomed to fail in the end, so that without prejudice to the possibilities of metaphysics, metaphysics is nonetheless limited with respect to the extent of knowledge it can attain so far as the difference between existence and 52thought is irreducible in the final analysis. so in other words while bradley is basically in sympathy with the basic insight of hegelian dialectic in respect the dynamism of reason in its attempt to grasp the nature of reality, he recoils from any attempt to annul the difference between thought and reality. for this reason, he will prefer a more humble dialectic of appearance to the ambitious speculative dialectic that we find in hegel on which, “the real 53 is rational and the rational is real.” because he has basic confidence in the powers of reason and because he believes that being is intelligible, bradley will endorse the first part of the foregoing thesis, that is, that the real is rational. this optimism invariably means that the project of metaphysics is feasible and by all means we can attain metaphysical knowledge of the nature of reality through the agency of reason. (see ar, introduction) but because he has his reservations concerning the claims 127 of rationalistic idealism (or speculative idealism) he will not endorse the second part of the foregoing thesis, that is, that the rational is real. the presupposition of course is that the sphere of rationality is co-extensive with the sphere of reality. if this were the case, it means nothing could escape the gaze of reason in the end. but apparently, as we have noted, bradley finds this thesis problematic given that it does not allow us to maintain the difference between thought and existence, a difference which is vital to the very possibility of existence as 54distinct from thought. in view of this submission what is evident is that bradley is in support of rationalism at the same time he is also a critic of rationalism. he is in support of rationalism so far as he is optimistic about the powers of reason as far as the ideal of rational determination of reality is concerned. he is confident that this is a viable project and through such rational determination we can arrive at knowledge of the true nature of things as comprehensive as possible. but paradoxically bradley is also pessimistic about the powers of reason, so far as he thinks that because of the final difference between reason and reality, there is a limit to which we can know reality through the means of our rational determination no matter how sophisticated such determination may be. because of the final difference between thought and reality, no matter how comprehensive our knowledge may be, our rational determination falls short of the nature of things. the implication of all this is that bradley's attitude towards metaphysics is ambivalent. while he will not deny the possibility of metaphysics, he will be 55 keen to avoid a grandiose concept of metaphysics. assessment at the start of our exposition we indicated that there is a close affinity between bradley and plato and aristotle's concept of metaphysics. we noted that bradley's definition indeed incorporates several features of the platonic and aristotelian metaphysics such that bradley's concept is 56 arguably a synthesis of plato and aristotle. while this point is essential in understanding bradley's account of metaphysics, especially his distinction between reality and 128 appearance with the core element of his metaphysics of the absolute, it is equally important to stress the difference between bradley, plato and aristotle which often is not so evident. but there are clues in his definition no matter how indebted to plato and aristotle the definition may be. the classical account of metaphysics is usually associated with plato and aristotle, the two philosophical giants that have shaped the fortunes of metaphysics over the course of the last two millennia. until the emergence of kant the portrait of metaphysics they sketched held sway and it was one that assumed the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason. however, with kant the era of critical metaphysics started in the sense that kant set up a tribunal to investigate the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason as a prolegomena to any future metaphysics. this approach is not only novel but the result is revolutionary because of the embargo kant subsequently placed on the traditional province of metaphysics, that is, that the platonic supra-sensible world and the aristotelian being qua being are inaccessible to pure 57 reason. with this development emerged the era of what has been called categorical metaphysics in contradistinction from 58 traditional metaphysics associated with plato and aristotle. with kant we begin to have complaints about the claims of metaphysics to investigate the transcendent reality and the attempt to reconceptualise metaphysics in terms of the science of synthetic a priori, that is, the so called transcendental condition for the possibility of knowledge. with the dispensation inaugurated by kant, the ideal of metaphysics as investigating the realm of noumena through 59 the agency of pure reason becomes problematic. we need to take into account this entire development in order to understand the nuances of bradley's concept of metaphysics. bradley is on the side of plato and aristotle but, as it were, it is as if the copernican revolution of kant comes with the effect of the need to limit the possibilities of metaphysics even if not in the kantian sense. thus while bradley remains basically in sympathy with the traditional concept of metaphysics as science of being qua being or again as science of the supra-sensible as laid down by plato and 129 aristotle, he is also keen to insist that there is a limit to which 60we can know reality through the agency of pure reason. from the kantian standpoint therefore he is positive about the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason. yet like kant but with a different motivation, he is also concerned to stress the metaphysical limitation of pure reason. interestingly the recognition of the metaphysical limitation of pure reason does not issue in the deconstruction of traditional metaphysics as kant does but it simply signals that a grandiose concept of metaphysics may hurt metaphysics than 61help it. hence one way to shield metaphysics from attacks that seek to deconstruct it is to make concessions and tone down its claims with respect to the sovereignty of reason without losing the substance of its claim. i think this toning down exercise is what is at issue in bradley's ambivalent attitude towards metaphysics and in the final analysis it is meant to protect metaphysics from deconstruction by reckless critics. i suggest that this exercise of toning down the claims of metaphysics in order to protect metaphysics from deconstruction is what we find in the seeming uncertainty that hovers round bradley's definition of metaphysics. i mean the fact that he will say it is an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance instead of saying more assertively as aristotle or plato says that “it is a science of being qua being” or “a science of supra-sensible.” or again the fact that he says it is “an effort to comprehend the universe not as piecemeal but as a whole.” (ar, 1) as noted both phrases does not suggest he is taking off on a confident mood. it suggests rather a note of reservation. when you ask someone to do something and he tells you he will try or that he will make an effort, it is clear it is a humble submission and in truth it may make us down the prospect of success in such endeavour. but, as we have also noted, bradley's use of these terms is deliberate and is meant to indicate already his intention to develop a more humble concept of metaphysics in contradistinction from the grandiose concept of metaphysics that is associated with the classical traditions of metaphysics as defined by plato and aristotle. 130 in bradley's case, he feels compelled to make allowance for failure in the project of metaphysics an allowance which he thinks strengthens metaphysics rather than weaken it if it will protect it from deconstruction by those who will be quick to notice its grandiose claims. to this extent the way to save metaphysics from the sort of self-destruction that stems from intellectual pride is to tone down its claims. in this respect it is clear that the environment in which plato, aristotle and bradley are operating is quite different. while bradley is familiar with the classical traditions, he could not ignore the modern tradition but, especially, it's suspicion about metaphysics. so while he will take what is best in the traditions of metaphysics he will also be keen to strengthen metaphysics in its modern context, even if it means making concessions that do not alter substantially the claims of metaphysics. in this sense, bradley's concept of metaphysics could be seen as a subtle critique of traditional metaphysics, so far as he is raising the sort of critical question that kant raises about the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason. but unlike kant, he remains optimistic in respect of the overall framework laid down by traditional metaphysics. on the other hand, bradley's concept of metaphysics, especially his position on the problem of relation of thought to reality could be seen as a critique of the kantian position in respect of its dualistic formulation of the relation between thought and reality. in retrieving the matter from the problematic dualistic formulation, bradley will then develop a view of the relation of thought and reality that is both cautious and optimistic such as to sustain the possibility of metaphysics while at the same time delimiting its claims. conclusion when we take into account bradley's relation to the traditions of metaphysics as defined by plato and aristotle and then his response to the challenge unleashed by kant's copernican revolution and the entire modern assault on metaphysics, we begin to understand the sense of humility that pervades his definition of metaphysics and his motivation to save metaphysics from deconstruction by 131 toning down its claim. in this respect, bradley must be seen as a transitional figure so far as the odyssey of metaphysics is concerned especially in its modern context. one of the features of contemporary philosophy has been its anti-metaphysical bias. against this backdrop the caution and optimism that bradley combines in the portrait of metaphysics he sketches is understandable. a humble concept of metaphysics is more likely to survive in the unabashedly anti-metaphysical environment of contemporary philosophy than a concept of metaphysics that is blown out of proportion. the bottom line is that a balanced concept of reason in its relation to reality must be put in place to forestall the event of the “death of metaphysics”. the attempt to secure this consideration seems to be the most important aspect of bradley's contributions as far as the situation of metaphysics is concerned. little wonder bradley says in the appendix to appearance and reality that: the solution to this dilemma (of thought's relation to reality) offered in chapter xv, is i believe, the only solution possible. it contains the main thesis of this work, views opposed to that thesis remaining, it seems to me caught up in and destroyed by the dilemma. and we must notice two main features of this doctrine. it contends on the one side that truth or thought essentially does not satisfy its own claims (and this will be applicable to any finite existence or appearance) that it demand to be, and so far already is something which it completely cannot be. hence, if thought carried out its own nature, it both would and would not have passed beyond itself and become also an other. and in the second place, this self-completion of thought, by inclusion of the aspects opposed to mere thinking, would be what we mean by reality; and by reality we can mean no more than this. the criticisms on this doctrine, which i have seen, do not appear to me to rest on any serious inquiry either as to what the demands of thought really are, or what their satisfaction involves. but, if to satisfy the intellect is to be true and real such a question must be fundamental (ar, 493) 132 end notes 1. cf. p. a. schipp (ed.) the philosophy of bertrand russell (evaton: the library of living philosophers, inc. 1946), p. 10 the following abbreviations are used in the text to designate bradley's works: es=ethical studies, ar=appearance and reality, pl= principles of logic and etr=essays on truth and reality. 2. cf. ar, 5. see also w. t. jones, a history of western philosophy, vol 2, ndthe medieval mind, 2 edition (new york: harcourt brace jovanovich, inc., 1969), pp. 84-85 3. cf. ar, 3-4. see also james allard and guy stock, “editor's introduction” in f. h. bradley: writings on logic and metaphysics, edited by james allard and guy stock (oxford: clarendon press, 1994), pp. 103-114 4. see damian ilodigwe, bradley and the problematic status of metaphysics (newcastle: cambridge scholars publishing, 2006), chapter 1 5. cf. ar, 485 6. cf. ar, 5-10. see also damian ilodigwe, “hume's criticism of metaphysics”, wajops west african journal of philosophical studies, volume 14 december 2011 7. cf. ar, 5-6 8. cf. ar, 5-10, etr, chapter 1 9. ar, chapter 15 10. ibid. see damian ilodigwe, “bradley's account of the self as appearance: between kant's transcendental idealism and hegel's speculative idealism”, paper presented at the oxford international conference on british idealism and the concept of the self, harris manchester college, oxford university, united kingdom, 27-30 august, 2013, pp. 1-21; see also his “bradley's account of truth: between epistemology and metaphysics” in collingwood and british idealism studies, 19: 2 (2013), pp. 219-250 11. see j. h. muirhead, the platonic tradition in anglo-saxon philosophy (london: george allen and unwin, 1931), chapters 22; see also g. r. g, mure, an introduction to hegel (oxford: clarendon press, 1950), chapters 1-3 12. see w. t. jones, a history of western philosophy, vol 2, the medieval ndmind, 2 edition (new york: harcourt brace jovanovich, inc., 1969), pp. 84-85. see also j. l. ackrill, aristotle the philosopher (oxford: clarendon press, 1996), pp. 116-121 13. d. j. allan, the philosophy of aristotle (oxford: oxford university press, 1979), chapters 8-9 14. see samuel enoch stumpf, elements of philosophy: an introduction, rd3 edition (new york: mcgraw-hill, inc. 1993), pp. 399-413 15. cf. ar, 120-123 16. see damian ilodigwe, “bradley's account of the self as appearance: 133 between kant's transcendental idealism and hegel's speculative idealism”, paper presented at the oxford international conference on british idealism and the concept of the self, harris manchester college, oxford university, united kingdom, 27-30 august, 2013, pp. 1-21; 17. in concluding the first part of appearance and reality which is devoted to an account of the nature of appearance, bradley takes care to accentuate the community between reality and its appearances, maintaining effectively that appearance cannot be divorced from reality. in his words, “all appearances must belong to reality. for what appears is, and whatever is cannot fall outside the real. and we may now combine this result with the conclusion just reached. we may say that everything which appears is somehow real in such a way as to be selfconsistent. the character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form. i will repeat this same truth in order to words. reality is one in this sense that it has a positive nature exclusive of discord, a nature which must hold throughout everything that is to be real.” (ar, 123) 18. see appendix ar, 491-495 19. see damian ilodigwe, bradley and the problematic status of metaphysics, chapter 2 20. ar, 403-431, etr, 159-201 21. cf. w. j. mander, “levels of experience in f. h. bradley” southern journal of philosophy 33, 1991: 485-498 22. see frederick copleston, a history of philosophy volume v111 bentham to russell, p, 187 23. see w. j. mander, “levels of experience in f. h. bradley” southern journal of philosophy 33, 1991: 485-498 24. see ar, chapter 24. see also “on our knowledge of immediate experience” in essays on truth and reality (oxford: clarendon press, 1914), pp. 159-201, first published in mind, number 18, 1909 25. see damian ilodigwe, “bradley's account of the self as appearance: between kant's transcendental idealism and hegel's speculative idealism”, paper presented at the oxford international conference on british idealism and the concept of the self, harris manchester college, oxford university, united kingdom, 27-30 august, 2013, pp. 1-21. 26. see ar, chapters 1-12. what bradley does in the first part of appearance and reality basically is to explicate the concept of appearance in terms of the various elements of our experience. in the second part of appearance and reality, he applies the general moral of his concept of appearance in dealing with the vexed issue of the nature and essence of thought and its relation to reality, concluding, as it were, that thought's effort to qualify reality unconditionally ends in failure as a consequence of its appearance status. it is the same logic at work in his analysis of morality, religion and judgment and philosophy in ethical studies, principles of logic and appearance and reality respectively. see ethical studies, essays 3-6, principles of logic chapters 1-2 and 134 appearance and reality, chapter 25 27. ar, chapter 24 28. see w. t. jones, a history of western philosophy, vol 2, the medieval ndmind, 2 edition (new york: harcourt brace jovanovich, inc., 1969), chapter 4; see also alan white, method of metaphysics (london: croom helm, 1987), chapter 1 29. see samuel enoch stumpf, elements of philosophy: an introduction, rd3 edition (new york: mcgraw-hill, inc. 1993), pp. 251-267 30. ibid. pp. 155-159 31. norman melchert, the great conversation volume 1: pre-socratics ndthrough descartes, 2 edition (california: mayfield, 1995), pp. 160165 32. ibid. 33. see samuel enoch stumpf, elements of philosophy: an introduction, rd3 edition (new york: mcgraw-hill, inc. 1993), pp. 251-267 34. cf. j. l. ackril, aristotle the philosopher (oxford: clarendon press, 1996), chapter 9 35. norman melchert, the great conversation volume 1: pre-socratics ndthrough descartes, 2 edition (california: mayfield, 1995), pp. 160165 36. see ar, chapter 24; cf. alan white, method of metaphysics, chapter 5 37. see ar, chapters 23-24 38. see alan white, method of metaphysics, chapter 9. the concern of metaphysics is always with the universal in the particular and not merely the particular in its particularity. metaphysics is interested, in other words, in the reality behind the appearance or rather the reality of the appearance. 39. see j. l. ackril, aristotle the philosopher (oxford: clarendon press, 1996), chapter 9 40. ibid. 41. cf. ar, introduction 42. cf. see samuel enoch stumpf, elements of philosophy: an rdintroduction, 3 edition (new york: mcgraw-hill, inc. 1993), chapter 23 43. cf. ar, chapter 14. see also damian ilodigwe, bradley and the problematic status of metaphysics, chapter 2. 44. cf. ar, chapters 14 and 27 45. stumpf, pp. 399-402 46. see e. j. lowe, a survey of metaphysics (oxford: oxford university press, 2003), chapter 1; see also brian carr, metaphysics: an introduction, chapter 1 and michael loux, contemporary introduction to metaphysics, introduction 47. we find such criticism in thinkers such as whitehead and heidegger. indeed this criticism informs much of the reaction against idealism at the turn of the century and to this extent provides the backdrop for the emergence of contemporary philosophy as can be seen in the various philosophical currents that condition the inheritance of contemporary philosophy such as phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism, 135 hermeneutics and deconstructionism. for the most part, these currents of philosophy are anti-essentialist in orientation. see alfred whitehead, process and reality: an essay in cosmology (new york: free press, 1969), chapter 1; martin heidegger, an introduction to metaphysics (london: yale university press, 1987), chapters 3 and 4. see also ludwig wittgenstein, philosophical investigations (london: blackwell, 1958) and alan white, method of metaphysics, chapter 8 48. see damian ilodigwe, “hume's criticism of metaphysics”, wajops west african journal of philosophical studies, volume 14 december 2011 49. of course this understanding of the nature of reason is usually associated with hegel in view of his account of absolute knowledge in the phenomenology of spirit, trans a. v. miller with analysis of the text and forward by j. n. findlay ( oxford: oxford university press, 1977), one which implies that there is no gap between our concept and reality. this overly optimistic view of reason finds expression in hegel's submission that “the real is rational and the rational is real”. the entire post hegelian criticism of idealism adopts the general strategy of weakening the relationship between thought and reality by denying that a one to one correspondence subsists between concept and reality, meaning effectively that existence is more than thought and cannot on any condition be reduced to thought. see for instance, dale snow, schelling and the end of idealism albany: state university of new york press, 1996), chapters 1-4. also cf. damian ilodigwe, “bradley's account of the self as appearance: between kant's transcendental idealism and hegel's speculative idealism”, paper presented at the oxford international conference on british idealism and the concept of the self, harris manchester college, oxford university, united kingdom, 27-30 august, 2013, pp. 1-21; see also his “bradley's account of truth: between epistemology and metaphysics” in collingwood and british idealism studies, 19: 2(2013), pp. 219-250 50. see james allard and guy stock, “editor's introduction” in f. h. bradley: writings on logic and metaphysics, edited by james allard and guy stock (oxford: clarendon press, 1994), pp. 103-114 51. see ar, 127-152 52. see ar, 143-153 53. see principles of logic 585-591 54. as bradley notes in the concluding paragraph of the principles of logic, 590-591, “unless thoughts stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if “thinking” is no used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can be purely rational. it may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or form a weakness of the flesh which continues to blind me, but the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes me as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism.” 55. in the light of this reservation, it is instructive that bradley's appearance and reality, supposedly a metaphysical essay, ends on the 136 note of scepticism as the final chapter carries the title ultimate doubt. unless the ambivalence in bradley's overall attitude towards metaphysics is understood one is always bound to misunderstand him as his sceptical submission could easily be taken as vote of no confidence in metaphysics when in actual fact, it is a strategic attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics so as to save it from deconstruction in the anti-idealist and anti-essentialist environment of contemporary philosophy. cf. damian ilodigwe, “bradley's account of truth: between epistemology and metaphysics” in collingwood and british idealism studies, 19: 2(2013), pp. 219-250 56. cf. alan white, methods of metaphysics, chapter 5 57. immanuel kant, critique of pure reason, everyman edition, edited by vasilis politis (london: j. m. dent, 1993), bxv and prolegomena to any future metaphysics, edited gary hatfield, with selections from the critique of pure reason (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997, p. 10. 58. see brian carr, metaphysics: an introduction, chapter 1 59. michael loux, contemporary introduction to metaphysics, introduction 60. see ar, chapter 14. see also damian ilodigwe, bradley and the problematic status of metaphysics, pp. 234-264 61. ar, introduction 137 abstract the sense of a possible moral world projects some developmental and social monitoring of human activities through the languages the individuals employ to express them. such activities demand to be good in constituting social order, justice, and peace. this is possible when human freedom is put under the operation and application of the ethics of living for the realization of integral human development. this is against the notation of human development inherent in ayer's emotivism as a moral theory. in emotivism, human freedom is erroneously and adequately maximized without recourses to the necessity of common social and moral facts that exist in a possible moral world. such possible moral facts in the moral world help to checkmate human activities and some unguided exercises of freedom. this paper aims at critiquing ayer's emotivism as a moral theory by recognizing that there are moral facts that can be socially and linguistically expressed to establish and sustain moral order. at such, it posits that no society can be ordered, just, and peaceful when every human individual is allowed to exercise his or her freedom or carry out any activity at will, based on personal moral conviction and directive as ayer's emotivistic theory the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world philip osarobu isanbor department of philosophy, st. albert institute, fayit-kagoma, kaduna state, nigeria. osarobuisanbor@gmail.com suggests, without recourses to common moral and ethical facts or principles inherent in a possible moral world. the paper concludes that proper moral development of the human person cannot be achieved in a human society that so desires social order and probity, due to the moral relativistic tendencies it presents to the human society. keywords: possible moral world, human freedom, emotivism, moral facts, development introduction understandably, the relations between language and emotions can be viewed from two angles. first, a language in a broad sense can be viewed as “being done” (performed) emotive. that is, considering the roles and effects of language in the expression of emotion. second, in a narrow sense, language as a mere tool for making one express him/herself without reference to the meaning of such expressions. put simply, man has the ability to make assertions with languages to express, most especially what he feels within. this is a rational ability or gift from nature that denes, most especially, his social identity, personality, dependence, dynamism, integration and participation. though man is an animal, he has a unique form of animal communication, expressed in different languages such as morality, religiosity, cultural heritages, medicine, technologies, socialization, sexuality, civilization, and so on. all these contents of languages situate some level of moral contextualism of the individual in a society of diverse and conicting moral and social interests and desires. language, whether vocal and symbolic, has been with the human person as a subject of lived experiences. from time immemorial, philosophers have preoccupied themselves with the quests of solving in life. ayer on his part, denes, explains, and argues for the verication principle of logical positivism, and he explains how this principle may be applied to the problems of philosophy. the term 'emotivism' is derived from the word emotion. emotion is a strong human feeling, for instance, love, hate, anger, etc. emotivism the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 141 as a philosophical doctrine; is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes 1or feelings. it posits that ethical languages and expressions are nothing but mere expressions of one's emotional dispositions, sentiments, and feelings towards a given situation and as such is meaningless. it opines that ethical principles and values are not factual therefore, meaningless. the emotivists' view get round the logical positivists who argue that moral statements are not factual but expressions of the feelings of the person who makes them. for instance, if you like something, you call it good, if you dislike it, you call it bad. more also, two people can consider exactly the same facts and come to quite different conclusions. in these cases, the emotivists claim that one cannot say one is right and the other wrong, because fact are separating them. that one can only accept that each is using moral language or judgment to express his or her emotional response to the set of facts. � employing human language and other means of social communication for the ordering of human actions and development, the conceptualization of ethics becomes inevitable and indispensable. in all, ethics seeks to device reasons for approving ot condemning human acts as right or wrong, good or bas, and as worthy 2ot unworthy of a rational being. ethics though, many ethical theories have come up, like naturalism, which states that ethical statements are made base on natural law, but ethics remains what it is, the ougthiness of living and actions. emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions, but emotional attitudes. prominent in this school of thought is a. j. ayer who was a logical positivist. the emotive theory was vividly discussed by ayer in his book: language, truth, and logic, and its development is strongly attributed to charles stevenson in his book: 1r. gaardner, moral philosophy: a systematic introduction to normative and metaethics. ny: macmillan, 1967, 18. 2see, a. echekwube, what is ethics?. in p. iroegbu and a. echekwube (eds). kpim of morality. ibadan: heinemann, 2005, 29. 142 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 3 ethics and language. in emotivism as a moral theory, ayer thought that the meaning of statements are speciable in terms of the conditions in which they could be veried. in this light, when we make assertions like 'good' and 'bad', it is made based on our emotions. � the objective of this study is centred on the needs to understand the ethical implications of ayer's emotivism if adopted in our contemporary society, and to arcertain that the indispensability of the moral facts in possible moral world. methodologically, for the purpose to achieve the objective of this study, within the thrust of its limitations, we will discuss the following headings such as: ayer's emotivisn as a moral linguitic theory in relativistic socio-cultural context; ehe epistemology of moral facts in a possible moral world; the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world, and concluding remarks. all these, are the foster the understanding of relativistic nature of ayer's emotivsm and its contemporary moral implications, and to maintain or sustain the thesis that morality is placed on the contents of moral facts in our possible moral world. ayer's emotivism as a moral linguistic theory in relativistic socio-cultural context in knowing the moral contents of the languages used in expressing our feelings, many moral, analytic, and linguistic philosophers have 4 reacted to, and are still reacting to such human development. here, many people besides the professional philosophers share the opinion that ethics is fundamentally about feelings or emotions. this view is called emotivism. according to the emotivists, when people respond to the ethical question by making moral pronouncements, what they are doing is simply expressing their feelings about something and 3a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, “emotivism and upbringing of children in the contemporary era”. in m. a. izibili, et al. (eds). study in philosophy and society. kagoma: albertine institute, 2018, 400. 4e. imadon, the popular\rationalist image of science: an overview of the positivist view of science. ekpoma review, vol. 2, pp. 101-119, see, 111. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 143 5 trying to impose such feelings on others. emotive judgments are unveriable because they are pure expressions of feelings and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. such an 6ethical judgment is not t to nurture our young ones. thereby, “morality will have an essentially communal dimension and cannot 7 simply be a question of an individual matter.” language is the ability to produce and comprehend both the spoken and written (and in the case of sign language, signed) words. understanding how language works means reaching across many branches of psychology evertthing from the basic neurological functioning to high-level cognitive processing. language shapes our social interactions and 8 brings order to our lives. complex language is one of the dening factors that make us human. the linguistic importance for the analysis of moral actions and decisions can be considered the basis of ayer's emotivist philosophy of human moral development. emotivism, as laid out in ayer's language, truth and logic, presents a different understanding how it is generally understood ethical statements. in emotivism, ethical statements are not statements of truth or fact, but statements that reveal a person's feelings towards a certain situation and the responses that they expect from others. ayer divides “the ordinary system of ethics” into four classes: 1. propositions that express denitions of ethical terms, or judgments about the legitimacy or possibility of certain denition: here, linguistic classications of objects and events are dened to know their cognitive relevance in order to situate their social placement for the valuation of the human individual. 2. propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes: translating moral judgments into non-ethical intuitionist propositions, then assessing their social 5e. a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, “emotivism and upbringing of children in the contemporary era”, 391. 6n. preston, understanding ethics, sydney: the federation press, 2001. 7l. richard, is there a christian ethics? new york: paulist press, 1988, 76. 8n. preston, understanding ethics, sydney: the federation press, 2001. 144 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 conditionings and interests, dependable on the capacity of which the individual employs them. 3. exhortation to moral virtue: here, moral terms can be used in arguments in which the moral terms appear in a conditional, and so, not rarely conditioning to the valuationsof the statements made. 4. actual ethical judgments: examining that, in appearance, moral arguments retain their validity, but very illogical, since they 9 cannot be veried. according to ayer, moral philosophers have misconstrued the meaning of ethics. ethical philosophy is based on a series of emotions, opinions, and sentiment, but rarely on empirical fact. he asserts that what we understand as ethical philosophy is truly psychology. he highlights the commonly referred distinction between “right” and “wrong” as a difference in sentiment rather than fact. he explains that even if an act is unanimously agreed upon as “good “or “bad”, we can 10never treat this consensus as a fact. hence, ayer disregards ethical philosophy as a self-contracting practice and thus, non-existent. he stated his mission on emotivism thus: a question which is often discussed by ethical philosophers is whether it is possible to nd a denition which would reduce all ethical terms to one or two fundamentals. but this question though it undeniably belongs to ethical philosophy, is not relevant to our inquiry. we are not now concerned to discover which term, within the sphere of ethical term, is to be taken as fundamental, whether for example 'good', can be dened in terms of 'right' or 'right' in terms of 'good' or both in terms of 'value'. what we are interested in is the possibility of reducing the whole sphere of ethical terms 9a. j. ayer, language, truth and logic, new york: dover publication inc, 103. 10r. bradt, “noncognitivsm: the job of ethical sentences is not to state facts.” in ethical theory, englewood cliffs: prentice hall, 145, the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 145 to non-ethical terms. we are enquiring whether statements of ethical value can be translated into a 11statement of empirical fact. simply put, using the positivist tool, he indicated that statements or judgments can either be veried in principle or in practice. and since moral judgments according to him could not pass this judgment, he 12 discarded them. although; the terms “right” or “wrong” are incredibly subjective, we should acknowledge them as facts in extreme situations in order to establish common moral guidelines. he makes a valid point that philosophers tend to treat matters of opinion as fact. nevertheless, if we were to treat all of these matters only in terms of sentiment, it would be impossible to condemn an act as “immoral” since it may very well be moral by another's standard. ayer applied the verication principle of logical positivism to moral terms, and as a result, developed the emotivist meta-ethical theory. for him, moral judgments are meaningless, therefore, they not truthaptness, because; they are neither analytic nor empirically veriable. moral judgments are used not to describe something but to express emotions, so they have emotive meaning. they are cognitively meaningless; but emotively meaningful (non-descriptivism). therefore, there is neither moral truth and moral facts or moral disagreement (moral anti-realism thesis, so there is no proceeding rational argument over moral values). for him, moral statements have no meaning on them. meaning that, if we take moral statements, especially not to have any factual content, then there will be no point in the ethical debate regarding the ways the human individual should behave. ayer maintained that ethical statements are the expressions of feelings or sentiments; they also arouse and stimulate feelings only. hence, sentences which simply express moral judgments that do not say anything; they are pure expressions of feelings and such do not 11a. j. ayer, language, truth and logic, 40. 12see, d. ilodigwe, “ayer's critique of metaphysics. ekpoma review, vol. 2, pp. 3555. cf, 45. 146 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 say anything: “if i make a statement and say for instance, 'stealing money is wrong,' i produce a sentence which has no factual meaning 13– that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false.” it means that, for someone to express that 'stealing money is wrong' remains a personal opinion, and he or she does not imply it as a general rule, only makes meaning to him or her onlym since it is mere personal statement, not as a general fact. ayer goes further to assert that, “it is as if i had written 'stealing money!' where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being 14expressed.” ayer's emotivism is a radical theory that thoroughly rejects fundamental presuppositions like cognitivism, moral realism, and rationalism, on which traditional ethical theories were based. ayer's emotivism contributed to the development of meta-ethics, in that, it directed our attention toward non-naturalist, anti-intuitionist, ethics and non-descriptivist ethics, and in that, it found out the practicality of moral judgments by showing their emotive meaning. he put it thus: “it is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not only serve to express feelings, they are calculated to arouse feelings and stimulate 15action.” by saying this, he modied the positivist's position that; ethical statements are only but mere expressions of the speaker's feelings. furthermore, ayer argued that if ethical statements were simply statements about the speaker's feelings, it would be impossible to argue about questions of value. instead, he claimed that it should be obvious that we discuss questions of value and that the 16 particulaly subjective. the epistemology of moral facts in a possible moral world the issues of morality are always within the projects of human experience. what is known to humanity is what the same humanity 13a. j. ayer, language, truth and logic, 40 14ibid. 15ibid . 16cf, m. john. the logical positivist and morality, london: university press 2000, 50. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 147 uses as a hinge of morality. it is a naturalised ethical projection of human experience, which formed an epistemic foundation of human moral development. with the expression of human lived experiences, the possibility of moral facts inherent in human actions becomes very inevitable and indispensable in sustaining human relations and development. socially, the human person is a being of experiences that are rationally, ethically, and intellectually classied. the necessity for such classication is epistemologically justied on the fact, as robert o'donnell asserts that “animals never become scientists. only people do. and that is because they combine their universal ideas into sentences (prepositions) which increase our 17 human knowledge.” the concept of “people' employed by o'donnell indicates or presupposes the establishment of knowledge that is socially or communally based. the individual is ethically situated within the moral consciousness of the society where he or she belongs to what the moral society directs him or her to do. it is about trying to establish what is good or bad, or works with the society in maintaining the ethics that promote social order and peace. in the moral sphere, such development of statements out of human experiences, help the human individual and his society to develop some ethical statements for the guidance or regulation of human actions and events, and they remain products of human intelligibility and rational capacities and capabilities, as aspects of human 18 beingness that differentiate the human person from other creatures. the agitation for the insititutionalization of the culture of peace and social order presuppose the interdependency of human lived experiences. it is about the social epistemology of the human lived experiences which is indispensably hinged on the possibilities of moral facts in expression of human actions. for paulo valori analyzing the moral contextualism of human actions in a world of nihilistic and relativistic conceptualization of development, asserts 17r. a. o'donnell, hooked on philosophy: thomas aquinas made easy. ny: st pauls, 1995, 2. 18e. a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, emotivism and upbringing of children in the contemporary era 395. 148 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 that, “it is the task of moral philosophy to try understand in-depth this (sometimes dramatic) life and to become moral science. the difference between moral life and moral science consists of the fact that the former establishes, while the latter understands and 19 explains.” with the authenticity and subjectivity of one's life being expressed among other lives presupposes the morality of freedom and character associated one's lived experiences. according to valori, “the former (moral science) observes phenomena as personal or social facts in their freedom, subjectivity, legality, utility, and in their absolute or relative character. the latter examines the spiritual value, the ideal, the objectivity, and the universality of these same phenomena, as well as their rapport with the happiness of the person 20 or of society, etc.” the human person develops along his or her moral provity and sensibility, a culture he or she projects through the expression of freedom and character of conscience in pursiunce of social order and peace. epistemologically, what the human person knows about his very self is what he uses to guide his actions and with such knowledge, he deals with others. then, human ethical or moral knowledge and development are not an exception to the content of his lived-experiences. so, “ethics are not necessarily unrealistic. likewise, utopia does not only signify the impossible. there exists, it is true, a bad utopia, that of a perfect society, totally harmonious, without conicts and contradiction. good utopias are based on 21possibilities that are not yet realisable.” within the ethical evaluation of human living, both good and bad utopias exist. for karol wojtyla, “the question: what of morality? is more directly related to the experience of morality and more plainly aimed at the 19p. valori, l' esperienza morale (the moral experience). brescia, 1971, as in dario composta, moral philosophy and social ethics. bangalore: theological publ. in india, 2000, p. 1. 20p. valori, l' esperienza morale, 1-2 21 ste. morin, “future ethics and politics” in j. binde (ed). the future of value: 21 century talks. paris: unesco, 2004, 242. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 149 interpretation of it. normally, when we come in contact with any reality, the rst question we ask: what is it? this is also true in the 22case of morality.” for instance, quine's project of naturalising ethics is an attempt to settle moral contextualism, in any way, afrms the 23 methodological inrmity of ethics. “it may even seem strange that we have ready questions that somehow presuppose that we know what morality is. what asked, “what makes human actions morally 24 good or evil?” and in posing the question in this way.” such questions like: what is morality? what constitutes good or evil? are all epistemic altercations that demand some regular foundation of what constitutes the true human knowledge, and what quine's account on the genealogy of moral values is established by human linguistic relevance of the contents of actions. it owes that moral value is generated in the same way as it is done in science and other naturalised discourses is further the reasons why such actions are 25 carried out.. within naturalised discourses of human issues, the ethics is normatively regarded as a science, and the understanding of science is situated on the fact that it takes interest in all facts that concern the human understanding of lived-experience. the actual way of being ethical for the sake of human development is man being sincere to any action he undertakes. he can only be ethical to this very self for being human when he is aware of himself that knows. the knowledge man has about himself determines his goals and interest, phenomenological concern for authenticity, and individuality. the knowledge of man himself cannot be distant from what the society provides for him. the issues for the epistemic justication of 22k. wojtyla, “the problem of the theory of morality.” in karol wojtyla, person and community: selected essays. translated by theresa sandok. ny: peter lang, 1993, 132. 23see g. fasiku, moral facts, possible moral worlds and naturalized ethics. west african journal of philosophical studies, vol. 11, 2008, p. 83. 24k. wojtyla, “the problem of the theory of morality”, 132. 25g. fasiku, moral facts, possible moral worlds and naturalised ethics, 83. 150 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 morality are based on the afrmative understanding of whether moral issues are facts or not. if there are moral facts, then, one can phenomenologically assert that morality can be epistemologically justied. if there is a possible world where human actions are either judged to be right or wrong ethically, such rightness or wrongness of actions is possibly in the afrmative as a fact in a possible world. therefore, the existentiality of the human person as a rational agent and a subject of lived experiences suggests the possibility of moral facts since the actions of the human person mst be checkmated. accoriding to wojtyla, “we assumed not only that morality was already experientially apprehended in its proper perspective, but also that it was intellectually objectied. since the question asks about 26 actions that are morally is.” in the words of gbenga fasiku; what derives from this understanding of moral facts is that the actual wrongness of a morally wrong act is not an empirical entity; it is a fact because it is not corrigible in the present and any possible world. though; the fact is not observable in the same sense in which natural facts are observed, they are observed by all the subjects concerned by searching through the entities in all possible worlds in order to see there is no fact that run contrary to the moral 27 fact. in a possible world, knowledge is possibly claimed when facts are established in line with the subject of knowledge. in ethics, as a normative science, the subject of knowledge is the perpetrator of the act (whether moral or immoral), while the object of the moral fact is the victim, and the medium of the fact to be established is the act itself (determining the means and nature of the social and cultural acceptance of the act). we know the establishement of moral facts from the means and nature of the moral actions, even they may be mere moral assumptions. man knowing what to do with ethical 26k. wojtyla, 132. 27g. fasiku, 95. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 151 practices presupposes that the individual is aware that such moral practices remain facts that can be subjected to future references. according to david lewis, the possible worlds are real in some way. in this conception of a possible world, what makes worlds distinct is that they are spatio-temporally separated from one another. in other words, every way that a world could have been is a way that some existing physical world really is. so, possible worlds are real worlds and they actually exist in the same sense the real or concrete world 28 we inhabit exists. hence, we are asking about the contents of moral facts that are indispensable for human moral development, this conviction especially when our question takes the form of what still goes further and enters the realm of the basis of moral norms themselves, thus, not only do ethical question go beyond the simple question, “what is morality?” which must suggest itself to us in connection with the experience of morality, but they also, so to speak, “begin farther 29down the line.” moreover, “naturally, man is eager from birth to death to know and discover what is unknown to him to have adequate 30 information and knowledge to live conveniently in human society.” the establishment of this point should ordinarily provide a ground 31for accepting ethics as belonging to the naturalist family. still, science cannot ignore questions that are less pressing from a vital or existential point of view, but not for the reason any less important from a scientic point of view. this applies in a special way to question the essence of morality, and how it is applied to the contents 28d. lewis, on the plurality of worlds. oxford: basil blackwell, 1986, 2. 29k. wojtyla, p. 132. 30w. o. aso, rudiments of philosophy for undergraduates. lagos: fropiel int'l ltd, 2018, 36. 31g. fasiku, p. 90. 152 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 32 of social development. to put it another way, the question of the essence of morality ensures that the questions concerning moral good and evil are posed homogeneously concenring the experience of 33morality. the experience of morality allows us to come in contact with the essence of morality, and, in direct relation to this, the question arises, “what is morality?” in this question, we are seeking the intellectual objectication of that which is given in the experience 34 of morality. humanity as a whole can only use its natural heritage to the fullest; if it does not lose sight of the library of knowledge that has 35been left to it by generations past. thus the theory of morality arises by means of knowledge of morality as the factor that accounts for the 36 homogeneity of ethical knowledge. like the human brain, it is only 37useful if it is integral and assessable exactly when it is needed. put simply, the epistemic justication of morality seats on the phenomenological afrmative of ethics as a normative science since moral actions can be epistemologically regarded as moral facts. this is because, experiences are facts, and since morality or moral action/event is an experience, then it can generate into a moral fact in order to afrm some level of social, cultural, and scientic justication of such act or event. in all, many ethical questions are epistemologically raised to situate any such justication. hence, thical questions – questions of the type, “what is morally good”, and what is morally evil in human actions? – already in a way concern a subsequent issue. we are not asking in them about morality as such; we are not trying to understand the morality; rather, we are asking – based on some previous understanding of moralityabout a distinction fundamental to 32k. wojtyla, p. 133. 33ibid. 34ibid. 35t. odhiambo, “the future of biodiversity” in j. binde (ed). the future of value: st21 century talks. paris: unesco, 2004, 209. 36k. wojtyla, 133. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 153 morality, the distinction between good and evil, and about the basis of 38 this distinction. every moral question will be meaningfully answered when it corresponds with the moral facts available for such moral knowledge, and it is justiable to be right or wrong in line with the content of such moral facts. this distinction (right or wrong, good or bad) is possible because the social status of morality is possible epistemologically, that is, the statue of morality is possible when the moral facts are possibly established. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world we have engaged in an expository analysis of an infamous ethical theory called emotivism. our expose brought to the fore the concomitant moral sleaze associated with this notorious doctrine. in an unequivocal language, it debunked the fallacious belief that ethical or moral statements are not reasonable statements but 39 statements based on one's emotional whims and caprices. we argue that the precepts of morality have their root in the moral laws of nature and as such not within the limit of science. hence the test for meaningfulness, wrongness, or goodness, licit or illicitness, would only be; if it conforms to the moral laws of nature which immanuel kant calls 'categorical imperatives' because it applies to man directly and it prescribes norms for human conduct. this can only be done by 40 metaphysicians and ethicists. according to research, ayer faced a 41 particular difculty in defending this brand of non-cognitivism; the combination of afrming a redundancy theory of truth with the denial that moral claims can be true; looks suspicious. though; looking at the views critically, one would discover that the views are not incompatible, the tension between the views is symptomatic of the worry that moral claims have so many of the features of truthevaluable assertions that one has to be unjustiably revisionistic in 37t. odhiambo, “the future of biodiversity” , 209. 38k. wojtyla, 132. 39r . m. hare, the language of morals. oxford: clarendon press, 1955. 40e. a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, 401. 41r. m. hare, the language of morals, 14 154 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 construing them as non-meaningful. they are, after all, typically expressed in indicative sentences, and people appear to dispute moral 42claims. however, there emerged a more troubling point about the role of moral terms and how it is being used in arguments. moral terms can be used in arguments in which the moral term appears in a conditional, and it is not their contributing to the expressive force of 43the utterance, not expressing an emotion of the speaker. ayer's defense is that all ethical disputes are about facts regarding the proper applications of a value system to a specic case, not about the value systems themselves; because any dispute about values can only be resolved by judging that one value system is superior to another, and this judgment itself presupposes a shared values system. with indispensability of shared values system in human society, we accept the conception of the good in monitoring human actions. here george edward moore's indenable good becomes very meaningful in understanding ayer's conception of moral emotivism in relation to the usage of human languages for the expressing moral facts. for moore, “if i am asked 'what is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. or if i am asked 'how is good to be dened?' my answer is that it cannot be 44dened and that is all i have to say about it.” if moore is wrong is saying that there are actual disagreements of value, we are left with the claim that there are actual disagreements of fact, and ayer accepts the position of moore's possibility of shared values system without hesitations. ayer sees good as an individual's approval of a particular thing and an attempt to arouse similar approval from other persons if 45 they morally accept it as well. ayer agree with moore that good is indenable and non-natural, and at such, it cannot be denied by anyone not be relevance for one's moral development. but ayer claim the he was misguided to think that it is cognitive, since good for his is 42see, r. m. hare, 15. 43see, r. m. hare, 15. 44g. e. moore, prinicipia ethica, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1903, 7. 45see, moritz schlick, the problem of ethics. usa: macmillan, 196, 91. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 155 just an expressor or evoker of feelings, mere suggestion, a pseudo and 46 indescrible concept which is neither true or false. � in ayer's emotivism ts into a naturalistic world view, and because of that, it appeals to many philosophers as an erotic philosophy. it does not posit the existence of any non-natural properties like goodness and love which cannot be empirically discovered. emotivism helps explain the strong link between making 47 a moral judgment and being motivated to act accordingly. looking at it from another angle, ayer claims that when we make moral judgments, what we are doing is expressing our emotional reactions to the thing we are judging. in sone indications, it seems possible to judge that something is morally wrong without having any emotional reaction to it, or even feeling positive about it. two moral judgments cannot contradict each other if they are, in fact, just expressions of 48 emotion. finally, our practice of making moral judgments treats such judgments as propositional in many ways. we use them in logical arguments and draw inferences from them. we employed them in other kinds of statements and use them in an un-asserted context. it is not clear whether the emotivist account of the nature of such judgments can explain why we can do these moral arguments. concluding remarks from the foregrounding, there are moral facts in any possible moral world since there are communities of persons that need to be guided in achieving social order and justice. we recognize here that any formation of the human person by the theory of emotivism would have the animalistic instinct and inclination and passions as his governing propensity. and instead of acting under the precepts of morality guided by reason, he would act under passion where there is no law, there is no sin. where there is no morality, no immoral acts, everything would be right. if all is neutrally neutral, then one will be 46v. c. anuniru, a critique of g. e. moore's indenable good. unpublished b. a long essay, deaprtment of philosophy, seminary of all saints, ekpoma, 2010, 49. 47see, e. a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, 391. 48see, d. ilodigwe, ayer's critique of metaphysics, 50. 156 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 able, ad libitum, to do whatever his or her whim and caprice urges. if putting on clothes is a mere matter of interest, like or dislike, convenience, those with emotivist' formation of minds may go on 49 naked if they so wish. for fasiku; a moral judgment is tested against a moral fact that exists in all possible worlds; it is a fact because it is found in possible worlds, and there is no world in which its contrary is found. if, however, there is a possible world where it is justiably shown that the moral fact does not exist, then the moral judgment would not correspond to 50any moral fact. such a judgment is therefore false. arguably, for an integral genuine and authentic formation of the human person, ethical relativism and emotivism should be carefully looked at and possibly pushed for its repudiation in its entity. the human family, the civil society, all agents of socialization, and indeed all those directly and indirectly concerned with the training, the formation of character, good conscience and personality of the child, 51should jettison emotivism and its doctrine. we can described the end effect of emotivism as oral annihilation, and any human individual brought up by this doctrine will end up being individualistic, antisocial, corrupt public morality, and embrace vices instead of virtues. according to eligabeth afolami and michael uzomah, man is a moral animal, because, he possesses distinctive quality and rationality, which makes him a moral agent. he is capable of moral evaluation/approbation and disapprobation. hence, obstinately denying man's rational ability to appraise social affairs, thereby, 52 making man an amoral being is incredibly absurd and despicable. one may be tempted to conclude that the theory of emotivism is so obscure and untenable that even the emotivists cannot attempt to 49e. a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, 402. 50g. fasiku, 99. 51see, m. lacewing, metaethics, intuitionism, emotivism and prescriptivism, http//www.alevephilosophy/socialphil.com. 52e. a. afolami and m. m. uzomah, p. 404. the ethics of ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world | 157 rear their children in an a moral emotivistic and relativistic world. it is because of its grave consequences on the formation of the characters and personalities of such children. at best, emotivism can only build a foundation of a social and moral disordered society. for williams aso, “there is no society; in which her own appreciated cultural values and practices that often served as the ontological basis of the worldview and approach to issues by the members of the social group. there is no iota of equivocation to say that these cultural values and practices, no matter how imperfect they may be, are not just from the 53 blues.” this is on the thrust that, given the conclusion that ayer's emotivism is unable to explain the meaning of all ethical terms used in moral discourse, and erroneous purpose of development and civilization in promoting relativistic society, only on the basis of personal conviction of what is right or wrong, it is reasonable to question whether emotivism should be abandoned as a meta-ethical theory. anyway, we believe that emotivism still offers one valuable insight that can potentially explain important features of our moral experience, and thus, should not be given up entirely, simply based on one's exercise of freedom and responsibility. 53w. o. aso, rudiments of philosophy for undergraduates, 36. 158 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 45 demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects abstract: the main objective of this paper is to discuss the role of african philosophy, in view of the links between africa and brazil, at a time marked by a reorganization of social life on the planet. this, of course, is a qualitative research. our investigation will focus on the current situation of these two regions, the historical elements that draw them together. one of the conclusions of this paper affirms that brazil should give due attention to the philosophical production in the african continent. keywords: african philosophy; 21st century; philosophy of education; brazil; conceptual decolonization. introduction the reflections presented here are grounded in a past that unites brazil and africa strongly. this connection is marked by pain and joy. as a birth that brings to the world a new being, the encounter that took place in these lands between three cultural matrices (indigenous, white and black) is the origin and source the modern brazilian people. as such, a brazilian is neither european nor african. however, his thinking is undoubtedly marked by western influence. in max weber's view, western rationality has as its main characteristic the desire to dominate the world. so, from an external perspective, we must consider our relationship with nature and with 46 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 other people as objects and adversaries that exist to serve us; from an internal perspective, the "i" channels its efforts towards profit. these weberian considerations are basic to explain the existence of capitalism. the main purpose of this paper is to reflect on the importance of african philosophical thought in times of restructuring of social life at planetary level. in addition this research also deals with the following scopes: discussing african philosophy as a problem for philosophy itself; discussing the philosophical production under development on the african continent; african philosophy as a source for education in the 21st century. in this academic exercise, we shall deal with african philosophy as a philosophical problem; the main currents of african philosophical thought since placide frans tempels; some of the most important issues facing philosophy in africa today; and finally, the relationship between the discipline philosophy of education and african philosophy. 1. the existence or not of philosophy in africa in my writing áfrica e filosofia, i present considerations on african philosophical thought as an issue to be confronted by philosophy itself. no século xviii, em um contexto histórico de colonização, aparece na europa para a filosofia o seguinte problema: há ou não uma filosofia africana? a resposta que o debate vai produzir reflete a visão de mundo e a compreensão de homem que possui o colonizador europeu à época. posteriormente, no século xx, esse problema será levantado outra vez, graças à obra la philosophiebantoue de l´être do missionário franciscano placidetempels, publicada em 1945. nela o missionário belga argumenta que as categorias metafísicas do povo bantu estão refletidas em suas línguas, isto é, em categorias linguísticas. finalmente, nasúltimasdécadas, o debate se intensifica.1 in fact it cannot be denied there is a philosophical thought in intense activity, in the african continent; but in addition there is a philosophy that can be termed african. demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 47 the philosophical work elaborated here can be organized into two groups: a traditional (not western) philosophy, linked to folklore; a modern (western) technical philosophy.2 thinkers like anta diop, odera oruka and théophile obenga represent the first group; the second consists of intellectuals such as paulin hountondji, kwame appiah and kwasi wiredu. let's pause a bit in this last one. wiredu, graduated in philosophy, at the university of ghana and then went on to oxford university in england for his postgraduate studies. for 23 years, he taught at the university of ghana, but also worked as a teacher at some western institutions of higher learning, especially at the university of south florida in tampa, united states. certainly, his training possesses strong western traits. this western foundation of his training must be taken into account for one to understand the conception of this theorist regarding the definition of african philosophy. for him, this kind of philosophy must be studied, using modern, logical and conceptual technical tools of western philosophy. he advocates a rational method used scientifically, but also recognizes the need of african philosophers to relate to the traditional basis of their philosophical thinking3. in his view, it is up to philosophy to perform an important social task. although philosophical ideas are theoretical and abstract, they are necessary for our well-being. he argues that this kind of knowledge is indispensable to modern life.4 wiredu recognizes, preserved in the oral tradition of african peoples, a popular thought that is present in proverbs, adages and folklore. for him, good philosophy, be it african or western, is one that is rigorous, constructive and critical. in this direction, he raises the following criticism: many identify the communal philosophy with the folk philosophy. according to wiredu, regardless of how we denominate it, it is no more than several aspects of traditional philosophy put together. the more technically elaborated philosophy is, the more philosophical it is considered to be in relation to its communal variation, explains the author.5 48 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 however, this distinction does not resolve the issue. wiredu considers the definition of paulin hountondji, according to which it would be the set of philosophical texts produced by africans. however, this definition has the limitation of not accounting for the traditional orality-based thinking produced in africa. indeed, wiredu defends the thesis that writing is an indispensable condition for african philosophy in the modern world. even so, he recognizes in the traditional thinking of staple societies the existence of both irrational and rational elements6 . concerning his understanding of african philosophy, he insists on the distinction mentioned above between: philosophy as popular thought preserved in the oral tradition of the african peoples and, philosophy as individual and critical reflection, aided by modern conceptual and logical techniques. we must emphasize: for him, the popular thought of the african continent should not be confused with african philosophy.7 the identification of the sayings of some traditional philosophers as a technical philosophy, however, represents an evolution in their conception of african philosophy8. he observes as a positive fact that, at present, there is a disposition, on the part of philosophers of that continent, to carry out studies on individual indigenous thinkers considered traditional technical philosophers. according to wiredu, this is a critical and reconstructive philosophy.9 indeed, the conception elaborated by wiredu as to what philosophy is, expresses his understanding of what african philosophy ought to be. fundamental, in this sense, is to define what philosophy can do for africa. in fact, he considers philosophy as theoretical knowledge, but emphasizing its practical function.10 in o despertar filosófico em áfrica11 (2014), the congolese pene elungudefends similar position. in his view, the main role to be played by contemporary african philosophy has nothing to do with either traditional africa or european modernity. their task is tied to what africa and africans want to do. demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 49 2. some chains of african philosophy in view of this dual conception of african philosophy, we will present three of the most significant currents of active philosophical thought on the african continent, from tempels to our days. ethno-philosophy: this chain has as important reference point the work of frans tempels a filosofia bantu.12 he worked as a missionary in the belgian congo for years. the occasion allowed him to carry out philosophical studies from an african perspective. the cited work: tornou-se um clássico do pensamento filosófico africano como etnofilosofia. filósofos como a. kagame ou j. mbiti têm seus nomes ligados à etnofilosofia. vale salientar que este modelo filosófico logo encontrou uma dura crítica. críticos dele são césaire e eboussiboulaga, por exemplo. se a filosofia africana termina sendo uma etnofilosofía (para estudo e análise dos de fora), se iria aniquilar tanto a existência como a identidade filosófica da áfrica. é o que defendem. assim, segundo eles, a filosofia bantu seria reduzida a um intento por parte dos europeus de explicar a idiossincrasia dos africanos.13 in fact, kwame appiah, in his book in my father's house (1992), claims to be the franciscan priest's text the founder of ethnophilosophy. he also criticizes this stream of thought that deserves to be recorded: “though much ethno-philosophical material is indeed very interesting – at least where it is not, as it too often is, woefully inaccurate – we should go carefully in discussing how to put it to philosophical use”14 he goes on to denounce the philosophical ingenuity of anthropological accounts by ethnographers. and he condemns it by explaining: we could say that it is only a question of criticism, if there were not the thesis defended by many, according to which african philosophy is ethno-philosophical.15 moving forward in his reflections on ethno-philosophy, he says that it is supported by two assumptions: 50 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 the first, which paulin hountondji has dubbed ''unanimism,'' is the factual assumption, which i have already rejected, that there is some central body of ideas that is shared by black. africans quite generally. the second is the evaluative assumption that the recovery of this tradition is worthwhile.16 the author cites some important works that critique ethnophilosophies: african philosophy: myth and reality (1976) of paulin hountondji; essaisür la problema de philosophique dans l'afrique actuelle (1971) of marcien towa; and philosophy and the african culture (1980) of kwasi wiredu. the sage philosophy: what is sage philosophy? the "philosophy of african wisdom" (also called "philosophy of wisdom" or "philosophy of sagacity") is the common name given to the body of thought produced by people considered wise in the communities of the african continent and, more specifically, to those who seek a rational basis for ideas and concepts used to describe and visualize the world, critically examining the justification of these ideas and concepts. this strand of thought has its origin in odera oruka, whose main objective was to establish, with evidence, that critical reflection on issues of fundamental importance has always been the concern of a few in african societies. these themes involve questions about the supreme being, person, freedom, equality, death, and the afterlife. the evidence that oruka collected about the rational elaboration of such themes by indigenous sages is contained in dialogues, many of which appear in his work sage philosophy: indigenous thinkers and modern debate on african philosophy, published in 1990. in the essay filosofia da sagacidade: sua metodologia, resultados, significância e futuro, kibujjo kalumba comments: a maioria das pessoas concorda que um sábio é uma pessoa excepcionalmente inteligente. além dessa sabedoria, henry oderaoruka sugere um segundo critério sobre a sagacidade. um verdadeiro sábio, ele diz, deve usar habitualmente o dom da sabedoria para o aperfeiçoamento ético de sua comunidade. por isso, ele ou ela tem que ser constantemente preocupado com os problemas éticos e empíricos provenientes de sua comunidade, com a intenção demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 51 de encontrar soluções interessantes para elas. na visão de oruka, o segundo critério é o que distingue um sábio de um sofista17 this proposal of odera oruka received criticism from many intellectuals, including the philosopher himself. next, to illustrate, we will present gail presbey’s criticism. she shows fragile points in the project of the kenyan thinker. she starts by considering odera oruka's self-criticism. for presbey,18 odera oruka doubted his own sage's philosophy project. in philosophy in east africa and the future of philosophical research in africa (1997)19, oruka admits the limits of his project from the point of view of the historical context and soon will give rise to tendencies that he considers central to the future of the african philosophy (the professional philosophy and the nationalist-ideological philosophy). moreover, although he criticizes the work of tempels and that of other ethnophilosophers, the author confesses that his own is a combination of anthropology and philosophy. oruka says that he began his sage philosophy20 as a contestation to the thesis defended by some europeans that the africans are not able to philosophize. however, he continues to suggest that his project serves only as a "base" or "raw material" for other forms of philosophy that must emerge in the future. in his view, professional academic philosophers must focus on african indigenous texts. in them, these philosophers can base their research, instead of always choosing the european texts for their future works. in addition, he notes that the beliefs of african populations would have little or no impact on the modern debate on philosophy or science. in other words, oruka seeks to reinforce his modernist position by asserting that the ethnological beliefs personified by those he calls "popular sages" would hardly have much impact on modern science and philosophy.21 according to presbey, oruka's criteria for the eligibility of someone as wise are discriminatory. he insists on the prudent philosophy that neither age nor gender is a necessary condition for becoming a sage. however, in his book sage philosophy (1991), we see that of the twelve sages, there is only one young man and one 52 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 woman. this credits presbey's critique and demands suspicion as to why the wise are generally referred to as "wise old men," in line with the general cultural bias that men are superior to women.22 thinkers like wiredu believe that it is not enough to limit themselves to data collection of what was thought or said by ancestors. part of the wiredudian critique of ethnophilosophical relies on this. in the philosopher's view, odera oruka's sage philosophy represents an individualistic version of ethnophilosophy.23 as previously noted, it can be said that wiredu does not agree to identify philosophy with traditional philosophy.24 this makes us realize that in kwasi wiredu the problem of whether or not an african philosophy exists is as follows: is it correct to speak of african philosophy as a contemporary discipline? in his work philosophy and an african culture, mentioned above, we find: "african philosophy, distinct from traditional african views of the world, is the current philosophy of production by contemporary african philosophers”.25 the formal african philosophical model: the position of kwasi wiredu, posed above, on african philosophy as a technical and professional philosophy enables the reader to have a reasonable idea of this current of thought. paulin j. hountondji26 and marcien towa27 ask whether it is really possible to speak of an african philosophy (alongside the western model) in the strict sense. for them, this is not possible. they deny, therefore, a strictly african philosophy. however, for the question of the existence of an african philosophy to find a solution, it must take into account the emergence of the spontaneous and autonomous development of african society. in this way, african philosophers are forced to invent their own definition of philosophy by virtue of their time and place.28 to end this topic, i would like to add, in terms of provocation, an element that seems to me indispensable in this debate. this is the role of the university for the development of africa. i am convinced that it does not make much sense to raise the problem of the definition of african philosophy without connecting it to the question of what task the university should carry out on that demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 53 continent, for as, for example, chemistry, physics, mathematics and medicine have a contribution to the development of africa, and for this to happen, these areas of knowledge need a well-structured university system, academic philosophy also has work to do not least important for the continent in question . in fact, this leads us to an old debate that goes back to plato, that is, to see if everyone can be philosophers or if, on the contrary, this would be the privilege of only a few. this debate is also of interest to brazil. there are issues to be resolved: what role should philosophy play in our country? is there a philosophy, effectively brazilian? what does it consist of? 3. some questions of african philosophy in recent decades the current philosophical debates that take place on the african continent revolve around topics such as identity, culture, religion, human rights, democracy, modernity, development and conceptual decolonization. it should be emphasized that, in brazil, they are also an object of interest in philosophy and the humanities in general. as an example and suggestion of consultation on the thematic identity, we present the congolese philosopher mudimbe.29 a obra a invenção da áfrica: gnose, filosofia e a ordem do conhecimento, de valentin yves mudimbe, caracteriza-se por abranger uma perspectiva historicista que problematiza os conceitos e discursos do que conhecemos como uma áfrica mitificada. as verdades veiculadas por filósofos, antropólogos, missionários religiosos e ideólogos, bem como imagens ocidentalizadas e/ou eurocêntricas, inerentes aos processos de transformações dos vários tipos de conhecimentos, são desconstruídas por mudimbepari passu aos padrões imperiais ou coloniais. para tal empreitada, vale ressaltar as inúmeras referências que compõem um sólido corpus documental utilizado pelo autor em sua investigação, ou seja, estas transitam da filosofia romana ao romantismo alemão. ou ainda, o questionar e investigar através do termo gnose, cunhado com o 54 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 intuito de erguer uma arqueologia do(s) sentido(s) do pensamento africano. 30 he is influenced by thinkers such as eboussi-boulaga, bimwenyi, foucault, lévi-strauss, ricoeur, among others. the very debate about which definition to give to african philosophy throws us directly into the heart of discussions about identity in general and about the identity of africa in particular. the same can be said in relation to thinking about these topics. as you can see, the problem of african identity has many nuances. one of them are the languages spoken on that continent. kwame appiah, in his book my father's house: africa in the philosophy of culture, right in the first chapter, faces this question of identity. he calls it the invention of africa (1992). the author begins his reflections by problematizing the multiplicity of languages and dialects spoken on the continent. the first element that he throws in the discussion is the predominance, in african countries, of the languages of the settlers (english, french, portuguese and arabic). africa, as a concept, is one of the main points of this book. defining what it is represents a central aspect of the debate about its identity. the philosophy of culture elaborated there is vigorous, and has provided good reflections so far. this text by appiah is an example of this. it is a recommended reading for anyone interested in the study of african culture. another notable author in the field of philosophy of culture in africa is kwasi wiredu. in this sense, famous is his already cited book cultural universals and particulars: an african perspective (1996). it starts from the universals and particulars in human culture to gain a better understanding of what africa means. as for religion, it can be said that this is an element that attracts, more and more, the interest of african philosophers. this assertion applies both to indigenous religions and to their relationship to both christianity and islam. to clarify these discussions, let us look at the text of wiredu african religions from a philosophical point of view (2010). the author points out that the term "religion" does not originate in africa. in addition, he adds that, according to mbiti, demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 55 there may not be an equivalent word in african languages. however, in african religions and philosophy, we read that not only are african peoples known to be religious, but they are said to know not how to live without religion.31 wiredu provokes: to have a religion isn’t necessarily a moral or intellectual advantage.32 wiredu, a confessed atheist, criticizes the fact that many african scholars strive to prove that a belief in god has arisen in africa. according to him, this results from the idea that religion is an achievement. the thinker points out: this assumption, unfortunately, is capable of undermining a dispassionate examination to clarify the role played by religion in african culture (2010). in his view, "the concept of religion applies to african culture, in most cases only in a minimal sense".33 he goes on treating the supreme being for african populations. the author seeks to clarify: african worldviews usually, though not invariably, feature a supreme being who is regarded as responsible for the world order. generally, that being is explicitly conceived to be omniscient, omnibenevolent, and, subject to a rider to be entered in due course omnipotent […]. a sense of dependency, trust, and unconditional reverence is almost everywhere evident in african attitudes to the supreme being.34 wiredu emphasizes an element that deserves to be mentioned in these reflections, that is, "strikingly, however, rituals of god-worship are often absent from african life".35 let's talk a little about human rights. law professor fischel andrade, in hisessay o sistema africano de proteção dos direitos humanos e dos povos, talksaboutthe banjul charter. a entrada em vigor da carta africana dos direitos humanos e dos povos, também conhecida como carta de banjul, aos 21 de outubro de 1986, consolidou o terceiro sistema regional de proteção internacional dos direitos humanos. trata-se, sem lugar a dúvidas, de um marco nos esforços que vêm sendo feitos, tanto a nível global quanto regional, com vistas à promoção e ao respeito dos direitos humanos. não obstante, o sistema africano encontra obstáculos de 56 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 ordem histórica, política, estrutural e jurídica que podem comprometer sua eficácia36. three decades after the promulgation of this document, the following testimony of achille mbembe, in a way, justifies this fear: eu estava aqui durante o último surto de violência contra esses “estrangeiros”. a caçada atual por “estrangeiros” é o produto de uma complexa cadeia de cumplicidades. o governo sul-africano tomou, recentemente, uma posição dura sobre a imigração. novas medidas draconianas têm sido aprovadas. seus efeitos são devastadores para as pessoas já estabelecidas aqui legalmente. algumas semanas atrás, eu assisti, em uma reunião de equipe “estrangeira”, na universidade de wits, histórias horríveis. licença de trabalho não renovada, vistos recusados para membros da família, crianças no limbo nas escolas… por meio de suas novas medidas anti-imigração, o governo está mudando os migrantes, anteriormente legais, para ilegais37. he is not reporting any developments in europe as a result of recent waves of migration of africans to that continent. on the contrary, it refers to what is being experienced in south africa. in fact, the cameroonian philosopher is denouncing human rights violations that are currently taking place in the country that had its name associated with the struggles against apartheid. indeed, this continent is the scene of countless disregard for human rights. wiredu believes that governments are his biggest violators. for the thinker, this results from the moral degeneration of some politicians or failures in the very system of majority democracy.38 of the suggested themes, the next three (democracy, modernity and development) will be treated together as a bloc because they have strong connections to each other. held (1996)39 and robert dahl (1989)40 present four historical models of democracy: a) participatory or classical democracy; b) republicanism; c) liberal representative democracy; d) marxism and single-party democracy.41 however, for many african intellectuals to propose democracy to that continent is something viewed with reservations or even reprehensible. already among the supporters of democracy for africa there is a problem to demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 57 be solved at the outset, that is, to define which model of democracy would be most appropriate there. the divergences are several. however, kwasi wiredu condemns both democracy by majority (proposed by the west) and that of a single party (inheritance of the former soviet union). the philosopher proposes a new model, that is, democracy by consensus. it is a system not anchored in political parties. this proposal has as reference the concept of community consensus, present in akan populations, in the pre-colonial period42. another relevant point for understanding kwasi wiredu's social philosophy is his contributions to the african development project. in this sense, a major challenge is the problem of selfdefinition, because, in that continent, the traditional and the modern coexist with difficulties.43 but what exactly does developed africa mean? for him, the development of africa demands technical-scientific knowledge, but he warns: “it would profit us little to gain all the technology in the world and lose the humanistic essence of our culture”.44 of course, developing it suggests modernizing it. this implies recourse to modern science to improve the living conditions of africans. in relation to the development of this continent, wiredu indicates two indispensable elements: technical-scientific knowledge and education. however, he makes an important clarification: the knowledge required by the continent is not that offered by the hard sciences, but the knowledge of the social sciences and philosophy, as these will contribute to defining how to apply scientific and technological resources properly.45 on conceptual decolonization, we will discuss in the next section. 4. the discipline philosophy of education and the african philosophy in brazil, we have in bachelor’s degree program under the discipline of philosophy of education. the idea is to provide future teachers with a minimum philosophical basis to better perform their 58 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 activities as education professionals. however, very often, the philosophical source that feeds this discipline is western philosophy (authors, theories, categories and concepts). we can say without fear of making mistakes: african philosophy is almost never considered when it comes to preparing the menus and, hence, the course plans of the discipline under analysis. looking briefly at the history of our country, we find without difficulty the neglect to which education was relegated from tomé de sousa to michel temer. one of the consequences of this is to have an elitist educational system (conscious, for most of its history). this is the first phase of a system whose landmark is the arrival of the jesuits to the land of vera cruz46. another important element is the fact that the constitution of brazilian society was marked by a terrible misunderstanding, that is, the attempt by the white matrix of anthropological negation of two of the three matrices responsible for the formation of the brazilian people (indigenous and afro). this was decisive in order to have, until the beginning of the twentieth century, a consciously elitist educational system, which made little or no case for indigenous and afros and their descendants. in the 1930s, due to the elaboration of the new constitution, we have a strong debate surrounding the theme of education. this is one of the highlights of the philosophy of education in our country. from these debates, there is certain hope that brazil needs an educational system open to all brazilians. so this is a new element. although, in practice, the country continues to have an educational system focused on the dominant elites, at least theoretically, we have a new concept. we can say that this is the second phase of the history of this system. with the departure of the military from power, in 1985, the period of redemocratization began in the country. in 1988, the new federal constitution, denominated as citizen constitution, was elaborated. this could be set as the beginning of the third phase of the brazilian educational system. the source that gives life to the discussions about education, in this third moment, is the notion of "democracy". in the years that follow, several practical measures are demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 59 taken with the aim of achieving the goal of providing quality education for all brazilians. however, since the end of 2014, we have been experiencing regression in educational policies, although we were still far from achieving the aforementioned scope. even so, it should be noted that there have been some advances regarding the integration of indigenous people, afros and their descendants. in this context of redemocratization, in spite of immense difficulties related to ethnoracial issues in brazil, there is maturation in some sectors of brazilian society capable of producing laws of the scope of the 10.639/200347 and 11.645/200848. certainly, in the country, one of the characteristics of basic education is inequality. it is in the racial field that these asymmetries are more blunt. ins fact, in brazilian society, those who are most affected by prejudice, racism and discrimination are those belonging to the afrodescendant population. as for the constitution of brazilian society, as mentioned earlier, the great misconception of the white matrix was to have expended a terrible effort with the objective of annihilating the other two matrices. indeed, this error contributes to a better understanding of the prejudices directed at blacks and indians in our country. if we consider the pre-colonial period, it is worth emphasizing that in the content taught in basic education, there is an almost absolute silence about the indian and the negro before his contact with the white in terra brasilis. inthe bookcasa grande e senzala (1963),theindians are describedby brazilian gilberto freire as "bandos de crianças grandes; uma cultura verde e incipiente; ainda na primeira dentição; sem os ossos nem o desenvolvimento das grandes semicivilizações americanas"49 (freire, 1963: 150). in a general way, the authors portrayed the indian and the negro, since the arrival of the europeans in our land. some of the themes visited by african philosophy today are of great interest to countries like brazil. among them we can emphasize those mentioned in the previous section. they involve issues that directly concern us. therefore, they are also interested in philosophical thinking that deals with brazilian educational issues. 60 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 therefore, in brazil, the discipline philosophy of education must seriously seek to carry out dialogues with the philosophers of africa, because for us, these are categories of the first order. one of the advantages that deserves to be highlighted in consulting these thinkers on these issues lies in the fact that we have in common with them the peripheral regions of the world. among so many traits that approach us this is quite significant. thus, in addressing these issues, observing the treatment given to them by africans will certainly be of benefit to us brazilians. here it is not suggested, of course, to give up the western classical philosophical tradition, when we approach the themes of interest in the philosophy of education. far from this, what we propose has to do with aggregate and not substitute. we defend the thesis, according to which, given the nature and proximity of the problems theoretically faced by the brazilian philosophy of education and those discussed by the african philosophy, we will only have to win if we are bold and able to include in the classes of said discipline, given for us in the courses of teacher training, the contributions of the african philosophers. as an example of the contributions that can be obtained by visiting the philosophical production of african intellectuals, researchers in the field of philosophy, let us cite the "conceptual decolonization", since it is a good category for dialogue with those mentioned above or with others of the interest of philosophy of education. for decades, this theme has been intensifying in that continent, involving several of its thinkers. in this direction, mbembe (2001) criticizes the fact that in europe, with the end of the slave trade, the doubts about whether africans can be able to govern or not to govern themselves.50 this negative view of the colonizer over the african ended up being assimilated by this. the result of this was the strengthening of something that was long gone, that is, the epistemic temptation of the african (and us brazilians) to think the world using european categories and concepts. hountondji is another author concerned with this subject. in conhecimento de áfrica, conhecimento de africanos (2008), he argues in favor of the thesis, according to which it is necessary to demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 61 strengthen in that continent an autonomous, self-confident epistemological tradition of research and knowledge that responds to problems and questions directly or indirectly, by africans themselves. the debate on the decolonization of thinking relies on the remarkable presence of kwasi wiredu. in hisview, conceptual decolonizationreferstotwocomplementaryactions: a) “evitar a assimilação sem verificações em nosso pensamento [...] de esquemas conceituais fixados nas tradições filosóficas estrangeiras que tiveram um impacto sobre a vida e sobre o pensamento africanos”51; b) “em nossas meditações filosóficas, desfrutar o máximo possível [...] dos recursos dos nossos esquemas conceituais originais, inclusive em setores altamente especializados da filosofia contemporânea".52 for the author, colonialism led to the overlapping of foreign categories over african thinking systems. basically, this is why it is necessary to carry out the task of conceptual decolonization in africa53. his research in this respect highlights his studies in the field of language and culture. in this direction, one of his works that deserves prominence is philosophy and an african culture. for him, there is a danger to be faced, that is, the “de-africanization”.54 here i turn to the words of kwame appiah in my father's house, which deals essentially with the philosophy of culture: when i argue that ideological decolonization is bound to fail if it neglects either endogenous ''tradition'' or exogenous ''western'' ideas, and that many african (and african-american) intellectuals have failed to find a negotiable middle way, i am talking about friends and neighbors and i am talking about how we deal with our shared situation”.55 bringing african philosophy into the philosophy of education will be helpful, as it will help us, as a brazilian people, to build our worldview (though open and attentive to the classical western tradition) from within ourselves, leading us to assume, in this process, an active role. in addition, it will produce, among 62 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 others, the following fruits: it will inform the new teachers in formation in brazil about the philosophical production, in the african continent; will move towards overcoming eurocentrism; will contribute to the enrichment of the content worked in the discipline philosophy of education; will collaborate for the implementation of laws 10.639/2003 and 11.645/2008; will enrich and deepen the debate on the brazilian identity. final considerations brazil should pay more attention to the philosophical work that, especially in the last decades, has been developed in africa. in my judgment, it is good that this happens for three main reasons: a) existence of a serious and quality work, in the field of philosophy, being elaborated in that continent; b) like us, they are seen as the periphery of the world; c) there are deep historical ties that bind us to them. as we have seen, wiredu takes the term "philosophy" in two distinct meanings: academic discipline and habit of reflection. the first is a relatively recent experience in sub-saharan africa; the second, in turn, is not something new on that continent.56 since the last decades of the twentieth century, humanity has been experiencing profound changes in social design. as in the fifth, fifteenth, and eighteenth centuries ad, we are experiencing another kind of society. put differently, we are undergoing a social restructuring. this time the process of transformation is marked, among others, by two new elements, that is, the highest level of technological development and a globalization that makes the planet a village. these changes bring before us a series of difficult challenges. i conclude these reflections by bringing to light one that, in my judgment, is central to this process. it is a question of the necessity of conducting, as humanity, this passage in such a way that we have as a result an organized society, where the humanity is given the greatest emphasis. it is worth clarifying that this does not imply taking it as master of nature, but, on the contrary, to consider it an integral and inseparable part of it and to understand it as a sine qua non condition of human existence. demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 63 to do this requires great effort and dedication from us. two things are indispensable: to be aware of this process; to resort to a type of rationality present, for example, in ubuntu that expresses itself in the "i am because we are". we should note the following: the "we" indicated here signifies not only the human collectivity (muntu) but also communicates nature (kintu). after all, we exist because we are also nature.57 end notes 1 translation: in the eighteenth century, in a historical context of colonization, the following problem appears in europe for philosophy: is there an african philosophy or not? the answer that the debate will produce reflects the world view and the understanding of man that the european colonizer has at the time. later, in the twentieth century, this problem will be raised again, thanks to the work la philosophiebantoue de l'étre of the franciscan missionary placidetempels, published in 1945. in it the belgian missionary argues that the metaphysical categories of the bantu people are reflected in their languages, that is, in linguistic categories. finally, in the last decades, the debate intensifies” vasconcelos, francisco antonio de (2015),“áfrica e filosofia”. in encontro internacional de literaturas, histórias e culturas afro-brasileiras e africanas universidade estadual do piauí, iv, teresina. anais iv encontro internacional de literaturas, histórias e culturas afro-brasileiras e africanas universidade estadual do piauí identidades e diásporas: afrodescendência, africanidade, educação e cultura indígena. teresina: nepa/uespi, 187-194. accessed september 15, 2016. http://s3.amazonaws.com/nepa2015/ckeditor_assets/attachments/56/africa_e_fil osofia.pdf. p. 1 2 ibid 3 ogbenika, gregory ebalu, democracy and development in the socio-political philosophy of kwasi wiredu. roma: pontificia universitas urbaniana, facultas philosopiae, 2008. pp. 14-15 4 ibid. p.16 5 ibid. p. 21 6 mozzato, diletta (2011),filosofia (africana) in progress: studio sukwasiwiredu. milão: mimesis. (coleção la scala e l’album, 16). pp. 32-33. 7 ogbenika, gregory ebalu, democracy and development in the socio-political philosophy of kwasi wiredu. op cit. p. 31 8 wiredu, kwasi (1980),philosophy and an african culture. cambridge: cambridge university press. p. 36 64 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 9 ogbenika, gregory ebalu, democracy and development in the socio-political philosophy of kwasi wiredu. op cit. pp. 32-33 10 ibid. 23. 11 elungu, alphonse elungu pene (2014),o despertar filosófico em áfrica. luanda: edições mulemba; mangualde, edições pedago. 12 tempels, placidefrans (1945). la philosophie bantoue. paris: présence africaine. 13has become a classic of african philosophical thought as ethno-philosophy. philosophers such as a. kagame or j. mbiti have their names linked to ethnophilosophy. it is worth mentioning that this philosophical model soon found a harsh criticism. critics of it are césaire and eboussiboulaga, for example. if african philosophy ends up being an ethnophilosophical (for study and analysis of outsiders), it would annihilate both the existence and the philosophical identity of africa.that's what they stand for. thus, according to them, the bantu philosophy would be reduced to an attempt on the part of the europeans to explain the idiosyncrasy of the africans” vasconcelos, francisco antonio de (2015),“áfrica e filosofia”. op. cit.. p. 4 14 appiah, kwame anthony (1992), in my father’s house: africa in the philosophy of culture. new york/oxford: oxford universit y press. p. 94 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 95. 17 translation: “most people agree that a sage is an exceptionally intelligent person. in addition to this wisdom, henry odera oruka suggests a second criterion on wit. a true sage, he says, should habitually use the gift of wisdom for the ethical improvement of his community. hence, he or she has to be constantly concerned about the ethical and empirical problems coming from their community, with the intention of finding interesting solutions for them. in oruka's view, the second criterion is what distinguishes a sage from a sophist.” kalumba, kibujjo m. (2004),“filosofia da sagacidade: sua metodologia, resultados, significância e futuro”,translation for didactic use ofrenato rocha lima marques.in wiredu, kwasi (ed.). a companion to african philosophy. malden, oxord, victoria: blackwell, 274-281.accessed april 6, 2017https://filosofiaafricana.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/1/13213792/kibujjo_m._kalumba__filosofia_da_sagacidade._sua_metodologia_resultados_e_ p. 1 18 presbey, g.m. (1997), “who counts as a sage?, problems in the further implementation of sage philosophy”, inquest: philosophical discussions: an international african journal of philosophy/revue africaineinternationale de philosophie, v.11, n. 1-2, 52-66. accessed may 12, 2016. http://www.questjournal.net/ 19 oruka, odera(1997), practical philosophy: in search of an ethical minimum. nairobi: east african educational publishers ltd. 20 oruka, odera (1990),sage philosophy: indigenous thinkers and modern debate on african philosophy, nairobi: african center for technological studies (acts) press; also published by leiden: e. j. brill demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 65 21 mosima.pius maija (2016), philosophic sagacity and intercultural philosophy beyond henry odera oruka. leiden: african studies centre. pp. 102-103 22 ibid. 23 36 23 ogbenika, gregory ebalu, democracy and development in the socio-political philosophy of kwasi wiredu. op cit. p. 18 24 mozzato, diletta (2011),filosofia (africana) in progress, op. cit. p. 35 25 wiredu, kwasi (1980), philosophy and an african culture. cambridge: cambridge university press. p. 36 26 hountondji, paulin (2008),“conhecimento de áfrica, conhecimento de africanos: duas perspectivas sobre os estudos africanos”, in.revista crítica de ciências sociais. ano 80, março, 149-160. 27 towa, marcien (2015). a ideia de uma filosofia negro-africana. curitiba: neab; belo horizonte: nandyala. 28 vasconcelos, francisco antonio de (2015),“áfrica e filosofia”. op. cit.. p. 5 29 mudimbe, valentin yves (2013),a invenção de áfrica: gnose, filosofia e a ordem do conhecimento. mangualde (portugal), luanda: edições pedago; edições mulemba. 30translation: valentin yves mudimbe'sainvenção da áfrica: gnose, filosofia e a ordem do conhecimento is characterized by a historicist perspective that problematizes the concepts and discourses of what we know as a mythical africa. truths conveyed by philosophers, anthropologists, religious missionaries and ideologues, as well as westernized and/or eurocentric images, inherent in the processes of transformation of the various types of knowledge, are deconstructed by mudimbeparipassu to imperial or colonial standards. for this work, it is worth mentioning the innumerable references that make up a solid documentary corpus used by the author in his research, that is, they go from roman philosophy to german romanticism. or, to question and investigate through the term gnosis, coined with the intention of erecting an archeology of the meaning(s) of african thought” weber, priscila maria (2014),“a áfrica de valentin mudimbe e o descobrimento de uma ordem do conhecimento”,anos 90: revista do programa de pós-graduação em história, v. 21, n. 40, 563-568. 31 mbiti, john. s (1990), african religions and philosophy.2. ed. london: heinemann. p. 2 32wiredu, kwasi (2010), african religions from a philosophical point of view. in taliaferro, charles; draper, paul; quinn, philip l. (eds.). a companion to philosophy of religion.second edition. malden; oxford; west sussex: blackwell, 2010, 34-43, by lana ellen t. de sousa. p.10 33 ibid. p. 2 34 ibid. p. 35. 35 ibid. p. 36 36 translation: “the entry into force of the african charter on human and peoples' rights, also known as the banjul charter, on october 21, 1986, consolidated the 66 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 third regional system of international protection of human rights. this is undoubtedly a milestone in the efforts being made, both globally and regionally, with a view to promoting and respecting human rights. nonetheless, the african system encounters historical, political, structural and legal obstacles that can jeopardize its effectiveness”andrade, josé h. fischel de (1994),“o sistema africano de proteção dos direitos humanos e dos povos”,áfrica: revista do centro de estudos africanos, 23-57. accessed november 23, 2016. http://www.revistas.usp.br/africa/article/view/96035/95278. p. 23 37 translation: “i was here during the latest outbreak of violence against these "foreigners." the current hunt for "foreigners" is the product of a complex chain of complicity. the south african government has recently taken a tough stance on immigration. new draconian measures have been passed. its effects are devastating for people already established here legally. a few weeks ago, i watched, at a "foreign" team meeting at the university of wits, horrible stories. unrecognized work permit, refused visas for family members, children in limbo in schools [...] through its new anti-immigration measures, the government is moving migrants, formerly legal, to illegal immigrants” (2015). mbembe, achille (2015),‘“afrofobia”? achille mbembe escreve sobre xenofobia na áfrica do sul”’. inpor dentro da áfrica. 19 abr. 2015. accessedseptember 3, 2016 http://www.pordentrodaafrica.com/noticias/afrofobia-achille-mbembe-escrevesobre-xenofobia-na-africa-do-sul-2 38 ogbenika, gregory ebalu, democracy and development in the socio-political philosophy of kwasi wiredu. op cit. p. 80. 39 held, david (1996),models of democracy. 2 ed. oxfor and cambridge: blackwell publishers 40 dahl, robert (1989),democracy and its critics. new haven and lodon: yale university press. 41 ibid. p. 48 42 remember that wiredu is of the ashanti people, one of the akan people. 43 ibid. p. 85. 44 wiredu, kwasi (1980), philosophy and an african culture. cambridge: cambridge university press. p. 18. 45 ogbenika, gregory ebalu, democracy and development in the socio-political philosophy of kwasi wiredu. op cit. pp. 88-89. 46 this was the first name that the portuguese "discoverers" gave to the lands that later would be called of brazil. 47 it imposes on the network of basic educationthe obligatory nature of the theme "history and culture afro-brazilian". 48 it imposes on the network of basic educationthe obligatory nature of the theme "history and culture afro-brazilian and indigenous". 49“bandos of large children; a green and incipient culture; still in the first dentition; without the bones nor the development of the great american semicivilizations”(freire, 1963: 150). demands of an afro-brazilian thought: philosophical aspects | 67 50 mbembe, achille (2001), formas africanas da escrita de si.accessed july 12, 2016. 51 translation: to avoid assimilation without verification in our thinking ... of conceptual schemas fixed in foreign philosophical traditions that have had an impact on life and african thinking" 52 translation: in our philosophical meditations, enjoy as much as possible ... of the resources of our original conceptual schemes, even in highly specialized sectors of contemporary philosophy" wiredu, kwasi (2009), la necessità di un a decolonizzazione concettualenella filosofia africana. in: rivista semestrale di filosofia, n. 6. roma: dipartimento di filosofia dell’universitàde gli studi roma ter. p. 97 53 ele aponta três canais responsáveis por essa sobreposição: a linguagem, a religião e a política. sobre a descolonização conceitual numa perspectiva de brasil, vale conferir o artigo descolonizar o saber: um tema da filosofia africana. [“he points to three channels responsible for this overlap: language, religion, and politics. regarding conceptual decolonization from a brazilianperspective, it is worth giving the paperdescolonizar o saber: um tema da filosofiaafricana” 54 vasconcelos, francisco antonio de (2016b),“descolonizar o saber: um tema da filosofia africana”, in congresso sobre gênero, educação e afrodescendência, iii, teresina. anais iii congresso sobre gênero, educação e afrodescendência: direito de ser nas relações de poder, november09-11, 2016. 55 appiah, kwame anthony (1992), in my father’s house: africa in the philosophy of culture. oxford: oxford universit y press. p. x 56 mozzato, diletta (2011),filosofia (africana) in progress: studio sukwasiwiredu. milão: mimesis. (coleção la scala e l’album, 16). p. 29 57 vasconcelos, francisco antonio de (2016a),“jürgen habermas e kwasiwiredu: reflexões sobre o consenso”, in colóquio habermas e colóquio de filosofia da informação, xii e iii, rio de janeiro. anais xii colóquio habermas e iii colóquio de filosofia da informação: conflitos contemporâneos – direitos humanos e solidariedade. rio de janeiro: salute, 342-355. accessednovember 12, 2016. introduction of late, some philosophers have come out to condemn rorty's neo-pragmatism as a distortion of the central goals of classical pragmatism, a great disservice to the contemporary pragmatic campaign. a good example of such thinkers is james kloppenberg, who in his article, pragmatism: an old name for some new ways of thinking? labels rorty's 1pragmatism as “…insufficiently pragmatic…” . for him, rorty's “liberal ironism encourages selfishness, cynicism, and resignation by undercutting efforts to confront the hard 2 facts of poverty and greed” . susan haack, who is strongly convinced that rorty misses the point of the early pragmatists, and primarily tilts the pragmatist legacy, terms rorty's pragmatism “vulgar 3 pragmatism” . basically, she is perturbed by “rorty's hopes of a post-philosophical culture in which 'we pragmatists' give up the old-fashioned idea that truth is a goal of inquiry, and remake philosophy as a genre of literature, just a kind of 4writing” . haack concludes that “playfulness has its price ... 189 rorty's neo-pragmatism: reshaping human condition with our thoughts stanley m. nkemnole literary dilettantism of rortyesque neo-pragmatism is crippled by its disastrous inability even to acknowledge the 5truths that literature can teach us” . 6 other contemporary thinkers have toed this line of thought in their attempt to disregard, and if possible totally eradicate rorty's brand of pragmatism. specifically, the work that triggered this write-up is rorty's point of departure from mainstream pragmatist approach to epistemology by 7 raymond osei and husein inusah . here, osei and inusah sort to demonstrate that “rorty's pragmatist theory is a deviation from mainstream pragmatism”, as his pragmatism 8repudiates epistemology . it is pertinent to state here that rorty's critique of epistemology is the most misinterpreted and, consequently, the most criticized part of his philosophical project. while this work is not a defense of rorty's pragmatism, we have to clarify some misinterpretations of rorty's philosophical concerns by the above thinkers. firstly, we need to state categorically that rorty's attack was on representationalist epistemologies (especially as championed by descartes and kant), not epistemology as such.in addition, rorty has done more than anyone to revivify pragmatism. in fact, his pragmatism reaffirms many of the central aims of the early forerunners of the movement. rorty's critique of representationalist epistemologies, his socialization of knowledge, and his emphasis on both fallibilism and possibility clearly keep in line with the pragmatist tradition. by bringing these pragmatist methods and concerns back into to the fold, rorty revitalized a rich philosophical tradition, thus enabling it to be put to use for inquiry into contemporary problems. more practically, rorty's philosophy has vital things to say in an epoch dominated by deconstructionists whose record appears less edifying to social structures. what makes rorty so stimulating in the present intellectual climate is his readiness to uphold an object of affirmation that functions in company with his criticism. rorty's idea of a post-philosophical culture, in which traditional intellectual constraints will give way to lively ironism and a more egalitarian society, is a source of hope in times when all the effects of global 190 capitalism are being established, terror is the new warfare, and fewer and fewer intellectual discourses seek to address concrete social realities. it is in this historically-specific concern for the problems of men that rorty best shows his pragmatist credentials. pluralism is a central feature in the history of pragmatism that allows rorty's position to be validated as sufficiently pragmatist. for peirce, a community of diverse minds was the only real means to refine knowledge and reach a final opinion. james held pluralism to be a critical philosophical and moral concept. in a pluralistic universe, james claims that there exists no final word, no one true perspective. he notes that “the pluralistic view ... is willing to believe that there may ultimately never be an all-form at all, that the substance of reality may never get totally collected, that some of it may remain outside of the largest combination of it ever 9 made” . in this acquiescence to the pluralistic universe, james sustains that mankind can leave its mark through dynamic, active creation. for dewey, pluralism encourages diversity in perspectives, which serves to multiply the capacities of human knowledge and discovery. in reconstruction in philosophy, dewey contends that “every combination of human forces that adds its own contribution of value to life 10has for that reason its own unique and ultimate worth” . indeed, rorty's emphasis on conversation is tacitly pluralist. for rorty, knowledge is contingent upon admittance to a particular language-game, which depends on a confluence of social and historical factors that define the sort of conversation taking place. thus, knowledge is not singular, but plural, depending on place and time. a consistent emphasis among the early pragmatists, then, was on the value of several perspectives in the testing of ideas and the formation of knowledge. it is in this vein that rorty's voice cannot be dismissed as distinct from the pragmatist tradition. this write-up, while not taking up the task of defending rorty's pragmatism, strives to show that rorty's neopragmatism supports the thesis that our thought (philosophy) can bear a hand in reshaping human condition. 191 rorty's neo-pragmatism pragmatism, as a philosophical ideology, stirs a multiplicity of meanings. to the common person, it suggests a sense of the american character, as americans are historically known for pragmatic choices that effect practical consequences. pragmatism can also suggest many things: a methodological approach for solving problems in the sciences and humanities; a term used by intellectual historians to describe a particular idea at a particular moment in american history; and so on. the multitude of meanings prescribed to the term is indicative of the difficulty of tying down pragmatism. as a philosophical field of inquiry, pragmatism is concerned with the practical significances of knowledge. william james reasons that “the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world11formula or that world-formula be the true one” . james gives voice to an important reoccurring feature of pragmatism: a passion for results, consequences, practicality, and value of knowledge and the means used to derive such knowledge. common among the early pragmatists is the preeminence conferred upon experience. although peirce, james, and dewey all hold divergent views of experience, the epistemological work of experience is the unifying thread that binds them together. on the surface, the emphasis on experience would appear to place pragmatism within the larger tradition that began with locke and berkeley. the critical difference between those usually identified as the british empiricists and the pragmatists is found in the rapport that exists between knowledge and experience. for locke, the epistemological role of experience is to provide the medium for coming to know ideas. that is, ideas are derived from experience. for the pragmatists, experience is transformed into an epistemological mechanism for evaluating ideas as they are encountered in reality. hence, pragmatists are concerned mainly with the consequences of experience and how experience can be used to test a store of 12ideas . with the publication of philosophy and the mirror of 192 nature, rorty “set down the path of pragmatism, one that he has been following for the past twenty years through a body of writing unmatched in recent american intellectual history in 13 terms of its mass, critical accessibility, and provocation” . charles taylor observes that “what is exciting and controversial about rorty's narrative is the sense of a radical new departure. what is radical is the promise that we can free ourselves of a whole host of questions which have been 14central to philosophy hitherto” . taylor enunciates the principal objective of rorty's argument: philosophy is constrained by the questions it thinks it has to ask. for rorty, the metanarrative of philosophical discourses, inherited from plato and the tradition he helped create, has become outmoded. rorty's intention “is to undermine the reader's confidence in 'the mind' as something about which one should have a 'philosophical' view, in 'knowledge' as something about which there ought to be a 'theory' and which has 'foundations', and in 'philosophy' as it has been conceived 15since kant” . from this, we can trace two main paths of rorty's philosophical outline in philosophy and the mirror of nature. first, traditional problems of epistemology (especially, the issue of foundations of truth) and metaphysics (especially, the mind-body problem) must be rejected because they are issues no longer valuable to study. additionally, the traditional philosophical categories of metaphysics, ethics, and particularly epistemology, reflect the entrenchment of the traditional metanarrative, and should be jettisoned as well. rorty believes that philosophy should move away from self-identification with truth-seeking and the finding of absolutes. on his evaluation, philosophers must develop mindfulness of the socio-historical context in which they are theorizing, while at the same time identifying the historicity of philosophical theories which are thought of as existing outside of time and place. it becomes apparent, then, why rorty chose wittgenstein, heidegger, and dewey as the 16“three most important philosophers of our century” : each of the three became profoundly dedicated to historicist and anti foundationalist positions in their careers, which, for rorty, “represented a paradigm shift from the cartesian-kantian 193 17era” . rorty's distaste of traditional philosophical categories reached its zenith in his critique of mainstream epistemology. in the structure of scientific revolutions, kuhn reasoned that scientific discourses function in two different ways: normally 18and abnormally . the former searches for answers to questions in an environment where an accepted paradigm is present and agreed upon. that is, an agreed upon foundation is present against which suppositions are tested, verified, or refuted. the latter is revolutionary, ushering in a new paradigm with an associated sphere of new questions and problems. for rorty, kuhn's distinction between normal and abnormal scientific discourses translates into the philosophical distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics. rorty contends that, similar to normal scientific discourses' notions of consensus, epistemology functions under a paradigm of “commensurability”. in his words, “epistemology proceeds on the assumption that all contributions to a given discourse are commensurable...by 'commensurable' i mean able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where 19statements seem to conflict” . for rorty, epistemology presumes the existence of a foundation that grounds the criterion of commensuration for a variety of discourses. for an epistemologist, this foundation is truth. for rorty, hermeneutics is much more fugitive in its treatment of knowledge. it is “an expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled-that our culture should become one in which the 20 demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt” . he maintains that hermeneutics embodies a similar function as kuhn's abnormal scientific discourse does. he notes: normal discourse is that which is conducted within an agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as answering a question...abnormal discourse is what happens when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions 21or sets them aside . by its very nature, hermeneutics functions without a clear vision of rules that guide enquiry. it has no standard to test its 194 objects of inquiry against. it views philosophy and epistemology as less a unified formal discourse, or a group of discourses, than an ongoing conversation. rorty observes that “hermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is 22never lost so long as the conversation lasts” . hermeneutics, then, is indirectly historicist , pluralist ic, and antifoundationalist. it is not reduced to a notion that philosophy and epistemology are wedded in a project aimed at showing how the mind mirrors nature. therefore, it makes no references to representation or correspondence that epistemology carries with it. rorty concludes that “if we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature, we will not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of 23all possible forms of social practices” . the emphasis on conversation allows rorty to move beyond the essentialism and foundationalism of traditional epistemological methods, while demonstrating the historical contingency of language and the discourses one chooses to express their knowledge and beliefs. this leads rorty to a position of epistemological behaviorism. rorty describes epistemological behaviorism as “explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the 24former” . this proposition is radical because it contests the t r a d i t i o n a l k a n t i a n i d e a o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l representationalism that is the foundation of analytic philosophy. rorty employs sellars's critique of the “myth of the given”, and quine's appraisal of the necessary-contingent distinction to demonstrate the social nature of knowledge and belief. in sellars and quine, rorty spots a “commitment to the thesis that justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of conversation, of 25social practice” . the emphasis on justification in social practice provides rorty with a more holistic view of knowledge, and, hence, allows him to abandon any criterion of accuracy linked with epistemological representationalism. 195 he reasons that “if assertions are justified by society rather than by the characterization of the inner representation they express, then there is no point in attempting to isolate 26 privileged representations” . consequently, the only criterion of knowledge for rorty's epistemological behaviorism is access to the rules of the language-game. if we see knowledge as justified in a social conversation, then “it will not occur to us to invoke either of the traditional kantian 27distinctions” . thus, without the appeal to representationalist epistemological techniques, rorty concludes that the “notion 28of the mind as mirror of nature can be discarded” . with the mind as mirror of nature metaphor discarded, rorty maintains that philosophy should move towards purposes of edification. using gadamer's notion of “redescription”, rorty describes edification as “finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking”, to “reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar 29 terms of our new inventions” . for rorty, by its very nature, edification is revolutionary: in kuhn's terms, it is expressed in an abnormal discourse, for it is “the power of strangeness” that facilitates the shedding of “our old selves...to aid us in 30becoming new beings” . in order to fashion new words and expressions to redescribe ourselves, the discourse to articulate such a vocabulary would, essentially, need to be of a different and new brand than that of the normal discourse. the new expressions in which to redescribe the familiar are nonconformists and subversive, thus, the language used to describe the new and novel cannot be that which reflects the conformity of normal discourse. therefore, for rorty, there is need for openness to new ways of thinking and speaking to overcome the traditions of philosophy that are no longer 31expedient . if edification demands an abnormal, revolutionary discourse to redescribe our familiar mode of being, then rorty believes a certain approach is required on the part of the philosopher. for him, the edifying “peripheral, pragmatic philosophers are skeptical primarily about systematic philosophy, about the whole project of universal commensuration...they make fun of the classic picture of man, the picture which contains systematic philosophy, the search 196 32for universal commensuration in a final vocabulary” . in challenging systematic philosophy, “great edifying philosophers {like wittgenstein, heidegger, and dewey}destroy for the sake of their own generation ... to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause--wonder that there is something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation of 33what was already there” . without the mind as mirror of nature, rorty sees the hope of plurality and new ways of describing ourselves that move beyond the normal discourse provided by the traditional western conception of philosophy and epistemology. rorty not only provides a hopeful vision of postepistemology philosophy, he also held that philosophical theories and methodologies encompass a sociological dimension that is inherent in philosophical doctrines. the notion, then, of there being philosophical theories that exist in a vacuum apart from a socio-historical context is untenable for rorty. rather, philosophy embodies the needs and concerns of people in a definite context at a certain historical moment. for rorty, the story of philosophy is not one of the perennial investigations of foundational problems; rather, philosophy is a story of intellectual answers to human needs and longings throughout history. contemporary meta-philosophical arguments essentially, one could say that what motivated rorty's philosophical project is a quest for significance of philosophy in a pluralistic society. for rorty, the realization that there a call at the door of philosophy to lend a hand in social project is continuously being distorted by philosophy's image as a classroom activity. such an image, in rorty's judgment, seems to be reducing the role of philosophers to that of a historical interest or lone rangers closed in their own heaven. as such, philosophy should bear a hand in shaping our present conditions. rorty contends that the unrelenting fidelity to the cartesian/kantian epistemological foundation has stiffened the move for an alternative culture vision that is appropriately pragmatic. he asserts that descartes and kant created a rationalistic world of meaning that was far detached 197 from a practical appeal in daily living. hence, there is need for deconstruction and circumvention to usher in a state of affairs in which the intellectual achievements of the contemporary man will bear hand in shaping socio-cultural realities of the epoch. thus it is a quest for a post-philosophical culture, a reshaping of our tradition with our thoughts. rorty sustains that philosophers do not seem to agree as to whether philosophy is to be regarded as a science, metaphor or politics. three answers offered are rooted in the scientific, poetic and political traditions. each answer, according to rorty, has been presented as the aim of philosophy in western philosophical tradition. according to rorty, the scientific answer is typical of edmund husserl and his positivist counterparts that model philosophy on science. their reflection seems to be remote from politics and art. while heidegger favors the poetic answer. pragmatists see in science and philosophy a tool for 34social progress ; hence political. and each group is suspicious of the other. evidently, science is constantly growing and continually improving human condition. the problem, rorty specifies, is not science itself but those who are using science to dictate the pace and values of the culture. this understanding opens our horizon to a whole new frame of mind. the past inaction of the philosophical tradition should no longer be stomached; the sense for urgency in searching for a new vision is expressed in the fact that we are approaching a time “we shall no longer turn to the philosophers for rescue as our ancestors turned to the priests. we shall turn instead to the poets and the engineers, the people who produce startling new projects for 35 achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number” . this, certainly, will puncture philosophy's insolent image as the foundation of culture. the expanding culture of poets, novelists, and politicians, interrogates the self-image of the philosopher as an intellectual supervisor. people are now in search of the opinion of poets and politicians rather than those of philosophers. in the face of this, philosophy senses itself as more outdated and less to do with the rest of the culture. thus, the big showdown to philosophers in their claim to ground, 198 criticize, and dictate for the rest of culture: they feel irrelevant because philosophy as a whole has been deflected by those that actually strive to improve human condition. nonetheless, there were some redeeming philosophical voices. according to rorty, wittgenstein tried to form a new theory of representation which would have nothing to with materialism; heidegger fashioned a new set of philosophical categories which would have nothing to do with science, epistemology, or the cartesian search for certainty; and dewey saw the illusoriness of epistemological problems, and truth as purported correspondence, and knowledge as accuracy of representations; he then tried to fashion a naturalized version of hegel's vision of history, by taking the 36line of a social crusader . instead of arguing against the kantian doctrines, rorty notes, these redeeming philosophical voices set them aside in order “to assert for the possibility of a post-kantian culture, one in which there is no all-encompassing discipline which legitimizes or grounds the 37 others…” . they announced new maps of terrain, thus, paving the way for new shapes in the culture. departure for a post philosophical culture rorty expresses the belief that the realization of a postphilosophical culture is imperative, because once we stop venerating idols like marxism, rationality, platonism, aristotelianism, cartesianism, etc., then we will be able to focus more fully on each other and attain a deepened sense of human solidarity. as a pragmatist culture, it will be a place for co-operation among all kinds of intellectuals. for rorty, this would be a culture in which neither the priests nor the physicists nor the poets nor the party were thought of as more 'rational' or more 'scientific', or 'deeper' than one another. no portion of culture will be singled out as exemplifying (or signaling or failing to exemplify) the condition on which the rest 38aspired . people will become champions, not because they have occult or clandestine knowledge of things, but because they have become extraordinary in being good to human beings. in other words, people will show themselves champions by being competent in their service to the human community. in 199 this culture in question, there will be a broader logical space in conveying communal opinions and hopes. in it, we seek for new enterprises that will help us transcend our acculturation. against this background, rorty trusts that “our best chance for transcending our acculturation is to be brought up in a culture that prides itself on not being monolithic on its tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its willingness to 39listen to neighbouring cultures” . rorty believes that the hermeneutics of postphilosophical culture is to listen and partake in conversation without preconception of a predetermined foundation. the hope of agreement is never lost as long as the conversation lasts. he writes: the notion of culture as a conversation rather than as a structure erected upon foundations fits well with this hermeneutical notion of knowledge, since getting into a conversation with strangers is like acquiring a new virtue or skill by imitating models. is a matter of (phronesis) rather than 40 (episteme) . as conversation is an important useful tool in the social project, the post-philosophical culture should not lose sight of that sense of community, which only impassioned 41conversation makes possible . in this new culture, philosophers will become players rather than onlookers. their thoughts will be verified by their practical and adaptive relevance to the subject within the community. the philosopher, here, risks the danger of being outdated if he does not comprehend that philosophy is an instrument for social reform. the credibility of rorty's project rorty persuasively opens our vistas to a passionate concern for philosophy's segregation from common human concerns. there is no doubt that rorty searches for a condition for living in solidarity in a pluralistic society. rorty's attack on any individual or groups who tries to dictate, under the pretense of philosophy or privileged knowledge, is illuminating. hence, any person or group of individuals that postulates a predetermined ground blocks conversation with others, thereby causing harm to the community. 200 accordingly, it is appropriate to reason that a philosopher should not detach and insulate himself from the joys and fears of his community. and if he cannot, in any way, contribute to the social project, one can rightly ask of what use is his philosophical knowledge or initiative. and if a philosopher is closed up in his own discipline and see no need for solidarity and partnership with others in the literary field, but takes the sole position of a judge of all, it will at once be an arrogance to claim to possess already all that can be known. such a pretense and arrogance will obstruct intellectual development and solidarity in the community. charles guignon and david hiley are right to hold that what motivated rorty's post-philosophical quest is a concern expressed near the end of philosophy and the mirror of nature that “traditional philosophy's search for final solutions to questions about truth, rationality and knowledge could lead to 'freezing over of culture' and 'the dehumanization of human beings' seems to reflect the moral 42concerns that drive the argumentation of the whole book” . conclusion as philosophical theories increase, philosophical propositions become gradually detached from practical and social problems that first attracted its practitioners, and progressively irrelevant to the rest of culture. rorty advocates for a therapeutic conception of philosophy, where there is no separation of knowledge and action. this brings up an important aspect of rorty's philosophy that illustrates his pragmatist commitments: meliorism. it is in his meliorism that one finds a profound concern for social hope that is absent of cartesian and kantian literature. improvement of human condition is, thus, at the heart of rorty's neo-pragmatism and is realized in the abilities of human effort to create better future realities. this is a call that philosophy should not shy away from if it is to remain relevant in this contemporary epoch. endnotes 1. james t. kloppenberg, “pragmatism: an old name for some new ways of thinking?”, the journal of american history, vol. 83, no. 1., 201 1996, p. 125 2. ibid. 3. susan haack, manifesto of a passionate moderate: unfashionable essays, chicago: university of chicago press, 1998, p. 2. 4. ibid. 5. ibid. 6. t. m. alexander, (1980) “richard rorty and dewey's metaphysics of experience”, southwest philosophical studies, vol. 5, 1980; j. campbell, “rorty's use of dewey”, the southern journal of philosophy, vol. 22, 1994; r. shusterman, “dewey on experience: foundation or reconstruction?”, in casey haskins and david seiple (eds.) dewey reconfigured: essays on deweyan pragmatism, albany, new york: suny, 1999; b. allen, “what is epistemology?”, in robert b. brandom (ed.) rorty and his critics, malden, ma: blackwell, 2000; j. mcdowell, “toward rehabilitating objectivity”, in robert b. brandom (ed.) rorty and his critics, malden, ma: blackwell, 2000. 7. raymond n. osei and huseininusah, “rorty's point of departure from mainstream pragmatist approach to epistemology”, the nigerian journal of philosophy, vol. 2, 2011. 8. ibid, p. 86 9. william james, “what pragmatism means”, in john i. mcdermott (ed.) the writings of william james, chicago: the university of chicago press, 1977, p. 20. 10. john dewey,reconstruction in philosophy, new york: henry holt and company, 1920, p. 204. 11. william james, “what pragmatism means”, p. 379. 12. h. s. thayer,meaning and action: a critical history of pragmatism, new york: the bobbsmerrill company, 1968. 13. j. pettegrew,a pragmatist's progress?: richard rorty and american intellectual history, lanham, md: rowman and littlefield, 2000, p. 9. 14. charles taylor,“rorty in the epistemological tradition”, in alan r. malachowski (ed.) reading rorty: critical responses to philosophy and the mirror of nature (and beyond), cambridge, ma: blackwell, 1990, p. 258. 15. richard rorty,philosophy and the mirror of nature, princeton, new jersey: princeton university press, 1979, p. 7. 16. ibid, p. 5. 17. neil gross,richard rorty: the making of an american philosopher, chicago: university of chicago press, 2008, p. 205. 18. 19. richard rorty,philosophy and the mirror of nature, p. 316. 20. ibid., p. 315. 21. ibid., p. 320. 22. ibid., p. 318. 23. ibid., p. 171. 24. ibid., p. 174. 25. ibid., p. 170. 26. ibid., p. 174. 27. ibid. 202 28. ibid., p. 170. 29. ibid., p. 360. 30. ibid. 31. ibid., p. 364. 32. ibid., p. 368. 33. ibid., pp. 369 370. 34. richard rorty,essays on heidegger and others: philosophical papers, vol. 2, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991, p. 19. 35. ibid., p. 26. 36. richard rorty, philosophy and the mirror of nature, p. 5. 37. ibid., p. 6. 38. richard rorty,the consequences of pragmatism: essays 1972-1980, minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota press, 1982, p.xl. 39. richard rorty,objectivity, relativism and truth: philosophical papers, vol. 2, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1991, p. 14. 40. richard rorty,philosophy and the mirror of nature, p. 319. 41. richard rorty, “the historiography of philosophy: four genres”, in richard rorty et al. (eds.) philosophy in history, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1984, p. 74. 42. c. b. guignon and d. r. hiley, “biting the bullet: rorty on private and public morality”, in alan r. malachowski (ed.) reading rorty: critical responses to philosophy and the mirror of nature (and beyond), cambridge: cambridge university press, 1990, p. 339. 203 1 1 let the real feyerabend please stand: interrogating the ontological basis for a postmodernist epistemology of the human person prof. isaac e. ukpokolo department of philosophy, faculty of arts, university of ibadan. ie.ukpokolo@ui.edu.ng introduction i consider it necessary to begin this interrogation of the ontological basis for a post-modernist epistemology of a human person with the assumption that there is a necessary relationship between metaphysics and epistemology. it is difficult to think of an epistemological stance without a corresponding metaphysics. by extension, it would be difficult to think of an epistemology of the human person without a given ontological stance. ontology is the science of ‘being’ in general, covering such issues as the nature of existence and categorial structure of reality. as a term, ‘ontology’ has some additional special uses in philosophy. it is used to refer to the set of things whose existence is acknowledged by a particular theory or system of thought: it is in this sense that one speaks of ‘the ontology of a theory’.1 to this extent, the post-modernist epistemology of the human person must rests on a given ontological scheme, and interrogating this ontological scheme is the point of focus for this essay. the work, therefore, considers the metaphysical ground or justification of a post-modernist theory of cognition concerning the human person. in other words, the work raises the question, how does the postmodern condition influence our cognitive process concerning the nature of the human person? 2 formation of the human person in the 21st century the received view of rationality since the 17th century, rationality has been understood through a matrix of relations between ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, ‘certainty’ and ‘reality’. this has been identified with a certain unique framework of principles and methods with reference to which we are to secure truth and objective knowledge; an impartial stand point for meaningful discussion, appraisal, comparison, and judgment. the task of identifying and characterizing this framework is one of the starting point of human inquiry in general and philosophy in particular. the cartesian epistemological program initiated in the 17th century, presents one of the attempts at developing a system of principles and methods for conducting human inquiry. inspired by the desire for reliable knowledge, descartes constructed a system which he bequeathed to modern thought of which he is often described as the father.2 this system had the background assumption that, the order of nature is fixed and stable, and that the human mind acquired mastery of it by operating in accordance with principles of understanding that are equally fixed and universal.3 to most seventeenth century thinkers, this assumption was beyond question. it did not only influence the understanding of rationality at the time, it also determined the type of epistemological question that could be raised.4 in addition to this assumption, there is a certain disposition of the mind – a certain anxiety5 expressed in the belief that in our understanding of reality and our interaction with it, only two options are open to us: either we are equipped with some permanent, historical framework to which we can ultimately appeal or we are ineluctably led to relativism, historicism, scepticism, and irrationalism. and so, we are always faced with a choice between a certain binding set of ideals and epistemological chaos.6 it was generally believed that to resolve this anxiety, we require a fixed framework of universal and foundational principles. descartes saw this and embarked on a search for what he called an “archimedean point” in his meditations.7 beginning with the first meditation, he says, it is now some years since i detected how many were the false beliefs that i had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and doubtful was everything i had constructed on this basis: and … i was convinced that i must once, for all, seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which i had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, if i want to establish any firm and permanent structure…8 the need for this project of establishing a securely grounded thought system is compared to the vision archimedes. thus, in the second meditation descartes writes: commissioned papers 3 archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, demanded that one point be fixed and immovable. in the same way, i shall have the right to conceive high hopes if i am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and immutable.9 in descartes’s view, the principles that guide our understanding of the world consists in the correspondence between “ideas” which the human mind found “distinct” and “clear” (such as the basic concepts of euclid’s geometry) and aspects of the world. it is in this correspondence that we establish the foundations of knowledge as well as the standard of rationality. thus, at the very base of knowledge is, according to descartes, the neutral activity of reason.10 an adequate analysis of the received view of rationality must consider the contribution of descartes and bacon to the development of ideas. in the 17th century, aristotle’s science faced challenges in the light of new discoveries in physics, astronomy and anatomy. francis bacon is often taken to be the spokesman to the new spirit and new method of science. his idea about scientific method subsequently became known as beaconian induction, and is expressed in his novum organum.11 in a general sense, bacon’s contribution to modern thought can be discussed at two related levels. the first level concerns the classification of knowledge. this is laid out in book 1 of the novum organum. in it, he made what was probably the first systematic attempt to express a psychological motives and human interests that often lie behind various forms of philosophical outlooks. he discussed what he called “idols of the mind” which had up to his own time persistently stood in the way of objective knowledge, dominated and distorted men’s mind and delayed the acquisition of true knowledge. the “idols of the tribe”, for instance, are tendencies to see things in relation to one’s own self, rather than as they are in themselves. in bacons view, man is not the measure of all things and we unthinkingly tend to impose order on phenomena which is not there. if we would command nature, he says, we must first learn to obey her. there are “idols of the cave”, which are the predispositions of character and learning with which different individuals approach facts, rather than seeing them as there really are. the “idols of the market place” arise through the use of language, when we read back into nature, conceptions that have arisen through our using words, which actually stand for nothing. bacon also identifies “idols of the theatre” which are due to the influence of philosophical system of our mind. in his view, we should not be misled by aristotle’s talk of experimentation and observation. someone in the grip of a philosophical system, he says, including aristotle himself had come to his conclusion before he did his experiment. the second level has to do with a new method of investigation, set forth in the most empiricist form. this consists in 4 formation of the human person in the 21st century making experiments and drawing general conclusions from them. these conclusions are then tested in further experiments.12 bacon’s position is primarily an attack against what he called the sterility of pure deductive logic, which is never really able to increase knowledge. he insisted that the traditional syllogism was not a means of discovery, but only an aid for exhibiting the deductive consequences of what is already known. he also attacked the older induction by simple enumeration which applies only when the class of “all” things referred to is finite and accessible, as in the statement: “the founding members of the royal society are all males and over the age of thirty years”.13 bacon’s new method of induction was believed to go beyond this aristotelian method because it is able to produce generalisations about “all” things, not simple about some property of members of a finite enumeration. however, bacon was not unaware of the fact that we cannot prove the truth of an induction in a general sense. the idea of “all”, he says, must always include the thought that there may be found an exception to the inductive generalisation, as this is always based on a finite number of instances. in this way, bacon proposed that a single negative experience was all we needed to falsify an induction. thus, although it was g.h. von wright and karl r. popper that expounded much later the principle that the laws of nature and theories are not verifiable, but only falsifiable, the credit of initial recognition of this principle should go to francis bacon.14 science, he thought, would develop by compiling vast tables of actual data accumulated with the help of experiment and observation. of course, he believed that the mere accumulation of facts would not necessarily yield knowledge. there must be, he argues, a selection whose establishment is also quite problematic.15 nevertheless, many scientists are known to have expressed, in varying degree, their adherence to baconnian philosophy. for instance, isaac newton in his principia (1682), explored and extended the inductive method from qualities of bodies on which experiments can actually be performed to “qualities of all bodies universally” (rule 3, bk. 3). in his words, the sum total facts, which are not only given in sense experience but also the experimental philosophical propositions gathered from phenomena by induction, should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exception.16 bacon’s writings inspired the concern by british philosophers for the analysis of the nature of inductive reasoning, a concern which culminated in j.s. mill’s system of logic (1843). importantly, while bacon’s classification of knowledge stands widely adopted, his commissioned papers 5 understanding of scientific methods presents an adequate framework. this is because he failed to appreciate the sense in which mathematics was already the language of science. he also underestimated the use of scientist need to make of imaginative hypotheses.17 on this, he was criticized memorably by immanuel kant in his critique of pure reason (b.xii. 4). yet, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the austrian philosopher and physicist, ernst mach (1838-1926) adopted bacon’s epistemology in his the science of mechanics (1893) and the analysis of sensation (1914). in his view, science is no more than a conceptual reflection upon facts whose elements are contents of consciousness, and are given to us in sensation. this means that scientific statements or theoretical terms must be reducible to statements about sensations.18 this is contained in his famous “doctrine of elements”. science as the paradigm of rationality from the foregoing, we are presented with the idea of rationality as a privileged framework of principles and methods to which we can ultimately appeal in our understanding of reality. it was noted that the attempt to codify these principles and methods found its significant expression first in the programmes based on the (new inductive) method of inquiry advocated by francis bacon in combination with the analytic method of deductive reasoning emphasized by rene descartes.19 the concern of these men was mainly to establish a “theory of knowledge”, to discover a unique set of terms into which discourses may be reduced, or some privileged vocabulary by means of which discourses may be rendered commensurable. the programmes of inquiry initiated in the modern period were essentially attempts to establish our discourses on a secure foundation; that is, to justify our beliefs and actions, goals and policies with reference to a certain universal “tribunal of judgment”.20 the validity of this foundationalist task of epistemology was reiterated during the first half of the twentieth century in the works of philosophers in the analytic tradition who sought to ground human knowledge in, or reduce all discourses to, a certain system of formal language.21 rooted in the works of gottlob frege, the analytic tradition influenced the works of bertrand russell, alfred north whitehead, ludwig wittgenstein, rudolf carnap, moritz schlick and several others whose ultimate concern was how to make philosophy rigorous and scientific.22 they initiated a new tendency in philosophy, re-orienting epistemology towards an ideal system of propositions and methods; a complex of principles and rules. it is with reference to such a system that theories are to be constructed and corroborated.23 the general aim of the new tendency was to sustain an adequate analysis of the character of 6 formation of the human person in the 21st century scientific investigations.24 and so, epistemology as a “transcendental” inquiry into the meaning and conditions of knowledge was gradually replaced by a methodology pursued with an understanding of science as the source of genuine knowledge and paradigm of rationality.25 the first significant representation of science as the paradigm of rationality and model of genuine knowledge, came with the positivist orientation. positivism, along with phenomenalism, pragmatism, operationalism, and empirico-criticism, belong to the empiricist tendency. for the positivist, an inquiry into the conditions of knowledge can be meaningfully pursued only as a methodological inquiry into the principles and methods for the construction and corroboration of scientific theories. thus, at the heart of the positivist philosophy of science is the belief in the exclusive validity of science. in his contribution, karl popper argued that the problem of this age, which is the possibility and method of achieving progress in human knowledge, can be resolved only in the appreciating of the growth of scientific knowledge. in this regard, it is in following the principles and procedures of scientific inquiry that we are likely to arrive at a system that accurately depicts the world.26 thus, researchers in various fields of inquiry, ranging from history to psychology and sociology, which have, with much vigour, engaged in the quest for laws and theories, usually felt apologetic whenever their discipline fell short of the ideas derived from physical science. in the field of education, curriculum theorists have often considered science to be one of the basics, and since the time of herbert spencer it has been regarded as an indispensable component of liberal education.27 the overwhelming popularity of this image of science arises, at least in part, from the great successes of recent science, particularly, physics.28 in explaining this success, scientists argue that science has evolved some procedures of inquiry, and that the observed developments in science have been determined by acting on the basis of the outcome of the application of these procedures. these procedures constitute the scientific method, a privileged method in the hands of the scientific community, which disinterestedly and detachedly employs it to reach the scientific goals.29 the post-modernist world view30 in recent times, particularly since the second half of the twentiethcentury, the intellectual world has witnessed the emergence of a certain shift in attitude towards reality (metaphysics or ontology), rationality and truth; a rejection of what could be referred to as the ‘received view’, and accompanied by a neo-protagorean relativism. the idea of the ‘received view’ of rationality is here identified with the idea of a universal, commissioned papers 7 foundational, permanent framework of thought and discourse developed in the 17th century. the programs of discourse that represents this shift include those developed by thomas kuhn, peter winch, donald davidson, paul k. feyerabend and a host of others. in his program, paul feyerabend proposed a pluralist conception of rationality, in particular, and worldview in general and meant to present this to stand in place of the enlightenment program characteristic of the modern period. for him, the modernist project has been shown to be sterile.31 the present study identifies the positivist worldview that constitutes the climax of modernism as well as the pluralist orientations of the post-modern which ushered in a rather reckless relativism. the study then goes further to establish a rejection of both positivist and post-positivist projects for reasons to be stated, and presents an alternative epistemology of the human person founded on a given ontology, while employing the methodology of education and a given scepticism to enhance a robust representation of the human person. feyerabend’s ‘post’ in the post-modern in his representation, paul k. feyerabend sees the commitment to just one theoretical framework or cognitive scheme as ‘monomania’. the clearest form of this criticism today is best identified with paul feyerabend’s postmodern orientation. a number of assumptions underscore his position. one such assumption is that, the theories, facts, and procedures that constitute the scientific knowledge of a particular time result from specific historical developments, and any such information cannot be about history-independent facts and laws – a rejection of the idea that tradition-independent points of view can overrule traditions. there are different points of view, ways of thinking and knowing. in the same vain, scientific theories branch out in different directions, use different and sometimes incommensurable concepts, and evaluate events in diverse ways. what counts as evidence or as an important or sound science or scientific procedure depends on time, profession and the research group. nature can be and is indeed approached in many ways, and for every statement, theory or point of view believed to be true with good reasons, there exists conflicting arguments. human experience, is not restricted to merely intellectual matters, but includes concrete human feelings, faiths and empathy, and involves more than just one single medium of discussion. and so, paul k. feyerabend is opposed to a certain program or tendency which, for want of a better name, is referred to as “methodism”, the idea of a method that contains fixed and binding principles for conducting the 8 formation of the human person in the 21st century business of science, politics or ethics. for feyerabend, science is not the paradigm of rationality. it is just a belief like any other. from the point of view of ethics, he privileges ethics without ontology. furthermore, he proposes a movement from “boundaries without values to values without boundaries”.32 the core of feyerabends moral philosophy is what he expressed in killing time, concerning the nature of moral character. for him, “a moral character cannot be created by arguments, education, or an act of will. it cannot be created by any kind of planned action, whether scientific, political, moral or religious”.33 here, feyerabend indicates what should not be associated with moral character or where it does not derive from. morality is not a product of education or any rational intentional, planned action. he compares moral character with what he calls “true love, which he says is a gift, not an achievement”. for him, the source or basis of morality or moral character is accidental, such as parental affection and friendship. these, he says, constitute the condition for some kind of stability or balance between what he refers to as “self-confidence” and “a concern for others”.34 according to him, it is possible for us to create these conditions: conditions that are meant to ensure the needed balance as we are never able to create the balance itself. it is only when the balance is enhanced, that the idea of guilt, responsibility, and obligation make real sense. but without the balance between self-confidence and concern for others, these ideas become not just empty words but obstacles.35 the idea of self-confidence of course, connotes a reliance on ones abilities – abilities to engage one’s experience, one’s environment and one’s reality. the product of employing this ability is to enhance the individual’s wellbeing. the need for the project of modernity, of establishing a securely grounded thought system is compared to the vision of archimedes. thus, in the meditation ii, descartes writes; archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of it place, demanded that one point be fixed and immovable. in the same way i should have the right to conceive high hopes if i am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain and immutable.36 this immutable foundation – ontological reference is rejected by the post-modernist position of paul k. feyerabend and replaces it with heterogeneity, chaos and pluralism. post-modern ontology at this point, it is pertinent to ask the question, is there any theory of ontology proposed by postmodern philosophy? in response to this question, it is to be borne in mind that paul k. feyerabend, presenting a prototype of the post-modern worldview, rejects any attempt to propose one singular general ground totalizing framework that could be a commissioned papers 9 reference point, and that could be a foundation for any inquiry. this is with regards to, not only a universal theory of truth, a fixed model of knowledge, a standard reference to method, but, indeed a foundation. and so, it presents a no-foundation epistemology as well as proposing an ontology that is not characterized by relativism, but a pluralism. what this means is that reality could be created, truth is formulated, knowledge is fabricated such that ontology which is the study of being, could only be said to be presented and created or formulated as need be. reading feyerabend therefore, one is tempted to raise the question, is it not the case that in proposing a no-universal foundational fixed theory of reality, by itself, proposes a universal theory? to this extent, the post-modernist proposal that there is no fixed theory of knowledge, truth and reality is itself a theory of truth, of knowledge and of reality – a philosophical dead end. perhaps, an alternative reading of the post-modernist theory of the human person would reject any fixed set of principles, axioms and assumptions, claiming that the character of the human person is hydraheaded and its features are not just pluralistic, but actually indeterminate. we are not to reduce the human person to any fixed model, be it scientific, legal, ethical, or social. rather, it would be a combination of all these and more. the human person would then be seen as a mystery that can be comprehended only inadequately by anyone even the self. thesis and concluding remarks identifying, with bernard lonergan this paper posit that the essence of the human person has to do with the fact that humanity is to be recognized in four characteristics. these characteristics belong to the human nature representing a fundamental orientation in the human person. these are (i) search for truth (ii) search for the good (iii) search for the absolute/infinite and, (iv) search for love. the human person in relating with these realities that is, truth, good, absolute and love employs the capacity of the senses, of understanding and of judging. the actions of these variables and their relationship with the human person are so complex that they can only be understood imperfectly. the human person, therefore, is driven to the actualization of truth, the good and love. these efforts remain always in the state of progress towards actualization. to this extent, the human person remains an ongoing project. 10 formation of the human person in the 21st century endnotes 1 ted honderich, the oxford companion to philosophy, 2nd ed. (oxford: oxford up, 2005), 671. 2 r. p. peerrenboom, “reason, rationales, and relativism: what’s at stake in the conversation over scientific rationality?,” philosophy today, vol. 34, no.14. (1990), 4. 3 toulmin, human understanding, 45. 4 toulmin, human understanding, 44. 5 bernstein, beyond objectivism and relativism, 9. 6 fritjof capra, the turning point: science and the rising culture, (london: fontana paper backs, 1984), 39, john veith (trans.) descartes: a discourse on method and meditation of first philosophy, (london: everyman’s liberty press, 1979), 120-121. 7 meditation i, in elizabeth s. haldane and g.r.t. ross (eds.), philosophical works of descartes, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1969), 114. 8 haldane & ross (eds.), philosophical works of descartes, 114. 9 haldane & ross (eds.), philosophical works of descartes, 6. 10 haldane & ross (eds.), philosophical works of descartes, 149. 11 francis bacon, novum organum, i, ix, in john m. robertson ed., the philosophical works of bacon (london: university press, 1965), 51-8. 12 o’hear, an introduction to philosophy of science, 5. 13 toulmin, human understanding, 57. 14 putnam, reason, truth and history, 108-109. 15 isaac newton, principia bk. i, rule 4, in b.i. cohen (ed.), 150. 16 isaac newton, principia bk. i, rule 4, in b.i. cohen (ed.), 150. 17 cohen, revolutions in science, 150. 18 jostein gaarder, sophie’s world: a 3000 year adventure in philosophy, (ibadan, spectrum books, 1996), 181. 19 antiquity had its own system constructors in plato and aristotle. the middle ages have st. thomas aquinas who attempted to link aristotle’s system with christian ethics and theology. after this came the renaissance with a welter of old and new beliefs about nature and science, god and man. but it was not until the seventeenth century that any significant attempt was made to assemble ideas into a coherent systematic whole. 20 randell, p. peerenboom, ‘reason, rationales, and relativism: what’s at stake in the conversation over scientific rationality?’ philosophy today, vol. 34, no. 14. (november, 1990), 4. 21 james l. battersby, “professionalism, relativism and rationality” in p.m.l.a. vol. 107, no. 1. (1992). 22 harre, the philosophies of science: an introductory survey, 18. many of the germinal ideas of frege’s philosophy are to be found in his conceptual notations (1879). his philosophy influenced russell’s thought. in the preface to volume i of russell and whitehead’s principia mathematica (1910), the authors wrote, “in all questions of logical analysis our chief debt is to frege”. in the same vein, wittgenstein acknowledged frege’s influence on his thought. in the preface to commissioned papers 11 tractatus logico-philosophicus, wittgenstein wrote, “i am indebted to frege’s great works and to the writings of mr. russell for much of the stimulations of my thoughts”. frege’s influence on carnap was also acknowledged by carnap who studied under him at the university of jenna. 23 habermas, knowledge and human interest, 65. 24 william bechtel, philosophy of science: an overview of cognitive science, (new jersey: lawrence eribaum, 1990), 1-15. 25 ted benton, philosophical foundations of the three sociologies, (london: routledge and kegan paul, 1977), 21. 26 karl r. popper, the logic of scientific discovery, (london: hutchinson and co. publishers ltd., 1975), 15. 27 a.f. chalmers, what is this thing called science?: an assessment of the nature and status of science and its methods, (london: open university press, 1990), 1. 28 newton-smith, the rationality of science, (new york: routledge, 1981), 1. 29 d.c. philips, philosophy science and social inquiry, (oxford: perganon press, 1988), 3. 30 a system of beliefs that are interconnected: not merely a collection of separate, independent, unrelated beliefs, but an intertwined, interrelated and interconnected systems of beliefs. 31 paul k. feyerabend presents his position most clearly in against method (london: verso, 1987) and farewell to reason (london: verso, 1993). 32 isaac ukpokolo, “navigating feyerabend’s moral philosophy from boundaries without values to values without boundaries” in the ethics of subjectivity, elvis imafidon ed. (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2015), 201. 33 paul k. feyerabend, killing time (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1995), 174. 34 feyerabend, killing time, 174. 35 feyerabend, killing time, 174. 36 elizabeth s. and g. r. t. ross eds. philosophical works of descartes, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1969), 149. introduction the complexities and pressures within modern western societies have eroded the perceived relevance of traditional sources of meaning and identity…the construction of meaning and identity is therefore, a critical developmental task…that needs to be well informed and supported by the church, catholic and religious 1 education. there is currently a growing concern in the catholic church about the continued but gradual confusion or at best deviation from the age-old understanding of catholic identity in the face of modern and contemporary ideologies, pressures and complexities of the human knowledge and societal 2 organization. some even fear that the continuity of this trend could, in the near future, result in significant erosion of the fundamental catholic identity which in reality, they say, may 3 have seismic implications on the church's survival. while this concern is generally shared about the catholic church, it is much more expressed about the catholic universities and colleges, some of whom are seen to have 165 osayamen s. imhangbe the quest for catholic identity for catholic universities and colleges over the years, assumed continually nuanced configurations 4and identities. this development no doubt, provokes such critical questions as, what is a catholic university? what should constitute the identity of a catholic college? what is 5 the nature of a catholic university and the like. these questions invariably raise a legitimate critical issue of what is and what should be the true and enduring identity of catholic colleges and universities today in the midst of growing technological and scientific advancements, cultural dynamism, societal configurations and incessant social 6change. the quest then into the true identity for catholic universities and colleges in the attempt to reassert their fundamental character as citadels of sacred and sound learning, where faith and reason meaningfully interact for the faithful service of the truth (benedict xvi, 2008) becomes imperative. it is in clear appreciation of this need therefore, that this work embarks on this enquiry, quest for catholic identity for catholic universities and colleges. it is its expectation that this enquiry would provoke some critical questions that would help to further understand and effectively engage this issue of the catholic identity of catholic universities in our world today. quest for catholic identity: what is catholic identity? d'antonio, davidson, hoge & gautier define 7 “identity” as “a person's sense of self, his or her concept.” (p. 15). alternatively, it is circumscribed as basically referring to the factor that differentiates one thing from another. that is, the essential characteristics that belong to a person, institute 8or organization. on this understanding of identity in general, they explain that catholic identity can be viewed as the distinctiveness and the uniqueness of the catholic 9institutions. in a similar way, fuller et al., place the meaning of catholic identity within the frame of the incorporation and expression of three circumscribing principles/characteristics; 10 viz: universality (catholic), tradition and sacramentality. these three principles, they observe, though overlapping and interdependent, yet distinctive, constitute the defining strands of catholicism that confer the catholic identity. thus, to be a catholic, true to the name, would mean 166 to be in full accord with the teachings and traditions of the universal church and to accept and submit to her hierarchical 11authority (p.17). this understanding of the catholic identity, it would appear, places more emphasis on what differentiates 12 than on what binds , which however, would seem to be the leaning for many with the shift of emphasis of the vatican 13 council ii. it remains, nonetheless, the subsisting conceptualization of the catholic identity and thus would be adopted as the work's working definition here. catholic universities and colleges: identity of pope benedict xvi in his address to catholic 14educators in his 2008 visit to the united states, states that a university's catholic identity does not necessarily reside in the number of students it has. but rather it resides in her acceptance and manifest conviction in the mystery of the word made man, commitment to the self, both in mind and heart, to god, acceptance of the truth that christ reveals faithfulness to the liturgical and sacramental life of the church, and in acts of charity, concern for justice and respect for god. these he avers give fervent expressions to these truths and mystery of the catholic faith. as such, in the mind of the pope, the true catholic identity of catholic universities and colleges must be found not in its numerical constitution but in its total immersion in the life, values, teachings, celebrations and sacramentality of the church. in this way, the true identity of the catholic university and colleges has to involve recognition and commitment to the ecclesial duty to illuminate the light of christ, demonstrate the harmony between faith and reason and maintain a careful and discreet posture towards methods and discoveries that not only deviate from the principles of the catholic teaching and cherished values but also that are seen 15to have controversial ethical implications and coloration. it is in the light of this functional identity that the catholic universities and colleges are called to maintain a posture that is in perfect accord with the church's teachings and positions on issues. every catholic university or college is, thus, charged with the inalienable commitment to the service of the 16truth ; to perform some specific functions for the church 167 17from whose heart it is drawn. maintaining the identity of catholic universities and colleges as institutions drawn from the heart of the church to be an extension of the church's life, teachings and cherished values and faith has posed current and contentious issue both in the church and in the institutions themselves. in relatively recent times, the catholic identity of the catholic colleges has been viewed to be gravely undermined in these universities' pursuit of relativism and unrestricted academic freedom, laying claim to their right to independence and 18autonomy. coupled with the declining control of the bishops over these institutions, many faculty members shifted focus from the catholic tradition “rooted in the liberal arts which was originally seen as tools to train the mind and heart to be able to deal with the big issues of the day and apply 19 christian faith to them” to opposing alternatives. in some catholic colleges and universities, the concept of boundary and distinctive culture which define the catholic identity are either undermined or totally lost within the campuses of these 20institutions morphing to places where almost anything goes. 21 the critical nature of this development especially in the 1970s, 1980s & 1990s, generated such complex questions and issues as: who can teach the catholic theology in the catholic university? what should be the supervisory role of bishops in the internal organization of catholic colleges and universities on campuses? what are the core elements of the catholic identity of a catholic university or college? how much freedom should be allowed faculty members? and what should be the criteria for selection of candidates for honorary degrees in catholic colleges and universities? to address these issues, pope john paul ii issued two separate documents: sapientia christiana and ex corde ecclesiae on april 29, 1979 and august 15, 1990 respectively. while in the former, he focuses on ecclesiastical universities and faculties that grant ecclesiastical degrees, in the latter, he aims at providing clarity of vision on the purpose and mission of catholic colleges and universities. the holy father defines a catholic university as: an academic community which, in a rigorous and critical fashion, assists in the protection and 168 advancement of human dignity and of a cultural heritage through research, and various services offered to the local, national and international communities. it possesses that institutional autonomy necessary to perform its functions effectively and guarantees its members academic freedom, as long as the rights of the individuals, persons and community are preserved within the 22 confines of truth and common good. according to him, catholic universities have four distinctive characteristics that define them uniquely and present them distinctively. these characteristics portray the catholic university as an institution with an identity that is informed and shaped by: 1) a christian inspiration not only of individuals, but of the university community as such 2) a continuing reflection in the light of the catholic faith upon the growing treasury of human knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research 3) fidelity to the christian message as it comes to us through the church and 4) an institutional commitment to the people of god and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the 23 transcendent goal which gives meaning to life. these distinctive marks were stipulated as the defining frames for every catholic university or college and every catholic university or college was expected to carry or be identified by these marks. in this way, it was thought that the issue of indistinctness and ambiguity about the true character and identity of the catholic university or college anywhere in the world would be wholly resolved and laid to rest. but did this put the issue of the catholic identity of catholic university to rest? it did not seem it did. developments after the documents continue to indicate that the quest for distinctive and common delineation and understanding of the catholic identity for catholic universities and colleges 169 remained very relevant and was still very much alive. we inquire more. historical development 24d'antonio et al., observe that over the years, the catholic identity of the average self-identified catholic in terms of perception of the catholic identity, identification with the faith and commitment to her cherished and taught values has consistently continued to evolve, variegate and assume new coloration. just as there has been evolving perception and conceptualization of the identity of the catholic among catholic members in general, so also it has been about the catholic identity of catholic universities and colleges. historical consideration, however, of the earliest periods of the existence of catholic universities does not suggest that the question of the catholic identity of catholic 25 universities and colleges was an issue. it was a given that to be identified as catholic university meant to be immersed in and to uphold unequivocally the known identity and commitment of the church. though the place of the origin of university remains unsettled among scholars with some identifying it with the greeks, and others, rome, it is, however, clear that the origin of the modern organization of the university system is undeniably traceable to the catholic church. it is the catholic church which in the middle of the th 13 century aided the unity of three cathedral schools to form 26 a university. thus, in the early centuries of the existence of this institution, most of the leading universities basically existed as extensions of the church's life, beliefs and values. it was not until 1871, following darwin's publication of the descent of man, that some questions began to emerge as to what should be the true identity of the catholic universities. the call for reform of the church's teaching to conform with modern science and sociology, the review of the content of the universities' curriculum and the general crisis that this publication provoked led to the issuance of two papal documents: testem benevolentiae nostrae of pope leo xii, 1899 and paschendi dominici gregis of pope st pius v, 1907. both documents condemned the call and posture and described them as heretical and an attempt at the 170 enthronement of relativism. since then, there has arisen series of declarations and postures, especially after vatican ii that has continually kept alive the critical question of the catholic identity of catholic universities and colleges. for example, the eugenic movement that spanned from 1899 to the 1960s on the basis of which many prominent universities and colleges' professors and luminaries like fr john a o' brien, c.s.c “publicly criticized church teaching on sexual morality and advocated their reform to conform to 27 the times” are still fresh in modern memories. in 1967, there was the notre dame statement, or the land o'lakes declaration, where the autonomy and independence of the universities from both lay and clerical authorities was asserted and enshrined. as a result, many of the universities and colleges engaged in activities that consistently raised question about the authenticity of their catholic identity. by 1972, many universities who were not part of the land o' lakes declaration adopted it; such that any appeal for an unreserved commitment to the fundamentals of the catholic faith became considerably ineffective in most of these institutions. the land o' lakes declaration won admiration in many quarters that in 1976, the national catholic education association of the united states (ncea) adopted it and made it an official document. the vatican however, 28 never gave its approval . this trend took a different turn in 1990 as observed earlier. some professors of theology in some catholic universities and colleges did not only make statements that ran contrary to some catholic teachings but also attempted to publicly debunk the principles on which the tenets of these teachings sprung and stood. we have, for instance the case of fr. macquarie of marquette university who in his sacred 29choices declared abortion, as an option, a sacred choice. this spurred the instance and issuance of the ex corde referenced earlier to address the issue. these examples are some historical cases in point that suggest that the question of the catholic identity of catholic universities and colleges has been and continue to be an issue of critical concern for the church. while these controversies seem to have expression in lands geographically distant from the african continent, their 171 possible or potential influence in the african continent in the near or distant future cannot be totally occluded. be that as it may, the reality and recurrence of these developments evoke a lot of critical questions that demand urgent attention and extensive consideration. we note a few. critical questions it would appear that the papal document of pope john paul ii, ex corde resolved this issue of the true identity of catholic universities and colleges. but recent developments in these institutions, like the continued hosting of the “coming out week” and the publication of “vagina monologues, both by notre dame university, which have been criticized as opposed to catholic teachings on sexual morality, protection of human life and contraception, indicate clearly that this issue is far from being laid to rest. hence, the more reasons that the following questions remain critical: who can teach the catholic theology in a catholic university? what should be the supervisory role of the bishops in the internal organization of catholic colleges and universities? who should be invited to speak in their campuses? what constitutes appropriate activities on campuses? what are the core elements of the catholic identity of a catholic university or college? how much freedom should be allowed faculty members? and what should be the criteria for selection of candidates for honorary degrees in catholic colleges and universities? conclusion the paper has attempted to point out that finding or carving the right and enduring definition and circumscription of the actual identify of catholic universities and colleges, remains a critical issue that appears to continue to demand attention and resolution. in so doing it observed that this attention and/or resolution that it apparently demands may be not effectively pursued and engaged if recourse to and clear understanding of the antecedents of the developments in the existence and intervention for this issue are not included in the effort. that is why this work took an intellectual journey into the development and progression of this issue over time 172 and highlighted efforts made to bring the final denouement to the issue. it was also able to show how these efforts of intervention and response do not seem to have quelled or surmounted the issue. in this way, the paper noted how the issue continues to haunt or linger and yawn for more and urgent action to forestall greater harm that its continued presence can trigger and/or engender. it is the expectation of this paper that unambiguous delineation of the identity of the catholic university or college is needed and the need to insist on compliance to the determined character and defining marks of the catholic identity of the catholic university or college for it to be properly and unquestionably so calls for urgent and specific action. to this end, it has been the intention of this paper to provoke and spur relevant efforts to put final analysis, conclusion and clarification to the issue of what can be properly known as catholic university and/or college and totally lay this issue to rest. endnotes 1. rossiter, g. & tinsey, w. search for meaning and identity. brisbane: acu, 2002, p. 1 2. d'antonio, w.v., davidson, j.d., hoge, d.r& gautier, m. l. american catholic today: new realities of their faith and their church: new york: a sheed and ward book, 2007. 3. hendershot, a. obama and the alternative magisterium: how catholic universities and colleges played a role in electing him, despite the pope's message to them about fidelity to the church's teaching, march, 2009. mcintire, m. v. from orthodoxy to heresy: the secularizing of catholic universities. new oxford review 75 (8) pp. 26-31. retrieved march 9, 2014 from pro quest catholic world report, pp. 19-22., 20008. 4. pace, e. “universities” the catholic encyclopedia, 15. new york: robert appleton, 1912. 5. the question of the indistinctness or nebulousness of the delineation of the identity of what is catholic in the catholic college or university comes to mind. the need for close engagement, determination and clarification for what should present for an institution that must go by the qualification “catholic” is called for, and the resolution of this may be urgent. 6. fullan, m. leading in a culture of change. san francisco ca: josseybass, 2007. 173 7. d'antonio, w.v. et al., opera cit. (p.15) 8. encarta world english dictionary microsoft corporation, 2005 9. d'antonio, w.v. et al., opera cit. (p.17) 10.fuller, j. l.,& eamon, m. irish and catholic? towards an understanding of identity. dublin: columbia press, 2006. 11.ibid, p.17 12.agnus, i. identity and justice. toronto: university of toronto press, 2008. 13.d'antonio, w.v. et al., op. cit. 14.benedict xvi. meeting with catholic educators: address of his holiness, benedict xvi.” in l.t. cameron, r.g. henning &p.i. vaccari (eds.) christ our hope: pope benedict xvi's visit to the united states and visit to the united nations. washington dc: editions du signe, 2008. 15.pope john paul ii. on catholic universities: ex corde ecclesiae. washington d. c. : united states catholic conference of bishops, 1990, no. 12. latter versions exist. the contents of the latter versions do not markedly defer on the issues referenced herein from the contents of this earlier version. 16.united states conference of catholic bishops committee on education. catholic identity in our colleges and universities: a collection of defining documents. washington dc: usccb, 2006. 17. on catholic universities: ex corde ecclessiae, op. cit. 18. hendershot, a. (2009, march) op. cit. mcintire, m. v., op. cit. 19. morey, m. m.& piderit, j. j. catholic higher education a culture in crisis: new york: oxford press, 2006, p. 4. 20. ibid. 21. the variegation in opinion about what catholic identity should be generated a lot of questions about what actually should stand as the unifying strand for what can be truly claimed the catholic identity as typified in institutions of leaning. 22. pope john paul ii. on catholic universities: ex corde ecclessiae, op. cit. no 12. 23. ibid. no 13 24. d' antonio, w.v. et al., op. cit. 25. mcintire, m. v., op. cit. 26. pace, e. “universities” the catholic encyclopedia, 15.op. cit. 27. mcintire, m. v., op. cit., p. 28 28. legan, j. p. catholic universities in the church and society: a culture in crisis. new york: oxford university press, 1993. 29. hendershot, a., op. cit. 174 192 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 the resurrection of jesus: our life abstract at easter we celebrate a super extraordinary event. in the words of pope john paul ii, paraphrasing st. augustine: “we are the easter people and ‘alleluia’ is our song”. we all sing ‘alleluia’ today to praise and thank the lord for the wonders he has worked for us. easter, the celebration of the lord’s resurrection is the center of the whole year of worship, ‘the feast of all feasts’. our faith, our hope and the meaning of christian life is founded on jesus’ resurrection. despite the surety of the christian belief, the idea of the resurrection and its effect or relevance in christian life has often been either underplayed or exaggerated. this paper therefore sets out to theologically affirm this historical reality of faith, examining counter theories of the resurrection by examining their logical correspondence and hypothetical soundness. as this essay will reveal, in as much as the resurrection of christ cannot be definitely disproved, it becomes a fundamental element and in fact the most radical of christian faith as the conclusion of the work revealed, to believe in the resurrection of jesus christ is to believe as well in the possibility and reality of change in one’s life. this essay also clarifies the existential concreteness of the resurrection; it is not a raising from the dead which postpones an inevitable fate still but rather a definitive victory of christ over death. different formulations of the creed and magisterial statements give complete credence to this faith. this is the faith of the the resurrection of jesus: our life | 193 christian church from its beginning, celebrated in her ceremonies and rituals and lived in the life of christians. keywords: resurrection, supernatural event, christian faith introduction we are in the year 2019 (two thousand and nineteen years, since the beginning of the calculation of time and history). in fact, two thousand and nineteen years since the birth of christ god became man the word was made flesh and dwelt among us. it is 2019 years since this happened; when god entered time and made time sacred. that was an extraordinary event in every sense of that word. ever since then in mankind’s history a lot of things have taken place. consider for a moment what mankind has accomplished. we have built spaceships that can leave our solar system. we have transplanted hearts into a week-old babies. we have computerized everything from architecture to zoology. we have made tremendous progress in many areas of life. we are, as some people claim, at the apex of history. nothing is so new that it has never been heard or seen before, and nothing is so old that it will never be seen or heard again. as the american astronauts landed on the moon for the first time, the then president nixon declared: “this is the greatest event in the history of the world since the day of creation.’ to this exaggerated statement bill graham responded: “the president seems mistaken because the birth, death and resurrection of jesus are the greatest and most important events in the history of the world.” that is true indeed, it was true, it remains true till this very day; and it will continue to be true forever. alleluia! at easter we celebrate a super extraordinary event. while the law of science stipulates a cycle of life and death, while other religions celebrate cycles of birth and death, christianity insists that in one unique historical moment, the cycle is reversed, and a dead man came back to life.1 that something which was never seen or heard before, or to be again, happened. round this revolves the whole economy of the christian religion. st augustine used to say, 194 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 “the faith of christians is the resurrection of jesus.” using the words of the holy father, pope john paul ii, while paraphrasing st. augustine: “we are the easter people and ‘alleluia’ is our song”. alleluia, as we know, is composed of two hebrew words ‘allelu’ and ‘ia’. the former is the imperative form of the verb hailal which means ‘to praise’, while the latter is a shortened form of the personal name of god, yahweh. ‘alleluia’ thus means “praise the lord”. throughout the christian era, ‘alleluia’ has been the outburst of the church, the authentic response to the joyful, easter event. we all sing ‘alleluia’ today to praise and thank the lord for the wonders he has worked for us. in fact ‘we are truly the easter people and alleluia is our song’. easter, the celebration of the lord’s resurrection is the center of the whole year of worship, ‘the feast of all feasts’. our faith, our hope and the meaning of christian life is founded on jesus’ resurrection. paul expressed it well: “if christ has not risen from the dead, then our believing is useless. . . ” (1 cor 15). the resurrection of jesus is a fundamental element and in fact the most radical of christian faith. it is theologically relevant in that it is essential for being identified as a christian. to be a christian is to believe in jesus christ not only as a great man of the past, even the greatest, but as someone ever living among us. otherwise his coming twenty centuries ago leaves us entirely indifferent and he interests us no more than napoleon or julius caesar. not to admit the resurrection of jesus means that one is not a christian. such issues which deal with the uniqueness of jesus can never become irrelevant to christians except as the price of making christianity itself irrelevant. no doubt the resurrection is a central and inexhaustible mystery. to attempt an account of the redemption without including the resurrection is to end in a deadlock. “no approach to new testament christology is possible without coming to terms with the resurrection.”2 through the centuries many princes and rulers have tried to stop the majestic wave of the news of the resurrection of jesus – first the synagogue, then roman empire, and then communist regimes. but the resurrection of jesus is still being proclaimed and celebrated. the resurrection of jesus is the most powerful, liberating, joyful message we can hear. the resurrection of jesus: our life | 195 questioning the resurrection of jesus but then, let us stop awhile and address ourselves to some pertinent concerns.the resurrection is ridiculed and rejected in some quarters, even supposedly ‘christian’ quarters. it is important that we get the right and proper meaning of what we are celebrating. inasmuch as we do not intend to be unnecessarily apologetic, it is also important that we brighten some clouds, clean some doubts, and settle some difficulties often associated with the resurrection of jesus christ. among the various stories and theories used to doubt or discredit the event of the resurrection are the following: 1. the fraud theory: that the disciples of jesus fugitively slipped to the tomb at night and stole his body, hid it somewhere and then circulated the report that he had risen from the dead. (cf. matt 28: 13) therefore the whole story is a hoax, a deliberate imposture. d. whitaker is of such opinion that the body of jesus was stolen by thieves. this idea even goes back to new testament times, and according to matthew 28:13, it was even put forward by the jewish elders in their attempt to bribe the roman soldiers. it figured in origen’s debate with celsus, in which origen argued that men do not suffer persecution and risk martyrdom for a lie. now we ask: how is this possible with the putting of seals on the stone and the soldiers to guard there? the soldiers could not be bribed to open it. how would they know it if they were asleep? what good would the body of jesus have done them? and again, if they were afraid to fight for jesus when he was alive (cf. matt. 2: 56; mk. 14: 50), how would they have the courage to risk their lives when he was dead? as it is commonly said: “the courage to die for one’s beliefs is given for those who have the courage to live for them.” the disciples were not trying to prove anything; in fact they were reluctant to believe in him after they saw him alive again. sincere belief in the resurrection does not spring up causally. indeed the pain and disillusionments of life and the scepticism of this world would almost seem to make confident faith in the resurrection foolish or impossible. 196 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 long ago, st. augustine gave a decisive answer to this theory when he said: “you bring forward as witness men who were sleeping. truly, it is you who have fallen asleep, you who have failed in examining such things. if they were asleep, what could they have seen? if they saw nothing, how are they witnesses?” 2. the swoon theory: holds the view that jesus was not really dead; that he had only swoon or fainted for the soldiers did not kill him and that the cool, quiet tomb and spices caused him to revive and come back to life. the rationalist h. e. g. paulus put forward this theory and in more recent times a similar view has been set out by h. schonfield in “the passover plot” (1965). we respond to this theory as follows: but the fact of jesus’ death was clear. the facts are evident. the soldiers pierced his side with the spear before joseph of arimathea took him down from the cross. if there were any possibility that jesus was still alive, mary and other disciples never would have let him be buried. according to jewish understanding, burial is the final signing and sealing of death. also, in contrast to the above story, the spices were poisonous and would have killed him instead. moreover, his weakened physical condition (after all those beatings and passion) would have prohibited such revival. then too, if he rose later, certainly he would have been apprehended by the guards. 3. the hallucination theory: states that the agitated disciples and hysterical women wanted to see jesus and thought that he would rise. so they imagined that they saw him. they therefore did not see what they claimed to have seen but just what they thought and wanted to see. they had hallucinations. but the response to this: if so, how did it happen that the disciples were steeped in unbelief and would scarcely believe him after seeing him, for which jesus rebuked them (cf. lk. 24: 25) think of thomas who refused to believe without touching him. the records all indicate that this resurrected jesus had a body. the disciples recognised his features; mary recognised the tone of his the resurrection of jesus: our life | 197 voice; his mannerisms; he ate fish with the disciples; he invited thomas to examine his hands and his side. furthermore, if this theory is true, how can one explain the fact that the tomb was empty? if what these believers saw was only a ghost in a vision, his body would still have been in the tomb. but the tomb was empty. jesus was not there. this is more eloquent than speech, more convincing than logic. 4. the mistake theory: states that the women made a mistake and went to an old deserted tomb, and thinking this to be the burial place of jesus, hurried away to circulate the report that jesus had risen. similar explanations are those of k. lake in “the resurrection of jesus”, lake conjectured that there were several tombs and that the women misunderstood the young man who said that jesus was not there. the man had intended to redirect them to the right place, but they read into it something more. but the response to this is: there is no parallel to this in all history. people do not forget a place so indelibly impressed on their minds and hearts. there is no question about the identity of jesus’ tomb. the women, some apostles, and even the pharisees saw to that. it was guarded carefully and sealed by men whose hatred and fear would let them take no chance of making a mistake. the facts are very clear, true and undisputed. 5. the earthquake theory: holds the view that an earthquake swallowed jesus’ body.the response to this is: peter and john found the linen shroud and face cloth wrapped neatly in the tomb. it would be a most considerate earthquake that would swallow the body of jesus and neatly fold the shroud. it certainly was not the work of vandals and enemies who would wish to desecrate the body of jesus. such a group would never have left the tomb and linens in such a neat order. even, how would they have entered the tomb with the seal and guard of soldiers there? 198 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 from the foregoing, it would seem that none of the alternative interpretations or attempted explanations succeed to provide a satisfactory account. they cannot be defended or sustained, even on the strength of their evidence, sequence or logic. their weaknesses are apparent and inherent. in fact, it requires as great a miracle to explain away these facts as it demands such a miracle to accept the reality of this supernatural event. as we read in the easter edition of the word among us, april 1999: in the orthodox world, there is a very beautiful tradition. when people meet each other, especially at easter time, one person says to the other, “christ is risen.” and immediately, the other answers, “he is truly risen.” at the beginning of the bolshevik revolution, there was a public debate in a russian city between an atheist and an orthodox priest. the atheist speaker stood up and spoke against the resurrection of jesus. when he was done, he stepped down convinced that his arguments could not be disputed. then, the orthodox priest came to the platform, looked at the crowd and said “christ is risen.” and all at once, everyone shouted, “he is truly risen!” with that, he left the platform. for the one who believes, no explanation is necessary. for the one who does not believe, no explanation is possible. the uniqueness of jesus resurrection no one in the new testament claims to have seen or witnessed the actual resurrection even, or to know what a resurrection is. this, however, is not to question whether it actually happened. though the event itself is nowhere described, since no one saw it or had direct experience of it and could have described it literally, the resurrection of jesus christ including the predictions and the testimonies, represent the watershed of new testament history and the resurrection of jesus: our life | 199 the central point of its faith. on the historical plane it marks the division between the earthly life of jesus and the apostolic age. it is a unique event, and not one of a class in relation either to the expectation of other individuals or to other raisings from the dead in the biblical narrative. it has priority in time (cf. act 26:23) and superiority in status in that it forms the first and most significant part of the series. in fact the noun (‘resurrection’) is never used to those other raisings. even in the lazarus story, it is reserved by martha for the general resurrection at the last day (cf. john 11:24) and by jesus for himself (cf. john 11: 25). all other men apart from jesus are restored to life only to die again. even those raised from the dead by jesus and the apostles have still to die again. their death is merely postponed. indeed, it is often debatable how far over the boundary of death they have passed. what the language indicates is, rather, that for the hebrew mind there was no absolute division between life and death. they are indeed dead; but in all these cases the dead person is simply called back to life, and this is indicated by the corpse’s opening its eyes and sitting up (cf. acts 9:40) or sitting up and beginning to speak (cf. luke 7:15). raising the dead is the continuation of healing beyond a certain point. such is included as part of the regular mission program laid upon the twelve (cf. matt. 10:8). the restorative power is of god, but the agents of it may be purely human. the case is quite different in the resurrection of jesus. only he is exempt from this (cf. acts 13:34; rom 6:9). there is no suggestion of mere resuscitation. he passed right over the border into the realm of the departed spirits. he is not brought back simply to this life, destined to die again, but raised forever to the right hand of god. this is effected, not through any human agency, but by god alone: and only of his rising does the new testament use the term ‘ the resurrection’. the resurrection of jesus, according to st. thomas is the efficient and exemplary cause of our resurrection.3 for karl rahner: the resurrection which is referred to in the resurrection of jesus as distinguished from the 200 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 resurrection of the dead in the old and new testaments means the final and definitive salvation of a concrete human existence by god and in the presence of god, the abiding and real validity of human history, which neither moves further and further into emptiness, nor perishes altogether.4 what kind of event is the resurrection of jesus? in the midst of all sorts of arguments and theories to explain the resurrection away as not real and factual, one can ask another meaningful question: what kind of event is the resurrection of jesus? is it an event or experience? no matter what we say about it, all would agree that something clearly happened after the death of jesus which transformed the band of shattered disciples into people who were firmly convinced that jesus was alive and that they had a message which would transform the world. even the historical scholar must agree that something has to have happened which suddenly awakened in all these men, who were in no way prepared for it, such a conviction that they had. the new testament writings are unanimous that what happened was the resurrection of jesus christ. such apparently divergent texts illustrate, if anything does, heraclitus’ principle: “an implicit agreement is more valuable than an explicit one.”5 the deep-seated harmony of these different testimonies have great weight. and it would be difficult to explain their mutual relationship by mental contagion or coincidence. in other words, the early preachers were proclaiming an actual event, an unexpected as it was supernatural. when we see the extraordinary way in which the church burst forth during the first centuries, we must admit that there was an explosion at the start; this explosion was the resurrection. it alone gave to the christian missionaries the dynamism that we see in them as that time; it alone made of them, who were discouraged and sad after the passion (cf. mk. 14:50) the martyrs and confessors of the faith who would fall by thousands, all declaring that christ lives forever. those who reject such are obliged to find some other explanations for the extraordinary transformation of the disciples. none of those the resurrection of jesus: our life | 201 attempted explanations will bear critical examinations or account for the extraordinary psychological and moral change induced into so many different people and with such lasting effects in the face of those who had every reason to discredit the belief if they could. the true plausible explanation of the disciples’ experiences of the appearances and the discovery of the empty tomb is the resurrection of jesus. we cannot therefore spiritualise the resurrection and remove it from the real of historical fact. neither can we allow christian theology and spirituality to be shaped by the contemporary distrust of the miraculous. we cannot impose on what god has chosen to do in jesus what we think god would have done. this is our faith. this is the faith of the christian church from its beginning, proclaimed in all her doctrines, celebrated in her ceremonies and rituals and lived in the life of christians. different formulations of the creed and magisterial statements give complete credence to this faith. historical and transcendent event yet our question remains: what kind of event is the resurrection of jesus? the new catechism of the catholic church describes the resurrection of jesus as ‘historical and transcendent event’. “the mystery of christ’s resurrection is a real event, with manifestations that were historically verified, as the new testament bears witness.” (ccc. 639) “although the resurrection was an historical event that could be verified by the sign of the empty tomb and by the reality of the apostles’ encounters with the risen christ, still it remains at the very heart of the mystery of faith as something that transcends and surpasses history.” (ccc. 647). as pope john paul ii emphasized, the resurrection is a ‘historical event’ because it took place in a precise context of time and place’.6 in our ordinary sense ‘historical’ denotes not only what is in itself knowable by scientific observation of facts in its actual occurrence, but also what has in fact occurred. in itself we cannot concede that the resurrection of jesus is historical in the first sense of something open to scientific investigation and verifiable by 202 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 neutral witnesses or an event that could have been photographed as it was occurring. the new testament does not claim that anyone saw the resurrection and makes no attempt to describe it. this ineffable reality cannot be assimilated to any fact of human history which can be grasped and completely understood by applying the rules of criticism. by its nature, such an event, being at the same time a mystery of the faith, does not completely fit into any of the categories of human knowledge. it is a real event which does not come from this world, and cannot be the object of historical investigation as such. on the other hand, the resurrection of christ is truly historical in the sense that, while it is in itself completely metaexperiential, it is objectively signified for us by its effects negative, like the empty tomb, or positive, like the appearances not to mention the faith of the women and the apostles and the birth of the church itself. the appearances, for the disciples who were convinced that they had indeed seen him, are historical. behind their confession of faith in the risen lord lies the experience of having witnessed him at some time and in some way. at the same time the resurrection event, as distinct from the appearances, is above all a unique supernatural event. as such, we are reminded by pope john paul ii that, at the same time: it transcends and stands above history . . . no one was an eye-witness of the resurrection. no one could say how it had happened in its physical reality. still less could the senses perceive the most interior essence of his passage to another life. it is this tranhistorical feature of the resurrection that must be especially considered if we are to understand to some extent the mystery of that historical but also transhistorical event.7 the resurrection of christ is transhistorical in the sense that it refers to an ‘event’ that took place on the other side of death; therefore, which lies beyond the confines of space and time. it is, as jean guitton said, “a trans-reality, known by trans-historical cognition; a the resurrection of jesus: our life | 203 trans-reality, but reality; trans-historical, but based on evidence.”8 history alone is not qualified to teach us about the facts of the beyond. similarly, the reality resulting from this event namely the reality of the risen lord, is also a trans-historical reality in that it belongs to the end of history existing within the new (eschatological) era. to say this, however, in no way invalidates the historicity of the appearances; it merely safeguards the other-wordly new reality of the risen jesus. by the resurrection jesus enters a completely new universe of being, the end-time of history, beyond the control of history and beyond the reach of historians. he rose to a new life transcending the co-ordinates of time and space and therefore not subject to the criteria of simple human empirical observation. it is true that there is an underlying identity between jesus of history and the christ of faith which the risen lord invited the disciples to confirm in the appearances, the human identity hides another which is pervaded by the mystery of god. in an important article, w. pannenberg, writing against a cavalier attitude toward the historicity of the resurrection, insists that there is no question here of a simple revivification of a corpse. not only is there the physical fact that immediately after death irreversible process of dissolution begins but the new testament are thinking of transforming rather than revivification. paul, who draws a close analogy between the resurrection of jesus and the future resurrection of the dead (1 cor. 15:12), stresses heavily the characteristics of the transformation that takes place in the resurrection. what dies was perishable, weak, and mortal; what rises is imperishable, glorious, and immortal (1 cor. 15: 42 43; 52 54). in short, “it is sown a physical body; it is raised a spiritual body” (1 cor. 15: 44). it was, rather than a return to his previous style of earthly existence, what the church has always referred to as a glorious resurrection. his body is endowed with special properties since it now shares in the glory which his soul had from the first instance of the incarnation. he appears as the same and yet different; a ‘transformed’ christ. 204 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 so we cannot speak of jesus’ resurrection as a process of revivification or resuscitation. his resurrection is not a “coming back” to life, but a “going beyond” to a totally new and different kind of life. stressing the change and the transformation and the newness of the risen body, so that resurrection cannot be understood as the old body coming back to life, st paul, writing to the corinthians (1 cor 15:35-36) said: “what is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory. it is sown in weakness, it raise in power. it is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body.” then he tells them a “mystery”: “we shall all be changed. … for this perishable nature must put on the imperishable, and this mortal nature must put on immortality” (15:51-53). thus there is both continuity and discontinuity between the old and the new. it was the same jesus of nazareth who was raised from the dead, but he has been changed and transformed. we cannot know in any literal way what a resurrection is. we can only speak of it only in imperfect and inadequate metaphors or analogies. we must say with st paul that the risen body of jesus is not like the physical body that we know in its earthly existence. john navone clarifies further: resurrection is in some sense a continuation of the life that existed in history, and this is the point of the continuity between the old and the new. but it is not an historical continuation of this life, for eternity or the eschaton is not history extended indefinitely. risen life is a new kind of life and a new kind of existence involving a total change and transformation of the old, and this is the equally important point of discontinuity that paul stresses. it would be more proper to speak of the resurrection as an eschatological event rather than as an historical event. eschatological existence is not simply a continuation of history, it is not history extended and continued indefinitely. it is rather the culmination of history, the passage of the historical into a new and final mode of existence.9 the resurrection of jesus: our life | 205 trinitarian act also the resurrection of jesus was a trinitarian act, accomplished by the one act of the three persons of the blessed trinity. the new catechism of the catholic church illustrates this well in nos. 648 650. 648 christ’s resurrection is an object of faith in that it is a transcendent intervention of god himself in creation and history. in it the three divine persons act together as one, and manifest their own proper characteristics. the father’s power “raised up” christ his son and by doing so perfectly introduced his son’s humanity, including his body, into the trinity. jesus is conclusively revealed as “son of god in power according to the spirit of holiness by his resurrection from the dead.” st. paul insists on the manifestation of god’s power through the working of the spirit who gave life to jesus’ dead humanity and called it to the glorious state of lordship. 649 as for the son, he effects his own resurrection by virtue of his divine power. jesus announces that the son of man will have to suffer much, die, and then rise. elsewhere he affirms explicitly: “i lay down my life, that i may take it again... i have power to lay it down, and i have power to take it again.” “we believe that jesus died and rose again.” 650 the fathers contemplate the resurrection from the perspective of the divine person of christ who remained united to his soul and body, even when these were separated from each other by death: “by the unity of the divine nature, which remains present in each of the two components of man, these are reunited. for as death 206 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 is produced by the separation of the human components, so resurrection is achieved by the union of the two.” as john navone explains: belief in the resurrection is not the same as believing in the immortality of the soul. there was nothing automatic about the resurrection, that is, it was not the automatic survival of the spiritual part of a man or of the soul. god raised jesus from the dead, not his soul, but the whole jesus in his total existence. it was the whole of jesus of nazareth who was changed and transformed into new life and existence. the whole jesus had to die and be raised from the dead, transformed into what paul calls “spiritual” existence.10 meaning and implications of jesus resurrection the consequences of the resurrection are far-reaching and have the utmost significance in christ and in the history of christianity. for jesus from the gospel narratives two characteristic reactions to jesus are evident to us: the one before the resurrection the other after it. there was a deepening of the evaluation made of him before. this would not have been so if a change had not taken place in jesus. a. “lord”, “son of god”, “christ” henceforth certain titles were to stand out in the minds of those who believed in jesus: “our lord”, “true son of god”, “christ”. these titles given to jesus at easter evoke a new messianic reality. the resurrection proved his claims and vindicated the character of jesus. the characteristic title of the risen christ lord was given to jesus with the same meaning it had when applied to god (cf. phil. 2:9; jn. 20:28.) in the fullness of his sovereignty. it is the resurrection that has established jesus in his lordship (cf. acts 2:24-36; mt. 28:18). many apologetic writers have presented the the resurrection of jesus: our life | 207 resurrection exclusively as the convincing demonstration of the claims of jesus or of his divinity. therein the full and profound significance of his earthly life is fully revealed. in lohfink’s erudite words, it was exactly through the resurrection that “the man jesus was shown to be ‘the one’ through whom god had definitively and unsurpassably revealed himself; and in whom he had acted in a definitive and unsurpassable way”.11 it is the resurrection, for the earliest christian preaching, that designates jesus as the christ, the son of god (cf. acts 2: 36; rom. 1:4.). this is the point at which his resign as messiah begins, when so far from returning to the confines of the present age, he enters upon and inaugurates the age of glory. at the hour when jesus is glorified, (cf. lk. 24:26; jn. 12:23; 1 pet. 1:21) god’s messianic act is complete and the age to come has begun to supersede this one. and conversely, it is because in it jesus is declared unequivocally to be the messiah that the raising of jesus can be spoken of as “the resurrection as the beginning of the last day. b. vindication of jesus by god another important aspect of the resurrection is the way in which it links the person and work of christ. the resurrection above all constitutes the confirmation of all christ’s works and teachings. this is its christological significance. the resurrection expresses god’s satisfaction with what christ has done. it is the seal the father put on the life, the death, the words, and the deeds of his son, jesus christ. the act of resurrection is always an act of god, although jesus claimed the power to take up his life again after laying it down, (cf. jn. 10:18) the new testament does not suggest that the resurrection was an independent act of jesus christ. the power behind it was the power of god. indeed, the resurrection of jesus christ is viewed as the supreme display of divine power. it is an allencompassing action of god in the history of humankind. the constant new testament emphasis is not simply that christ has risen, but that god has raised him or that he has been raised, not from the underworld back to earth, but up to heaven. the exaltation of the 208 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 person is the vindication of his mission. it is as his son that god raised jesus from death. if christ had not been raised there would have been no certainty that his death had effected anything. man would, as st. paul says, still be in his sins. the resurrection is seen, therefore, to be indispensable to man’s salvation. his exalted position has a direct bearing on his present activity. his capacity for effectively acting on behalf of his people in his continued ministry is as unlimited as his sovereignty. hence the epistle to the hebrews drew from its study of the resurrection the title “eternal high priest” and assigned it to christ. c. completion of redemption the resurrection is essentially part of god’s plan for the redemption of mankind. in fact, it demonstrates the completion of redemption. it is the salvific event par-excellence. jesus died to save the world. had he remained permanently in the state of death he could not have redeemed the world. had he not come from the grave no gospel message would have been given to the world. the work of redemption was completed in the resurrection. death plus the resurrection equals perfected redemption. it was by being raised to anew life, not less than by dying to this old existence, that christ now presents the picture of man-redeemed, or as st. paul states it “the redemption in christ jesus” (rom. 3:24). the resurrection of jesus christ is central within the whole act whereby we are saved. isolated from the earlier life of jesus, the resurrection becomes something unnatural and nothing more. however related to the whole gospel of the deeds and teaching of christ, the resurrection is seen to be its crowning point. this aspect is developed in the papal discourses: christ’s resurrection is closely connected with the mystery of the incarnation of the son of god. it is its fulfillment, according to god’s eternal plan. rather, it is the supreme crowning of all that jesus had revealed and wrought throughout his whole life, from his birth to his passion and death, by his deeds, miracles, teaching, example of perfect holiness and above all by his transfiguration. he had never the resurrection of jesus: our life | 209 revealed directly the glory, which he had with the father ‘before the world was made’ but he concealed this glory in his humanity until the definitive emptying of himself through his death on the cross.12 the resurrection is a saving event because it is not until jesus has received the fullness of life, which is properly his as son of god and son of man that his redemptive work is complete and effective. he is the first-born of those who rise (cf. col. 1:18.), “the first-born of all creation” (col. 1:15), the germinal cell of the new world and the figure of it in its final form, “the alpha and the omega” (apoc. 1:8; 21:6; 22:13). jesus is the second adam, the true adam (cf. rom. 5:12-21). the saving effect of the resurrection that jesus communicates a new life to those who believe in him. d. fulfillment of prophecy the resurrection is the fulfillment of christ’s own prophecies and as such, is the most sublime proof of his divinity. as pope john paul ii points out, “the resurrection of the crucified proved that he was really the ‘i am’, the son of god.”13 christ had referred on a number of occasions to the glory that would be manifested in his death and resurrection as the eternal son of the father (cf. jn. 2:19-22; 11:4; phil. 2:9-11). this doctrine was subsequently expounded by st. paul as the high point of revelation in the way he based his evidence of the resurrection on the evidence of scriptures. the announcement of the death and the resurrection of the son of man (cf. mk. 9:34; 10:32-34) pertains to the preaching of the eschatological kingdom. it means that it is through death and then in a resurrection that jesus will enter into the glory of the kingdom (cf. lk. 24:26). jesus thus fulfills the prophecy of daniel chapter 7 on the heavenly coming of the son of man through that of the suffering servant. thus, theologically, we may conclude that the coming of the kingdom in which is the eschatological fullness of salvation is identical with the mystery of the resurrection. 210 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 e. victory over death the first christians did not just say that jesus lived beyond death. they said that he overcome (conquered) death (cf. acts 2:24). the resurrection of jesus meant that the kingdom of god, which was present in jesus, had also conquered death. the messiah had risen. the reign of god had come ‘with power’. christ has conquered sin and death and has promised us that we shall conquer it too. this easter mystery is one that throws a continuous challenge to us to rise above the fear of our precarious, tenuous and finite existence here on earth. our belief in christ’s resurrection is a radical expression of man’s conviction that no matter what happens, good and godliness will triumph over evil in the end. hence, with the risen christ, we can triumphantly say, “o death, where is thy victory? o death, where is thy sting?” (1 cor. 15:55). c. f. gellert rightly wrote: jesus lives! thy terrors now can, o death no more appaul us. jesus lives! by this we know thou o grace cannot enthrall us halleluiah! the powers of death have done their worst. but christ their legions hath dispersed. let shouts of holy joy outburst: halleluiah! 14 the victory of our lord jesus christ is one we can share. the holy father, pope john paul ii, reminds us that the definitive victory over death, already won by christ, is shared by him with humanity in the measure in which we receive the fruits of redemption, bringing with it admission to the “new life”.15 the importance of jesus’ victory over death is the christian mystery that underlies resurrection language. this sharing with humanity leads us to examine as well the theological implications of jesus’ resurrection in all men. for all people apart from being the culminating point of revelation, the resurrection has a number of consequences, which affect us directly. what jesus is in virtue of his resurrection, he is in relation to man and creation. far from him alone being affected by his resurrection, the resurrection of jesus: our life | 211 all men and women are affected. as the second vatican council emphasized: all this holds true not for christians only but also for all men of goodwill in whose hearts grace is active invisibly. for since christ died for all, and since all men are in fact called to one and the some destiny, which is divine, we must hold that the holy spirit offers to all the possibility of being made partners, in a way known to god in the paschal mystery.16 a. gift and union with the life of christ in the first place, jesus’ resurrection is also seen by the new testament, in addition to its application to christ, as the moment when christ “opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers” and inaugurated the “new and living way” (heb. 10:20) between man and god. the risen christ is the principle and source of a new life for all men since he makes available to us a sharing in the divine life of grace and in that victory over death caused by sin (cf. eph. 2:45). the resurrection is the point of release, when the “life” that jesus came to bring (cf. jn. 10:10) is poured forth in power and let loose in the entire world. this new life is characterized in a special way by our becoming adopted children of god (cf. gal. 4:4-5; rom. 8:14) as a result of being freed from the slavery of sin. the grace of adoptive sonship or divine filiations makes us brothers and sisters of christ. jesus is restored to his friends, never again to be parted from them. he lives with and in his people. this vital union of the believer with christ becomes more precious after the resurrection. the believer is risen with christ and christian life is the outliving of the in living christ (cf. gal. 2:20). this restoration is not a mere human reunion but a permanent divine indwelling (cf. jn. 14:23). salvation is realized in christ alone, with whom it is identified. thus the resurrection that brought about salvation in christ also puts this salvation at the disposal of men. men will not be saved except by communion with christ in this salvation. 212 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 b. pledge and principle of our own resurrection another effect of christ’s resurrection is its causal relationship with our own resurrection. pope john paul ii thus writes: when he foretold the institution of the eucharist, jesus referred to himself as the sacrament of eternal life and of the future resurrection: ‘he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life and i will raise him up at the last day’.17 we derive our title and hope for bodily immortality our supernatural union with him by faith in his divinity and by partaking of his lifegiving flesh. scheenben makes a penetration comment on this point: ‘the flesh of the lord is life-giving spirit’ says st. athanasius, ‘because it was conceived by the lifegiving spirit’. thus the spirit of god abides in it and the son of god, from whom the spirit proceeds, has taken it to himself as a fire takes iron. this indwelling spirit did not, it is true, actually preserve it from death, but guarded it from dissolution and decay; and once death had embraced it, the spirit called it back, in a way that was all the more miraculous, in a new, immortal life. this same spirit brings the flesh of christ, as the organ of his spiritual might, upon the alter, there to unite it to the flesh of the faithful.18 for st. paul, too, the strongest argument for our resurrection is that christ, the god-man, one head, has risen from the dead by the power of his divinity (cf. eph. 2:5; col. 2:12; rom. 8:11). since the best way of bringing about this union is to partake of the life-giving flesh of christ, the fathers point to the eucharist as the primary source and chief title of our immortality and the resurrection of the body. that christ is risen from the dead, and that through communion with him in the eucharist we already participate in this new life of christ in a very real way is the key to our own bodies on the last day. the resurrection of christ is our inheritance as well. in view of the the resurrection of jesus: our life | 213 finality and banality of human mortality, and more so of its frequency in nations like ours where both life-saving and prolonging devices are in short supply, the hope and purpose of life to be reposed in the resurrected jesus becomes the more urgent. it is this resurrected jesus who transforms and explains the meaning of human existence and materiality in all its ramifications. the resurrection of jesus, therefore, is the principle of the resurrection of the christian to the eternal life of glory. only because god has done this for his son are new possibilities opened for his many children who have come to believe in what he has done. the father who raised jesus will also raise the christian (cf. 2 cor. 4:14). nowhere is this theme more fully elaborated than in 1 corinthians 15. the risen christ is at once the prototype of redemption and the effective cause of the resurrection of all other men (cf. 1 cor. 15:20f; col. 1:18). he is the first to return from the dead. what takes place in him will take place in all. so closely bound together are christ’s resurrection and that of the christian, it must be said that if the christian will not rise from the dead, then christ is not risen (cf. 1 cor. 15:13) and mankind is not saved. salvation means union with the risen lord and through him peace with god and between all men, and this is meant not merely in a spiritual sense but in a real, corporeal sense. the resurrection of the faithful completes the victory of christ over sin and death. the resurrection is not a return to the conditions of the present life, but to a life of the spirit, the life already possessed by the risen jesus and communicated from him to those who believe in him. what the resurrection or man in christ means is not only a deliverance from physical death into eternal life. it also means – and this is in some ways more primary – the here-and-now deliverance of man from spiritual death into a life lived in christ and in consciousness of the power of his resurrection. according to the apostle, we shall share in christ’s resurrection principally for the reason that the divine, life-giving spirit of christ and his eternal father abides in us, the living members of christ (cf. rom. 8:11). 214 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 c. gift of the spirit this last passage again draws attention to the holy spirit as the vital link, not only between christ’s resurrection and ours, but also between our present and our future state. that “what is mortal” will be swallowed up by life is even now guaranteed by the gift of the spirit (cf. 2 cor. 5:4-5). for christ “will change our newly body to be like his glorious body, by the power, which enable him to subject all things to himself (phil. 3:21); and this power is the spirit”. indeed, the spirit, the principle of the new life of the christian, is not given until jesus is raised and glorified (cf. jn. 7:39; 16:7), and the first thing the risen lord did when he appeared to the disciples behind locked doors is to breathe the holy spirit upon them (cf. jn. 20:19-23). in fact st. paul regards the giving of the spirit as the characteristic activity of the risen christ (cf. 1 cor. 15:45). he is raised by the spirit, is transformed by the spirit and becomes source of the spirit for the christian. it is arguable that it is at the resurrection that the holy spirit enters history and the christian church is established as the new people of god. st. paul also identifies the spirit’s operation within the christian with that of the risen christ. our very bodies are given life through the spirit, which now possesses us (cf. rom. 8:11). the very same spirit who gave assurance to jesus can assure us in the midst of our struggles and problems and even in the face of death itself. it is the spirit who gives us confidence that we too will rise, not only as individuals, but as the whole and perfect body of christ. the process by which we are “transformed” ultimately to be “conformed” to the body of his glory (cf. phil. 3:21) is but the same process by which christ himself is formed in us. and this begins at baptism where, by incorporation into the body of christ, we come to “belong to another, to him who has been raised from the dead” (cf. rom. 7:4). by such language st. paul relates the risen life at present known in christ to the resurrection yet to come. the agent of this continuity through change is, from the divine of side, the spirit; the vehicle, from the human side, is the body. the resurrection of jesus: our life | 215 caveat where then does the mystery of the resurrection stand in the work of redemption? what is its role and its aftermath in the life and mission of the church? what is the relevance of all this to our life as christians? of what significance is it to us today as christians? faith in the resurrection is something that has such a deep effect on life and has such profound repercussions on all that we do that it cannot be dependent on a few shaky arguments that not everyone accepts. it must have a more solid basis. faith in the resurrection holds two poles together very firm; one in the past, and the other in the future. what about the present? is there a wire that connects one pole to the other and, as it passes through the present, lights up the lamp of life, lets us see the road surface and starts the engine of existence? what use do people who are alive today make of their faith in the resurrection in their lives? is there any resurrection in their lives? for most of us christians today, to all intents and purposes the resurrection has little to do with our lives here and now. it is one of those difficult mysteries of the faith, hidden in the wake of the past and the future, that we’re not very sure what to do with in everyday life. for the first christians, faith in the resurrection was the necessary condition for talking about the life that sprang from the resurrection. faith in the resurrection was the environment within which they lived and out of which they spoke. it was like the air they breathed. both those who talked about the resurrection and those who listened to them lived within this new environment. faith in the resurrection was the root of everything, just as the life we have is the root of everything we do in life. there are two very different ways of approaching and living the same truth of faith. today we situate the object of faith in the resurrection in the past and in the future. the first christians situated it in the present. the way the new testament talks about the resurrection contains many elements that can help us to rethink our way of seeing and living the resurrection. 216 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 to believe in the resurrection is not just to accept a fact from the past and another in the future, but is, first and foremost, an attitude to life arising out of the discovery of a friend, alive in our lives, thanks to the power of god. believing in the resurrection, therefore, is believing, not in a thing, not in arguments, but in someone who acts in us and through us, with immense power, capable of bringing life out of death and making old things new, guiding us toward a future of vast dimensions and possibilities. the key point to faith in the resurrection is that we should discover in our lives this ever-present power of god who is a god of the living. only in this way will we too rise and, once risen, realise the scope of faith in the resurrection. the scientific arguments will not give faith in the resurrection its importance, but the lived experience of the resurrection will give importance to the arguments we discover to defend it. our faith in the resurrection of jesus is not out of human reason alone but reliance on god’s power at work in jesus. the power of god is great. his ability is certain. his faithfulness is sure. his promises never fail. he has promised and he will never fail. we stand on the unconquerable rock of our maker. the only truly convincing proof of the resurrection is life that rises again and is renewed today, that overcomes the powers of death today and enables the repressed and shackled powers of life to be discovered and released to give us all happiness and hope. this is the proof that there is a power stronger than death acting in human beings, the power of the risen christ. where are these signs of the resurrection in our lives to give backing to our words about the resurrection? this is the almighty question we need to search for and answer during this easter season. conclusion christ’s resurrection occupies, as asserted in creedal statements, an essential part of christian faith. it is, as pope john paul ii says, “the greatest event in the history of salvation and indeed, we can say in the history of humanity, since it gives definitive meaning to the world”.19 things can never be the same again. on this great event of good news revolves time and eternity. it completes the revelation of god, who has been trying, since the time of abraham, the resurrection of jesus: our life | 217 to make himself known to us. it is the supreme “epiphany”, for in the risen jesus we have, as john says, seen the “glory” of god (cf. 1 jn. 4:15; 5). at the same time we have the pledge and the first realization of the final state to which the whole human history and with it the whole creation must attain. as found in the easter preface ii “his resurrection is our rising to life”. however this consequence of the resurrection is not just automatic. each one of us must make room for the risen christ in our thoughts, words and deeds. the faith in the resurrection of jesus should have a great influence in our everyday life. if we do not die with him, then we cannot return to life with him (cf. rom. 6:5-11; 2 tim. 2:11). the sacraments of the church, especially baptism and the eucharist, incorporate us with the risen christ, make us become the physical body (people) of the risen christ. that participation in the new life of the risen christ, however, must, if it is to be authentic, be reflected in an external apostolic dynamic, as it was in the lives of the disciples in the post-paschal period. the christian people of every generation have the responsibility to continue this task. as john paul ii points out: every christian in every age and place is a witness to the risen christ. he sees with the eyes of peter and the apostles; he is convinced of the glorious resurrection christ crucified and therefore believes completely in him who is the way, the truth, the life and the light of the world, and proclaims him with a serene courage. the ‘paschal witness’ is thus the specific characteristic of the christian.20 to be credible witnesses of the resurrection, the pope says that our lives must be characterized by three elements: (a) clarity of doctrine; (b) ascetic struggle and consistency of behaviour; (c) apostolic commitment.21 218 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 this is life-long program. it is in fact the christian response to that call to holiness, which was articulated so eloquently by the second vatican council.22 this also has been explicated in practical detail in the papal document on the vocation and mission of the laity.23 however in fidelity to proclaiming the bodily resurrection of jesus, we should never become so defensively governed by apologetics that we do not do justice to the element of transformation and mystery in the risen state (glorified) of christ. on the final note, the call to give witness to the paschal events is not an invitation to an optional commitment. the words of the risen christ, “go therefore into all the world and preach the gospel to the whole of creation” (mark 16:15), have an imperative ring about them. this is one of the most abiding and onerous duties given to the pilgrim church. it is an immortal tradition for every generation of christians. this unchanging nature of christ’s injunction, however, does not affect the means of realizing in concrete its requirements. the church would not be faithful to her own identity and vocation, did she not heed the urgent command to bring the good news to all people. in fact the church cannot avoid this divine commission without doing violence to herself. thus as rev. fr. (dr.) john k. a. aniagwu wrote: “evangelization belongs to the very essence of the church; so that the church can only be church if she evangelizes. if the church were ever to cease to evangelize, then she would cease to be the church, at least the church founded by christ.”24 hence the necessity and relevance of a new era of evangelization worldwide to revive methods, to seek every means by which we can bring the christian message to modern man. such a christian message and mission rested heavily on the resurrection as its essential instrument just as it was in the lives of the disciples in the post-paschal period. without the resurrection of jesus there would have been no message. christians today, as ever before, have no message more central or more important to give to mankind. therefore the resurrection is of central importance in the mystery of redemption and is at the very heart and seal of christian faith a living faith. above all, the resurrection is the seed of our hope. to believe in the resurrection of jesus christ is to believe as well in the the resurrection of jesus: our life | 219 possibility and reality of change in one’s life. what happened in the life of jesus can and will surely be brought about again in the life of his followers who truly believe in him as the resurrection and the life. jesus resurrection life is not a promise that will only be fulfilled in some future existence. this life is available to us here and now even as we await its complete fulfillment at the end of time. endnotes 1. k. stendahl, immortality and resurrection (new york: 1968) in rosemary edet. “leadership in the new testament resurrection/feminist perspective,” the nigerian journal of theology vol. 1 no. (april, 1990), p. 94. 2. donald guthrie, new testament theology (england: inter-varsity press, 1981), p. 372. 3. ferdinand holtz, s. c. j. “the soteriological value of the resurrection of christ,” theology digest vol. 3 (1955), p. 101. 4. karl rahner, foundations of christian faith, translated by willian v. dych (london: darton, longman & todd, 1976), p. 266. 5. eugene joly, what is faith? (new york: hawthorn books, inc., 1958), p. 78. 6. address, 1 march, 1989, no.1. 7. address, 1 march, 1989, no. 3. 8. jean guitton, the problem of jesus: a free thinker’s diary (london: burns & oates, 1955), p. 216. 9. john navone, “the resurrection,” in faith promoting a new synthesis of faith and reason, vol. 34, no. 2 (mar apr 2002), p. 17. 10. ibid. 11. the nigerian journal of theology vol. 1 no. 2 p. 41. 12. address at general audience of 8 mar. 1989, no. 9. 13. address at general audience of 8 mar. 1989, no. 3. 14. “easter, the message of hope”, sunday tribune, 31 march 1991, p. 11. 15. cf. address at general audience of 15 mar. 1989, nos. 4, 5. 16. vatican council ii, pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world, gaudium et spes, no. 22. 17. address at general audience of mar. 1989, no. 4. 18. m. j. scheeben, the mysteries of christianity, st. louis (1961), p. 518. 19. address, 1 mar. 1989, no. 8. 20. address at general audience of 29 mar. 1989, no, 2. 21. cf. ibid. no. 3. 22. cf. dogmatic constitution on the church, lumen gentium, no. 42. 23. post-synodal apostolic exhortation, christifideles laici of his holiness pope john paul ii on “the vocation and the mission of the lay faithful in the church and in the world”, 30 december 1988. 220 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 24. a talk on ‘the call to holiness and evangelization’ given on 10th october 1990 to nigerian federation of catholic students (n.f.c.s.) u. c. h., ibadan branch, 1990 federation week. 12 2 what sayest thou of thyself? some remarks on the entanglement of life and narration and its ethical implications for the philosophical canon björn freter, ph.d independent scholar, knoxville, tennessee, united states of america bfreterb@gmail.com i. life and narration when we are asked who we are, we often answer in stories. let us take a look at an example, namely at the answer given to that very question by john the baptist as told to us by the john the evangelist1. the evangelist has the baptist answer the question posed by the jewish priests and levites “who art thou?” – “σὺ τíς εἶ;” as follows: i am not the christ [ἐγὼ οὐκ εἰμὶ ὁ χριστóς] (john 1:20). the learned men do not understand this cryptic reply. they continue to interrogate john the baptist: what then? art thou elias? (john 1:21) john the baptist responds: i am not [οὐκ εἰμί] (john 1:21). and a third question follows: art thou that prophet? (john 1:21) john responds and, for the third time, only provides a negative confession: “no [οὔ]” (john 1:21). the inquisitors become impatient: who art thou? […] what sayest thou of thyself? (john 1:22) “what sayest thou of thyself?” – “τí λέγεις περὶ σεαυτοῦ;” that is a wonderful explication of the initial question “who art thou?”. who john the baptist is, είναι, is what he has to say, λέγειν, about himself. one could argue that at times the same can hold true for us: who we are is what we have to say about ourselves and, of course, what others have to say about us. we are our stories. we can express who we are by telling – commissioned papers 13 even, as john does, in a highly condensed way – our story. in fact, it seems we have to express ourselves in stories, it seems to be a specific and rather necessary way of being alive as a human being, in other words, using odo marquard’s phrase, “narrare necesse est” – “to narrate is necessary” (marquard 2003, 56, 60, 64, 71). let us turn back to the evangelists’ narration. after his negative confession to christ john the baptist eventually determines himself positively: i am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, make straight the way of the lord, as said the prophet esaias (john 1:23).2 the inquisition is still not over. now the pharisees proceed to question why john baptizes, if he is not the messiah, nor elijah, nor the prophet. john replies: i baptize with water: but there standeth one among you, whom ye know not; he it is, who coming after me is preferred before me, whose shoe's latchet i am not worthy to unloose (john 1:26-27). this is what john the baptist wanted and had – narrare necesse est (to narrate is necessary) – to say about himself – “τí λέγεις περὶ σεαυτοῦ” (john 1:22): initially it is vital to him to make his story distinguishable from the story of the one who is of the foremost importance. he is not the prophet; he is not elias and – most notably – he is not jesus. “οὐκ εἰμί” – “i am not” is stated by john the evangelist in strict opposition to the many times he records jesus saying: “ἐγώ εἰμι …“ – “i am …”3. eventually john the baptist declares who he is positively: he is the one who announces jesus. even this positive confession is a conscious redirection from himself and towards jesus, the one who is coming after – “ὀπίσω” – him. john is the “voice of one crying” – “φωνὴ βοῶντος”, he is announcing the one “whom ye know not;” – “μέσος ὑμῶν στήκει ὃν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε”. this story is who john the baptist is. the story of john the herald of jesus christ is john. this story, john is convinced, is precisely what any person who wishes to know who he is must learn about him. john encounters himself through his story and he tells this story to those who wish to know him. thus those – be it the jewish priests, levites, pharisees or the reader of the story in the present day – need this story to understand him as the human being he understood himself as to be. “to comprehend anything human”, spanish philosopher ortega y gasset observed, “be it personal or collective, one must tell its history” (gasset 1941, 214) – “para comprender algo humano, personal o colectivo, es preciso contar una historia” (gasset 1970, 49). and that means nothing else but: one must make accessible our stories. 14 formation of the human person in the 21st century human beings attempting to comprehend other human beings need to learn about the other’s life stories. here we see that life and narration are, as edmund husserl’s earliest disciples, wilhelm schapp described, entangled (schapp 1953). not only are our histories vital for comprehending the other and that our lives and the stories we tell inextricable, even the stories tell do not necessarily have to be factual. returning to our example, it does not even matter if we consider john the baptist to be a factual or fictious person, the real herald of christ or not. as paul ricœur states, “fiction is quasihistorical, just as much as history is quasi-fictive” (ricœur 1990, 190). german novelist siegfried lenz notes we have to learn that even those experiences ‘made’ by fictious personal still hold relevance for us. our being or vitality is very much alive in the fictitious experience. lenz explains: “experiences made by the invented person do not only concern them; they are transferable experiences. novel characters would never challenge our interest in this way if we did not feel that our matter was being negotiated; we stop and say: that is how it will be. […] at such moments it becomes clear that we need the invented person if we want to give expression to the general or to find the hidden law that underlies human existence.” (lenz 1981, 437-438)4 from this we expand the essential nature of stories from being necessary for understanding others and a fundamental part of our lives to incorporate stories of both fact and fiction that bring vitality to our experiences and our understanding of ourselves and others. we could say, narration is being alive. it seems we would not be able to eradicate our aliveness out of narration, even if we wanted to. when the human being narrates it inevitably add its humanity or vitality into the narration. when the human being narrates it implicitly speaks – λέγειν – of the human being – ἄνθρωπος – in general. conversely, narrating – λέγειν – implies to tell about the human ἄνθρωπος. anthropology implies narration as narration implies anthropology. our aliveness remains alive when it is spoken, written, or sung, in any the narrative form. indeed, we encounter narration as a form extracorporal human vitality. not only are we able to convey this vitality, we are in need of this vitality. it allows us to understand our story, it allows us to be understood and furthermore to understand other human beings. interconnected human life itself comes to reality in stories just as stories come to reality in human life. schapp even insisted, that access to the human being is “only possible through stories, only possible through his [her/their] stories” (schapp 1953, 100)5. commissioned papers 15 being alive is narrative. the telling of stories at all, is possible, because we are alive in a narrative sense. it can be said that stories enable our existence, and our existence enables stories. maybe we can even say that the telling of stories enables the living of stories, and the living of stories enables the telling of stories. life is always life’s story and life’s story is always something living, something living in which we see our vitality reflected back to us. returning to john the baptist we see he is who he is, and he can tell his story because he is his story and he is his story because he can tell it. life is narration and narration is alive. this makes the story of john the baptist being asked who he is a story that can affect us all, whether we understand him to be a herald of christ or something entirely different. certainly, we hear the story of the herald of christ, but we find a human being narratively self-determining himself. this self-determination can speak to any human being. and here the significance of our telling the stories of ourselves takes on crucial importance: the question of “who am i?” is connected at the very foundations of our existence with the question of “what ought i do?”. these questions converge so dramatically at the foundations of existence that they seem to form only one single question: work on the question “who am i?” seems to be the same work as that concerning the question “what should i do?”. martin luther understood the baptist in precisely this sense in a sermon on the gospel according to john. he has john the baptist say: i know neither how to help nor how to advise you [scil. the inquiring scholars], nor indeed myself; but i know of one who can help me and you alike. […] [f]ollow [christ], i and will do so as well (luther 2002, 31).6 follow christ – that is what is to be done here. while we may know the story of john only in its outline, we know not only his actions, his being, but also his “why?”, his practical answer to the question “what ought i do?”. we know john’s ought-to-be: to be a follower – or a precursor – of christ. this connection between being and ought, between what i am and what i ought to be is present in john’s story in concreto, but it is present in abstracto, as the fight for self-determination, for anyone who comes across this narration. when we hear the story of john, we also hear – without this having to be expressly spoken of – his normative narrative. a story, as we would like to put it, thus concerns the genesis of action and the reasons for it, or, put into philosophical terminology, is and ought and the connection between the two at the foundations of existence. our biographical narrative is not an objective narration. in the biographical narrative, in the understanding of the world and oneself according to this biographical narrative, our normative understanding of the world is also reflected. 16 formation of the human person in the 21st century the biographical narrative tells not only of our being, but also of who we are, and this self-determination necessarily includes the ought to which we subject this being. let us summarize our findings: we are our stories. being alive implies being entangled in stories, implies tell one’s story – or at least desiring to have a story – and to deal with stories of other human beings. a hermeneutic of human life needs cannot be complete without taking into account that being alive happens qua narration. an epistemology of human understanding that disregards stories, as far as we can tell, will necessarily be an ignorant reductive epistemology. we have to take stories seriously as a part of the expressivity of human life. ricœur remarked that “the novel occupied a still vacant place in the realm of human sciences” (ricœur 1990, 191) – “le roman occupait ici une place encore vacante dans l'empire des sciences humaines” (ricœur 1985, 278). we agree with ricœur. however, we would like to broaden his understanding and insist that this holds true not only for the novel, but for stories in the broadest sense as we can find it in schapp when he observed that even the “corporeal appearance” of a human being is actually “an appearance of his [her/their] stories” (schapp 1953, 100)7. with stories, the narratives of life, we possess a reservoir of testimonies of human self-understanding that has thus far, despite the works of schapp, ricœur and others – been widely underestimated. we must finally and fully accept narrations as, in the words of austrian thinker robert musil, “contributions to the intellectual dealing with the world” (musil 1978, 942)8. ii. consequences we have to tried to show the mutual implication of life and narration. our hypothesis may seem prima facie deceptively simple, but there are some surprisingly powerful ethical consequences to it. if it is true that stories – in the broadest sense – and human life are inextricably entangled then the disregard of some stories as irrelevant, beyond the canon, or primitive equals the disregard of those people who listen to and tell these stories. the western humanities have hegemonically determined for centuries what stories are of relevance. those stories were mostly written by white, heterosexual men and those stories were mostly written down – even though some foundational figures of the western culture, most notably socrates and jesus, never wrote a single line of their own teachings. the african culture, for example, was and continues to be for its many people who continue to hand down their stories orally deemed ‘primitive’, pre-western, of less relevance, inferior. however, if we take the entanglement of life and narrative seriously, we might have to give up the idea of a narrow canon. commissioned papers 17 of course, can establish different parameters of, for example, the impact of different stories. the story of jesus christ has certainly had a great impact, but that does hardly make the stories of the yoruba or akan any less relevant. it is a still prevailing predominantly western misunderstanding that impact – often advanced by subsequent domination and subordination – is the parameter of relevance. we have to give up the idea of canonical stories as story of superior relevance, of a canon that one has to read to become a human being, of a canon that determines that only those who think within these given stories are truly thinking and thus entitled to speak their thoughts. we have to give up the idea of a general canon, because a general canon is necessarily an antiinclusive and superiorist tool of domination that is compiled by those in power. however, power is not a philosophical argument. there is, if we agree to the interconnectedness of life and narration, no philosophical argument for a canon. any argument for a general canon is an argument against the relevance of all human beings. when we accept life and stories and stories and life as what they are by their blending, we have to understand that ignoring, disregarding, suppressing stories means to ignore, disregard and suppress human life. africa was during the colonial era not allowed to have a story, was not allowed to continue her story. georg wilhelm friedrich hegel famously claimed that africa is “no historical part of the world; it shows no movement or development” (hegel 1986, 129)9, and anything one might of relevance there is actually part of europe’s or asia’s history. africa, in hegel’s opinion, which was highly impactful for the development of what is to be considered part of the philosophical canon and what not, has no story to tell and – and the colonial reality shows the transition of this philosophical assessment into tangible reality – thus there are no living beings to considered as fully human. this practice has to be discontinued. philosophy has to desuperiorized, i.e. philosophy has to understand and dismantle the – implicit or explicit – assumptions of superiority in all its iterations. all must be able to determine who they are so that they can determine how they should act. thus everyone is included in the ethical conversations of our times and we can collaboratively broaden our epistemological understanding and desuperiorize the philosophical canon by making it inclusive so that philosophy as a discipline can be a vital part of our coming history. 18 formation of the human person in the 21st century endnotes 1 we will use the king james version to cite the english text of the new testament and the aland & aland 26th edition for the greek text. 2 see esaias 40:3. 3 see for example john 6:20, 7:9, 10:11 and many more, furthermore see thyen 2005, 112. 4 this is my translation. the german text reads: “erfahrungen, die die erfundene person macht, betreffen nicht nur sie; es sind übertragbare erfahrungen. niemals würden romanfiguren unser interesse derart herausfordern, wenn wir nicht spürten, daß an ihnen auch unsere sache verhandelt wird; wir stutzen und sagen: so ist es, so wird es sein. […] in solchen augenblicken wird deutlich, daß wir auf die erfundene person angewiesen sind, wenn wir dem allgemeinen ausdruck verschaffen oder die verborgene gesetzmäßigkeit auffinden wollen, die dem menschlichen dasein zugrundeliegt“. 5 this is my translation. the full german passage reads: “wir meinen auch, daß der zugang zu dem mann, zu dem menschen, nur über geschichten, nur über seine geschichten erfolgt“. 6 this is my translation. the german text reads: „ich weiß euch [scil. den gelehrten] nicht zu helfen noch zu raten, auch mir selbst nicht; sondern ich weiß und kenne einen, der mir und euch helfen kann. […] [h]änget euch an [christus], ich wills auch tun”. 7 this is my translation. the german text reads: “das leibliche auftauchen des menschen [ist] nur ein auftauchen seiner geschichten ist“. 8 this is my translation. the german text reads: “beiträge zur geistigen bewältigung der welt”. musil refers here only to the novel. 9 this is my translation. the full german passage reads: “[afrika] ist kein geschichtlicher weltteil, er hat keine bewegung und entwicklung aufzuweisen, und was etwa in ihm, das heißt in seinem norden geschehen ist, gehört der asiatischen und europäischen welt zu“. abstract� in this paper, we assess some factors that are obstacles to healthy christian – muslim relations in a pluralistic society such as nigeria. for several years there have been crises between christians and muslims in nigeria, most especially in the northern part. christianity and islam are two of the three major religions in nigeria, the african traditional religion being the third. sufce to point out here that christians, muslims, and adherents of the african traditional religion live together, buy and sell in the same markets, work in ofces together, and sometimes even inter-marry in various communities in nigeria. in this kind of scenario one still wonders the sometimes show of hatred between christians and muslims. tracing historically the two religions under focus it is pertinent to note that both religions are called the religions of the book and share a common heritage. the research methodology adopted here are socio-historical, and evaluative approaches. one of the research ndings is that authentic education of adherents by both religions is the panacea to healthy relations between the christians and muslims in nigeria. this work concludes with the fact that the existing religious climate in nigeria is a direct result of certain actions, utterances, and insinuations all unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations in nigeria as a pathway to authentic dialogue felix ehimare enegho, ph.d. professor of church history and mission studies research fellow, department of christian spirituality, church history and missiology university of south africa, pretoria felixenegho@gmail.com of which are preventable. this is to suggest that if nigerians are sincere in their quest for religious harmony and peaceful co-existence, the rst step is to address the issue of factors, which are inimical to religious unity and peaceful co-existence. subsequently, the nal solution becomes easily attainable. keywords: unity, diversity, christian, muslim, pathway, dialogue, nigeria introduction the quest for peace by all in our world today cannot be overemphasized. but there can be no peace without tolerance from inhabitants living together in human society. peace is an opposite of strife. to eliminate strife and crises within human society is the responsibility of all persons who genuinely want a peaceful society. � nigeria as a nation with three major religions, african traditional religion, christianity, and islam have overtime be bedeviled by strife, chaos, and outright crises which have often led to underdevelopment. while the african traditional religion, the oldest religion in nigeria has been quite docile and accommodating to other religions, the attitude of the adherents of christianity and islam has not been quite encouraging. for several years now, some adherents of these two religions have continued to see one another as enemies and competitors in their bid to proselytizing within the nigerian nation. this unhealthy attitude has continued to constitute a cog in the wheel of progress as far as religions are concerned in nigeria. � this paper aims to assess those lingering issues in christian–muslim dialogue in the nigerian context to ameliorate the crises that such issues have raised. we are quite aware of the bickering going on between the christians and muslims in the nigerian state. this work sets to outline those issues and thereafter suggest ways that would bring about worthwhile dialogue between the christians and muslims, which invariably would lead to peaceful co-existence between adherents of the two religions. the research 206 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 methodology adopted here is sociohistorical, and evaluative approaches what is dialogue? since the 1970s, interreligious dialogue has made unprecedented advances. in this relatively short period, a number of initiatives have emerged, including dialogue groups, encounter centres, interreligious organizations, academic and popular journals, and academic programmes, where the possibilities of interreligious dialogue are studied. depending on the participants (laypeople, religious leaders, theologians, and monks), the structure (local/international, small/large-scale, bilateral/multilateral), and the themes to be discussed daily concerns, ethical challenges, spiritual experiences, doctrinal issues, etc, interreligious dialogue can take diverse forms. these can range from encounters between academics in which the exchange of religious ideas is central to those between grassroots groups that are engaged in joint emancipation projects and dialogue, from diplomatic consultations between religious leaders to interreligious prayer meetings in which buddhist and christian monks share experience and insights on meditational practices. they can span the spectrum from encounters focused on action regarding concrete local, national, or ethical challenges such as global warming, human rights, etc., to scriptural reasoning groups in which jews, christians, and muslims read one another's scripture, from personal conversations to international conferences with hundreds of participants, from spontaneous encounters between people who live in the same neighbourhood to colloquia of specialists planned a long time in advance. these different types of dialogue, each in their own way, promote positive and constructive relations with individuals and communities of other faiths that are aimed at mutual understanding 1 and enrichment. 1marianne mayaert, “interreligious dialogue” in cheetham, david, prat douglas, and thomas, david (eds.), understanding interreligious relations. oxford: oxford university press, 2013, 201-202. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 207 dialogue as a term implies a conversation or an attempt to construct a bridge between two people or two communities with the purpose of coming to mutual understanding, respect, reconciliation, peaceful co-existence, and collaborative action for mutual growth in all aspects of human life. dialogue also connotes an exchange of opinions, assumptions, convictions, experiences, principles, beliefs between two representatives of different cultures, customs, 2 traditions, academic disciplines, religious beliefs, etc. � diversity is made up of enrichment and not necessarily a reason for a struggle. also, we are aware of the fact that the breath and plurality epistemologies impede any claim of dominance or exclusivity or absoluteness by any kind of research or search for 3 existence among different communities and countries. � dialogue is connected deep down with the search for truth and a striving for wisdom. it excludes fanaticism. a fanatic is someone who, convinced that he/she is absolutely right, locks himself/herself up in his/her position and refuses any critical testing or challenge. dialogue presupposes precisely the engagement of people with critical minds, who question the obvious and also give 4 room for others to challenge them. 'what all dialogues have in common is that they always concern a history of homo loquens, who 5is driven by reason, seeks wisdom.' in that sense, it is not surprising that the existence of dialogue and philosophy have been connected right from the start. although the adventure of dialogue started in greece with plato, the philosophical hermeneutics of han-georg gadamer especially can assist us to gain a better understanding of what is at stake in the dialogue between the religions. although he did not engage philosophical hermeneutics with a view to interreligious dialogue, reection on interreligious dialogue is greatly indebted to 2joseph bitole, kato, “reections on inter-religious dialogue: an african pastoral perspective.” in klaus kramer and klaus vellguth. mission and dialogue: approaches to communicative understanding of mission, quezon city: claretian publications, 2012, 45. 3ibid. 4ibid, 206. 5ibid. 208 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 gadamer. his hermeneutical model of conversion often resounds in reections on interreligious dialogue. as sallie b. king correctly remarks: 'dialogue and hermeneutics are at base about a very 6mysterious thing: the process of coming to understand the other'. pathway to authentic dialogue in our world dialogue has become such a fashionable word in recent times. we consider it progressive to discuss the need for the dialogue of religions and cultures and how to become competent for dialogue. it is generally accepted that interaction between human beings of diverse origins, leads to a positive result and is for that reason desirable. it naively assumes that people who know each other faceto-face are likely to develop an afnity for each other. but is the opposite not also possible? here, we mean people who get in touch with each other and know each other's views thus creating the opportunity for dissent and conict, perhaps even violence. obviously, more is needed for dialogue than just a coming together and speaking with each other or with one another. this additional feature is known as “good intention”, or the a priori positive inclination towards each other, the willingness to listen, the expectation of enrichment and the hope for a personal meeting of minds. unless the good intention exists, a dialogue is impossible. this positive inclination towards each other is an occidental heritage. it is a reection and a consequence of the christian command to love one's neighbour. it embraces whoever happens to be near; that is, 7potentially it includes everyone. � dialogue can be dialogue only if the focus is on the otherness, when the other can also truly be other; when the strange is not colonized. in the interreligious dialogue as well, openness cannot mean that the other is completely understood as such. the understanding of the other does not happen in a neutral space; our 6ibid, 206-207. 7martin kampchen, “dialogue between christianity and hinduism” in klaus kramer and klaus vellguth (eds). spirituality of the universal church rediscovering faith. quezon: claretian publications, 2014, 201. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 209 prejudices, commitments, and convictions help to determine how we approach the other and his/her tradition. human beings are situated and embodied beings, and we can never fully transcend our historical and cultural context. 'we never see from a god's – eye point of view, we never think from a neutral place or tabula rasa, but always from a specic point of view rooted in our culture, our language, our worldview, and our individual life experiences. there is no escaping 8� being rooted in the particular in this way' dialogue is a revelation of a christian–enlightenment optimism. it claims that conversation pays off because people are different. conversation is another ingredient of dialogue and is such a useful tool to discover differences and liberate oneself from illusions. it is useful because we expect that beyond those differences there lies something which unites us and which we can discover in our conversations. whatever we may have in common does not mollify these differences. however, our christian optimism demands that the common features are given more weight, thereby reducing the 9 perceived differences to insignicance. � one wonders the concept to be used in describing this common bond beyond all differences. is it the human factor, the divine in man, the holy spirit, or the divine soul in every human being? only when this common feature dwelling in every human person can be activated and put into constructive use will dialogue make sense. this means that the rst condition for dialogue is that it should take place between two partners with equal rights, meaning who are equal because god has equally endowed them with that common heritage. no cultural or religious superiority can be expressed, not even in innuendoes or by uttering obsolete clichés. a constant watch over our language, also body language, is needed to 10 avoid slipping into our clichés of superiority. in the case of nigeria, christians must never encounter muslims with a sense of superiority; neither should muslims show superiority towards christians. the 8marianne mayaert, “interreligious dialogue”, 208. 9martin kampchen, “dialogue between christianity and hinduism”, 201. 10ibid, 202. 210 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 claim that christianity is the only religion capable of salvation should not be the case because the muslims are also god's children created in his image and likeness and therefore, also on the path leading to paradise. some areas of divergence in christianmuslim relations we do not intend to highlight all the areas of conicts between christianity and islam in nigeria and other nations of the world. this analysis is just a microcosm of the divergence in the understanding of one another by the christians and muslims in our world. � we commence this section with anecdotal history which relates to an encounter in the mid 1960s between dr. nnamdi azikiwe who was nigeria's rst president and alhaji ahmadu bello, a onetime premier and sarduna of sokoto. the story related by johnson mbillah, general coordinator of the programme for christian – muslim relations in africa, is transmitted as follows: the two leaders met to discuss the growing tensions between coalition partners in central government (the northern people's congress and the national council of nigerian citizens). the tension brought to the fore open divergences between the majority christian south which was degenerating into ethnoreligious antagonism. in the cause of dialogue to restore some understanding, dr. azikiwe is quoted to have said to ahmadu bello, “let us forget our differences.” ahmadu bello replied, “no, let us understand our differences… by 11 understanding our differences we can build unity in nigeria.” from the perspective of islam, christianity is one-sided in its preoccupation with spiritual matters; it is exclusively concerned with the salvation of people's soul in the hereafter. but what does it have to say about life in this world, especially about social and political matters? secondly, the separation of state and religion is alien to islam; it is a western and christian idea. thirdly, christianity distinguishes between the things that are god's and the things that are 11martha th frederiks, “let us understand our differences: current trends in christian-muslim relations in sub-sahara africa” in marina ngursangzeli behera (ed.) interfaith relations after one hundred years: christian mission among other faiths. oxford: regnum books international, 2011, 49. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 211 caesar's. how then should one understand ventures carried out in the 12 name of christianity such as the crusades and colonialism? � islam understands itself as the nal revealed religion, fullling and superseding all earlier religions. judaism is one-sided in its preoccupation with this world; christianity is one-sided in its emphasis on the spiritual. islam in contrast is the perfect, harmonious religion of the middle way (cf. qur'an 5:3 and the reference to din wasat at 2:143, which is interpreted in this sense of a mediating religion). islam concerns body and soul, social, political and religious life, prosperity in this world and the hereafter. christianity, on the other hand, sacrices the body and the soul; it deals only with religion (din) and ignores politics and the state (dawla), setting no store by prosperity in this world, but rather laying all its hope on 13heaven. to varying degrees, such ideas are widespread among muslims. it needs to be acknowledged that several features of the th image that christianity offered in the 19 century lent support to this grossly oversimplied view. typical in this regard are phrases like 'the saving of souls' in this valley of tears'; a widespread negative view of the body and especially of sexuality, what at times was portrayed as sin's chief domain; the concepts of christianity as a 14private religion and of politics as a 'dirty business; and so on. � majority of muslims see monasticism and the practice of celibacy for the sake of the faith as a typically christian phenomenon which leaves its stamp on the entire christianity. they regard it as an embodiment of a 'ight from the world' (al-rar min al –dunya) which the 'healthy' perspective of islam rmly rejects. it should be noted, however, that this traditional muslim perspective of christianity has in recent years undergone a partial change. muslims often declare their interest in the efforts of the christian churches to gain a hearing in the sphere of politics and public opinion of issues of 12christian w. troll, muslims ask, christian answer. lahore: multi media affairs, 2012,103. 13ibid. 14ibid,104. 212 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 peace and justice in the name of the poor, the marginalized, and the oppressed. muslim thinkers are interested in liberation theology because it issues a call to struggle against political oppression and 15social injustice. christian mission and islam in nigeria today the shared history of christians and muslims indicates that it does not matter who is politically or culturally dominant, muslims or christians, perhaps with some exceptions in the ninth century, conict and confrontation have been a norm. the principle of 'exchange' has rarely been explored. in the early arab middle east, which experienced the muslim conquest and was integrated within the expanding muslim rule, only muslims had full rights. this may have partly contributed to the decline of eastern christianity. their migrations, even in our contemporary time (e.g. in turkey and iraq) are perhaps a sign of the continuing conicts (most of it avoidable, as in iraq). islam and christianity have been guilty of taking their notion of truth and reality to extremes and in hating the other enough to wage 16wars. � there is certainly something worthwhile that modern christians and muslims in nigeria need to learn from the ninth century dialogues. mark beaumont's work on christology indicates how christians presented 'christ for muslims' in what he called 'the th most creative period of christian-muslim dialogue' (9 century). thwhat is interesting is that he compares it with the 20 -century dialogue which follows a similar trajectory and this is where his signicant contribution lies. christians believed there were continuities between the two faiths. islam on the other hand already had the christ and their task was simply to build on this preunderstanding. in such an open and honest context even the seemingly intractable problems of jesus' divinity and crucixion 15ibid 16david emmanuel singh, “hundred years of christian – muslim relations: mission to interfaith relations” in marina ngursangzeli behera (ed.) interfaith oxrelations after one hundred years: christian mission among other faiths. ford: regnum books international, 2011, 39. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 213 could be explained and people were civil enough to hear them speak. they may eventually reject the idea but not before they had properly 17heard them. � the comparative framework for beaumont's study was intended to serve as a model for dialogue. for him what characterized christians from these periods was their ability to listen to muslims and their objections and take their 'concerns seriously'. there existed genuine commitment to engaging with them and although, they might eventually not accept christian claims, christian commitment to continue fostering this relationship and creative exchange held promise. this sort of friendly persistence was exactly what jesus intended in 'the parable of the sower' in mark 4. jesus spoke creatively in parables not to confuse people and prevent them from comprehending but to secure understanding. the question of acceptance was the prerogative of the listener. some thinkers go a step further in seeking to understand and secure an understanding of their respective faiths in the spirit of friendship and service. apostolov, for instance, in his 'christian-muslim frontiers' searches for an interface between christianity and islam from the new perspective of intercultural theology. the key notions in this approach are 'interface' or the 'zone of contact' where theologies 18intersect. � the notion of 'interface' or the 'zone of contact' (rather than conict) is quite interesting. it conceives of religions as representing as it were, different circles. much of these circles are unique to the religions they represent; meaning that the greater space in these stands on its own may owe to the unique trajectories they have traversed in their political, social, cultural, and economic history. however, between these circles, there appear, 'zones of contact' or 'interfaces' which may also be due to historical contacts between them, the natural osmosis of ideas and possibly also the common operations of a just and loving god, the creator of all beings and the spirit of christ. from the perspective of the idea of exchange through 17ibid, 39-40. 18ibid, 40. 214 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 such zones of contact, we have the example of w.c. smith who purposefully worked assiduously to emphasize 'interfaith' and particularly christianity's relations with islam. according to him, it was not about sacricing religious distinctiveness as that was the greater part of religious identities. the traditional approach, for smith, assumed that islam and christianity are two distinct religions and civilizations and as such presented them as separate circles. it is not a surprise therefore, that confrontation and conict have characterized their history. their relationship as a result is still largely understood and construed in terms of clash rather than cooperation and acceptance. therefore, smith's call, was for 'a new mental map', simply 'understanding' the other and securing their understanding of another's faith but to lead to genuine relations expressed in and through a common theology. this theology would be based on the premise that truth was a 'humane' and 'not an objective' concept. it was not contained in 'beliefs or doctrines' but was 'a function of the inner person.' if the nature of truth was concrete and not abstract then 19 it was something that grew in human engagement with it. christian communities and relations with others there is the need for urgent dialogue and collaborative solidarity from all faith-based organizations, communities, and cultural groups in africa (and most especially in nigeria) for the following reasons: a). the perceived dechristianisation of some nations which were for centuries considered to be the origin and hub of christianity, its inspiration, human and material resources for missionary activities in africa and worldwide; b). the general decreasing religious sense in society for several reasons, such as absolute or extreme materialism, socialism, egoistic individualism, and hedonistic tendencies (benedict xvi 43). the alarming share of ignorance of judeo christian principles and values in nigerian local christian communities whose population is 19ibid, 40-41. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 215 demographically increasing but lacking in deep christian conviction 20and commitment. c). the ideology of absolute human freedom that divinizes a created human being to the extent that those who embrace it ignore and devalue the rights of the community, senselessly exploit nature including fellow human beings; or the conviction that god does not 21intervene in human society. the mission is the reason for which an organization or a community was created, chosen, elected such as the church to do, or the reason why it exists. jesus christ tasks the church to bring the light of the gospel to all humanity without exemption. this task is executed via the tripartite ministry of jesus christ and his church, meaning, the prophetic, liturgical or sacramental and shepherding or deaconia or witnessing to gospel values and law of love of god and 22 neighbour. it is through love that dialogue comes into play; loving not only brothers and sisters and neighbours but strangers, opponents, true enemies, or those we merely perceive to be against our cherished interests. in this context; muslims, hindus, buddhists, animists, members of christian sects, extreme secularists, materialists, people with hedonistic tendencies, all are fellow partners with christians in the dialogue journey and process. the purpose of dialogue is that there exist several persons who are born, grow up, and educated in a cultural context that completely disregards or ignores the idea or 23 reality of god, the transcendental dimension, to mention just a few. a. the old classic absolute secularists who nd it a herculean task to imagine the existence of god; 20joseph, bitole, kato, “reections on inter-religious dialogue: an african pastoral perspective.” in klaus kramer and klaus vellguth. mission and dialogue: approaches to communicative understanding of mission. quezon city: claretian publications, 2012,43. 21ibid, 44. 22ibid, 45. 23ibid, 45-46. 216 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 b. the agnostics who purposely or intentionally refuse to decide whether to believe in god or not; c. the positivists who take pride in rejecting any reality that cannot be scientically tested, measured and veried through laboratory gadgetry or bodily senses; d. the extreme humanists who divinize the human being as having the absolute capacity to control and know every reality through scientic and technical know-how; thus giving him or her the unlimited power and freedom to do anything in his or her favour 24 and pleasure. e. the muslims who though believe in god and many of the characters and stories in the christian bible have their mindset and conviction on how god should be worshipped from the perspective of islam. the process of dialogue does not exclude any person(s) in these categories. nigerian christians need not see the muslims as enemies but rather as neighbours on the same road to knowing god and working towards the realization of god's kingdom here on earth. they are fellow pilgrims on the path to paradise where all mortals strive to reach to be united with the almighty god. christians in nigeria need to understand how christians elsewhere around the world are relating to muslims and surviving amid any situation. perhaps coptic christianity in egypt and ethiopia serves as a good example of intentional disjunction and separation. indeed coptic christianity is a brave survivor in a context dominated by islam. its marginalization in egypt does not make for a pleasant spectacle. even at that, one of the contemporary responses to this has been a reafrmation of a distinct identity that is rooted in an ancient culture that does not have another living parallel. this kind of identity serves to assert their unique discourse on egyptian – ness and coptic christian identity that is not shared by egyptian islam. separateness is emphasized to inspire the revival of a distinct identity and communal pride. this type of recollection or coming together 24ibid, 46. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 217 does not have its advantages in a context of overt discrimination and outright hostility but only for a time. it almost seems like coptic christianity is reliving a period of rst 'contact'. what it needs to further its relevance in egypt will require an immense sense of faith 25 to transcend to the level of 'cooperation' and 'exchange' with islam. the idea of conceiving christianity and islam in absolute circles may have been a welcome development in an era of political conicts of the western christianity with the east, but today we live more or less in a different world. we have the benets of hindsight. we remember vividly the crusades and the world wars and not forgetting the iraq war spearheaded by george w. bush which was actually not necessary because they were simply made to happen. they owe to certain ideological positions sometimes religiously legitimized. they could all have been avoided. there is the need to bear in mind that today, a majority of the christians live in the east where christianity is also growing. christianity can no longer be equated with the west. the great ideologically conicting axes of the west and islam cannot be simplistically equated with christianity versus islam. this way of thinking has serious consequences for the ancient christian minorities living in 'islamic' lands and generally for muslims and christians in africa and asia alike. in the case of nigeria just like elsewhere in the african continent, christians live with muslims and are often part of the same cultural and civilizational 'circles'. there is often a greater degree of overlap between the christians and their muslim neighbours than them and western christians. therefore, emphasis needs to shift to relations as we search with bennett (2008) for bases for peace and justice and 26 reconciliation. interreligious dialogue between christians and muslims in nigeria in nigeria, interreligious dialogue dates back from the second coming of christianity to the present geographical entity now called 25ibid, 41-42. 26ibid, 42. 218 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 thnigeria. its rst appearance in the 15 century was both brief and uneventful, as the portuguese traders who practiced their christian faith alongside their primary business adventure did not pursue evangelization with vigour, and they were also confronted with many unresolved challenges. there was no report of any clash between muslims and christians. however, the second appearance of th christianity in nigeria in the 19 century was ushered in with a determined effort on the part of various christian denominations church missionary society (c.m.s) at the forefront to convert muslims and others. no sooner had the missionaries settled down to business than informal discussions and consultations began. such discussions sometimes took place between muslims and christians and some other times between muslims and the colonial rulers who being christians themselves had always thrown all their ofcial 27 weight behind the missionaries. � the muslims in nigeria found the method used by the christian missionaries for evangelization as offensive, especially the use of education as bait to de-islamise muslim homes. the emergent discussions ranged between asking for a three hour on friday to full an important religious obligation and a provision for the muslim youth education system that should be devoid of christian colouration. such isolated cases of discussions and consultations represented the very early forms of interreligious dialogue in nigeria. but with the inception of tertiary education in nigeria and the subsequent proliferation of universities in which religious studies discipline was and is given some recognition, interreligious dialogue emerged as a tool to foster understanding and mutual respect between 28muslims and christians as well as adherents of other faiths. dialogue is rst and foremost meant to celebrate a common belief in god. dialogue brings together the community of believers of men and women who confess to the greatness of god and consciously employ this communality for the spread of peace and justice and love. 27muritala aderemi bidmos, inter – religious dialogue: the nigerian experience. abuja: panaf publishing, inc., 2006, 133-134. 28ibid,134. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 219 it is meant as a vehicle and a powerful sign in a world characterized by injustice and a lack of faith. by associating with non-christian communities for some length of time we become aware of the fact that they worship their god or their gods with the same fervor and dedication as christians do. dialogue professes the general aim to learn about the experiences and realizations of other religions and in 29 this way nd a new depth and breadth in their own religion. � understanding the missionary nature of islam and christianity is very imperative in any discourse on the interreligious dialogue between the two faiths in nigeria just as elsewhere around the world. inviting people to the worship of god is an obligatory duty in the monotheistic religions. in islam, for instance, the invitation is called da’wah and it is made compulsory on the muslim ummah (community). “let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong: 30they are the ones to attain felicity. (qur'an 3:104). also, the question of the mission is fundamental in christianity. the christians are instructed as a matter of duty to embark on the spread of the 31 gospel: “but as for you, go and proclaim the kingdom of god.”. the intriguing question applicable to both muslims and christians is, what extent have the faithful in nigeria complied with these golden and divine injunctions about da'wah and mission? the situation so far is that of awful disgust as some of those who claim to be calling people to the way of god have often conducted themselves in a manner considered a agrant violation of the tenets of their religions. for example, there have been incidents of clashes between muslims and christians during preaching sessions due to a group expressing unprintable words which the opposite group would consider offensive and react to spontaneously and violently too. the 1986 ilorin and the 1987 kafanchan incidents are good examples. it is obvious that the ugly incidents took place due to over-zealousness to win converts coupled with the unbridled utterances and violation of 29martin kampchen, “dialogue between christianity and hinduism”, 209. 30muritala adeyemi bidmos, inter – religious dialogue: the nigerian experience, 46. 31ibid,50. 220 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 32the divine principles guiding preaching. � islam and christianity lay down very clear and adequate regulations in pursuance of da’wah and mission. if these were strictly followed, there would be no case of bloody clashes during preaching sessions. the prospective preachers will be doing themselves and the faiths they represent a lot of good if they would 33 comply with the regulations. � another body that can play a key role in healthy interreligious dialogue is the press. it is a well-known fact that the traditional function of the press in any society is to inform, entertain, and educate. the mass media practitioners, like any other professionals, have a code of conduct that governs their practice. within the context of their professional immunity or license, they can decide on which of the many events covered by them is newsworthy. by implication, they reserve the right, by virtue of their profession and training, to determine what information or news item to feed their audience with. with regard to religious affairs in nigeria, it may be important to redene the role of the mass media practitioners, particularly in terms of what events they will nd newsworthy. the mass media reports, news analysis, and features are most likely capable of playing a positive or negative role in the relationship between muslims and christians depending on the intention and orientation of the journalist 34concerned. more often than not, the reactions of the muslims to the actions of a christian or vice-versa are determined by the mass media reports. it will be difcult for instance, to reconcile the objectivity, which supposedly constitutes the bedrock of the etiquette of journalism and the role played so far by the journalists in the following situations: first, during the second republic in nigeria (1979 – 83) a press report stormed the entire country like a thunderbolt. there was an allegation that the muslims had been given ten million naira (n10,000,000) by the then federal government, to 32ibid, 51-52. 33ibid, 51. 34ibid unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 221 build a central mosque in abuja, the new federal capital. the gesture was seen as a favour to the muslims and contempt for, or neglect of, the christians. the tension caused by the report was better imagined. even the prompt intervention of the government to explain the matter could not help the situation. the truth of the matter as given by a prominent member of the ruling party who incidentally was a christian was that both muslim and christian groups were given ten million naira each to build a mosque and church respectively in the new federal capital. the circumstances that led to the speculation came up when the muslims commenced work on their mosque project in earnest. they had mobilized their resources to contribute more money enough to erect a magnicent mosque. but for the christian church, information gathered indicates that the christians had to hold prolonged deliberations to resolve some nagging problems. it seemed that the press had hidden motive as the press was not willing to give an explanation offered by the government over the matter the same prominence given earlier to the damaging speculation. while some newspapers did not see the need to carry the story, others that carried it did so obviously reluctantly, as the report 35was tucked obscurely in one corner of the papers. secondly, the part played by the press in the religious crisis in kaffanchan in 1987 was surely not in the interest of peaceful coexistence between muslims and christians. the newspapers, radio and television programmes devoted their front-page headlines, editorial comments, and features to the reactions of the muslims in kano, kaduna, and zaria. whereas what transpired in those places represented the muslims' reaction to the original action of the killing of muslim students and the burning of their mosque in kaffanchan on july 6-7, 1987. the public was grossly misinformed by the press as they were fed with partial reports. such reports by the press led to 36muslims and christians ghting themselves. the electronic media too often give prominence to events that are negative and capable of causing hatred and antagonism between 35ibid, 51-53. 36ibid, 53. 222 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 muslims and christians. such events as the maitatsine riot of 1980, the bauchi and katsina unrests of 1991 were given wide publicity at the prime period of network bulletins. if the nigerian press was indeed interested in religious harmony in the country, they would nd several events that take place daily in nigeria that can promote unity 37 and cooperation between the muslims and christians. the stand of islam on alcohol is very clear. alcohol in all ramications, its brewing, distribution, consumption, entertainment, etc is forbidden to muslims. whereas, a substantial part of the nation's resources is earmarked to the brewing industry whereby alcohol is produced in such a quantity as to make alcoholic drinks more accessible than potable water in almost all parts of nigeria. in the health sector, facilities such as the ambulances, which are bought and maintained with the public funds in which the muslims are also contributors, carry the red cross sign. theologically, the religious symbolism of the red cross is not acceptable by the muslims. similarly, the common law practiced in nigeria is of western origin, and it is a truism that somehow christianity seem to be interwoven 38 into the western culture. in nigeria just as elsewhere in our global community, christians habitually live in close contact with muslims. for this reason, christians often feel the psychological urge to set themselves apart. however, such an identity must never be cultivated for its own sake, meaning for selsh motives. instead, nigerian christians should emphasize their identity so as to discover a new depth and maturity in their religion. this may also mean that christians absorb certain elements from islam or other religions and integrate them into their way of living the christian faith. just like other tradition, the christian tradition remains alive and vibrant only by continuing to develop and grow. it must be involved in a constant process of selfdoubt and self-discovery. accordingly, christians in nigeria must learn to strike a balance between two seemingly contradictory goals: on the one hand, to maintain an identity separate from the identity of 37ibid,53-54. 38ibid,58-59. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 223 the muslims and on the other hand, to learn from muslims for the 39 purpose of renewal of their christian faith. the second vatican council theologians suggested that christianity “fulls” the other religions which are so to speak, “prechristian”. these were theological crutches that shed away from formulating a genuine pluralism of religions. dialogue cannot but assume such a genuine pluralism. when engaging in dialogue, christians need to take muslims as seriously as they do their own faith. if they fail to do so, they cannot accept and treat their partners in 40 dialogue as full and equal partners. in conversing amicably with the 'other' person, you must set aside some of your ideas about his inferiority. indeed, if you genuinely want to comprehend his outlook and to learn something from him, you will quickly nd yourself admitting that your defensive beliefs are mere 'defences' and are far from being objective statements. the point being made here is that in interfaith dialogue, participants must abandon their defensive attitude and adopt an attitude of openness. openness implies readiness to look at the other man's beliefs from his point of view, to place them in the best possible light for understanding them, and to see that, even in some belief or practice which at rst seems meaningless or abhorrent, there may be 41 an element of truth. in interfaith dialogue, therefore, the participants should aim at faithfully representing their respective positions in an earnest effort to create a deeper understanding of each other's religious commitments. the two sides are free to express their views, ideas, doubts, objections, and agreements with complete freedom and without inhibitions, but necessarily in an atmosphere of goodwill and understanding. since nigeria is a pluralistic and 'inter-religious' society, there is an ever-growing interdependence in every aspect of our material life, interfaith dialogue is therefore to be seen as an 39ibid, 209. 40ibid,210. 41joshua idowu-fearon, “the imperative of dialogue for the survival of nigeria: lessons from christian-muslim relations” in leadership (online newspaper) accessed 14 october 2019. 224 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 imperative for the evolution of a truly happy and prosperous multireligious society. interfaith is to be accepted as an opportunity to describe and witness to one another. for too long we have described the 'other' from our own understanding resulting in prejudice, stereotyping, and condescension. this is a false witness and the bible 42 commands us not to bear false witness. recommendations; for a healthy relationship between the muslims and christians in nigeria, there is the need to suggest the following recommendations: the claim of the uniqueness of one's religion is psychologically easy to understand. in the old testament, we encounter a jealous god who is venerated by a jealously loyal devotee. neither god nor the devotee wishes to accept somebody equal beside them. god reveals himself as god when he emerges victorious from the competition with other gods. this kind of tribalism is inherent in the psyche of everyone in the global community. distinguishing between various tribes, social groups and economic strata comes naturally to human beings. we believe that 43only enormous efforts can free humans from it. often times we transfer group mentality from our human society to god. divine revelation of the different religions expresses itself through languages that are human-made and shaped by history. they speak to us from a particular historical context into our contemporary context. god is shown as a god who does not tolerate other gods beside him. this path towards the realization that there cannot be but one god, only one divine being that reveals himself/herself/itself in each religion – this path is long and requires prayer, contemplation, dialogue, and most importantly, the 44 renunciation of selshness. there is always a tendency to base one's image of islam and muslims on second-hand information from a distant, instead of entering into explorative dialogue with the muslim neighbour next 42ibid 43martin kampchen, “dialogue between christianity and hinduism”, 202. 44ibid. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 225 door. as a way of reducing this hatred between christians and muslims in some parts of our country, we must seriously try to identify with our muslim/christian friends, try to see people, society, and the world from their point of view, thereby gaining true understanding. to some extent there are possibilities for a process of mutual learning, e.g. through participation in one another's religious festivals. a basic principle, to begin with, is the 8th commandment; to speak well and respectful of one another, thus breaking the vicious 45circle of “prejudice by tradition.” conclusion as we round off this work it may be appropriate to use an analogy one of these researchers saw on a social media platform where one of his friends adams had an encounter at a bank premise. he went to an ebank hall and as he was entering the hall, a lady ran ahead of him and pushed him away, so she could quickly join the long queue before him. he refused to react in any way. she thought he would queue behind her, but he was actually not there to withdraw money but to make a deposit. so he walked to the deposit machine and he was the only one there and no other depositor joined the queue till he was through with his transaction. as he was set to leave the hall, the lady left the queue to apologize for her earlier rude attitude towards him. with a sorry smile on her face, she said “i am sorry sir for pushing you away, i thought you were coming to the queue, adams simply smiled and told her not to bother that it was not a big deal. but since then, the lesson in this story kept coming to his mind. he asserts that we do not have to push away or try to outrun anyone in the race of destiny, relationship, business, ministry, career, religion, etc. we should not always think we are going to the same queue (destination) with others. unknown to you, though your path may look alike, your destinations are different. in like manner, with the analogy above, christians and muslims in nigeria must never forget their differences but rather must learn to understand their differences. they may be different in worldview but the two religions lead people to the same 45joshua idowu-fearon, “the imperative of dialogue for the survival of nigeria 226 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 god via different methods and paths. the acrimony most times between christianity and islam leading to disagreements and tensions are from lack of proper understanding of the true meanings of christianity and islam on the path of some uninformed adherents of the two religions. for this reason, there is a need for the proper education of persons by the hierarchy of the two religions in nigeria. lack of proper education is the reason for the shallow understanding of what christianity and islam truly are. 46 finally, we share the view of bidmos that the existing religious climate in nigeria is a direct result of certain actions, utterances, and insinuations all of which are preventable. this is to suggest that if nigerians are sincere in their quest for religious harmony and peaceful co-existence, the rst step is to address the issue of factors, which are inimical to religious unity and peaceful coexistence. subsequently, the nal solution becomes easily attainable. 46muritala adeyemi bidmos, inter – religious dialogue: the nigerian experience, 59. unity in diversity in christian –muslim relations | 227 110 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 conceptualizing the problem of perception in the epistemological enterprise abstract is it possible to discuss perception from the object perspective? the much that has been recounted about perception has actually centred on the subject experience and i fear that such rather one-sided introspection may not offer a satisfactory view in the discourse of perception. so, the perennial problem of perception is not that we perceive differently or that we are trapped in an endless struggle of justifying knowledge claims through perception, but that proponents of the theory of perception are often guilty of silencing the vociferous perspective of the objects of perception. my concern, therefore, is how to echo the perspective of the object of perception in such a way that its relevance in the discourse of perception is not quietened. again, there is an attempt to discover if the objects of perception speak and if it does why the discordance interpretation of what otherwise is unanimous. finally, i conclude that there are linguistic aspects to the disconnection between the subject and the object of perception. keywords: perception, illusion, hallucination, realism, phenomenalism, idealism. introduction the epistemological enterprise is dotted with knowledge claim and the justification thereof. put differently, it prioritizes the quest for conceptualizing the problem of perception in the… | 111 how we come to know and the justification of what we claim to know. little wonder jürgen habermas opined that “if we are to be answering a question about modern epistemology, it should be about the possibility of human knowledge. what can we know? how do we know what we claim to know? how are we certain that we know what we claim to know?”1 robert audi typifies that “like rene descartes, we have all asked ourselves at one time or another ‘couldn’t everything i seem to see, hear, etc. be illusory? might i in fact be dreaming all this? if so what do i really know of the outside world?”2 worthy of mention is the fact that one of the thematic discourse in the epistemological enterprise is perception. scepticism about perception poses a great challenge to the possibility and justification of human knowledge by questioning the trustworthiness of our senses since avalanche of our knowledge claims are premised on the senses. most of the time, we justify our knowledge of the world on our ability to perceive things via the senses. sceptics ask, how reliable are the senses in providing us with accurate knowledge of the world? how sure are we that we are not actually experiencing a dream? what if we are just merely a brain in a vat stimulated to have the experiences and apparent memories we now have, what if all knowledge claim is illusionary and mere hallucination? consequence upon the above challenges, there are attempts to address them by scholars which has been novel. while some parts of this paper would relay critically some of the contributions to this discourse, the main focus is to explore the possibility of championing an object perspective. moreover, we submit that the problem of perceptions has a linguistic implication which is novel and worthy of attention. . perception: meaning and theories the oxford companion to philosophy defines perception as the “extraction and use of information about one’s own environment (exteroception) and one’s own body (proprioception). the external senses sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste — though overlapping to some extent, are distinguished by the kind of information they 112 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 convey (e.g. about light, pressure, sound, and temperature).3 perception, put simply is the channel through which we acquire information and knowledge about the outside world. perception has also been conceived as the process by which we become aware of physical objects, including our own body.4 according to robert audi, perception is a source of knowledge and justification mainly by virtue of yielding beliefs that constitute knowledge or are justified. hence, perception is not only regarded as how we acquire knowledge of our environment, but also as a ground or basis on which our knowledge claims are justified.5 for jimoh anselm, “perception is of things or facts, that is, the use of any of the five senses, seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, and smelling, to acquire knowledge of the world around us. through the senses we explore the world and gain knowledge of it.”6 having examined some of the views of some scholars, it is pertinent to submit that perception is not equivalent to knowledge although it is crucial for the assertion of knowledge. at this juncture, let us examine some of the theories of perception. some theories of perception i share with michael huemer the sentiment that a theory of perception should answer such questions as: what is it to perceive something? what sorts of things does perception make us aware of? how does perception enable us to gain knowledge of the world around us?7 with these in mind, we shall look at a number of the theories of perception. representationalism (indirect realism) it is a realist theory of perception which maintains that in perception, we are directly aware of certain internal, mental states or entities — referred to by various philosophers as “ideas” (locke), “impressions” (hume), “mental images,” or “sense data” (russell) — and we arc indirectly aware of’ external things (that is, our awareness of them depends on our awareness of the images).8 the mental images we perceive are usually said to be caused by external, physical objects or events and also to represent them. conceptualizing the problem of perception in the… | 113 representationalism implies a sense experience or collection of sense data that apparently picture some aspects of our physical world like objects. in other words, we can have knowledge about our external world by inferring facts about external objects from the character of our mental images. again, it claims that physical objects impact upon our sense organs causing us to experience sensations which represent the objects that cause them.9 this theory accommodates the opinion that there exists material objects with independent properties, but unlike direct realism, maintains that we do not perceive these objects directly as they are, rather, that we perceive them indirectly through mental representations. the proponents of representationalism are john locke and david hume amongst others. jimoh summarizes the general framework of this theory when he asserted that representative realism hopes to explain away sense deception by using the distinction between sensation and the objects we perceive. according to the representative realists, deceptions occur when our sensations do not match up with the objects of sensation.10 by implication, whenever the image or representation i have of an object does not correspond to the actual way the object is in the world, i might be subject to an illusion, while, in a condition in which my sensations do not correspond to anything in the world, i am then hallucinating. the pertinent question here therefore is how do we account for the actual condition of the object in the world? more so, how do we bracket the influence of the subject in accounting for the object? idealism idealism championed by george berkeley is epitomised by the submission that it is only the mind and its ideas that exist. this is was against the backdrop of indirect realism orchestrated by john locke. for locke, the only thing we are immediately aware of is ideas. but berkeley attempted to draw a connection between ideas and the mind which perceive them which is christened in the popular dictum, “esse est percipi”, meaning to be is to be perceived, for physical objects or things only exist when perceived by the mind. he argued that the mind perceives what god implanted in it hence 114 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 god is the cause of ideas. for berkeley, we have no reason for believing in the existence of external objects, and we could not have any coherent conception of what external objects (things that exist outside of the mind) were like. locke had posited that they resembled our ideas, hut for berkeley, nothing could resemble an idea, except an idea. berkeley thus refutes the concept of an external object claiming that it is a contradiction.11 the problem with berkeley’s idealism is that it fails to resolve the problem of perception, for it does not satisfactorily explain the distinction between perceptual error and veridical or accurate perception. by implication, everything we perceive could be asserted to be a kind dream, if this is so, then, there is no difference between perceiving something as it really is and being mistaken. therefore, there is no distinction between hallucination and reality. how then, does idealism make sense of perceptual error, since it has no representation of a real world? direct realism this theory developed by thomas reid was a response to hume and berkeley. the crust of this theory is the claim that we do not perceive ideas but we perceive physical objects directly. it maintains that objects continue to observe the laws of physics and maintain their properties irrespective of their being perceived or not. more so, that the senses are windows through which we make contact with the world and through which we know the world as it is. that is, we come to perceive the world in its most direct way through the senses. reid, furthermore argues that we are justified in believing in the existence of external objects without supplying arguments for their existence. another name for this theory is naive realism or common sense view of perceptual experience. aligning with the claims of reid, we find it really challenging to make a demarcation between perceptions shredded by illusion or hallucination and actual ones. russell buttressed the aforementioned when he observed that the apparent shape and colour of a table depend not just upon the properties of the table, hut also upon the lighting conditions. conceptualizing the problem of perception in the… | 115 phenomenalism phenomenalism maintains that physical objects are not just collections of actual sense data but also of potential sense data, therefore, they continue to exist even when they are not perceived. in other words, physical objects are permanent possibilities of sensation and that all talk about them can be reduced to talk about actual and potential sense data. phenomenalists would generally opine that “to be is not just to be perceived, but also to be perceivable.”12 there is a variation of phenomenalism, known as linguistic phenomenalism. it is essentially a theory of meaning, which tries to answer the question of what we mean when we talk about physical objects as if they are actual independently existing objects, we actually referring to various patterns of’ sense data that we experience. for them, talk about physical objects is a short form of sense data or phenomena. the argument that the linguistic phenornenalists seek to raise is that we can technically avoid talk about physical object, since all talk about them can be translated to sense data or phenomena, without any loss of meaning. for example, the word orange does not refer to any independently existing material object, but really means something round, green or orange, sweet and juicy and so on; a collection of potential sense data. even when it has been argued that if we translate physical object language into phenomenal language, physical objects will always recur in the translation into phenomenal language. and that it is almost impossible to use phenomenal language without mentioning physical objects, we feel mandated to explore the perhaps narrow possibility of using phenomenal language without mentioning physical objects. talks about physical objects should stand uncorrupted and battered by subject interference. we proposed that this might offer a viable address to the avalanche problems of perception. at this juncture, it is important to relay some of the known problems of perception in the history of this discourse. 116 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 the problems of perception when philosophers ask, what is the nature of perception? they are not asking purely empirical questions, such as: how do our senseorgans actually work? what are the mechanisms of smell and taste? how do vision and touch actually provide us with information about the world around us? on the contrary, they are concerned about how perception provides reason for our beliefs about the empirical world. for instance, suppose i see a jug before me, and come to believe on the basis of this that there is a jug before me. my reason for believing that there is a jug is that i can see it. but the question is what makes seeing the jug a reason for this belief? is it not possible that one is caught in a web of illusion or hallucinating? the problem of perception therefore, is the result of attempting to reconcile some apparently obvious truths about perception with the apparent possibility of a certain kind of perceptual error. the problem of perception is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what we ordinarily understand it to be, an openness to and awareness of the world? put differently, the very fact that it is difficult to identify when an object is perceived correctly and when an error occurs in perception spells out the problem of perception. in an actual instance of perception an object is seen and seen correctly or as it is. but in the case of illusion, an object is seen but seen incorrectly or as it is not. instances of illusion can be found in eases in which a round object is seen to be oval, a brown object is seen to be black, or a tall object is seen to be short. in such cases, the subject could be said to be suffering from illusion. hallucination on the other hand is a case in which it seems to the subject as though something is seen but where in fact nothing is seen. it is the kinds of things that happens in a dream experience. this problem emerged from descartes’s scepticism about experience where he alluded the possibility of one been deceived by a demon. again, the brain in the vat illustration by the sceptics point to the fact of the possibility of hallucination. the possibility of illusion, hallucination and perspectival variation or conflicting appearances are the underlying factors of the problem of perception. conceptualizing the problem of perception in the… | 117 david hume, bertrand russell and a j ayer are the major proponents of the argument from illusion. hume posited this argument in criticizing direct realism when he observed that the character of our sensory experiences often varies even when there is no change in the physical object we are putatively perceiving. for example, as one moves further away from a table, the table looks smaller, but there is no objective change in the physical table. this shows that one is not perceiving the real table. rather, one is perceiving an image of the table in one’s mind. 13 bertrand russell offered another versions of the argument from illusion when he argued that the “apparent shape and colour of a table depend not just upon the properties of the table, but also upon the location of the observer and lighting conditions.14 another version of the argument from illusion is expressed by a.j. ayer. ayer in his famous optical illusion in which a straight stick, when halfway immersed in water, appears bent. ayer claims that in this case, what one sees cannot be the real stick. in our ordinary conception of perceptual experience, we always assume that we are sometimes perceptually aware of ordinary mind-independent objects in perceptual experience. however, such awareness can come from veridical experiences, cases in which one perceives an object for what it is. i3ut it can also come from illusory experiences. for we think of an illusion as “any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is.15 the argument from illusion has been strongly criticized by john austin, especially when he responded to a.j. ayer who subscribed to the argument from illusion alongside bertrand russell. in actual fact, austin “argues that the argument from illusion draws plausibility from various misuses of language.”16 he criticized ayer’s optical illusion in which a straight stick looks bent when immersed halfway in water, and as such does not amount to an experience of a real stick. for austin, for the fact that the stick looks bent, it does not follow that one is seeing something that is bent, nor does it follow that one is not seeing the actual stick. rather, for austin, what one is seeing is a straight stick that appears bent. this pre-empts the stance of this paper which is a clarion call for an 118 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 evaluation of the relationship between the subject and object of perception. exploring the objective perspective: a linguistic approach a critical introspection in the discourse of perception showcases that it is possible to assert that the entire arguments on the theories and problems of perception could be effectively summarized into a subject and object perspectives. in other words, positions offered so far could be categorized into two main emphasis; either the subject or the object. however, a sojourn through the history of the discourse of perception suggests that so much emphasis have been laid on the subject almost to the detriment of the object of perception. the over-imposition of the categories of the subject has silence the germane import of the object. this has left us to wonder if it is possible to analyse perception from one perspective without been erroneous. the claims of austin seems to corroborate the point that so much has to be done to offer a voice to the object of perception. in a case where a table appears differently to different observers troubles a critical mind. the challenge of asserting whose account represents the actual status of the table becomes herculean. this has been the fate of the philosophers of perception ab initio. worthy of note also is that in all the instances of reports from the subjects, the table’s status remains unchanged. we are therefore inspired to propose that philosophers of perception by amplifying the status of the object would go a long way to addressing the pristine and multi-faceted problems of perception. conclusion having attempted a conceptual analysis of the theories and problems of perception and also demonstrated the positions of various proponents in the discourse, it is pertinent to assert that the position of this paper is that there a linguistic twist to the discourse of perception which offers a viable perspective in addressing the problem of perception. we drew from the claims of austin which advocates for a language of report that would not compromise the status of both the subject and object of perception. conceptualizing the problem of perception in the… | 119 furthermore, we may ask; how then can we achieve the linguistic proposal of austin? for austin, a linguistic approach which will report the status of the subject as well as the object of perception without a compromise is inevitable in addressing effectively the problem of perception. again, how do we construe such a language that would guarantee these ambitions? this question is dedicated to the future of philosophers of perception. however, it is worthy of note to identify that there is a linguistic twist to the problem of perception. endnotes 1 sosa, f., kim, j., franti, j., mcgrath, m., 2008: epistemology: an anthology, usa: blackwell publishing. (second edition). p. 3 2 audi robert, 1998. epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge, london: routledge, the taylor and francis group. p. 14. ted honderich, 1995. the oxford companion to philosophy (oxford new york, oxford university press, inc.) p. 652. 4 cardinal, d., hayward, .j., & jones, g., 2004. epistemology: the theory of knowledge, london: john murray publishers ltd. p. 148. 5 audi robert, 1998. epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge, london: routledge, the taylor and francis group. p. 16. 6 jimoh anselrn, 2013. certitude and doubt: a study guide in epistemology, ibadan: ebony books & kreations. p. 88. 7 huemer michael, 2002. epistemology: contemporary readings, london & new york: routledge, the taylor & francis group. p. 3 1. 8 ibid, p. 27 9 cardinal, d., hayward, j., & jones, g., 2004. epistemology: the theory of knowledge, london: john murray publishers ltd. p. 149. 10 jimoh anselm, 2013. certitude and doubt: a study guide in epistemology, ibadan: ebony books & kreations. p. 97. 11 cardinal, d., hayward, j., & jones, g., 2004. epistemology: the theory of knowledge, london: john murray publishers ltd, p. 149 12 jimoh anselm, 2013. certitude and doubt: a study guide in epistemology, ibadan: ebony books & kreations. p. 99 13 huemer michael, 2002. epistemology: contemporary readings, london & new york: routledge, the taylor & francis group. p. 29. 14 ibid, p. 31 15 smith, a.d., 2002. the problem of perception, cambridge, mass,: harvard university press. p. 23. 16 snowdown, p.f., 2005. some reflections on an argument from hallucination. philosophical topics, 33.1. p.74. abstract the epistemology of testimony is an inquiry into the nature of testimony as an epistemic source. given that testimony is an epistemic source, is it a basic or generative epistemic source? or does it derive its epistemic credentials from other more basic and generative epistemic sources, like; perception, reason, and introspection? if testimonial knowledge is dependent on other basic epistemic sources, it means that testimonial knowledge is inferential. on the alternative, if testimonial knowledge is basic, it implies an inherent justicatory power. given that there are two cognitive agents in testimonial epistemic transaction – the testier (speaker) and the receiver (hearer); where do we situate the justicatory power of testimonial knowledge, the testier or the hearer? the responses to these questions have generated theories that dominantly swing between reductionism and anti-reductionism, bringing in the inferentialist and non-inferentialist perspectives. these theories, however, fail to successfully establish whether testimony, justification, and virtue: investigating the justificatory source of testimonial knowledge anselm k. jimoh, ph.d. department of philosophy ss. peter and paul catholic major seminary jimohanselm@gmail.com precious e. iyogun department of philosophy, university of ibadan p.m.b. 5171, bodija – ibadan, ibadan. iyogunp@yahoo.com and testimonial knowledge is basic or not and therefore, makes it problematic to establish the justicatory source of testimonial knowledge. the less dominant quasireductionism of duncan pritchard opens up the possibility to consider miranda fricker's application of epistemic virtues to testimonial justication. therefore, with the aim to establish the justicatory source of testimonial knowledge, this paper critically analyses and evaluates the role of epistemic virtues in testimonial knowledge. we argue that testimonial justication is a two-way process, and conclude that testimonial belief is justied as knowledge on the basis of the intellectual virtues of the testier's cognitive character traits and the hearer's cognitive faculties and excellences. keywords: ant i reduct ionism, epis temic source, reductionism, testimony, virtue epistemology. introduction this paper aims to establish the justicatory source of testimonial knowledge. the problematic lies in the question whether testimony is, or not, a basic epistemic source? by basic epistemic source, we mean a source of knowledge that is not reliant on other epistemic sources for its epistemic credentials. for instance, perception is considered to be a basic epistemic source because we acquire perceptual knowledge through our perceptual engagement with the world, without reliance on any other cognitive faculty. thus, the question, reformulated is: can testimony, without reference to other purported more basic epistemic sources like reason, experience, and introspection, generate knowledge in the hearer (receiver)? reductionism and anti-reductionism have emerged as the two dominant positions in this discourse. a corollary of the problematic, which is the focus of this paper is the question: what is the actual source of the justicatory power of testimonial knowledge; the trustworthiness of the testier, or the belief of the hearer? we rely on existing literature, to critically analyse and evaluate the various 160 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 issues within the purview of the discourse on the testimonial justication. first off, we analyse the meaning and nature of testimony, as well as, the different approaches to testimony and testimonial knowledge. secondly, we explicate the relationship between testimonial knowledge and justication. thirdly, we shall investigate the role of epistemic virtues in testimonial knowledge. thereafter, we conclude, based on our analyses, that neither the testier nor the hearer of testimony has the monopoly of justicatory power because the latter is not dependent solely on either the testier or the hearer, but a shared responsibility between the testier and the hearer. on the meaning and nature of testimony testimony is “a statement or other communication that purports to 1state a fact or provide information.” from its latin etymology, which is a synthesis of two words: testis – witness, and monium – which signies an action, state, or condition, testimony describes a proof or demonstration of some fact, evidence, or a piece of evidence that conrms or negates a state of affairs. therefore, we can understand testimony as that which a declarative sentence asserts, either written or spoken. needless to say that most of the body of knowledge we presently have are products of the testimony of others which we have learnt from their spoken and/or written words. we depend in endless practical ways on the technological fruits of the dispersed knowledge 2of others. hence, dan o' brien describes it as the way human beings 3 obtain knowledge through linguistic communication. despite, the fact that much of the beliefs that constitute our knowledge system extensively dependent on testimony, the very vast 1alvin goldman, “testimony and disagreement,” in alvin i. goldman and matthew mcgrath, epistemology: a contemporary introduction (oxford: oxford university press, 2015), 207. 2 elizabeth fr icker, “second-hand knowledge,” philosophy and phenomenological research 73, no. 3 (nov. 2006), 592-618. 3daniel o'brien, “introduction to the epistemology of testimony,” philosophica 78 (2006), 6. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 161 role testimony plays in our acquisition of knowledge, has not enjoyed a corresponding vast treatment in the history of traditional epistemology (te). the latter did not consider testimony as a basic epistemic source; its epistemic status was reduced to inference based on the trustworthiness of the speaker, which makes it a mere 4 transmitter of knowledge. testimony was conceived to be less reliable than other epistemic sources, like; experience, reason, and introspection. testimony embodies beliefs, and the beliefs acquired through testimony are considered, by te, to be second-hand because they have been passed on to the believer by someone else. although testimonial beliefs are considered second-hand, they are not second5 rate since on some occasions they may amount to knowledge. like knowledge, testimony is propositional. given that propositions are statements of fact about the world, they have a truth-value and therefore, are considered to be a medium for knowledge transfer. as a medium of knowledge transfer from the testier to the receiver, testimony presupposes credulity, especially when dealing with a trusting receiver – the latter readily believes whatever the information the testier provides. within this context, the issue of trust and reliance become important factors to consider in the epistemology of testimony. the interesting questions here are: (i) is the receiver's credulity founded on the reliability of the testier? (ii) 6 is credulity not an invitation and/or license to gullibility. what reason, if any, is there for a receiver to believe a testier, given that the testier is capable of lies, deception, error, and poor ambiguous or misleading expressions? does the receiver have good reason to rely on or believe the testier/speaker? note that the terms hearer and receiver, testier and speaker, are used in this paper as synonyms. sometimes, our testimonial information is misleading or false. but as 4dhirendon m. datta, “testimony as a method of knowledge,” mind 36, no. 143 (july 1927), 354-358. . http://www.jstor.org/stable/2249544 5daniel o'brien, “introduction to the epistemology of testimony,” 6. 6duncan pritchard, what is this thing called knowledge? (london: routledge, 2006), 99. 162 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 duncan pritchard avers, this kind of testimonial deceit, in itself, is not all that troubling given that there are some checks and balances through which we evaluate the testimony of others. the problem, however, with testimonial knowledge is that we are not able to offer 7 independent grounds for most of our testimony-based beliefs. in the opinion of laurence bonjour, this is precisely the problem with testimonial justication – our inability to provide general 8 justication for testimony-based beliefs. contemporary social epistemology tries to investigate whether testimony provides knowledge and justication. if it does, how does it provide knowledge and justication; by yielding basic knowledge or bas ic jus t icat ion l ike percept ion and 9 introspection/reection? the idea is to plausibly establish if belief in a testier's words is actually caused by inference. the questions correlated to this are: i. does the receiver of testimony believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgement about what she hears? ii. is the receiver justied in believing what she hears? iii. does the receiver acquire knowledge from what she hears? the attempts to respond to these questions raise another key question, namely; is testimonial knowledge inferential or non-inferential? for those who argue that it is inferential, a testimonial belief only amounts to knowledge if it is justied, and for it to be justied, it must be supported by inferences available to the hearer. on the contrary, non-inferentialists insist that we do not need to work through inferences to possess testimonial beliefs, that even if we have the ability to make such inferences, it does not play a justicatory role in 10 testimonial beliefs. 7duncan pritchard, what is this thing called knowledge? 91. 8laurence bonjour, epistemology: classical problems and contemporary responses, 2nd edition (london: rowman and littleeld, 2010), 164. 9robert audi, epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge, 2nd ed. (new york and london: routledge, 2003), 137. 10daniel o'brien, “introduction to the epistemology of testimony,” 6. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 163 the inferential vs. non-inferential debate is concomitant with 11 the question of whether testimony is a basic epistemic source or not. while the inferentialists insist that testimonial knowledge is not basic in the sense in which perceptual knowledge is basic because the former derives its justicatory power from perceptual, memorial and inferential resources, non-inferentialists opine that even though testimony may be causally related to perception, the former does not need to be epistemically dependent on the latter. in other words, noninferentialists insist that the justication of testimonial beliefs is not derived from other sources since a hearer can acquire knowledge from simply hearing the testimony of another. testimonial knowledge: basic or not basic? inferentialists provide a reductionist account of testimonial knowledge by arguing that the latter is a derivation of more basic forms of knowledge and justication. on the contrary, noninferentialists maintain an anti-reductionist account that testimonial knowledge and justication are basic. the underlying assumption that undergirds both positions is that our testimonial beliefs are justiable on the basis that testimony provides evidence for the truth that it asserts. the argument can be formulated in a bi-conditional: either we trust the testimonies of others on account of what we have acquired from other epistemic sources or we do based on what we have independently veried to be true. therefore, we are generally entitled to trust what others tell us. reductionism is the argument that we can only rightly hold a 12 testimonial belief if it is traceable to a non-testimonial justication. the implication here is that our personal evidence is insufcient to justify testimonial knowledge. according to axel gelfert, if our testimony depends on our sense perceptions for its reception and the sincerity and competence of the testier for its truthfulness, it means that our justied testimonial beliefs must have been derived from, 11laurence bonjour, epistemology:classical problems and contemporary responses, 165. 12duncan pritchard, what is wrong with this thing called knowledge? 82. 164 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 and ultimately reducible to more basic epistemic sources, like 13 perception, memory, and inference. james van cleve, for “testimony gives us justied belief … not because it shines by its own light, but because it has often enough been revealed [to be] true by our 14 other lights.” here, van cleve collapses three other forces of justication – perception, memory, and inductive inference, into testimony. this position is described as “global reductionism,” the view that, based on the general reliability of inferential appeal to testimony, hearers are justied in believing particular instances of 15testimony. david hume's work, “on miracles,” promotes this position. here, hume argues that our general observations of testimonial trustworthiness in the past, allows us to inductively infer that fresh 16items of testimony would be justied. we do not have any a priori reason to think that beliefs gained through testimony should be true. therefore, we need independent grounds to justify our testimonial beliefs. he further argues, as michael huemer afrms, that the observation of the veracity of human testimony and their conformity to the facts of the testier's report provide the assurance of our 17 testimonial beliefs. this implies that our beliefs are proportionate with evidence to the extent that we either have a proof or a probability. we have a proof when the testimony and evidence are in constant and unalterable conformity and a probability when they 13axel gelfert, “hume on testimony revisited,” logical analysis and history of philosophy 13, no. 1 (2010), 62. 14james van cleve, “reid on the credit of human testimony,” in j. lackey and e. sos, (eds), the epistemology of testimony (oxford: oxford university press, 2006), 69. 15alvin goldman and thomas blanchard, “social epistemology”, the stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy (summer 2015 edition), edward zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/epistemology-social/, [accessed 29/02/2020]. 16david hume, “on miracles,” an enquiry concerning human understanding, (1748), e. steinberg (ed.) (indianapolis: hackett publishing, 1977), 74. 17michael huemer (ed), epistemology; contemporary readings, (routledge, new york, 2002), 225. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 165 (testimony and evidence) are not in constant and unalterable 18 conformity. hume assumes that the trustworthiness of testimony depends on the evidence that the testier is likely to be right. therefore, whether we accept a testimony or not must depend on inferential reasoning; from the speaker's track record and the plausibility of the claim to the acceptability of the specic testimonial claim in question. our reliance on testimony is based on our observation of a constant and regular aggregation between testimony and the facts in the external world. according to alvin goldman, the following questions would arise from hume's position: i. do we all, individually, make enough observations to justify our conclusions? ii. are our range of individuals and subject-matters diverse enough to warrant our acceptance and application of such a general principle of justication to testimonies and persons, 19 even those we have not met before? for anthony coady, we do not have enough observational bases to inductively conclude that testimony is generally reliable because we cannot individually achieve the required amount of eldwork to reach such conclusions. for instance, even though many of us have never witnessed the process of giving birth to a baby or examined how blood circulates around the body, we nonetheless, still hold the 20 conclusions we have about them based on the testimony of others. elizabeth fricker attempts to mitigate the global reductionist position of hume by advocating a local reductionism. she argues that the general principles of testimonial trustworthiness in hume's account do not sufciently warrant a receiver's justication in particular acts of testimony. in addition to these general principles, she contends that the receiver requires background evidence, based on observation and memory, about the specic testier to warrant the receiver's justiedness. the receiver achieves this by constantly 18axel gelfert, “hume on testimony revisited,” 63. 19alvin goldman, “testimony and disagreement,” 208. 20c. a. j. coady, testimony, (oxford: oxford university press, 1992), 82. 166 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 evaluating the testier for trustworthiness and make her conclusions based on the pieces of evidence available to her. therefore, all that is required for a testimonial belief is that the testier is reliable in relation to her specic testimony, and not the general reliability of testimony. reliability here refers to the sincerity of the testier and 21 not the testimony itself. thomas reid advanced an anti-reductionist argument against hume's reductionism. anti-reductionism is the view that testimony, like perception, memory, and introspection, is a basic epistemic 22source. the anti-reductionists argue that a receiver is justied to hold a testimonial belief, based on the testimony of a testier, given that the receiver has no defeaters (doubts) about the credibility of the testier. based on the general assumption of credulism that human beings have the natural propensity to speak the truth, and a 23disposition to conde in the veracity of others, reid argues that testimony is a social intercourse between intelligent beings by which 24 human knowledge is transmitted. according to him, although hume broke away from the traditionalist scheme with his (hume's) reductionist account of testimony, he did not free himself from his 25 own implausible principles. his argument tended toward individualism and solitude, which are against human nature. the human person is social by nature, and therefore, hardwired to trust the testimony of other people. for reid, we should rely on commonsense in our quest to justify testimonial knowledge instead of past experiences as posited by hume, because, the experiences of the past 21elizabeth fricker, “against gullibility,” in b. k. matilal and a. chakrabarti (eds), knowing from words: western and indian philosophical analysis of understanding and testimony (dordreecht: kluwer academic publishers, 1994), 125-161. 22alvin goldman and dennis whitecomb (eds), social epistemology: essential readings (oxford university press, newyork,2011), 73. 23thomas reid, “inquiry into the human mind,” in inquiry and essays, r. e. bean blossom and k. lehrer (eds), (hackett, indianapolis, 1983), 236-237. 24thomas reid, “inquiry into the human mind,” 236. 25nicholas wolterstorff, thomas reid and the story of epistemology (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2001), 163. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 167 26 cannot, of themselves, provide a belief of what is in the future. other anti-reductionists like tyler burge and richard foley argue that irrespective of the amount of evidence in support of the testier's reliability and sincerity, a receiver of testimony is warranted to believe the testimony of a given speaker. according to burge, a “person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to him unless there are stronger reasons not to 27 do so.” this implies that a receiver of testimony does not necessarily require positive support for the sincerity of the testier to hold a testimonial belief. what is required is that the receiver has no evidence that defeats the testier's reliability and sincerity. goldman supports this argument with the assertion that without defeaters, like prior experience, testimonial justication comes free for the receiver 28without reference to any positive reason for believing the testier. to moderate the rift between reductionism and antireductionism, duncan pritchard proposed a quasi-reductionist thesis. against anti-reductionism, he argues that credulism permits widespread gullibility, which is not epistemically attractive. against reductionism, he insists that we cannot resolve the issue of testimonial justication by providing additional instances of testimony that support the original testimonial belief. if the reductionist position is correct, we have to look for adequate supporting grounds that are non-testimonial. in the absence of the latter, reductionism leads us directly to a form of scepticism about the 29 epistemic status of our testimonial beliefs. pritchard's quasireductionist thesis is a hybrid position that accommodates the motivations and respects the intuitions of both the reductionist and anti-reductionist. according to o'brien, when we cannot have testimonial knowledge without non-testimonial epistemic support for our beliefs, we express the spirit of reductionism. this is, 26thomas reid, “inquiry into the human mind,” 236. 27tyler burge, “content preservation,” philosophical review 102 (1993), 457-488. 28alvin goldman, “testimony and disagreement,” 209. 29duncan pritchard, “the epistemology of testimony,” philosophical issues 14 (2004), 326-328. 168 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 however, compatible with certain fundamentalist or credulist intuitions in the sense that it provides some epistemic support by 30means of testimonial evidence. in this wise, quasi-reductionism brings within its ambiance the two-key intuitions regarding any knowledge inquiry, namely; that knowledge is a cognitive achievement, and that knowledge is not compatible with luck. hume's reductionism assumes that we should only trust testimony when we have evidence that the testier is likely to be right. it is an inferential position that places testimonial justication on the relationship between the reliability of the testier and supporting evidence, which invariably implies that the justicatory power of testimony lies in the reliability of the testier. reid's antireductionism argues for the reliance on common-sense in the quest for justifying testimonial information. this is a non-inferential position that presupposes that credulity is based on the commonsense of the receiver of testimony. here, the responsibility of justication is hinged on the receiver of testimonial information. pritchard's quasi-reductionism supports a justicatory model that accommodates some elements of both the inferentialist and noninferentialist considerations. it synthesises the reliability of the testier with the innate natural tendencies of the receiver to account for testimonial knowledge. if pritchard's synthesis is correct, it means the justication of testimonial knowledge is a shared responsibility between the testier and the receiver. herein, the latter applies common-sense in the exercise of her credulity to apprehend the reliability of the testier. this seems to be miranda fricker's concern when she explicates the idea of the testimonial sensitivity of the hearer. by the testimonial sensitivity of the hearer, fricker describes a virtuous display of perceptual capacity by the receiver towards a testimony. for the virtuous receiver to trust the testier, she must consider the testier to be trustworthy to a degree that enables her to achieve a reasonable level of trust towards the testier and the 30daniel o'brien, “introduction to the epistemology of testimony,” 8. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 169 31 testier's testimony. according to fricker, there is an emotional aspect proper to cognition, which is displayed through empathy. therefore, it is only when the virtuous receiver is in such an empathetic relationship with the testier, that she can make a good 32 judgement of the latter's trustworthiness. given that empathy is the ability to identify with the feelings of others; epistemically, it describes being in the same cognitive situation with someone. consequently, for a receiver to consider a testier reliable, both the receiver and the testier must possess some form of similar cognitive abilities, which are only perceptible empathically. such cognitive abilities are rooted in the theory of epistemic virtues, hence, we need to consider how epistemic virtues impact on testimonial justication. epistemic virtues and testimonial justication if fricker is correct about the idea of the testimonial sensitivity of the hearer as analysed above, it would mean that epistemic virtues impact on testimonial justication. given that this is the case; we should investigate the importance of the impact of virtue in testimonial justication. such an investigation warrants that we consider virtue epistemology since the virtues in question here are epistemic virtues. essentially, virtue epistemology (ve) is modelled on intellectual virtues, which is sometimes described as epistemic virtues. it promotes the socratic and aristotelian idea that a truly virtuous agent 33 would be an excellent cogniser, because intellectual or epistemic virtues are characteristics of the cognitive agent that promote intellectual ourishing, which accounts for excellent cognition. therefore, ve denes knowledge in terms of virtue-theoretic concepts, with two variants to its thesis. the rst variant is traced to aristotle's notion that intellectual virtues are cognitive excellences, which constitute reliable or truth-conducive qualities of the agent. this is virtue reliabilism. and the second variant is linked to 31miranda fricker, epistemic injustice; power and the ethics of knowing (oxford university press, oxford, 2007), 79. 32miranda fricker, epistemic injustice; power and the ethics of knowing, 80. 33julia driver, “the aristotelian conception of virtues,” in uneasy virtue (london: cambridge university press, london), 6. 170 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 aristotle's ethics, whereof, intellectual or epistemic virtues are conceived as character traits, like; fair-mindedness, open34 mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual courage, etc. this is virtue responsibilism. virtue reliabilists argue that it is possible to acquire knowledge in the absence of an exercise of intellectual character virtues. consequently, they insist that virtue responsibilists character model of intellectual virtue does not provide a helpful account of the nature of knowledge because any analysis of knowledge aims to 35specify the necessary and sufcient conditions for knowledge. virtue responsibilists, on the contrary, argue that intellectual virtues 36 are states that indicate an intellectual grasp of the truth. therefore, they disagree with virtue reliabilists that intellectual excellences are competencies that properly position us to pursue the truth. virtue responsibilists consider virtue reliabilists' class of virtues as natural powers, faculties, and receptivities that provide the grounds for intellectual virtues. however, they are nurtured to the extent to which they nd expressions in rened character traits of epistemic agents. therefore, we can argue that intellectual virtues do not only refer to rened character traits but also to our nurtured inherent capacities. virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism share the same aim – the attainment of truth and knowledge, which is critical to intellectual well-being and ourishing. while the former considers cognitive qualities or faculties that effectively aid the attainment of truth and knowledge, the latter is concerned with the character traits of the cognitive agent that enable the attainment of truth and 37 knowledge. both variants of ve credit knowledge to the believer. considering that social epistemology (se) advocates the view that 34paul faulkner, “a virtue theory of testimony,” proceedings of the aristotelian society 114, no. 2 (2014), 189. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00370.x. 35jason baehr, “character reliability and virtue epistemology,” 197. 36michael depaul and linda zagzebski, intellectual virtues, (oxford: clarendon press, 2007), 38. 37anselm jimoh, “a critical assessment of virtue epistemology,” flash: journal of philosophy and religion 9, no. 1 (2015), 7. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 171 the trustworthiness of the testier justies testimonial knowledge, it 38 would seem that ve would run into tension with se. this, at least, is the view of jesper kallestrup and duncan pritchard, who argue that a robust ve is opposed to se, especially the epistemology of 39 testimony. kallestrup and pritchard differentiated robust ve from modest ve. the latter, for them, denes knowledge in both virtuetheoretic and non-virtue-theoretic concepts, and the former, which is 40 their concern, denes knowledge only in virtue-theoretic concepts. according to benjamin mccraw, as kallestrup and pritchard conceive it, for robust ve, “there is nothing more to knowledge than true belief plus some virtue-theoretic condition or set of 41 conditions.” this implies that a cognitive agent's true belief in knowledge is a credit of the agent's (who is the believer) virtuous activity. this is the credit thesis (ct), which states that: “s knows 42 that p only if s believes that p because of s's virtuous operation.” the ct situates the credit for true beliefs that yield knowledge to the individual believer, which in the view of kallestrup and pritchard defeats the paradigm of ve as se. this is so because the ct commits robust ve to epistemic individualism. the latter is the view that 43justication supervenes on internal features of the cognitive agent. internal features here should not be associated with epistemic internalism or externalism, but instead, refers to the cognitive faculties of the individual cognitive agent. the position of kallestrup and pritchard notwithstanding, the question of interest in relation to our subject matter – the possibility of a virtue epistemology of testimony is: “what justies out uptake of 38benjamin w. mccraw, “virtue epistemology, testimony, and trust,” logos and episteme v, no. 1 (2014), 95-102. 39jesper kallestrup and duncan pritchard, “robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualism,” pacic philosophical quarterly 93 (2012), 84103. 40kallestrup and pritchard, “robust virtue epistemology and epistemic antiindividualism,” 85-86. 41mccraw, “virtue epistemology, testimony, and trust,” 96. 42mccraw, “virtue epistemology, testimony, and trust,” 96. 172 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 testimony? that is, when our acceptance of a bit of testimony to p is 44 the acquisition of the belief that p, what justies this acceptance?” the two prevalent answers to this are: (i) the reductionist view that because “our grounds for acceptance are all the things we believe about the testimonial situation [our] uptake is … justied … in so far as, our beliefs about the testimonial situation overall support the 45conclusion that a piece of testimony is true.” (ii) the none or antireductionist view that “we do not need grounds to be justied in the uptake of a bit of testimony. rather, we have a general defeasible 46entitlement to accept what other people tell us.” fricker does not nd these prevalent views favourable to her project. she opines that our uptake of testimony is more often immediate and non-inferential, even though it is informed and supported by the background beliefs we have. this claim poses an epistemological challenge, namely; how do we account for the fact that our uptake of testimony is immediate and non-inferential, and yet supported by background beliefs? according to fricker, virtue ethics provides the resolution to this challenge. virtue ethics expounds on how perception can deliver judgement. using the example of kindness, fricker argues that a kind person does not calculate or appeal to principles to determine which situation requires her kindness. she (kind person) is reliably sensitive to the situational features, which provide her the reasons to be kind. the kind person perceives the situational features as her reasons to judge what she ought to do in any given situation. therefore, to resolve the epistemological challenge, the receiver of testimony only needs a testimonial sensibility that cognises the features of the testimonial situation which enables the receiver to see that a piece of testimony is trustworthy or not trustworthy. according to fricker, “the main idea is that where a hearer gives a suitable critical 43kallestrup and pritchard, “robust virtue epistemology and epistemic antiindividualism,” 86. 44faulkner, “a virtue theory of testimony,” 190. 45faulkner, “a virtue theory of testimony,” 190. 46faulkner, “a virtue theory of testimony,” 190. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 173 reception to an interlocutor's words without making any inference, she does so in virtue of the perceptual deliverances of a well-trained 47testimonial sensibility.” fricker draws the following closely related parallel between “the virtuous agent's moral perceptual capacity and the virtuous 48 hearer's testimonial capacity,” i. that in the testimonial as in the moral sphere, the judgement model is perceptual, and so non-inferential. ii. in both spheres, good judgement is uncodiable. iii. in both spheres, the judgement is intrinsically motivating. iv. intrinsically reason-giving v. in both spheres the judgement typically contains an 49 emotional aspect that is a proper part of the cognition. as faulkner emphasises, the rst two points of parallel – (i) and (ii), dene the operation of sensibility, while (iii) to (v) are considerations 50 on the nature of the judgement output. for fricker, these ve points of parallel are consistent with “the spontaneous, unreective phenomenology of the testimony [which provides] so much impetus 51 for non-inferentialism.” therefore, they explicate how our testimonial sensibility provide the spontaneous judgement about the trustworthiness of a bit of testimony. concerning whether, and how epistemic virtues impact on testimonial justication, our take is that cognitive faculties as intellectual virtues require character traits as intellectual virtues, to serve as indicators for the intellectual grasp of truth. as such, for testimonial information to be justied there is a need to establish that neither the virtue reliabilist cognitive faculties nor the virtue responsibilist character traits are indispensable. to this extent, we can talk about a virtuous hearer or a virtuous speaker; both of them have 47miranda fricker, epistemic injustice; power and the ethics of knowing, 71. 48miranda fricker, epistemic injustice; power and the ethics of knowing, 71. 49miranda fricker, epistemic injustice; power and the ethics of knowing, 72. 50faulkner, “a virtue theory of testimony,” 192. 51miranda fricker, epistemic injustice; power and the ethics of knowing, 80. 174 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 an important role to play in testimonial justication. here, pritchard's quasi-reductionist approach is applicable – the synthesis of the reliability (trustworthiness) of the testier/speaker and some innate natural tendencies (credulity) of the receiver/believer. this is a twoway justicatory process, which brings together the reliability of the virtuous testier as indicated by her rened character traits (which mark an intellectual grasp of truth) and receiver's cognitive faculties – innate natural tendencies (which properly positions her to pursue truth). almost all hearers access testimony for credibility. according to fricker, the virtuous hearer does not arrive at her credibility judgment of testimony through principles that are pre-set because such pre-set principles are usually not precise or 52comprehensive enough to do the job. on the other hand, fricker argues that the speaker arrives at her credibility judgment through the aid of cues, which indicate her moral attitude towards the hearer. based on this, we argue that there are cases where the speaker may have a positive moral attitude without having the right information that will lead to truth in her testimony. more so, moral attitudes may not be as stable as epistemic attitudes can be, especially because of their emotional content. as such, we argue that the speaker's moral attitude towards the hearer may not be sufcient in aiding the hearer to arrive at a proper credibility judgment of testimonial information. the two-way justicatory process, we propose, for testimonial justication is characterised by the following features: (i) the indispensability of cognitive faculties and character traits. (ii) the reliability of the virtuous testier. and (iii) the sensitivity of the virtuous hearer to the epistemic salience of the testier, based on epistemic empathy. this model is both perceptual and inferential because it involves the speaker's reliability and the hearer's perceptual capacity. the idea of testimonial justication being both perceptual and inferential implies an interconnection between the reliability of the testier (as some form of non-testimonial supporting 52miranda fricker, epistemic injustice, power and the ethics of knowing, 75. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 175 ground for justication) and the innate natural tendencies of the hearer through which she apprehends the speaker's reliability, as a 53basis for justication. the reliability of the speaker goes beyond what is established beforehand, it includes what is to be established in the present through the epistemic virtues of the speaker. this interconnection stimulates the justicatory process both internally and externally. when a testier gives a testimony on a particular incidence, the hearer does not access the credibility of the testimony solely by relying on the testier's reliability, the hearer relies also on her perceptual capacity to access the credibility of the testimony. the wide-ranging advantage of this kind of interconnection is that it allows us to understand that an epistemic agent's reliability is not merely pre-established but has to be re-established at every point. our analysis above establishes that testimonial judgement is both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated. this further implies that testimonial justication entails the cognitive abilities of both the hearer and the speaker because the virtuous hearer is motivated to accept what the speaker says, not just based on her cognitive capacities, but also based on the cognitive character traits of the speaker. the idea here is that an agent with excellent cognitive faculties has what it takes to apprehend cognitive traits because they seem to be two sides of the coin. herein is a uniformity of cognitive situation identied above as epistemic empathy. it is an approach to testimonial justication that follows the paradigm of pritchard's quasi-reductionist thesis. a possible objection to this model would be on the grounds of its sufciency to resolve the question of testimonial justication. for instance, we could ask: does this model provide general justication for testimonial beliefs? that is to ask if testimonial information is sufciently justied when the hearer and speaker are involved in the justicatory process on the grounds of epistemic virtues? this is the point where we align with laurence bonjour who argues that the problem of justifying testimonial knowledge has persisted because of our inability to provide general justication for testimonial beliefs. 53duncan pritchard, “the epistemology of testimony,” 327. 176 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 according to him, because we cannot successfully distinguish all the 54 different kinds of cases of testimonial uptake, we cannot adequately assess the justication of testimonial beliefs. therefore, we cannot begin to provide 55 a general justication for testimonial beliefs. given that bonjour is correct, which we think he is, our concern is whether the two-way model we have proposed sufciently takes care of most cases of testimonial uptake? our response to this is afrmative. conclusion this paper aims to establish the source of justication of testimonial knowledge. given the vastness and practical indispensability of testimony as a source of knowledge, we embarked on the project of analysing if testimony is a basic or generative epistemic source. this project brought to the fore the discourse on reductionism and antireductionism theories of testimony. the failure of both theories to satisfactorily resolve the nature of testimony as a basic epistemic source gave way to pritchard's project to synthesize the plausible claims of both theories in his quasi-reductionism thesis. pritchard's project provides the grounds to consider fricker's idea of the testimonial sensitivity of the hearer. the application of fricker's idea permits us to explore the role of epistemic virtues in testimonial justication, a permission that necessitated that we briey but critically analyse the literature on virtue epistemology. based on our various analyses, we argued that testimonial justication or the justication of testimonial knowledge lies in the reliability of the testier as a trustworthy cognitive agent and the perceptual capacity of the hearer to access the credibility of the testimony. this provides us a justicatory process that is both perceptual, from the perspective of the testier, and inferential from the perspective of the hearer. the entire breadth of this paper is couched in the attempt to establish a proper way of justifying testimonial beliefs as knowledge. we have 54laurence bonjour, epistemology: classical problems and contemporary responses, 164. 55lawrence bonjour, epistemology: classic problems and contemporary responses, 158. ttestimony, justication, and virtue | 177 argued in this paper that a general justication for testimonial beliefs rest, not solely on either the testier or the hearer, but on both players – the testier and the hearer, in the epistemic transaction involving testimony. this is because a testimonial belief is justied as knowledge based on the intellectual virtues by the testier's cognitive character traits and the hearer's cognitive faculties and excellences. 178 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 abstract this article focuses on the parable of the pounds as it is found in the gospel of luke (19:11-28), which constitutes the conclusion of the lukan 'journey narrative' (jn). it provides a literary-critical exegesis of the parable in order to understand and explain its signicance within the context of the lucan 'journey narrative' in particular and the gospel of luke in general. the study holds that the nobleman who goes on a long journey and returns a king is not archelaus as many exegetes and commentators tend to claim, but jesus christ himself, who goes to his heavenly abode, entrusting the missiological endeavour to his followers. the parable of the pounds is, therefore, an allegorical reference to the mission entrusted by jesus to the apostles and their successors. it accentuates the seless, committed and relentless service required of christ's disciples, especially those who have received the vocation to partake of the ministerial mandate of the church. at the end of his earthly ministry, jesus goes on the journey of his return to the father, and he leaves behind on earth, servants (disciples and believers) of various degrees of merit, and enemies as well. each of these servants and enemies will be rewarded or punished according to his the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey narrative and the rhetoric of kerygma: a paradigmatic analysis of lk 19:11-28 stan-william o. ede ponticium institutum biblicum, rome stanwilly@yhoo.com deeds; and the rewards are larger opportunities of service. highly signicant is the lesson that there is not to be, as the disciples fancied, immediate triumph and joy for all; but, rst a long time of probation, and then at last, triumph and joy for those only who have earned them, and in exact proportion to their merits. the paper therefore recommends commitment to a life of obedience and service for all followers of jesus, albeit the trials and sacrices that accompany the task of true discipleship. keywords: journey, travel, pounds, talents, service, kerygma, reward. introduction a careful study of the gospel of luke reveals a purposeful collection and strategic incorporation of parables within the corpus. majority of these parables are clustered in the central section of the gospel which is generally referred to as the journey narrative (cf. 9:51-19:44). one of these parables which catches our attention is the 'parable of the 1pounds' (cf. 19:11-28). the parable of the ten pounds (19:11-27) constitutes a core part of the concluding section of the lukan journey narrative (19:144) which begins in 9:51. its pivotal role within the narrative is cast in a shining light not only by the fact that it is placed within an inclusio formed by two “journey notices” (19:11 and 19:28), but also by the 1the number of parables is counted differently depending on how one denes the parable. however, the bulk of parables in luke's gospel are concentrated within this section of the journey narrative, and at least fourteen of the parables are unique to luke. the parable of the pounds which is our focus in this paper has its parallel in matthew in the parable of the talent (matt 25:14-30). though it is not unique to luke, but it is carefully arranged and inserted within journey narrative material as we shall be discussing in this paper. 2 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 2fact that it brings together several themes contained in that narrative. this study which will be taken from a redaction-critical point of view, serves to show that this parable of the pounds was carefully incorporated by the author into the journey narrative material, weaving up a literary and rhetorical connection between it and other key sections of the narrative, especially the beginning part (9:51-62) in rendering its pertinent message which is itself characterized by various key themes. among these themes however, the two-fold motif of mission and discipleship is explicit, and shall be the focus of this paper. by way of procedure, we shall begin by presenting some of the unique textual features that distinguish this journey section of luke's gospel from its matthean and markan parallels. this will be followed by textual criticism and delimitation of the text. we shall then proceed in the third section to consider the 'synoptic parallels', and in the fourth by an analysis of the 'literary and narrative context of the parable of the pounds' in the fourth section. after this, we shall, in the fth section carry out a verse-by-verse 'analysis of the text', though the latter bulk of the parable will be analyzed in one group. taking all these into consideration, we shall proceed in the sixth section to discuss the 'function of the parable of the pounds within the journey narrative and its message'. this will be followed by the conclusion. 2luke is fond of employing the literary device ofinclusio to create prominence around issues which he intends to invest with special meaning and emphasis. a clear example in the signicance of faith in god, which is shown in the persistence in prayer, illustrated with the inclusio created with the lord's prayer towards with beginning of the journey narrative (lk 11:1-13) and the story of the unjust judge towards the end of the journey narrative (lk 18:1-8). cf. marianus pale hera, “the lucan lord's prayer: the prayer of the disciples”, journal of the nanzan academic society – humanities and natural sciences 17 (2019) 82. it is worthy of mention that despite the inner delimitation within the gospel of luke which is the focus of this paper, the lucan 'journey narrative' has a structure that allows for tracing it along a thread that extends from the onset of jesus' ministry and culminates with paul's missionary journey to the capital of the roman empire. cf. eddie germiquet, “luke's journey narrative: a literary gateway of the missionary church in acts”, scriptura 103 (2010) 16. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 3 preliminary observations: distinctive features of the text the parable of the pounds (lk 19:11-27) evinces a unique set of literary and rhetorical features and it behooves us to highlight some of them here to guide our approach to this paper. of note is the observation that lk 18:15-19:40 follows the order of mk 10:1311:10, a sort of return by luke to the markan order or material after departing from about the point where the jn begins. the markan order of events is again interrupted by the insertion of the zacchaeus incident and of the parable of the pounds. one can understand the presence of the zacchaeus narrative based on geographical considerations, since mark also tells that jesus travelled through jericho where the incident that luke narrated took place. but why did luke include the parable of the pounds at this point? the question is even more pertinent when we consider the fact that matthew has a similar parable, that of the talents (25:14-30) which reveals a number of differences from that of luke, showing luke to entertain a signicant number of peculiarities in the parable of the pounds. � as we shall observe when we present the synoptic parallels in comparing the lukan parable of the pounds with the matthean parable of the talent, luke uses μνᾶ (mina) while matthew uses τάλαντον (talent). the terminological choice is hypothetically not arbitrary, but ordered towards specic rhetorical ends. likewise is the intentionality of the plot. as has been identied by many scholars, the plot of this parable of the pounds bears a very close parallel with the true historical situation of the tyrannical judean ethnarch, archelaus who on his journey to rome to seek conrmation as king in 4 bc, had a delegation sent after him to protest his appointment. nevertheless, he was conrmed as king, and when he returned with 3 royal power, he exacted judgment on his enemies. considering that the parable also has a christological dimension to it, a keen reader would wonder why a christian redactor should choose a ruthless and murderous judean ethnarch as a type of the messiah. from a cursory 3brianschultz, “jesus as archelaus in the parable of the pounds (lk. 19:11-27)”, novum testamentum 47 (2007) 105. 4 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 consideration, one could say that the connection of the parable of the pounds with archelaus is problematic. yet from a closer look, the true rhetorical underpinning of the parabolic representation is evident. in essence, the real master of the parable is a “god” gure – the messiah who bestows generous gifts and expects a just accounting of their service. � textual criticism and delimitation of the text it must be here acknowledged that the various greek texts and witnesses to this lukan parable of the pounds present a number of variant readings within some of the verses of the pericope. because of the huge number of verses involved in this pericope and the amount of space it will require to analyze the textual issues, we shall leave out this section concerning the textual analysis, especially due to the fact that we consider most of the variant readings as word/morphological adjustments which do not make much signicant impact on the 4 interpretation of the text in the nal analysis. on the delimitation of the text, lk 19:1-10 narrates the arrival of jesus in jericho and the story of his encounter with zacchaeus. and then 19:29-44 whose beginning is marked by a change of location (near bethphage and bethany, and no longer in jericho) narrates a series of activities and conversations that culminated in the entry of jesus into jerusalem (19:45-46). in between, we have 19:11-28 which tells of the parable of the pounds.� scholars have often debated whether the lukan parable of the pounds is one parable or two parables woven into one by luke. this is because the matthean version of the parable (of the talents) does not contain the issue of the 'throne claimant', the story of the nobleman who went to receive a βασιλεία (kingdom) amid 4it would be fair not to categorically maintain that the textual issues involved in the pericope do not make any real impact in the strict sense of the word. however, based on the scope of this paper and the trajectory of our analysis, we wish to assume the minimalization of such impact and rely fully on the text we have taken as the basis of this paper. our textual basis therefore for this paper is: eberhard and erwin nestle andbarbara and kurt aland et al. (eds.), novum testamentum graece. 28th edition(stuttgart: deutsche bibelgesellschaft, 2012). the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 5 opposition, as contained in luke. while some argue that this strand is 5a lukan addition to the material in q, some argue that it was already 6 combined in the version which luke inherited, and some others argue that two of jesus' parables have been combined into one parable 7 by luke. the circumstances regarding its construction 8 notwithstanding, lk 19:11-28 presents a number of features in its form and structure that impels the reader to approach it as a single narrative unit. the unit begins in 19:11 which intimates the reader that jesus goes on to tell a παραβολή (parable) – one parable and not two – and the story ows until v.27 and then in v.28, the narrator informs the reader what jesus does after he had said these things. further, we also note that 19:28 appears to function not only as a transitional verse that concludes the preceding parable, καὶεἰπὼνταῦτα(“and having said these things”),but also initiates a new section of the narrative in which jesus' activities in and around jerusalem will be recounted. at the same time, 19:29 marks the beginning of a new narrative situation that will unfold in three discreet phases: entry into the temple (19:2944), cleansing of the temple (19:45-46), and teaching in the temple 9precincts (19:47-21:38). this point that 19:29 marks the beginning of a new narrative unit is also corroborated by the introductory function by which the account of jesus' entry into the temple (19:29:46) shifts the perspective of the narrative to what is about to 10 occur in the story. given the foregoing considerations, lk 19:11-28 can be delimited as a narrative unit. 5joseph a. fitzmyer, the gospel according to luke i-ix (ancb 28; garden city, ny: doubleday & co., 1981) 63-97; luke timothy johnson, the gospel of luke (collegeville, mn: michael glazier, 1991) 6. 6jan lambrecht, “the parable of the throne claimant (luke 19:11-27)”, in veronica koperski (ed.), understanding what one reads: new testament essays (leuven: peeters, 2003) 113.\ 7joachim jeremias, the parables of jesus (london: scm press, 1972) 59. 8nolland presents a beautiful summary of the debate: cf. john nolland, luke 18:35-24:53 (dallas, tx: word books publishers 2002) 910-911. 9cf. dean béchard, “the journey narrative: preliminary considerations” (unpublished lecture notes i on the gospel of luke at the pontical biblical institute, rome 2013) 7. 10cf. béchard, “the journey narrative”, 7-8. 6 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 lk 19:11-28matt 25:14-30 mk 13:34 14“for it will be like a m a n g o i n g o n a journey, who called h is servants and entrusted to them his property. 15 to one he gave ve talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his ability. then he went away. 16 he who had received the ve talents went at once and traded with 34it is like a man going on a journey, when he leaves home and puts his servants in charge, each with his work, and commands the doorkeeper to stay awake. 1 1 as they heard these things, he proceeded to tell a parable, because he w a s n e a r t o j e r u s a l e m , a n d b e c a u s e t h e y supposed that the kingdom of god w a s t o a p p e a r immediately. 12 he said therefore, “a nobleman went into a far country to receive a kingdom and then return. 13 calling ten of his servants, he gave them ten pounds, and said to them, `trade with these till i come.' 14 but his citizens hated him and sent synoptic parallels &comparison a tabular representation of the synoptic comparison would be helpful 11 here: 11our comparison in this section is made much easier with the greek and english edition of the well-tabulated synopsis done by the american bible society on the four gospels. cf. kurtaland (ed.), synopsis of the four gospels (new york: american bible society 1982). the english translation presented here are from the revised standard version (rsv) and the english standard version (esv). this however applies only to this tabular presentation of the synoptic parallels, while we shall continue to use our own personal translation all through the paper. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 7 them, and he made ve talents more. 17 so also he who had the two talents made two talents more. 18 but he who had received the one talent went and dug in the ground and hid his master's money. 19 now after a long time the master of those servants came and settled accounts with them. 20and he who had received the ve talents came forward, bringing ve talents m o r e , s a y i n g , ' m a s t e r , y o u delivered to me ve talents; here i have made ve talents more.' 21 his master said to h im, 'wel l done, good and faithful servant. you have been faithful over a little; i will set you over much. enter into t h e j o y o f y o u r master.' an embassy after him, saying, 'we do not want this man to reign over us.' 1 5 w h e n h e returned, having r e c e i v e d t h e k i n g d o m , h e commanded these servants, to whom he had given the money, to be called to him, that he might know what they had gained by trading. 16 the rst came b e f o r e h i m , saying, 'lord, your pound has made ten pounds more.' 17 and he said to him, 'well done, g o o d s e r v a n t ! because you have been faithful in a very lit t le, you 8 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 22 and he also who had the two talents c a m e f o r w a r d , saying, 'master, you delivered to me two talents; here i have made two talents more.' 23 his master said to him, 'well done, good and faithful servant. you have been faithful over a little; i will set you over much. enter into the joy of your master.' 24 he also who had received the one talent came forward, saying, 'master, i knew you to be a hard man, reaping where you did not sow, and gathering where you scattered no seed, 25 so i was afraid, and i went and hid your talent in the ground. here you have what is yours.' 2 6 but his master answered him, 'you wicked and slothful servant! you knew that i reap where i have not sown and shall have authority over ten cities.' 18 and the second came, saying, 'lord, your pound has made ve pounds.' 19 and he said to him, 'and you are to be over ve cities.' 2 0 then ano the r c a m e , s a y i n g , `lord, here is your pound, which i kept l a i d a w a y i n a napkin; 21 for i was afraid of you, because you are a severe man; you take up what you did not lay down, and reap what you did not sow.' 22 he said to him, 'i will condemn you out of your own mouth, you wicked servant! you knew that i was a severe man, taking up what i did not lay down and reaping what i the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 9 g a t h e r w h e r e i scattered no seed? 27 then you ought to have invested my m o n e y w i t h t h e bankers, and at my coming i should have received what was my own with interest. 28 so take the talent from him and give it to him who has the ten talents. 29 for to everyone who has will more be given, and he will have an abundance. but from the one who has not, even what he has will be taken away. 3 0 a n d c a s t t h e worthless servant i n t o t h e o u t e r darkness. in that place there will be w e e p i n g a n d gnashing of teeth.' did not sow? 23 why then did you not put my money into the bank, and at my coming i should have collected it with interest?' 24 and he said to those who stood by, `take the pound from him, and give it to him who has the ten pounds.' 25 (and they said to him, 'lord, he has ten pounds!') 26 'i tell you, that to everyone who has will more be given; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away. 27 but as for these enemies of mine, who did not want me to reign over them, bring them here and slay them before me.'” 28 and when he had said this, he went on ahead, going up to jerusalem. 10 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 though mark does not have any version of the parable, but in the context of making comparison with the kingdom of heaven as matthew does, mark engenders the “journey motif”, and that becomes a common feature in the three synoptic gospels. but on the parable itself, we shall deal with the comparison between matthew and luke. what is the relation of the parables in matthew and luke? can the earliest version be determined? comparing both versions from all possible perspectives, there are opinions that if the two versions of the parable derive from the same original source, then the traditions on which matthew and luke depend must have diverged 12very early. we need to analyze the features of the parable to be able to ascertain or refute such a position. a close reading of each of the two versions given in matthew and luke reveals some obvious parallelisms making up the bulk of the two versions which make many scholars in modern critical scholarship regard the two versions as derived from the same source, or one derived from the other. at the same time, it reveals a number of divergent details which are also very signicant. on the parallel details, we could compare: also there are a number of common phrases such as: “good ... faithful servant” (lk 19:17; cf. matt 25:21); “i was afraid” (lk 19:21; cf. matt 25:25); “because you are a hard man” (lk 19:21; cf. matt 25:24); “you reap what you did not sow”, (lk 19:21; cf. matt 25:24); “wicked servant” (lk 19:22; cf. matt 25:26); “deposit my money with the bankers” (lk 19:23; cf. matt 25:27); “with interest on my return” (lk 19:23; cf. matt 25:27); “take the pound from him” (lk 19:24; cf. matt 25:28); “give it to him who has the ten pounds” (lk 19:24; cf. matt 25:27); “everyone who has will be given more” (lk 19:26; cf. lk 19:12, 13, 15b-23, 24b-26 matt 25:14, 15, 19-27, 28, 29 12klyne r.snodgrass, stories with intent:a comprehensive guide to the parables of jesus (grand rapids, mi: eerdmans publishers, 2008) 525. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 11 matt 25:29); “from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away” (lk 19:26; cf. matt 25:29). beyond the wording and in terms of the content of the parable, common also to both matthew and luke is that the responsibility assigned the servants gives them an obligation, and there is the device of dialogue between a master who entrusts the obligation and a subordinate in the wrong. in both parables, the master is addressed with κύριε, the vocative case of the term κύριος (master). besides the fact that κύριος is the right word to use for a human master, it is also used with reference to god or later in the church, the exalted christ. hence, the exibility of the word has also attracted much attention. whereas no other word is suitable for a servant in both versions of the parable to use for master, in matt 25:37, 44, the son of man as judge is addressed as κύριε, and in lk 19:33-34, οἱκύριοι is used for the owners of the colt jesus will ride and ὁκύριος is used for jesus himself, the colt's true master. in both parables, the 'money' of the third servant who did not invest is taken from him and given to the servant with the most money. both parables also contain the saying, “to all those who have, more will be given; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away” (matt 15:29; lk 1319:26). there is however a catalogue of signicant differences between the two versions. we can picture the 'delay motif' in the matthean story whereby the master returns after a long time. while this 'delay motif' and the settling of accounts when the master returns (matt 25:19) has been interpreted to support a reading which sees the 13in both parables, a man entrusts an obligation ('money' as it were, following the more general interpretation rendered to matthew's τάλαντονand luke's μνᾶ) to his servants before he goes away. on his return, the servants give an account of what they have done with the money. two servants have increased their money while a third returns only what he was given. the master rewards the rst two servants but criticizes the third for not investing the money so that the master could receive back his money with interest. cf. elizabeth v. dowling, taking away the pound: women, theology and the parable of the pounds in the gospel of luke (london: t & t clark, 2007) 72; cf. snodgrass, stories with intent, 526. 12 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 14parable as being about the last judgment, the lukan story does not indicate any such delay in return. in the matthean story, the number of servants the master called is n o t e x a c t l y s p e c i  e d , a s w e  n d i n m a t t 2 5 : 1 4 , ἐκάλεσεντοὺςἰδίουςδούλους (“he called his very servants”); but according to the distribution of the amount and their returns, there are three servants (matt 25:15-18), and the master in the matthean story gives different amount of the τάλαντον to each servant. in the lukan s t o r y , t h e r e a r e t e n s e r v a n t s ( c f . l k 1 9 : 1 3 ) : καλέσαςδὲδέκαδούλουςἑαυτοῦ (“having called ten servants of his own”); and they all received equal amount, aμνᾶ each, but like matthew, only three of them are treated at the time of delivering the returns. the rst two servants in the matthean version each doubled their money in the master's absence (matt 25:20,22) while the rst two servants in the lukan story respectively made 1000% and 500% prots (lk 19:16, 18). the third servant in the matthean parable dug the ground and hid the money of his master (matt. 25:18), while the third servant in the lukan version (lk 19:20) wraps his money ἐνσουδαρίῳ (“in a piece of cloth”). where the rst two slaves in matthew are praised and told that they will be put in positions of authority, the rst two slaves in luke are given authority over cities in 15 the present rather than at some future time (lk 19:17,19). in the lukan version, the master repeats the description of himself as a harsh man. matthew's version does not have such a qualication. 14daniel j. harrington, the gospel of matthew (collegeville, mn: the liturgical press, 1991) 352. 15the matthean case of the reward presents a future dimension, and in the context of the injunction to 'enter into the joy of your master', the eschatological element in the reading of matthew's version stands out. this is further corroborated by the order in the matthean story that the third slave be thrown 'into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth' (mt. 25:30; cf. 8:12; 13:42, 50; 22:13; 24:51). the 'outer darkness' which suggests condemnation at the last judgment contrasts with entering 'into the joy of the master' which alludes to a positive at the judgment. no corresponding punishment is given to the third slave in the lukan version. cf. harrington, matthew, 352-353; dowling, taking away the pound¸ 74. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 13 1� τάλαντον vs. μνᾶ as we mentioned earlier, one of the very prominent distinctive features in the two versions of the parable is the monetary unit employed. matthew uses the word τάλαντον (“talent”) for the object of the business while luke uses the word μνᾶ, which many english translations render as 'pound'. a μνᾶ is a monetary unit equivalent to hundred drachmas or 16 denarii. the word is a semitic loanword from the akkadian word manû, and it made its appearance in greek as early as the period of the 17attic greek. it is a considerable, though not an enormous, sum of money. in the new testament, it is used only by luke and appears 18 only in the parable of the pounds (lk 19:13, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25). we shall consider its ot usage later in our verse-by-verse analysis of the text. τάλαντονwas originally a measure of weight varying in size from about 26 to 36 kg, and then became a unit of coinage whose value differed considerably in various times and places, but was always comparatively high. it varied also with the metal involved which might be gold, silver, or copper. in the nt, the word is found only in 19matt 18:24; 25:15 (2x), 20, 22, 24 (2x), 28. while there is a variety of understanding of the precise value of the τάλαντον, it is considerably more valuable than the μνᾶ, that is, of much larger 16cf. james hope moulton andgeorge milligan, the vocabulary of the greek testament: illustrated from the papyri and other non-literary sources (london: hodder and stoughton, 1930), 414. the drachma itself can be considered the same value as the denarius, the usual daily wage for a labourer. 17frederick william danker and walter bauer, a greek-english lexicon of the new testament and other christian literature (chicago and london: the university of chicago press, 2000) 654. 18alfredschmoller, handkonkordanz zum griechischen neuen testament (stuttgart: deutsche biblegesellschaft, 1989) 339; dankerand bauer, a greek-english lexicon, 654. 19danker andbauer, a greek-english lexicon, 988; schmoller, handkonkordanz 479. 14 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 20denomination with each talent equalling sixty minas. from the above analysis, it is clear that each evangelist uses a term peculiar to him as the monetary unit of the task, and signicant is the fact that matthew's word applies somewhere else outside the parable of the talents in his gospel (cf. 18:24). 2� the matthean story and the lukan story: source primacy considered the pressing questions: whose version of the parable is older? did matthew copy from luke or did luke copy from matthew? and which of them adapted certain features of an existing tradition and reworked them to suit his purpose? the typical scholarly approach to these parables as presented by 21 matthew and by luke amounts to the following three points: i.) that the two versions are divergent accounts of a single original, though it is difcult to trace the similarities in both accounts to quelle (i.e. the q source); ii.) that matthew's account is closer to the original, but matthew shaped the parable allegorically to reect a concern for eschatology and the delay of the parousia by placing it in his eschatological discourse, by several additions some of which may be due to the tradition, and by the change from minas to talents; and, iii.) that luke has somewhat ineffectively joined two parables, that of 22the minas and that of the throne claimant. on the basis of an overall critical analysis, we are caught between tradition and redaction, and also in the web of the arguments 20it is pertinent to note that the value of the talent also varies considerably, depending on times and places. some scholars evaluate a talent as equivalent to sixty minas, while some others understand the talent to be one hundred times more valuable than the pound. cf. eduard schweizer, the good news according to matthew (transl. david e. green) (london: s.p.c.k., 1975) 470; johnson, the gospel of luke, 289-290. 21cf. snodgrass, stories with intent, 529-530. 22scholars also believe that luke has also shaped the result of the parable eschatologically by placing it just before the entryto jerusalem, by his introduction in v.11, and by the direct order to “do business in v.13). but our focus in the paper is the orientation of the parable to the two-fold theme of mission and discipleship, owing to the fact of 'calling' and 'entrusting a task' which is expected to yield due fruits with the passage of time. this mission-disciple theme is also evident in the form and 'shape' of the parable. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 15 23 between single tradition and double tradition. both past and contemporary critical scholarship is divided between a single original source tradition adapted independently by matthew and luke, and the view that one depended on the other. many scholars agree that the bulk of similarities between the two accounts is due to 24 the fact that they emerged from a single teaching occasion of jesus or from different occasions of teaching in which jesus repeated the 25parable. two main explanations are given as to how the dissimilarities crept into the accounts: (1.) that the original parable is preserved independently in the matthean tradition (m) and in the lukan tradition (l), and that it is these traditions which are responsible for the discrepancies between the two accounts. (2.) that the parable was preserved in a source common to both evangelists, such as q, and that the evangelists themselves or various editors 26 before them are responsible for the differences. either of these two positions however raises a further question: which of the two evangelists preserves the most original form of the parable? the vast majority of commentators opine that whatever the 'original' teaching looked like, it would have been more similar to matthew's version 23cf. richard l. rohrbaugh, “a peasant reading of the parable of the talents/pounds: a text of terror?” biblical theological bulletin23 (1993) 32-39; r. q. ford, the parables of jesus. recovering the art of listening (minneapolis 1997). 32-46; snodgrass, stories with intent, 530-531. the scope of this work does not avail us of the opportunity to analyse as many scholarly divides and arguments as possible in this regard. but we shall limit ourselves to a few details that have bearing on the trajectory of this paper. 24cf. adelbert denaux, “the parable of the talents/pounds (q 19,12-27) – a reconstruction of the q text”, in andreas lindemann (ed.), the saying source q and the historical jesus (leuven: leuven university press, 2001) 430. 25cf. alfred plummer, a critical and exegetical commentary on the gospel according to luke (edinburgh: t & t clark, 1922) 437 26this debate has really received considerable attention in critical scholarship. cf. arland j. hultgren, the parables of jesus:a commentary (grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2000) 278-279; william d. davies – dale c. allison, a critical and exegetical commentary on the gospel according tosaint matthew, vol iii (edinburgh: t & t clark international 1997) 376; edgarhennecke, new testament apocrypha (ed. &transl. wilhelm schneemelcher and r. mclwilsonet al.) (london: lutterworth press, 1965) 149 ff. 16 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 27than to luke's. a counter position is held by just a few, one of whom is marie-joseph lagrange who argues that it is luke who preserves the most original form, and that matthew (or his source) is the one 28 guilty of the most redactional work. more appealing to me is the view that each of the two evangelists based their versions of the parable on the teaching of jesus, either a single teaching which experienced variation in form as passed from one period to another, or various occasions of teaching where the same story had to be told with different nuances, contextualized according the peculiarities of the audience or kerygmatic purpose, in terms of the intended message of each occasion. alfred plummer suggests that it is more likely that both of them reect two separate, albeit similar, teachings of jesus, given on different occasions, rather than stipulating that the gospel writers confused the details of the 29 teachings as well as its context. it is like someone telling the same story twice on different occasions, each time adapting not only the presentation but also the details of the story in order to better t the audience before us. a very tenable view in our consideration that gives credence to the possibility of plummer's suggestion is given by n. t. wright: “it is highly likely that jesus used such stories on 27they mostly base their argument upon the supposition that there is no adequate not tentative reason why matthew or his source would have removed certain elements from the parable which are preserved in luke, all the more so since these elements were particularly tting for mathew's context. cf. joseph a. fitzmyer, the gospel according to luke x-xxvi (ancb 28a; garden city, ny: doubleday & co., 1985) 1230. on this point, we nd it difcult to agree with these scholars that matthew would nd everything preserved in the l tradition useful for his context. matthew's eschatological context is enough reason why adaptations could be set in, if he were to really have the l or q source to rework. the view that lukan version was expanded from the original which is said to have been preserved by matthew may not be outrightly tenable, in our view. 28marie-josephlagrange, évangile selon saint luc (paris : j. gabalda 1921& 1948) 490-492.i also nd it a sort of over-assumption the claim that matthew did the redactional work on the original which luke preserves. rather, i believe that both of them independently retold an existing story which has its source in the historical jesus, and then applied vocabulary and context that would be more comprehensible to their respective audience. 29plummer, gospel according to luke, 437. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 17 numerous occasions (not just 'twice', as cautious conservative exegetes used to suggest). there is no reason to suggest that either matthew or luke's version was derived from the other, or both from a 30 single original. klyne snodgrass observes that at least three parables beside these two deal with the same themes of entrusted possessions, a master's absence, and a later reckoning: the faithful or unfaithful servant (matt 24:45-51), the man going on a journey (mk 13:34-36), and the wicked tenants (matt 21:33-45; mk 12:1-12; lk 20:9-18). given that such stories were told often and given the lack of common language between matthew and luke, he argues that matthew's parable of the talents and luke's parable of the pounds do not render 31the same parable or have any genetic relation. lending support to these latter views also impels us to acknowledge that it is not impossible, and in fact it must have been that case, that each of the two evangelists, without necessarily depending on each other, in adapting the parable whose source is the teaching of jesus, included their own redactional input to the story in order to render more apt the overriding message as it connects and ows with its overall context. there is a very strong indication of luke's ingenuity in this parable to prove this point. let us consider the parables in luke's gospel that are completely lukan, that is, found only in luke. on an interesting note, g. sellin divides the introductory formulas of the lukan parables into a three-fold categorization such as ἄνθρωπός-τις(anthrōpos-tis), τίς-ἐξ-ὑμῶν(tis30nicholas t. wright, jesus and the victory of god (minneapolis: fortress press, 1996) 632-633. 31with all the efforts made by scholars to determine the original source(s) of the parable(s) as contained in matthew and luke, klyne sondgrass comes to the conclusion that the signicant differences between the two accounts make three options possible: (i.) we have two independent parables developing the same plot with the throne claimant being original to luke's parable; (ii.) we have two independent parables, but luke (or his tradition) added the throne claimant elements; (iii.) we have a common original which developed in two directions and which luke (or his tradition) altered by merging the throne claimant elements. according to him, one of the rst two options is more likely. cf. snodgrass, stories with intent, 531. 18 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 ex-hymōn) and ὅμοιος(homoios) parables. by examining the introductory formulas of the parables, he states the important fact that luke has a preponderance of τίς-ἐξ-ὑμῶν and ἄνθρωπός-τις parables, while mark and material peculiar to matthew's gospel contain exclusively ὅμοιος parables. on the basis of this, he attempts to establish the contention that they come entirely from the hand of 32 luke and not from the jesus tradition. following such an observation, we can see the uniqueness of the parable of the pound, in the sense that while also having enough other characteristics to qualify it as a parable of the jesus tradition which both luke and matthew share, the lukan introductory formula (cf. 19:13) and many other unique lukan characteristics that it possesses, shows it to be a piece of ingeniously arranged material by luke and strategically tted into its context in the gospel to convey some pertinent message. literary and narrative context of the parable the context preceding the parable deals with jesus' activities near jericho and inside jericho while still on his way to jerusalem (18:3543; 19:1-10). the narrator tells us that as he draws near jericho (18:35) he encounters a blind man and restores his sight. and then he enters jericho (19:1) and eats with zacchaeus (a story unique to luke). the parable of the pounds is given immediately after the zacchaeus incident and immediately before jesus' entry into jerusalem. since 9:51, jesus has been on a journey to jerusalem, such that through the intervening ten chapters the reader has been anticipating his arrival. as a matter of fact therefore, the parable is placed at a crucial stage within the journey narrative, a sort of climax in a series of activities and conversations during the nal lap of that journey to jerusalem. while on the journey and prior to the telling of the parable, jesus converses with a rich ruler and invites him to 32g. sellin's analysis is found in the phd dissertation of c. i. blomberg, “tradition history of the parables peculiar to luke's central section” (university of aberdeen, 1982), 248-258. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 19 distribute his wealth to the poor, but he would not yield, and jesus dec lares how di fcul t i t i s for the weal thy to en ter εἰςτὴνβασιλείαντοῦθεου (“into the kingdom of god” – 18:18-25). then jesus makes the third prediction of his passion and states clearly that jerusalem, to which he is going, is the place where he would be killed (18:31-33). drawing near jericho, jesus cures a blind beggar who then follows him (18:35-43). and then in jericho, jesus encounters the tax collector, zacchaeus who welcomes him into his house (19:1-10). signicant in this latter encounter is that, in contrast to the rich ruler mentioned in 18:18-25, zacchaeus voluntarily decides to give half his possessions to the poor, and becomes intent on not defrauding anyone (19:8); and then jesus pronounces salvation 33 upon zacchaeus and his household (19:9). in the analysis of many scholars, the introductory clause of 19:11, ἀκουόντωνδὲαὐτῶνταῦταπροσθεὶςεἶπενπαραβολὴν (“as they were hearing these things, he proceeded to tell a parable”), somewhat indicates the linking of the following story the parable of the pounds with the zacchaeus narrative, and they conclude from it that it is the same audience which hears jesus' pronouncement in 19:9-10 that will hear the parable jesus tells. after this particular introductory clause, verse 11 gives two narrative reasons for the parable being here. as the narrator indicates, jesus tells the parable because 'he was near jerusalem' and because “they” thought the βασιλείατοῦθεοῦ would appear immediately (19:11). in this, we see that placing the parable after the zacchaeus story and before the triumphal entry deserves c lose a t ten t ion . the s ta tement to zacchaeus i 19 :9 , 33in this whole narrative contextup to the followership and resolve of zacchaeus, the discipleship-mission motif and its connection with the journey jesus makes to jerusalem where he would die, is already brought out clearly, setting the stage for deepening of the message via an allegorical rendering in the parable of the pounds that follow immediately after. in obeying the command to come down from the tree, zacchaeus answers the call to discipleship. he then invites jesus to dine with him and his closer encounter with jesus leads him to μετάνοια. the nal result is that zacchaeus gains salvation (cf. lk 19:1-10), the reward that awaits every true disciple. 20 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 σήμερονσωτηρίατῷοἴκῳτούτῳἐγένετο (“today salvation has come to 34this house”) provides the reason within the narrative why “they” thought the kingdom was immediately to appear, whereas the situation makes evident their lack of understanding that jerusalem would be the place of death for jesus. jesus goes on to tell the parable. after the parable, the narrator 35 tells us that jesus continues his journey to jerusalem (19:28). signicant to note also is that several features of luke's narrative of the last days in jerusalem connect the features of the parable. in the account of the triumphant entry which follows, jesus is acclaimed as “king” (19:38), a nuance which is found in only luke's account of the 36 triumphant entry, a reminder that the βασιλεία is present. within its larger narrative context, there are also some other signicant features which scholars have identied both inside the parable and in its seams as stylistic techniques employed by luke to highlight the message of the parable. amongst these is the feature of opposition and destruction as identied by guy. he links the opposition of the citizens in 19:14 with the opposition by the pharisees in 19:39, and also links the slaughter of the citizens in 19:27 with the slaughter of 19:44. guy describes these connections as 'a textual web of interrelationship' between the parable and the 37 following pericope. the connection i would prefer to make in this regard of connecting the parable with the pericope that comes after is 34the identity of this “they” who are expecting the kingdom of god raises further questions. who exactly does the “they” refer to? some think it is the crowd who complains in 19:7 – cf. james m.dawsey, the lukan voice: confusion and irony in the gospel of luke (macon, ga: mercer university press 1986) 95; others point to the disciples – cf. sharon h. ringe, luke (louisville, ky: westminster john knox 1995) 234. according to dowling, since it is unlikely that opponents of jesus would be expecting the kingdom of god to appear once jesus arrives in jerusalem, it is more likely that “they” refers to supporters, including the disciples – cf. dowling, taking away the pound, 76. 35snodgrass, stories with intent, 527. 36dowling, taking away the pound, 77. 37dowling, taking away the pound, 77. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 21 that, as the fate of the opposing citizens (cf. 19:14) seems to be an allegorical allusion to the fate that awaits the opposing pharisees, so does reward as bequeathed upon the faithful servants awaits the “multitude of disciples” who welcomed him, rejoicing and praising god (cf. 19:37-38), a strong enough reason to make the stones themselves protest if the disciples were to be deterred (cf. 19:39-40) from trailing the path marked for them by the master. � closer analysis of the text 19:11 the introduction (v.11) leading into the parable holds a lot of information and draws a lot of questions as well. what is the meaning of this verse? did jesus tell this parable to prevent eschatological excitement among his followers or to announce the reality of the kingdom for which preparations must be made? most commentators 3 8agree that i t is a lukan creat ion, and the effect of ἀκουόντωνδὲαὐτῶνταῦταis to tie the parable closely to the preceding scene (cf. ἀκούω – 16:14; 20:45) with its audience as the followers of jesus (5:27-39). this is further corroborated by the use of προσθεὶςεἶπενπαραβολὴν (“he proceeded to tell a parable), which implies an addition to what they have been hearing. luke distinctively uses προστίθημι(cf. 3:20; 12:25, 31; 17:5; 20:11-12; acts 2:41, 47; 5:14; 11:24; 12:3; 13:36). the main organizing device of the central portion of luke's gospel is the journey of jesus to jerusalem with numerous travel notices rubbing through the narrative (9:31, 51, 53; 13:22, 33-34; 17:11; 18:31). now, it is nearing its climax as he gets closer to 3 9jerusalem. the causal clause in 19:11 is signicant: διὰτὸἐγγὺςεἶναιἰερουσαλὴμαὐτὸν (“because he was near to jerusalem”).with these words, the narrator noties us that he added this parable because he was getting close to jerusalem? what then is the connection between this parable and his journey to jerusalem? 38jeremias, parables, 99 n40 gives a list of lukan and pre-lukan characteristics. 39johnson, luke, 289. 22 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 many commentators would like to nd the answer in the second reason given for the parable, “… and because they supposed that the kingdom of god was to appear immediately” (19:11). the natural antecedent for the implied subject (“they”) is the accompanying crowd made up of followers, opponents, and the “rest”. the verb δοκέω is sometimes used to express false opinion, but in fact, luke uses it neutrally (1:3; 10:36; 22:24; acts 15:22, 25, 28, 34; 25:27; 26:9) as often as to designate erroneous perceptions (8:18; 12:40, 51; 13:2-4; acts 12:9; 17:18). yet the verb itself does not tell us whether we are to take the parable as a correction or conrmation of their 40opinion. the two points that i would like to emphasize in this verse however, for the purpose of our paper are:(i.) the journey notice, and (ii.) the presence of the disciples amongst those who make up the audience. we shall discuss them further in the section that treats the function of the text in the lukan jn. 19:12 this verse like the preceding one, contains numerous indications of lukan compositional activity such that one can say that whatever may have been his original source for the story, it involves a lukan revision inserted into this lukan context for a particular purpose. as with this verse in which the jesus' story really begins, evidence of lukan characteristic within this parable would also be seen all over the text. the adverb, οὖν (“therefore”) is used here in a responsive sense, being that their expectation has generated this response, which is the parable. the closest parallels to this usage are in lk 3:7, 18; 7:31.the term, εὐγενὴς is an adjective which literarily means “noble birth” (cf. acts 17:11; 1 cor 1:26). the word ἐπορεύθη (“he journeyed”) is part of luke's journey vocabulary and would recall for the hearer jesus' journey to his destiny in jerusalem. it is used again in luke's travel notice at 19:28. and earlier in 9:51, as part of luke's journey vocabulary, το ῦπορεύεσθαι signals jesus' movement toward 40johnson, luke, 289. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 23 41his goal of death and resurrection. another catch-word in this verse is ὑποστρέψαι (“to return”), for the entire parable is dependent on the return of the king, who will require his servants to give an account. the allegorical meaning of these details is that jesus is the “man of noble birth” and that the χώρανμακρὰν (“distant country”) refers to his being in heaven awaiting his return. his servants are to do his 42work until he comes back. 19:13 the δέκαμνᾶς(“ten minas) are central to this verse. a “mina” was an ot measure of weight consisting of fty shekels (ezek 45:12), used for gold and silver (1 ki 10:17; ezra 2:69; neh 7:71–72). it was “a sixtieth of a talent or about one hundred drachmas, i.e., about three months' wages”. even though a mina is a much smaller sum than the ve talents in mt 25:15 (which represent a sizable fortune), three months' wages is still a considerable sum of money. the nobleman makes his expectation concerning the money clear with the use of πραγματεύσασθε the imperative of πραγματεύομαι, meaning “to engage in business. the phrase, ἐνᾧἔρχομαιpresents a sense of construction that is somewhat ambiguous. most translators simply render it as “until i come”, while some others would see it as “while i go”. this latter nuance which could also mean “while i am travelling” captures the context of the journey information that keeps being highlighted by the author. 41j. fitzmyer calls this luke's “pregnant use of the verb πορεύεσθαι … [where] the context is one of opposition and hostility, and the implication is that his destiny is to be reached despite such opposition. further noteworthy instances of it are to be found in the travel account in particular (9:51, 52, 53, 56, 57; 10:38; 13:33; 17:11; 19:12) though its use is not conned to this section”, cf. fitzmyer, luke i-ix, 164-171; a. arthur, luke 9:51-24:53 (concom; st. louis 1998) 426; johnson, luke, 289. 42m. c. black, luke (joplin, mo 1996). 43danker and bauer, a greek-english lexicon of the new testament. 24 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 19:14-27 luke continues the thread of the parable. we would just highlight a few of the various lukan characteristics to buttress our point that this parable is a purposeful lukan insertion into the journey narrative for a signicant purpose. in 19:14,τοῦτονis a derogatory reference with the nuances of “this guy” or “this fellow” and βασιλεῦσαιis an ingressive aorist, “to 43become king.” the bidding of some of the nobleman's fellow citizens who sought to upset his conrmation as king was clearly unsuccessful and he returns with full royal authority. here the opposition to jesus, perhaps especially that which culminates in his death, is in view. in the larger lukan perspective, the journey is a journey through death and to god (see acts 2:33–36), and the return is the anticipated coming of the son of man (see luke 21:27–28). the case in point is that as he journeys (to god), jesus would entrust the task for the continuation of his mission to his followers, as envisioned in the parable where the noble man entrusts talents to his servants. the term, γνοῖin 19:15 is also an ingressive aorist, “come to know.” probably a large part of the reason they did not want him to be king is that they did not want to be held accountable – to him or to 44anyone. the success achieved by the rst two servants may seem extraordinary to us, but in the ancient world huge risks went with huge returns. they have done well in their trial and are given an important share in the rule of their monarch (cf. 22:29–30). the expression, ὅτιἐνἐλαχίστῳπιστὸςἐγένου (“because you have been faithful in very little”) in 19:17 re-echoes 16:10 which is the parable 45 of the unrighteous steward. the third servant, however (note that luke seems to lose sight of the rest of the ten who were entrusted with money), returns the money, carefully preserved, but has made absolutely no use of it. the man explains his action as provoked by fear, based on his understanding of the exacting nature of his master: 44a. arthur, luke 9:51-24:53 (st. louis: 1998) 725 ff. 45cf. arthur, luke 9:51-24:53, 291; also, howard i. marshal, the gospel of luke: a commentary on the greek text (grand rapids, mi: william b. eerdmanspublishing company, 1978) 707. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 25 this man withdraws from the bank what he has not deposited and claims the harvest that represents the effort of somebody else's 46 sowing. in marked contrast to the other two, the third servant loses his stake in his master's affairs precisely when his master has become the undisputed ruler of the realm. here too the proverb in 19:26, παντὶτῷἔχοντιδοθήσεται,ἀπὸδὲτοῦμὴἔχοντοςκαὶὃἔχειἀρθήσεται (“to every one who has will more be given; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away”) proves true that winners win yet more and losers lose all that they have. but this slave is not the only loser in our story. his loss suddenly appears modest when it can be compared to that of the fellow citizens who opposed the coming to power of this ruler. they are guilty of treason, and they will pay the 47 ultimate penalty. but who made the statement is not exactly clear whether it is the king in the story, or an interjection by jesus into the parable. this pronouncement is found also in matt 25:29; 13:12; mk 4:25. 19:28 this verse is a lukan link with the preceding section. the phrase, εἰπὼνταῦτα (“having said these things”) is meant to emphasize that jesus has removed any basis for misunderstanding of the present incident. this verse which comes soon after the parable, doubles as the conclusion of the parable of the pounds and the conclusion of the journey narrative, and it goes on to give the nal travel notice: ἐπορεύετοἔμπροσθενἀναβαίνωνεἰςἱεροσόλυμα (“he went on ahead, going up to jerusalem”). indeed, ἔμπροσθενmeans that jesus went in front of his followers (cf. mk 10:32 for the motif). while ἀναβαίνωεἰςἱεροσόλυμα recalls lk 2:42, invoking jesus' pilgrimage to jerusalem at the age of twelve in the company of his parents, it also recalls lk 18:31 which signals his nal earthly destination where 46nolland, luke 18:35-24:53, 917-918 47nolland, luke 18:35-24:53, 918; j. b. green, the gospel of luke (grand rapids, mi 1997) 679ff. 26 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 everything that is written about the son of man will be accomplished. in a similar vein, εἰςἱεροσόλυμαis drawn from mk 11:1 with an eye to the triumphant entry of jesus into jerusalem to begin his ultimate journey to the cross. it puts jesus' journey to jerusalem at the center stage. the hearer is alerted 'one more time' to pay attention to what is about to transpire in the holy city of jesus' destiny. the hearer's response to the events that take place there will be signicant for his eternal salvation. � the 'journey notice' in this nal verse of the pericope combines with the preceding one in v.11 for a specic function. these last two 'journey notices' (v.11 and v.28) in the lukan journey narrative t the parable of the pounds within an inclusio, and renders it a lot signicant in the broader context of the journey narrative that begins from lk 9:51. the function of the parable in the journey narrative and its message obviously, as we said in the introduction, the parable of the pound was carefully incorporated by luke into the journey narrative material to weave up a literary and rhetorical connection of all the themes present in the discourses and actions of jesus throughout the entire journey narrative. the parable brings the ideational purpose to 48bear on the overarching message of the jn as it approaches its end. the linguistic choices and pragmatic undertones of the parable convey the writer's perspective on, and experience of, 'what is happening' in the ministry of jesus. whenever we talk about events, we represent them in a certain way. luke uses the parable of the pounds to represent what the departure of jesus after his earthly ministry implies for his followers to whom he is entrusting the continuation of the ministry on earth. 48in presenting a number of arguments that have been advanced in support of the theory that lk 19:28 should mark the end of the jn, dean béchard points out that amongst other elements, there is rst some indication that luke intents the parable of the pound (19:11-27) as an “interpretive pause” that not only comments on the preceding zacchaeus episode (19:1-10), but also offers a recapitulation of the major themes of the entire jn. cf. béchard, “the journey narrative”, 7. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 27 in v.11, luke provides his audience with an interpretive frame by which to make sense of the parable laying emphasis on their 'erroneous' thinking concerning the imminence of the parousia: “he proceeded to tell a parable, because he was near to jerusalem, and because they supposed that the kingdom of god was to appear immediately” (19:11), although the presence of σήμερον (“today”) in 49 vv.5, 9 raises the question of the eschatological timetable. going on to tell the parable gives enough clarication on the issue, providing that, rather than set eyes on the “when” of the appearance on the kingdom, attention should focus on how we use our time and given resources to prepare ourselves and others for admittance into the 50kingdom (cf. acts 1:6-11). therefore, of the various themes it engenders, and the various possible functions that the parable of the pound play in the entire context of the journey narrative – christological, theological, ecclesiological, missiological, etc. – our focus on this paper is to take on the missiological function, that is, the motifs of “discipleship” and “mission”. david gill's apt description very well captures our purpose: “the parable of the pound, coming as it does at the close of the travel narrative, has special signicance; and it is comforting for our interpretation of the whole that it contains the two themes of 49scholars have interpreted this view in a variety of ways. while conzelman emphasized luke's concern with “readiness”, maddox thinks that luke's primary concern is not when the kingdom will come but with who will qualify to be admitted to it. cf. hansconzelman, the theology of luke (transl. geoffreybuswell) (london: faber, 1960) 113; robert maddox, the purpose of luke-acts(göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht, 1982) 49-50;105106.this latter view challenges us to search for other dimensions intentions in the message, which brings us to the question of true discipleship as an 'ingredient' that can truly qualify one for admittance into the kingdom. 50cf. this is actually a strong statement and reminder of the seriousness of the call to discipleship and mission. everything has its own time. the journey of jesus which culminates with his entry into jerusalem leads to the fulllment of his earthly destiny, to suffer and to die in jerusalem, and to rise again. but his death and the end of his earthly ministry does not mark the end of his mission, and until the time of the eschatological fulllment which is certainly not so imminent (cf. lk 19:11), the disciples are to 'engage in business', the business of making god's salvation reach the ends of the earth. 28 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 proper discipleship and mission. one might almost say that it identies them, i.e., missionary activity is the work of the good 51 disciple.” looking at this two-fold theme (mission and discipleship) again from the context of the entire journey narrative, we would come to see that it constitutes the framing structures of the narrative (cf. 9:51-62; lk. 19:11-28, 29ff), in which verbs of “sending” and “entrusting” 52some tasks are signicantly employed. some important elements connecting the beginning of the lukan journey narrative with the end part, specically the parable of the pounds can therefore be briey be highlighted. first it must been noted that like the case with 19:11-28, a number of themes and motifs extend through the narrative of 9:51-62, and most prominently the 'journey notices' and 53 the theme of discipleship. following the element of necessity seen in jesus' journey and his determination in taking it (19:51), he 'sends' messengers ahead of him, to make 'ready' for him (9:52). the 'sending' of the disciples surfaces also in the parable of the pounds where the nobleman charges his servants with the task of 'engaging in business' (service) until he comes (cf. 19:13). also present is the 'motif' of rejection – the samaritans would not receive him (9:53) just as the citizens of the nobleman sent an embassy after him to accentuate their rejection of him (19:15), but despite the rejection however, the mission is not abandoned and in each case the determination takes them on (9:56; 19:12, 15a). the theme of discipleship is then clearly taken up and expanded in 9:57-62, and the nal statement of jesus in v.62 ts well into comparison with the rendering of accounts situation of 19:15-27 given that the nobleman's servants, by answering the call and accepting the task entrusted to them, they thereby put their hands on the plough and the one who 51david gill, “observations on the lukan travel narrative and some related passages”, harvard theological review 63 (1970) 212. 52with a collection of such verbs, we can say therefore, that lk 19:11-28, 29-44 forms an inclusio with lk 9:51-62, and upon this basis, we can develop out theme of discipleship which is found in the parable of the pounds. 53cf. deanbéchard, “exegesis of the travel narrative” (unpublishedlecture notes ii on luke's gospel at the pontical biblical institute, rome 2013) 2 the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 29 looks back (cf. the third servant – 19:20-26) is not t for the master's reward (kingdom of god – cf. 19:62). we can, in fact, notice from the foregoing that the 'journey notices' on the outer frames of the parable – v.11 (being near to jerusalem) and v.28 (going up to jerusalem) together set the parable within an inclusio characterized by the 'journey motif'. this is in effect, a signicant standpoint in the overall connection of the parable with its predominant theme. the narrator's introduction and conclusion to the parable therefore, reinforce the focus on jerusalem (the place where jesus would die to rise again after three days – 18:31-33). it is a sort of κήρυγμα (kerygma, i.e. “proclamation”), an important and signicant rhetorical device applied to this parable which has the 'journey motif', used by the author to teach his audience and readers the right way to respond to the task charged by the 'master', whose going away after being rejected (cf. 19:14) by the elders and scribes, does not end there, but will receive his exaltation and return in glory to demand the rendering of accounts by all the servants he left behind (cf. 19:15-27 vis-à-vis the totality of the gospel message). luke's editing and use of the parable therefore offers a lot of signicance. the point in the parable is that jerusalem in vv.11 and 28 is not about the establishment of the βασιλεία and the parousia, rather it is a place for the passion and resurrection of jesus. it is a key place 54 but not the place for the end. luke has therefore used the parable of the pound to correct a false notion of discipleship. the fact that jesus has gone to take his βασιλεία does not mean that the disciples can relax and simply wait around until he returns. the author points out that the time while he is away is a time for “trading” (19:15), i.e. for 55the hard work of the christian life. that this work includes missionary activity and relentless service is shown by the parallel passage in acts 1:10-11 – “and while they were gazing into heaven as he went, behold, two men stood by them in white robes, and said, 54gill, “observations”, 211; darrell l. bock, luke (downers grove, il: intervarsity, 1994). 55gill, “lukan journey narrative” 212. 30 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 'men of galilee, why do you stand looking into heaven? this jesus, who was taken up from you into heaven, will come in the same way as you saw him go into heaven'”. this very scene points back more or less to the conversation between jesus and his disciples in acts 1:6-8 and the mandate jesus gives to them just before he ascended into 56 heaven. to give the μνᾶς and entrust them with a duty to accomplish, is tantamount to the details of the call to discipleship. with the giving of the 'minas', the nal parable of the jerusalem journey highlights the disciple's stewardship in the interim between jesus' death and return. it continues the theme of his preparation of the disciples for life after his departure. his servants must recognize that the consummation of the kingdom is yet in the future and they are accountable for their service in the meantime. those who would not serve and those who reject jesus' kingship face judgment, whether they reject that kingship directly or view the king as harsh rather than gracious (cf. lk 19:24-27). it is pertinent to note also that patristic exegesis is fraught with emphasis on the 'discipleship' and 'mission' motifs with regard to this parable of the minas. one clear example is cyril of alexandria who states that, “we should see in the parable of the pounds an allegorical 57 reference to the mission given to the apostles and their successors. therefore, in our nal analysis, the nobleman who goes on a long journey and returns a king is not archelaus as many exegetes and commentators tend to claim, but jesus christ himself. at the end of his earthly ministry, jesus goes on the journey of his return to the father and he leaves behind him servants (disciples and believers) of various degrees of merit, and enemies as well. each of these servants and enemies will be rewarded or punished according to his deeds; and the rewards are larger opportunities of service. it is clear therefore 56before then the disciples had asked if jesus were going to restore the βασιλείαto israel now. he answers that it is not for them to know the time (acts 1:7-8); he promises them the holy spirit and predicts, “you will be my witnesses … to the ends of the earth. cf. gill, “lukan journey narrative” 212. 57arthur a.just, luke (downers grove, il: intervarsity 2003) 294. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 31 that the main lesson of the parable of the pounds is the long period of christ's absence, during which there will be abundant time for both service and rebellion, time to fulll the mission and call to service and be rewarded at last, or to neglect the given opportunity and face the judgment (cf. lk 19:13-27). therefore, there is not to be, as the disciples fancied, immediate triumph and joy for all; but, rst a long time of probation, and triumph and joy at last for those only who have 58earned them, and in exact proportion to their merits. � � conclusion we have examined the parable of the pounds as a kerygmatic rhetoric employed by luke to establish the climactic standpoint of the journey narrative (jn), which is to recall and make emphatic all the themes and motifs that constitute the entire jn itself. our particular emphasis has been on the preponderant two-fold theme of discipleship and mission. the parable of the pounds (lk 19:11-28) analysed through the prism of its allegorical referent accentuates luke's ingenuity, the rhetoric of kerygma with which he is able to reach far with his message. the kingdom will not appear immediately (19:11). disciples therefore are called to be trustworthy and proceed diligently with the mission entrusted to them while they wait for the second coming of christ the king. this in effect invites hearers and readers not just merely to stand near the beginning of the narrative but to stand with courage and joyful hope at the end of the narrative, at that crucial and pivotal point when the account of stewardship is rendered to the master. following our analysis and discussion, this paper proposes a three-fold set of recommendations: (i.) that all followers of jesus, indeed all christians, should engage in “purposeful action” of putting their god-given μνᾶς to good use so as to yield good fruits – beatitudes; (ii.) that modern disciples should follow jesus dutifully 58included also in this overarching message is the point that to neglect opportunities is to lose them; andto make the most of opportunities is to gain in felicitous strides. cf. plummer, gospel according to luke, 443. 32 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 on the journey to bring about the reign of the βασιλείατοῦθεοῦ, viz by a life of seless service to the needs of others and wholehearted commitment to the promotion of brotherhood, justice and peace in the society; and (iii.) that those entrusted with ministerial and missionary vocations should relate themselves appropriately to the spiritual signicance of the “journey towards jerusalem”, viz. the sacricial import and self-giving dimension of their calling. the parable of the pounds in the lukan journey ... | 33 219 16 catholic social teaching on immigration and the movement of peoples prof. ikechukwu anthony kanu department of philosophy and religious studies tansian university, umunya anambra state ikee_mario@yahoo.com & mike boni bazza, ph.d department of history and international relations veritas university abuja (the catholic university of nigeria) danbazza68@gmail.com & immaculata olu omojola (ssma), ph.d department of business administration and management villanova polytechnic imesi ile, osun state omojolassma@yahoo.co.uk abstract this paper interrogates the catholic social teaching on immigration and the movements of peoples. the discourse does this, by first of all stating that, the rights of migrants (refugees, immigrants, asylum seekers, migrant workers, and internally displaced persons-idps) begin with the foundation of catholic social teaching, namely, the dignity and sanctity of the human person. the paper submits that right to life and the conditions worthy of life, when threatened by poverty, injustice, religious intolerance, armed conflict, and other root causes, give rise to the right to migrate. it argues that unity in diversity is firmly grounded in the church's social teaching and understanding and appreciating this helps us to put our faith into action. this paper, further evaluates the principles of catholic social teaching using specific quotes from church documents that address the most common misperceptions about church teachings. the purpose of this discussion therefore, is to provide a brief, 220 formation of the human person in the 21st century concise, and useful compilation of information on authentic roman catholic teaching regarding the areas of immigration and the movements of peoples that currently concern most christians. the body of this work consists of quotes from documents and statements originating only from those men who are authorized to speak for the catholic church, namely, the popes and those bishops and theologians in union with them. thus, following this methodology, these quotes are extracted from encyclicals, pastoral letters, and addresses by these representatives of the magisterium (teaching authority) of the catholic church. keywords: migration, catholic social teaching, magisterium, church documents introduction in advocating on behalf of migrants, immigrants, and refugees, it is important to understand that the catholic position is based on catholic social teaching, which is derived from the gospels and the words of christ; statements and encyclicals of the popes; and statements and pastoral letters of bishops around the world. the rights of migrants (refugees, immigrants, asylum seekers, migrant workers, and internally displaced persons-idps) begin with the foundation of catholic social teaching, namely, the dignity and sanctity of the human person. the right to life and the conditions worthy of life, when threatened by poverty, injustice, religious intolerance, armed conflict, and other root causes, give rise to the right to migrate.1 as pope john xxiii explained: every human being has the right to freedom of movement and of residence within the confines of his own country; and, when there are just reasons for it, the right to emigrate to other countries and take up residence there. the fact that one is a citizen of a particular state does not detract in any way from his membership in the human family as a whole, nor from his citizenship in the world community.2 this is a right to both emigrate from one’s own country and immigrate into another country. in 2003 for example, the catholic bishops of the united states and mexico named five principles3 that have emerged from the “rich tradition of church teachings with regard to migration”: first principle: persons have a right to find opportunities in their own homeland this principle reflects the responsibilities of all citizens and governments for the common good, creating the political, economic, and social section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 221 conditions for persons to live in dignity, raise their families, use their god-given gifts, and find employment that provides a living family wage a fundamental principle of catholic social teaching (cst) dating back to the 19th century. wealthy and powerful nations are obliged to assist less developed nations in creating the conditions for people to live dignified lives. second principle: persons have the right to migrate to support themselves and their families pope pius xii declared in 1952 that both natural law and devotion to humanity required that international migration be opened to people forced from their countries by revolutions, unemployment, or hunger. he explained: “for the creator of the universe made all good things primarily for the good of all.”4 when people cannot find adequate work, they have a natural right to work elsewhere to attain the means of survival for themselves and their families. third principle: sovereign nations have the right to control their borders our tradition recognizes the right of nations to control their territories, a right arising from their responsibility for the common good. however, as pope pius indicated, this right is not absolute. state sovereignty “cannot be exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inadequate or unjustified reasons, denied to needy and decent people from other nations….” balancing rights then becomes critical. in fact, according to the bishops, individual rights and state responsibility for the common good are complementary. while the sovereign state may impose reasonable limits on immigration, the common good is not served when the basic human rights of the individual are violated. in the current condition of the world, in which global poverty and persecution are rampant, the presumption is that persons must migrate in order to support and protect themselves and that nations who are able to receive them should do so whenever possible.5 in 2000, the bishops, reflecting on the tension between border control and the individual right to fundamental dignity, declared the latter to “give rise to a more compelling claim to the conditions worthy of human life.”6 fourth principle: refugees and asylum seekers should be afforded protection those who flee wars and persecution have a greater claim for protection from the global community. as the fathers of the church would urge: 222 formation of the human person in the 21st century “this requires, at a minimum, that migrants have a right to claim refugee status without incarceration and to have their claims fully considered by a competent authority.”7 fifth principle: the human dignity and human rights of undocumented migrants should be respected according to the bishops, it is noteworthy that: “regardless of their legal status, migrants, like all persons, possess inherent dignity that should be respected.”8 this applies to punitive laws, enforcement practices, detention conditions, abuse and neglect, and policies that tear families apart. even undocumented workers, often subject to inadequate wages and demeaning conditions in a shadow economy, are entitled to basic human rights in terms of wages and working conditions. immigrant workers, even ones without documents, do not lose their status as human persons made in god’s image. demeaning wages, inhuman conditions, and the denial of workers’ natural rights assault the dignity and sanctity of the human person. biblical vision of love for strangers both the old and new testaments tell compelling stories of refugees forced to flee because of oppression. exodus tells the story of the chosen people, israel, who were victims of bitter slavery in egypt. they were utterly helpless by themselves, but with god's powerful intervention they were able to escape and take refuge in the desert. for forty years they lived as wanderers with no homeland of their own. finally, god fulfilled his ancient promise and settled them on the land that they could finally call home. the israelites' experience of living as homeless aliens was so painful and frightening that god ordered his people for all time to have special care for the alien: "you shall treat the alien who resides with you no differently than the natives born among you; have the same love for him as for yourself; for you too were once aliens in the land of egypt” (lv. 19:33-34). the new testament begins with matthew's story of joseph and mary's escape to egypt with their newborn son, jesus, because the paranoid and jealous king herod wanted to kill the infant. our savior himself lived as a refugee because his own land was not safe. jesus reiterates the old testament command to love and care for the stranger, a criterion by which we shall be judged: “for i was hungry and you gave me food, i was thirsty and you gave me drink, a stranger and you welcomed me” (mt. 25:35). the apostle paul asserts the absolute equality of all people before god: "there is neither jew nor greek . . . for you are all one in christ jesus" (gal 3:28). in christ, the human race is one before god, equal in section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 223 dignity and rights. in addition to the five principles articulated by the catholic bishops of the united states and mexico in 2003 as mentioned above, three other basic principles of catholic social teaching on immigration is given due attention here. although catholic theology has always promoted human rights rooted in natural law and god's revelation, it was the encyclical rerum novarum (on the condition of labor) in 1891 that developed a systematic presentation of principles of the rights and responsibilities of people.9 rerum novarum commented on the situation of immigrants; in later documents, popes and bishops' conferences have synthesized the catholic theological tradition to articulate three basic principles on immigration. first principle: people have the right to migrate to sustain their lives and the lives of their families. at the end of world war ii, with the fall of the nazi empire and the subsequent creation of the soviet "iron curtain," europe faced an unprecedented migration of millions of people seeking safety, food, and freedom. at that time, pope pius xii wrote exsul familia (the emigre family), placing the church squarely on the side of those seeking a better life by fleeing their homes. when there is a massive movement of people such as during a war, natural disaster, or famine, the lands that receive these displaced people may be threatened. the influx may make it impossible for the native population to live securely, as the land may not have enough resources to support both. even in more orderly migrations, such as in the united states, citizens and residents of the land may fear that newcomers will take jobs, land, and resources, impoverishing the people already present.10 because of the belief that newcomers compete for scarce resources, immigrants and refugees are at times driven away, resented, or despised. nevertheless, the first principle of catholic social teaching regarding immigrants is that people have the right to migrate to sustain their lives and the lives of their families. this is based on biblical and ancient christian teaching that the goods of the earth belong to all people. while the right to private property is defended in catholic social teaching, individuals do not have the right to use private property without regard for common good. every person has an equal right to receive from the earth what is necessary for life: food, clothing, shelter. moreover, every person has the right to education, medical care, religion, and the expression of one's culture. in many places people live in fear, danger, or dehumanizing poverty. clearly, it is not god's will that some of his children live in luxury while others have nothing. in luke’s gospel, the rich man was condemned for living well while the poor man starved at his doorstep (lk. 16:19-31). the native does not have superior rights over the immigrant. before god all are equal; the earth was given by god 224 formation of the human person in the 21st century to all. when a person cannot achieve a meaningful life in his or her own land, that person has the right to move. second principle: a country has the right to regulate its borders and to control immigration. the overriding principle of all catholic social teaching is that individuals must make economic, political, and social decisions not out of shortsighted self-interest, but with regard for the common good. that means that a moral person cannot consider only what is good for his or her own self and family, but must act with the good of all people as his or her guiding principle. while individuals have the right to move in search of a safe and humane life, no country is bound to accept all those who wish to resettle there.11by this principle the church recognizes that most immigration is ultimately not something to celebrate. ordinarily, people do not leave the security of their own land and culture just to seek adventure in a new place or merely to enhance their standard of living. instead, they migrate because they are desperate and the opportunity for a safe and secure life does not exist in their own land. immigrants and refugees endure many hardships and often long for the homes they left behind. as human beings, we should cherish and celebrate the contributions of immigrants and their cultures; however, we should work to make it unnecessary for people to leave their own land. because there seems to be no end to poverty, war, and misery in the world, developed nations will continue to experience pressure from many peoples who desire to resettle in their lands.12the catholic social teaching is realistic, thus, while people have the right to move, no country has the duty to receive so many immigrants that its social and economic life is jeopardized. for this reason, catholics should not view the work of the federal government and its immigration control as negative or evil. those who work to enforce our nation's immigration laws often do so out of a sense of loyalty to the common good and compassion for poor people seeking a better life. in an ideal world, there would be no need for immigration control. the church recognizes that this ideal world has not yet been achieved. third principle: a country must regulate its borders with justice and mercy. the second principle of catholic social teaching may seem to negate the first principle. however, principles one and two must be understood in the context of principle three. and all catholic social teaching must be understood in light of absolute equality of all people and the commitment to common good.13 a country's regulation of borders and control of immigration must be governed by concern for all people and by mercy and justice. a section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 225 nation may not simply decide that it wants to provide for its own people and no others. a sincere commitment to the needs of all must prevail. in our modern world where communication and travel are much easier, the burden of emergencies cannot be placed solely on nations immediately adjacent to the crises. justice dictates that the world community contributes resources toward shelter, food, medical services and basic welfare. even in the case of less urgent migrations, a developed nation's right to limit immigration must be based on justice, mercy, and the common good, not on self-interest. moreover, immigration policy ought to take into account other important values such as the right of families to live together.14a merciful immigration policy will not force married couples or children to live separated from their families for long periods. undocumented immigrants present a special concern. often their presence is considered criminal since they arrive without legal permission. under the harshest view, undocumented people may be regarded as undeserving of rights or services. this is not the view of catholic social teaching. the catholic church teaches that every person has basic human rights and is entitled to have basic human needs met: food, shelter, clothing, education, and health care. undocumented persons are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by employers, and they are not able to complain because of the fear of discovery and deportation. current immigration policy that criminalizes the mere attempt to immigrate and imprisons immigrants who have committed no crime or who have already served a just sentence for a crime is immoral. in the bible, god promises that our judgment will be based on our treatment of the most vulnerable. before god we cannot excuse inhumane treatment of certain persons by claiming that their lack of legal status deprives them of rights given by the creator. conclusion finally, immigration policy that allows people to live here and contribute to society for years but refuses to offer them the opportunity to achieve legal status does not serve the common good. the presence of millions of people living without easy access to basic human rights and necessities is a great injustice. it is the position of the catholic church that pastoral, educational, medical, and social services provided by the church are never conditioned on legal status. all persons are invited to participate in their parishes, attend our schools, and receive other services offered by their institutions and programs. in the course of this discourse thus far, this paper has successfully interrogated, examined and evaluated the principles of catholic social teaching on migration and movements of peoples. using specific quotes from church documents that address the most common 226 formation of the human person in the 21st century misperceptions about church teachings in areas immigration, it was noted that the excerpts quoted in this work focus on the dignity of human person. as such, they are most suited for use to educate those who are ignorant of the church’s social teachings on the movements of people as a whole. in order to comprehend the beauty, richness, and wisdom of the quoted church documents, we conclude by saying: it is necessary for the reader to take the time to sit down, read them, and contemplate their messages. endnotes 1. catholic bishops of mexico and the united states, strangers no longer: together on the journey of hope, joint pastoral letter concerning migration, january 2003, nos. 28-29. 2. pope john xxiii, pacem in terris, 1963, no. 25. 3. strangers no longer, op. cit., nos. 33-39. 4. pope pius xii, exsul familia, apostolic constitution, vatican city, 1952. 5. strangers no longer, op. cit., no. 39. 6. u.s. conference of catholic bishops, welcoming the stranger among us: unity in diversity, washington, d.c., 2000, p. 11. 7. strangers no longer, op. cit., no. 37. 8. ibid., no. 38. 9. this resource was written by fr. thomas betz, ofc, director of immigration and refugee services for the archdiocese of philadelphia, and is used with permission. scripture texts used in this work are taken from the new american bible, copyright © 1991, 1986, and 1970 by the confraternity of christian doctrine, washington, d.c. 20017, and are used by permission of copyright owner. all rights reserved. 10. pope pius xi, acta apostilicae sedis, xliii, 1951, p. 843. 11. pope john xxiii, mater et magistra no. 193, may 15, 1961. 12. fr. thomas betz, ofc, op. cit. 13. ibid. 14. pope john paul ii in his address on responsible procreation, september 17, 1983. " the wanderer, september 29, 1983, pp. 1-3. introduction: the salvation of souls the church in her infinite wisdom gives ample opportunities for the proper reconciliation of souls in situations of danger of death. the last canon of the 1983 code 1 of canon law while specifically dealing on the need to exercise clemency in the act of transferring a pastor from the church he has governed well for some time, remarked wonderfully that nobody should forget the salient fact that 2 “the salvation of soul is the supreme law” (canon 1752). this mode of often placing last the most significant word of a sentence is typical of the latin language from which the present code is derived. even though the fonts of canon 1752 attribute the source of this maxim to latter christian authors of th ththe 12 and 13 centuries a.d. like saints ivo of chartres, raymond of peñaforte and thomas of aquinas, deeper historical investigation reveals that the axiom was already thcited in the twelve tables of the roman law of the 5 century 3 b.c. in this roman law, cicero posits thus: “the salvation 4(safety/welfare) of the people shall be the supreme law”. at the end of it all, it is the salvation, nor damnation, of souls that 204 souls in danger of death while in some irregularity paul i. abhulimen gives god the greatest glory. it would mean, ultimately, that the precious blood, suffering, crucifixion and death of christ did not end in vain for such souls most dear to the incarnate son of god. if there is a great joy among the angels over the initial repentance of a sinner, then there is undoubtedly a greater or immense joy in heaven when souls are saved. the paradigm of the good thief from scriptural basis the event of the crucifixion of christ on calvary in between two thieves, one on his right and the other on his left (lk 23: 32-34, 39-43), offers us a wonderful lesson in the possibility of the miraculous opportunities for souls in situations of danger of death to be reconciled to god. the bad thief crucified along with jesus failed to utilize the grace of the moment for his salvation; but rather, remarked sarcastically: “are you not the messiah, save yourself and save us” (v. 39). the good thief, conversely, profited from his proximity to the saviour of humankind. this latter, having rebuked the erring bad thief while acknowledging his own faults as well, asked humanely, “jesus remember me when you come to your kingdom” (vv. 40-42). william barclay highlights the fact that: surely this story tells us above all that it is never too late to turn to christ. there are other things of which we must say, “the time for that is past. i am grown too old now”. but we can never say that of turning to jesus christ. so long as a man's heart 5 beats, the invitation of christ still stands. the verdict of jesus was instantaneous; “truly i tell you, today you will be with me in paradise” (v. 43). commenting further on this occurrence, g. b. caird opined succinctly that: the one criminal, lacking any sense of guilt, was ready to blame anyone for what he regarded as a vindictive twist of fate. the other, whatever else may be said of him, at least knew that he was guilty and jesus innocent. but did he really believe that, beyond the present travesty of justice, the future held for jesus the royal triumph of the messiah? if so, the approach of death must have given him an acuteness of vision denied as yet to jesus' closest friends. perhaps he simply wanted to be kind to this innocent enthusiast who had fallen victim to passion and intrigue, and seized upon the words of the placard over his head as a means of saying 205 something to offset the taunts of his companion. in this case, his was the cup of cold water that did not go without its reward. whatever he expected, the promise of jesus was out of all proportion to his request. not in some far-off assize but now he is acquitted before the divine tribunal, and his reward is not in some age to come but today and in 6paradise. thus, the salvation of the good thief is made manifest after his sincere admittance, confession and contrition for his sins. we cannot be certain about the fate of the bad thief who wasted the golden opportunity for conversion and salvation. the good thief is commonly believed to have stolen heaven at his final moment. he must have led a very contrary life, according to the roman-jewish expectations of the time, to the extent that he was given the maximum penalty of execution by crucifixion. nevertheless, he won salvation in the final hour by his acceptance of the fact that he had been condemned to death justly for his deeds, unlike the innocent christ (v. 41). the foregoing biblical incidence offers us a foundation in the understanding of the church's insistence on the need to reconcile souls in danger of death. faithful in situations of danger of death while also in irregularity ordinarily, the church makes it very obligatory for pastors of souls not to hesitate to come to the aid of the souls in danger of death since this is of the greatest advantage for the salvation of such souls which is the supreme law. to this effect, canonical legislation prescribes thus: §1. the christian faithful who are in danger of death from any cause are to be nourished by holy communion in the form of viaticum. §2. even if they have been nourished by holy communion on the same day, however, those in danger of death are strongly urged to receive communion again. §3. while the danger of death lasts, it is not to be delayed too long; it is recommended that holy communion be administered often, but on 7separate days. unfortunate incidences, however, do occur along the line whereby souls of the faithful who are in danger of death who must be given holy communion without delay are also in the 206 category of those prohibited by canon 915: “those upon whom the penalty of excommunication or interdict has been imposed or declared, and others who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin, are not to be admitted to holy communion”. accurate understanding of the foregoing canon reveals that those considered for exclusion from holy communion are the formally excommunicated or interdicted persons (cf. canons 1331 and 1332) and those who glaringly contradict in grave manner the sound practices of the church. persons who are divorced and remarried find themselves in 8 this situation. canonical prescriptions, under normal circumstances in the foregoing cases, recommend deferring the reception of holy communion in such situations in order to avoid scandal and unworthy communication that could be unfruitful to the soul of the recipient. this holds true until requisite dispositions are attained before fruitful communication can be made. moreover, “of its very nature celebration of the eucharist signifies the fullness of profession of faith and the 9fullness of ecclesial communion”. laudable as the foregoing might be, the unusual occasions of danger of death and irregularity for the reception of the sacraments especially that of the eucharist, may engender great conflict against the perennial doctrine of salvation of souls as uppermost in the church's consideration. these may call for special application of the law and adjustments by way of dispensations in order to meet up with the supreme law of salvation of souls in the church. the law forbidding communication of canon 915 may therefore need to be reconciled with that of the salvation of souls of canon 1752 whenever there is danger of death of canon 921. summarily put: there is obvious conflicts between canon 915 prohibiting communication in the eucharist for souls in some irregularity and canon 921 which encourages prompt ministration of holy communion as viaticum for souls in danger of death. sacraments of healing: penance, anointing of the sick and the eucharist there is a general relaxation of the law prohibiting reception of the last rites of penance, anointing of the sick, and the holy eucharist in certain situations of peril, in order 10 to help the soul towards attainment of salvation. the code 11does not define the meaning of danger of death and this is 207 therefore left to the prudential judgment of the sacred ministers. danger of death or periculum mortis in latin, maybe considered as such conditions in which the soul of an individual is relatively more prone to death than ordinarily the case. this may be the case at the advent of illnesses or severe sicknesses, accidents or during emergencies like war times. souls are considered to be in danger of death when they are scheduled to undergo certain surgical operations, be it major or minor. such dangers are also discernable even when they take some means of transportation like aeroplanes or vehicles in some risky terrains. in general, when there is danger of death and pending the duration of such situation of danger of death, the law is usually relapsed to allow penitential reconciliation, anointing of the sick and the reception of holy communion. due to the wide range of applications of the term 'danger of death' it has occasioned great doubts in the hearts of ministers and people alike, as to the precise manner of knowing when souls are in danger of death. the prudent judgment is left to the ministers of souls and in some cases too, to the faithful themselves, to discern when there is danger of death. the canonical understanding however recommends that in situations of doubt, in any of the cases at hand, the benefit of doubt should be given to the soul of the recipient of the sacramental grace. that is, if one entertains doubt whether there is actual situation of danger of death in a particular case, that one should, nevertheless, go on to administer the particular sacraments required, baptism, confirmation, eucharist, confession, anointing of the sick, as long as the basic requirement of right intention is melt. more good would be done than harm if one administers in error than if one abstains from acting and then later discovers that one may have jeopardized the salvation of a soul due to negligence or over-scrupulosity. the canonical term 'danger of death' or periculum mortis has a very wide range of prudential or subjective applications and it is to be distinguished from the previously used term 'point of death' or articulum mortis. this latter term in the old legislation was required for the administration of the so called 'extreme unction'. due to the nonrepeatability of extreme unction then it was therefore highly emphasized that ministers of souls must be very certain that souls were actually at the final hour or point of death before its administration. it was then given along with the still popular 208 practice of viaticum, otherwise known as “the last sacrament of christian life, holy communion given to those at or near 12death”. one may not be certain therefore that it is a viaticum until after the subsequent occurrence of death and so it is wise to simply refer to it as holy communion to the sick until the advent of death thereafter. these days in the light of recent understanding, 'extreme unction' has been replaced by the new doctrinal terminology of anointing of the sick as a sacrament. no emphasis is laid anymore on 'point of death' or articulum mortis and the consideration is now rather given to danger of death or periculum mortis. while viaticum remains but is generally now intended as communion to the sick who need this all-important nourishment to sustain them in this life and in eternity. the problem with the old practice was that many incidences of deaths occurred without the administrations of the required last sacramental aids of 'extreme unction' because no one could be actually sure of when it was 'point of death' or articulum mortis. even several souls at the dawn of such critical points of death could not receive the scrupulously-reserved-for-final-moment sacrament and viaticum. a relaxation of the law in danger of death canon 844 § 4 actually prescribes that: if there is a danger of death or if, in the judgment of the diocesan bishop or of the bishops' conference, there is some grave danger and pressing need, catholic ministers may lawfully administer these same sacraments [of penance, anointing of the sick and the eucharist] to other christians not in full communion with the catholic church, who cannot approach a minister of their own community and who spontaneously ask for them, provided that they demonstrate the catholic faith in respect to these sacraments 13 and are properly disposed. the foregoing section of the canon is intended for other christians mainly of the western extraction such as the protestants who do have the required catholic faith regarding the recommended sacraments who in danger of death, in the absence of their own minister, have spontaneously asked 14them for them and are well disposed. if these sacraments of 209 healing could be administered to non-catholics, how much more should they be given to repentant catholics in danger of death even though they have being in some irregularity such as, those living in concubinage, mere customary or civil marriages, and the divorced and remarried. at least, it is recommended that “sacramental absolution is not to be denied to those who, repentant after having gravely sinned against conjugal chastity, demonstrate the desire to strive 15 from sinning again, notwithstanding relapses”. this latter recommendation is irrespective of whether there is danger of death or not; it regards ordinary daily practice of giving room to these christians in suchlike irregularities. wider margin for reconciliation through the reception of the sacraments of penance, anointing and the eucharist is given to the faithful when there is danger of death. by christ's faithful or christifideles, it is meant those who have been incorporated through baptism into the church, or those formally received into the church with valid baptism of other ecclesial bodies, and who have not by a formal act of the will separated themselves (cf. canon 1117) and who have not incurred the maximum sanction of excommunication officially declared or irrogated by the competent ecclesiastical authority (cf. canon 96). while the holy mother church hardly inflicts officially the maximum penalty of excommunication but if done, separates one from the communion of the faithful until remission of it is received (cf. canon 1331). the sole actual known case to me of a faithful who has been officially excommunicated from the church is archbishop milingo, former archbishop of lusaka in zambia. moreover, canon 915 states categorically that, “those upon whom the penalty of excommunication or interdict has been imposed or declared, and others who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin, are not to be admitted to holy communion”. the reason for such restriction is obvious, since worthy external communication at the eucharist can only be fruitful if the inner channel of grace has not been ruptured in the soul. it would therefore amount to an absolute contradiction to feign external communion through participation at the eucharist when such act harms the soul internally due to non-disposition for worthy reception. therefore, let everyone examines his conscience thoroughly before partaking of the body of christ, lest he eats damnation unto himself (1 cor 11:27-29). 210 however, according to canon 1352 § 1, if a penalty prohibits the reception of the sacraments or sacramentals, the prohibition is suspended for as long as the offender is in danger of death. thus, in danger of death, there is a general suspension of the law in order to minister sacramentally to the souls of the faithful irrespective of their spiritual condition in the preservation of the obligation of communion: of the bond of faith, sacraments and ecclesiastically discipline (cf. canon 205). in danger of death, a baptised person who in whatever irregularity: be it concubinage, polygamy, occultism, censures, lapsed practise of the faith or even notorious abandonment of the faith, is allowed, as long as the danger lasts and as long as such soul is willing to embrace the part of reconciliation, to the sacramental life of confession, anointing of the sick and even communion. the reason given such relaxation of law is understandable since the supreme law of the church is the salvation of souls (cf. canon 1752) and the purpose of penalties or disciplinary restrictions is to reform the offender and to repair the damages done by the scandal caused, the law therefore wisely foresees some circumstances like during danger of death in which a suspension or relaxation of the law becomes preferable in order to guarantee the ultimate end of the church for 16salvation. however, due caution is to be observed to avoid putting in jeopardy the veritable beliefs of the faithful and as such the admittance to sacramental life while the danger of death lasts is to be done discretely and most probably in private. specific dispensations for sacramental reconciliations during danger of death admittance to the sacrament of reconciliation in danger of death any of christ's faithful can be fully reconciled sacramentally when and as long as there is danger of death by any priest even though officially excommunicated. this canonical regulation shows the largesse of ecclesiastical practice at the service of the supreme law of salvation of souls. in this regard, canon 976 emphatically and extensively declares that 211 any priest, even though he lacks the faculty to hear confessions, can validly absolve any penitents who are in danger of death, from any censures and sins, even if an approved priest is present. in the same way, canon 977 asserts that “the absolution of a partner in a sin against the sixth commandment of the decalogue is invalid, except in danger of death”. previously, in the old legal disposition of canon 882 of the 1917 code of canon law allowance was given for the valid absolution of all sins and censures when there was danger of death except for the absolution of one's partner in the sin against the sixth commandment of the decalogue which was still retained as illicit under some circumstances (canon 2367 of the cic/17). unlike the code of the old dispensation, canon 976 of the new code places no restrictions on the confessor or on the penitent and so any priest may absolve, validly and licitly, of any sin or censure, of any penitent in danger of death even if such is an 17accomplice in a sin against the sixth commandment. however, the obligation remains to make recourse within one month of recovery from danger of death to the competent if one had been absolved from officially declared censures 18reserved to the holy see according to canon 1357. moreover, the faculty to hear confession is usually restrictive but “in danger of death, every priest is obliged” (canon 986 § 2) to hear the confession of christ's faithful. this includes priests who may be under the sanction of excommunication since the urgency of the salvation of soul relapses such extant prohibition (cf. 1352 § 1). ordinarily, “for valid absolution of sins, it is required that in addition to the power of order, the minister has the faculty to exercise that power in respect of the faithful to whom he gives absolution” (canon 966). though integral and individual confession of one's sins is obviously the norm, in situation of death, general absolution may be carried out in so far the penitents are recommended to first make an act of contrition as long as time permits (canon 962). the individual confession and integral confession of sins constitute the only ordinary way for the reconciliation of the faithful but when the conditions required by canonical discipline of grave necessity occurs such as danger of death the extraordinary form of general confession 19and absolution is allowed. 212 anointing of the sick in danger of death the sacrament of the anointing of the sick is properly meant for those in danger death due to illness. so it not presupposed general cases of danger of death but only for the sick, and especially those sick and in danger of death. thus canon 998 declares that the anointing of the sick, by which the church commends to the suffering and glorified lord the faithful who are dangerously ill so that he may support and save them, is conferred by anointing them with oil and pronouncing the words prescribed in the liturgical books. even in the event of doubt as to whether the sick person has the use of reason or is dead, the sacrament is still to be administered (canon 1005). however, there is a particular prohibition which deviates from the general suspension of the law in danger of death since “the anointing of the sick is not to be conferred upon those who obstinately persist in a manifestly grave sin” (canon 1007). thus the anointing of the sick requires a disposition of conversion which may be guaranteed if the sick person is penitent and accepts first to undergo confession of sins with perfect contrition and sincere resolution for amendment henceforth. admittance to the holy eucharist as viaticum in danger of death canon 921 states succinctly and has been elucidated on earlier that, christ's faithful who are in danger of death, from whatever cause, are to be strengthened by holy communion as viaticum (§1). while the danger of death persists, it is recommended that holy communion be administered a number of times, but on separate days (§3). the ordinary ministers of viaticum, that is, holy communion to the sick is the parish priests, assistant parish priests and the superiors of a clerical religious community with regard to those who are members therein (canon 911 §1). however, in case of necessity, that is, there is need to give holy communion to a sick member of the faithful, the permission 213 of the proper parish priest, assistant parish priest or religious superior of such faithful is presumed as long as one is able to notify any of them of the occurred act (canon 911 §2). ordinarily, holy communion is administered to children who have reached the age of reason, have sufficient knowledge, have been carefully prepared and do have the requisite faith and devotion to participate worthily therein (canon 913 §1). however, canonical prescription allows that infants in danger of death, having earlier received baptism may be admitted to holy communion as long as they can distinguish it from ordinary food (canon 913 §2). confirmation in danger of death ordinarily, unless there is a grave reason to the contrary, an adult who is baptised is to be confirmed immediately after baptism and is to participate in the eucharistic celebration also by receiving holy communion (canon 866). this is the standard practice of the church as regard full christian initiation. the legitimate age for the reception of the sacrament of confirmation therefore is from when persons have reached the age of discretion, otherwise known as the age of reason, which is presumed at the attainment of seven years of age, having first received baptism, suitable instruction and being properly disposed. dispensation may be given for the use of reason, proper instruction and renewal of baptismal promises in the event of danger of death (cf. canon 889 § 2). the bishop's conference may decide on a different age for the reception of the sacrament of confirmation. whenever there is a danger of death, confirmation may be conferred according to the prudent judgment of the minister to those about the age of discretion (canon 891) who have not previously been confirmed. canon 883 outlines those having the faculty to confirm: 1° the diocesan bishop and his equivalents within the confines of their jurisdiction; 2° the priest by virtue of his office or mandate may do so too when he baptises one who is no longer an infant or admits a person already baptised into full communion with the catholic church; and 3° “in respect of those in danger of death, the parish priest or indeed any priest”. consequently confirmation can be administered to the baptised (faithful) who are in danger of death by any priest (canon 883 n 3°). be that as it may it remains the special function of the parish 214 priest to administer the sacrament of confirmation to those who are in danger of death (canon 530 n. 2°). apart from the foregoing considerations made for the faithful in danger of death while also in some situations of irregularity, the church is also desirous of the proper incorporation or integration of the non-baptised persons and catechumens. this latter category could be similarly helped in order to facilitate the salvation of soul. special consideration is given to the non-baptised who is also in some form of polygamous relation. dispensation from ecclesiastical impediments and form to celebrate marriage in danger of death there are two basic ways regarding dispensations of matrimonial impediments of ecclesiastical origin and of canonical form during danger of death: through the official process of the local ordinary, parish priest, or confessor (canon 1079 §§ 1, 2, or 3); and secondly through the sworn declaration of couples that they have no impediments (canon 1068). canon 1079 § 1 states categorically that, “when danger of death threatens, the local ordinary can dispense his own subjects, wherever they are residing, and all who are actually present in his territory, both from the form to be observed in the celebration of marriage, and from each and every impediment of ecclesiastical law, whether public or occult, with the exception of the impediment arising from the sacred order of priesthood”. the same faculty of dispensation in similar circumstances as the foregoing is given to parish priest, a properly delegated sacred minister, or any available priest or deacon even though may not possess the relevant faculty through delegation (canons 1079 § 2 and 1116 § 2). the dispensing power of confessors within or outside the internal-sacramental forum in the said circumstances regards only occult impediments (canon 1079 § 3). the second mode of personal dispensation concerns where there is “danger of death and if other proofs cannot be obtained, the affirmation of the contracting parties, even sworn if the case warrants it, that they are baptised and are not prevented by no impediment is sufficient unless there are indications to the contrary (canon 1068). the canonical form that is being referred to here is, the requirement by ecclesiastical law that valid marriages can only be contracted by the catholic faithful when done in the presence of the local ordinary or parish priest or the priest or 215 the deacon delegated by either the first two (that is, local ordinary or parish priest) as official representative in the name of the church who ask the parties to manifest their consent, and in the presence also of two witnesses (canon 1108 §§ 1 & 2). furthermore, such marriages have to be celebrated in the parish which either parties has a domicile or quasi-domicile or a month's residence or, if there is a question of vagi (or nomads), in the parish in which they are actually residing (canon 1115). thus with the permission of the local ordinary or the parish priest, marriages may be celebrated elsewhere within or outside territory (canon 1115). canonical form is therefore dispensable in some circumstances and danger of death by the competent authority so that undue delay will not be caused by the inability of the official representative of the church of the sacred orders to be reached. when dispensation is granted, the marriage may be celebrated without observing the usual canonical form of an official assistant in the name of the church, or of domiciliarity (canon 1118 §§ 1, 2 & 3) or the use of rites of the liturgical books (canon 1119). canon 1116 § 1 which concerns extraordinary form of celebration of marriage still retains the aspects of two or common witnesses even when the competent or official assistant, domiciliary forum and liturgical rites are dispensed with. thus, “as far as the two common witnesses are concerned, nothing specific is established for them ... any person (laypersons, clerics or religious; baptized or not, blood relations, et cetera) may undertake this commitment, provided that they have use of 20reason and can give witness to the celebration of marriage”. mere civil, customary, or similar marriages within the expected canonical framework of any two witnesses who have the use of reason to testify about its occurrence become valid and ipso facto it is sacramental according to the norm of canon 1055 § 2. reserved dispensation of impediment of holy orders to apostolic see even in danger of death canonical regulations allow for wide dispensations by the local ordinary of sins, censures and impediments, including that of the perpetual vow of chastity in religious institute of pontifical right and that of crime, whenever there is danger of death in order to coherently uphold the axiom of the supreme law of salvation of souls in the church. nevertheless, the 216 impediment of holy orders remains reserved to the holy see. this means that even if the subject concerned is reconciled temporarily during danger of death and given useful sacraments penance, anointing of the sick and the eucharist, there still cannot be the granting of dispensation from the vow of celibacy by the local ordinary thereby allowing him valid celebration of matrimony but strictly reserved to holy see. thus, those who are bound by the vow of sacred orders invalidly contracts marriage, be it civil or otherwise (canon 1087). on this margin of dispensability of impediments during danger of death by the local ordinary, canon 1078 elucidates the following facts that § 1 the local ordinary can dispense his own subjects wherever they are residing, and all who are actually present in his territory, from all impediments of ecclesiastical law, except for those whose dispensation is reserved to the apostolic see. § 2 the impediments whose dispensation is reserved to the apostolic see are: 1° the impediment arising from sacred orders or from a public perpetual vow of chastity in a religious institute of pontifical right; 2° the impediment of crime mentioned in cann. 1090. the impediment of public perpetual vow of chastity in a religious institute of pontifical right is ordinarily not dispensable by the local ordinary as attested to by subsection one of section two of the foregoing canon. but when there is danger of death according to the proceeding canon 1079 § 1, the ordinary can dispense from all impediments in order for to allow proper celebration of marriage except from the impediment holy orders which therefore remains reserved. the foregoing canon gives the local ordinary who may not necessary be of episcopal character the faculty to dispense from the impediments even of public perpetual vows of religious institutes of pontifical right given the temporary incidence of danger of death in the life of such religious in order to have valid matrimony. if the religious institute is of diocesan right, the local ordinary can dispense from perpetual vow anytime even when there is no danger of death. this impediment requiring dispensation does not in any way bind 217 anybody, be it of society of apostolic life or secular institute who is under private vow. the local ordinary therefore can dispense from all impediments of ecclesiastical law, except 21 only that arising from the priesthood. equally, the impediment of crime as defined by canon 1090 § 1 is the intentional killing of one's partner in marriage or that of another in order to contract marriage thereof with the intended spouse is not dispensable according to the norm of canon 1078 § 2 n° 2. dispensation from the foregoing impediment of crime is under normal circumstances reserved to the holy see. be that as it may, a dispensation could be given by the local ordinary under situation of danger of death in order to validly contract a marriage. nevertheless, care should be taken to exercise refrain where the murder is publicly known or likely to be known since it borders now on civil law or a criminal case. in suchlike situations, simple reconciliation, where possible, of the faithful in danger of death while also in irregularity could be given thereby allowing the three sacraments of penance, anointing of the sick and the viaticum. indispensable impediments of divine or natural law even in danger of death there are no dispensations for impediments of divine or natural order. the impediment of age of sixteen for males and fourteen for females in order to contract marriage being a human law allows for the possibility of dispensation, usually not more than one year (canon 1083 § 1). in fact, higher age of eighteen for either sex in order to contract matrimony validly is in force according to the canonization of civil prescription in nigeria. canon law gives this counsel to national episcopal conferences to establish the required age for matrimony as it discourages except in necessity and with the permission of the local ordinary any marriage that cannot be recognized by civil law of the place of celebration (canon 1071 n. 2°). impotency, be it of natural or accidental cause, cannot be dispensed with in order to have legitimate validation of marriage (canon 1083 § 1). antecedent and perpetual impotence contradict the very essence of the end of marriage. with impotency, a ratified marriage cannot be consummated. the roman pontiff using his petrine privilege or vicarious power can thus dispense with a ratified but not consummated matrimony due to the foregoing or any other cause (cf. canon 218 1142). this is not so with sterility which does not invalidate marriage (canon 1083 § 3). impediment of a previous bond of marriage, that is, a ratified and consummated marriage being of a divine law cannot be dispensed by any human power (canon 1085 § 1). this fact is true even if the marriage was only ratified and not consummated. dissolution of a previous bond of marriage can only be by death (canon 1141), or must be subjected to the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunal to resolve when suspected of nullity and no presumption is to be taken by anyone in this regard (canon 1085 § 2). divine law is very lucid on especially from the teaching of jesus christ himself that from the beginning god made them male and female and so man leaves his father and mother and becomes joined to his wife; thus what god has joined together no one must divide (mt 19:6). it is not quite clear whether the impediment of consanguinity be considered of natural law but with more of human specification. the impediment is certainly of natural divine law when it is of the direct line, that is between parents and children and similarly likely to be so between brothers and sisters. so canonical regulation declares the impediment of consanguinity not dispensable in all degrees of the direct lines; though it considers marriage invalid in the collateral line up to the fourth degree, it is never dispensable in the second degree collateral (canon 1091 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4). thus, canon 1079 § 3 highlights the fact that “a dispensation is never given from the impediment of consanguinity in the direct line or in the second degree of the collateral line”. generally, those who lack good use of reason (usus rationis) are unable to carry out any juridical act acceptable as valid by the law (canons 99, 124 § 1, 97 § 2). so insanity is an irregularity for the receptions of sacred orders (1041 n. 1°) while it is also incapability for the contracting of marriage (canon 1095). the impediment of insanity cannot be dispensed. the baptism of the non-baptised and the catechumen in danger of death, the conditions required for the baptism of the non-baptised adults are: if such persons have some knowledge of the principal truths of the faith together with the manifestation, in some manner, of the intention to receive baptism (canon 865§ 2). a catechumen obviously qualify to be baptised ipso facto since the preparation for baptism 219 already begun is an eloquent testimony of the manifest intention to be baptised. the principal truths of the faith are such general doctrinal knowledge of the trinity, the forgiveness of sins, eternal life and so on. most people living in christian environments may be presumed to have some basic awareness of such truths. even in doubt, that is, if the minister has no certainty of the contrary being the case, the soul in danger may be given baptism. accurate documentations of the event are to the forwarded to the parish records where the candidate is domiciled. in the event of recovery from the situation of the danger of death, the candidate should be encouraged to undergo further instructions and be admitted fully to the sacramental life of the eucharist and the other sacraments. infants, that is, children below the age of reason of seven years, are usually baptised through the consent of their parents or guardian within the first few weeks of birth (canon 867 § 1 ). if infants are in danger of death, the code prescribes that they should be baptised without any delay (867 § 2). the reason for the foregoing prescription is based on the supreme law of the salvation of soul which supersedes any legal barriers in such situations of emergencies. in fact, “an infant of catholic parents, indeed even of non-catholic parents, is lawfully baptised in danger of death, even if the parents are opposed to it” (canon 868 § 2). the law of due process in such situation is ipso facto dispensed by the superior need of salvation in the mind of the church. similarly, “an abandoned infant or a foundling is to be baptised unless diligent inquiry establishes that it has already been baptised” (canon 870). moreover, “aborted foetuses, if they are alive, are to be baptised, in so far as this is possible” (canon 871). holy communion is usually allowed to baptised children who have been formally admitted to it having reached the age of reason. canon 913 § 2 states that “the blessed eucharist may, however, be administered to children in danger of death if they can distinguish the body of christ from ordinary food and receive communion with reverence”. the foregoing presupposes baptised children. it is a christian obligation to ensure that souls in danger of death are duly baptised if need be but, in emergency or “in case of necessity, any person can baptise provided that he has the intention of doing that which the church does and provided that he pours water on the candidate's head while saying: 'i baptise you in the name of the father, and of the son, 220 and of the holy spirit” (ccc, 1284). due record of event should always be made in each case and forwarded to the relevant parish of the candidate. if the non-baptised in danger of death is in an irregular union of concubinage or polygamy, he or she is still to be baptised as long as he or she, along with the basic demands already mentioned previously, accepts to regularize invalid unions as soon as possible. this is the case if such souls are conscious and are able to respond; otherwise, they are given baptism in hope of their reconciliation when recovered. if the non-baptised candidates along with the non-baptised spouse(s) accept to ratify their invalid unions then they can thus be allowed to the sacraments of full christian initiation of baptism, confirmation and the holy eucharist. however, in the case of polygamy, he or she may retain one of them while the extra spouses are to be sent away (canon 1148 § 1) except if the permission of the local ordinary is given for the extra spouses to live together as 'brother and sister' under the same roof. conclusion indeed, the salvation of souls is the supreme law of the church (cf. canon 1752). to re-echo christ, the son of man is lord even of the sabbath. what the lord wants is the merciful application of the law. that is, it should be done with a human face. nevertheless, this is not an invitation to lawlessness, liberalism or anarchy. it only calls for a matured christian obedience to the law since the son of man has not come to abolish the law and the prophets but to fulfil them. and so every dot of the law needs respect and compliance within the limits of human possibility. any subscription to the law that leads to the destruction of the soul of man is meaningless and futile. law is indeed supposed to be a guide to human development, freedom and salvation. thus, god is maximally glorified over the salvation of a soul, for whom his precious son, jesus christ, became incarnated in the human flesh, suffered severely the ignominious passion, crucified with great outpouring of blood, died forsaken on the shameful cross, rose again to sit at the right hand of the father in the glory of heaven, and poured forth graciously on the church the living spring of his life giving holy spirit. 221 endnotes 1. pope john paul ii, the code of canon law, new revised english translation, theological publication in india, bangalore, 1983. 2. cf. eduardo labandeira, “commentary on canon 1752” in code of canon law annotated edited by ernest caparros, michael theriault thand jean thorn, second edition revised and updated of the 6 spanish language edition, wilson & lafleur limitée, montréal (canada), 2004, p. 1374: “in order to bring the cic/83 to a close, nothing is more appropriate than to remember that canonical equity the spirit of the gospel in dealing with particular subjective situations can and should be applied in harmony with the supreme law of the church which is the salvation of souls”. 3. j. p. beal, james a. coriden and thomas j. green (eds.), new commentary on the code of canon law commissioned by canon law society of america, paulist press, new york, 2000, p. 1847. 4. cicero, de legalibus 3.3.8: salus populi suprema lex esto, cf. loeb classical library, 1977, pp. 466-467. cf. also b. nicholas, an introduction to roman law, clarendon, oxford, 1962, p. 15. 5. william barclay, the gospel of luke, revised edition, the daily study bible series, the westminster press, philadelphia (usa), p. 287. 6. g. b. caird, saint luke, the pelican new testament commentaries, penguin books, london, 1963, pp. 251-252. 7. pope john paul ii, the code of canon law, op. cit., canon 921. 8. cf. committee on the revision of the code of canon law, communicationes 15 (1983) 194 at canon 867, vatican city, 1969-. 9. secretariat for promoting christian unity, instruction “in quibus rerum circumstantiis” iv 1 in acta apostolicae sedis 64 (1972) 518-525 [cf. austin flannery (ed.), vatican council ii, vol. i, revised edition, dublin, 1988, p. 557]. 10. cf. ecumenical second vatican council, constitution on the sacred liturgy sacrosanctum concilium, n. 74. 11. j. p. beal et alii (eds.), new commentary on the code of canon law, op. cit., p. 1115. 12. ibid. 13. cf. pope john ii, the catechism of the catholic church, paulines, nairobi (kenya), 1994, no. 1401: “when, in the ordinary's judgment, a grave necessity arises, catholic ministers may give the sacraments of eucharist, penance, and anointing of the sick to other christians not in full communion with the catholic church, who ask for them of their own will, provided they give evidence of holding the catholic faith regarding these sacraments, and possess the required dispositions. 14. cf. pope john paul, encyclical letter ecclesia de eucharistia, libreria editrice vaticana, vatican city, no. 46: “these conditions from which no dispensation can be given, must be carefully respected, even though they deal with specific individual cases, because the denial of one or more truths of the faith regarding these sacraments and, among these, the truth regarding the need of the ministerial priesthood for their validity, renders the person asking improperly disposed to legitimately receive them”. 15. pontifical council for the family, the pastoral care of the divorced and remarried and vademecum for confessors concerning some aspects of the moral conjugal life, pauline books & media, boston 222 (u.s.a.), 1997, n. 11. 16. cf. “commentary on canon 1352 § 1” in gerard sheehy et alii (eds.), the canon law letter & spirit a practical guide to the code of canon law, georffrey chapman, london, 1995, p. 776. 17. tomás rincón, “commentary on canon 976” in code of canon law annotated edited by ernest caparros et alii (eds.), op. cit., p. 753. 18. pope john paul ii, the code of canon law, op. cit., canon 1357: “§ 1 without prejudice to the provisions of cann. 508 and 976, a confessor can in the internal sacramental forum remit latae sententiae censure of excommunication or interdict which has not been declared, if it is difficult for the penitent to remain in a state of grave sin for the time necessary for the competent superior to provide. § 2 in granting the remission, the confessor is to impose upon the penitent, under pain of again incurring the censure, the obligation to have recourse within one month to the competent superior or to a priest having the requisite faculty, and to abide by his instructions. in the meantime, the confessor is to impose an appropriate penance and, to the extent demanded, require reparation of scandal and damage. the recourse, however, may be made even through the confessor without mention of a name. § 3 the same duty of recourse, when they have recovered, binds those who in accordance with can. 976 have had remitted an imposed or declared censure or one reserved to the apostolic see”. 19. pope john paul ii, post-synodal apostolic exhortation on reconciliation and penance in the mission of the church today reconciliatio et paenitentia, pauline boods & media, boston (u.s.a.), 2 december 1984, no. 33. 20. rafael navarro valls, “commentary on canon 1116” in code of canon law annotated edited by ernest caparros et alii (eds.), op. cit., p. 872. 21. “commentary on canon 1079 § 1” in gerard sheehy et alii (eds.), the canon law letter & spirit, op. cit., p. 594. 223 138 introduction the place of adequate definition on any subject of discussion cannot be overemphasized. a proper definition of an idea is a true path way to better understanding and appreciation of its components, from the main topic to the minutest parts. hence, a good definition of an academic subject tele-guides those who have interest in the subject to know what the subject holds, its concerns and what distinguishes it from other related subjects. a definition that involves all these concerns will help participants in the discussion at stake to avoid misconceptions and misgivings in one sense and overcome ambiguities and equivocations in another sense. as a matter of fact, a justified definition is necessary for african philosophy to determine its scope, to illustrate its characteristics, to identify its concerns and inherent problems. this attempt will make anybody in an academic environment to have a clearer picture of what is african philosophy. there is no doubt that countless definitions of an appraisal of the challenges confronting the nature of african philosophy williams o. aso african philosophy may come up as a result of diverse impulses from the background, the school, the culture and appreciated methodology of each philosopher. however, a notable parameter is necessary to judge if a particular definition of african philosophy is credible and acceptable. what count most in the definition of african philosophy is not as important as the relationship that such definition must have with african worldview. therefore, any definition of african philosophy that reflects on african perspective either by an african or non-african is relevant for the understanding of african philosophy. this paper tends to survey why african philosophy is facing challenges of recognition and acceptance in academic arena unlike european, arabic and chinese philosophies. the write up demonstrates some problems involved in an attempt by some scholars to provide a definition of african philosophy. a good number of identified problems in the definition of african philosophy clearly show some misconceptions and misrepresentations of african sociocultural experience. for instance, some of the definitions provided by some philosophers illustrate different approaches that limit the scope and relevance of african philosophy as evident in this paper. by and large, the paper highlights the criteria for the definition of african philosophy that is more standard and attracts barest minimum of criticism. it is pertinent to note also that this paper identifies, emphasizes and recommends the necessary features that can make the identity and contents of african philosophy less doubtful and more intellectual. the work depends strongly on the articles that g. e. azenabor articulated in his book, understanding the problems of african philosophy, published in 2002, to demonstrate the challenges that limit the growth and development of african philosophy and the way forward. nevertheless, the works of other relevant scholars on african philosophy are examined to give more credence to this paper. as a matter of fact, evaluation and the recommendation for the way forward conclude the write up. the necessity for a definition of african philosophy any standard definition of philosophy is expected to 139 focus on the love of wisdom, the desire and quest to know what, why and how of all the realities in human experience, both physical and metaphysical. but definition of african philosophy will give a leeway to the contents, the frontiers and the relationship of its contents to the experience of africans and their society. an acceptable definition of african philosophy will show that their quest for knowledge is closely connected to every aspect of their existential realities: god and the gods, the land, the community and the ancestral world. the awareness of these peculiarities will put any scholar in a better position to understand the characteristics of african philosophy and the reason behind each of them. this implies that a typical definition of african philosophy ought to be an emblematic expression of what african philosophy is all about. the moment a scholar grasps the meaning and definition of african philosophy he can easily make connection with its contents and relevance to the african society. in other words, a good definition of african philosophy becomes a key for scholars to get access to its concerns and essential problems. african philosophy will never get acceptance in academic world if its definition and meaning of its terms are shrouded in oral tradition and ethnography. why the definition of african philosophy is difficult in spite of the need to get a credible definition of african philosophy, there is no universal definition that covers all its characteristics. scholars pitched their tents in different camps to give a definition of african philosophy according to the world-view of their background and eager to criticise 1different definitions coming from the other camps. this insurmountable disposition renders any definition of african philosophy subjective. in spite of this, no definition of african philosophy is totally alienated from the issues associated with the philosophy. as we have it below, c.s. momoh identified some factors behind the diverse definitions of african philosophy. it is pertinent to examine these factors to judge how relevant they are in the definition of african philosophy. 140 geographical location africa is the only continent where you have the largest number of black people living together with some whites and arabs especially in the northern part of africa. they all have similar culture, history, tradition, colonial experience but 2have diverse cultures and languages. the attempt to get an acceptable definition of african philosophy leads to the challenge of determining the source of a credible definition of african philosophy. all scholars of african philosophy are not limited to african continent, some non-africans are found in europe like placide temples and in the united states of america like barry hallen. besides, there are african scholars in diaspora like william amo in germany, anthony appiah in canada, molefi asante in the us, geoffrey onah in 3 italy and a host of others in other parts of the world. again, we cannot fail to acknowledge the african scholars in places like brazil and caribbean islands as part of african community. as noted by j. i. ebeh, geographical location can easily affect one's perception of certain realities of life. for instance, apart from basic relevance of water to man, the perception of water and its relationship with those living in riverine areas of africa tend to be different from those located in the tropical and the savannah regions of africa. the world and life experience of those in the riverine areas revolves around water while those that populatetropical region centres on forest and in the savannah is incomplete without reference to drought and dryness. hence, the geographical location of african philosophers influences them to have diverse definitions of african philosophy. the definition of african philosophy traceable to any of the scholars outside the confined of africa are sometimes viewed as less important to the ones given by the scholars within the continent. this claim sounds absurd because geographical location of a scholar does not count as much as the content of his definition of african philosophy. as moses oke rightly posits, “it is by the content of a philosopher's work, and not by either his/her nationality or domicile, that an african is to be identified. in this connection, barry hallen is a good example of a non-african (an american national) african philosopher. on the other hand, though he is an african and a philosopher, j. t. bedu-ado (an akan 141 142 colleague of wiredu) does not qualify to be called a 4substantive african philosopher.” one can easily deduce from this position of oke that the primary concern in the definition of african philosophy is the identity of african philosophy while the background, tradition, language and the name of the philosopher that identified the identity is insignificant. influence of cultural background there is no doubt that every man is a product of his culture and environment. the culture determines the values appreciated, the frontiers of belief and accumulated knowledge. no man can be easily alienated from the influence of his cultural milieu; he speaks, thinks and writes 5 through his culture and vice versa. as momoh succinctly asserts, “a philosopher, like any other professional or individual, is a child of his culture and a culture often influences a philosopher's definition and perception of his 6 subject-matter.” in addition to this claim of momoh, lucius outlaw believes that appreciated african philosophical ideas and ideals are associated with particular african communities. as he maintains, “philosophizing is inherently grounded in socially shared practices, not in transcendental rules. when we view philosophical practices historically, sociologically, and comparatively, we are led inescapably to conclude that 'philosophical practice is inherently pluralistic', and philosophical ideals are local to communities of 7 thinkers.” if this is indisputable, one cannot be surprised if cultural influence makes many scholars of african philosophy to generate diverse definitions of african philosophy. there is no need for people of different cultures to condemn the definition of african philosophy that are not based on their cultural roots. this is one of the reason why african philosophy seems to be stagnant and difficult to grow. it is obvious that we do not have one language and culture in africa which is part of african uniqueness. this reality makes it difficult for african philosophy to have a universal definition. therefore, it is reasonable to accept any definition of african philosophy that captures the common african world-view and appreciates realities no matter the cultural background of the definition. after all, an attempt to accept the cultural in-put of diverse peoples in africa will enriched african philosophy and make it holistic. influence from the school of thought as the cultural background often manifests and determines the perspective of any scholars on academic issue, the school of thought that an african philosopher belongs also influences his reasoning disposition on african philosophy. this implies that an african philosopher is a representative of the school of philosophy that nurtured him to maturity. as a matter of fact, he is expected to think and write according to the principles and values appreciated and projected by his school. basically, there are some prominent philosophical schools of thought that contemplate on the subject matters of philosophy like metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ethics. we have philosophers that belongs to analytic school, some are trained in speculative school and there are others notable for logical positivism and practical philosophy. it is understandable if the school background of each philosopher tends to influence the way he defines african philosophy. hence, it should not be a surprise to see that we have many subjective definitions of african philosophy. personal ambition of scholars it is apparent that every philosopher has an inner force that determines his philosophical orientation. it could be a disposition towards innovation and transformation of existential realities in his society or the desire to protect and promote the status quo. the passion involved often consumes each scholar that he invests his rational ability and available material resources to fulfil his goal. hence, he often has sleepless nights to write articles, books and preparing for academic seminars where he can define, defend and expatiate on his personal opinion on fundamental issues that form the subject matter of philosophy. for instance, in the process of defining and promoting his views and understanding of african philosophy, he can come up with personal definition of african philosophy. in most cases, such definition of african philosophy is traceable to the perspective and school of philosophy that fostered the scholar. in other words, no personal ambition of a philosopher that has no affinity to a 143 particular way of doing philosophy. therefore, every philosopher with his cherished ideas and world-view is a product of his school of thought. influence of the era there is a common saying that idea rule the world and ideas that dictate how existential realities in the world affect man are not static. they change from time to time and man and his environment cannot resist this fundamental transformation. the periodic changes in human consciousness about dominant issues in the world also affect 8 the disposition and the subject of concern for philosophers. the history of philosophy is characterised with different philosophical concerns of philosophers like the periods of idealistic and rationalistic philosophy, the scientific and the humanistic philosophy, the ideological and the feminist 9philosophy. all these diverse era and changes in the understanding of philosophy determines different interpretations and meanings of african philosophy. the constant change in the existential experience of man also makes it difficult for african philosophy to have a definition that covers all time and season. as d. a. masolo asserts, “philosophy is invariably tied to social reality…the mode of doing philosophy, e.g. its methods, dominant issues, 10 questions, and schools of thought vary as society changes.” as social change and transformation is indispensable, african philosophy cannot have a dogmatic definition. and as joseph omoregbe would say, the way traditional african philosophy of the past can be defined is quite different from the meaning and definition of the contemporary african philosophy. religious background as cultural and scholarship backgrounds exercise dominance in the writing and thinking of any scholar, religion also has indispensable influence over a scholar that is rooted in a particular religion. although, c. momoh paid less attention to this type of influence in the definition of african philosophy but i think it deserves our consideration. it is observable that religious education often imparts some basic values and principles that characterised a particular religion. 144 a scholar that is exposed and educated with the values and principles cherished by a religious group cannot avoid its sway in his writings and approach to philosophical issues. in africa context, there are many scholars like placide temples, pauline hountondji, peter bodunrin, moses makinde, c. b. okolo, pantaleon iroegbu, francis ogunmodede and similar others that have christian background. it would not be a surprise if any of them give a definition of african philosophy that has relationship to the religious context in which they live, think and write. however, the likes of c. momoh of islamic religious setting and j. s. mbiti of traditional religious milieu may not be totally at home with the definition of african philosophy that gives attention to christian dogma and general worldview. the reality of diverse religious beliefs and appreciated values makes the possibility of getting a universal definition of african philosophy always difficult if not an impossible task. at this point, it is relevant to examine some definitions of african philosophy from notable philosophers that recognised african philosophy. some notable definitions of african philosophy it is necessary to have a cursory look at some of the definitions of african philosophy provided by those that believe there is an african perspective of philosophy. the examination of these definitions will give credence to the fact that we can have as many definitions of african philosophy as the number of interested scholars. any dogmatic definition of african philosophy has the potential to cause controversy among philosophers in the past and even more provocative today. every interested philosopher will like to give a definition of african philosophy that is supported with the values and worldview that characterised his socio-cultural background. at the end, one would see what ought to be the criteria for giving a definition of african philosophy that may attract negligible degree of criticism. it would be an utopia for anyone to think he can provide a definition of african philosophy that all scholars of various contextual roots will accept without any modification. in the opinion of j. s. mbiti, an african philosopher of religion, african philosophy “is the understanding, attitude of mind, logic, and perception behind the manner in which 145 african people think, act or speak in different situations of 11life.” it is ostensible that mbiti's definition of african philosophy does not take written documentation into consideration. hence, african philosophers like bodunrin and wiredu will find problem with this type of definition of african philosophy. in a different approach to the definition of african philosophy, olusegun oladipo gathers from k. c. anyanwu that african philosophy is embedded in african socio-cultural way of thinking and acting about issues that 12relate with african social concerns. in addition to anyanwu's perspective of african philosophy, pantaleon iroegbu, asserts that “african philosophy is the reflective inquiry into the marvels and problems that confronts one in the african world in view of producing systematic 13explanation and sustained responses to them.” the same view is evident in francis ogunmodede's assertion that, “african philosophy is the articulated doctrines and theories 14based on african cultural experience.” the definition of ogunmodede implies that african philosophy is a contemplative activity based on the historical, cultural, religious and technological experiences of africans in relationship with the divine, nature and harmonious society. it is obvious from the three scholars that african philosophy is concerned with reflection on african cultural realities observable in their day to day activities. nevertheless, oladipo in his own view does not appreciate any definition of african philosophy that fails to enhance creativity and transformation capable of improving human existence. he is strongly opposed to any definition of african philosophy that lay much emphasis on static tradition, doctrines and culture. in the opinion of okolo, african philosophy like other philosophies is a logical, rational and systematic inquiry into the existential realities in 15 africa society. for him, the contents of african philosophy are universal issues and concerns of peoples in other cultures of the world. the manner of approach to interpretation and expression of existential realities may differ from culture to culture. kwasi wiredu in his own approach to the definition and understanding of african philosophy identified three-way to the definition and understanding of african philosophy. the 146 first one he describes as collective bold assertions that are 16rooted in “what our ancestors said” without adequate justification. this type of african philosophy is not written but inherited from one generation to the other in the 17community. this first category of african philosophy forms the body of communal thoughts and appreciated values that no particular individual can lay claim to them. he defined the second category of african philosophy as that, in which one might refer to the thought of a class of individuals in traditional african societies who, though unaffected by modern intellectual influences, are capable of critical and original philosophical reflection as distinct as from repetitions of folk ideas of their peoples. because the fruits of such reflections are generally not perpetuated in prints, they tend to be swamped in the pool of communal thought leaving it, 18 if anything at all, only faint traces. this is a peculiar way of generating definition for african philosophy as evidenced in the dialogue between two 19 legends, grianule and ogotemmelli as wiredu claimed. it is observed that the categories of african philosophy identified by wiredu are situated in ethno-philosophy. the third sense of african philosophy recognised by him is “the results of the work of individual africans using the intellectual resources of 20 the modern world to grapple with philosophical problems.” the intellectual resources he meant includes written documentation with supportive arguments. for him, therefore, a credible definition of african philosophy must be based on the last category of african philosophy where scholars are expected, “to philosophise in a manner that takes account of development in logic, mathematics, science and 21humanities.” nonetheless, wiredu did not condemn ethnophilosophy in its entirety but recommended a kind of reconstruction with intellectual tools to determine its originality and justify its relevance to the contemporary world. from the aforesaid, one can see that it is hard to have a universal definition of african philosophy because of the strong influence coming from diverse affinities that are peculiar to every african scholar. criteria for a credible definition of african philosophy 147 it is generally believed that philosophy anywhere and anytime is the love and quest for knowledge about the physical and metaphysical realities recognised by man and 22 how to bring growth and development to the society. what is african is anything that shares the characteristics that set africans apart from people of different continents. hence, what can be defined as african philosophy needs to illustrate african perspective of the desire for knowledge about all the existential realities in their daily experience and how they affect their social life. according to c.s. momoh, “it is difficult, if not impossible to draw a sharp line between 23 world-view and philosophy” of any group of people in africa. hence, one cannot easily make a clear cut distinction between the world view, existential realities and the meaning of philosophy for any community. there is need to note that the definition of african philosophy that goes along the above line of thought can come either from african or non-african philosophers located anywhere in the world. this implies that as we have african philosophers whose works are based on european perspective of the quest for wisdom and knowledge, there are also non-african scholars who are experts in african 24perception of philosophy. the language of writing must not necessarily be african for any definition of african philosophy to be credible. as we have different stages in the history and meaning of western philosophy, the same standard is applicable in african philosophy. the approach may be different but the experience and the desire to get involve in philosophical activities is the same. evaluation and conclusion a guarded look at the history of african philosophy shows that the challenges against the recognition and acceptance of african philosophy are derived largely from early european bias of mind as evidenced in the denial of africans' ability to engage in intellectual endeavours. as a matter of fact, they do not believe that africans have any history and peculiar approach to the understanding of realities of life. it is popularly known that “european scholars and historians, until recently, had approached the question of african history with racial prejudice, just as it is being done to 148 african philosophy today.” therefore, it is not a surprise that african philosophy is going through a difficult time to imprint herself into the consciousness of all that care for its contents. there is no gain saying that the heroic goal of many european scholars is to deny the historical contributions of the african continent to the growth and development of greek philosophy described as the origin of philosophical enterprise. as a matter of fact, it has been imparted into the perception of an average european many years ago that every african philosophical creativity is not better than materials meant for refuse dump. as maurice m. makumba highlights, “genuine african (philosophical) contribution is dismissed by some (european scholars) as unphilosophical on the basis that it is unwritten, as if literacy was a condition for logical or 26 philosophical thinking.” after all, the great historian, herodotus, was clear in his writings that many notable ideas in human history and icons of history have their roots in 27african civilization. this was possible because egyptian cities like memphis, thebes, hermopolis and heliopolis were described as the centres of learning before ionia and 28other greek cities. but today many european scholars are not ready to acknowledge this these evidences and are even trying to frustrate any attempt to bring them to the lime light, perhaps because of their national pride or superiority complex. it is incontrovertible that africans are capable of rational thinking and to hold any contrary view to what is real and evident is to be unphilosophical. according to placide tempels, “anyone who claims that primitive peoples possess no system of thought, excludes them thereby from the 29category of men.” this implies that anthropological enquiry has established the fact that every human being, including africans, is capable of intellectual activities. the scholars of every culture, black or white, contribute to the universal pool of knowledge that helps man to have a better understanding of the realities that constitute his existential experience in a particular society. it is the contributions of every culture to the contents of philosophy that is known as african or european, american or arabic, indian or chinese philosophy. if history of african society provides supportive evidence to show that she makes reasonable contributions to the concerns of 149 philosophy then african philosophy deserves its rightful place in the academic world. now that the problems confronting the growth, development and acceptance of african philosophy have been identified, it is the responsibility of every contemporary african philosopher to resolve the problems that are holding back her progress and position in the world. contemporary african philosophers are duty-bound to put into writing the diverse ethno-philosophical ideas that are identified in african cultural society as the wisdom of the elders. the same obligation is required of them for any philosophical thought traceable through oral history to an african personality. after all, that was how some philosophical ideas in greek culture were later written down and circulated to the whole world. for instance, plato and xenophon put together in writing a lot of socrates' philosophical thoughts. plato actually developed 30 and taught them to his pupils in the academy he established. this is one of the ways that traditional african philosophy can be salvaged from oblivion. when it comes to the problem of language in african philosophy, it is not feasible now to have a single language for expressing african philosophy because african continent has the largest diversity of languages in the world. this paper subscribes to the view that african philosophy needs to be written in african language of the author as much as it is possible. this is because the essence of a philosophical idea and concept can only be expressed in the language of the author. nonetheless, efforts must be made to get a good translation of such african philosophy in relevant languages for wider audience. this is how western philosophy made herself domiciliary nearly everywhere in the world. but where this ideal is not possible, the work could be written in any language of the author's choice. besides, african ethno-philosophy and philosophical sagacity may sometimes replete of questionable evidence, logic and methodology because of the characteristics of their origin. as evident, they are the thought patterns of the ancestors of a community or intellectual acuity of an outspoken individual in a particular african society. therefore, contemporary african philosophers are to rise up to the challenge of making any aspect of african philosophy 150 to have a standard methodology, scientific evidence and logical presentation. all these, including the definition of african philosophy, must be done to reflect african world view and understanding of the perceived realities that are part and parcel of their social lives. by the time african scholars consider the demands and recommendations of this paper, african philosophy will then attain her rightful place in the world philosophies. endnotes 1. as g. e. azenabor puts it, “understanding the concept or nature of anything is a formidable task, especially in an academic circle. this is because academicians, more than any other group of people, are intellectually cantankerous and ideologically unyielding.” second edition of his book titled: understanding the problems in african philosophy, (lagos: first academic publishers, 2002), p. 1. 2. ibid. p. 9. 3. ibid. p. 18. 4. olusegun oladipo ed., the third way in african philosophy: essays in honour of kwasi wiredu, (ibadan: hope publications ltd., 2002), p. 27. 5. g.e. azenabor, p. 8. 6. ibid. p. 2. 7. emmanuel chukwudi eze, ed., african philosophy: an anthology, (massachusetts: blackwell publishers ltd, 1998), p. 29. 8. g.e. azenabor, p. 8. 9. ibid. pp. 8-9. 10. d. a. masolo, african philosophy in search of identity, (bloomington: indiana university press, 1994), p. 43. 11. j. s. mbiti, african religions and philosophies, (london: heinemann educational books ltd. 1969), p. 2. he also sees african philosophy “in the religion, proverbs, oral traditions, ethics and morals of the society concerned.” p. 2. 12. olusegun oladipo, the idea of african philosophy, (ibadan: molecular publishers, 1992), p. 4. 13. pantaleon iroegbu, enwisdomization and african philosophy, international university press, 1994, p. 116. 14. francis ogunmodede, unpublished class hand notes on african philosophy given at saints peter and paul major seminary, bodija, ibadan, 1993, p. 12. 15. chukwudum b. okolo, african social and political philosophy selected essays, (nsukka: fulladu publishing company, 1993), pp. 45. 16. kwasi wiredu, philosophy and an african culture, (london: cambridge university press, 1980), p. 47. 17. ibid. 451 18. ibid. p.37. 19. ibid. 20. ibid. 21. ibid. 22. “etymologically speaking, therefore, philosophy connotes “love for wisdom” or knowledge”. in g. e. azenabor, understanding the problems of african philosophy, (lagos: first academic publishers, 2002), p. 3. 23. c.s. momoh, “african philosophy: past, present and future” in the nigerian journal of philosophy, vol. 11, nos. 1 and 2, 1991), p. 13. 24. ibid. p. 18. 25. ibid. p. 18. 26. maurice m. makumba, introduction to philosophy, (nairobi: paulines publications africa, 2005), p. 133. 27. ibid. 28. as quoted in the book of makumba, africanus horton was credited to say that “pilgrimages were made to africa in search of knowledge by such men as solon, plato, pythagoras; and several came to listen to the instructions of the african euclid, who was at the head of the most celebrated mathematical school in the world and flourished 300 years before the birth of christ…origen, tertullian, augustine, clemens, alexandrius, and cyril, who were fathers and writers of the primitive church, were tawny african bishops of apostolic renown.” p. 133. this quotation is cited by m.m. makumba in the work of james africanus horton, west african centuries and peoples, (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1868), p.59. 29. placides tempels, bantu philosophy, trans. colin king, (paris: presence africaine, 1969), p. 21. 30. 30“like buddha in the east, socrates left no writings, for he wrote nothing. but his life and teaching made such a deep impression on his friends and disciples that two of them wrote books about him. xenophon and especially plato wrote about his life and teaching.” cited in joseph omoregbe, knowing philosophy, second edition, (lagos: joja press ltd., 2005), p. 91. 152 120 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching of an epistemology of otherness abstract this paper argues for an epistemology of otherness; an epistemology which pursues knowledge not just from the knower’s perspective, but also from the known or object of knowledge or in a particular way, from the other person’s view which is referred to in this paper as the other. it develops this thesis from the ethical alterity of emmanuel levinas, which privileges the other over the self. this mirrors the postmodernist efforts which react against the linear and the objectivist outlook of traditional and classical philosophy. the outlook of traditional philosophy was largely individualistic. the implication of this according to levinas is a philosophy shrouded in egoism and for epistemology, our grounds for knowledge claims could be partial or incomplete. an epistemology of otherness, therefore, argues for an intersubjectivist epistemology as an option that can produce a wholesome epistemic situation. it argues that deference to the other both as a source of knowledge and justification of our beliefs would produce more warranted grounds for knowledge. this paper concludes that this option would help diminish all forms of epistemic injustices and imbalances to our knowledge claims. this essay adopts an expository-analytical method in both shedding light on the ethics of intersubjectivity of emmanuel levinas and against this backdrop, advance an epistemology of otherness which this paper argues and levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 121 concludes can lead to knowing the other better and consequently, having a more inclusive epistemic situation. keywords: otherness, intersubjective epistemology, the other, alterity, levinas introduction in book iv, chapter 1 of fyodor dostoevsky’s epic novel, the brothers karamazov, published in 1880, the russian philosopher and existentialist writes “know, dear ones, that every one of us is undoubtedly responsible for all men and everything on earth, not merely through the general sinfulness of creation, but each one personally for all mankind and every individual man. this knowledge is the crown of life for the monk and for every man”1 these talismanic lines mirror a philosophical tradition which characterizes the ethical philosophy of emmanuel levinas. the philosophical tradition it represents is postmodernism. in philosophical terms, “postmodernism shares something with the critique of enlightenment values and truth-claims mounted by thinkers of a liberal-communitarian persuasion; also with neopragmatists like richard rorty, who welcome the end of philosophy’s presumptive role as a privileged, truth-telling discourse.”2 postmodernism came as a “reactionary” philosophy and maintains that there can be newer ways of doing things rather a linear pattern. as a movement, it is characterized by pluralism, scepticism, subjectivism or relativism and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology. this is in contrast to the linear way of doing philosophy in the era prior to it. with postmodernism, western philosophy moved its frontiers from an individualized pattern of philosophy to newer ways that favour the social or ‘the other’ dimension. by a direct reference, it reacts to the individualism of modern western philosophy. from the cartesian tradition, individualism characterized philosophical outlook. it is the individual that knows, thinks and acts. hence, rene descartes’ famous cliché, cogito ergo sum (i think, therefore i am). for a long time in philosophy, ‘other minds’ constituted a problem, because of this individual 122 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 characterization of philosophy. from descartes to locke, berkeley to hume, kant to hegel, the subject of any philosophy was an individual. individualism characterized modern philosophy. individualism refers to the political, social or moral outlook which emphasizes individual interests, independence and freedom as opposed to statism, communitarianism or collectivism that stresses the interests and goals of the state, group or community.3 the cultural context of the modern period was a reaction to the dogmatism and dominance of religion and the church in the medieval period. with the copernican revolution and the new science in the modern period, the focus shifted from the church or institutions to the individual. thus, there was an elaborate emphasis on the individual and this influenced philosophical discourses. dostoevsky’ works are precursory to this era with his leaning on the “other”, responsibility and ethics. thus, with postmodernism philosophy moved from the “individual” to the “collective”, from the “i” to the “other” and from the “ego” to the “alter ego”. the aim of this paper is an attempt to sketch out an epistemology of otherness using the alterity of emmanuel levinas as a critical departure point. epistemology investigates the scope and limits of human knowledge. it questions whether we can know everything about our world and if not, what can we know and what can we not know how much of what we claim to know can be ascertained to be true?4 this essay, therefore, pursues an epistemology that seeks to know from the other person’s perspective rather from the knower’s perspective. it is believed engaging the other in its proper context would provide more evidence for belief formation or knowledge. levinas’ original contribution is that ethics precedes metaphysics, that ethics is the true prote philosophia5 or first philosophy. the thrust of his contribution is premised or grounded on his claim that all traditional ethics and philosophy is grounded on egoism, which understands my relation to myself as the primary relation6. this again mirrors the individualism which characterized modern philosophy. levinas argues that against this egoism, my responsibility to the other is the fundamental structure upon which all other structure rests. levinas’ philosophy deconstructs the previous foundation for philosophy and levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 123 reconstructs a new one. it is this ethical substructure that we shall leverage upon to advance an epistemology of otherness. philosophical understanding of otherness the notion of the “other” is an eclectic theme that regained prominence in a great deal with 20th century french philosophy. it means different things in different fields. in philosophy, however, it is primarily understood as the other human being in his or her differences.7 sisay mengstie explains it as “the way of defining one’s own “self” or one’s own “identity” in relation to others”8. by this interpretation, the other refers to the special qualities of each group that makes them different or unique in relation to another.9 the other does not, therefore, designate just an individual, but a broad way of understanding “difference” and “identity”. it can, therefore, stand for an individual, for a race, a social-economic class, physical ability, gender group, sexual orientation or even a nation. in the field of sociology and cultural studies, the term “other” is often used conterminously with the word, “difference”. the concept of the other in philosophy, first featured clearly in the works of john stuart mill in his examination of the problem of other minds. the problem of other minds is the problem of justifying the commonsensical belief that others besides oneself possess minds. antecedents of this position are, however, found in the works of descartes. in mill’s discussion, it was in reference to the consciousness of the self or mind. edmund husserl's on the fifth of the cartesian meditation picks up the notion of the other which he refers to as the alter ego. husserl’s discussion of the other was in reference to the phenomenology of consciousness. however, it was with levinas that this notion of the other was freed from these phenomenological and epistemic problems. levinas criticized the abstraction associated with the other, especially in the work of husserl. he criticized husserl for reducing the other to an object of consciousness alone, which is more like an isolated ego. with levinas, the other was then explained in terms of the ethical relation than a mere abstraction. the other of levinas is, rather, another individual that is largely unknowable to the interpreting self but demands responsibility. in his totality and 124 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 infinity, levinas speaks of the other as “that which calls to me, calls for a response from me, is the very source of all language and culture, and hence is a source of instruction”10. the other is another person who demands responsibility. in husserl, the other is defined by the self and is faceless, in levinas; the other is understood differently from the self and has a face. another french scholar with a similar ethical account on the other is paul ricoeur which he developed in his major work on intersubjectivity, oneself as another, (1992)11. while ricoeur’s thought on the other squares with levinas on responsibility, ricoeur’s other is reductive. he reduces the other to the self, an account that has been largely criticized. dermot moran explains that levinas’s chief target in his discussion of the other is in reply to husserl’s fifth cartesian meditation. levinas is critical of husserl’s account of the other, because, for levinas, husserl reduces the alterity of the other to the sameness of myself, that is to say, i experience the other as same as myself.12 the difference between husserl and ricoeur is ricoeur’s emphasis on a responsibility which is a furtherance of levinas’ ethical alterity.13 conversely, simeone de beauvoir introduces the other as “difference” in her book, the second sex (1949) in which she criticizes the dominance of patriarchy and the stereotyping of women. in this work, the woman is the other. it is from this notion, othering as a philosophical term takes on the notion of prejudice, inequality, marginality14 and an inferior contrast of one to the other. this notion of the other in de beauvoir’s work was influenced by hegel’s dialectic of identification and distantiation in the encounter of the self with some other in his “master-slave dialectic.15 16 the historical and political dimension of this master-slave dialectic concerns the relationship between the feudal lords and the serfs and from the psychological dimension, brons lajos explains involves self-consciousness. from the political and historical dimension, the other involves an “inferiorization” or marginalization”, while from the psychological dimension hegel refers to the other as not-self. it is on this view simeone de beauvoir builds on to develop the theme of the other as a marginalized or unequal second. from this philosophical construct, lajos explains othering, thus: levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 125 a process through which identities are set up in an unequal relationship. [it] is the simultaneous construction of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual and unequal opposition through the identification of some desirable characteristic that the self/in group has and the other/ out-group lacks and/or some undesirable characteristic that the other/out-group has and the self/in-group lacks. othering thus sets up a superior self/in group in contrast to an inferior other /out-group, but this superiority/inferiority is nearly always left implicit.17 from de beauvoir’s construction of the other, othering now describes the reductive action of labelling a person as someone who belongs to a subordinate social category defined as the other. the practice of othering is the exclusion of persons who do not fit the norm of the social group, which is a version of the self.18 this is different from the notion of otherness which refers to the characteristics of the other. there is yet another notion of the other that is fostered in the works of the jacques lacan, sometimes referred to as the “french freud”. brons describes this account as a much more abstract notion, he explains: “the other” as something (more than someone) outside of and/or in some way opposed to the self this is (part or aspect of) lacan’s “big other”. building on freud, but also influenced by kojeve’s interpretation of hegel, lacan distinguished little other and big other, which he represented in pseudomathematical notation as a and a (the first letter of “autre”, french for “other”). little other or a is a reflection and projection of the self (of the “ego” in particular); big other or a is radically other and includes both other subjects and the (institutionalized) relationships between the self and those others.19 126 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 lacan’s idea brings two important points to the fore: (i) the central role of language in constituting identity and (ii) the fact that identity is fundamentally gained in the gaze of the powerful.20 the different notions of the other make it a polymorphous theme in philosophy, nevertheless with slight nuances. otherness as an adjective of the noun ‘other’ refers to the characteristics of the other, the state of being different from an alien to the social identity of a person and to the identity of the self.21 otherness as a philosophical discourse deals with the characteristic of “who?” and “what?” of the other which is different from the self. the concept of otherness in philosophy is also known as alterity, which means the “other of two” from the latin alter which means “the other (and not the one)”. the term alterity is an encounter with “the other”. in philosophical phenomenology, the term alterity can be said to gain modern conception and consummation in the works of emmanuel levinas. peter fenves explains this conception thusly: “while studying the work of husserl and heidegger, levinas came to realize that the phenomenology of the other cannot be accomplished in the same manner as the phenomenology of consciousness or the hermeneutics of existence.”22 levinas refutes the grounding of philosophy on the cogito (consciousness or thinking), rather, he gave primacy to the other. levinas returns to the idea of subjectivity which he presents as ‘welcoming the other’, as hospitality and in it, the idea of infinity is consummated. the idea of infinity in philosophy means that which is irreducible or that which constitutes the smallest unit of anything. the problem of infinity goes back to zeno of elea23 and anaxagoras.24 from descartes methodic doubt and deconstruction of all philosophies, that which is irreducible is the cogito or consciousness, but for levinas, it is the other. levinas argues that “infinity overflows the thought that thinks it”.25 infinity is not to be understood subjectively as “an incidental notion forged by subjectivity to reflect the case of an entity encountering on the outside nothing that limits it, overflowing every limit, and thereby infinite”.26 levinas attributes infinity to that which remains outside the subject, for the infinity of the other is alterity.27 otherness or alterity in levinas is not just the alter ego. in husserl’s levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 127 phenomenology, the alter ego would just be another like i am or would be the other. for levinas, the other is a step beyond, one moment in the future.28 he also argues that the other can never be reduced to the same – not to the identity of the cogito (epistemology) nor to the sameness of being (ontology) – and so ethics becomes, for levinas, ‘first philosophy’. otherness as alterity takes on a radical version with levinas and other scholars have taken a moderate position in other scholars like paul ricoeur. levinas’ theory of alterity levinas was born in 1906 in lithuania which was part of prerevolutionary russia. he was born into an orthodox jewish family. the surrounding culture in russia then tolerated jews. in 1914, the first world war broke out and the family moved to ukraine. there he immersed himself in russian literature, especially the works of nikola gogol, fyodor dostoevsky and leo tolstoy where he experienced some ideological influence from their works. in 1923, he proceeded to strasbourg university in france, where he gained his licence in philosophy. in strasbourg, he was introduced to a number of works and scholars, particularly husserl’s phenomenology. he later bagged his doctorate from the same university and was a naturalized citizen of france in 1931. when france declared war on germany, he was ordered to report for military duty. during the german invasion of france in 1940, his military unit was surrounded and forced to surrender. levinas spent the rest of world war ii as a prisoner of war in a camp near hannover in germany. levinas was assigned to a special barrack for jewish prisoners, who were forbidden to practice any form of religious worship. life in the camp was difficult, but his status as a prisoner of war protected him from victim to the holocaust. many members of levinas’ family were killed in the holocaust29, however, and the impact of this large-scale massacre left its mark on levinas, both personally and philosophically. his best-known work is totality and infinity an essay on exteriority (1961). the effect of the wars, the killing of jews and the living conditions of people gave rise to his philosophy of consideration for the other, which is a philosophy of 128 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 intersubjectivity; that is, how we relate to the other subject and the need to deconstruct philosophy from metaphysics is the first philosophy to ethics. alterity is central to levinas’ philosophy. in his, time and the other, he explains alterity as that which: appears as a non-reciprocal relationship – that is, as contrasting strongly with contemporaneousness. the other as other is not only an alter ego: the other is what i myself am not… it can be said that the intersubjective space is not symmetrical. the exteriority of the other is not simply due to the space that separates what remains identical through the concept, nor is it due to any difference the concept manifest through spatial exteriority. the relationship with alterity is neither spatial nor conceptual.30 levinas’ equation of the alter ego with sameness can be misleading. i can never really make the other fully present in myself and that is the meaning of alterity. levinas is trying to safeguard the other from violation, oppression and inferiorization, hence, his use of alterity begins with a sense of responsibility to the other. consequently, upon the earlier established constitution of the other, levinas holds that it is superior to the self. levinas’s refusal to equate alter ego with alterity is to reject any possibility of synchronicity and reciprocity, wherein, for instance, the self does not do good to him or herself, he projects the same on the other. in his attempt to make the other absolutely distinct, levinas comes to his specific use of alterity. levinas explicitly argues: to be sure, the other that is announced does not possess this existing as the subject possesses it; its hold over my existing is mysterious. it is not unknown but unknowable, refractory to all light. but this precisely indicates that the other is in no way another myself, participating with me in common existence. the relationship with the other is not an idyllic and levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 129 harmonious relationship of communion or sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other’s place.31 it suffices to mention that levinas’ critique of husserl makes him refute the alter ego with the self; this marks a relationship with the future, wherein husserl it marks a relationship with the present. alterity marking a relationship with the future means a prescriptive obligation of the self to the other. with levinas, otherness takes on radical alterity which is a responsibility and an encounter with the other’s “face”. by “face”, levinas does not mean the literal perception of the face consisting of the eyes, forehead, ears, lips, etc., but rather in the manner the other presents him or herself as the other, that is, his/her irreducibility and transcendence.32 levinas remarks that “the relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face cannot be reduced to that”.33 the face is not merely an appearance. it does not entail mere perception or description of what we know. but in the face-to-face encounter, i am not facing a thing merely of perceptual comprehension, but of responsibility. the other by virtue of its appearance commands a response different from knowledge. arnel palado argues that “although i inevitably have knowledge of the other’s manifestation and the demands put on me, the epiphany needs a response beyond my pre-theoretical perspective. hence by the other’s appearance, he also gives commands”.34 the command that comes from the epiphany of the other is ethical and not a compelling manipulation. in the words of levinas: the first word of the face is the “thou shall not kill”. it is an order. there is a commandment in the appearance of the face as if a master spoke to me. however, at the same time, the face of the other is destitute; it is poor for whom i can do all and to whom i owe all. and me, whoever i may be, but as a “first-person”, i am he who finds the resources to respond to the call.35 in levinas, the other’s command implies a challenge and a responsibility. this command does not appeal to my goodness but 130 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 to my responsibility. further, the appeal does not change with a third other. the command is irrespective of perception. this does not also diminish the freedom of the self or ego. the challenge of moral responsibility is akin to immanuel kant’s categorical imperative. kant describes the moral command as categorical because, this imperative cannot be split into means and ends, it commands an action which is good in itself and which is thus necessary to a will that orients itself on reason. it is not a hypothetical imperative. william lawhead clearly corroborates this explanation, "the moral law is presented to us as a categorical imperative. it tells you what you ought, should, or must do, but it does not depend on any prior conditions, or subjective wants and wishes, and it contains no qualifications. it takes the form, "do x!" it is not preceded by an “if clause”, for it tells you what you are morally commanded to do under all conditions and at all times”.36 levinas like kant believes that the imperative springs from reason alone and is rationally consistent. kant expresses the first formulation of his categorical imperative thus: “there is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. it is: “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”.37 the second formulation of his categorical imperative is, “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”.38 kant's formulation is similar to the biblical so-called golden rule, “do unto others what you want to be done to you” (matt 7:12). there is however a lot of pregreek bible texts referring to this principle like herodotus’s. nevertheless, kant explicitly warns his readers to understand his second formulation as a version of the golden rule. kant considers the golden rule as trivial because it does not refer to the foundations of obligations towards oneself and others. later scholars, of course, fought kant on this assumption, but kant himself despised the golden rule. although both kant and levinas can be dubbed examples of deontological ethics (from the greek word, deon, meaning duty or obligation) in contrast to teleological ethics(a theory of morality that derives duty or moral obligation from what is good or desirable as an end to be achieved), there are, however, some differences in them. whereas, kant calls his levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 131 proposition “metaphysics of morals”, levinas calls his, the “ethics of ethics”. nevertheless, levinas does not believe, our duty to the other should be as we would treat ourselves; rather, we should treat the other in a superior manner. in levinas’ alterity which begins from responsibility, he argues that it does not diminish freedom, rather, it commits our responsibility to the other in a strong way. for levinas, responsibility precedes freedom. he says, “i am responsible for him without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me”.39 this responsibility of care is the tie between me and the other, whether we accept or refuse to accept, whether we do know of it or not know, whether we are able to or unable to do something concrete for the other.40 what levinas attempts to do with this i-other relationship of care and responsibility is to withdraw philosophy from the egoism that according to him has shrouded it. he argues that most philosophy understands the relation to oneself as the primary relation. this is clearly mirrored in the works of descartes, hobbes, locke and freud. he argues, therefore, that my responsibility to the other is the fundamental structure of upon which all other social structures rest.41 for levinas, the first question of philosophy is not ontological, why is there something rather than nothing, but ethical: how can my being justify itself? he argues that ethics is foundational for all other issues since human being already lives in the midst of others. dermont moran interprets levinas’s philosophy as “a kind of humanism; a “humanism of the other man”, one which wants to speak of the other, not objectively in the third person, but addressing the other directly, in the vocative case, invoking his or her proper name”.42 the ethical outlook of levinas’ philosophy makes him describe philosophy from its greek etymological roots, philos and sophia, not understood as ‘love of wisdom’, but he understood as the ‘wisdom of love’. with this interpretation, levinas disrupts and repositions the foundations of philosophy from the domain of ontology to that of ethics. the discourse on levinas’ alterity opens up a number of considerations for ethics, epistemology and even ontology. one point is clear; levinas withdraws philosophy from 132 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 individualism to otherness and from objectification of knowledge to subjectivity of knowledge claims. alterity and epistemology: towards an epistemology of otherness levinas’ thoughts on alterity leave a lot of epistemological questions open. epistemology which concerns itself with how we know what we know and what we can know is an open-ended discipline. the fact that human knowledge is really finite makes epistemology dynamic. philosophy deals with knowledge not only as a first-order activity of producing knowledge but, also as a second order enterprise of criticizing and justifying the grounds of knowledge produced in other disciplines.43 the activity of justifying the grounds of knowledge is the focus of epistemology. the epistemological questions provoked by levinas’s alterity begins with a question like: how can we really know the other person? in the kantian-hegelian tradition, truth is made relative to the subject. can we really know the other without a relationship? relationship? does the pre-reflective self-consciousness mind really know? are there not forms of othering, in which we base knowledge of the other on the perceptual conditions and terms, and do not seek the other’s position or perspective? are there not claims of epistemic injustice to the other, when the claims and beliefs are based only on the subject alone without comprehending all the circumstances of the other? these are the questions an epistemology of otherness asks. an epistemology of otherness is socially-oriented. by the token, it falls into the domain of epistemology known as social epistemology. social epistemology departs from traditional epistemology by critiquing its foundational assumption that only individuals can know. social epistemology, on the contrary, argues that there are social sources of knowledge and consideration outside an individual domain to the other enters into a social domain. when we talk about the testimony of the other as a source of knowledge rather than my individual perception alone, then we are talking of social epistemology. the other becomes an epistemic agent, who knows and can be relied upon in forming beliefs. social epistemology which is a program epistemologists have engaged in, levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 133 in the last thirty years more vigorously seeks to address the epistemic imbalances from individual epistemology by dealing with social conditions, relations within a social system. this is, precisely, what alterity pursues, seeking the perspective of the other. in an epistemology of otherness, the other becomes a source of knowledge. thus, knowledge is no longer determined from the perceiver’s perspective alone, but also from the “object”, which levinas calls the other. since levinas gives primacy to the other before the self, an epistemology of otherness becomes a variant of social epistemology, and it investigates truth from the social conditions and relations of the other. an epistemology of otherness is normative in its approach. steve fuller, who is a prominent figure of a variant of social epistemology argues that his vision of social epistemology is committed to normativity. the normative approach is committed to organizing the means available to bring about or maintain a desirable state of affairs.44 this approach keeps opening the scope of the norms. traditional epistemology arguably seeks the objectification of knowledge. it means there are objective and linear paradigms for judging truth and knowledge. however, edmund gettier with his epochal paper, “is justified true belief knowledge?”45 published in 1963, contested the dogmatism of objective paradigms. since then, there have been new philosophies that favoured new ways and methods of searching for truth and knowledge. these are reflected in the philosophies of richard rorty with his epistemological behaviourism, thomas kuhn’s thought on scientific revolution and even paul feyerabend’s methodical pluralism. it is this similar idea of normativity that is mirrored in levinas’s alterity. from levinas’s critique of traditional philosophy, he saw western metaphysics as a grand project of totalization, of reducing everything to the sphere of the ego, the self and thereby eliding the difference between being and thought. it means whatever is thought of or represented in thought we take alone to be true. the weakness of this approach is that it limits being to self-conception or selfknowledge. for levinas, philosophy must always be an attempt to defend the priority of the other and resist its reduction to the sphere 134 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 of sameness. the philosophy of the same is what has grounded all knowledge to involve objectification with a violation of the object. this can create an epistemic injustice and imbalance with regards to knowledge production. in contrast, an epistemology of otherness argues for an intersubjective epistemology. this is in contrast with epistemic relativism. epistemological relativism may be defined as the view that knowledge (and/or truth) is relative – to time, to place, to society, to culture, to historical epoch, to conceptual scheme or framework, or to personal training or conviction – so that what counts as valid knowledge depends upon these variables.46 an intersubjective epistemology in this sense would imply one that takes what a subject or a group of subjects holds to be true as being true on the basis of valid reasons for such beliefs. in this case, knowledge is not just a function of the subject’s epistemic virtue(s), but also those of the object. justification of beliefs in intersubjective epistemology involves factors beyond the internal faculty of the subject (internalism) but also external (externalism) to it. justification theory for intersubjective epistemology is primarily context-dependent. thus, intersubjectivism can come in either an individualistic form or a social form. in the former, this theory relies on the object which is the other, while in the latter, the other takes on a collective nature beyond an atomic individual. this can help to understand that what happens in the social sphere is not just independent of the subject. for instance, when you are talking to me and i appear to be expressionless, you may conclude that i am bored by what you are saying. it may be that as you spoke, my mind went to a bad experience which changed my feeling. an intersubjectivist epistemology would investigate into what made my feelings change, rather than relying on the justification that was taken from my expression. levinas’ alterity is premised on a defense of intersubjectivity. in levinas, the other is everything which resists such totalizations and which resists violence. the other means that which cannot be objectified. intersubjectivity is contrary to totality. this is explained by levinas in his major work, totality and infinity as a defense of intersubjectivity. an epistemology of otherness seeks to address the problem of epistemic injustice from perceptual understanding and othering. levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 135 epistemic injustice refers to “those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding and participation in communicative practice”47. this term was coined by miranda fricker in 2007. the term, othering, on the other hand is the process of treating someone as different, inferior, prejudiced or lookeddown than oneself. it is a form of inferiorization and prejudicing. allie bunch48 categorizes three different forms of epistemic injustice in the process of othering as (1) discriminatory epistemic injustice which involves the dehumanization of the other or outgroup, (2) testimonial epistemic injustice which comes as reduced credibility and silencing. silencing comes from non-reciprocity (3) distributive epistemic injustice which refers to the refusal of resources for the other or group. an epistemology of otherness offers non-oppressive ways of knowing. an epistemology of otherness involves epistemic responsibility. epistemic responsibility involves taking responsibility for our individual beliefs. responsibility is at the heart of levinas’s alterity. an epistemology of otherness would not be totalizing but prioritizing the other in forming a judgment about him/her. conclusion the ethical alterity of emmanuel levinas has been examined in this paper as a template for developing an epistemology of otherness. differences in social relations have brought to light imbalances and sometimes even forms of injustice. the search for knowledge is a herculean task and scepticism of different kinds has challenged what we can know from different sides. thus, the task of epistemology is to secure what we know from errors and make our knowledge claims warranted. in the light of a self-absorbed and the individualistic nature traditional objectivist epistemology has been shrouded in, the human epistemic situation can be said to be incomplete. the desire to have a wholesome epistemic situation opened the threshold for social epistemology. the focus of social epistemology is assessing new pathways we can know. one of such, is how we can know from not just from the knower’s perspective but also from the objects. this is an intersubjective epistemology which this work has described as an epistemology of otherness. this 136 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 paper has argued that it is in knowing the other better, that we can well relate with him/her and not see him/her as an object to be violated. the epistemology of otherness prescribed in this paper seeks to eliminate the possibility of epistemic injustice and false claims. the aim is to achieve truth of the other, his/her appreciation. without claiming to be a perfect agenda, the epistemology of otherness is a step towards knowing the other better. endnotes 1 dostoevsky fyodor, the brothers karamazov. transl. from the russian by constance garnett, new york: the lowell press, 2009. p 202. 2 docherty thomas, “postmodernism” in honderich ted (ed), the oxford companion to philosophy, second edition, oxford: oxford university press, 2005 3 fidelis chuka aghamelu & emeka cyril ejike, “hegel’s contributions to modern individualism and totalitarianism” in http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/og.v13i 1.12 4 jimoh anselm, certitude and doubt a study guide in epistemology, second edition, benin: floreat publication, 2017, p. 8. 5 the term, “prote philoophia”, was coined by aristotle for metaphysics. it is the most general abstract science and thus conceived as the foundation of philosophy itself. see, aristotle, metaphysics, iv, 1, 1003 a21. levinas on the other hand, declared that rather than metaphysics, ethics is the first philosophy. 6 dermon doran, introduction to phenomenology, london: routledge taylor and francis group, 2000. pp 320-321. 7 derrida jacques, “other” in honderich ted (ed), ibid. 8 mengstie sisay, “ constructions of “otherness” and the role of education: the case of ethiopia” in journal of education culture and society, no. 2, 2011, p. 7 9 ibid 10 levinas emmanuel, totality and infinity an essay on exteriority, translated by alphonso lingis, boston: martinus nijhoff publishers 1979. p. 46 11 paul ricoeur, oneself as another, trans. k. blamey (chicago & london: the university of chicago press, 1992). 12 moran dermot, introduction to phenomenology, london: routledge taylor and francis group, 2000. pp. 337-338 13 see dierckxsens geoffrey’s “otherness and desire in paul ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self” in https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/d34db6/d606e14f.pdf 14 jimoh anselm “justice and the othered minority lessons from african communalism” in elvis imafidon (ed), handbook of african philosophy of difference: switzerland: springer, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03004941-6_12-1 15 brons lajos, “othering an analysis” in transcience, 6 (1), 2015, p. 69 levinas’ theory of alterity and the sketching… | 137 16 see also, g.w.f. hegel, phenomenology of spirit, translated by a.v. miller with analysis of the text and foreword by j. n. findlay (oxford: clarendon press, 1977). 17 lajos, p. 70. 18 “othering", the new fontana dictionary of modern thought, third edition (1999), p. 620. 19 brons, p. 74. 20 jimoh, “justice and the othered minority: lessons from african communalism”, ibid. 21 miller, j. "otherness". the sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods. thousand oaks, ca: sage publications, inc. 2008, pp. 588–591. 22 fenves peter, “alterity and identity, post modern theories of” in routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, version 1.0, london and new york: routledge, 1998. 23 zeno opens up the problem of infinity with his paradoxes on infinity. he argues against the pythagorean theory of the plurality of things. according to the pythagoreans, everything in the universe is made up of units. now, these units, says, zeno, are either with size or without size. if they are, they can always be divided up which means they are infinitely divisible. and since they are infinitely divisible they must be made up of infinite units. in other words, everything in the universe is made up of an infinite number of units. but whatever is made up of infinite number of units must be infinitely great. it follows therefore that everything in the universe is infinitely great. now, let us take the second alternative and say that these units are without size. in that case, says, zeno, they must be infinitely small. and if everything in the universe is made up of infinitely small units, it follows that everything in the universe is infinitely small. see, omoregbe joseph, a simplified history of western philosophy, vol. one ancient and medieval philosophy, lagos: joja educational research and publishers limited, 1999. p. 16. 24 anaxagoras’ philosophy begins by wading into the ultimate stuff of reality by attempting to reconcile the theories of heraclitus and parmenides. empedocles had proposed four elements as the constitutive of all reality. anaxagoras leveraging on empedocles’ thought, argues that each of these four elements are themselves a combination of several different particles. in other words, there are particles of all things in everything. this is how anaxagoras describes his notion of the infinite. see, omoregbe, joseph, a simplified history of western philosophy, ibid. p. 20. 25 levinas emmanuel, totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority, trans. alphonso lingis (pittsburgh duquesne university press, 1969, p. 25. 26 ibid. p. 26. 27 friedman randy, “alterity and asymmetry in levinas’s ethical phenomenology”, the journal of scriptural reasoning, vol. 13, number 1, 2014, p. 6. 28 ibid, p. 11. 138 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 29 holocaust refers to the genocide during world war ii in which nazi germany, aided by its collaborators, murdered over six million jews. this is an estimate of over two-third of the jewish population of europe between 1941 and 1945. 30 levinas emmanuel, time and the other. translated by richard a. cohen. pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1987. p.84. 31 levinas, time and the other, p. 74. 32 arnel palado, “emmanuel levinas on the other and the third party” in https://ustedu.academia.edu/arnelpalado. 33 levinas emmanuel, ethics and infinity: conversation with philippe nemo, translated by richard cohen, pittsburgh: duquesne university press, 1985, pp 85-86. 34 arnel palado, “emmanuel levinas on the other and the third party”, ibid. 35 levinas, ethics and infinity: conversation with philippe nemo, p. 89. 36 lawhead william, the voyage of discovery, a historical introduction to philosophy, second edition, london: wadsworth group, 2002. p. 342. 37 immanuel kant, foundations of the metaphysics of morals, translated by lewis white beck, indianapolis: bobbs-merill, library of liberal arts, 1959, 39. 38 kant, foundations of the metaphysics of morals, p. 47. 39 levinas, ethics and infinity: conversation with philippe nemo, p. 96. 40 ibid, p. 97. 41 levinas, totality and infinity, p. 79; 51 42 dermont, introduction to phenomenology, p. 321. 43 owolabi kolawole, “the nature and problems of knowledge” in owolabi kolawole (ed) issues and problems in philosophy, ibadan: grovacs network, 2000. p. 49. 44 fuller steve, “ a sense of epistemic agency fit for social epistemology” in reider patrick, social epistemology and epistemic agency decentralizing epistemic agency, new york: rowman and littlefield, 2016. p. 21. 45 gettier edmund, “is justified true belief knowledge?” in analysis, vol. 23, no. 6. june 1963. pp. 121-123. 46 harvey siegel, “relativism” in jonathan dancy and ernest sosa (eds), a companion to epistemology, oxford: blackwell, 1992. pp 428-429. 47 kidd, ian james; medina, josé; pohlhaus jr., gaile (2017). "introduction to the routledge handbook of epistemic injustice". in kidd, ian james; medina, josé; pohlhaus jr., gaile (eds.). routledge handbook of epistemic injustice. routledge. p. 1. doi:10.4324/9781315212043 48 bunch allie, “epistemic violence in the process of othering: real world applications and moving forward”, in scholarly undergraduate research journal at clark: vol. 1, article retrieved from https://commons.clarku.edu/surj/vol1/iss1/2/ abstract the problem of suffering which is connected with the problem of theodicy, has to do with why a good god would permit humans to undergo physical, mental and spiritual afictions. human suffering, which is an indisputable fact of human existence that raises many questions, remains a mystery. why is there suffering and what is the purpose of suffering? what should be the attitude of man to suffering? kierkegaard sees suffering as essential in the life of man in order for him to actualize his potential. his treatment of suffering is of great importance in understanding the role of suffering in human existence. this essay attempts to approach suffering from the thkierkegaardian perspective. kierkegaard, a 19 century danish philosopher and existentialist thinker, sees suffering as the essential expression of the existential pathos which the religious individual understands as something essential. suffering, which is a dying to immediacy, is an essential expression of the relationship to the absolute. the religious person is one who is reected inward and understands suffering as essential and is ready to confront it in all its ramications. this approach to suffering has the capacity of encouraging an individual to face all of life's dangers, to embark joyfully exploring the theme of suffering in soren kierkegaard's philosophy benedict egbuchunam department of philosophy seminary of all saints, uhiele-ekpoma. emechunam@yahoo.com upon the necessary challenges of life and to cultivate a positive attitude to suffering. keywords: suffering, immediacy, essential, absolute, existential, pathos. introduction suffering is an unavoidable mystery of human existence. it is seen by some as something evil that comes to those who have 'bad luck' or to bad people. it is natural that human beings should shy away from suffering and from anything that will cause pain. however, it is an undisputable fact that suffering is a part and parcel of human existence. but the question is: why is there suffering? what is its purpose? what should be the attitude of humans to suffering? a proper and adequate knowledge of what suffering is and its role has the capacity of encouraging an individual to face all of life's dangers, to embark joyfully upon the necessary challenges of life and to derive benets from a positive approach to suffering. to this end, kierkegaard's treatment of suffering is of great importance in understanding the role of suffering in our lives. this essay, therefore, attempts to expose kierkegaard's view on suffering as the essential expression for existential pathos; as an expression of a religious view of life in contradistinction to fortune and misfortune as the expression of an aesthetic view of life. to achieve this, this essay would have an overview of suffering. then, kierkegaard's view on existence and the stages of life after which his treatment on suffering would follow and the bulk of what kierkegaard says on suffering would be taken from his work, concluding unscientic postscript. an overview of suffering the term suffering is sometimes used in the narrow sense of physical pain, but more often it refers to mental or emotional pain, or more to pain in the broad sense, that is, to any unpleasant feeling, emotion or sensation. the term pain usually refers to physical pain, but it is also a common synonym of suffering. the terms pain and suffering are exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 35 sometimes used together in different ways. for instance, they may either be used as interchangeable synonyms or they may be used in contradistinction to one another as in "pain is physical, suffering is mental", or "pain is inevitable, suffering is optional". sometimes, they are used to dene each other, as in "pain is physical suffering", or 1 "suffering is severe physical or mental pain" suffering occurs commonly in the lives of sentient beings in diverse manners. it is the presence of pain, displeasure, and other forms of anguish: physical or spiritual, in a given person or sentient 2 being. one thing is clear and that is the fact that it is the subject – the human person – who suffers. of course, the lower animals do undergo suffering (physical pain) but what differentiates the human person from lower animals is on the level of consciousness. only the 3suffering human being knows that he is suffering and wonders why; and he suffers in a humanly speaking still deeper way if he does not 4 nd a satisfactory answer. it has been said that the high-level capacities of memory, anticipation, and conscience, which gives rise to the human experience of suffering as distinct from the experience of physical pain, is lacking in lower animals, which live wholly in the 5 present. the eld of human suffering is much wider, more varied, and multi-dimensional. man suffers in a variety of ways not always considered by medicine, not even in its most advanced specializations. suffering is something which is still wider than sickness, more complex and at the same time still more deeply rooted 6in humanity itself. in day-to-day human experience, we are faced with various types of suffering and evil. pantaleon iroegbu makes a 1 “suffering”, in en.wikipedia.org/wiki/suffering, 2010. 2pantaleon iroegbu, kpim of predicaments, ibadan: hope publications, 2004, 31. 3the terms ‘man’, ‘he’, ‘him’ and so on is used here occasionally in a generic sense to avoid making the work cumbersome. it does not, in any way, denote disrespect or disregard for the female gender. 4john paul ii, the christian meaning of human suffering (salvici doloris, thapostolic letter), 11 february, 1984. no. 9. 5j. bukovsky, “suffering”, the new catholic encyclopedia, vol. 13, ed. rev. w. j. mcdonald et al, washington: the catholic university, 1967, 775. 6john paul ii, salvici doloris . . . , no. 5. 36 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 difference between evil and suffering. he says that evil is generally a lack of being or acting that should be there in a being while suffering involves some anguish, pain or displeasure on the part of the victim. while all suffering is evil, not all evil is suffering in the strict sense of the presence of pain, anguish or displeasure. in other words, there are various types of evil some of which may entail suffering and others 7not. according to etienne borne, suffering is not 'immediately given' in human consciousness. it does not have the simple character of sensation or pleasure. it raises questions as soon as it is present in the one suffering and feeds that self-reection peculiar to the human mind. he says that there is a distinction between the different forms of suffering. the rst kind of suffering could be called work or labour (suffering in work). this is when pain is the means to a worthwhile end, that is, it has meaning beyond it. it creates a kind of division or alienation within the human person. this is the most fundamental dimension of interiority and it is at the origin of technical activity and properly human actions. in “suffering in work”, suffering assumes a mediating role; it can be seen in the light of a comforting truth. here the pain of the road is incurable and is part of the journeying. but its 8justication lies in the destination and in the happiness of arriving. there is also suffering of anguish, which occurs in the meeting point with absolute misfortune when one must bear the unbearable. for example, the death of a loved one, the triumphant persecution of the innocent etc. in this type of suffering, which natural reason cannot give a 'means-end' explanation, we are inicted with 'obtuse evidence' of their meaninglessness. suffering, which comes from our own faults, has two faces. at one time, a moral and intelligent action may mediatize the suffering, that is, the evil, which makes one evil, is changed by the person into repentance, which puries. at other times, the evil is irreparable and the remorse, which turns into anguish, is unconquerable by heroism and wisdom natural 7iroegbu, op.cit., p. 32-33. 8etienne borne, “the meaning and meaninglessness of suffering”, philosophy today, vol. 1, (june, 1957), no. 2/4, 100. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 37 9 to man. relative suffering, in which the search for meaning is rewarded, and absolute suffering, whose meaning escapes us, inuence one another with the latter infecting the former. there is an undened area between the two where the hope of nding meaning is always mingled with fear of meaninglessness. there is an obtuseness, the lling of shadows even when it is evident that pain is necessary for humans and can serve a good purpose. it would seem that suffering of any kind destroys something of goodness and truth such that it becomes subject to reason by 'constraint and violence'. in suffering, there seems to be a sure sign of death and both seem impossible to mediatize, that is, it seem impossible to nd meaning in 10 both. in whatever form it takes, suffering is indeed a passion for humans. it is “an ordeal, imposed by fate or circumstances, which neither will nor reason can completely dominate and conquer” and it brings to the heart of an individual “a mixture of exaltation and 11blindness and bafing light.” a question that comes to mind is: if god is both willing and able to prevent evil, then why is there evil and suffering in the world? the problem of suffering is connected with the problem of theodicy, or why the just god allows evil in the world. why would a good god permit man to undergo physical, mental and spiritual afictions? this constitutes on one hand, the objection to god's existence by atheists like david hume, who gives positive reasons for rejecting a theistic deity, and on the other hand, a challenge to the believer whose faith in 12 god is severely tested by trials. at a deep human level, human suffering is a mystery before which scientic and most philosophical systems are either silent or without adequate answers. the mystery of suffering lies not in its existence which is obvious, nor in the fact that it can be painful and that we seek to avoid it nor does it lie in the fact that it can be 9ibid. 10ibid. 11ibid. 12bukovsky, “suffering”, the new catholic encyclopedia, vol. 13 . . . , 775. 38 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 necessary and even redemptive for our experience may show this to 13 be true. our persistent which shows that we are staring at a mystery. according to pope john paul ii: “within each form of suffering endured by man, and at the same time at the basis of the whole world of suffering, there inevitably arises the question: why? it is a question about the cause, the reason, and equally, about the purpose of suffering, and, in brief, a question about its meaning. not only does it accompany human suffering, but it seems even to determine its human content, what 14 makes suffering precisely human suffering.” in considering suffering, it would be discovered that it reveals the polarity existing between the exterior and interior self, the puzzled way in which one is stretched between the world of nature and spirit. substantial unity becomes so difcult to understand that one can only 15call it a mystery. suffering is an enigmatic fact which challenges every world view. no suffering is a simple physical reality. there is always that resistance, the effort to ignore or scape, to discover its causes. man tries as much as possible to seek solutions to human suffering or nd ways of doing away with it. but it ends up being a futile exercise. this is not to discredit those who seek ways to reduce human suffering or to say that we should not seek solutions to human problems. but as pope john paul ii says: “seeking new and effective ways to alleviate suffering is a valid quest, but suffering nevertheless remains a fundamental fact of human life. in a way, it is as deep as man himself and touches upon his very essence. medical 13h. c. bradley, the mystery of suffering, http://www.sju:edu/campus_ministry/ newsletter/cnl033003.htm. 14pope john paul ii, salvici doloris . . . , no. 9. 15borne, art.cit., 100. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 39 research and treatment neither wholly explains nor fully overcomes suffering. in its depth and its so many forms it needs to be considered from a perspective, which 16transcends the merely physical.” suffering as suffering is obviously an evil. suffering for the sake of suffering is an antithesis of goodness and to that extent it is 17 existentially a hollow in the order of reality. but what is the source of evil? if there is evil, then something is missing that ought to be there, in god or in the world and that is perfection. why would a perfect god make an imperfect world a world in which there is suffering and death? it is at this point that we now turn to kierkegaard whose view on suffering would be understood in the light of his idea on existence and the stages of life. the concept of existence in kierkegaard's philosophy the term existence constitutes the foundational structure of kierkegaard's philosophy. his career was a self-conscious revolt against abstract thought which hegel's system was noted for. for kierkegaard, existence, which is a specically human category, can have two senses. he made a distinction between the spectator and the actor. he says that the spectator can be said to exist in the sense of inert or inactive things. but the term existence does not apply properly to these whether they are spectators or stones. it is only the actor that is involved in existence. the act of existing, which is a striving, is both pathetic and comic. existence, for kierkegaard, is the “child that is born of the innite and the nite, the eternal and the 18 temporal, and is therefore a constant striving.” according to kierkegaard, the self is the conscious synthesis of innitude 16pope john paul ii, the christian response to suffering (message of the holy father for the world day of the sick for the year 2002), cf., http://www.wff.org/02-1-christian suffering.html. emphasis is mine. 17iroegbu,, op.cit., 43. 18soren, kierkegaard, concluding unscientic postscript, princeton: princeton university press, 1941, 84. 40 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 and nitude, which relates itself to itself, whose task is to become itself, a task which can be performed only by means of a relationship to god. but to become oneself is to become concrete. but to become concrete means neither to become nite nor innite, for that which is to become 19concrete is a synthesis. for kierkegaard, the search for truth may be pursued either in an objective or in a subjective manner. objective reection consists in an abstraction from the subject and his subjective interest such that truth becomes subjectively indifferent. while in subjective reection, the task is to interpenetrate the subjectivity of the inquirer with thought that the inwardness thus developed may be a truth that is relevant to existing human beings. the highest task that is proposed to every human being is the task of becoming subjective just as the highest reward, which is an eternal happiness, exists only for those who are subjective or rather, comes into being for the individual who becomes subjective. the subjective thinker is a dialectician dealing with the existential and he has the passion of thought requisite for holding fast to the qualitative disjunction for the existential dialectic, which moves within three spheres of life: aesthetic, ethical and religious, is a movement in the direction of decisive choice and fullness of life and is relevant to an individual who confronts the 20future as an active participant in life. kierkegaard makes a distinction between what man now is, that is, his existential condition and what he ought to be, that is, his essential condition. he says that there is a movement in the life of man from his essential to existential condition; a movement from essence to existence. according to kierkegaard, man's anxiety over his nitude is the cause of his estrangement from his essential being. 19soren, kierkegaard, fear and trembling, princeton: princeton university press, 1954, 162-163. 20d. f. swenson, something about kierkegaard, minneapolis: augsburg publishing house, 1941, 117-119. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 41 man's essential nature entails his relation to god, the innite being. his existential condition is a consequence of his alienation from god. and a person's alienation and despair is further compounded if his actions drive him further from god. there is in man a dynamic drive, which this alienation creates, to recover his essential self. and it is in describing this dynamic movement that kierkegaard speaks of the 21stages on life's way. kierkegaard builds his theory of the stages, which he believes “embraces all possibilities of human existence,” on the fact that man is a synthesis of the nite and innite, the eternal and the temporal. he used the concept of a stage either because he holds that each higher stage is constituted not by abolishing the lower but by subordinating it. he posited three stages: the aesthetic, ethical and religious. the aesthetic stage can be exemplied in the poet who transmutes the world into an imaginary realm and in the romantic. the essential features of this stage are the absence of xed universal moral standards and of determinate religious faith as well as the presence of a desire to enjoy the whole range of emotive and sense experience. an individual can exist inasmuch as he chooses to be an aesthetic man. although existence can be achieved at this level, kierkegaard injects the element of quality into the matter of existence. ultimately, 22“authentic existence” cannot be achieved at this level. the ethical stage constitutes the sphere of duty, of universal rules, of unconscious demands and tasks. like socrates, whom kierkegaard considers to be the best and famous example of the ethical mode of existence, the ethical man, through the act of choosing, learns to know himself by turning towards the inwardness of his own self and thus reaches a decision to live a life that has meaning. the act of choosing is essentially a proper and stringent 23expression of the ethical. inasmuch as the ethical stage is an improvement on the aesthetic stage, it is nevertheless still 21 ths. stumpf, philosophy: history and problems (4 ed), new york: mcgraw-hill publishing co., 1971, 113-114. 22ibid. 481. 23robert, bretall, ed. either/or in a kierkegaard anthology, new york: the modern library, 1946, 105. 42 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 incomplete. the individual realizes that he is incapable of fullling the moral law, and becomes conscious of his guilt through deliberately going against the law. this guilt or the sense of sin becomes the dialectic element, the anti-thesis, which is that of estrangement or alienation from god which he belongs and from 24 whom he must derive strength. with sorrow in his heart, the ethical man asks divine forgiveness and it is at this point that he moves onto the religious stage. kierkegaard believes that the religious sphere is an embodiment of a truly authentic existence. it is seen as the culminating point of existential dialectic for in it can be found and obtained the authentic approach to life that has been so desired by the individual in both the aesthetic and ethical spheres. this religious stage is by acknowledging god, openly confessing one's sinfulness, choosing oneself as guilty and hoping for divine forgiveness. in this stage, an individual makes a choice, a personal commitment, which involves a passionate, non-rational “leap of faith.” kierkegaard makes a distinction between two forms of the religious stage: religiousness a and religiousness b. the former, which is not specically christian religiousness, can exist in paganism and in christianity; that is, it can be the religiousness of everyone who is not decisively christian, whether he be baptized or not. while the latter is precisely christian religiousness, is discriminative, selective, polemical and is closely dened by sin consciousness, the possibility 25of offence and the smart of sympathy. kierkegaardian perspective on suffering as a prelude to kierkegaard's discourse on suffering, it would be necessary to point out that for kierkegaard, the task of the individual consists in the simultaneous maintenance of an absolute relationship to the absolute telos and a relative relationship to relative ends. kierkegaard says that in order for the individual to be able to relate 24stumpf, op.cit., 481, 482. 25f. j. lescoe, existentialism: with or without god, new york: the society of st. paul, 1974, 4. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 43 absolutely to the absolute telos, he must begin by exercising himself in the absolute relationship through renunciation. this renunciation involves freeing oneself from relative ends. and it is when the individual is able to free himself from relative ends that he can now begin to think of the ideal task, which is the simultaneous maintenance of an absolute relationship to the absolute and a relative 26relationship to the relative. kierkegaard would say that even when the individual has brought his immediacy to subjection, he is still in existence, and is thereby prevented from expressing absolutely the absolute relationship to an absolute telos. unlike aesthetic pathos, which keeps itself at a distance from existence, or is in existence in a state of illusion, existential pathos dedicates itself more and more profoundly to the task of existing. it is able to penetrate all illusions, through the consciousness of what existence is, thereby becoming more and more concrete through reconstructing existence in action. suffering as the essential expression for existential pathos kierkegaard says that action may be seen as the precise opposite of suffering, which is the essential expression for existential pathos – the pathos of action. this is apparently the case as is evident from the fact that the positive is the index of the negative: “a revelation is signalized by mystery, happiness by suffering, the certainty of faith by uncertainty, the ease of the paradoxical – religious life by its 27difculty, the truth by absurdity …”. for kierkegaard, the distinguishing mark of religious action, which is directed towards eternal happiness, is suffering. action here does not mean outward activity for this does not transform the individual's own existence. rather, it can transform existence in the sense of an emperor conquering the world and enslaving people. but kierkegaard would say that such action is aesthetic pathos. the aesthetic individual transforms the world while he himself remains untransformed. this is because he has the dialectical outside of him 26kierkegaard, postcript, 386. 27ibid., 387. 44 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 instead of within him. kierkegaard says that suffering is the highest action in inwardness. this is because “essential existential pathos is essentially related to existence; and to exist essentially is inwardness, 28and action in inwardness is suffering. suffering, which is essentially the expression of existential pathos, is rooted in the fact that the individual is from his happiness. but this also signies that he is in relationship to this happiness and 29 consequently, to be without suffering is to be without religion. it should be pointed out that kierkegaard does not teach that all suffering is religious although all suffering may become religious by being incorporated into a god-relationship. if suffering ceases, the religious life is also abolished for all religious life involves suffering. swenson says that this suffering is due to the necessity of a reformation of the individual for religious suffering is the sign of transformation in the personality of the individual by which it is in the process of becoming better. the individual needs the transforming 30 discipline of suffering for its imperfection is at the bottom of guilt. from what swenson says, guilt lies at the bottom of our suffering. according to garelick, the suffering of the subjective individual lies in the fact that “he carries with him at all times in his search for eternal happiness, the awareness of the disproportion he has created between his existence and the demands of subjectivity.” the individual suffers because he bears the burden of guilt consciousness as a consequence 31 of his guilt consciousness. kierkegaard says that in transforming his entire existence, which is a dying away from immediacy, the religious individual would feel himself conned within the absolute conception of god; for the absolute conception of god consists in having it at every moment. the religious individual is so conned since absoluteness is not directly the element of a nite creature. kierkegaard says that inasmuch as the conception of god is the absolute help, it is also the 28ibid., 388. 29ibid., 406. 30swenson, op.cit., 174. 31h. m. garelick, the anti-christianity of kierkegaard, the hague: martinus nijhoff, 1965, 26. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 45 only help, which is also capable of revealing to man his own helplessness. the religious man, who lies in the nite as a helpless child, desires to hold fast to the conception of god and it is this that annihilates him. he desires to do everything he can to express this religious absoluteness, but as it were, he is unable to make the “nite 32 commensurable therefore.” kierkegaard says that although there is this absolute difference between god and man, the principle of equality in love expresses itself by means of the absolute difference whose form is humility – the humility that frankly admits its human lowliness with humble cheerfulness before god, trusting that god knows all this better than himself. it is here that the profound suffering of true religiosity lies – the deepest and unthinkable, namely, to stand related to god in an absolutely decisive manner, and be unable to nd any decisive expression for this. this inability is rooted in the necessary relativity of the most decisive expression, in its being too much because it involves a certain presumptuousness against other men 33and too little because it is a worldly expression. suffering as dying from immediacy kierkegaard says that immediacy is fortune; for there is no contradiction in the immediate consciousness. the view of life natural to immediacy is one based on fortune and as such, the immediate individual is essentially seen as a fortunate one. the contradiction comes from without and takes the form of misfortune. the immediate individual is unable to understand misfortune. this is because he never becomes dialectical in himself. due to his inability to grasp misfortune, the individual may despair; for the immediate individual expects the difculty to stop since it is a foreign element. kierkegaard says that the despair of the individual, which comes because the difculty does not cease, makes the transition to another understanding of misfortune possible for the individual's immediacy ceases as a result of despair. unlike the immediate individual who 32kierkegaard, postcript, 431-432. 33ibid., 439. 46 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 lacks the dialectical in himself, the inwardness that is the core of the ethical and ethico-religious individual understands suffering as something essential. for the aesthetic (immediate) individual “suffering must come from without, be visible, not having its origin 34 and expression in the individual himself.” but the religious individual has suffering constantly with him. just as the immediate individual requires fortune, the religious individual requires suffering and has it even in the absence of external misfortune. it is not misfortune that the religious individual requires for that would mean that the relationship would be aesthetic and he would remain essentially undialectical in himself. according to kierkegaard, just as immediacy pins its faith to fortune, the religious man believes that it is precisely in suffering that life is to be found. immediacy expires in suffering and it is in suffering that the religious man begins to breathe; the religious man comes to life in suffering. in other words, all men are sufferers. but the problem is to share fully in the suffering, and not to get away from misfortune. sharing fully in suffering is not by plunging oneself into 35it but by discovering that it is there. for kierkegaard, religiosity is inwardness, which is the “relationship of the individual to himself before god, his reection into himself.” and it is from this that suffering derives, this being the ground of its essential pertinence to the religious life such that its absence means the absence of religiosity. this is why kierkegaard approves of pascal's statement which he says came out of pascal's own experience as a christian, that “suffering is the natural state of the christian just as health is that 36 of the 'natural' man.” and as such, religiosity is not to serve as a place of refuge from suffering. 34kierkegaard, stages on life’s way, (princeton: princeton university press, 1945), 413. 35kierkegaard, postcript, 391. 36kierkegaard, stages…, 416. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 47 suffering as the mark of the relationship of the exister to the absolute telos kierkegaard asks the question: is it possible for an existing individual, at the same that he expresses precisely by means of suffering his relationship to an eternal happiness as the absolute telos, is it possible for him at the same time, on the basis of his knowledge about this relationship, to place himself beyond the 37suffering? he says that in such a case, it is not suffering, which is the essential expression for the relationship, but the rejoicing, naturally not a direct joy, but a joy grounded in the consciousness that the suffering signies the relationship. in discussing which was the highest (that is, either suffering or joy as the essential expression for the relationship), kierkegaard says that although there is no suffering in the eternal happiness itself, a relationship with the absolute telos, which is established by an existing individual, rightly expresses itself through suffering. if an individual were able to elevate himself above the suffering, knowing that it means the relationship, then he would also be able to transform his status from that of an existing individual to that of an eternal being, which for kierkegaard, is impossible. since it is impossible, the individual nds himself again in the situation of suffering, because the knowledge that suffering means the relationship with the absolute telos must be held fast in the medium of existence. the perfection of that individual's joy would fail of being complete and the pain of this circumstance is again the essential expression for the 38relationship. kierkegaard points out that when an individual is secure in his god-relationship and suffers only outwardly, that it is not religious suffering; for such suffering is subject to an aesthetic 37kierkegard, postcript…, p. 404. 38ibid., 405. 48 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 dialectic, like misfortune to the immediate consciousness. the fact that an individual is without misfortune does not mean that he is without suffering if he is religious. an individual who suffers, cannot in his joy over the signicance of this suffering, as a mark of the relationship, transcend the suffering. this is because the suffering is rooted in the fact that he is separated from his happiness but also signies that he has a relationship to this happiness. hence, to be without suffering is to be without religion. the religious individual is reected inward, is conscious of being existentially in the process of becoming and yet maintains a relationship to an eternal happiness. he says that if religious suffering ceased and the individual became secure, such that, he stands in relationship only to fortune and misfortune, then, he is an aesthetic person who has mistakenly 39strayed into the religious sphere. the category of anfechtung according to kierkegaard, there lies within the sphere of religious suffering, a special type of religious conict, which the germans call anfechtung. it is a type of temptation, which is within the sphere of the god-relationship. it ceases as soon as an individual fails to maintain a relationship with the absolute telos. he makes a distinction between temptation and anfechtung. in temptation, it is the lower that tempts and allures while in anfechtung, it is the higher that tempts and as if jealous of the individual, has to frighten him back. temptation exists in the ethical sphere and constitutes the greatest danger when the ethical relationship to reality is at its maximum for the individual. anfechtung, on the other hand, originates rst in the essentially religious sphere and occurs there only in the nal stage. as the intensity of the religiosity of the individual increases, anfechtung increases in proportion too. this is because the individual has discovered the limit and anfechtung 40 expresses the reaction of the limit against the nite individual. according to swenson: 39ibid., 406. 40ibid., 4 exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 49 it is only when the individual has been developed ethically and religiously to the point where there can be some question of his submitting himself to the divine in order to be radically transformed by the discipline of the relationship that the paradoxical makes its appearance. in this conict, the individual's strength consists in his 41weakness and his victory in his defeat. for kierkegaard, anfechtung becomes an expression for the limit which the individual discovers the moment he is able to relate himself to the absolute. in this type of temptation, the individual is innocent but the suffering is however fearful. it is only the religious man who will be exposed to anfechtung, for it is “precisely the reaction to the absolute expression for the absolute relationship.” an individual is tempted in his weak moments, while anfechtung is the nemesis upon the strong moment in the absolute relationship. “temptation therefore stands in connection with the individual's ethical habitus, while anfechtung, on the contrary, is without continuity, and is the 42opposition of the absolute itself.” kierkegaard says that it is in this manner that religious suffering has its essential persistence and reality. even in the most highly developed religious personality, who has succeeded in ghting his way through the suffering, which is involved in the dying away of immediacy, this suffering does not cease. and it is only a rare individual who succeeds in ghting his way through to the end, or in overcoming it for long, for this conict is so persistent and relapse into it so frequent. that is why the religious individual must understand that he is nothing before god or to become wholly nothing and to exist before god. he requires and should constantly have this consciousness of impotence for if it were to cease, 43 religiosity automatically ceases too. 41swenson, op.cit., 184. 42kierkegard, postscript…, 411. 43ibid., 412. 50 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 humor as an incognito for religiosity kierkegaard says that there are two boundary zones that correspond to the three spheres of existence: irony constitutes the boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical; humor, as the boundary that separates the ethical from the religious. when a religious individual, a knight of hidden inwardness, is set in the medium of existence, there emerges a contradiction in relating himself to the environment. this contradiction consists in the fact that with all this inwardness hidden within him, with his pregnancy of suffering and blessing in his soul, his appearance is exactly like that of other men. he looks like other men despite the fact that his inwardness is concealed. there is something comical here for where there is a contradiction there the comical is present. this comical aspect exists, not for others, but for the religious individual himself, when humor is his incognito, that is, 44he uses it as a disguise. the religious individual sets up a screen between himself and men, in order to safeguard and insure the inwardness of his suffering and his god-relationship, lest he be infected with worldliness. he does this because he feels compelled by the environment to do what the dialectical process of producing inwardness demands of him. for kierkegaard, as long as conict and suffering persist in his inwardness, the religious individual will not succeed in wholly concealing it. but he will not express himself directly and he will negatively prevent such a direct expression with the assistance of the humoristic. an observer who goes out to discover the religious individual would follow the rule of making everyone in whom he found humoristic, the object of his attention. but he may be deceived 45 for a religious individual is only a humorist in outward appearance. kierkegaard points out that a humorist presents the closest approximation to the religious individual and as such, he also has an essential conception of the suffering in which life is involved. he does not see existence as one thing, and fortune and misfortune as something happening to the existing individual, but exists so that 44ibid., 412. 45ibid., 451. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 51 suffering is for him relevant to existence. the humorist comprehends suffering as relevant to existence, but he does not comprehend the signicance of suffering itself; he understands that it belongs to existence but does not understand its signicance except through the principle that suffering belongs. it is at this point that the humorist differs from the religious individual. the humorist and the religious individual apprehend suffering in intimate conjunction with existence; but while the humorist revokes its essential signicance for the existing individual, the religious individual sees suffering as 46essential for the pathetic relationship to an eternal happiness. the humorist constantly sets the god-idea into conjunction with other things and evokes the contradiction. but in terms of religious passion, he does not maintain a relationship to god. instead, he transforms himself into a jesting and yet profound exchangecentre for all these transactions, but he does not himself stand related to god. the religious man, on the other hand, does the same as the humorist, that is, he places the god-idea side by side with everything and sees the contradiction, but he is related to god in his inmost consciousness. religiosity with humor as its incognito is a synthesis of absolute religious passion – the inwardness being dialectically produced – with a maturity of spirit, which withdraws the religiosity away from all externality back into inwardness, where again it is 47 absolute religious passion (kierkegaard postscript 452). relevance of kierkegaard's positive idea of suffering this essay has attempted to present the basic issues on suffering by kierkegaard. for kierkegaard, suffering is the essential expression of the existential pathos which is essentially related to existence; and to exist essentially is inwardness, and action in inwardness is suffering which a religious individual understands as something essential. this suffering is rooted in the fact that the religious individual is separated from his happiness and is conned within the absolute conception of god. he also says that suffering is a dying 46ibid., 396, 404. 47ibid., 452. 52 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 away from immediacy in which the religious individual, who is reected inward and is conscious of being existentially in the process of becoming, sustains a relationship to an eternal happiness, and the sign of this relationship is suffering, which is its essential expression. kierkegaard also points out that there is a higher sphere of suffering called anfechtung, which is precisely the reaction to the absolute relationship and that the religious individual uses humor as his incognito in order to safeguard and insure the inwardness of his suffering and his god-relationship. kierkegaard, in his thoughts, has certainly pointed out the consequence of trying to exist authentically and what suffering should be not only to the christian but any person who wants to live religiously. however, there are some inconsistencies in his thoughts. firstly, for kierkegaard, the humorist, who lies in the boundary between the ethical and religious sphere, apprehends suffering as something essential, and belonging to existence but does not understand its signicance. although, the suffering kierkegaard talks about is essentially inner suffering, which the religious man always has with him whether he suffers from without or not, he seems to refer to suffering from without (fortune and misfortune) when discussing about the humorist who presents the closest approximation to the religious. he does not seem to be consistent between suffering that belongs to inwardness and external suffering even though he claims to refer to the suffering that comes with inwardness. it is important to note that kierkegaard does not deny the fact that the religious individual could suffer from without. but for him, the suffering that comes with inwardness is more important for it is a sign of the god-relationship. the main problem in kierkegaard's view on suffering is his over-emphasis on subjectivity to the detriment of interpersonal relations. for kierkegaard, subjectivity is suffering. but the problem with subjectivity is that when taken to its logical conclusion, it denies objectivity. if subjectivity is suffering, then, suffering is reduced to a personal level – to the 'i', such that neither suffering in others nor the fact that humanity suffers is acknowledged. according to garelick, “subjectivity cannot allow a fraternity of subjectivists to gain exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 53 inspiration from shared experiences.” brotherhood may be a sign of 48 lack of subjectivity for in subjectivity, a man has to do with himself. macquarrie says that this is the substance of martin buber's critique of kierkegaard. buber (and some christian theologians) disagree with kierkegaard saying whether we relate to god by turning from the other person or do we relate to god precisely by turning toward the other and nding the 'eternal thou' through the nite? as macquarrie points out, a fruitful way to god is through the relation to other persons and through involvement in the life of the human 49community. in spite of this limitation, kierkegaard's view on suffering is of great importance to man and particularly, in our contemporary society where mediocrity reigns and suffering abounds; where the religious attitude (especially the christian attitude) to suffering is obviously disowned and vigorously denied by the world in which pleasure and comfort is absolutised. it is important to point out that apart from the pain and suffering caused by diseases, earthquakes, ood, drought and natural disasters which built into the structure of the world itself, much of human suffering is traceable to human wrong doing – man's inhumanity to man. all humans to a certain extent endure agonies of loneliness, frustration and emotional and spiritual starvation. these pains are somehow connected to failures in love. the essential sadness of pain is such that it not only magnetizes the focus of our attention, but it also preoccupies us with ourselves and consequently, such self –preoccupation is an absolute obstacle to a life of love and inwardness. people then turn to religion as they try to nd meaning in their lives in the midst of so much suffering and as a way of eeing from their pains believing that through religion, their sufferings will cease. the numerous prayer houses and churches are testimonies to this. obviously, what obtains today is an external type of religiosity. kierkegaard's thoughts are relevant in our situation in making us understand that religion is not to serve as an escape from suffering. 48garelick, op.cit., 24. 49macquarrie, existentialism, harmondsworth: penguin books ltd, 1972, 83-84. 54 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 we would approach it from three perspectives: suffering from within, which is essentially kierkegaard's position, accepting suffering from beyond and suffering with others, which is part of the critique against kierkegaard. as aquinas is said to have baptized aristotle's philosophy in the sense that aristotle didn't know the christian god, so we would do to kierkegaard's view on suffering by extending inward suffering to suffering with others. from the perspective of suffering from within, the religious individual understands suffering as something essential for it is the highest action in inwardness, which is the relationship of the individual to himself before god who is his reection into himself. therefore, complete inwardness, which is the mark of the religious stage, has suffering as its criterion. the going into oneself is marked by suffering for interiorization is a struggle, an interrupted becoming 50which is marked by qualitative leaps and crises. unfortunately, not many people are willing to face the struggle of the interior life and undergo the pain of inwardness through which a person realizes himself. the greatest fear of people is not something external but themselves. people are afraid of going down deep into themselves, not only because of the suffering and struggle involved, but because of what they will nd there. that is why john powell says that “the longest journey is the journey inward” and not many people are willing to undertake this long journey of inwardness. this accounts for the increasing mediocrity in life, depression, emotional imbalance and so on because people lack the courage and will to embark joyfully upon the challenges of life of 51 which journeying into oneself is one. hence, the socratic maxim: the unreected life is not worth living. maintaining an in-depth relationship with the absolute necessarily involves purgation and it is only when a person realizes himself through this interior struggle that he/she begins to live a true life which involves active acceptance of 52 the human condition with its demands for creative perfection. 50regis, jolivet, introduction to kierkegaard, new york: p. j. kennedy & sons, 1963, 118. 51ignace, lepp, the challenges of life, new york: society of st. paul, 1969, 11. 52ibid., 9. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 55 active acceptance of the human condition means accepting suffering with a conscious intentionality from the perspective of suffering from beyond. living a true life means actively accepting pain and suffering. bernard lonergan distinguishes between the different levels of consciousness and intentionality. there is the empirical level in which we sense, perceive, feel; the intellectual level in which we inquire to understand, express what we have understood and workout presuppositions and implications of our expression; rational level in which we reect, marshal the evidence, pass judgement on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability of a statement; and responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations,, goals and so deliberate on possible courses of action, evaluate them and put our decisions into actions. according to lonergan, inasmuch as operations on these four levels are intentional and conscious, intentionality and consciousness differ from level to level. what is conscious can be intended and it is a fourfold matter to apply the operations as intentional to the operations of the conscious: one has to experience one's experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding; one has to understand the unity and relations of one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding; one has to afrm the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding; and one decides to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, afrmed experiencing, 53 understanding, judging and deciding. in applying this to suffering and pain, there is rst the experience of one's suffering. one seeks to understand the cause of his suffering and the meaning though it may be beyond his understanding. one afrms in reality that he/she is passing through suffering rather than deny it. and one responsibly accepts his suffering. in applying the operations as intentional to these operations as conscious, one experiences one's experiencing, understanding, judging and decision on suffering; one tries to understand the unity and relations of one's experienced experiencing, 53bernard, lonergan, method in theology, new york: herder and herder, 1972, 9. 56 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 understanding, judging and decision on suffering; one afrms the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging and decision on suffering; and one decides to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, afrmed experiencing, understanding, judging and decision on suffering. this constitutes an active acceptance of the human condition (our limitations, failures, pains and sufferings). it is in this active acceptance of the human condition that one begins to live a true life. but this is not possible without inwardness, which understands suffering as essential. for it is only a person who has achieved interiority that can fully face the exigencies of human existence. from the perspective of suffering with others, it is only a person who has not only journeyed inward and discovered himself, but has experienced pain and suffering, that can reach out to others in their pain. the discovery of our limitations and helplessness enables us to understand the limitations and helplessness of others – it pushes us out of our comfort zones to truly share with others in their pain. it is this sharing of experiences that leads to growth. a truly religious person dedicated himself to the task before him/her without seeking to avoid the inevitable struggle and such acceptance of “existential risk forces man to emerge from his egotistic and narcissistic 54absorption in his own private world.” such a person who has experienced the pain of long-suffering understands others in similar positions, is sensitive to their problems and doubts that come from experiencing suffering. such attitude and disposition is necessary in our society of today that is plagued by 'man's inhumanity to man'. conclusion from the foregoing, suffering is part of human existence and is an essential expression of the religious state, that is, a truly religious individual sees suffering as something essential. kierkegaard has made an invaluable contribution to the problem of suffering. his view is of great importance in our world 54lepp, op.cit., 44. exploring the theme of suffering in soren ... | 57 where the religious attitude, especially the christian attitude is disowned and vigorously denied by the world we live in. his view is also of practical value to various religions especially the christian religion that maintaining a relationship with the absolute requires whole and undivided attention and such a relationship necessarily entails suffering. the religious person is one who is reected inward and such a person understands suffering as essential and is thus ready to confront it in all its ramications. suffering is an essential part of human existence such that it could be said that to be human is to suffer. suffering is the means through which the highest nature of man is to be disciplined and developed. the works of the greatest of men had been done amidst suffering, trial and difculty. that character, in its highest forms, is disciplined by trial and “made perfect through suffering” is 55 something that cannot be denied. a wholesome attitude is thus necessary to confront pain and suffering and according to kierkegaard, it is the religious attitude, in which a man is reected inward, and relates absolutely with the absolute and sees suffering as essential, that is needed to face the pain of human existence and to embark joyfully upon the challenges of life. 55s., smiles, character, (mumbai: the bombay saint paul society, 1987), 157 & 159. 58 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 74 6 the relevance of experiential knowledge of jesus in seminary formation in the light of john 14:1-14 vincent ojo, ph.d head, department of theology, seminary of all saints, uhiele-ekpoma ovbpres@yahoo.com abstract the formation of the human person has always been a herculean labour as a result of the complex nature of human beings. the human specie has similarities with other animal species but some other features radically distinguish human beings from other living beings. outstanding of these features is the power of reasoning and freewill. the human person can make decisions based on the level of reasoning and disposition. the formation of the human person can never be imposed as a result of the freewill. this means the human person can be impervious to formation passing through the person. john 14:1-14 presents a conversation between jesus and his disciples about his imminent return to his father. in this pericope, jesus takes up both thomas and philip over their shallow knowledge of him in spite of their closeness to him. thomas did not know that jesus is the way and philip failed to see god in jesus. their familiarity with jesus did not simply afford them this experiential knowledge. this paper opines that it is a possibility for seminarians to spend years in the seminary learning about jesus without actually knowing him. experiential knowledge of jesus is different from academic knowledge. academic knowledge is necessary in as much as it leads to the experiential knowledge. the danger, however, comes when the knowledge the seminarian has of jesus during his seminary formation is limited to the academic knowledge. this can hamper his effectiveness as a priest in the 21st century. section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 75 keywords: experiential knowledge, jesus, seminary formation, john introduction seminary formation is the process young men aspiring to become catholic priests pass through in order to become priests in the catholic church. seminary formation affords the candidates for the priesthood to acquaint themselves with the essential doctrines of the church which have their basis in the scriptures. seminarians, in the course of their seminary training, are given formation in four crucial areas namely human, pastoral, spiritual and academic. they are to be well-grounded in these four areas so as to be effective ministers of both the word and sacraments after their ordination. these areas are integral to the wholistic formation of candidates for the priesthood. they are thus to immerse themselves in formation and not lag behind in any of these four areas. however, experiences have shown that it is possible to go through the entire seminary formation without necessarily allowing the formation to permeate one’s life. in other words, one may pass through the seminary without the seminary passing through the person. we may, therefore, have intelligent and hardworking priests who act only like functionaries. they know a lot about jesus and can talk so much about him too. however, in all their dealings as priests, something still seems to be missing. they lack that inner touch that only someone with a personal knowledge of jesus and an intimate relationship with him can have. this is what this write-up is all aboutexperiential knowledge of jesus. the bone of contention is: how can the academic knowledge of jesus be transformed into experiential knowledge? it is the stance of this writer that if the candidates for the priesthood are able to have the experiential knowledge of jesus before leaving the seminary, they would be in a better position to “bring all to christ and christ to all”. definition of terms for an easy understanding of this work, some terms that are operational are clarified and their use explained. the words are experiential knowledge and seminary formation. experiential knowledge according to the new international webster”s comprehensive dictionary of the english language, experience is “knowledge derived from one’s own action, practice, perception, enjoyment, or suffering”1. this means that experience is something personal to the individual and must come from one’s perception of reality. experiential too has been defined as “pertaining to or acquired by experience; empirical”2. this also suggests that experiential emanates from experience. it is empirical 76 formation of the human person in the 21st century and not abstract. knowledge on the other hand is defined as “a result or product of knowing; information or understanding acquired through experience”.3 there is another aspect of knowledge which the dictionary points out namely that it is “information; learning; specifically, the cumulative culture of the human race”.4 knowledge, therefore, is the accumulation of all that is learnt either through learning or experience. bearing the foregoing in mind, experiential knowledge as used in this work refers to that knowledge that is gotten from experience rather than one that is gotten from mere learning through academics. seminary formation seminary formation refers to that process whereby young and interested men are trained towards becoming priests in the catholic church. they undergo some rigorous training in both philosophy and theology and thus become mature intellectually and otherwise to be able to proceed to the priesthood. seminary formation spans some few years of aspirancy, spiritual year, philosophical studies, pastoral year and theological studies. it also involves the work of discernment on the part of the formators who together with the rector have the responsibility to recommend candidates to the bishops for ordination at the end of their training. seminary formation, therefore, as used in this paper refers to the training of young men for the catholic celibate priesthood. john 14:1-14: the conversation between jesus and his disciples in this passage, jesus engages hi disciples in a conversation during which he tells them that he is about to leave them and return to his father. he assures them that he would not abandon them but would go and prepare a place for them so that where he is going, they too would follow later. this is because they know the way to the place. it was at this point that the first scandal occurred. thomas, one of the disciples listening to jesus betrayed his ignorance about the way. he says: “lord, we do not know where you are going. how can we know the way?” (v.5). at this culpable ignorance of thomas, jesus does not hide his disappointment. however, he seizes the opportunity to teach them that he is the way (ego eimi he hodos), the truth (kai he aletheia) and the life (kai he zoe) (v.6). he continues by saying “no one comes to the father except through me”. this means that the knowledge of the father is in the son and that of the son is in the father. so, if the disciples truly know jesus, they have known his father as well (v.7). in the words of teresa okure, “a most consoling message for the disciples is that they know the way to where jesus is going (v. 6). jesus is the way to god: they need to walk along it and have no fear of stumbling. he is the truth: they need to hold on to him and rely on him without fear of being failed by him. he is the life: section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 77 they need to live it, live in him, and have no fear of death.”5 this knowledge is necessary for a continued relationship between jesus and his disciples. jesus reveals the identity of the father to the disciples and through this revelation, they are able to sustain a relationship with jesus. “the link between jesus’ words and those of the father who sent him”, says pheme perkins, “is grounded in the picture of jesus as the agent of the father (e,g. 3:34; 7:17-18; 8:28,47; 12:47-49)”6 jesus makes the knowledge of him and his father a joint one so that anyone who has the knowledge of one also has the knowledge of the other. there are two key words used in this passage to express this namely  and . these two verbs denote knowing with  and  meaning “i know”.  means to perceive, gain knowledge of, know, learn, understand, judge, determine, decide, think and to resolve.7 it follows from this that  has a wider meaning than . these two words are key in this passage. the use of in the perfect here means knowledge already attained.8however, this knowledge is not perfect yet as it becomes obvious from the question philip asked afterwards. in v. 8, philip cuts in to the discourse of jesus by asking jesus to show them the father so as to quench their doubt, ignorance and curiosity. jesus is once again taken aback by this display of ignorance by philip. what philip is actually asking for here is not that clear. is it like one of the great theophanies that moses and elijah enjoyed or the visions of the heavenly court enjoyed by the prophets? hence, brown concludes thus: “in the context of the evangelist’s own time, perhaps philip is made the innocent spokesman of those heretical christians who seek after or claim a mystical vision of god.”9 jesus reprimands him and continues his teaching regarding the unity that exists between the father and himself. this knowledge is open to only those who are close to jesus. they are the ones expected to have a first-hand knowledge of who jesus is and what he stands for. however, in spite of their close affinity to jesus, the disciples, thomas and philip, could not fathom the real personality of their master. thus, “the disciples are ignorant of truths that are fundamental for an understanding of who jesus is, what he is doing, and where he is going.”10it must be noted that this reprimand was not meant for only thomas and philip but for all the disciples as it is evident in the use of the plurals in v. 7 ,  and  and in v. 11 with the use of and  . these plural verbs suggest that even though thomas and philip were the disciples who displayed publicly this ignorance about jesus, the teaching that followed was not meant just for the two of them but for all the disciples.11 78 formation of the human person in the 21st century this discourse regarding the relationship between jesus and his father continues till v. 14. here, jesus makes it abundantly clear to his disciples that he is god’s representation on earth. to have seen him is to have seen his father too. seeing and knowing jesus is tantamount to seeing and knowing the father. the fact that the disciples have not yet arrived at this level in their knowledge does not make them a failure but in the words of moloney, “the disciples have not failed completely to know jesus (as “the jews” had done: viii 19); yet their questions indicate that they do not know him perfectly.”12 jesus seizes this opportunity to enlighten and educate them on his real identity, where he comes from and where he is returning to. he also tells them that even if they do not believe on account of his words to them, his works are there as outward manifestations of his personality and his relationship with god the father. “real belief in the works”, according to moloney, “involves the ability to understand their role as signsthe ability to see through them to what they reveal, namely, that they are the work both of the father and of the son who are one, and thus that the father is in jesus and jesus is in the father.”13 the discourse ends with the invitation to the disciples to ask for anything in the name of jesus which he would grant (v. 14). the point at issue in this pericope is not so much the discourse of jesus with his disciples as the interventions of the disciples to jesus’ words. the betrayal of their shallow knowledge of him and his father points to the fact that it is possible to know many things about someone without really knowing the person. this fact is made clearer by the immediate response of jesus to the request of philip (“lord, show us the father, and we shall be satisfied.” v. 8) namely, “have i been with you all this time, philip, and you still do not know me? (v. 9). this response must have been worsened because of the ignorance displayed earlier on by thomas who did not know that jesus was the way to the father. it was as if the disciples of jesus did not actually know the true identity of their master even though they were very close to him listening to his words and seeing his marvelous deeds. the truth of the matter is that if his disciples did not know him well enough, how would they be able to make him known to the people around them who were not close to him, that is, the pagan world? nevertheless, the point must be made that this is not an indictment on the part of the two disciples, thomas and philip, as their requests were not ridiculous or outrageous. it only shows how imperfect they were in their understanding of the person and mission of jesus on earth. seminary formation in perspective the task of the seminary is to train and form men who would be ordained as priests to minister to the needs of the church. to facilitate section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 79 this task, priests are chosen and sent as formators to the seminary to accompany the candidates on their journey to the priesthood. seminary formation is thus divided into different stages with studies in philosophy and theology. there are four major areas of seminary formation which are spiritual, pastoral, intellectual and human. these run through the different stages of seminary formation. the seminarians are expected to develop in the four areas of formation without leaving any one behind. to achieve this end, auto formation is highly encouraged but with the formators accompanying the seminarians to be able to reach the requisite maturity for ordination. the formators by their words and examples accompany them to respond positively to god’s call. philosophical studies as part of the prerequisites for ordination, seminarians are to undergo studies in philosophy to sharpen their power of reasoning and enable them to make mature decisions resulting from critical analysis. through the study of ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary philosophical thoughts of philosophers, they arrive at a moment when they are disposed to receiving different thoughts and opinions with the aim of sifting out the truth. philosophy enables the candidates to have an open mind towards the opinions of others and to approach issues with equanimity. with the aid of studies in logic, metaphysics and epistemology and other related disciplines, they learn to articulate their thoughts in a convincing way to win people over and are also circumspect regarding what they hear. the knowledge acquired in philosophy serves as a preparatory ground for theology which is “faith seeking understanding”. also within the years in philosophy some theological courses are taken by the candidates to balance up their study in philosophy before they proceed on the pastoral year. theological studies on the return of the seminarians from their one year pastoral year, they begin their theological studies in earnest. in the course of the years in theology, they undergo studies in scriptures, dogma, canon law, liturgy and morality. it must be noted that the essence of these courses is to acquaint the candidates with the knowledge of jesus christ as revealed to us in the old and new testaments, in the fathers of the church and in the teaching office of the church. with this requisite knowledge it is believed that the seminarians have reached an appreciable level of maturity to advance to ordination. the rector and the entire formation team do not come to this conclusion without first examining and assessing the candidates. this process is called evaluation. first, they are assessed on the basis of their academic performance which the various 80 formation of the human person in the 21st century examinations they do reveal. before the reception of any ministry, the candidates are also tested and evaluated to ascertain their readiness to advance towards the priesthood. in the final year of their priestly formation, candidates who have been judged worthy and suitable are recommended to their bishops for diaconate ordination. those who are ordained serve as deacons for six months till the close of the session. they are then further recommended for priestly ordination after a thorough evaluation has been done by the rector and the formators. lack of in-depth knowledge of christ by the seminarian it has been observed by many people that there seems to be a great dichotomy between the seminary and the parish. the seminary is the house of formation for future priests while the parish is where the ordained minister functions. due to the nature and function of the seminary, seminarians do all in their power to abide by the rules and regulations of the seminary. this, more often than not, is as a result of the saying that “if you keep the seminary rules, the seminary would keep you”. therefore, seminarians often put on their best behaviour while in the seminary so as not to be expelled but to be recommended for ordination in due course. sometimes, this attitude leads to a lot of pretence such that the true colour of seminarians does not come out until after ordination. the seminarians in this category pass through the seminary formation and even excel in the various aspects. to the formators these seminarians have met the requirements to be admitted to ordination into the catholic priesthood. however and quite unfortunately, immediately after ordination, the newly ordained priest begins to act in a way that is incongruous with the training he has just received. he begins to behave in a way that is at variance with the examples of jesus christ whose herald he has now become according to the words of ordination. he feels and acts as being on top of the world with the whole world answerable to him forgetting christ who says: “whoever wants to be first must be last of all and servant of all.” (mark 9:33). one finds some situations in the parishes that make people to ask if a particular priest ever passed through a seminary. they do things in ways that show that they only passed through a seminary without the seminary passing through them. there seems to be a general belief that there is a contradiction between seminary life and parish life. this perhaps accounts for words like “do you think i’m still a seminarian? do you think we are still in the seminary? i am no longer a seminarian etc. some believe that there is no consensus between the theory in the seminary and the practical in the parish. therefore, for such priests, once the seminary formation is ended, so also is anything that has to do with section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 81 it. as such, some practices in the seminary are the immediate victims of this kind of attitude like praying the office of the hours, doing adoration and benediction, praying the rosary and so on. the pertinent question is this: why is there such a dichotomy between the life of the seminarian while in the seminary and the life of the priest after ordination? it is the opinion of this writer that the lack of an in-depth knowledge of jesus is responsible for this dichotomy. the relevance of experiential knowledge of jesus for the seminarian in the 21st century experience, they say, is the best teacher. the dictionary defines experience as “knowledge derived from one’s one action, practice, perception, enjoyment or suffering.”14 experiential i also defined as “pertaining to or acquired by experience.”15 experiential knowledge, therefore, refers to the knowledge acquired through experience. it is quite different from mere theoretical knowledge which is a knowledge acquired through learning alone. with theoretical knowledge one learns with the head alone without necessarily involving the heart. this is why one can learn something and forget it thereafter. it is not the case with experiential knowledge. more often than not, whatever one learns through experience does not depart from the person. it rather becomes part and parcel of that person. in the episode of john 14:1-14 discussed earlier in this piece, thomas and philip were among the disciples of jesus who have been with him for some time listening to him and learning from him. they seem to know so much about their master except his real identity as the visible image of god on earth. this accounts for their questions to jesus while he was discussing with them. thomas asked for the way jesus was going while philip asked to see the father so as to be satisfied. the amazement of jesus at these questions reflected in his response tells the whole story. as his close friends and companions, they were expected to have known him through and through having listened to him and seen all his marvelous deeds. however, their lack of this in-depth knowledge of him surprised him and he seized the opportunity to educate all the disciples on his real nature and personality. this does not in any way put these disciples in a bad light but only exposes their imperfection. they still had so much to learn from jesus who even after his death and resurrection promised to send them the holy spirit who would lead them to the complete truth (john 16:13). the seminarian in the 21st century, in order to be true to his calling to be a priest after the heart of jesus, must not only have the theoretical knowledge of jesus but also the experiential knowledge. this will enable him to live out more concretely the values of the priesthood 82 formation of the human person in the 21st century in a world that is hostile to the gospel. this experiential knowledge is relevant today because it helps the seminarian to see continuity between life in the seminary and life in the parish. the seminary training is to enable the seminarian when ordained to become a good and holy priest. he must not see the discipline he received in the seminary only as a means to become a priest but as a discipline for life. this is one of the benefits of experiential knowledge that the seminarian is able to see the seminary formation not just as a means to an end but a way of life that must be lived out in the priesthood. another way that experiential knowledge can impart positively the life of the 21st century seminarian is that having embraced the life of christ as his own, the things of this world are not his immediate priority after ordination but to do the will of god just as jesus said in john 4:34, “my food is to do the will of him who sent me and to complete his work”. this is quite different from what we observe today among newly ordained priests. even before ordination, the preoccupation of the deacon preparing for ordination is on the material acquisition like the kind of car(s), latest gadgets in town, large sum of money in his bank account and a host of others. this is not to suggest by any means that these things are not necessary for the ministry. it is rather the inordinate desire for them at any cost that calls our preparedness for service to question. after all, the master, jesus, when he was sending out his disciples on their mission said: “as you go, proclaim the good news, ‘the kingdom of heaven has come near.’ cure the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out demons. you received without payment; give without payment. take no gold, or silver, or copper in your belts, no bag for your journey, or two tunics, or sandals, or staff; for laborers deserve their food” (matt. 10:7-10). hardly can we find today disciples who are ready to plunge themselves into the ministry without first looking for comfort and conveniences. i once heard of a deacon preparing for his priestly ordination who came up with a list of things needed for the ordination and commencement of priestly service. the total cost of all the items on the list runs into several millions of naira. it is not a bad thing for the disciples to be comfortable in the course of their work but the truth of the matter is that comfort and conveniences should not be the conditio sine qua non for service or what the disciples would be pursuing. otherwise, these things could act as encumbrances to the carrying out of our duties as priests. an experiential knowledge of jesus who had nowhere to lay his head would help achieve this (matt. 8:20). section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 83 the difference between mere functionaries and real pastors of souls there is a vast difference between functionaries and ministers of the gospel. functionaries can be likened to hirelings who feel nothing for the sheep but only carrying out the task they are being paid for. these are the people jesus refers to in john 10:11-13 when he says “i am the good shepherd. the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. the hired hand, who is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep, sees the wolf coming and leaves the sheep and runs awayand the wolf snatches them and scatters them. the hired hand runs away because a hired hand does not care for the sheep”. it can be said then that any minister of the word and sacraments who pursues only his own interest and not that of the sheep entrusted to him is only a hireling. such a person does not possess the experiential knowledge of jesus. we find so many of such hirelings in the ministry today. they are not ready to dive into the deep for a catch of fish but are busy pursuing their own selfish interests and ambitions and whenever and wherever these are not satisfied, there is trouble and discontentment. thus, they could be referred to as mere functionaries, performers and artistes. real pastors, on the other hand, having experienced jesus as one who has come to serve and not to be served, are always ready to go in search of souls to be won for christ. they are prepared to be sent anywhere to minister to people as long as human beings are there. they do not pick and choose where they are going to work. wherever their bishop or superior sends them, they are happy to go there. on resuming there, they do not put their own needs first. rather, their preoccupation is to elevate the life of the people and make them better than they met them. they try to imitate the good shepherd himself who knows his sheep just as his sheep know him too (john 10:14). they identify with the people not only when things are going on well for them but also and more importantly in their moments of crisis and suffering. the role of the seminary and diocese in imparting experiential knowledge to the seminarians there is no gainsaying the fact that both the seminary and the diocese play important roles in the formation of seminarians. theirs, therefore, is a collaborative ministry and to succeed in this, all hands must be on deck. the seminary. among all the other functions that it performs, must ensure that seminarians are given sufficient time and space to really discover themselves. while in the seminary, everything must not be subjected to a matter of horarium. if everything is about horarium the seminarians would always abide by it and participate in all the programs of the seminary even when they are not convinced or disposed towards 84 formation of the human person in the 21st century it. however, if some of the programs in the seminary are presented as private which by no means indicates optional, they are better able to make up their minds on what to attend and for how long. though this idea may seem to subject seminary formation to the whims and caprices of the seminarians, the intention behind it is to prevent the mechanical obedience to seminary programs. in this way seminarians would be better known and those having challenges can be better helped. the diocese of the seminarians has a role to play too in giving to them the experiential knowledge of jesus. seminarians go on pastoral work every year and they are sent to work in parishes. it must be ensured that they are well guided to carry out real pastoral works and not just some menial or domestic assignments in the parish or rectory. besides, since examples are better than precepts, priests must always show them good examples for them to emulate. it is often counterproductive when they hear one thing from priests and yet observe another. also, more often than not, people learn bad things faster than good ones. seminarians must see priests do the right things so that they can learn them and be able to put them into practice when they eventually become priests themselves. conclusion the encounter of jesus with his disciples, thomas and philip, as enunciated in this work has opened up the discussion on the meaning of experiential knowledge as distinct from mere theoretical knowledge. these disciples as well as others have been with jesus for a while and yet their knowledge of him has been somewhat shallow. they know him well in the flesh but their knowledge of him as a divine being is inadequate. they still had doubts regarding his divinity. that accounts for why these disciples questioned jesus the way they did. f. moloney’s words are apt here when he says “to know jesus is to know the father, and philip is exasperatingly ignorant in asking jesus to show the father (v.9). the problem lies in the disciples’ lack of faith.”16 it is the opinion of this piece that the same thing happens to seminarians who only have theoretical knowledge of jesus without advancing to the experiential knowledge. they know so much about jesus but jesus himself they do not know. this is a clarion call on all those responsible for the formation of future priests and the seminarians themselves to interiorize whatever theoretical knowledge they have about jesus so as to make jesus more real to the 21st century world. section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 85 endnote 1 the new international webster’s comprehensive dictionary of the english language. typhoon media corporation, 2010. p.447. 2 ibid 3 ibid 706 4 ibid 5 teresa okure, “john” in the international bible dictionary. bangalore: theological publications in india, 2004. p. 1562 6 pheme perkins, “the gospel according to john” in the new jerome biblical commentary. bangalore: theological publications in india, 1995. p. 974 7 james morwood, john taylor (eds), pocket oxford classical greek dictionary. new york: oxford university press, 2002. p. 70. 8 max zerwick, mary grosvenor, a grammatical analysis of the greek new testament. roma: editrice pontificio istituto biblico, 1996. p. 330 9 raymond e. brown, the gospel according to john x111-xx1. new york: doubleday, 1970. p. 632 10 francis moloney sacra pagina: the gospel of john. minnesota: the liturgical press, 1998. pp 395-396 11 raymond e. brown, the gospel according to john x111-xx1. new york: doubleday, 1970. pp. 621-622 12 ibid p. 631 13 ibid 633 14 the new international webster’s comprehensive dictionary of the english language. p. 447 15 ibid. p. 447 16 francis moloney, sacra pagina: the gospel of john. p. 396 abstract: stthe 21 century has been bombarded with different types of ideologies, from relativism to secularism and one of the most pressing of them today is the wave of feminism, although feminist ideology is not alien to humanity, or to the nigerian society particularly through neocolonialism and the advancement of social media, while africans are intertwined with their cultural practices and traditions, which assigns to every individual their roles in the society, feminism tends to reshape their pattern of thought and history specically in a male-dominated world, from politics to business and even religion. hence, plato postulates his idea of women from the background of an athenian civilization which relegates the signicance of women in the polis, as an athenian, he argues alongside the trend of the city, by showing the difference in the nature, role and prociency of women in the development of the society on the one hand, while on the other hand, he argues against the waves of trend on gender by endorsing a complementary society between men and women. therefore, this paper seeks to promote the role of women in the nigerian society, in the limelight of plato's advocacy for gender equality and women rights, it seeks to maintain that women have a role in the exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context gregory ebalu ogbenika, ph.d. department of philosophy, seminary of all saints, uhiele – ekpoma, edo state, nigeria. oshokwe67@gmail.com growth and development of the nation and these roles must be nurtured and not subjugated, and these tasks go hand in hand with their role in the formation of the family, aimed towards creating a peaceful family and an ordered society. keywords: plato, feminism, women, nigerian society, genital mutilation. introduction the ability of a nation to harness every facet of human resource at its disposal is an index to its growth and development, it is clear that women in most part of the world today enjoy the freedom and rights that many dreamed of particularly in the political representation and exercise of universal adult suffrage. this is because in the past, women were relegated to the background in political representation in the world, and the outcry of some feminists, has contributed to some of the preferential treatments women enjoy today. but, there are areas where we still experience women marginalization, particularly in africa where our culture is predicated on the premise of patriarchy and other patrilineal ideologies which has also become the bane for women's representation. this paper, therefore, seeks to examine plato's view of women and how women can be empowered in nigeria, it also condemns discriminatory practices on the female gender as experienced in some tribes in nigeria, which tend to hamper the physiological and social status of women and in the long run cripples development. it seeks to proffer a philosophy of complementarity in governance, economic and social sphere between both sexes, particularly in areas where women are neglected. it, however, warns against gender wars and struggles that seek superiority of one gender over another. the methodological framework of this paper begins by exposing plato's views on the origin of the sexes which gives a background of his appraisal for women as equal with men. it also questions and explicates plato as being a feminists due to his exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 121 contrasting views about them, after which the paper proceeds to aligns its view of women and its relevance to the nigerian society particularly in the areas where women are marginalized and treated inhumanely. the key point of this paper is the philosophy of complementarity, which emphasizes the harmonizing role between men and women in the development of the society. plato's origin of sexes the origin of mankind has created a perpetual divide among scholars and philosophers, while evolution ascribes the origin of man to apes, christianity on the other hand, attributes the origin of mankind, from the creative power of god, who made them male and female. meanwhile, plato in his account of the origin of humanity presents a mythic account, he opines that male and female were like hermaphrodites with both sexes before the gods (zeus) split each person in half way. there are two basic reasons why the gods cause this separation. the rst reason is to moderate or restraint the excess in these hermaphrodites (the rst humans) that sometimes run contrary to the will of the gods. the second, however, is to make these hermaphrodites procreate as male and female. this is clearly expressed in the symposium: ...they were dying out when in pity for them zeus devised a new plan: he turned their genitals around to the front, for this had not always been their position, and they sowed their seed no longer, as hitherto, like grasshoppers in the ground, but inside one another; and he effected this transposition, and caused male to generate in the female, in order that their mutual embraces might be procreative, in this case of man joining woman, and that thus the race be continued,...so ancient is the desire for one another that is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, trying to make one of two and healing the state of man. each of us, sliced in two like a at sh, is but half of a human form 122 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 1 one, two. and each is looking for his other half. plato, therefore, believes that male and females are from the same source. this, therefore, gives a background to plato's view of women and stretches to the point of the advocacy for equal treatment of both sexes against any form of discrimination and marginalization. the concept of feminism one of the most talked about issues in the world today is feminism which is rooted in the belief that women are subjugated, oppressed and marginalized in the society. george ukagba expresses that feminism is both a theoretical concept and a practical movement or 2 view of life, as a movement feminism has a history, which can be traced to france, while as a theoretical concept popular nigerian novelist and feminist, chimamanda ngozi adichie, sees feminism as 3 a belief in the social, political and economic equality of the sexes. in the same vein, the new international webster's comprehensive dictionary, denes feminism as a doctrine which supports and encourages the equality of gender (male and female) and advocates 4 equal social, political, religious and economical right of women. meanwhile, feminism on one hand aims specically at addressing issues of gender inequality. gender inequality centers on the idea that men and women are not equal. this distinction stems from socially constructed beliefs that permeate through cultural and religious lines. on the other hand, feminism champions gender equality of which dickson ekpe, refers to as a situation where women and men having equal conditions for realizing their full rights and potentials, are able to contribute equally to national, political, 1plato, symposium, in benjamin jowett (transl.) selected dialogues of plato. new york: modern library paperback publication, 2001, 191c.d. 2george ukagba, “feminism in historicism: a critical perspective”, in george ukagba et al. (eds.), the kpim of feminism: issues and women in a changing world. victoria: trafford publishing, 2010, 29. 3chimamanda ngozi adichie, we should all be feminists, new york: anchor books, 2012, 47. 4the new international webster's comprehensive dictionary of the english language, chicago: deluxe, encyclopedic edition, 1971, 456. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 123 economic, social and cultural development and benet equally from 5 the results. further, william lawhead, exposes two categories of feminism, namely the liberal feminists and radical feminists, the former do not advocate for the elimination of the current social structures, but aims at full intellectual and political participation of women in the society, while the latter seek an abolition of the current 6social structure which they perceive is controlled by men. however, the categorization of feminist does not only involves the female gender, rather male individuals have indicated to be feminist, because feminism as is an embracing concept of both sexes, aims at removing the excesses of one gender over another. is a plato feminist? plato creates a divide in his thought on women, which generates a dispute whether he is a feminist or not, taking into cognizance his dicey views about women, whereas, same cannot be said about aristotle, who considers women to be both biologically and intellectually inferior to men. for instance, in the republic, plato 7asserts “that a woman is inferior to a man.” he further stated that women can be involved in music, poetry, training and even war, but the lighter part must be assigned to them because of the weakness of 8their sex. also, plato agreed that a woman by nature is very different from a man, as a result he agreed that different work should be 9 assigned to a man and a woman each in accordance with its nature. plato's suggestion that a good and a brave man should have more marriages available to him and should be selected for such things more frequently than the others and that he will beget as many 5dickson ekpe, et al, “women, gender equality in nigeria: a critical analysis of socio-economic and political gender issues”, in journal of research in peace, gender and development (jrpgd), 2014, vol. 4 (1), 16. 6william f. lawhead, the voyage of discovery. belmont: wadsworth thomson learning, 2002, 564. 7plato, “the republic”, book v, b. jowett (trans.), in the dialogues of plato. vol. 1, new york: macmillan publication, 1937, 451e 8plato, “republic”, 452a 9plato, “republic”, 453b 124 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 10 children as possible, depicts his inconsistency in his view on women. another major reason why the above question is imminent is his seemingly contradictory view on the origin of women. according to him, all male-born humans who lived lives of cowardice and injustice were reborn in the second generation as women. and this explains why at that time the gods fashioned the desire for sexual union by constructing one ensouled 11living thing in us as well as another one in women. but in the symposium, plato claimed that the male and female are from the same origin and that they are equal half searching for the 12other. placing his earlier statement on the origin of women side-byside with the latter brings to bare the inconsistency in his view about women. for aristotle in his politics, “the relation of male to female 13is by nature a relation of superior to inferior and ruler to ruled”. in contrast to this aristotelian view, plato in the republic, book v, has strong feminist views about women as evident from his educational theory where he advocated equality between men and women suggesting that women should be educated for their roles in the 14 society. meanwhile, this marginalization of the female gender can be beautifully traced to the golden age of philosophy. the athenian society was premised on male superiority, of which plato made attempts to swim against the currents, as elon vanheerst notes, “torn by tradition that told him women were not people by the same 10plato, “republic”, 468c 11plato, “timaeus”, book v, b. jowett (trans.), in the dialogues of plato. vol. 1, new york: macmillan publication, 1937, 90e 12cf. plato, “symposium”, book v, b. jowett (trans.), in the dialogues of plato. vol. 1, new york: macmillan publication, 1937, 190-192 13aristotle, the politics. translated by c.d.c. reeve. indianapolis: hackett publishing, 1998, p. 1245,b12 14plato, “republic”, book v, b. jowett (trans.), in the dialogues of plato. vol. 1, new york: macmillan publication, 1937, 451e. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 125 standards as men, and logic and reason that told him otherwise, plato 15 spoke for those who, at the time, had a very quiet voice”. plato juxtaposes the masculine superiority, and creates an avenue for complementarity in the affairs of the states between the sexes. although, plato's position on women and his feminist philosophy is not very lucid, he argues as an athenian, inuenced by the activities of the polis and neglects the role of women in the open society, while also, as a philosopher, in tackling the issues prevalent in the city as regarding women and their representation gives them a bit of voice, he tends to argue in the position where other philosophers argued against, which gives him credit for his philosophical instinct. however, a clear understanding of plato's philosophy as evident in his republic book v, will be of great importance in ascertaining whether plato was a feminist or not. plato's inquiry of the nature of women is buttressed in his conversation with glaucon; the beginning of the conversation is on what women can do. in the republic, although, he is of the opinion that women are weaker physically, however, they should be given the same education as the men, since 16they are capable of doing the same thing as the men. � in response to the above question that women are generally weaker in comparison with men. plato responded to the view of glaucon about the inferiority of women when he opined: you are quite right, glaucon in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex: although many women are in many things superior to men, yet on the whole what you say is true. and if so, my friend, i said, there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue of his sex, but the gifts of nature are diffused in both; all the 15elon vanheerst (1999), 'feminism and plato', http://facstaff.elon.edu/ sullivan/femplato.htm accessed on march, 3rd, 2019 16plato, republic (book v), b. jowett (trans.), in the dialogues of plato. vol. 1, 451d&e 126 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 pursuits of male are the pursuits of women also, but in all 17 of them a woman is inferior to a man. this inferiority of female mentioned by plato above is only about their physical weakness. however, this does not mean that plato was not fully aware of the inequality that exists between men and women of his age. in fact, plato saw this inequality as a violation of nature when he asserts. the law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not impossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails present, is in reality a 18 violation of nature. he also opines that women can be involved in music, poetry, physical training and even war but the lighter part must be assigned to them because of the weakness of their sex. one aspect of his view on the physical training that looks awkward was his recommendation that women should be stripped before involvement. this further shows the inuence of his society on him although; he desires that both men and women should go through the same process of growth � therefore, alison mary jaggar, appraised the above position of plato by noting that even though plato seem sometimes inconsistencies in his representation of women; his views are ahead of his age. also, plato seems to be saying that the ultimate goal for any person is manliness, but it is possible for a soul in a female body to achieve it through a philosophy that is brought about by 19 education. also, looking at the appellation given to plato by most of the feminist in contrast to aristotle whom the writers view as an antifeminist and a critical examination of the ontological status of plato wanting to speak for women, one cannot just but conclude that plato 17ibid, 455d &e. 18ibid, 456c. 19alison m. jaggar, feminist politics and human nature, lanham: rowman & allanheld publishers, 1983, 5. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 127 does not just have feminist tendencies but above all, feminism is found in plato's philosophy. in a nutshell, what is signicant in plato as against other athenian thinkers is his advocacy for the equality of sexes in the affairs of the society, which is also encouraged in our world today. hence, in the next section, this paper shall examine its relevance to the nigerian society, and how women can help curb out backwardness in development if given the same opportunity and treated the same way as their male counterpart. plato's views and the nigerian society it is glaring that in nigeria today, women are treated as second class citizens, they do not equal their male counterparts in the area of social and economic activities and most of all in politics. these various areas of women under-representation are detrimental to the growth of the nation. meanwhile, what appears to be more striking are the barbaric and inhumane discrimination of women. olu awofeso, notes that many have unveiled the travail of the female gender humiliation, manipulation, and marginalization through a number of culturally biased norms and gender practices which have culminated into systematic institutionalization of male superiority over the 20female. consequently, this paper elaborates on the effect of plato's philosophy on women and how it can be benecial in promoting the dignity of the women in nigeria and placing them on the same pedestal with their male counterparts. women empowerment and education: women empowerment is one of the most talked about issues in our contemporary era, particularly in africa and nigeria alike. this stems from the important and signicant role empowered women have been able to contribute to the society. in nigeria for example, women such as ngozi okonjo-iweala, and her exploits as the rst female nance minister of nigeria and coordinating minister reafrms the abilities 20olu awofeso, et al, “gender and political participation in nigeria: a cultural perspective”, in journal research in peace, gender and development (jrpgd). vol 4, september, 2014, 105. 128 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 of women. iweala went on to become the managing director of the world bank (2007-2011) and she was also named an independent non-executive director at the standard chartered plc in the united kingdom. dora nkem akunyili, who redened the face of nafdac, (national agency for food and drugs admistration and control), prof grace alele willims mariam ciroma, obiageli ezekwesili, and et cetera, have shown that women can be at the fore front of all round nation building, transformation and growth. � many nigerians believe that educating the girl-child is a waste of resources, when they will be married and their expertise not put into use, or they will become over less concerned about marriage. adichie, wrote in we should all be feminists that: we say to girls, you can have ambition, but not too much. you should aim to be successful, but not too successful. otherwise, you would threaten the man. because i am female, i am expected to aspire to marriage. i am expected to make my life choices always keeping in mind that marriage is the most important. now marriage can be a source of joy and love and mutual support but why do we teach girls to aspire to marriage and we don't teach boys the same? we raise girls to see each other as competitors not for jobs or accomplishments, which i think can be a 21good thing, but for the attention of men. � one of the rights to life is the right to education, it is also one of the fundamental human rights of every individual, but experience has shown that some people have been infringed of this right, therefore, they lack not just educational qualication, but also the ability to compete with their peers in major facets of mankind. this subjugation is mostly, tended towards the female gender, which has given rise to the “education for the girl-child” advocacy. � meanwhile, the whole idea of women empowerment stems 21chimamanda ngozi adichie, we should all be feminists, 18. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 129 st from the education of the girl-child. it is appalling that in the 21 century, there are still arguments of the right of the girl-child to education, which was an argument prevalent in the greek city state, which plato advocates for in his educational theory. buttressing this further, anne dickson notes that plato showed the fact that both men and women have the same essential nature and worth; thus, they 22should receive equal education. education is paramount to development and growth of any sort, the educational theory of plato is very relevant to nigeria since it was emphasized by plato that all citizens, irrespective of their sexes, be educated. � while plato views that some women have the capacity to become philosophers, it is important to note that every individual including the woman has something to offer to the societal development if given good education and equal opportunities to display their potentials, as an anonymous author states “if you educate a man, you educate an individual. but if you educate a woman, you educate a nation,” this indicates therefore, that women have the potentialities to develop not just their family, but the entire community which can be best realized if empowered with the sufcient aid and most importantly the opportunity to sound education. political participation and representation in governance: nigerian political scene has not been gender neutral, and her politics is characterized by patriarchism which in the words of heywood 23 generally connotes the rule by men. therefore, olu awofeso, notes that although women were politically active and relatively less exclusive in decision making process in many pre-colonial societies, the advent of colonial administration with its anti-woman policies, gradually transformed a hitherto politically gender unbiased to a 22anne dickson, “anatomy and destiny: the role of biology in plato's views of women” as quoted in carol c. gould and marx w. wartofsky, eds., women and philosophy: toward a theory of liberation. new york: putnam's publication, 1980, 45-46. 23a. heywood, politics, new york: palgrave mcmillan, 2007, 98. 130 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 24 predominantly male dominated political scene. women today are almost withdrawn to the spectatorship roles in politicking, which includes wearing of party badges, caps, uniforms, or emblems, running errands for political leaders, voting at elections, et cetera. in all of these activities, women have been considerably subdued in nigeria's political affairs, therefore, several factors and strategies need to be in place to correct this anomaly. these includes funding women perception of politics in nigeria, political violence during election, lack of self-condence on the part of women, women's marginalization in party leadership, illiteracy and low educational status of women, as well as cultural and religious discrimination have been identied by scholars as inhibitory factors to women political 25 representation. as such women “have been castigated and calculatedly kept away from the course of civilization, even much 26farther from their roles in government”. also, while plato views that “women could be equally suited 27 to the position of guardian as their male counterparts.” . the nigerian constitution reveals some deciency in the electoral processes entrenched therein which are gender insensitive. hence, adichie succinctly expresses that in the world we live in today, as against the world in earliest times, the person more qualied to lead is not the person who is most physically strong. she notes also that the persons more qualied to lead should be the more intelligent, the more knowledgeable, the more creative, the more innovative, and 28there are no hormones for these attributes. therefore, the major strategies, that would be effective in ensuring that there is improved 24olu awofeso, et al, “gender and political participation in nigeria: a cultural perspective”, 105. 25a. a. terwase, (ed.), “women in politics and decision making in nigeria: challenges and prospects”, in european journal of business and social science. vol. 2, no. 8, november, 2013, 52. 26i. a. okpanachi, “a philosophical case for proportionate representation of women in governance in africa: the nigerian example” in enwisdomization journal. vol. 5, no. 3. 2013, 183-184. 27m. adair, “plato's view of the wandering uterus” in classical journal, 91.2, 1995, pp.153-164 28chimamanda ngozi adichie, we should all be feminists, 10. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 131 participation of women in politics and leadership positions in line with what plato advocates for is to review the nigeria constitution and revisit the electoral processes and the positions allotted to women and also removing the ills of violence that militate against women in politics. more so, in nigeria the overwhelming percentage of the upper hierarchical positioning in politics and the high rate of corruption is the virtual exclusion of women from key institutions of 29 government, coupled with the difculties in their abilities to get into power. hence, eguavoen, suggests that to achieve better representation of women in nigeria's politics. “nigeria should consider seriously the use of quota to help integrate the women into policy/decision making process of the country. this quota system 30will aim at giving more powers to women”, not just in politics but also in other areas of the nigerian society. the abolition of some gender-specic traditional practices aimed at women: there still exist some traditional views and customary practices, some of which are unwritten, that impedes the involvement of women in nigeria in the social sphere and are even an infringement to sttheir human dignity. thus, nigerians cannot be said to live in the 21 century and champion cultural ideas that are barbaric and inhumane, practices which are discriminatory and create marginalization, example of which is the obnoxious widowhood practices. emeka martins uchendu commenting on it states the following: there are places in the nigerian society that take delight in seeing women suffer. you can imagine that after the demise of a man, his wife is kicked out as a chicken and everything she ever worked with her husband is taken, 29i. a. okpanachi, “a philosophical case for proportionate representation of women in governance in africa: the nigerian example” 187-188. 30agatha eguavoen, tension and contentions in gender debates: natured or nurtured, ekpoma: ambrose alli university press, 2017, 48. 132 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 whether she had children or not is not the issue… widows are denied of the rights of the property of their husband when the man dies. some widows die in silence not knowing what to do or not having the wherewithal to go to court. in some areas women who lost their husband are 31 made to mourn for a long time. agatha eguavoen adds that “women are even forced to eat with the dead body of her spouse or drink the water used in washing the corpse 32just to prove her innocence, whereas, when a man loses his wife, he is not made to go through such suffering and in some cases, does not even mourn his wife for a reasonable period before contracting another marriage. thus the act of widowhood discrimination should be jettisoned in whatever manner, the government has a role to play in curbing it from the society, by enacting laws which will protect widows and charge the traditional rulers in safeguarding such laws, such local practices impede on the dignity of the human person and women in particular. � also, in the traditional african setting, men were made to marry so many wives and give birth to many children, indeed having a large family was seen as a blessing and it also had an agricultural advantage, whereby a large area of land can be cultivated within a short time, which will increase their agricultural output. while it was the husband's duty to provide what was needed in the family, it was the wife's (wives) duty to ensure the welfare of their children. but today, polygamy in some places in nigeria has taken another form, women now serve as baby machines, ensure the provision of social amenities in the family and provide for their children's needs. in some polygamous families, the women work tirelessly, while the man does nothing to support the family even when they are physically able to do different jobs, but rather rely on the output of his 31emeka martin uchedu, “societal discrimination against women in the south east zone in nigeria”, in george ukagba et al. (eds.), the kpim of feminism: issues and women in a changing world. victoria: trafford publishing, 2010, 150. 32agatha eguavoen, tension and contentions in gender debates: natured or nurtured. p.27 exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 133 wives, with the conception that they own their wives (wife) and command them at will. men who are involved in such act should be corrected by the society, it behooves on both the man and woman to take care of the family particularly in cases of polygamy. one other obnoxious practice is the issue of child marriage, which many writers have considered to be pseudo marriage or rape marriage. this is widely practiced in the northern part of nigeria. a child is any person under the age of 18 years of age, while child 33 marriage is dened as any marriage to an underage girl eguavoen went on to assert that section 29(4)(b) of the 1999 nigeria constitution which deems a married underage girl as an adult has not been abrogated, the consequence is that a man can marry an underage and seek refuge in that section of the law, opining that the girl is an 34 adult. child marriage is not different from raping a child, it has increased the rate of vesicovaginal fistula (vvf) in nigeria, with most percentage in the north and also increase maternal mortality rate (mmr) because the physiological and phsycological make up of a child is not compatible to the hormonal changes which occurs in the body. the government need to repeal section 29(4)(b) of the constitution and punish those who practice such act. this also leads to the end of the education of such a child in most cases, while the decision to enter into marriage is not by consent, but by force or in some cases as gift, reward or even as means of debt servicing. curbing violence against women: violence is an ambiguous concept, according to hannah skoda, “violence encompasses an enormous range of phenomena, from subtle structural exclusion or moulding of particular groups, to verbal manipulation, to physical damage done by one human being to 35another” it means the behavior involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something. the cambridge 33ibid, 70. 34ibid. 35h. skoda, medieval violence: physical brutality in northern france 1270–1330.united kingdom: oxford university press, 2013, 2. 134 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 dictionary of philosophy, distinguishes two forms of violence: physical and psychological violence. physical violence is the use of force to cause harm or destruction. psychological violence is the causing of severe mental or emotional harm, as through humiliation 36 or deprivation whether using force or not. violence against women is an issue that is prevalent in the nigerian society, while violence is condemned on one hand as inhumane it is also carried out simultaneously on the other hand. men violence against woman is so common in nigeria thus, eguavoen explicates four ways in which violence against women takes place, which are physical, physiological, economic and social violence. firstly, physical violence involves a physical harm on a woman such as wife battering, sexual abuse of any form, female genital mutilation 37rites and widowhood obnoxious practices. secondly, psychological violence, which affect the psyche of the woman as a result of dehumanizing act such as wife inheritance, preference of the male 38 over female children, intimidation and trafcking of women. thirdly, economic violence which occurs when a woman has no means of livelihood and as such she is treated by her husband as a slave or deprived of funds particularly when she has no male (or any) 39child. lastly, social and sexual violence, which deprives women from reproductive right as men dictates the family size and makes 40 decision. thus, these violent conducts against women should be stopped, it is not just dehumanizing but has also led to the death of many women. female genital mutilation (fgm) is one of the most unreported crimes against women in nigeria. the world health organization denes fgm as any female procedure involving partial or total removal of female genitalia or other injury to the female 36r. l holmes, “violence”, in robert audi (ed.), the cambridge dictionary of philosophy, cambridge: cambridge university press, 1995, 829. 37agatha eguavoen, tension and contentions in gender debates: natured or nurtured. 27. 38ibid, 28. 39ibid, 28-29. 40ibid, 29. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 135 genital organs for cultural, religious or other non-therapeutic reason (2008). genital cutting according to patrick iroegbu, arise from social, religious and bodily point of view to preserve virginity, enhance femininity, mark ethic boundaries, and limit women 41 excessive drive. it is regarded as a vehicle for gender indoctrination. while fgm is believed to curb promiscuity among females by reducing their desire for sex, nothing of such is done to reduce male sexual pleasure, therefore, this practice should be completely eradicated, for the female reproductive physiology is not appropriate for circumcision, hence, it is a mutilation and not circumcision as 42compared to the male organ. the person involved is also prone to contracting blood transmitted diseases. in all, fgm should be abrogated and jettisoned because it is a crime against women and it disgures their bodily composition. evaluation to understand plato's argument on the complementary roles between male and female in the society, one needs to have a background of his origin of sexes, on which he argues that both spring from a divided unit and thus are equal, not minding their strength or biological make up. plato further advocates for equality in education between both sexes and women as guardian in the society. the anti-feminist aspect of plato's view on women is his argument that the brave man is to have more wives than others. this is because, plato was inuenced by the trend in his society, this anti-feminist view of plato is today conceived as archaic in our society, although it is practiced in some cultures in nigeria, but it is dehumanizing to present a human person as a gift, because it reduces the dignity of the person. meanwhile, plato's advocacy for equality of sexes is laudable particularly in 41patrick iroegbu, “genital culture and circumcision law: issue of representation in global centres”, in george ukagba et al. (eds.), the kpim of feminism: issues and women in a changing world, victoria: trafford publishing, 2010, 547. 42agatha eguavoen, tension and contentions in gender debates: natured or nurtured. 77. 136 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 nigeria social-political and economic situation, but their functions in the state and the society should be complementary and not competitive. this understanding that we are made to complement each other would quell to a large extent the unnecessary, gender wars that plagues society and seeks superiority. there are areas were women are better in than the men. there are also areas were men ourish more than women, for instance the area of military might where physical strength is needed. harnessing these differences for the good of all, will be of invaluable help to national growth. the saying therefore, that the best man for the job is a woman, will therefore assume a healthy meaning when viewed through the lenses of complementarity and unity. similarly, arthurs conari dayler summarized this when he opines: nature made women and men very different from each other in the way they think, act, and reason. these differences were designed to be complementary and not devise... i have seen too much not to know that the impression of a woman can be more valuable than the 43 conclusion of an analytical reasoning moreso, in as much as this paper advocates for the equality of both sexes, and the education of women as parallel to that of men, it does not champion the neglect of their specic duties, particularly in the area of the family. robert sarah expresses that many women now have access to education… it is important that women should be able 44to have a job that is compatible with motherhood. while the duties of tending their children, performing household chores and their roles as mothers in the family are been conceived by the radical feminist as oppression of women, elvis imadon, argues against that, he views that the african women in the real sense do not see these functions as oppression, rather they see it as their role in the family, which 43m. munroe, understanding the purpose and power of women. usa: library of congress cataloging-in-publication, 2001, 143. 44robert sarah, god or nothing: a conversation with nicolas diat, san francsico: ignatius press, 2015, 115. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 137 complements the role of others in the society. he argues also that it is the westerners that conceive it as oppression all with the aim of removing the institution of marriage and family in the society. hence, the african woman should not jettison the beauty of complementarity in the family in performing their duties alongside that of their husbands, as this aspect of family role is also evident in plato, who does not see the bearing of children as a problem in the 45 education of women, nor is it a prevention to their role as guardian. meanwhile, obioma dies, also argues against radical feminism, he expresses that it tends to create an articial things or situation that makes women act un-natural in order to t well into their own society, they need no sort of liberation, what they need is a sort of recognition of what they can offer to the family, society and 46nation. for him, women should not abandon their natural 47motherhood, while giving their best to development. it is pertinent to restate that the obnoxious cultural practice that are detrimental to women should be abolished and laws should not just be created but enforced and whosoever is found wanting should face the consequences. conclusion issues of gender inequality or equality will continue to be a debate if both sexes do not recognize that they are from the same source as explicated by plato and shown in this paper. more so, the origin of humanity as plato conceives gives a background towards the need for both sexes to complement each other. this advocacy for complementation is more pressing in our world today. this paper also advocates for the elimination of barbaric and inhumane practices imposed on women in the nigerian society which are detrimental to the dignity of the human person, it also promotes the call for the eradication of such acts and that women be empowered politically, 45plato, republic (book v), b. jowett (trans.), in the dialogues of plato. vol. 1, 451d &e. 46dies obi, “the role of african women in nation building”, in george ukagba et al. (eds.), the kpim of feminism: issues and women in a changing world. victoria: trafford publishing, 2010, 173. 47ibid. 138 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 socially and economically, while at the center of this empowerment is the education of the girl-child which has the potency to curb the ills associated with women in the society. this paper subscribes to moderate feminism that creates a harmonious balance between liberal feminism and radical feminism. moderate feminism favours complementarity and the elimination of many of the obnoxious and anachronistic practices that tend to dehumanize the status of women in the nigerian society. one pertinent problem faced in the society today is the incessant call by the radical feminists to create a new order in gender, which has led to some abhorrent act in the society. in as much as this paper champions the abolition of inhumane conditions on the female gender by their male counterpart, it is also important to express that this paper condemns the self-inicted violence some females inict on themselves. many young girls now conceive a negative conception of the ownership of their body, it has now become as means for pleasure and livelihood, they feel that they can do whatever they want with their bodies and this has given rise to prostitution, high rate of contraceptives and abortion. they use popular phrases such as “your money, my body” “small girl, with a big god” etc., which promotes immorality and it is due to the unfavourable call for the emancipation of women backed by the negative conception of what feminism stand for, this emancipation should rather strive towards complementarity. in conclusion, this paper proposes a philosophy of complementarity where the women in society complement the men by providing their own quota of intelligence, organizational skills and competence in social, economic, moral, governance and leadership sphere. the areas where women have fared and has done well must be highlighted and more women should be drafted into those positions. this philosophy of complementarity seeks to reasserts that a man is not better than a woman and a woman is not better than the man, but rather they complement each other as a result of the differences in their individual, logical, physiological and psychological structure tailored and made so that the one realizes that there is need for the other. exploring plato's idea of women in the nigerian context | 139 abstract as philosophy of economics investigates the foundational concepts and methods of economics: the rational choice, the appraisal of economic outcomes, institutions and processes, and the ontology of economic phenomena and the possibilities of acquiring knowledge of them, this research raises the question of why is there continuing economic underdevelopment in africa? how to explain africa, the world's second-largest continent, with 1.4 billion people in 54 countries and with plenty of human and natural resources, but still lacking in development over 60 years after its independence? by phenomenological and structural methods, the author critically evaluates the economic theories, particularly on the views of african scholars after independence, that have been proposed for this continuing problem that affects the human condition of so many people. this study nds that among post-colonial african scholars, the path to african development has been debated between the internalist and externalist schools of development. while the internalist tends to blame inside forces (local corruption, tyranny, bad governance), and with the view that africa alone has the responsibility of bailing itself out of its present state of underdevelopment. the externalist school contends that africa alone cannot attain any level an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment evarestus igwe-alufo, ph.d. st albert the great major seminary, idowu-offonran abeokuta, ogun state, nigeria. eigwedumogu@gmail.com of development because of historical constraints, such as the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism, and the power structure of the modern world. the integrationist school, which nds the polarizing african development experts ridiculous, as they blame both internal and external forces for the causes of africa's underdevelopment, holds that africa's underdevelopment is solved by the integration of forces both from within and outside africa. however, and philosophically speaking, the author nds that africa's development is possible only with an appreciation of what is original and authentically african, which is dependent on the culture and consciousness of african people. keywords: africa's underdevelopment, internalists, externalists, integrationists, culture and consciousness. � introduction as philosophy of economics investigates the foundational concepts and methods of economics, and philosophers of history, not only ponder on the past and the future of western civilization, they also reect seriously upon the experiences of other societies in hopes of 1 understanding the larger dynamics of world history; the question of why is there continuing economic underdevelopment in africa comes to mind. how do we explain the fact that africa, the world's secondlargest continent, with 1.4 billion people in 54 countries and with plenty of human and natural resources, is still lacking development over 60 years after its independence? by lack of development, i mean a nation's inability to provide its citizens with food, clothing, shelter, education, decent health care, good road, and employment, while 2 also attending to environmental sustainability. 1jerry h. bentley, shapes of world history in twentieth century scholarship, washington dc: american historical association, 2003, 3. 2jeffrey sachs, the end of poverty: economic possibilities of our time, london: penguin books, 2005, 23. 60 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 the more puzzling issue is that despite over 60 years of independence and after receiving 600 billion us dollars of external 3aid, africa continues to be underdeveloped. the consensus is that the 4money has had a little long effect. it is more disturbing to see that the region's extreme poverty has increased during the reign of “globalization” in the 1990s when the modern world experienced great economic growth. moreover, as of january 2020, 91% of african countries had a gdp (gross domestic product) of less than the net-worth of the world's richest personjeff bezos (an american internet and aerospace entrepreneur, media proprietor, and investor). only south africa, nigeria, egypt, angola, sudan, and algeria have a gdp of 5 above us$115 billion. why such continuing underdevelopment after a lot might have been put in place? could poverty and underdevelopment be the destiny or lot of a people? what is the cause of persistent poverty in african land? could this persistent underdevelopment and poverty be socially constructed or the design of the maker of the world? where is this curse of underdevelopment and poverty upon africa coming from? however, to philosophically enquire into this existential issue, a multi-dimensional approach has to be employed. such as a phenomenological, structural, and historical method may enable us do the evaluation analysis. first, we will briey glance over the western theories proposed to explain the lack of development in africa. secondly, we will critique the views of african experts on the issue. lastly, we will propose that sustainable development in africa 3cornelius p. cacho, "confronting the main causes of african underdevelopment" in foreign policy association (resource library, 2008). adam lerrick, "aid to africa at risk: covering up corruption" in international economics report, december 2005. http://www.house.gov/jec/publications/109/12-09-05galliotcorruption.pdf. 4james a. robinson and daron acemoglu, "why foreign aid failsand how to really help africa" in the spectator, 2017. retrieved jan 30, 2020, from https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/04/9824422. 5shephard dube, "jeff bezos richer than 130 countries" in shepharddube.com, retrieved jan 30, 2020. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 61 must be based on the culture and consciousness of the african people. highlighting theories of underdevelopment in africa going through the available data, we can see that questions continue to arise as to why the situation of africa's development continues to deteriorate? attempting a solution, three main western theories tend to explain why the continent is still lacking in development half a century after its independence. they are modernization theory, dependency theory, and world system theory. during the 1950s, some western economists tied the idea of development to the idea of modernization. in searching for a model of development for third world nations, including africa, modernization analysts studied the political, social, economic, and cultural history of western nations to identify policies that led to their material prosperity. among some prominent economic modernization analysts include walter whitman rostow (19162003), w. arthur lewis (1915-1990), and cyril e. black (19161989). "they assumed that underdeveloped africa could adopt 6similar policies and follow the same path to prosperity." � walt w. rostow, an american economic historian, for instance, described the development of the first world as the result of ve sequential stages: traditional society, preconditions of development, industrial take-off, full industrialization, and, nally, high mass consumption. rostow states the possibility of identifying all societies in their economic dimension as lying within one of the ve stages and suggests that underdeveloped countries pass through 7 the same stages of development. however, in the late 1960s, against rostow and modernization theorists, dependency theory holds that it is not internal factors that impede the development of the third world, including africa, but rather their relations of dependence on western powers. dependency theorists, such as raul prebisch (19011986), 6jerry h. bentley, shapes of world history in twentieth-century scholarship, washington dc; american historical association, 2003, 8. 7. walt w. rostow, the stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto new york: cambridge university press, 1960, 1-105. 62 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 andre gunder frank (1929 2005) and theotonio dos santos (b. 1937), viewed africa as a continent which has become underdeveloped because it was an integral part of the modernization process of the western industrial nations, but in a subordinate and exploited position. andre gunder frank has strongly attacked the stages of economic growth by arguing that rostow ignored the exploitation of the third world by the capitalist economy of the united states, which presents free-market policy as a panacea for the development of backward economies. but the policy was only a ploy to perpetuate 8american hegemony. frank contends that it is not internal factors that impede the development of africa, as posited by rostow, but 9 rather their relations of dependence on western powers. yet, during the 1970s, one of the popular founders of the world systems theory, immanuel maurice wallerstein believed, like dependency theorists, that world economies are integrated into one market system, the capitalist system, in which the surplus is transferred from the periphery to the core. wallerstein (b. 1930), an american sociologist and an expert on post-colonial african affairs, analysed that the core states are administratively well organized and militarily powerful. wallerstein observed a third economic zone (semi-periphery) to the core and the periphery of dependency theory, and this addition accounts for the experiences of countries that moved up or down in the economy of the world-system. he argues that africa's lack of development is a result of the continent's peripheral position in the international division of labour mediated through trade exchanges 10 without a unied political structure. he advocates for a truly 8 andre gunder frank, “sociology of development and underdevelopment of sociology,” catalyst 3, in (new york: monthly review, summer 1967); also in, mcx.sagapub.com/cgi/content/refs/4/3/341 9 a. g. frank, “dependency theory” in capitalism and understanding in latin american: historical studies of chile and brazil new york: monthly review, 1969. 10 immanuel wallerstein, “the rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts of comparative analysis,” comparative studies in society and history (1974), vol. 16, 390. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 63 democratic world in which all peripheral countries would unite against the system of world exploitation. summarily, no matter the differences, western theories of underdevelopment in africa are formulated in universalistic terms, implying that only by following their theories could resolve the situation of underdevelopment in africa. but, among other criticisms, a cultural anthropologist, franz boas (1858-1942) believes that local conditions force adaptations to the local environment, and, therefore, what is adaptive for one region might not be appropriate for another. the dependency-world system theorists have also been accused of some bias towards the west. so, neither western ethnocentrism nor bias toward the western capitalist economy fosters development in africa. more so, some critics have held that dependency and world system analysts have focused on the interests and activities of western capitalists, overlooking the roles played by peoples in the peripheral countries as active participants in the 11development of their world. thus, the issue of overlooking roles played by peoples in the peripheral countries has called to examine the opinions of african scholars on the continuing underdevelopment in africa, following frank boas' important admonition that local conditions force adaptations to the local environment. afrocentric theories of economic underdevelopment in africa: a critique the causes of underdevelopment in africa have always evoked a heated debate among post-colonial african elite. since the 1970s, three major schools of thought have emerged among post-colonial african development experts: the internalist school, the externalist 12school, and the integrationist school. the three schools of thought 11 bentley, shapes of world history in twentieth century scholarship, 13. 12 y fredua-kwarteng, “etiology of ghana underdevelopment,” in modern ghana news (thursday, august 4, 2005); h t tp : / /www.modernghana.com/pr in t /117675/1/e t io logy-of-ghanaunderdevelopment.html retrieved july 3, 2009. 64 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 tend to reect the “functional, conict, and interactionist theories of 13 inequality in sociology.” examination of these schools points to the thinking of african experts on a continuing lack of development in their continent. (a) the internalist school drawing from rostow's modernization theory and functional sociology of emile durkheim (1858-1917), the internalist school believes that the causes of africa's lack of development lie mostly within africa. especially the issues of local corruption, tyranny, and bad governance from the 'internal factor' which is the brain behind the continent's continuing underdevelopment. they hold that africa has the sole responsibility to bail itself from underdevelopment; especially as africa should have recovered from the scourge of 14 colonialism after more than half a century of independence. internalist scholars include george ayittey, moeletsi mbeki, thabo mbeki, and chinua achebe, to mention but a few. george ayittey (b. 1947), a prominent ghanaian economist, president of the free africa foundation, washington dc, and founder of internalist school, holds that africa has to seek internal 15solutions to its economic problems. in his africa unchained (2006), ayittey argues that africa is poor because it is not free and that the actual cause of african poverty is less of colonial oppression and 16 mismanagement than an oppressive native autocrat. he listed the ills of local autocrats including bad leadership, ineffective governance, rampant corruption, capital ight, military vandalism, political repression, economic mismanagement, and 17 destructive civil wars. to be replaced with a democratic government, a modernized infrastructure, debt reexamination, free13 vincent n. parrillo, understanding race and ethnic relations, second edition, boston: pearson education, 2005, 8-10. 14 tongkeh fowale, “the distant dream of african development”, 2009. 15 george ayittey, africa unchained: the blueprint for africa's future, hampshire: palgrave macmillan, 2006, 1-10. 16 ayittey, africa unchained, 2006, 1-10. 17 y fredua-kwarteng, “etiology of ghana underdevelopment”, 2005. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 65 market economies, and free trade as preconditions of development in 18 africa. ayittey narrated how the internalist scholarship evolved slowly in the 1970s; how infectious the euphoria was that gripped the continent during independence in the 1960s; how african nationalists were worshipped as gods and heroes, and how it was sacrilegious to criticize them. it did not take long before the heroes and governments began to outlaw opposition parties and declared themselves 19 presidents for life. there was no tolerance for dissent, no democratic freedom, but creeping despotism that sowed the seeds of internal revolt. the leaders put their own benets before people's needs, and they blamed the continent's problems on external factors alone, instead of looking 20at themselves as major contributors to the continent's woes. ayittey continued that not long after independence, namely in the 1960s, it became increasingly clear that africa had traded “white colonialists” for “black neo-colonialists,” and that the oppression and exploitation 21of the african people continued unabated. ayittey's analysis was corroborated by the former u.s. president barrack obama, when he visited ghana in july 2009. in his speech in accra, president obama urged african leaders to end tyranny, corruption, and get rid of violence to move the continent forward. that africa does not need strong men, but strong institutions; that no country can create wealth if its leaders are exploitative; no investment business can ourish where the government skims 20% off the top, and no one wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of bribery, 18 ayittey, africa unchained, 2006. 19ko akosah-sarpong, “special interview emerging african development thinking, ii”, in modern ghana news (october 7, 2008). 20. ko akosah-sarpong, “ghana's externalists and internalists (part 2)”, in patriotic vanguard (sierra leone: march 23, 2010); http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/article.php3?id_article=104 21. akosah-sarpong, “special interview with george ayittey: emerging african development thinking (2), in modern ghana news (september 30, 2009). http://www.modernghana.com/news/241260/1/special-interview-emergingafrica-development-thi.html 66 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 22 corruption, violence, and brutality. obama categorically concluded that africa's future lies with them, and their development depends on 23 good governance and strong institutions. in 2004, moeletsi mbeki (b. 1947), blames african underdevelopment on its political elite. moeletsi, a political economist argues that all modern political thoughts, from marx and lenin on the left to hayek and friedman on the right, are in agreement that the private sector is key to modern economic 24 development. moeletsi explains that africa arguably has one of the largest private sectors in the world because most africans live and work within private sectors as peasants and or in subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinational corporations. however, neither private nor the public has complete freedom to operate within the market in africa, hence the latter is controlled by the state. since private sectors in africa lacks political power, they are not free to operate in such a way as to maximize their objectives and to control their savings. the political elite prey on the 25peasants' vulnerability just as karl marx once observed. moeletsi concludes that african development needs a new type of democracy, that will empower the political elite as well as the private sector producers. also that africa should learn from china's agricultural reforms, which are today the core of its great economic 26 growth. � thabo mbeki (b. 1942), the former president of south africa (1999-2008) and the elder brother of moeletsi mbeki, belongs to internalist school when he popularized the african renaissance in 1998, with the slogan that “africa is for africans, africa's problems 22cf. barrack obama, "end tyranny and corruption for development" in hufngton post (september 5, 2009). 23. cf. barrack obama, “end tyranny and corruption for development” in hufngton post (sept. 5, 2009). 24. moeletsi mbeki, “south africa: the private sector, political elite and underdevelopment in sub-saharan africa” in allafrica.com (august 2, 2004). 25 karl marx, “the eighteen brumaire of louis bonaparte” in karl marx and fredrick engels: selected works london: 1970, vol. 1, pp.170-171. 26 moeletsi mbeki, “south africa: the private sector…” 2004. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 67 27 require african solutions.” mbeki's african renaissance is based on the concept that african people and nations must by themselves overcome the recurrent political, socio, and economic challenges facing the continent and achieve cultural, scientic, and economic 28 renewal. in 1997, thabo listed the elements that constitute the african renaissance, including social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding and growth, and the establishment of africa as a major contributor to world affairs. thabo's african renaissance encouraged education and attempted to reverse the issue of the “brain-drain syndrome” of many african intellectuals toward europe and america. but urged the africans and their intellectuals to be 29 proud of their heritage and to enhance it. chinua achebe (1930-2013), a prominent nigerian professor, novelist and social critic believed the internalist factor. in his archetypal novel things fall apart (1958), achebe admitted that the arrival of british colonialism deteriorated the traditional igbonigerian society, but the destruction of igbo society was the result of 30weaknesses within the native structure. achebe favoured the igbo-african culture of pre-western society, with its religion, government, a system of money, an artistic tradition, and its judicial system. he argued that prior to british colonization, the igbo people lived in a patriarchal collective political system which was democratic. they did not rule by monarchy nor single individual, as decisions were made by a council of male elders. religious leaders were also invited to settle cultural issues. achebe contradicted the biases of many british colonial writers who depicted 27 thabo mbeki, “the african renaissance statement”, from the ofce of the executive deputy president (august 5, 1998) http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/tm0813.htm 28 ibid., “statement on behalf of the african national congress, on the occasion of the adoption of the constitutional assembly of 'the republic of south africa constitutional bill 1996”, in ofce of the president (august 5, 1996) http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1996/sp960508html 29 w.a.j. okumu, the african renaissance, 2002, 12. 30chinua achebe, things fall apart, new york: first anchor books, 1994, 176206. 68 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 31 africans as ignorant and uncivilized. nevertheless, achebe's things fall apart faulted the native structure for the collapse of umuoa village. he placed no blame on the igbos for being subjected to colonialism but often criticized their 32 traditional customs, especially those customs that appeared “static.” achebe clearly endorsed the internalist position in his book the trouble with nigeria (1983), where he articulated the nigerian problem as unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to their responsibilities and challenges of providing a personal example, 33which, according to him, are the hallmarks of true leadership. � (b) the externalist school unlike the internalists, and perhaps more explicitly than the dependency and world system theorists, the externalists blame 34 “outside forces” for africa's continued lack of development. africa alone cannot attain any level of development because of historical constraints and the power structure of the modern world. the externalist scholars include macleans a. geo-jaja, moshood k.o. abiola, walter rodney, and cornelius p. cacho, to mention but a few. they hold that western colonialism and imperialism, the transatlantic slave trade, the unfair international trade system and practices, and the policies of the world bank and international monetary fund (imf), are the independent or remote causes of african underdevelopment. they chastise rampant corruption, ineffective governance, military vandalism, political oppression, civil war and violence, and 35 economic mismanagement as proximate causes of underdevelopment in africa. however, they believe that any credible healing must start from the root-sources. 31chinua achebe, things fall apart, ny: emc corporation, 2003, 177-207. 32jeffrey w. hunter, “things fall apart, chinua achebe: introduction.”(gale cengage, 2002) vol. 152. 33chinua achebe, the trouble with nigeria, uk: heinemann, 1984, 1 34tongkeh fowale, “the distant dream of african development”, 2009. 35 y fredua-kwarteng, “etiology of ghana underdevelopment” 2009. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 69 the externalists highly concur with dependency theorists in considering the global, political, and economic order in a coreperiphery context and in the relationship between the rich north and the poor south. moreover, they agree with the marxist exploitation thesis which claims that european industrialization was built on the 36 imperialist exploitation of africa. for instance, macleans a. geo-jaja (b. 1930), a prominent nigerian development economist and educationist, has asserted that african development has been deliberately held ransom by and to the advantage of some of the advanced nations. to prove his point, geojaja pointed out that nowhere in africa is there an indigenous education system designed to meet african needs because of the 37 conspiracy interests of some advanced nations. geo-jaja, who is also a former professor of economics in the university of utah, salt lake city, and, the chair of the national think-tank on the review of the nigerian constitution, has traced africa's lack of development to both the african slave dealers and the western industrialists. he thought that the scramble for raw materials and markets culminated in wars among european powers, which 38 enabled africans to play them off against each other. like walter rodney (1942-1980), a prominent guyanese political historian, who in his book: how europe underdeveloped africa (1972), supported the view that africa was deliberately exploited and underdeveloped by the european colonial regime. geo-jaja argued that africa's greatest nightmare came in 1884-1885, when the colonial powers of england, france, germany, italy, spain, portugal, and belgium met in berlin and divided up the african continent. there was no consideration for pre-existing governmental structures, institutions, and tribal relations, but only for raw materials, surplus labour, and export opportunities. 36 tongkeh fowale, 2009. 37 macleans a. geo-jaja, “underdevelopment and education in africa” in africa economic analysis (april 11, 2008); http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/15/1/underdevelopment-andeducation-i 38 geo-jaja, “underdevelopment and education in africa”, 2008 70 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 geo-jaja revealed that one important weapon that destroyed africa during the colonial imperialism was “imported education systems”, which were designed to exalt the image of european societies to the detriment of africa. colonial powers trained africans into a cadre of low-level clerks and administrators, and they shielded them from any intellectual or skill development as the africans were 39 used as wage slaves in the farms and mines. prof. geo-jaja argued that there could be no true economic development in africa without the education of africans, by africans and for african purposes. there could be no democracy and peace without a population prepared to be self-governing committed to africanization, leaving behind the divide and conquer hatreds of 40 colonialism which are the source of so much current internal strife. geo-jaja concluded that beyond the inuence of family and religion, education is the key to stopping the continuing underdevelopment of africa and to prevent episodes of horrible ethnic violence, like the genocide in rwanda. after all these analyses of the causes of african underdevelopment, it is not difcult to see why alhaji moshood k.o. abiola (1937-1998) had to call for “reparations” for africa and its people. m.k.o. abiola was a popular yoruba nigerian businessman, publisher, and politician, who sponsored the campaign to win reparations for slavery and colonialism in africa and in the diasporas. “chief abiola personally rallied every african head of state and every head of state in the black diasporas to ensure that africans 41 would speak with one voice on reparations.” inspired by panafricanism, abiola in 1990 confronted the issue of african development by embracing the concept of reparation. “the basic idea of reparation is that africa does not owe the world, but above and beyond the cancellation of the debt issue, the world that has exploited 39ibid, 2008. 40ibid. 41moshood abiola, “on his philanthropyreparation” in http://eliesmith.blogspot.com/2008/senator-as-yarima-reparation-for-africa.html retrieved march 23, 2010 an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 71 africa for so long, owes africa the basic capital for development. such capital will enable africa to build roads, railways, hospitals, schools and the necessary communication infrastructure to support 42development.” in 1990, abiola got his concord press to organize an international conference on reparation in lagos, and persuaded the then president ibrahim babangida (ibb) of nigeria to endorse it at the organization of african unity (oau) in abuja in 1991. in 1992, the oau summit in dakar (senegal), created a “group of eminent persons” (gep) to pursue the issue of reparation through the united nations' (un) agenda. included in the campaign for reparation were 43 the blacks in the diasporas. abiola's reparation campaign helped african americans in the united states to demand reparations from corporations from their unjust enrichment through the immoral and inhuman institution of 44 slavery. the reparation drive is born out of a conviction that africa's lack of development is attributed to western colonization, unfair international trade systems and practices, and the adverse policies of the world bank and imf that multiplied debts in africa 45 and made cancellation of those debts difcult. (c) the integrationists' perspective there is also the integrationist school. this third group nds the polarizing african development experts ridiculous, as it blames both internal and external forces for the causes of africa's underdevelopment. the integrationist searches both within and outside africa for solutions to the continent's backwardness. this is because it realizes from both history and contemporary global events 42o. k. amuni, “arab enslavement of africans: the reparation caravan must reach arabia and middle east” (lagos: dept. of foreign languages, lagos state university, 2003), 45. 43.ibid. 44.ibid, 47 45. hakeem harunah, “criticisms of reparation” in amuni's arab enslavement of africans, 2003. 72 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 46 that enemies of african development abound everywhere. the integrationist scholars include y. fredua-kwarteng, wangari maathai, dambisa moyo, and chinweizu ibekwe, to mention but a few. the analysis of this school evokes ideas of panafricanism, traceable to symbolic interactionism of george hubert mead (1863-1931) and herbert blumer (1900-1987). symbolic interactionism examines the micro-social world of personal interaction patterns in everyday life and studies the shared symbols and denitions people use when communicating with one another. such that it shows how individuals create and interpret the 47life situation they experience. symbolic interactionism is very useful in understanding the integrationist theory because it assumes that african people are responsive and creative in the construction of their world and development, rather than being passive, as might have been suggested by the internalist and externalist schools of african development. � y. fredua-kwarteng is a prominent ghanaian scholar of the university of toronto who coined the term “integrationist school.” he stressed that in the realm of development, like any other domain in the social world, things are so interconnected that it is misleading to 48 separate variables neatly into external and internal causalities. kwarteng cautioned that “in solving underdevelopment problems, scholars need to understand that human beings are multifaceted being: they are cognitive, emotional, religious, social and 49behavioural.” therefore, a nonpositivist approach is needed. he argues that enemies of african development abound everywhere, both internally and externally. he cites african corrupt leadership for an illustration. he believes that the sources of african corrupt leadership include the institutions where the leaders received their education and training, the personal philosophy of the leaders, and the inuence of people around these leaders. kwarteng wonders how people could critically say that corruption and political 46y. fredua-kwarteng, “etiology of ghana underdevelopment” 2005. 47vincent parrillo, understanding race and ethnic relations, 2005. 48y. fredua-kwarteng, “etiology of ghana underdevelopment” 2005. 49ibid. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 73 oppression in ghana, for instance, have no colonial connections. � kwarteng believes that african development can be sought through ne arts, religion, philosophy, morality, and herbal medicine. he does not accept that african ethics and morality can be validated by the application of capitalist economic principles; but that african ethics and morality have their own internal logic, and that their 50 justication lies in an african worldview. � against the internalists, kwarteng criticized the idea of “import and implant foreign models” in africa to attempt to solve african problems. but rather than foreign models should be viewed with suspicion and skepticism rather than with the “europhilia 51 syndrome” found in africa today. � chinweizu ibekwe (b. 1943), a nigerian economic historian and cultural critic, observes that the pervasive mentality in twentiethcentury africa is one of europhilia an uncritical acceptance and high valuation of every bit of thing from the west. he calls for africa's 52decolonization and renaissance. chinweizu, the popular author of the west and the rest of us, is a contemporary afrocentric leader and a beacon of africanism. pan-africanism is a socio-political worldview, philosophy, and movement that seeks to unify native africans and those of african 53 heritage into a global african community. against europhilia, chinweizu attempts to reexamine african life and history from an african perspective and advocates a return to traditional african concepts about culture, society, and values. � he criticized the interpretation of african literature as a twentieth-century appendage to european literature, an 50ibid. 51ibid. 52chinweizu ibekwe, “nationalist values and political will: the mental health of the nigerian elite” (07 dec., 2005); http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/chinweizu/nationalist-values-andpolitical-will-18.html 53itibari m. zulu (editor), “sculpting a pan-african culture in the art of negritude: a model for african artist” in journal of pan african studies, 2006; http://www.jpanafrican.com/ 74 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 interpretation that was produced by those african writers who have digested a european tradition. he believed that the true african tradition extends back beyond the european and hellenic kinds of 54 literature and as far as the egyptian pyramid. chinweizu holds that for development in africa, there must be an appreciation of what is originally and authentically african and achievable by decolonizing the african mind by afrophilia. � the africanist goal of decolonization is to overthrow the authority of alien traditions. pan africanism calls for the dismantling of white supremacist beliefs and structures which superimpose themselves on every aspect of african life. it is not implied that africans must ignore foreign traditions, but simply a denial of the authority of foreign traditions and a withdrawal of allegiance to 55them. more so, the kenyan wangari maathai (b. 1940), an environmental and political activist, in her book the challenge for africa (2009), argues that there is no inherent trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection and that african leaders should pursue both. as an integrationist, she blames both western colonialism for devaluing african identity and culture and 56africa for its bloody attachment to fractured micro-nations. � maathai criticized foreign aid dependency as part of the problem of underdevelopment in africa. she believes in a change that will come through grassroots activism and suggests strongly that 57 africans must embrace their own traditions. among her africanist objectives include the need for visionary leadership and nation54chinweizu ibekwe, “chinweizu, rothenberg, duns scotus”, in towards the decolonization of african literature (united kingdom: howard university press, 1983); ... http://www.tomleonard.co.uk/online-poetry-a-prose/chinweizu-rothe 55chinweizu ibekwe, “decolonizing the african mind: further analysis and strategy” in (assata shakur forum, nov. 17, 2004); ... http://www.assatasakur.org/forum/pan-afrikanism-afrocentricity/16 56francis fukuyama, “out of africa; foreign aid is part of the problem, but so is corrupt politics” in slate (may 4, 2009); http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2217394 57wangari maathai, the challenge for africa (pantheon: first edition, 2009), pp. 136. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 75 building through a central leadership. she cited, for instance the leadership of julius nyerere, who knit tanzania's multiple languages and ethnic groups together through the use of kiswahili as the 58national language. � however, the zambian dambisa moyo, a global economist at goldman sachs in london, argues in her dead aid (2009), that foreign-sponsored development is at the root of africa's 59 underdevelopment and calls for its cessation if africa is to progress. as a world-class economist, who has understood the “pros-and-cons” of the world bank and imf's consequences of the foreign aid for development in africa, moyo favours private sector development, no matter where it comes from and vehemently protests against the agricultural protectionism of the global north that prevents trade 60from becoming an engine of growth. embracing both the internalists' renaissance objectives and the externalists' reparation drive, we could see that the integrationists hold no ideological position, but rather seek from within and outside africa for ways to move the continent forward. (3) culture and consciousness: basis for a sustainable development in africa regrettably, the western development model for africa takes for granted the impact of culture and consciousness on the political and economic dimensions of development in africa. but the integrationist philosophy that seeks both within and outside africa for solutions to the continent's backwardness holds the way forward. the 'within' is africa's peculiarity, which includes african culture and consciousness. � kwarteng's warning that in solving underdevelopment problems, scholars need to understand that human beings are multifaceted beings and that they are cognitive, emotional, religious, 58ibid, 312-336. 59dambisa moyo, dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for africa new york: farrar, straus & giroux, 2009, 180-200. 60francis fukuyama, out of africa, 2009. 76 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 social, and behavioural, ought to be listened to. perhaps, a non positivist approach is needed in sustaining development in africa. according to the late afrobeat legend, fela anikulapo kuti, in one of his songs titled "teacher don't teach me nonsense" says: "who be government teacher? culture and tradition" (1986). � any model of development in africa that excludes a genuine historical role for consciousness, culture, and religion, functions for some set of economic or political interests. hence, i enjoin the calls to re-examine african life and history from an african perspective, and a re-switch to the traditional african concepts about culture, society and values, and that would be the way forward. to catalyst this fact, there is a need for an indigenous education system and philosophy that will serve exclusively for african purpose and worldview. � probably, many may ask, what has culture and consciousness got to do with africa's development? a lot, because the culture and consciousness of people carry them through all aspects of their life. it may look difcult to see that investment in ceremonies and social redistribution in african societies were part and parcel of the traditional balance between society and economies rather than just 61 waste of economic opportunities. according to battista mondin, man has always produced culture, because he is essentially a cultural, and not a natural, being. this is because the development of cultural anthropology as a science has brought to light the value and the function that culture has in the 62 development of civilization and in the characteristics of nations. he explains anthropologically, that culture signies the totality of customs, techniques, and values that distinguish a social group, a 63 tribe, a people, a nation... and the mode of living proper to a society. thus, man is essentially a cultural being. god has endowed man with nature, but it is man's to order nature for his progress and development. culture must not be done without. the catholic 61luigi solivetti, “w.w. rostow and his contribution to development studies: a note” 2005. 62 battista mondin, philosophical anthropology bangalore: theological publications in india, 2011, 145. 63ibid, 145-146. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 77 theology teaches that grace is built on nature, so as development, civilization is built on culture. � just in january 2020, when the us president donald trump threatened to bomb the iranian cultural center if iran continues to retaliate for his murdering of iran’s general suleiman, and the world (the un) including the us congress rose against him, and immediately trump rescinded his threat. colonization in africa was cultural, and that devalued african identity and culture. � how can africa be compared to china? had they the same form of colonization? today, china is the second-largest economies of the world, but without the benet of the “rule of law” and enforceable property rights. the beijing consensus proved that there could be market reform without democracy and that strong selfdetermination can prevent powerful international actors from unduly 64 inuencing its choices of development. china, instead, developed a variant socialist rule of law that is compatible with its cultural norms, its current form of government, and its level of institutional development. � shameful to read some development experts arguing that africa's cultural practices could be antithetical to socio-economic development, specically when dened exclusively in economic 65 terms, a self-sustaining rise in the gross national product (gnp), without the ndings of experts on the project. ambe j. njoh, a prominent nigerian development analyst, studied the link between cultural tradition and socio-economic development in africa. he discovered that there are clear differences between eurocentric cultures, which are rooted in capitalist ideology and protestant ethics, and traditional african culture, where ideas such as capital accumulation, entrepreneurial attitudes, and material 66 wealth are not top priorities. � njoh, like chinua achebe, argued that africa was not poor 64randal peerenboom, china modernizes: threat to the west or model for the rest? new york: oxford university press, 2007, 3. 65ambe j. njoh, tradition, culture, and development in africa, burlington: ashgate pub., 2006, 5. 66bid, 5. 78 | ekpoma review, volume. 7, 2020 before the coming of the white man. achebe favoured the africanigbo culture of the pre-western society, which he portrayed as having a religion, a government, a system of money, an artistic tradition, as well as a judicial system of its own. he explained further that before british colonization, the igbo people lived in a patriarchal collective political system that was democratic. they did not rule by monarchy or a single individual, as decisions were made by a council of male 67 elders. religious leaders were also invited to settle cultural issues. indeed, africa needs to get back to their essences (culture and consciousness), to that 'distinctness', that which marks them as africans, thus creating ways for its growth and development. � in summary, this article has raised the incredible question of a continuing economic underdevelopment in africa. by a phenomenological and structural approaches, it has briey reviewed and highlighted the theories of underdevelopment for africa, including modernization, dependency, and world systems theory. the article also reviewed and critiqued the afrocentric theories of economic underdevelopment in africa, namely the internalist, externalist, and integrationist schools. the study nds the african scholars on a deadlock on whether the cause of the problem is from africa or from outside africa. some school calls for all hands on deck to move the continent forward. however, it is the position of the article that, philosophically speaking, african development is possible only by appreciation of what is originally and authentically africa, which depends on the culture and consciousness of the african people. 67chinua achebe, things fall apart, new york: first anchor books, 1994, 176206. an afrocentric critique of africa's underdevelopment | 79 255 19 an ethical appraisal of the family as an agent of priestly formation in africa gregory ebalu ogbenika ph.d lecturer, seminary of all saints, uhiele ekpoma, edo state, nigeria. oshokwe67@gmail.com & mr gideon adeniji (ph.d cand.) university of benin, benin city etrophodon17@gmail.com abstract the family is the first unit of human formation among the various units of formation in every age. it is a unit that is indispensable in the grooming of the child. the way a child was brought up within a particular family can go a long way to influence his general attitude towards life. if the child was exposed to a good and favorable formation within family, the child is bound to be positively disposed toward others, because the child would not only have passed through the system, the system would have passed through the child. if it is the other way round, then it will manifest in the child’s general attitude towards life as a whole. it has been discovered that with the disengagement of moral and religious education in schools, the moral fabric of societal life is progressively depreciating at an alarming rate. a lot of children and young people are now living without the basic and rudimentary knowledge of morals and religion. the only emphasis on education in many developed countries is intellectual knowledge, devoid of human formation. most modern societies depend so much on the positive laws of the state to groom children and direct the affairs of their lives. this is having a toll on products of post primary schools, which are the raw materials for formation at the level of the seminary. it is against this backdrop that this paper attempts an ethical appraisal of the role of the family in the formation of the candidates for the priesthood. this paper adopts the analytical and hermeneutical methods of analysis. it concludes 256 formation of the human person in the 21st century that a proper attention to the role of the family, will produce better candidates for formation and reduce incidences of behavioural dysfunctions in priestly ministry within the society. keywords: family, formation, agent, seminary formation, and africa conceptual elucidation. family: the concept ‘family’ depicts a group of persons united by the ties of marriage, blood, or adoption, constituting a single household and interacting with each other in their respective social positions, usually those of spouses, parents, children, and siblings.1 the family plays the role of development with the relationship of the parents and the children; it is basically the “original cell of social life”2, where values are transmitted, and the basic level of socialization from which the human person gets the first bits of education. the family is the key and basic unit of development, a key aspect of the family is the role of formation, the family serves to form the members of this social unit, a place or ideal situation where the more experienced members, the parents and over time, elder siblings pass on the necessary basic values and ideas that require proper and adequate cultivation. the family passes on the first form of education to the young ones,3 helping them form their primary and basic conceptions of the human life. “it is the most basic unit of the church”4 formation: the concept of ‘formation’ basically references development, in context, the process of shaping a person. further, formation basically is a series of holistic developmental strategies aimed at improving the human person in different and basic facets of life, as the advanced english dictionary would refer to formation as fabrication into a particular shape, this is the basis of the formation of the human person, forming the person into a particular and certain shape, a shape of primarily, all round brilliance. formation, as implicitly stated earlier is an all-round activity which implies that it covers varying aspects of the personality be it emotional, physical, moral, social, cognitive, behavioural etc. also, the instruments of formation are diverse, there are varying social groups that have a role to play in the formation of the human person, the family being the basic unit that helps forms the perception of the human person, that presents the lenses by which the person sees the world, it is as though the grassroots, as though the background from which the development process takes its root, the human person would always have other instruments and factors, the peer groups and other social institution but a pivotal agent would always remain the family. section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 257 the seminary formation: the formation in the seminary is one that is structured to meet all areas that are necessary for a holistic human formation. the four cardinal areas of formation in the seminary are the human, spiritual, intellectual and pastoral formation. these are areas that are sacrosanct and intrinsic to ensure a balanced and full grown man, ready for the priestly vocation. these areas of formation are very integral to the actualization of the goal of an authentic formation. the human formation: according to the synod fathers, “the whole work of priestly formation would be deprived of its necessary foundation if it lacked a suitable human formation.5 “this therefore reveals the importance of human formation, as it represents the foundation upon which every other formation is built. the young men are first human beings, and would in their vocation deal with human beings. the letter to the hebrews notes that “every high priest chosen from among men is appointed to act on behalf of men in relation to god” (heb. 5:1). in order that his ministry may be humanly as credible and acceptable as possible, it is important that the priest should mold his human personality in such a way that it becomes a bridge and not an obstacle for others in their meeting with jesus christ the redeemer of man.6 future priests should therefore cultivate a series of human qualities, not only out of proper and due growth and realization of self, but also with a view to the ministry3. the seminary hand book adds that maturity in human formation entails a two-fold demand, namely, increasing knowledge of oneself in all humanness as a creature, with particular strengths and weaknesses and understanding this within the framework of the relationships which forms the context of the priests life.4 an understanding of humanity of an individual, and a conscious acceptance of the human nature, towards a conscious effort to be better, and to grow helps in undergoing a human formation devoid of pretense and hypocrisy, one that is open to learning. as the priest grows both in the knowledge of himself and in his relationship with others, he will be more deeply formed into his priesthood. the seminarian is therefore formed to work on himself and mold himself better into the image of christ, and by extension, work on his relations with men, so as to become a healthy and lovable conduit of god’s mercy and love for humanity. in pastores dabo vobis the holy father, st. john paul ii of blessed memory talks about “affective maturity”, which for him, is the result of an education in true and responsible love, and notes that it is a significant, and decisive factor in the formation of candidates to the priesthood.5 affective maturity presuppose an awareness that love has a central role in human life.6 in his encyclical, redemptor hominis, st. pope 258 formation of the human person in the 21st century john paul ii notes that man cannot leave without love. he remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is meaningless if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate innately in it.7 this therefore implies that the seminarian is groomed and grows in love in all its entirety, physical, psychic and spiritual, with a human maturity subsumed in clear training in freedom, expressed in heartfelt obedience to the truth of one’s own being, and to the meaning of one’s own existence.8 spiritual formation: the formation of the human person, finds its fullest expression in spiritual formation. when it is carried out in the context of an anthropology which is open to the full truth regarding the human person, it leads to and finds its completion in spiritual formation.9 the hand book of the seminary of all saints adds that spiritual formation sets the foundation for the attitudes, habits and practices of the spiritual life in a lifetime of priestly ministry especially as regards priestly celibacy.10 as a result of this, the new ratio fundamentalis institutionis sarcedotalis, notes that initial admission to the seminary should be preceded by a spiritual and ecclesial programme, in which a serious discernment of the motivation in responding to a vocation can be undertaken.11 this programme which is referred to as the spiritual year is a programme that is set aside for the spiritual formation of aspirants to the priestly vocation. for one year, the aspirant is engaged in spiritual exercises that also help in his discernment of his vocation. the major seminary, however, continues in this spiritual grooming as the daily schedules of the seminary contain different spiritual activities that are a necessary ingredient of his vocation. the seminarian also has access to a spiritual director to whom he meets for guidance and counseling, on spiritual matters. the essential content of spiritual formation specifically leading towards the priesthood is well expressed in the vatican council’s decree optatam totius: spiritual formation (…) should be conducted in such a way that the students may learn to live in intimate and unceasing union with god the father through his son, jesus christ in the holy spirit.12 those who are to take on the likeness of christ, priest by sacred ordination should form the habit of drawing close to him as friends in every detail of their lives.13 prayers and study of the word of god and the attendance of holy mass are core spiritual activities for all seminarians and priests in formation. pastoral formation: the whole formation imparted to candidates for the priesthood aims at preparing them to enter into communion with the charity of christ the good shepherd. hence their formation in its section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 259 different aspects must have a fundamentally pastoral character.14 this means that one major aspect of formation in the seminary is the pastoral formation, where students are trained to be true shepherds of soul after the example of the lord jesus christ. therefore seminarians are engaged in evangelical activities and are also posted to parishes. the handbook of the seminary of all saints notes that seminarians are introduced to the apostolic life by hands-on-experience in areas such as parish and campus ministry, counseling, parish religious education programmes, diocesan tribunals, vocation offices, hospital ministry, serial ministry to the poor and the disadvantaged etc.15 through these field experiences the seminary is helped to understand the apostolate, and is prepared to make a more matured commitment to the priesthood of christ. intellectual formation: this aspect of formation is, perhaps, central to the whole project of formation in the church. this is a very vital aspect of the priestly formation that cannot be overemphasized. in pastores dabo vobis, st. pope john paul ii of blessed memory notes that “intellectual formation has its own characteristics but it is also deeply connected with, and indeed can be seen as a necessary expression of, both human and spiritual formation: it is a fundamental demand of human intelligence by which he participate in the light of god’s mind and seeks to acquire wisdom which in turn opens to and is directed towards knowing and adhering to god.16 the challenges of the rapidly developing world and the intellectual demand of a highly knowledgeable society makes it important for the priest to be a man of great intellectual fecundity and knowledge to meet the challenges of evangelism to highly intellectual people. the synod fathers notes that “if we expect every christian to be prepared to make a defense of the faith, and to account for the hope that is in us (cf 1 pet. 3:15), then all the more should candidates for the priesthood and priests have diligent care of the quality of their intellectual formation in their education and pastoral activity. for the salvation of their brethren and sisters, they should seek an even deeper knowledge of the divine mysteries.17 the seminary is not only a place for spiritual and human formation, but also a place where there is a rich investment in intellectual rigor and exercises. the peculiarity of the priestly vocation is one that demands that the seminarian is equipped with philosophical and theological knowledge. the young man in formation is exposed to the different schools and areas in philosophy that helps him delve into existential questions and rationalizations about the world and creation in general. the seminarian is exposed to a high level of education and academic activity befitting of every higher institution of learning, to learn 260 formation of the human person in the 21st century undergraduate courses in philosophy, so as to come out a philosopher of refinement, knowledge and understanding, balanced intrinsically by studies in theology, (knowledge of god) which is in fact the goal of his philosophical endeavor. therefore, like all other young men and women undergoing undergraduate studies in philosophy, the seminarian undergoes rigorous intellectual exercise in philosophy, but this rime with a purpose and a goal to be able to wither the storm that comes from a proliferation of knowledge that could pose a challenge to faith and learning in the knowledge of god. the holy father, john paul ii of blessed memory explains this further when he notes that “the theologian is first and foremost a man of faith. but he is a believer who asks himself question about his own faith (fides quarens intellectum), with the aim of reaching a deeper understanding of the faith itself.18 this is what philosophy helps to do, as it asks so many questions on existence and god. the need for philosophical studies geared and channeled towards a better understanding of the christ is of the essence, as the philosophical traditions of the seminary are studied up to the point of supplementing theology, through the inclusion of various christian philosophers and their philosophy that possesses a theological touch. theological formation is therefore very vital as it is the destination of all philosophical studies and the focal point of the intellectual studies of a seminarian. for john paul ii, theological formation is both complex and demanding. it should lead the candidate for the priesthood to a complete and united vision of the truths which god has revealed in jesus christ and of the church’s experience of faith.19 who are the agents of priestly formation? throughout the course of the formation of an intending priest, there are various persons, structures and institutions he comes in contact with which shape his personality and necessary qualities that place him in a better position to exercise his clerical responsibilities. the role of these agents cannot be treated with levity because in the long run, the impact of these agents go a long way to influence the candidate’s conception of what the priestly ministry entails and how he is to go about the exercise of the ministry. there are so many people involved in the work of formation. but for the purpose of this paper, we would like to identify the main agents or units involved in the work of priestly formation. they are the key instruments being used by the god and church to ensure the formation of future priests for the church. we shall examine some of these salient agents which shape and influence priestly formation and section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 261 their respective roles in the whole formation process. these are as follows: the family as stated earlier, the family plays a pivotal role in the early upbringing of the child. it is the primary or primordial unit or agent of formation of the child. the attention paid by the family to the upbringing at the early stage of the growth of a child makes a lot of difference in the maturity of the child. the more attention given, the better for the child, the less attention given, goes a long way to affect the development of the child. this does not apply to the early stage alone, but at every stage of the development of the child. the whole gamut of formation should be wholistic. there is this tendency for some families to pay attention one or some aspect(s) of the child’s formation to the detriment of the others. a lot of parents pay particular attention to the intellectual formation at the expense of human and spiritual formation, which is so important in the life of the child. they do this by sending their wards to the best school that are famous for academic prowess in the society without minding what they are able to offer in the areas of values and their relationship with the creator. it is of paramount importance for the family to give priority to the wholistic formation of the child till the child attains the age of fending for himself or herself, which is the age of reason, the age at which they can now take complete responsibility for their actions: the fecundity of conjugal love cannot be reduced solely to the procreation of children, but must extend to their moral education and their spiritual formation. the role of parents is of such importance that it is almost impossible to provide an adequate substitute. the right and the duty of parents to educate their children are primordial and inalienable20. having enjoyed tutelage under the guidance of their parents in a wholistic manner, it is most likely that the child would take the path for which he has been brought up while growing up. this also applies to the seminarian who is in formation. while on holidays with the family, the onus is on the family to guide and support him as he undergoes formation. in the most of numerous distractions that could arise while on holidays, it behooves of parents to ensure that attention is paid to the seminarian’s well-being so that he may not be swallowed by the negative influences that abound all over our contemporary african society. the diocesan bishop/presbyterate: the diocesan bishop is first and foremost the one who discerns the vocation to the priesthood of any candidate. he is responsible for the seminarian from the beginning to the end of the formative process and ultimately decides if the candidate is fit 262 formation of the human person in the 21st century enough to be ordained and to exercise the priestly ministry.21 although, he may not directly carryout these functions, the bishop puts the necessary personnel and mechanisms in place to help him carryout this responsibility and that is where the role of the diocesan presbyterate (especially the vocations director) comes in. during the course of the seminarian’s formation, he is bound to come in contact with various priests in the diocese who through such encounters help to shape the personality of such seminarian.22 the vocations director is primarily saddled with the responsibility of formation of seminarians in the diocese whenever they are away from school (the seminary). under the overall supervision of the bishop, he monitors the growth of priestly qualities in aspiring candidates and inspires the blossoming of these necessary qualities. as an illustration, here in our nigerian clime, it is the practice to send seminarians on pastoral work during their holidays or break from the seminary in which the priests in question are required to observe the seminarian and write a report of what has been observed during the period of his work. it is also the responsibility of the priest to guide and direct the seminarian on what it entails to possess the necessary priestly qualities. this shows in no small measure the great responsibility placed on the shoulders of the diocesan presbyterate in the formation of candidates. the bishop also intervenes from time to time to examine the progress candidates are making in their formation in all aspects of their formative life. the seminary: the seminary, which is a place where seminarians are trained, plays a very crucial role in the formative process as an agent.23 the seminary which is not only an educational institution for the intellectual formation of priests also coordinates the various elements which culminate in a holistic priestly personality. in this sense, this means that even if the seminary is an educational institution where seminarians bag degrees in philosophy and divinity, it is not just all about that. if not, it would not be different from the secular institutions where people study for degrees. apart from the intellectual formation, the seminary also takes into cognizance, the spiritual, human and pastoral aspects of the candidate’s formation which are geared towards the effective exercise of the priestly ministry24 the seminary carries out its function through the instrumentality of formators (basically priests) and other lay members of the community, including the lecturers and other relevant persons who contribute to the day to day activities of the seminary. the formators, though, play a very crucial role as through their actions and encounter with the seminarians, ideas and conceptions about what the priesthood section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 263 entails are formed in the minds of the candidates. this is not exclusive of their encounter with other priests, such as those in their respective dioceses. the laity: the laity of the diocese from where the seminarians come also play a crucial role in the discernment process. during his formative years, the seminarian will be privileged to work with various segments of the laity in his diocese and beyond. he will be actively involved in the affairs of pious societies, associations, lay ministers and other lay ministries in the church. his encounter with these various categories of persons go a long way to help him stand better prepared to relate with these various segments of christ’s faithful by furnishing him with experience and concrete problem solving tools that will help him in the exercise of the ministry in the future. on the other hand, the laity also helps the seminarian to sustain himself and give an appropriate assent to the call of god’s work.25 they also serve as guardians and can be helpful in helping the seminarians to focus on their call. they can serve as advisers, dialogue partners and counselors to the seminarians which in the long run go a long way to shape the candidate’s disposition towards the priesthood. the subject of formation: apart from the aforementioned, kit is pertinent to note that the candidate is primarily responsible for his own formation, as other attempts to form him will result in futility if the candidate remains closed-in to himself and wrongly disposed to the whole process. this point is well expressed in where it states that: each seminarian is the protagonist of his own formation, as he has already been mentioned and is called to a journey of ongoing growth in the human, spiritual, intellectual and pastoral areas, taking into account his own personal and family background. seminarians are likewise responsible for establishing and maintaining a climate of formation that is consistent with the values of the gospel.26 hence, the seminarian should develop what is referred to as “formative attitudes” such as availability, openness and docility to learn from the different circumstances he comes across in life and in various dimensions of his personality.27 the communitarian climate of the seminary also plays a crucial role in helping the candidate to internalize vocational values interwoven in inter-personal relationships. the family: the family’s role, which is sometimes downplayed, is of utmost importance in the shaping of a candidate’s personality. the 264 formation of the human person in the 21st century family serves as the foundation on which every other attempt at building a formidable priestly character springs. a christian family can truly assist candidates to discover and nurture a call to priestly vocation in the candidate.28 the spirituality of the family could either foster or mar a candidate’s desire for priestly service while a dysfunctional family or a family which pays little or no attention to spiritual matters can create a warped mindset in the consciousness of the candidate which further influences his disposition and openness to formation. while it is true that through the extra-ordinary grace of god, genuine vocation to the priesthood can spring from even the most despicable situations, we cannot overlook the influence of environment and family on character formation. if the foundation of the family is shaky, all other agents or institutions of formation will have a hell of a time molding the candidate to suite his call. the all important role of the family will be discussed in subsequent sessions. the holy spirit: while discussing the various inputs of human agents in the formation of a candidate, we must not leave out the necessity of grace and god’s intervention because the whole enterprise of priestly formation is controlled by god himself who chooses. this fact is all exemplified in christ’s admonition to his apostles “you did not choose me; i chose you…” (jn 15:16). hence, it is the holy spirit who forms the candidate through the instrumentality of these various mediators (patron wong, 2014). as a result, it is very necessary that all requisite agents of formation should teach the candidate the importance of openness and docility to the actions of the spirit which inflames the heart with sincerity and clarity of purpose. an assessment of the family as an agent of formation as earlier stated, the role of the family as an agent of priestly formation cannot be over-emphasized. this fact is re-echoed in prominent church documents on priestly formation. emphasizing the foundation-laying responsibility which accrues to the family, a second vatican document says: since the reality of the christian family is endangered nowadays, much importance should be given to pastoral work on behalf of the family, in order that the families themselves, generously accepting the gift of human life, may be ‘as it was a first seminary.29 in line with the above stand, and in consideration of all necessary elements which promote priestly vocation, another salient document on priestly formation states: a very special responsibility falls upon the christian family, which by virtue of the sacrament of matrimony, shares its own unique way in the section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 265 educational mission of the church, teacher and mother. families can become a first seminary in which children can acquire from the beginning, an awareness of piety and prayer and love for the church.30 the above statements from the church’s magisterium accentuate the importance of the family as an agent of priestly formation. the life of piety, the consciousness of the importance of prayer, the ability to learn submissiveness to god’s will and respect for the church and authorities all spring forth from the spiritual tradition of a family. if the father and mother in the home develop a culture of family prayers and devotion, the children do not need to be told of the importance of prayers in their lives as christians. other salient points that need to be examined are the vocation-friendly nature of the family, how they encourage members to open themselves to a life of service and tolerance by listening to the cares and needs of each member of the family, how much support members get from the family in pursuing a career or vocation which is in view of the happiness of such individual.31 all these elements combine to either foster or discourage the sprouting of the vocational seed in the hearts of aspiring candidates to the priesthood. as a way of diversion, it is pertinent to assess the concept of the family in our traditional african culture. the average african is always concerned with inculcating certain societal values and morals in members of his or her family basically for the preservation of the family’s integrity in the society which in turn fosters respect among society members for such family. african families do not joke with the moral formation of their wards which are often tied to the religious practices of the family and the communities at large because they recognize that such persons will someday go out as an ambassador of the family or cultural heritage. it is a common african saying to their wards that ‘they should know the child of whom they are wherever they go’. this goes a long way to demonstrate the importance attached by africans to the preservation of the family name which is only possible if the members of such family have a sound moral foundation. each individual in the family is considered as an ambassador of the family. hence, the family takes the duty upon itself to embark on extensive social, religious and cultural education of its members so as to avoid the situation where members become deviant in the society as a result of poor education. if families generally hold forth to this african model of the family, the task of formation of candidates to the priesthood will be much easier. not only will they be good priests but good christians and patriotic citizens for those who may eventually not make it to the priesthood. another important consideration is that the holy family of jesus, mary and joseph should continue to serve as a reference point to all families. 266 formation of the human person in the 21st century fathers and mothers should look up to joseph and mary in the upbringing of their wards. jesus christ, in his sovereignty, subjected himself to the headship of joseph his foster father and learned the dignity of labour as a carpenter. from his foster father, christ must have experienced how hardworking his foster father was, who provided for his family and lived in accordance with the commandments of god. in his human nature, christ learned the relevant skills and the use of the necessary tools in carrying out manual labour.32 as a result, st. joseph and his wife, mary should be honoured and invoked in the attempt to plant and cultivate the seed of vocation to the priesthood as he can truly become the head of our domestic churches which are ‘the family’. the role of the family in the formation of future priests it is worthy of note that the role of the family in the training and molding of a child’s character is un-negotiable irrespective of the vocation such child wishes to embrace. hence, we shall examine certain duties and responsibilities of the family in the training of their wards which could in the long run sow the seed of the vocation to the priesthood in their minds. religious education of children: the church’s teaching since the commencement of the second vatican council explicitly states that the duty of religious education of children is a shared responsibility between the ministers and parents. according to the code of canon law, the right and obligation of parents to procreate and educate their wards arise from the meaning and significance of marital union itself.33 since they have given life to their children, parents have a most grave obligation and possess the right to educate them. therefore, it is for christian parents particularly to take care of the christian education of their children according to the doctrine handed on by the church. the second vatican document, gaudium et spes, also emphasizes this point when it states that “parents are consecrated by the sacrament of marriage to a specific function: they are active co-workers in the salvific and evangelizing mission of the church, a service they perform by their educational duties towards their children.”34 these following documents all add up to the point that parents are responsible for the moral upbringing of their children which serve as foundations for their views about life and principles. a faulty moral upbringing will surely lead to a faulty personality so will a faulty personality lead to a faulty formation of the necessary priestly qualities in a candidate. the formators can hardly work on a candidate with a faulty personality due to a faulty moral foundation except by the extra-ordinary intervention of the holy spirit. section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 267 assist in the process of discernment: it is the role of the family to ‘assist’ the candidate in the process of discernment and not to determine or enforce the vocation to the priesthood on the candidate or discourage him from embarking on such a journey. with prayer, advice, mentoring and counseling, the family can play a very important role of formation of the candidate’s attitude towards the priesthood. by the very fact that the candidate grew up in the midst of his family, it is expected that the parents, guardians and siblings understand his character, disposition, principles and attitudes better. this fact places the family in a very good position to help the candidate discern if truly the vocation to the priesthood is his calling. in the whole process, the family must be wary of imposing their wishes on the candidate as this in itself could backfire. it is common knowledge in nigeria that some candidates are answering the call of their parents or guardians and not their own call. in some places where the priesthood is regarded as a status symbol or some kind of reputation which brings dignity to the family, some candidates can be placed under unnecessary pressure to become priests without the family members bothering to understand the candidate’s true disposition towards the whole process. on the other hand, some families do not want some candidates to embrace the call to the priesthood and regard it as a wasted life. these perspectives are a misconception of the role of the family in the process of discernment. collaboration with other agents of formation: it is the responsibility of parents who have candidates aspiring towards the priesthood to cooperate and collaborate with other agents of formation such as the bishop, vocations director, seminary, parish priest, among others. this collaboration could be in form of material or spiritual support. it is the practice in many dioceses that the bishops are in charge of the financial responsibilities of the candidates. however, it is not out of place for parents of seminarians to come together once in a while and donate towards the training of seminarians in order to ease the burden on the diocese, especially in developing regions like ours in nigeria. apart from the material support, it is the duty of parents to pray for the candidates and all those in charge of their formation that the holy spirit will guide them in making the right decisions. in conclusion, parents can also play a crucial role in the encouragement of others, even if not their own children, who have expressed interest in the vocation or call to the priesthood, to embrace the vocation by being sources of testimony to others of the beauty and the dignity which comes with the service of god and his church. in nigeria where we have vocations committees saddled with the responsibility of fostering vocations in the diocese, parents of aspiring 268 formation of the human person in the 21st century candidates can volunteer to be a part of such initiatives, which in itself can be a sign of encouragement to others. endnotes 1 the new encyclopaedia brittannica ,vol 14, 15th edition, 1988, s,v, “family” 2 catechism of the catholic church, london, geoffrey chapman,1994, no. 2207 3 vatican council ii, decree on the apostolate of lay persons, apostolicam actuositatem, no. 11 4 mitch finley, “family” in richard mcbrien, ed,, encyclopedia of catholicism, 1st edition, new york, harper collins publishers, 1966, 5 message of the synod fathers to the people of god at viii ordinary general assembly on the “formation of priests in the circumstances of the present day” (september 30th 28 october, 1990) 6 i will give you shepherd, apostolic exhortation pastorers dabo vabis of john paul ii, no. 43, 1992, pp. 69. 7ibid. 8 handbook of the seminary of all saints, 2005, benin city: ava printers, p. 6. 9 i will give you shepherds, apostolic exhortation, pastores dabo vobis of john paul ii, no. 43, 1992, pp. 70. 10 ibid. no. 44, 1992, p. 70. 11 encyclical letter redemptor hominis (4th march 1979), 10:aas71 (1979), 274. 12 i will give you shepherds, apostolic exhortation, pastores dabo vobis of john paul ii, no. 44, 1992, pp. 70-71. 13 ibid, no. 45, p. 72. 14 handbook of the seminary of all saints. 2005, p. 6 15 the gift of the priestly vocation, new ratio fundamentalist institutions sacerdotalis, paulines publications african daughters of st. paul, nairobi, 2017, p. 27. 16 i will give you shepherds, apostolic exhortation, pastores dabo vobis of john paul ii, no. 45, 1992, pp. 73. 17ibid., p. 73. 18 ibid. no 57, p. 88. 19handbook of the seminary of all saints 2005 – 2008, ava printers, benin city, p. 8. 20 catechism of the catholic church, no. 2221 21patron wong j.c. (2014) “foundations of priestly formation” conference on priestly vocation organized by the congregation for the clergy http://www.clerus.va (retrieved 18th march, 2020). 22 ibid, 23szczesny, w., (2015) families play important role in vocation, (article) http://www.wnycatholic.org/news/article/featured/2015/02/26/100511/familiesplay-important-role-in-vocation. 24 patron wong, 2014. 25patron wong, 2014. section ii: philosophical perspectives and human formation 269 26 ratio fundamentalis in sacerdotalis, no. 130. 27 patron wong, 2014). 28 szczesny, 2015. 29 optatam totius no. 2 30pastores dabo vobis, no. 41. 31szczesny, 2015. 32fr. aytona, j., (2018) family life: the first seminary, (article) http://fathersof mercy.com/family-life-first-seminary/ 33the code of canon law, no 226 ⸹2. 34 gaudium et spes no. 6 57 5 priestly vocation and discernment: espousing the gamalian approach in spiritual formation. peter ajayi wojuaye seminary of all saints, uhiele, ekpoma, edo state deogratiaswoju@gmail.com abstract the priestly vocation is a mystery and its discernment is metaphysical because the reality of the call to the roman catholic priesthood is ultimately divine, therefore it calls for proper discernment from both the formandee and the formators. the letter to the hebrews chapter five makes it clear that “no one takes the honour upon himself”. vocation to the priesthood which is a call as well as a precious gift from god “is the love of the heart of jesus” as congregation for the clergy reminds us in june 7, 2013, the world day of prayer for the sanctification of priests. in this light, gamalian spirituality is born out of the way of life, the reputation and the way in which gamaliel; a pharisee approached the issue of the conflict between the sanhedrin and the persecutions of the early church when peter and john were persecuted cf. act 5:34-40. gamaliel said, “so in the present case i tell you, keep away from these men and let them alone; for if this plan or this undertaking is of men, it will fall; but if it is of god, you will not be able to overthrown them. you might even be found opposing god!” to this effect, in the formation and the discernment of priestly vocation, gamalian spirituality is very important. keywords: priestly vocation, seminary formation, spirituality, gamalian spirituality, discernment introduction priestly vocation is a mystery, life itself is a mystery and the task of discernment of the call itself is indeed a mystery. francis cardinal arinze 58 formation of the human person in the 21st century was once asked to explain his vocation to the priesthood he however, gave a brief history of his life how he was influenced by blessed michael i. tansi (his former parish priest who is now a blessed). cardinal arinze said, “only god can finally analyze the reason a person is attracted to the catholic priesthood.” in the book titled “saint john paul ii the story of my life gift and mystery”, our loving saint pope john paul ii gives the reality of this mystery!1 vocation to the catholic priesthood is a mystery. how can one know that he is called? how could this call be discerned by those in charge of forming candidates for the priesthood? in fact, formation could be defined as ‘deciding for god’ those whom he has chosen. this tells us that formation as a process or art is not an easy task. how can formators despite human limitations recommend young men whom “they may not know in totality” for the priesthood? this is also a mystery. to further this mysterious nature of this vocation we are led back to its discernment. the story of the way david was anointed readily comes to mind. before samuel could discerned that david was the one chosen by god after god rejected seven sons of jesse tells us the difficult task of discernment cf. i sam 16:1-13.2 it is on this note we shall look at some terms that need clarification as follows: priestly vocation, seminary’s formation, spirituality, gamalian spirituality, and discernment. priestly vocation the priestly vocation, is a mystery, it is a call to become another christ. vocation is from the latin word vocare which means to call. in the latin rite, it is to be a celibate. by the laying on of hands and the prayer of consecration the man that was in the seminary becomes another christ. this means that priestly vocation is a called to discipleship. in fact, the holy orders is a sacrament of service. in the latin rite, we have seven sacraments, three of these are sacrament of initiation while two are sacrament of healing, and the other two are sacrament of service namely: holy orders and matrimony. the priestly vocation as the sacrament of service, is a call to become another christ and a mystery. to this effect, because of who the priest is, the church as laid down through experiences ways in which young men are admitted to the seminary so that they could be formed and their calling to this great ministry discerned; this is why formation in the seminary is necessary. seminary’s formation the council of trent in the sixteenth century instituted seminary formation. the seminaries were given directive for the formation of men for the priesthood. it is imperative to know what is a seminary before going to the seminary’s formation. seminary is a nursery ground for the section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 59 training of those preparing for the catholic priesthood. it is reserved to schools instituted, in accordance with a decree of the council of trent, for the training of the catholic priests.3 a theological seminary (grand séminaire) provides courses in holy scripture, philosophy, theology and so on to give young men immediate preparation for ordination.4 a priest is the representative of christ among men: his mission is to carry on christ's work for the salvation of souls; in christ's name and by his power, he teaches men what they ought to believe and what they ought to do: he forgives sins, and offers sacrifice of the body and blood of christ. he is another christ (sacerdos alter christus). his training, therefore, must be in harmony with this high office and consequently different in many ways from the preparation for secular professions. he must possess not only a liberal education, but also professional knowledge, and moreover, like an army or navy officer, he needs to acquire the manners and personal habits becoming his calling. to teach candidates for the priesthood what a priest ought to know and to make them what a priest ought to be is the purpose of seminary formation.5 it is to this effect that the seminary’s formation is divided into four major parts as it had been laid down by the church from experiences through the inspiration of the ‘finger of god’, the holy spirit who is going to lead the church to the complete truth (cf. jn 16:13) and in pastores dabo vobis of pope john paul ii numbers 42 to 59 the four areas of priestly formation as follows: (1) human formation, the basis of all priestly formation, (2) spiritual formation, in communion with god and search of christ, (3) intellectual formation, understanding the faith, and (4) pastoral formation, communion with the charity of jesus christ the good shepherd.6 these areas of formation is indeed good and useful for forming candidates for the priesthood in its synthesis and none of this parts should be neglected as if it were unimportant. for christ to be formed in an individual candidate, these areas of formation must as a matter fact, be united. in fact, i would like to call it “an indispensable tetra-formative process” and in parts they cannot formed but in their unity we see another christ, who is human, spiritual, a scholar and a pastor as well. to this end, we look at the spiritual formation of a candidate by examine spirituality. as noted by the fathers of the second vatican council, spiritual formation is a necessity for priestly formation. and just as religious institutes use the period of novitiate to introduce their candidates to their spiritualities, that is, (to the way in which connection with god is sought and established in their particular traditions) the spiritual year is a duration set apart for initial spiritual formation in view of the priestly life and ministry.7 and this 60 formation of the human person in the 21st century spiritual formation continues in major seminary or theological seminary. spirituality in order that the term spirituality might be understood in its entire dimension, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the term spirit. spirit is from the latin word, spiritus meaning breath, spirare to blow, breathe which is an animating or vital principle held to give life to physical organisms, a supernatural being or essence.8 spirit is mysterious in nature and it is ascribed to a divine origin.9 in the bible, the spirit is called the creative, animating power or divine influence of god (cf. joel 2:28).10 so when we are talking about spirit, we refer to the activating or essential principle influencing a person, an inclination, impulse, or tendency of a specific kind and a special attitude or frame of mind.11however, in as much as there are different kinds of definition of spirituality this paper uses the definition provided by fagun when he was asked the meaning of spirituality. he says, spirituality is a core aspect of religion though some nonconformists try to create some spirituality in the air. spirituality is essentially based on religious practices. in fact it leads to the height of religious experience. it consists of a particular experience of what is divine. i say a particular experience because there are many sides to spirituality based on one’s faith and character. for according to my slogan, "a kìí ṣe ìgbàgbọ́ kọjá ìwà ẹni" one’s character is basic to one’s spiritual life, because character would dictate the level of cooperation with divine grace. authentic faith is a gift of god, and it is grace that inspired the spiritual person who freely cooperates.12 so, the context in which this paper shall adopt as regard spirituality is the influence of the spirit of god in an individual irrespective of the person involved and how this stimulus reflects in the individual day-today living and most importantly, noticing the spirit of god at work in a certain person or in a given situation most especially a particular way of experiencing the divine as noted by fagun. in the aspect of spirituality, spirituality means being spiritual, relating to, consisting of, or affecting the spirit, incorporeal, connected with religious values, related or join in spirit.13relating to or affecting the human spirit as opposed to material or physical things, relating to religious belief.14 what then is spirituality? spirituality, therefore, means sensitivity or attachment to religious values, the quality of being spiritual.15 that is, a soul is acted upon by the holy spirit.16 the basic truism from this section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 61 definition is that spirituality has a transcendental dimension which goes beyond physical reality for it is a religious term. this implies that spirituality, as a concept is a broad concept. that is why we have different kinds of spirituality like african traditional spirituality, buddhist spirituality and christian spirituality. in christian spirituality, there are many kinds of spirituality. some words associated with spirituality are piety, devotion, godliness and holiness.17 the word “spirituality” and “mysticism” are somewhat used in an equivalent way.18 spirituality etymologically suggests “life”, and “dynamism” and “breathing”. and that is what the spiritual life aims to be: coming to life in all one’s dimensions.19 the word “spirituality” a word obviously “contaminated” by the “spirit”20often refers to a way of living in line with a particular way of life. to further this example, let us examine what donald dorr has to say about spirituality. now i prefer to begin at the other end to accept that the most privileged ‘place’ in which god speaks to me is my own spirituality. this means that i can no longer think of a person’s spirituality as something that comes from outside. rather it is that which is most deeply personal. my spirituality is me. not the ‘me’ that so often is distracted, scattered, and inauthentic; but the most genuine and profound ‘me’ that exists.21 this tells us how spirituality is personal and entails a communication of the divine to the human person. it is the sum total of religious or ethical values that govern a person’s life. spirituality is that which determines and directs one’s life.22 christian spirituality is therefore, a participation in the mystery of christ through the interior life of grace, actuated by faith, charity, and the other christian virtues. the life that the individual receives through participation in christ is the same life that animated the god-man, the life that the incarnate word shares with the father and the holy spirit; it is, therefore, the life of god in the august mystery of the trinity. through christ, the spiritual life of the christian is eminently trinitarian23 the difficulty in constructing a theology of the spiritual life consists in the fact that the spiritual life is at once a mystery and a problem. it is a mystery specifically since it is life, indeed divine life, a sharing in the christ-life. although one may experience this life in the depths of his being as a life of union with god, it is nevertheless ineffable because the supernatural and transcends human comprehension.24 however, living well is at the heart of all serious spirituality.25 this implies that no matter how secularized the word spirituality is we cannot remove religiosity from it if it is to be authentic. it is on this note we have different kinds of spirituality: like islamic spirituality, african traditional spirituality and christian spirituality which follows a doctrine or a way of life of a 62 formation of the human person in the 21st century particular religious figure. for example, jesus for the christians and muhammad for the islam and the practices with different gods in african traditional religion in relation to the supreme being (god). as noted earlier that spirituality is a broad term, and that its definition in particularity might be very difficult. this same difficulty is also apparent in christian spirituality that sometimes becomes difficult to define it with any specificity. in other words, christian spirituality manifests in different forms, and so, it is difficult to find one common form of christian spirituality.26 however, in the heart of any christian spirituality is jesus christ and the working of his spirit. fagun defines christian spirituality as imitation of christ when he was asked in an interview the question: “what is christian spirituality”? christian spirituality is a life of spiritual perfection in the imitation of the lifestyle of jesus christ as he taught his followers to be perfect (matthew 5:48). and this perfection requires placing spiritual values over and above the material in practice (cf. matthew 19:16-29).27 let us examine the definition of spirituality according to balthasar. the notion of spirituality is a modern one, found neither in the tradition of religious philosophy nor of biblical theology. it is therefore important to determine its content and bearing. in general (negative speaking) it may be said that there is no reason for the christian to limit spirituality to the context of christianity; just as christians speak of a “medieval” or a “carmelite” or a “lay” spirituality, so can we speak analogously of “buddhist” or a “sufi” spirituality. on the basis of the same common understanding of the idea, spirituality may be approximately defined as that basic practical or existential attitude of man which is the consequence of expression of the way in which he understands his religious or more generally, his ethically committed existence; the way in which he acts and reacts habitually throughout his life according to his objective and ultimate insights and decisions.28 gamalian spirituality the pharisees are one of the jewish religious sects in jesus’ time. this particular sect was always at loggerheads with jesus. in fact, jesus christ had confronted them with statements like: “woe to you pharisees”, “you hypocrites” and so many others unkind statements. in fact, there is no less than six woes for the pharisees and scribes in the gospel according to st. matthew (cf. 23:13-39) this is because of the ways in which the pharisees presented themselves and ultimately the way they organized and practiced the jewish religion. this statement by jesus to the pharisees was because of their external observance of law and religious practices that were not truly internalized or even practiced with the spirit of the law. hence, they followed the law (torah) to the latter as against section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 63 the spirit behind the law. another aspect of this pharisaic way of life is the trait of self-righteousness, which jesus christ was totally against when he gave the parable of the tax collector and the pharisee who were in the temple for prayer and the pharisee’s prayer was rejected because of the lack of humility which is an essential element of an authentic prayer to god (cf. lk 18:9-14). be that as it may, there exist questions that could be raised from the above and which need careful consideration. firstly, is everything wrong in being a pharisee on one hand? if this is yes, why would jesus christ recommended that people should observe and practice everything that the pharisees tell them? (cf. mt 23:3). but then, this recommendation has a clause and that is “what they do”. in other words, this recommendation by jesus excludes “what they do”. secondly, can anything good come from a pharisee? or are the pharisees totally bad? these are basic questions which this paper tries to address that despite the disputes that existed between jesus christ and the pharisees in the gospel we can have a spirituality that could be useful for christians which is named after the pharisee called gamaliel. the aim and objective of this work is to examine and expose gamalian spirituality and show how a christian spirituality may be gotten from a pharisee namely: gamaliel and how it can be applied to the discernment of priestly vocation. discernment discernment is the process of gaining insight into a situation in order to arrive at appropriate judgment, often times in view of taking or not taking a certain action. in spiritual direction, one analyzes how a person’s spirit is moved to determine whether or not the movement comes from the holy spirit. it is quite possible, even in what appears to be favorable inspiration that comes from the evil spirit or from the person himself.29 but in priestly vocation it means the process of recommending a candidate for the priesthood. of course, in the major seminary or the theological seminary it is the sole responsibility of the rector in conjunction with other formators to decide whether or not a candidate is suitable for the priesthood. the management of the seminary is in the hands of the rector, who alone under the bishop governs the seminary, calls to orders, admits and dismisses the students; a treasurer has full charge of temporal matters, while to a spiritual director is entrusted with the formation of the students in piety(which is the spiritual formation). the professors are merely teachers. however, all the formators have a share in the administration of the seminary; and all important matters are decided by a vote of the faculty. the spiritual directors and confessors of the students have no voice in the faculty meetings when one of their 64 formation of the human person in the 21st century penitents is concerned.30 to this end, discernment in spiritual matters as well as priestly vocation is not an easy task. since vocation to priesthood is a mystery so it discernment is demanding. for example, a seminarian was expelled in a minor seminary in view of priestly vocation upon the issue he honestly did not know anything about. but has providence would have it, this same rejected stone by the builder became the cornerstone not just a cornerstone but “a special-cornerstone”. it will interest you to know he became a deacon, a priest and a bishop who has ‘the fullness of priesthood’, ‘the successor of the apostles’ who was raised to the higher level greater than those who expelled him.31 when it comes to issue of vocation one need to trend with caution and that is why gamalian spirituality is paramount in this case. st. pope john paul ii in pastores dabo vobis no. 2 was aware of the difficulty in the discernment of priestly vocation when said: for this reason, the total trust in god's unconditional faithfulness to his promise is accompanied in the church by the grave responsibility to cooperate in the action of god who calls, and to contribute toward creating and preserving the conditions in which the good seed, sown by god, can take root and bring forth abundant fruit. the church must never cease to pray to the lord of the harvest that he send laborers into his harvest, (cf. mt. 9:38). she must propose clearly and courageously to each new generation the vocational call, help people to discern the authenticity of their call from god and to respond to it generously, and give particular care to the formation of candidates for the priesthood. the formation of future priests, both diocesan and religious, and lifelong assiduous care for their personal sanctification in the ministry and for the constant updating of their pastoral commitment is considered by the church one of the most demanding and important tasks for the future of the evangelization of humanity. the church's work of formation is a continuation in time of christ's own work, which the evangelist mark illustrates in these words: "and he went up on the mountain, and called to him those whom he desired; and they came to him. and he appointed twelve, to be with him, and to be sent out to preach and have authority to cast out demons" (mk. 3:1315).32 section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 65 gamaliel to gamalian: a christian spirituality to this end, the major concern of this aspect most especially the different kinds of spirituality we have apart from christian spirituality and the christian (catholic) spirituality in particular had been exposed. this aspect is to attribute christian spirituality after gamaliel and that is, gamalian spirituality. it is a way of life lived after gamaliel, a pharisee, as recorded in acts of the apostles chapter five. hence, “gamaliel to gamalian” is the transposition of gamaliel’s way of life to a christian way of life in all its good aspects. furthermore, gamaliel, as a person belonged to a particular religious sect called the pharisees. so for better understanding of the background to which gamaliel belonged to at that time, it is very important to examine the spirituality of some religious sects of judaism. the working definition of spirituality that this paper adopts is the definition by fagun that had been cited earlier. in it, fagun gives credence to the fact that religion and spirituality are closely related when he says: “spirituality is essentially based on religious practices.”33 the sect we are going to examine is the pharisees since it is to this sect that gamaliel belongs. the pharisees the word pharisee is from the hebrew word 34ים רּושִׁ perusim meaningפְּ separated, separated ones, separators.35 they are called hasidim;36 as a continuation and development of hasidaeans the hebrew word pɞrûšίm; aram. pɞrίšayyā, from which the greek word φαρισαίοι is derived means those who had “separated themselves”37. the pharisee, ‘separate’ or ‘detach’ as the name connotes. in this regard, from whom did the pharisees separate themselves? from those, particularly priests or clerics, who interpreted the law in a different way than they; from the common people of the land or people of the earth am-ha-ares (cf. john 7:49 ); from gentiles or jews who embraced the hellenistic culture: from certain political groups? all these groups of people the pharisees would have been determined to avoid in their decision to separate themselves from any type of impurity proscribed by the levitical law — or, more specifically, their strict interpretation of it.38 they were an active, vocal religious jewish sect in the centuries before and after christ appeared on earth. they represented by and large the intellectual sector of their people, because they were passionate, continuous students and teachers of jewish religious law. their intensity and single-mindedness resulted in a harsh and uncharitable emphasis on the legal aspects of religion at the expense of charity and loving concern. jesus represented a threat to their intellectual security and leadership. they tempted him at every opportunity. they tried to trap him into wrong answers (mat 22:15-22). 66 formation of the human person in the 21st century they opposed questions, hoping to prove contradictions (mat 22:34-40). they criticized the company he kept. they objected to his sabbath activities (mk 2:15-17).39 these appellations were given to describe what the pharisees stood for at that time. but then, this does not mean that the pharisee do not have spirituality on which their religious practices are based. it is on this note that their spirituality shall be examined. the spirituality of the pharisees the teaching of the sect was based on the oral tradition as well as on the written law. the pharisees held such religious truths as the resurrection of the body and the existence of angels. since these doctrines were not clearly taught in the pentateuch (the only scripture accepted by the sadducees), the pharisees founded their belief in them upon later writings and oral traditions. in the field of morals, the pharisees taught a rigorous observance of the sabbath and insisted on legal purity and the payment of tithes. they offered various opinions on observance of these and other precepts degenerating into rigorism and casuistry. the result was frequently a sterile externalism destructive of a real religious spirit. after the destruction of the temple, and the overthrow of the jewish state, the pharisees, became practically the only influential group among the jews. they held the jewish people together. later rabbinical schools looked back with admiration upon the pharisees as the true upholders of israel’s law and traditions. the rabbis of the talmud40 were their spiritual descendants.41in order to join this spiritual association and be called a pharisee, it was necessary to have an exact knowledge of the mosaic commandments (the written torah) and the traditions of the ancients (the oral torah), to adhere with mind and heart to the teachings of the doctors of the party, and to distinguish oneself by the exact fulfillment of all their precepts. as josephus flavius points out, the pharisees concerned themselves with the strict interpretation and observance of the torah, and spared themselves no efforts to fulfill the law in every detail, earnestly and consistently striving to practice the ideal propounded by the torah scholars. in that sense, they were the classic representatives of the course adopted by judaism in its inner developments during the post-exilic period. juridical science of the pharisaic rabbis manifested itself particularly in three points: the observance of the sabbath, legal purity, and the payment of the sacred taxes.42many of the pharisees, like the essenes, believed in doctrines such as resurrection of the body, day of judgment, apocalyptic holy war and life in the world to come, while sadducees disagree with essenes and pharisees, over these doctrines. the pharisees hold only the written torah as authoritative 43 and they agree that the torah admitted of variation in applications, but jesus pressed the variation further than they section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 67 did.44with regards to the sabbath rest, they had multiplied prohibitions, going into even the smallest details. on the question of impurities, the most minute prescriptions had been added to the mosaic legislation regarding foods, diseases, corpses, apparatus in daily use, ablutions and purifying baths, contact with persons and things considered impure, and so on. as to the tithes to be paid to the priests and levites, the list of goods, revenues, and products affected had been considerably lengthened.45the rabbinical writings show that the problems raised by the observance of these traditions suggested refined casuistry. thus, with respect to the sabbath: was it permissible to eat an egg laid on such a day, or fruit plucked from the tree on that day? with regards to ablutions: which kind of water purified best, and how far must one throw one’s hands into that water? regarding taxes: was it lawful to eat vegetables or fruits bought at the market without knowing for certain whether the tithe had been paid on those products.46this is the religious sect which gamaliel belongs. to this effect, who is this gamaliel? a biography of gamaliel gamaliel, rabban gamaliel i, so called, to distinguish him from his grandson gamaliel ii who lived around 100 a. d. gamaliel is also called ‘the great’. he was a pharisee and a member of sanhedrin which judged peter and john. gamaliel intervened in favour of the apostles with prudent reasons. he intervened in their judgment noting that if the christian movement were merely human, it would of itself break-up but if it were from god then it would endure. he then admonished his colleagues to exercise caution (acts 5:34-39). in his address to the jews in jerusalem, paul claimed that he had studied under gamaliel (acts 22:3).47the word, gamaliel, is a greek form of the hebrew name meaning ‘reward of god’.48he had a son named simeon. he was of the city of jerusalem, and a noble family, of the sect of the pharisee, which were above others in the accurate knowledge of the laws of their country.49but it seems that he took a special interest in social reform, particularly in bettering the legal status of women.50 base on who gamaliel is, fagun has this to say when he was asked the question “do you know anything about gamaliel of acts 5:34-40?” gamaliel was a rabbinic scholar of the school of hillel, the liberal minded, as against the school of shammai, the far right in israel. he was one of the chief judges in the sanhedrin court at the time of the apostles of jesus christ, and paul would later boast of being his student (acts 22:23), because he was a highly esteemed and popular scholar (acts 5:34).51 from the above, we see clearly the personality of gamaliel and his reputation. his name designates in the new testament a pharisee 68 formation of the human person in the 21st century and celebrated doctor of the law. gamaliel is represented in act 5:34ff as advising his fellow-members of the sanhedrin not to put to death st. peter and the apostles, who, notwithstanding the prohibition of the jewish authorities, had continued to preach to the people. his advice, however unwelcome, was acted upon. so great was his authority with his contemporaries. gamalian spirituality: theological look at acts 5:34:40 in order that we may better understand acts 5:34-40 which shows gamaliel’s intervention or advocacy for the apostles during the persecutions in the early church at jerusalem, it is very important to recall what happened in the previous chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the acts of the apostles in order to understand what led to gamaliel’s intervention of which gamalian spirituality is solidly based. the holy spirit had just descended upon the apostles (cf. acts 2ff) and the apostles were able to preach with confidence without fear of the jews (cf. jn 20:19). as a result of sadducean jealousy at the apostles’ reputation for the healing of a man lame from birth (cf. acts 3:2) and many other signs and wonders, they had been arrested and put to jail, only to be released by an angel (cf. acts 5:12-20). when the sanhedrin convened, their captain and officers eventually tracked the apostles down in the temple, and brought them before the council (vv. 21-27). the high priest demanded to know why the apostles persisted, in spite of prior threatening, to teach in jesus’ name. they replied thus: “we must obey god rather than men.” they also accused the sanhedrin of murdering the saviour (vv 27-32). condemnation of death at that moment seemed certain (v 33).52 it is in this certainty that gamaliel gave the following admonitions to the council which is the foundation of gamalian spirituality: so in the present case i tell you, keep away from these men and let them alone; for if this plan or this undertaking is of men, it will fail; but if it is of god, you will not be able to overthrow them. you might even be found opposing god! (act 5:38-39) gamaliel intervened and cautioned against imprisonment and further persecutions. his standing in the sanhedrin is assumed to be great, in that he commands the apostles to be put outside for brief time (v 34). he, then, urges caution, and gave instances of theudas and judas the galilean which had come to nothing. the apostles also will fail, if their movement is of men (vv 35-38). if their movement is of god, gamaliel argues that the sanhedrin would be unable to prevail, and it will even be a fight against god (v 39). having been convinced by gamaliel’s arguments, the sanhedrin released the apostles after flogging them and repeated the old command, not to speak in jesus’ name (v 40, cf. 4:17). section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 69 however, the apostles were very happy to suffer for the sake of christ and they did not cease to talk about jesus. the second and last mention of gamaliel occurs in acts 22:3, during a speech of paul, in which the apostle claims to have been instructed at the feet of gamaliel with an exact knowledge of the ancestral law.53these passages give credence to the fact that gamaliel is a person with high integrity. to this end, gamaliel’s counsel to the council is the bases for the gamalian spirituality which calls all to a life of tolerance, respect for human dignity and being sensitive to the action of the holy spirit. gamaliel was able to be sensitive to the signs of time and his expression testifies truly he was a man of high repute as earlier described by the evangelist (cf. acts 5:34). an application of gamalian spirituality to priestly vocation and its discernment the priestly vocation is indeed a spiritual thing and through the application of gamalian spirituality to the spiritual formation and the entire process of formation there will definitely be a proper judgment, helping the seminarian to better appreciate his call, give him another opportunity this will definitely makes him to value the mystery of his call, a mystery that goes beyond the one who is called the letter to the hebrews 5:4 tells us: “and one does not take the honour upon himself, but he is called by god, just as aaron was.”pope john paul ii gives credence to this point in pastores dabo vobis when he says: the absolute primacy of grace in vocation is most perfectly proclaimed in the word of jesus: “you did not choose me, but i chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit and that your fruit should abide (jn 15:16). if the priestly vocation bears unequivocal witness to the primacy of grace, god’s free and sovereign decision to call man calls for total respect. it cannot be forced in the slightest by any human ambition, and it cannot be replaced by any human decision. vocation is a gift of god’s grace and never a human right, such that “one can never consider priestly life as a simply human affair, nor the mission of the minister as a simply personal project” every claim or presumption on the part of those called is thus radically excluded (cf. heb 5:4ff). their entire heart and spirit should be filled with an amazed and deeply felt gratitude, an unshakeable trust and hope; because those who have been called know that they are rooted not in their own strength but in the unconditional faithfulness of god who calls.54 70 formation of the human person in the 21st century conclusion to end, the fact that priestly vocation is a mystery calls for a careful discernment of which gamalian spirituality is very important. fr. michael bunmi olofinlade, in his book “mystery of god’s call: a reflection on discipleship” reflecting on the mystery of vocation and the choice of the twelve by jesus out of many that he had called says: “thus, jesus christ is the one who determines the choice of his disciples, it is not a human choice despite human instrumentality in its discernment.”55this, therefore, is a pointer to the reality that seminarians are not to give up. if they do not become catholic priests they can still be useful in the church. they must not use it to alienate themselves from the church or become anti-catholics. if one becomes a catholic priest after one’s seminary training, we can only attribute it to the grace of god. the letter to the hebrews tells us, ‘no one takes this honour upon himself’. that is why vocation is a gift as well as mystery, says st. pope john paul ii.56 pope francis reminds us in his message for 2018 world day of vocation that: “the lord’s call – let it be said at the outset – is not as clear – cut as any of those things we hear, see or touch in our daily experience…”57. this tells us that both the formed and the formators are to tread with caution in this discernment there must not be harsh judgments base on sentiments. in fact, gamalian spirituality gives credence to probation by which the formators gives second chance to a given seminarian. as regards vocation, all that can be expected is not indeed certainty, but probability.58 and this is why the formators recommend candidates for the priesthood while dismissal from the seminary means no more than that the student is not considered fit for the priesthood. but then, gamalian spirituality will plead to give more chance(s) because if they have the call they will definitely be. just has the bishop who ordained me into catholic priesthood was expelled in the minor seminary but he later became a bishop! can we say the judgment was wrong or that was the path that god wants for him? but history proves he was expelled but later exalted. prof. plo lumumba says: “history is a fair judge, it is a judge that is able to identify the things that speak for themselves”. and if gamalian spirituality is applied in formation it will save many fruitful vocations. but then, gamalian spirtuality is not an advocate of seminary where anything goes! it is about a careful discernment. endnotes 1 cf. saint john paull ii, the story of my life: gift and mystery, (vatican; libreria editrice vaticana: 1996, in paulines publications africa, 2014 with a new title: the story of my life on the occasion of the canonization of pope john paul ii) it must be section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 71 noted that the title that was given to this book when it was first published in 1996 by libreria editrice vaticana was “grace and mystery” but on the occasion of his canonization in 2014 the paulines publication added the title “the story of my life”. 2the holy bible revised standard version, 1 samuel 16:1(rsv) says “ the lord said to samuel, ‘how long will you grieve over saul, seeing i have rejected him from being king over israel? fill your horn with oil, and go; i will send you to jesse the bethlehmite, for i have provided for myself a king among his sons” this explains that even before david was anointed had already been chosen by god. applying this to formation one could say that before a seminary formation a seminarian had been called by god himself. for example in the life of david, he was already a shepherd and the qualities of a leader has been inculcated one could say his formation was on the field he was called on the field. this could be applied to the story told by francis cardinal arinze that he was influenced by his former parish priest blessed michael i. tansi the influence that blessed tansi had on the lad, francis arinze provided a suitable ground for his seminary formation. this too is a mystery! 3 viéban, a. (1912). ecclesiastical seminary. in the catholic encyclopedia. new york: robert appleton company. retrieved april 26, 2010 from new advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13694a.htm. 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 pope john paul ii, apostolic exhortation ‘pastores dabo vobis’ i will give you shepherd, (vatican: st paul publications africa, 1992) 42-59 7“the spiritual year” in ikenna henry okoroji, catholic seminaries directory nigeria, 1st edition (abuja: catholic secretariat of nigeria abuja, 2011) 67. 8 catherine soanes and angus stevenson, concise oxford english dictionary, 11th edition, (new york: oxford university press, 2004) 1391. 9 “spirit” in the new international webster’s comprehensive dictionary of the english language (usa: deluxe encyclopedic edition, trident press, 1977) 1210. 10ibid. 11 fredrick c. mish (et.al.), merriam-webster’s collegiate dictionary, 11th edition, (usa: 2004) 1203. 12michael, fagun, “a theological appraisal of gamalian spirituality in acts 5:34-40.” an interview, ado-ekiti: september 23, 2018. it worth noting that fagun is emeritus bishop of the catholic diocese of ekiti, he was ordained as a bishop on october 10, 1971 he is an historian and he had authored many books. 13 fredrick c. mish (et.al.), merriam-webster’s collegiate dictionary, 11th edition, (usa: 2004) 1203-1204 14 catherine soanes and angus stevenson, concise oxford english dictionary, 11th edition, (new york: oxford university press, 2004) 1391. 15 fredrick c. mish (et.al.), merriam-webster’s collegiate dictionary, 11th edition, (usa: 2004) 1204. 16the new international webster’s comprehensive dictionary of the english language (usa: deluxe encyclopedic edition, trident press, 1977) 1210. 72 formation of the human person in the 21st century 17william m. thompson, christology and spirituality, (new york: crossroad publication, 1991) 4. 18 ibid, 5. 19ibid., 4. 20ibid., 5. 21donald dorr, spirituality and justice, (new york: macmillan, 1984) 19-20. 22abraham kadaplackal, the spirituality of the diocesan priest, (bandra: st paul’s publication, 2010) 15. 23 jordan aumann, spiritual theology, (london; sheed and ward stagbooks; 1980) 18. 24 ibid. 25richard s. briggs in kevin j. vanhoozer (et.al), dictionary for theological interpretation of the bible, (usa: baker academic publisher, 2001) 768. 26obi oguejiofor, “the world as summum bonum: impact of african idea of ultimate reality on christian spirituality” in marysylvia nwachukwu and augustine oburota, theological perspectives on spirituality and piety in nigeria, proceedings of the 19th conference of cathan(the catholic theological association of nigeria) held at st. augustine’s major seminary, jos 14-16th april, 2004,( enugu: 2005) 101. 27“what is christian spirituality?” michael, fagun, “a theological appraisal of gamalian spirituality in acts 5:34-40.” an interview, ado-ekiti: september 23, 2018. 28 hans urs von balthasar, “the gospel as norms and test of all spirituality”, in christian duquoc and claude geffré et al, spirituality in church and world, vol. 9 (new york; concilium paulist press, 1965 ) 7. 29 theodore w. walters, a guide for spiritual direction (kenya: paulines publication africa, 2015) 48. 30 viéban, a. (1912). ecclesiastical seminary. in the catholic encyclopedia. new york: robert appleton company. retrieved april 26, 2010 from new advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13694a.htm 31 it worth noting that this is a life story of the bishop who ordained me into catholic priesthood. cf. portrait of a servant of god: biography of bishop ayo-maria atoyebi, o.p. @ 70 (ilorin: published by catholic diocese of ilorin 70th birthday committee, 2014) 32 pope john paul ii, apostolic exhortation ‘pastores dabo vobis’ i will give you shepherd, (vatican: st paul publications africa, 1992) 2. 33 “what is spirituality?” michael, fagun, “a theological appraisal of gamalian spirituality in acts 5:34-40.” an interview, ado-ekiti: september 23, 2018. 34 hebrew word for pharisees https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/pharisees accessed on 3 march, 2019 9:35 pm 35john a. hardon, pocket catholic dictionary: abridged edition of modern catholic dictionary, (new york: doubleday, 1985) 326-327. 36william bridgewater (et al.,) the columbia-viking desk encyclopedia, (london: macdonald, 1968) 843. 37new catholic encyclopedia, vol. xi (usa: catholic university of america, 1967) 252. 38“pharisees”https://www.biblestudytools.com/dictionary/pharisees/(3/3/2019) 39 john a. hardon, pocket catholic dictionary: abridged edition of modern catholic dictionary, (new york: doubleday, 1985) 326-327. section 1: ecclesiastical/theological perspectives and seminary formation 73 40the talmud (/ˈtɑːlmʊd, -məd, ˈtæl-/; hebrew: ְלמּוד talmūd) is the central text ofתַּ rabbinic judaism and the primary source of jewish religious law (halakha) and jewish theology. until the advent of modernity, in nearly all jewish communities, the talmud was the centrepiece of jewish cultural life and was foundational to ‘all jewish thought and aspirations’, serving also as "the guide for the daily life" of jews. cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/talmud (7/3/2019). 41new catholic encyclopedia, (london: catholic university of america, 1969) 252. 42 francis pereira,gripped by god in christ: the mind and heart of st. paul, (bangalore: st. paul publications, 1993) 24. 43 john t. pawlikowski and james a. wilde, when catholics speak about jews, (new york: liturgical training publications, 1987)24. 44 ibid.., 25 45francis pereira,gripped by god in christ: the mind and heart of st. paul, (bangalore: st. paul publications, 1993) 24. 46francis pereira, gripped by god in christ: the mind and heart of st. paul, (bangalore: st. paul publications, 1993) 25. 47the new world dictionary concordance to the new american bible, (usa: catholic world press, s.d,) 2000. 48 gigot, francis. "gamaliel."the catholic encyclopedia.vol. 6. new york: robert appleton company, 1909. 26 apr. 2010 . 49josephus flavius, the works of josephus, (usa: hendrickson publication, transl. by william whiston, 2006) 12. 50new catholic encyclopedia, vol. vi, (usa: catholic university of america, 1967) 275. 51michael, fagun, “a theological appraisal of gamalian spirituality in acts 5:34-40.” an interview, ado-ekiti: september 23, 2018. 52bruce chilton in david freedman, anchor bible dictionary, vol. 2 (london: yale university press, 2008) 904. 53ibid. 54 pope john paul ii, apostolic exhortation ‘pastores dabo vobis’ i will give you shepherd, (vatican: st paul publications africa, 1992) no. 36 55 michael b. olofinlade, the mystery of god’s call: a reflection on discipleship, (ado-ekiti: afusco printing press, 2001, ) 24-25. 56 cf. st. john paul ii the story of my life: gift and mystery, (libreria editrice vaticana: 1969 in paulines publications africa 2014) 57 pope france message for the 2018 world day of vocation, vatican: 3 december, 2017. 58 viéban, a. (1912). ecclesiastical seminary. in the catholic encyclopedia. new york: robert appleton company. retrieved april 26, 2010 from new advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13694a.htm st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 139 st. augustine's epistemology and the education process abstract st. augustine's epistemology can be seen in his doctrine of divine illumination, where he distinguishes knowledge got through the senses, inferior reason, and superior reason. augustine was interested in education and he was a teacher very interested in how learners get the best knowledge from the teaching and learning process. he held that love of god, expressed through love of neighbour was to be the bedrock of the teacher-pupil relationship, but he did not clearly state the bridge or connecting link between the teaching and learning process. so, through critical analysis. this essay intends to explore augustine's divine illumination theory as the missing link between teaching and learning. it employs the method of exposition and critical analysis. keywords: st. augustine, epistemology, basis, teaching, learning, divine illumination introduction history has it that aurelius augustine, popularly known as saint augustine or augustine, the bishop of hippo, was born in a.d. 354 at thagaste, in north africa. thagaste was a town forty-five miles south of hippo in the roman province of numidia, which is the current algeria. augustine's father was patricius (a pagan), and his mother was monica (a christian). through his mother's persistence in pressuring augustine to become a christian, augustine ended up becoming a christian, and through his writings a rich intellectual 140 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 foundation of christianity was established in the west. augustine became enthused about philosophy through his reading of cicero's hortensius, when he went to carthage for further studies in his late teens. then he taught rhetoric in carthage and later in rome and milan. as a thinker, augustine was more of a restless seeker than a systematic thinker. he restlessly sought to unravel the problem of evil, which may be said to have characterized his intellectual and moral struggle in life. this restless search brought augustine to romance briefly with the dualistic philosophy of manichaeanism, and then dived headlong into the neoplatonic philosophy of plotinus. to bring a solution to his struggle with the problem of evil, augustine synthesized the ideas of neoplatonists with christianity; upholding the teachings of the bible but equally realizing that broad education was needed to maintain these teachings in the intellectual and political climate of his time.1 for augustine, the ultimate purpose for education is turning towards god, because in his analysis for the presence of evil, augustine notes that evil is not a being but human exercise of the free will in rejecting god who is the ultimate good.2 augustine believes that education helps save humans from the self destructive path of rejecting god in human's exercise of the free will, and he dedicated himself to delivering a good number of teaching and learning aid to facilitate the education of humans. this point is presented by raymond canning thus: augustine of hippo offers a rich resource for philosophical, theological and pastoral reflection on teaching and learning. already in december 386, four months or more before his baptism, he had proposed, in on order 2,7,24-19,51, a program for education in the liberal arts, the object of which was the vision of beauty, the vision of god. shortly afterwards, in his soliloquies, he had explored the epistemological foundations of such a program, focusing on the highest of the liberal arts, i.e., philosophy, the subject matter of which for him was god and the soul. then, in the late 380s, in the st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 141 dialogue with his son, adeodatus, called the teacher, he developed an accompanying theory of language and interpretation, a theory that would be further worked out and applied in his classic treatment of the interpretation of scripture in on christian doctrine dating from the mid to late 390s. it is not surprising, therefore, that in 415-418 as he explores different mental analogies in his work, on the trinity, he should draw attention also to the amor studentium, i.e., “the sort of love... that the studious have, that is people who do not yet know but still desire to know some branch of learning.... the more... the thing is known without being fully known, the more does the intelligence desire to know what remains.... the object of our inquiry is what it is that [someone] loves in that which he is studious to know.”3 augustine placed education within the realm of the search for love, and indicates that education comes through the instrumentality of teaching and learning. through teaching, the phenomenon to be known is exposed, while through learning, the exposed phenomenon is grasped. but a close consideration of the elements of teaching and learning in augustine's philosophy of education may leave one asking: “are the elements of teaching and learning in augustine's philosophy of education parallel to themselves or do they have a point of convergence?” this paper argues that there is a point of convergence for the elements: teaching and learning, in augustine's philosophy of education, and that point of convergence lies in augustine's epistemology. but before digging deep into this, let us consider two philosophical trends that influenced augustine. platonic and aristotelian influence on augustine augustine is ordinarily considered to be a platonist, and he even made allusion to the strong influence of neoplatonism on him thus: “in the regular course of study i came upon the book of a certain 142 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 cicero... that book of his contained an exhortation to philosophy. it was called hortensius. in fact that book changed my mental attitude, and changed the character of my prayers to thyself, o lord.”4 augustine held firmly to neoplatonism and was pleasantly surprised by its unexpected agreement with christian doctrine: therein i read, not, indeed, in these very words, but quite the same thing, supported by means of many and manifold reasons, that: in the beginning was the word and the word was with god and the word was god. furthermore, i read that the soul of man, though it gives testimony of the light, is not itself the light, but the word, god himself, is the true light, that enlightens every man who comes into the world.... again, i read there that the word, god, was born not of the flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, nor of the will of flesh, but of god.5 neoplatonism offered augustine the soft landing he needed to accept the christian faith, yet retain his pagan literary culture. so augustine belongs to the platonic school of thought, but robert c. trundle notes that “augustine is normally associated with plato's essentialism rather than aristotle's 'organismic' empiricism. but... both aristotle and plato presented paradigm metaphysical options. and an open-minded reading of augustine's philosophical theology belies some mediation between them.”6 the metaphysics of plato was attractive, especially to a thinker like augustine, for the fact that it made a distinction between two realities together with a soul that knew eternal ideas, just as the scripture made a distinction between unchanging spiritual reality and a changing corporeal reality. yet, plato's metaphysics loses its attractiveness in the face of the claim in the new testament that all things will pass away, and that includes knowledge, leaving only love (agape) that will endure forever. also, the new testament teaching of the resurrection of the body, which is ultimately connected to love, cannot find a place in platonism which regards the body as a 'dark' receptacle, obscuring st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 143 the cognitive 'light' of the soul. for these difficulties with plato's metaphysics, an alternative is found in aristotle's metaphysics, based on the fact that: ...it is easier for the later greeks as well as for augustine to embrace an aristotelian paradigm in which the mind, without recourse to a pre-existing soul, distinguished immutable universal ideas from mutable objects. for one thing, this was a simpler thesis. for another, this thesis would give an omniscient god some possible role in illuminating such objects. further, these objects qua unities of form and matter implied a unity of body and soul. though the later implied the death of soul and body alike, it rendered a personal resurrection viable and significant. [but].... the significance of the resurrection was tainted by an aristotelian view of a single reality that, while involving a cosmological principle of causation, proceeded ad infinitium into the past. besides an infinite past conflicting with creatio ex nihilo, it further anchored in otherwise transcendent god in a single reality.7 having pin-pointed the attractive and unattractive metaphysical options of platonism and aristotelianism, tundle submits that “it is reasonable to suppose that augustine limitedly embraced both. the platonic ontology of two realities explained the transcendence of god as well as both an inferiority of corporeal reality and sin-laden human condition;”8 which reveals the inherent fault in human knowledge and self deception in wanting to use just only human knowledge to solve moral and political problems, while doing away with god. the aristotelian epistemology explained the merciful immanence of god, despite its fruitless pursuits of godless utopias. it acknowledges the ordered and rationality at play in the world, and these tended towards empiricism, yet the medium of articulating them cannot solely be limited to bodily senses. this is in close 144 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 association with augustine's claim in the on free choice of the will, that persons “are forced to admit that the order and truth of numbers have nothing to do with the bodily senses;”9 a claim that is not meant to mean that the real mathematical ideas are to be found in another 'real world of ideas' but that mathematical ideas cannot just be merely explained out on the base of a materialist account of perception. to explain the fact that ideas cannot be limited to strict materialist account of perception, augustine in the city of god exhibits an aristotelian-like understanding of the 'infusion' of the material body of human beings with an inner light or intelligence;10 and with this persons are able to numerically articulate the various parts of mutable bodies that are said to constitute a body, no matter how small it may be. but then, augustine will count it as folly when human beings confuse the rational inner light, used both in nature science and mathematics, with the wisdom of god. this reveals augustine's leaning to platonic ontology of an unchanging (spiritual) realm that is not to be confused with cognitive knowledge. augustine notes this distinction in his on free choice of the will, when he identified in solomon's words in eccles. 7. 26, his futile search for wisdom: “i and my heart have gone round to know and to consider and to search out wisdom and number”11 to make a claim of having learnt something, would involve for augustine the dual understanding of one learning the rules of valid inference as being different from learning the truth of propositions. augustine portrays this difference when he said that one “who knows that there is a resurrection of the dead is better than another who knows that it follows from the proposition that there is no resurrection of the dead that 'then christ is not risen'”12 augustine acknowledges, from the above, that humans have knowledge claims that are based on inferences, yet he is of the opinion that learning a proposition's truth is better, especially a truth revealed by god. in this regard, augustine would opine that in secular reason lies an inner light which can be said to be a kind of lower wisdom, having its link and source in a higher wisdom, which may be supposed to be the light of god illuminating the lower wisdom of humans; this he expressed thus: st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 145 just as the objects which men see in the sunlight and choose to enjoy are many and varied, yet the light in which the sight of each man watching sees and holds what he enjoys is one; so even if the goods are many and varied from which each man may choose what he wishes […] nevertheless it is possible that the very light of wisdom […] is one wisdom common to all wise men.13 augustine notes that it is the sun that illumines the objects that humans see and enjoy; and no matter how many the objects are that are illuminated by the sun, it is the same one sun that illuminates them all. the illumination of the objects cannot and should not be equated to the illuminating act of the sun. bringing this analogy to the human act of cognition, augustine would reckon it foolishness for humans to elevate human cognitive inner light to an absolute light of god, and hence start perceiving themselves as gods. from the foregoing it can be see that augustine is principally influenced by the thoughts of plato, yet it cannot be said that he was not in any way influenced by aristotelian thoughts. augustine and the acquisition of knowledge in de magistro, augustine dealt with the issue of epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge. the style adopted by augustine in de magistro was to analyze language, its semantics and its semiotics, and the reason for adopting this style was for the reason that “knowledge acquisition implies learning, learning implies teaching, and teaching involves either the telling or the showing of something to someone;”14 and for augustine, the most obvious form of teaching would appear to involve telling something to someone. in this regard, meaning and concept are important to augustine, for the fact that something bears meaning and it is conveyed through concept. while not considering in this study augustine analysis of language as a medium for acquiring knowledge, it is to be noted that for learning to take place, there are some requirements to be met 146 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 according to augustine; and this he explained with the analogy of the birdcatcher. though augustine used the imagery of the birdcatcher in both de magistro and de animae quantitate in varying contexts, yet with regard to learning and the requirements needed for learning to take place, he used that imagery to show that, firstly, it is a nostalgic glance back to his youth which focuses upon the place of play and enjoyment in the learning process, the learner should be filled with wonder ('admirans' dm 32) and should want to know ('scire cupiebat' dm 32). secondly, and most significantly, there is the contrast, in the de animae quantitate passage, between the studious life of the young adult and the outdoor life of the young child. the contrast highlights learning through direct experience and learning through study.15 augustine used the imagery of the birdcatcher often in his writings, and this for him would interpret to mean that the birdcatcher is “...involved in the act of grasping discrete items of knowledge (as represented by birds) and is employing his equipment so as to gain this knowledge. the equipment is a metaphor for the practical tools which one is in possession of to this end, namely, reason and the practical tool of argumentation.”16 also, “the birdcatcher is instructing the spectator in the use of the equipment so as to capture the bird, or piece of knowledge, and in this sense is a teacher.”17 when a teacher wants learning to take place, he or she can teach through the form of telling or showing; two forms of teaching that are expressed in de magistro. these forms of teaching can serve to encourage or remind a listener to look and thereby learn. but if telling as a form of teaching is used in the learning process then it means that words must be involved, yet, augustine perceives words as empty signals except if they are already known; that is, a word taken alone signifies nothing if that thing is not already known. a problem that arises from this, is that if knowledge cannot be learned through words, then how can the words of a narrative, especially historical narrative, give some knowledge of certain occasion? to resolve this kind of problem, augustine considered a section of the narrative from the book of daniel (dan. 3), wherein ananias. azarias, and misahel were thrown into the furnace by st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 147 nebuchadnezzar because of their faith in the god of israel. it can be argued that the words of the narrative were already known, and so there meaning is conveyed. but what of the names of the young men thrown into the furnace, the words hardly convey the knowledge of these names? to respond to this, charles connaghan notes that, the story itself, which primarily demonstrates the power of belief, signals the response to the place of narrative within augustine's epistemology. testimony is, in itself, concerned with belief and not with knowledge. everything which one receives in historical testimony is most accurately described as something we believe (credere) rather than know (scire). this fact is observed by the authorities, upon whose testimony one must base one's belief (“...ipsi quibus credimus...ait enim propheta”), in scripture. for it is stated (isaiah 7:9), that unless one believes, one will not understand, which signals an awareness that these two items (belief and understanding) are distinct.... what one understands, one also believes, but one does not understand all that one believes. also, what one understands, one knows, but one does not know all that one believes – quod ergo intellego, id etiam credo; at non omne, quod credo, etiam intellego, omne autem, quod intellego, scio; non omne, quod credo, scio …. the conclusions provided by the above statements are that, although understanding entails knowledge and belief, belief does not entail understanding or knowledge. belief would then appear to be a prerequisite for knowledge and understanding, although not vice versa, and so belief is useful as a progression towards knowledge and understanding. this is to say, as knowledge and understanding require belief and belief does not require knowledge and understanding, then belief must be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for knowledge and understanding.18 148 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 what can be seen as established from the foregoing is that by reason, one can affirm that it is useful to believe what is known, even when human knowledge is limited, because humans cannot know everything. no matter how close or necessary belief may be to knowledge, augustine makes a clear distinction between knowledge and belief in a passage from the retractationes (1.14.3) on the de utilitate credendi, because for him knowledge has some additional factor which the firm reasoning of the mind adds to true belief. so the distinguishing factor between knowledge and belief for augustine is reason, because by this the item in question is understood. “justified true belief cannot, in this sense, be equated with knowledge, for such belief does not provide an understanding of something. it is only the firm reasoning of the mind, leading to an understanding of the item under consideration, which can accurately be described as knowledge.”19 augustine's philosophy of education augustine was very interested in education and though selfeducation may have been possible during his time, yet, he believed that it was better to have an educated work-force of teachers, who through their education and combined force can match on equal grounds with the 'pagans' of his time who boast of the fact that they understand and explain the scripture without the aid of instructional directions from anyone. augustine would argue to the fact that such persons may rejoice in god's great gift in them, yet they must not forget that they learnt to read because they were first thought by human teachers.20 though augustine's philosophy of education centered on christianity, so he advocated that the core of the christian curriculum should be the bible. deducing from this, augustine was advocating that if any educational endeavour was to be meaningful, then it was to have a core of concentration; and this is to be conveyed with sound linguistic method. this idea is largely gaining increasing recognition in curriculum development in educational systems of the world. in holding the core of the christian curriculum to be the bible, augustine was of the opinion that all other branches of learning may be used to help in the correct interpretation of the st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 149 bible: “let every good and true christian understanding that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his master.”21 following from this, augustine indicates that discernment must not be played down while allowing other branches of learning to be used in properly moderating the core of concentration of a curriculum of an educational system. to the teacher, especially the christian communicator, augustine stresses that a teacher must understand the principles of language, knowing the meaning borne by ideas that are translated from one language into another, and appreciate how ideas are communicated to the learner: “through words we learn only words...the knowledge of words is completed only after the things they signify are understood.”22 in this regard, there should not be a passive spectator in augustine's philosophy of education, because both teacher and learner must be active in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding. for augustine, the possession of virtue by a teacher was a principal requisite before a teacher can teach others: “do not look for an evil teacher; if a man is evil, then he is not a teacher; if he is a teacher, then he is not evil.”23 augustine was very particular about the teacher possessing virtue before teaching others because the teaching of the teacher will be more effective when the teacher practices what he or she teaches. augustine on teaching and learning in the teacher, augustine gave a more focused consideration on teaching and learning, especially in his discussion with his son, adeodatus, when he admonished him “to be discriminating about words, to question and test the assumptions underlying assertions, and to take delight in contemplating created truth;”24 and then there is the call on teachers to “introduce their students to the culture of the intellect,”25 because the student's intellect is central to the subject of education. this notion can be summarily seen in the teacher thus: do teachers advertise that they verbally transmit their own acts of understanding, or the truths of their disciplines, for students to receive and retain? what 150 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 father sends a child to school with the silly aim of finding out what the teacher's understanding is? rather, when all subjects, even those concerning virtue and wisdom, have been expounded by those who profess them, then, students, if they are really to be called that, investigate within themselves whether what they are hearing is true, strenuously putting it to test of their own interior truth. that is the point at which they learn. and when they reach an inner conviction of truth, they praise their teachers, not realizing that, even if the teachers knew what they were saying, the praise rightly belongs to the taught ones not the one who taught. men make the mistake of calling others their teachers when they are no such thing, since there is a near-simultaneity between what is said and what is understood, and where inner assent follows so quickly on outer discussion they think the latter caused the former.26 for augustine, learning takes place within the learner because of what is to be learnt and what that which is learnt is to the learner. in augustine's view, the purpose and goal of all learning exercise is to learn of god, that is, to learn that there is god and learn about god, because it is really the same god that is the learner's very life. this may go to explain why the teaching method that may be deduced from augustine's confessions is not strictly directed towards selftransformation in any classical sense of the term, but towards the total surrender to god alone who can transform, heal, and properly channel one's life away from self-destruction: “for what am i to myself without thee, but a guide to mine own downfall?”27 augustine’s concept of divine illumination: the bridge between teaching and learning the epistemology of augustine or his theory of knowledge is well laid out in his divine illumination theory, wherein he proposes three cognitive operations which are the senses, the inferior reason and the superior reason, and he noted that each operation has its own st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 151 unique and peculiar objective to attain. augustine held that knowledge of things like colour, odour, etc., are got through the use of the senses. inferior reason is used to obtain scientific knowledge because scientific knowledge occupies itself with the corporeal world and seeks to discover universal laws through the process of abstraction. and then, having knowledge of eternal truth comes by way of the superior reason, through divine illumination and not through reminiscence. espousing his theory of divine illumination in the confessions, augustine notes that the mind needs external enlightenment for it to participate in truth, because it is not itself the nature of truth. you will light my lamp, lord.28 with this view, he defines illumination as that which makes eternal truths visible. in this regard, ideas like truth, justice, etc., are made more visible, and the truth of judgment shown. in his theory of divine illuminations, augustine notes that the senses know only the qualities of the body because they are only concerned with the knowledge of this visible world. yet, he notes that the soul, which is part of the body, is not passive with regard to sense knowledge because “the soul is absolutely superior to the body and that it cannot depend on the body in any of its activities, not even sensible activities.”29 the soul may be superior to the body that bears it, yet the soul connects to the body because sensation is an activity exercised by the soul through the body; for the body receives sensation from other bodies, and the soul acquires knowledge of corporeal world through gleaning from the sensation received by the body. it is for this reason that augustine holds that it is through mediation that bodies are known: “the soul gathers the image, not the sense, of all the sensible objects.”30 this shows the pride of place that augustine accords to the soul, placing it as the engine room of human daily activities; and so it takes precedence over all other human activity. another way of acquiring knowledge that augustine spoke about in his elaborations of his theory of divine illumination was inferior reason (ratio inferior), which was the means of acquiring scientific knowledge. augustine claimed this to be so because of his notion that “scientific knowledge occupies itself with the corporeal 152 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 world and seeks to discover universal laws through the process of abstraction;”31 thereby making it an imperfect way of acquiring knowledge, since it is subject to human limitations and not reliable. the world is filled with a lot of imperfections, and since scientific knowledge preoccupies itself with the corporeal world that is bound by imperfections, then the knowledge characterized as scientific knowledge cannot but be imperfect and unreliable, and thus is obtained through inferior reason and cannot claim to be superior knowledge. augustine is not condemning scientific knowledge outright because science has done many positive things to improve the world and living conditions, yet because of the fact that scientists are human beings, who are imperfect beings, they are subject to failures and imperfections. scientific knowledge is imperfect because it is based only on the corporeal world, and denouncing any form of metaphysical knowledge. augustine holds that metaphysical knowledge is fundamental and vital for knowledge to be superior and reliable, and because this is lacking in scientific knowledge, it cannot claim to give reliable or superior knowledge. eternal truths are superior knowledge and they need superior reason to attain them. the central point in augustine’s theory of divine illuminations rests on the superior reason, and to this, augustine opines that it can attain eternal truth because of the contingency of the known object and the contingency of the knowing subject. augustine was not able to explain the knowledge of eternal truths with the doctrine of reminiscence, as plato did, because he rejected the notion of the pre-existence of the soul; rather he explained the knowledge of eternal truths with his doctrine of illumination. augustine acknowledges the corporeal world but also believed in realities that transcend the corporeal world, which are not attainable through scientific knowledge but through divine mediation. so for augustine, the attainment of real knowledge comes only through the light of reason grounded in divine illumination. since in augustine's consideration divine illumination is the need for one to attain real knowledge, and it has been established from the foregoing above that love of god through love of neighbour is to guide the teacher-pupil relationship, then it can be said that st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 153 augustine's divine illumination is the basis for the teaching-learning relationship. to teach means that the teacher has some form of acquired knowledge to be communicated to the learner. the starting point for the teacher will be to have love for acquiring the 'real' knowledge to be communicated, and then have the love to communicate the knowledge despite the human limitations and existential challenges that will befall the teacher. but the teacher, according to augustine, will not be able to acquire the 'real' knowledge to teach without divine illumination to enlighten the teacher's reasoning. with divine illumination, the teacher transcends beyond the knowledge of the corporeal realities which come to him or her through the senses or use of inferior reason, and is opened up to eternal truths or real knowledge through use of superior reason. from the foregoing, a teaching process guided by divine illumination is revealed by which the teacher can be said to be thought the real knowledge that he or she will communicate to the pupil or learner. in like manner, there is a learning process also guided by divine illumination that takes place with regard to the learner. in this case, the learner, moved by love for knowledge, surrenders him or herself in love to a teacher from who the learner reposes confidence of being led to the knowledge being sought. but the leaning process cannot take place if the learner does not allow or dispose him or herself to the guidance of divine illumination that carries the learner beyond the corporeal world realities that surround and may aid the teaching of the teacher, so as to transcend beyond these and with superior reason attain the real knowledge being sought. it therefore follows, that both teaching and learning are guided and directed by divine illumination, by which attainment of real knowledge is made possible in the process of teaching and learning. this can be perceived when augustine said: “truth, when did you ever fail to walk with me, teaching me what to avoid and what to seek.... without you i could discern none of these things;”32 154 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 for divine illumination guided the teaching of what augustine was to avoid, and the same divine illumination guided the learning of what augustine was to seek. evaluation augustine acknowledged that sensations of bodily qualities and the sensitive knowledge of colours, odour, etc., are obtainable through the use of the senses. the inferior reason can be used to obtain both the laws of the physical world and the scientific knowledge, while superior reason leads one to the knowledge of eternal truths that are obtainable through divine illumination. this in a nutshell presents a quick view of the epistemology of augustine. when augustine, in his theory of divine illumination, uses inferior reason and superior reason, he presents two functions in which knowledge takes on two opposing directions. superior reason tends toward the divine, the universal, the eternal and the immutable realities, while inferior reason tends towards the world, the contingent, the mutable realities. though both inferior and superior reasons are necessary to human beings, yet with respect to their hierarchical relations, we are faced with a choice involving the entire personality. in the process and act of teaching and learning, it is the whole personality of a person that is involved. a teacher cannot be teaching just with the mouth and other parts of the body are completely left out of it, nor can a learner be leaning with just the brain and other parts of the body are completely left out. so it involves making a choice to opt for the primacy of contemplation and hence orient all activity toward the divine and the eternal, or choose the exclusive exercise of science, and orient oneself toward the corporeal world. should there be a reduction of the human person to purely scientific dimension, then only self-affirmation will characterize the aim of human beings, just as the annulment of contemplation in the name of science has led people to use the whole in view of the particular. the vocation of pure science ought to tend towards contemplation, since through the senses it can have knowledge of the corporeal world, which should ordinarily lead it to contemplate beyond the corporeal world to get to wisdom, but because of the annulment of st. augustine's epistemology and the education process | 155 contemplation from science, it ends up in egoism, anarchy, individualism, etc. it may therefore be for such reason that augustine held that love of god, through love of neighbour, was to permeate the teacher-pupil relationship, and divine illumination guide the teaching and learning process. conclusion though augustine does not have a systematically treated document or writing on epistemology or theory of knowledge, yet it cannot be said that augustine did not have a theory of knowledge. to a great deal, augustine's theory of knowledge can be seen in his treatment of divine illumination, wherein he espoused that the use of inferior reason leads to the knowledge of the corporeal world, while the use of superior reason leads to eternal truths, knowable through divine illumination. in the teaching and learning process, characterized by the giving and reception of knowledge, the divine illumination cannot be discounted because it is by it that there is a basis between teaching and learning, for the fact that divine illumination is needed to attain the knowledge that will be taught, and the same divine illumination is needed by the receiver to understand that what is to be received is real knowledge. endnotes 1. cf. leonard, timothy. “st. augustine (354-430) – augustine and teaching, influence”, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1778/augustine-st-354430.html [retrieved 29/09/2018]. 2. cf. ibid. 3. canning, raymond (2004). “teaching and learning: an augustinian perspective”, australian ejournal of theology 3(august), http://aejt.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/395647/aejt_3.4_canning.pdf [retrieved 29/09/2018]. 4. augustine. confessions, iii, v, 7, p. 54. 5. ibid. vii, ix, 13-14, pp. 177-178. 6. trundle, robert c. (1994). “st. augustine's epistemology: an ignored aristotelian theme and its intriguing anticipations”, laval theologique et philosophique, 50, 1 (fevrier), pp. 187-205. https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ltp/1994-v50-n1-ltp2148/400823ar.pdf [retrieved 30/09/2018]. 156 | ekpoma review, volume. 5 no. 1., 2019 7. ibid., p. 188. [but] added by me. 8. ibid. 9. st. augustine. on free choice of the will, tr. by a.s. benjamin and l.h. hackstaff, new york, macmillan publishing co., 1985, p. 36. 10. cf. st. augustine. city of god, tr. by g.g. walsh, s.j., d.b. zema, s.j., g. monahann, o.s.u., and d.j. homan, garden city (ny), doubleday & company inc., 1958, p. 516. 11. on free choice of the will, p. 57. 12. st. augustine. on christian doctrine, tr. by d. w. robertson, jr., new york: mamillan publishing co., 1988, p. 70. 13. on free choice of the will, p. 59-60. 14. connaghan, charles. signs, language, and knowledge in st. augustine's de magistro, [phd dissertation], http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445358/1/u592678.pdf [retrieved 07/10/2018]. 15. ibid. 16. ibid. 17. ibid. 18. ibid. 19. ibid. 20. cf. de doctrina christiana, pref., 4. 24. de magistro, 36. 26. st. augustine. de libero arbitrio, i, 3. introduction background of study the insight to write on this theme came while in rome on studies away from my land and people. listening to the news from nigeria both in the radio and on the television became a kind of nightmare as a result of the many atrocities being reported. some instances might suffice here. there were cases of misappropriation and mismanagement of public funds; misappropriation of justice; extrajudicial killings; armed robbery and ritual killings; kidnappings and assassinations, just to mention a few. it prompted the question: is the prophetic voice in nigeria being heard loud enough so as to effect any positive change in the society? this is what then forms the background for this study: to look at the prophetic consciousness of jeremiah, a consciousness that made him to give up everything for the sake of his prophetic ministry. one sees in nigeria today a great number of men and women who claim to have been called and sent by god. they 89 an exegetical understanding of jer. 26:12-15 and the challenges facing the prophetic ministry in nigeria today vincent b. ojo go about as god's messengers and emissaries enjoying all the privileges that pertain to the office of god's mouthpiece. in the same society, however, we find so many atrocities being committed in high and low places, and the prophetic voice is almost never heard or at the least never loud enough. in this paper, an exegesis of jer 26:12-15 is done to prove that jeremiah was a true prophet who was conscious of his calling and mission. it also underscores the fact that a true prophet must be resolute and determined to speak to the different situations of life irrespective of whose ox is gored. it is sad to submit that our society today is not yet blessed with many such prophets like jeremiah. historical background of jer 26:12-15 chap. 26 is dated in the accession year of king jehoiakim to underscore the fragility of the political situation at the time. king josiah initiated some reforms which were both religious and political to which jeremiah gave his succinct support initially until he realized that the reform failed to inspire personal repentance because it dealt more with the externals of religion. henri cazelles describes this period saying that judging by the possibilities offered by deuteronomy (17:6), jeremiah became prominent in jerusalem where he enjoyed the friendship of the reformed group that sustained him in the difficult moments (26:24) but he had only limited rights to worship in the temple such that he came in conflict with the priests of jerusalem (20:26, 28). what he then saw in jerusalem showed fullness of corruption (5:1) and the strength of the resistance to the politics of josiah (183). that is, jeremiah became discontented with the behaviour of the religious figures and the people in jerusalem even after the reforms of josiah. werner schmidt also believes that jeremiah was favourable to the reforms of josiah but he warns: “jeremiah has good relations with the supporters of the reform (compare 26:24; 36:10 with 2 kgs 22:12), but at no point does he take an explicit position on it. king josiah is praised not for his reform but for his dedication to social justice (22:15f.)” (277). however, king josiah met his death at the hands of pharaoh necho of egypt at megiddo (2 kings 23:29ff) while trying to prevent necho from helping the assyrians against the babylonian incursion and his son 90 jehoahaz was installed in his place. he was only there for three months when pharaoh necho removed him and sent him on exile in egypt and in his place he installed his elder brother, eliakim, whom he named jehoiakim as king. this means within one year, judah had three different kings (2 kgs 23:28-37). jehoiakim was loyal to egypt as he was paying the heavy tribute to necho even at the expense of his people. he did everything to wipe out the traces of his father's reforms. jeremiah discerned that the idolatrous practices of the king and his encouraging the people to participate in such would spell doom for the whole nation. he then heard the word of the lord to warn them of the danger involved in taking such a course of action. meanwhile at this time, babylon had grown to become a super power demanding the allegiance of judah and so judah was caught between the two super powersegypt and babylon. this was how there came to be two different parties in judah namely those who were pro egyptian and those who were pro-babylonian. the proegyptian party wanted judah to maintain allegiance to egypt while the probabylonian party wanted judah to submit to babylon. jeremiah urged the king and the people not to resist nebuchadnezzar of babylon but to submit to him as this was the lord's wish to punish the people for not heeding the words of the prophets he had sent to them (jer 25). however, these words of jeremiah were considered by the officials of judah as treacherous even though the king zedekiah believed jeremiah but was too weak and afraid of his officials, the priests and prophets and all those who were pro-egyptian. they therefore regarded the prophet as being pro-babylonian and so a traitor and an enemy of the state (jer 27-29). this fact could have contributed to the hostile way in which the people, especially the religious authorities, reacted to the temple sermon and were bent on killing jeremiah. as barbara bozak puts it “jeremiah's prophetic message attempted to make sense of a constantly changing situation. after assyria's power had crumbled and babylon had grown stronger, jeremiah, recognizing the futility of an alliance with egypt, preached confidence in yhwh” (1066). the shock, however, came when he asked the people to surrender to 91 nebuchadnezzar of babylon as god's servant (jer 27; 29). what all this points to is that jeremiah was no longer seen as speaking the mind of god but the mind of babylon. he was considered a traitor. this may have also contributed to the continued suffering and persecution of the prophet at the hands of the political and religious establishments of judah. the historical background of this text, therefore, rests on the fact that the prophets, the priests and all the people, bearing in mind all the aforementioned, saw jeremiah as a traitor and someone not to be trusted. he was looked upon with suspicion and all his prophecies and actions were seen as such. hence, jeremiah had to put up a defence of his prophetic call, using his divine mandate to establish that he was conscious of his prophetic call. literary analysis of jer 26:12-15 the literary analysis of this text is done under the following sub headings: delimitation, text and textual criticism, literary context and genre, and organizational structure. delimitation of jer 26:12-15 the defence of jeremiah is a unique unit in chap. 26. in addition, there is an internal coherence in the pericope of vv. 12-15 that makes it independent of v. 11 and capable of standing on its own. this coherence is shown by the content and the language of the text which are different from the content and language of the preceding verse (v. 11) and the following verse (v.16). the pericope, vv. 12-15, is marked by the first person pronouns. it is the only place in the entire chapter where jeremiah refers to himself in the first person. the remaining verses are marked by references to jeremiah in the third person. besides, the content is also different from the rest because it contains the defence speech of jeremiah distinct from the narration of the events leading to and following it. the process started in v. 10 and ended in v. 16 but it is only vv. 12-15 that contains the direct words of the prophet. therefore, the unit, vv. 12-15, can stand on its own as a pericope. structure of jer 26:12-15 the structure of the text of jer 26:12-15 is concentric. 92 this means that the author ends with the same theme with which he begins the text. in this case, what is contained in v. 12 is repeated in v. 15. this proposed structure is presented thus: the proposed structure could be interpreted as a-b-a¹. this is a chiastic structure in which jeremiah begins his speech in v. 12b which is a. then from vv. 13-15b which is b, the speech continues but in a different tone and is closed by 15c which is a¹, because it goes back to the same theme as 12b (a). as noted while delimiting this text, jer 26:12-15 is a literary unit bound together by the setumah at the end of the unit. they are together because they contain the response of the prophet in his own defence before the officials and all the people as a result of the allegation by the priests and prophets that he prophesied against the city. this is the only place where jeremiah spoke directly in the entire chap. 26. this in itself marks it out from the rest of the chapter. from the structure of jer 26:12-15, it is evident where the emphasis lies. this is underscored by the repetition of the words ynix;�l'v.��hw"hy> which appear in both v. 12 and v. 15. yes, yhwh truly sent jeremiah to speak his words to his people. in other words, jeremiah is fully conscious of his identity as god's prophet and he is ready to defend it with the last drop of his blood. the order of these words, furthermore, forms a chiasm as the following table shows: 93 v. 12 ynix;�l'v. hw"åhy> v. 15 �hw"hy> ynix:ül'v.. though they are not worded in the same manner, a parallel is also formed by the words :l. in v. 12 and �rbed:l. abe�n"hii in v. 15 which may be referred to as a synonymous parallelism. this is due to the fact that they both have the same object, the prophet, and they both refer to the same activity of proclaiming. this is why this researcher thinks that the structure of this pericope is a-b-a¹ where v. 12b is the a, vv. 13-15 is the b, and v. 15c the a¹.b therefore, this structure can be summarized in pictorial form thus: v. 12b= a: jeremiah's assertion of divine authority 94 vv. 13-15 = b: new call to conversion and submission to b judgment v.15c= a¹: jeremiah's assertion of divine authority content analysis of jer 26:12-15 the defence of jeremiah as noted all along in this work is a turning point in chap. 26 and in the entire book of jeremiah. this is because it is the only instance in the whole book where the prophet was brought to trial and was allowed to defend himself. this however did not prevent further persecution by the royal and religious authorities. it nevertheless showed up the prophet as being able to stand by his vocation and defend it. ynix;�l'v.�hw"åhy> (the lord sent me v. 12) jeremiah opens his defence with the claim that the lord sent him to the people. this is a very strong claim by jeremiah considering the regulation in the book of deuteronomy concerning those who claim to have been sent by god whereas they have not been sent (deut 18:20). so, jeremiah's offence could vary from treason (by predicting the overthrow of the government of the land cf. 1 sam 22; 6-19); to blasphemy (by saying that the sacred city and its temple would be destroyed cf. exod 22: 8; lev 24:16); to presumptuous prophecy (by claiming to have spoken at god's orders cf. deut 18:20). the consequence of prophesying falsely in the name of god, if found guilty, is death. jeremiah was aware of this provision, yet, he dared claim that it was the lord who sent him to prophesy to the people. by so doing jeremiah establishes his authenticity as the spokesman for god in bringing the people back to the right track. jeremiah uses this verb to challenge the authority of his opponents, the “false prophets” according to the lxx. unlike them who have not been sent by god, jeremiah claims his divine authority as god's messenger by using this verb. though the goal is not stated, it is to be understood from the context of the oracle where god explicitly says: i have sent you (jer 1:7). the use of this word as sending does not refer exclusively to the commissioning of a prophet by god. it could be used in other contexts like sending someone to do something in the ordinary day life. however, it is still “the primary catchword for the commissioning of a prophet.” (herrmann 64). the use of this word with the subject, yhwh, points to a prophetic call. jeremiah claims by these words that his call and message came from yhwh whose mission he must accomplish. so in jer. 26:12-15, jeremiah used the verb xlv to underscore the fact that it was god who sent him. it is used in the transitive sense saying that god sent him to prophesy. the three components are present namely the sender (god), the object (jeremiah) and the purpose (to prophesy). the fact that this word is repeated in v. 15 demonstrates its importance and relevance in the book of jeremiah showing that jeremiah is convinced of his divine call and mission and has no doubts whatsoever about it. the words were not his but the lord's. k. o'connor puts it thus: “by affirming that yahweh is the source of his mission, the latter frame highlights jeremiah's claim to be a true prophet” (622). the word ynix;�l'v is put in the qal perfect in both verses to underscore this fact which is also to debunk the first allegation of his accusers that he has spoken presumptuously in the name of the lord (v. 11) in fact, the entire defence of jeremiah revolves around this verb because it is the springboard upon which his entire message rests. one can see the indication to this in the structure of the pericope which is chiastic. thus, the most important word in the defence is xiv together with hw"åhy> which is mentioned both at the beginning and at the end of the pericope. this is not surprising because the word was prominent even at the beginning of the book in the episode of the call and commissioning of the prophet (1:4-10) and he was very conscious of this throughout his entire prophetic ministry notwithstanding the few times that he complained to god (cf. 15:10-21; 18:18-23; 20:7-18). in the other prophetic books, this word occurs especially in the commissioning of the prophets. in isaiah 6, it was the prophet who volunteered to be at the service of the lord as his messenger when he says in v. 8�ynixe)l'v.�yniïn>hi “here i am, send me”. the prophet jeremiah at his own commissioning when he expressed his unworthiness to be god's messenger was told this by god %leête�'^x]l'v.a,¥�rv<üa]-lk'-l[;(�yk�“for you shall go to whomever i shall send you” (jer 1:7). ezekiel too received his own commissioning when god said to him: laeêr"f.yi�yneåb.-la, '^t.aa�yniüa]�x:le'av “i send you to the sons of israel” (2:1). so xlv is very prominent in the call and commissioning of the prophets. 95 there can be no doubt as to the importance of these words in the defence of jeremiah since the defence opens with it and closes also with it. the prophet begins his speech by laying claim to divine authority (v. 12b) and after preaching repentance to the people, he concludes by reiterating with an oath that he had truly been sent (v. 15c). brueggemann highlights the meaning and significance of these words when he says: “jeremiah makes an important distinction between the words he must speak from god (vv. 12-13) and his own personal destiny (v. 14)…. in v. 15 the prophet returns to the main issue, the summons to torah as the only chance for life in jerusalem. his opponents want to dispose of his message by a political-judicial maneuver. such an urgent, ominous word, however, cannot be eliminated by disposing of the messenger. the message itself will have to be engaged, because it is from god” (7). so, it is in order to emphasize the otherness of his mission and message that jeremiah used these words in two of the four verses that make up his defence. he has not spoken of his own volition but he had been mandated by god to speak all the words they had heard him speak. the reference, therefore, is not just to the message but also to the exact words spoken. this is the essence of the lk' “all” that jeremiah used to accompany the words in both verses. by this he removes himself completely from the scene while laying everything at the doorsteps of god, the giver of the message. however, he takes responsibility for the message by submitting himself to judgment (v. 14) because he is the messenger that brought the message. abe�n"hil (to prophesy, v. 12) that jeremiah is a true prophet is the goal here. the prophet uses the verb form of the word abn to convince his hearers that he is a true prophet sent by god to prophesy to them. the lxx distinguishes between jeremiah and the other prophets by referring to the latter as pseudo-prophetai (lundbom, jeremiah 21-36, 288). the word as used in the mt is in the niphal infinitive construct abeún"hil placing emphasis on his mission unlike their own prophets who have not been sent by god but prophesy peace and tranquility to them. jeremiah speaks against the prophets who have not been sent by god but prophesy lies in his name (cf. 14:13-16). 96 all the versions are agreed on the use of this word to express the authentic ministry of jeremiah. jeremiah used the niphal infinitive construct of abn to lay claim to his prophetic authority to speak in the name of the lord. the meaning of this word in the niphal sense is to signify an inspired prophetic discourse. he is under prophetic influence and whatever he says is not his own but belongs to the one who has sent him. that jeremiah is a true prophet who spoke the mouth of the lord is attested to in 1 chr 36:12. he is sent like any other true prophet before him to bring the people to repentance in order to avoid disaster and so what he is sent to do is to prophesy concerning what is about to happen to the people should they fail to repent which is what these words la, abeún"hil. “to prophesy against” stand for. what the use of nḇי strongly suggests is that jeremiah did not just say the words of his own volition but had been compelled by the lord to “play the prophet”. this means that the initiative to prophesy is not from him but from yhwh who mandates him to go and deliver his message (jeremias 705ff). this may have perhaps been the reason he used nḇי (to prophesy) instead of the usual ̓�âmar (to say) though he also used another word in the defence (v. 15) apart from nḇי which is ḏbr (to speak). this brings about the question of the difference between nḇי “to prophesy” and ḏbr “to speak”. the difference between them is that while nḇי refers to a prophetic action, �br concerns only the action of speaking. these two words are used in the defence of jeremiah in vv. 12 and 15 respectively though the targum maintains the use of pi��gâmayâ ̓ in both vv. 12 and 15. ta k e n t o g e t h e r, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s t a t e m e n t abe�n"hil�ynix;�l'v.�hw"åhy> (the lord sent me to prophesy v. 12) answers the charge against jeremiah by the prophets and priests that he spoke presumptuously in the name of the lord. this could not have happened if jeremiah had not been conscious of his status as a prophet and his mission to prophesy to the people. this is the argument of this paper that jeremiah, in the course of his defence, did not mince words in showing that he was very conscious of his prophetic calling and mission. this is the high point of the defence which is also reiterated in v. 15. 97 �~k,êylel.[;m;äw��~k,yker>d:�wbyjiûyhe (make good your ways and your deeds v. 13) jeremiah continues by inviting the people to reform. this word h��î�� can mean “make good” or “reform”. it is a term used for repentance. the people are summoned to amend their ways and conduct before god. this is a clarion call from the prophet that the people turn from their evil ways and practices. hence he says to them “make good your ways and your deeds”, that is, he charges the people to make their ways and deeds right before god. their ways may refer to their worship of yahweh in the temple while their deeds may refer to their conduct outside of the temple. jeremiah therefore dissociates himself from any shallow and superficial worship of god. the reference to “your ways and your deeds” points not just to the people's public worship of yahweh in the temple but more importantly to their way of life outside of the temple. in other words, it challenges the people's life in its entirety, be it in the temple, at home and everywhere they may find themselves. this is why j. p. hyatt describes jeremiah as a man who challenged the people “…and called them to find true salvation by practicing justice and righteousness in the sight of god” (34). their ways and deeds must be right before god if their worship is to be acceptable. laqßb�w[§m.viw> (obey the voice of v. 13) the use of w[§m.viw> is not like its use in v. 12 where it simply means to hear or to listen. here it also involves obedience. this word can have different meanings depending on the hebrew grammar. hence it could mean to hear, listen, pay attention, understand, heed, obey, grant, and examine, all these in the qal sense. here the word, used in the qal imperative, means to obey. in the niphal it means to be heard, be obedient or be granted. in the piel it means to summon. in the hiphil it means to cause to hear, proclaim, announce or summon (aitken 175-181). here as it is used in this verse it means to listen and obey. israel's failure to perceive god's revelation is often expressed as the inability of their ears to hear (deut 29:4; isa 6:9ff). this word echoes jeremiah's call to reform in 7:3-7 (lundbom 292). so it can be said that while in v. 12 [m;v refers simply to 98 the act of hearing, in v. 13 it goes deeper into the act of obeying what is heard. the people must as a matter of fact put into practice the message of the lord which they hear from the mouth of his servant, the prophet. however, it is interesting to note the way the targ. renders this passage. in place of the mt's �w[§m.viw> “and obey the voice of”, it has laqßb w�qabil��l��mêm�râ ,̓ which means “and welcome the memra”. the word memra does not refer to mere words but it is a powerful way of expressing what comes from god to human agents. hayward expresses the meaning of memra thus: “the word (memra) of yhwh is one of the most famous targumic expressions, … and seems to have a sense of a divine command or order which israel may receive (e. g. 3:13, 25; 9:12; 23:18; 34:14, 17; 40:3; 44:23), transgress and rebel against (e. g. 2:20, 29; 3:13; 11:9; 33:8), or believe in (2:2)” (hayward 31). ~xeän"yiw> (and will repent, v. 13) the use of the word here is to say that god will change his mind and not punish his people if they turn away from their sins. it is used in the niphal with a jussive meaning, that is, to repent (butterworth 89ff). in many cases in the ot, god's changing his mind is a gracious response to human factors. thus in jeremiah we often read that repentance on the part of the people will make it possible for god to also repent or change his mind. cfr. jer 18:8, 10; 20:16; 26:3, 13, 19; 42:10; cf. also amos 7:3, 6 (butterworth 81ff; simian-yofre 340355). the word used to designate the change on the part of god in the lxx is quite different from the mt. while the mt uses the word נחם “to repent”, the lxx uses pau,setai meaning “to cease”. here the lord does not repent as if a human being but ceases to carry out what he has threatened. the targum too seems to have a problem with the use of n�m for god and therefore opts for wî��� which means “will turn”. in this sense, the lord will turn from the evil which he has threatened rather than repent which is a human way of doing things that does not befit god. the mt however does not consider the use of n�m for yahweh as inappropriate or demeaning. in fact, in this chap. 26 alone, the word occurs 3 times (vv. 2, 13, and 19) being used for god and “the notion of yahweh's repentance (cf. v. 99 19) is mooted as a general principle in 18. 7-10” (carroll 513). the significance of this word is captured succinctly by an author, simian-yofre, when he says: “the syntagmeme of yahweh's repentance thus gives expression to yahweh's profound and fundamental determination to forgive, gives meaning to the prophet's mission as one of intercession, and justifies the defense presented by the elders” (340-355). it must be noted that the use of this word for god in the entire ot does not have the same meaning as it is used of a human being. god is not repenting from evil or sin but rather changing his mind from inflicting punishment on his people because of their sins (osuji 128). the import of this word in v. 13 rests on the fact that the message which yahweh has sent through his prophet jeremiah is not a concluded one. the people are given a way out if only they would heed the call to amend their ways and be upright. this is in contrast to the claim of the priests and prophets, jeremiah's accusers, who have given the impression that the prophet has prophesied the ruin of the nation. as noted earlier, their aim in not stating the conditionality in jeremiah's message might be to elicit sympathy from the officials and the people and thereby accelerate the prophet's condemnation. however, the prophet restores this conditionality in his defence which may have partly influenced not just the officials but also the people who now changed sides to be on the side of the prophet. he turns his defence into a form of offence by challenging both his accusers and the judges to “listen to the voice of the lord” (v. 13) (for more on the rare occurrence of a defence turned offence, see bovati, re-established justice, 114-117). ~k,_d>yhi�ynißa]w: (i am in your hands, v. 14) jeremiah begins this second part of his defence in v. 14 with a rhetorical genre called “surrender”. he says: ~k,_d>yhi�ynißa]w: which translates into “i am in your hands”. with these words jeremiah surrenders himself to the judgment of the “court” trying him for perjury or treason as the case may be. having stated his own side of the story which seems to be evidently clear to all over against the distorted version told by his accusers, the prophet leaves himself curiously not in the hands of god but in the hands of the officials and the people. it is curious because as god's messenger delivering god's 100 message, one would ordinarily have expected jeremiah to invoke god's help and intervention at such a perilous moment in his prophetic life. this is especially true because god himself has promised to deliver him from all his adversaries (jer 1:19). instead of making recourse to this lifeline that he has, jeremiah submits himself to the decision of the court. the question is: what does he expect to get from this haphazardly constituted court? majority of scholars agree with the way the mt puts it and based on this they extol the courage and resillience of jeremiah in the face of stiff opposition and imminent death that he is able to hold up his head. r. carroll calls it “a magnificent gesture of self-humbling which indicates a lack of arrogance” (517). w. holladay explains it thus: “jrm deliberately puts himself in the power of the court, a power that obviously includes the possibility of the death penalty” (107). for j. lundbom, jeremiah's submission to the will of the court is a veiled argument because it is meant to throw the challenge back at the court. he says: “this submission to the will of the court is actually a veiled argument, one that the classical rhetoricians called “surrender”” (292). o'connor also says of jeremiah's surrender: “jeremiah's surrender into the hands of his captors (v 14) dramatically underscores the decision facing the community which this text places before them anewto accept or reject the prophetic word. it is a matter of life or death for the community, and it rests in their hands (v 14)” (622). we can therefore say that jeremiah's submission to the court is a subtle way of making the judicial panel take responsibility for whatever decision they may take concerning him. he is right there before them powerless, defenceless and apparently forsaken. ~k,(yney[eb.�rv"ßy"k;w>�bajïk;�yli�-wf[} (do to me as good and right in your eyes, v. 14) after jeremiah had submitted himself into the hands of the court, he challenges the members of the court to do to him what is good and right in their eyes. he invites them to use their power to give him a fair hearing, a hearing that respects the principles of justice and right judgment. as officials of judah, they should be knowledgeable in the law to know 101 when an offence is committed and which offence merits a death sentence as demanded for him by his accusers, the priests and prophets. w[�d>te�[:doåy"��%a:å (but know for sure, v. 15) jeremiah introduces this statement in v. 15, the last verse of the defence, with an adversative particle %a:å a word which suggests a contrasting opinion from the previous one. it is a very powerful word in making comparisons. in v. 14 he submits himself to the whims and caprices of the court challenging them to do to him whatever seems good and right to them. however with this particle, he gives another dimension of the issue by pointing out the consequence of an unjust death sentence on him. the “only” here changes the tone of the defence and introduces in clear terms the likely consequence of the decision before the court. jeremiah begins the second part of his defence with a rhetorical argument called “surrender” (v. 14) and now in v. 15, he introduces another one called descriptio by the classical rhetoricians. in fact, lundbom says that this kind of argument could be used for both prosecution and defence. (293). w[�d>te�[:doåy"��%a:å which literally means “only know for certain” is a way of underscoring the seriousness and importance of the issue at hand. it is a form of emphasis given to the discussion by the play on the verb [dy “to know”. the knowledge spoken about here is awareness or consciousness. jeremiah calls the people to the awareness of the seriousness of the decision that lies ahead of them. this consciousness or awareness is very necessary for any imputation of guilt to take place. should the people proceed to kill the prophet, they would have no excuse because they have been forewarned. however, ידע[dy could also refer to god's knowledge of his people which signifies the special relationship he has with the people of israel (amos 3:2). so this phrase better translated as “only know for sure” can also be found elsewhere in jeremiah (jer 42:19, 22). the prophet had no doubt whatsoever in his mind that he was delivering god's message to the people and that whatever course of action they take against him would be tantamount to fighting against god, the sender of the message, and this can only result in one thing namely disaster. ytiao�é~t,a;�~ytiämim.-~ai�ykiä (for if you put me to death v. 15) 102 jeremiah continues by telling the members of the court that “if you put me to death” which is a conditional statement, then he states the consequence h'yb,_v.yo-la,w>�tazoàh;�ry[iîh'-la,w>�� ~k,êyle[]�~yniåt.no��~t,a; yqi�n"�~d"ä-yki “you are bringing innocent blood � upon yourselves, and upon this city and upon its inhabitants”. there is a case of protasis and apodosis here. this explains the communal nature of the sin of shedding innocent blood. jeremiah considers the possibility that the officials together with the people could pass a death sentence on him. he knows the danger which faces him based on the obvious animosity of the priests and prophets who are bent on his death. one might not be too certain what was going on in the mind of jeremiah during his trial and defence before the court. however, what becomes clear is that he lays the options before the people from which to choose, each with its own consequence. this knowledge is necessary for them before they make their decision concerning him. it is such a delicate decision to take, hence he brings their attention to the full consequence of that decision not only on the judges themselves but also on the whole land and their posterity (o'connor 622). some questions have been asked about why jeremiah chose this form of argument. was he threatening the judges in his case? was he intimidating them because he had a direct contact with god? was he even blackmailing them by preempting their judgment? a few authors have tried to explain why jeremiah employed these rhetorical methods. keown, scalise and smothers have given some explanation about the reason behind the way jeremiah defended himself. they say: “jeremiah was not threatening his judges with some form of personal revenge, a haunting from his grave, or a curse laid upon them; he was reminding them of an accepted principle of justice: the death of innocent persons… must be avenged or atoned (gen 9:5-6; deut 19:13)” (26). jeremiah could not have been threatening his accusers and all the people having earlier on submitted himself to their judgment. what he was doing was to make them conscious of the action they were about to take and to take responsibility for it. lundbom, brueggemann, barker and kohlenberger have all acknowledged the brave performance of jeremiah at his trial. for mcentire, the defence of jeremiah was an affirmation that he knew what he was doing and what life with 103 yahweh could meandanger and risk. he says: “jeremiah points to a way to live with this danger faithfully, while his opponents deny the existence of danger and claim god's protection from all harm” (303). the implication of these views is that jeremiah's defence was one that demonstrated courage, fortitude and fearlessness in the midst of danger, hostility and even imminent death. this does not in any way turn jeremiah into a superman who was not afraid even to die. no! what it only did show is a man who being very conscious of his prophetic calling was undaunted in defending it. he was also conscious of the fact that he was part and parcel of the people and whatever happens to them, he too would not be spared. in fact, it seems that the fate of jeremiah is embedded in the fate of the city. this explains further his passion and resolve in wanting to save his people from disaster even when they were hell-bent to enter into it. he continued to make effort to convince his people that the only option available to them to be at peace is a return to god and his commands. he followed this path of negotiation and patriotism till even after the destruction of jerusalem though he was often misunderstood by his people who saw him as a traitor. however, the love he has for god and his people would not permit him to remain silent (14:19). thus in this episode, he resumes the defence of his prophetic authenticity in the words that follow. hl,ae(h'�~yrißb'd>h;-lk�taeî�~k,êynez>a'b.��rbed:l.�~k,êyle[]��hw"hy>�ynix:ül'v.�tm, �a/b�ykiä�(for in truth the lord sent me to speak in your hearing all these words, v. 15) jeremiah goes back to what he started with by adjuring himself that “for in truth the lord sent me to speak in your hearing all these words”. in these words we again find all the essential features of a true prophet namely: the sender (god); the messenger (jeremiah); and the mission (to speak). jeremiah here reiterates the fact that he has been truly sent by yahweh to deliver his words to his people. this is his final appeal to the court before they give their verdict. carroll has this to say about these final words of the defence: “it is an impressive performance by a man facing death at the hands of a mob screaming for his blood and, even more dangerous, a 104 tribunal with the power to execute him. the editors have penned the portrait of a very brave man” (517). thus the portrait of jeremiah in his trial and defence is that of a man resolute and determined to carry out god's commands to the very end no matter the sufferings and pains that accompany them. it is therefore not a matter of blackmail or threat but a plea for conversion. the point of emphasis in the judicial trial of jeremiah in general and his defence in particular is the message that came from god and the need to be faithful to it. the defence brings into limelight how the words of god could be received by people especially when it calls to conversion and amendment of life. jeremiah finds himself at odds with the power establishment of judah because he dares to challenge the status quo to make it turn inwards and reform. by openly defending himself and his prophetic ministry, jeremiah resonates the need to distinguish between true and false prophecy as this would go a long way in determining the fate of the people before god. if they listen to false prophecy which ordinarily will soothe them by preaching peace even where there is obviously none, this will pitch them against god and consequently lead to their destruction. however, if they listen to true prophecy no matter how harsh and uncomfortable it may be, they will have sought the face of god and thus save their own lives (cf. 26:19). l. allen summarizes the events of the trial and defence of jeremiah thus: “that jeremiah's prophesying led to a public discussion of whether jeremiah should be tried on a capital charge carries the ironic implication that his audience was hammering a further nail into its own coffin. the community's response to jeremiah was a measure of its response to yahweh, because prophesying had been done “in yahweh's name” (vv. 9, 16, 20)” (296-297). the officials and all the people seem to have realized this by the verdict of v. 16 which acquits jeremiah of any wrongdoing. in their judgment, they simply negated the words of the priests and prophets by saying: � tw