

























Abstract
The sense of a possible moral world projects some 
developmental and social monitoring of human activities 
through the languages the individuals employ to express 
them. Such activities demand to be good in constituting 
social order, justice, and peace. This is possible when 
human freedom is put under the operation and 
application of the ethics of living for the realization of 
integral human development. This is against the notation 
of human development inherent in Ayer's emotivism as a 
moral theory. In emotivism, human freedom is 
erroneously and adequately maximized without 
recourses to the necessity of common social and moral 
facts that exist in a possible moral world. Such possible 
moral facts in the moral world help to checkmate human 
activities and some unguided exercises of freedom. This 
paper aims at critiquing Ayer's emotivism as a moral 
theory by recognizing that there are moral facts that can 
be socially and linguistically expressed to establish and 
sustain moral order. At such, it posits that no society can 
be ordered, just, and peaceful when every human 
individual is allowed to exercise his or her freedom or 
carry out any activity at will, based on personal moral 
conviction and directive as Ayer's emotivistic theory 

THE ETHICS OF AYER'S EMOTIVISM 
IN A POSSIBLE MORAL WORLD

Philip Osarobu ISANBOR
Department of Philosophy,

 St. Albert Institute, Fayit-Kagoma, 
Kaduna State, Nigeria.  

osarobuisanbor@gmail.com



suggests, without recourses to common moral and ethical 
facts or principles inherent in a possible moral world.  
The paper concludes that proper moral development of 
the human person cannot be achieved in a human society 
that so desires social order and probity, due to the moral 
relativistic tendencies it presents to the human society.

Keywords: Possible Moral World, Human Freedom, Emotivism, 
Moral Facts, Development

Introduction 
Understandably, the relations between language and emotions can be 
viewed from two angles. First, a language in a broad sense can be 
viewed as “being done” (performed) emotive. That is, considering 
the roles and effects of language in the expression of emotion. 
Second, in a narrow sense, language as a mere tool for making one 
express him/herself without reference to the meaning of such 
expressions. Put simply, man has the ability to make assertions with 
languages to express, most especially what he feels within. This is a 
rational ability or gift from nature that denes, most especially, his 
social identity, personality, dependence,  dynamism, integration and 
participation. Though man is an animal, he has a unique form of 
animal communication, expressed in different languages such as 
morality, religiosity, cultural heritages, medicine, technologies, 
socialization, sexuality, civilization, and so on. All these contents of 
languages situate some level of moral contextualism of the individual 
in a society of diverse and conicting moral and social interests and 
desires.
 Language, whether vocal and symbolic, has been with the 
human person as a subject of lived experiences. From time 
immemorial, philosophers have preoccupied themselves with the 
quests of solving in life. Ayer on his part, denes, explains, and argues 
for the verication principle of logical positivism, and he explains 
how this principle may be applied to the problems of philosophy. The 
term 'emotivism' is derived from the word emotion. Emotion is a 
strong human feeling, for instance, love, hate, anger, etc. Emotivism 

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 141



as a philosophical doctrine; is a meta-ethical view that claims that 
ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes 

1or feelings.  It posits that ethical languages and expressions are 
nothing but mere expressions of one's emotional dispositions, 
sentiments, and feelings towards a given situation and as such is 
meaningless. It opines that ethical principles and values are not 
factual therefore, meaningless. The emotivists' view get round the 
Logical Positivists who argue that moral statements are not factual 
but expressions of the feelings of the person who makes them. For 
instance, if you like something, you call it good, if you dislike it, you 
call it bad. More also, two people can consider exactly the same facts 
and come to quite different conclusions. In these cases, the emotivists 
claim that one cannot say one is right and the other wrong, because 
fact are separating them. That one can only accept that each is using 
moral language or judgment to express his or her emotional response 
to the set of facts.
� Employing human language and other means of social 
communication for the ordering of human actions and development, 
the conceptualization of ethics becomes inevitable and 
indispensable. In all, ethics seeks to device reasons for approving ot 
condemning human acts as right or wrong, good or bas, and as worthy 

2ot unworthy of a rational being.  Ethics though, many ethical theories 
have come up, like naturalism, which states that ethical statements 
are made base on natural law, but ethics remains what it is, the 
ougthiness of living and actions. Emotivism is a meta-ethical view 
that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions, but 
emotional attitudes. Prominent in this school of thought is A. J. Ayer 
who was a logical positivist.  The emotive theory was vividly 
discussed by Ayer in his book: Language, Truth, and Logic, and its 
development is strongly attributed to Charles Stevenson in his book: 

1R. Gaardner, Moral Philosophy: A Systematic Introduction to Normative and Meta-
Ethics. NY: Macmillan, 1967, 18.
2See, A. Echekwube, What is Ethics?. In P. Iroegbu and A. Echekwube (eds). Kpim 

of Morality.  Ibadan: Heinemann, 2005,  29.

142 |    Ekpoma Review, Volume. 7, 2020   



3
Ethics and Language.  In emotivism as a moral theory, Ayer thought 
that the meaning of statements are speciable in terms of the 
conditions in which they could be veried. In this light, when we 
make assertions like 'good' and 'bad', it is made based on our 
emotions. 
� The objective of this study is centred on the needs to 
understand the ethical implications of Ayer's emotivism if adopted in 
our contemporary society, and to arcertain that the indispensability of 
the moral facts in possible moral world. Methodologically, for the 
purpose to achieve the objective of this study, within the thrust of its 
limitations, we will discuss the following headings such as: Ayer's 
emotivisn as a moral linguitic theory in relativistic socio-cultural 
context; ehe epistemology of moral facts in a possible moral world; 
the ethics of Ayer's emotivism in a possible moral world, and 
concluding remarks. All these, are the foster the understanding of 
relativistic nature of Ayer's emotivsm and its contemporary moral 
implications, and to maintain or sustain the thesis that morality is 
placed on the contents of moral facts in our possible moral world.

Ayer's Emotivism as a Moral Linguistic Theory in Relativistic 
Socio-cultural Context
In knowing the moral contents of the languages used in expressing 
our feelings, many moral, analytic, and linguistic philosophers have 

4
reacted to, and are still reacting to such human development.  Here, 
many people besides the professional philosophers share the opinion 
that ethics is fundamentally about feelings or emotions. This view is 
called emotivism. According to the emotivists, when people respond 
to the ethical question by making moral pronouncements, what they 
are doing is simply expressing their feelings about something and 

3A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah, “Emotivism and Upbringing of Children in the 

Contemporary Era”. In M. A. Izibili, et al. (eds). Study in Philosophy and Society. 

Kagoma: Albertine Institute, 2018,  400.
4E. Imadon, The Popular\Rationalist Image of Science: An Overview of the 

Positivist View of Science. Ekpoma Review, Vol. 2, pp. 101-119, see,  111. 

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 143



5
trying to impose such feelings on others.  Emotive judgments are 
unveriable because they are pure expressions of feelings and as such 
do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. Such an 

6ethical judgment is not t to nurture our young ones.  Thereby, 
“morality will have an essentially communal dimension and cannot 

7 
simply be a question of an individual matter.” Language is the ability 
to produce and comprehend both the spoken and written (and in the 
case of sign language, signed) words. Understanding how language 
works means reaching across many branches of psychology- 
evertthing from the basic neurological functioning to high-level 
cognitive processing. Language shapes our social interactions and 

8
brings order to our lives.  Complex language is one of the dening 
factors that make us human. 
 The linguistic importance for the analysis of moral actions and 
decisions can be considered the basis of Ayer's emotivist philosophy 
of human moral development. Emotivism, as laid out in Ayer's 
Language, Truth and Logic, presents a different understanding how it 
is generally understood ethical statements. In emotivism, ethical 
statements are not statements of truth or fact, but statements that 
reveal a person's feelings towards a certain situation and the responses 
that they expect from others.  Ayer divides “the ordinary system of 
ethics” into four classes:
1. Propositions that express denitions of ethical terms, or 

judgments about the legitimacy or possibility of certain 
denition: Here, linguistic classications of objects and events 
are dened to know their cognitive relevance in order to situate 
their social placement for the valuation of the human individual.

2. Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, 
and their causes: Translating moral judgments into non-ethical 
intuitionist propositions, then assessing their social 

5E. A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah, “Emotivism and Upbringing of Children in the 

Contemporary Era”, 391.
6N. Preston, Understanding Ethics, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2001.
7L. Richard, Is there a Christian Ethics? New York: Paulist Press, 1988,  76.
8N. Preston, Understanding  Ethics, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2001.

144 |    Ekpoma Review, Volume. 7, 2020   



conditionings and interests, dependable on the capacity of 
which the individual employs them.

3. Exhortation to moral virtue: Here, moral terms can be used in 
arguments in which the moral terms appear in a conditional, and 
so, not rarely conditioning to the valuations- of the statements 
made.

4. Actual ethical judgments: Examining that, in appearance, moral 
arguments retain their validity, but very illogical, since they 

9
cannot be veried.

According to Ayer, moral philosophers have misconstrued the 
meaning of ethics. Ethical philosophy is based on a series of emotions, 
opinions, and sentiment, but rarely on empirical fact.  He asserts that 
what we understand as ethical philosophy is truly psychology. He 
highlights the commonly referred distinction between “right” and 
“wrong” as a difference in sentiment rather than fact. He explains that 
even if an act is unanimously agreed upon as “good “or “bad”, we can 

10never treat this consensus as a fact.  Hence, Ayer disregards ethical 
philosophy as a self-contracting practice and thus, non-existent.  He 
stated his mission on emotivism thus: 

A question which is often discussed by ethical 
philosophers is whether it is possible to nd a denition 
which would reduce all ethical terms to one or two 
fundamentals. But this question though it undeniably 
belongs to ethical philosophy, is not relevant to our 
inquiry. We are not now concerned to discover which 
term, within the sphere of ethical term, is to be taken as 
fundamental, whether for example 'good', can be dened 
in terms of 'right' or 'right' in terms of 'good' or both in 
terms of 'value'. What we are interested in is the 
possibility of reducing the whole sphere of ethical terms 

9A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publication Inc, 103.
10R. Bradt, “Noncognitivsm: The Job of Ethical Sentences is not to State Facts.” In 

Ethical Theory, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,  145, 

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 145



to non-ethical terms. We are enquiring whether 
statements of ethical value can be translated into  a 

11statement of empirical fact.

Simply put, using the positivist tool, he indicated that statements or 
judgments can either be veried in principle or in practice. And since 
moral judgments according to him could not pass this judgment, he 

12
discarded them.  Although; the terms “right” or “wrong” are 
incredibly subjective, we should acknowledge them as facts in 
extreme situations in order to establish common moral guidelines. He 
makes a valid point that philosophers tend to treat matters of opinion 
as fact. Nevertheless, if we were to treat all of these matters only in 
terms of sentiment, it would be impossible to condemn an act as 
“immoral” since it may very well be moral by another's standard. 
Ayer applied the verication principle of logical positivism to moral 
terms, and as a result, developed the emotivist meta-ethical theory. 
For him, moral judgments are meaningless, therefore, they not truth-
aptness, because; they are neither analytic nor empirically veriable. 
Moral judgments are used not to describe something but to express 
emotions, so they have emotive meaning. They are cognitively 
meaningless; but emotively meaningful (non-descriptivism). 
Therefore, there is neither moral truth and moral facts or moral 
disagreement (moral anti-realism thesis, so there is no proceeding 
rational argument over moral values). For him, moral statements 
have no meaning on them. Meaning that, if we take moral statements, 
especially not to have any factual content, then there will be no point 
in the ethical debate regarding the ways the human individual should 
behave. 
 Ayer maintained that ethical statements are the expressions of 
feelings or sentiments; they also arouse and stimulate feelings only. 
Hence, sentences which simply express moral judgments that do not 
say anything; they are pure expressions of feelings and such do not 

11A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 40.
12See, D. Ilodigwe, “Ayer's Critique of Metaphysics. Ekpoma Review, Vol. 2, pp. 35-

55. Cf, 45.

146 |    Ekpoma Review, Volume. 7, 2020   



say anything: “If I make a statement and say for instance, 'Stealing 
money is wrong,' I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning 

13– that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false.”  
It means that, for someone to express that 'stealing money is wrong' 
remains a personal opinion, and he or she does not imply it as a 
general rule, only makes meaning to him or her onlym since it is mere 
personal statement, not as a general fact. Ayer goes further to assert 
that,  “It is as if I had written 'Stealing money!' - where the shape and 
thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, 
that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being 

14expressed.”
 Ayer's emotivism is a radical theory that thoroughly rejects 
fundamental presuppositions like cognitivism, moral realism, and 
rationalism, on which traditional ethical theories were based. Ayer's 
emotivism contributed to the development of meta-ethics, in that, it 
directed our attention toward non-naturalist, anti-intuitionist, ethics 
and non-descriptivist ethics, and in that, it found out the practicality 
of moral judgments by showing their emotive meaning. He put it 
thus: “it is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not only serve to 
express feelings, they are calculated to arouse feelings and stimulate 

15action.”   By saying this, he modied the positivist's position that; 
ethical statements are only but mere expressions of the speaker's 
feelings. Furthermore, Ayer argued that if ethical statements were 
simply statements about the speaker's feelings, it would be 
impossible to argue about questions of value. Instead, he claimed that 
it should be obvious that we discuss questions of value and that the 

16
particulaly subjective.

The Epistemology of Moral Facts in a Possible Moral World 
The issues of morality are always within the projects of human 
experience. What is known to humanity is what the same humanity 

13A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 40
14Ibid.
15Ibid .
16Cf,  M. John. The Logical Positivist and Morality, London: University Press 2000, 
50.

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 147



uses as a hinge of morality. It is a naturalised ethical projection of 
human experience, which formed an epistemic foundation of human 
moral development. With the expression of human lived experiences, 
the possibility of moral facts inherent in human actions becomes very 
inevitable and indispensable in sustaining human relations and 
development. Socially, the human person is a being of experiences 
that are rationally, ethically, and intellectually classied. 
 The necessity for such classication is epistemologically 
justied on the fact, as Robert O'Donnell asserts that “animals never 
become scientists. Only people do. And that is because they combine 
their universal ideas into sentences (prepositions) which increase our 

17
human knowledge.”  The concept of “people' employed by 
O'Donnell indicates or presupposes the establishment of knowledge 
that is socially or communally based. The individual is ethically 
situated within the moral consciousness of the society where he or she 
belongs to what the moral society directs him or her to do. It is about 
trying to establish what is good or bad, or works with the society in 
maintaining the ethics that promote social order and peace. In the 
moral sphere, such development of statements out of human 
experiences, help the human individual and his society to develop 
some ethical statements for the guidance or regulation of human 
actions and events, and they remain products of human intelligibility 
and rational capacities and capabilities, as aspects of human 

18
beingness that differentiate the human person from other creatures.
 The agitation for the insititutionalization of the culture of 
peace and social order presuppose the interdependency of human 
lived experiences. It is about the social epistemology of the human 
lived experiences which is indispensably hinged on the possibilities 
of moral facts in expression of human actions. For Paulo Valori 
analyzing the moral contextualism of human actions in a world of 
nihilistic and relativistic conceptualization of development, asserts 

17R. A. O'Donnell, Hooked on Philosophy: Thomas Aquinas Made Easy. NY: St 

Pauls, 1995, 2.
18E. A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah, Emotivism and Upbringing of Children in the 

Contemporary Era 395.

148 |    Ekpoma Review, Volume. 7, 2020   



that,   “it is the task of moral philosophy to try understand in-depth 
this (sometimes dramatic) life and to become moral science. The 
difference between moral life and moral science consists of the fact 
that the former establishes, while the latter understands and 

19
explains.”  With the authenticity and subjectivity of one's life being 
expressed among other lives presupposes the morality of freedom 
and character associated one's lived experiences. According to 
Valori,  “the former (moral science) observes phenomena as personal 
or social facts in their freedom, subjectivity, legality, utility, and in 
their absolute or relative character. The latter examines the spiritual 
value, the ideal, the objectivity, and the universality of these same 
phenomena, as well as their rapport with the happiness of the person 

20
or of society, etc.”  the human person develops along his or her moral 
provity and sensibility, a culture he or she projects through the 
expression of freedom and character of conscience in pursiunce of 
social order and peace.
 Epistemologically, what the human person knows about his 
very self is what he uses to guide his actions and with such 
knowledge, he deals with others. Then, human ethical or moral 
knowledge and development are not an exception to the content of his 
lived-experiences. So, “ethics are not necessarily unrealistic. 
Likewise, utopia does not only signify the impossible. There exists, it 
is true, a bad utopia, that of a perfect society, totally harmonious, 
without conicts and contradiction. Good utopias are based on 

21possibilities that are not yet realisable.”  Within the ethical 
evaluation of human living, both good and bad utopias exist. For 
Karol Wojtyla, “the question: What of morality? is more directly 
related to the experience of morality and more plainly aimed at the 

19P. Valori, L' esperienza morale (The Moral Experience). Brescia, 1971, as in Dario 

Composta, Moral Philosophy and Social Ethics. Bangalore: Theological Publ. in 

India, 2000, p. 1.
20P. Valori, L' Esperienza Morale, 1-2
21 stE. Morin, “Future Ethics and Politics” In J. Binde (ed). The Future of Value: 21  

Century Talks. Paris: UNESCO, 2004,  242.

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 149



interpretation of it. Normally, when we come in contact with any 
reality, the rst question we ask: What is it? This is also true in the 

22case of morality.”  
 For instance, Quine's project of naturalising ethics is an 
attempt to settle moral contextualism, in any way, afrms the 

23
methodological inrmity of ethics.  “It may even seem strange that 
we have ready questions that somehow presuppose that we know 
what morality is. What asked, “What makes human actions morally 

24
good or evil?” and in posing the question in this way.”  Such 
questions like: What is morality? What constitutes good or evil? are 
all epistemic altercations that demand some regular foundation of 
what constitutes the true human knowledge, and what Quine's 
account on the genealogy of moral values is established by human 
linguistic relevance of the contents of actions. It owes that moral 
value is generated in the same way as it is done in science and other 
naturalised discourses is further the reasons why such actions are 

25
carried out..
 Within naturalised discourses of human issues, the ethics is 
normatively regarded as a science, and the understanding of science 
is situated on the fact that it takes interest in all facts that concern the 
human understanding of lived-experience. The actual way of being 
ethical for the sake of human development is man being sincere to 
any action he undertakes. He can only be ethical to this very self for 
being human when he is aware of himself that knows. The knowledge 
man has about himself determines his goals and interest, 
phenomenological concern for authenticity, and individuality. The 
knowledge of man himself cannot be distant from what the society 
provides for him. The issues for the epistemic justication of 

22K. Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality.” In Karol Wojtyla, Person 

and Community: selected essays. Translated by Theresa Sandok. NY: Peter Lang, 

1993, 132.
23See G. Fasiku, Moral Facts, Possible Moral Worlds and Naturalized Ethics. West 

African Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 11, 2008, p. 83.
24K. Wojtyla, “The Problem of the Theory of Morality”, 132.
25G. Fasiku, Moral Facts, Possible Moral Worlds and Naturalised Ethics,  83.

150 |    Ekpoma Review, Volume. 7, 2020   



morality are based on the afrmative understanding of whether moral 
issues are facts or not. If there are moral facts, then, one can 
phenomenologically assert that morality can be epistemologically 
justied. If there is a possible world where human actions are either 
judged to be right or wrong ethically, such rightness or wrongness of 
actions is possibly in the afrmative as a fact in a possible world. 
 Therefore, the existentiality of the human person as a rational 
agent and a subject of lived experiences suggests the possibility of 
moral facts since the actions of the human person mst be checkmated. 
Accoriding to Wojtyla, “we assumed not only that morality was 
already experientially apprehended in its proper perspective, but also 
that it was intellectually objectied. Since the question asks about 

26
actions that are morally is.”  In the words of Gbenga Fasiku;

What derives from this understanding of moral facts is 
that the actual wrongness of a morally wrong act is not an 
empirical entity; it is a fact because it is not corrigible in 
the present and any possible world. Though; the fact is not 
observable in the same sense in which natural facts are 
observed, they are observed by all the subjects concerned 
by searching through the entities in all possible worlds in 
order to see there is no fact that run contrary to the moral 

27
fact.

In a possible world, knowledge is possibly claimed when facts are 
established in line with the subject of knowledge. In ethics, as a 
normative science, the subject of knowledge is the perpetrator of the 
act (whether moral or immoral), while the object of the moral fact is 
the victim, and the medium of the fact to be established is the act itself 
(determining the means and nature of the social and cultural 
acceptance of the act). We know the establishement of moral facts 
from the means and nature of the moral actions, even they may be 
mere moral assumptions. Man knowing what to do with ethical 

26K. Wojtyla, 132.
27G. Fasiku, 95.

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 151



practices presupposes that the individual is aware that such moral 
practices remain facts that can be subjected to future references. 
According to David Lewis, 

The possible worlds are real in some way. In this 
conception of a possible world, what makes worlds 
distinct is that they are spatio-temporally separated from 
one another. In other words, every way that a world could 
have been is a way that some existing physical world 
really is. So, possible worlds are real worlds and they 
actually exist in the same sense the real or concrete world 

28
we inhabit exists.

Hence, we are asking about the contents of moral facts that are 
indispensable for human moral development, this conviction 
especially when our question takes the form of what still goes further 
and enters the realm of the basis of moral norms themselves, thus, not 
only do ethical question go beyond the simple question, “What is 
morality?” which must suggest itself to us in connection with the 
experience of morality, but they also, so to speak, “begin farther 

29down the line.”   Moreover, “naturally, man is eager from birth to 
death to know and discover what is unknown to him to have adequate 

30
information and knowledge to live conveniently in human society.”  
The establishment of this point should ordinarily provide a ground 

31for accepting ethics as belonging to the naturalist family.  Still, 
science cannot ignore questions that are less pressing from a vital or 
existential point of view, but not for the reason any less important 
from a scientic point of view. This applies in a special way to 
question the essence of morality, and how it is applied to the contents 

28D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986,  2.
29K. Wojtyla, p. 132.
30W. O. Aso, Rudiments of Philosophy for Undergraduates. Lagos: Fropiel Int'l Ltd, 

2018,  36.
31G. Fasiku, p. 90.

152 |    Ekpoma Review, Volume. 7, 2020   



32 of social development. To put it another way, the question of the 
essence of morality ensures that the questions concerning moral good 
and evil are posed homogeneously concenring the experience of 

33morality.  The experience of morality allows us to come in contact 
with the essence of morality, and, in direct relation to this, the 
question arises, “what is morality?” In this question, we are seeking 
the intellectual objectication of that which is given in the experience 

34
of morality.
 Humanity as a whole can only use its natural heritage to the 
fullest; if it does not lose sight of the library of knowledge that has 

35been left to it by generations past.  Thus the theory of morality arises 
by means of knowledge of morality as the factor that accounts for the 

36
homogeneity of ethical knowledge.  Like the human brain, it is only 

37useful if it is integral and assessable exactly when it is needed.  Put 
simply, the epistemic justication of morality seats on the 
phenomenological afrmative of ethics as a normative science since 
moral actions can be epistemologically regarded as moral facts. This 
is because, experiences are facts, and since morality or moral 
action/event is an experience, then it can generate into a moral fact in 
order to afrm some level of social, cultural, and scientic 
justication of such act or event. 
 In all, many ethical questions are epistemologically raised to 
situate any such justication.  Hence, thical questions – questions of 
the type, “What is morally good”, and what is morally evil in human 
actions? – Already in a way concern a subsequent issue. We are not 
asking in them about morality as such; we are not trying to understand 
the morality; rather, we are asking – based on some previous 
understanding of morality- about a distinction fundamental to 

32K. Wojtyla, p. 133.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
35T. Odhiambo, “The Future of Biodiversity” In J. Binde (ed). The Future of Value: 

st21  Century Talks. Paris: UNESCO, 2004,  209.
36K. Wojtyla, 133.

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 153



morality, the distinction between good and evil, and about the basis of 
38 

this distinction. Every moral question will be meaningfully 
answered when it corresponds with the moral facts available for such 
moral knowledge, and it is justiable to be right or wrong in line with 
the content of such moral facts. This distinction (right or wrong, good 
or bad) is possible because the social status of morality is possible 
epistemologically, that is, the statue of morality is possible when the 
moral facts are possibly established. 

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World
We have engaged in an expository analysis of an infamous  ethical 
theory called emotivism. Our expose brought to the fore the 
concomitant moral sleaze associated with this notorious doctrine. In 
an unequivocal language, it debunked the fallacious belief that 
ethical or moral statements are not reasonable statements but 

39
statements based on one's emotional whims and caprices.  We argue 
that the precepts of morality have their root in the moral laws of 
nature and as such not within the limit of science. Hence the test for 
meaningfulness, wrongness, or goodness, licit or illicitness, would 
only be; if it conforms to the moral laws of nature which Immanuel 
Kant calls 'categorical imperatives' because it applies to man directly 
and it prescribes norms for human conduct. This can only be done by 

40
metaphysicians and ethicists.  According to Research, Ayer faced a 

41 
particular difculty in defending this brand of non-cognitivism; the 
combination of afrming a redundancy theory of truth with the denial 
that moral claims can be true; looks suspicious. Though; looking at 
the views critically, one would discover that the views are not 
incompatible, the tension between the views is symptomatic of the 
worry that moral claims have so many of the features of truth-
evaluable assertions that one has to be unjustiably revisionistic in 

37T. Odhiambo, “The Future of Biodiversity” , 209.
38K. Wojtyla, 132.
39R . M. Hare, The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.
40E. A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah,  401.
41R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, 14

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construing them as non-meaningful. They are, after all, typically 
expressed in indicative sentences, and people appear to dispute moral 

42claims.  However, there emerged a more troubling point about the 
role of moral terms and how it is being used in arguments. Moral 
terms can be used in arguments in which the moral term appears in a 
conditional, and it is not their contributing to the expressive force of 

43the utterance, not expressing an emotion of the speaker.  
 Ayer's defense is that all ethical disputes are about facts 
regarding the proper applications of a value system to a specic case, 
not about the value systems themselves; because any dispute about 
values can only be resolved by judging that one value system is 
superior to another, and this judgment itself presupposes a shared 
values system. With indispensability of shared values system in 
human society, we accept the conception of the good in monitoring 
human actions. Here George Edward Moore's Indenable good 
becomes very meaningful in understanding Ayer's conception of 
moral emotivism in relation to the usage of human languages  for the 
expressing moral facts. For Moore, “if I am asked 'what is good?' my 
answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am 
asked 'How is good to be dened?' my answer is that it cannot be 

44dened and that is all I have to say about it.”  If Moore is wrong is 
saying that there are actual disagreements of value, we are left with 
the claim that there are actual disagreements of fact, and Ayer accepts 
the position of Moore's possibility of shared values system without 
hesitations. Ayer sees good as an individual's approval of a particular 
thing and an attempt to arouse similar approval from other persons if 

45
they morally accept it as well.  Ayer agree with Moore that good is 
indenable and non-natural, and at such, it cannot be denied by 
anyone not be relevance for one's moral development. But Ayer claim 
the he was misguided to think that it is cognitive, since good for his is 

42See, R. M. Hare,  15.
43See, R. M. Hare,  15.
44G. E. Moore, Prinicipia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903,  
7.
45See, Moritz Schlick, The Problem of Ethics. USA: Macmillan, 196, 91.

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 155



just an expressor or evoker of feelings, mere suggestion, a pseudo and 
46

indescrible concept which is neither true or false.   
� In Ayer's emotivism ts into a naturalistic world view, and 
because of that, it appeals to many philosophers as an erotic 
philosophy. It does not posit the existence of any non-natural 
properties like goodness and love which cannot be empirically 
discovered. Emotivism helps explain the strong link between making 

47
a moral judgment and being motivated to act accordingly.  Looking at 
it from another angle, Ayer claims that when we make moral 
judgments, what we are doing is expressing our emotional reactions to 
the thing we are judging. In sone indications, it seems possible to 
judge that something is morally wrong without having any emotional 
reaction to it, or even feeling positive about it. Two moral judgments 
cannot contradict each other if they are, in fact, just expressions of 

48 emotion. Finally, our practice of making moral judgments treats such 
judgments as propositional in many ways. We use them in logical 
arguments and draw inferences from them. We employed them in 
other kinds of statements and use them in an un-asserted context. It is 
not clear whether the emotivist account of the nature of such 
judgments can explain why we can do these moral arguments.

Concluding Remarks
From the foregrounding, there are moral facts in any possible moral 
world since there are communities of persons that need to be guided 
in achieving social order and justice. We recognize here that any 
formation of the human person by the theory of emotivism would 
have the animalistic instinct and inclination and passions as his 
governing propensity. And instead of acting under the precepts of 
morality guided by reason, he would act under passion where there is 
no law, there is no sin. Where there is no morality, no immoral acts, 
everything would be right. If all is neutrally neutral, then one will be 

46V. C. Anuniru, A Critique of G. E. Moore's Indenable Good. Unpublished B. A 
Long Essay, Deaprtment of Philosophy, Seminary of All Saints, Ekpoma, 2010, 49. 
47See, E. A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah, 391.
48See, D. Ilodigwe, Ayer's Critique of Metaphysics, 50.

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able,  ad libitum, to do whatever his or her whim and caprice urges. If 
putting on clothes is a mere matter of interest, like or dislike, 
convenience, those with emotivist' formation of minds may go on 

49
naked if they so wish.  For Fasiku; 

A moral judgment is tested against a moral fact that exists 
in all possible worlds; it is a fact because it is found in 
possible worlds, and there is no world in which its 
contrary is found. If, however, there is a possible world 
where it is justiably shown that the moral fact does not 
exist, then the moral judgment would not correspond to 

50any moral fact. Such a judgment is therefore false.

Arguably, for an integral genuine and authentic formation of the 
human person, ethical relativism and emotivism should be carefully 
looked at and possibly pushed for its repudiation in its entity.  The 
human family, the civil society, all agents of socialization, and indeed 
all those directly and indirectly concerned with the training, the 
formation of character, good conscience and personality of the child, 

51should jettison emotivism and its doctrine.  We can described the end 
effect of emotivism as oral annihilation, and any human individual 
brought up by this doctrine will end up being individualistic, anti-
social, corrupt public morality, and embrace vices instead of virtues. 
According to Eligabeth Afolami and Michael Uzomah, man is a 
moral animal, because, he possesses distinctive quality and 
rationality, which makes him a moral agent. He is capable of moral 
evaluation/approbation and disapprobation. Hence, obstinately 
denying man's rational ability to appraise social affairs, thereby, 

52
making man an amoral being is incredibly absurd and despicable.
 One may be tempted to conclude that the theory of emotivism 
is so obscure and untenable that even the emotivists cannot attempt to 

49E. A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah, 402.
50G. Fasiku,  99.
51See, M. Lacewing, Metaethics, Intuitionism, Emotivism and Prescriptivism, 
http//www.alevephilosophy/socialphil.com.
52E. A. Afolami and M. M. Uzomah, p. 404.

The Ethics of Ayer's Emotivism in a Possible Moral World   | 157



rear their children in an  a moral emotivistic and relativistic world. It is 
because of its grave consequences on the formation of the characters 
and personalities of such children. At best, emotivism can only build a 
foundation of a social and moral disordered society. For Williams 
Aso, “there is no society; in which her own appreciated cultural values 
and practices that often served as the ontological basis of the 
worldview and approach to issues by the members of the social group. 
There is no iota of equivocation to say that these cultural values and 
practices, no matter how imperfect they may be, are not just from the 

53
blues.”  This is on the thrust that, given the conclusion that Ayer's 
emotivism is unable to explain the meaning of all ethical terms used in 
moral discourse, and erroneous purpose of development and 
civilization in promoting relativistic society, only on the basis of 
personal conviction of what is right or wrong, it is reasonable to 
question whether emotivism should be abandoned as a meta-ethical 
theory. Anyway, we believe that emotivism still offers one valuable 
insight that can potentially explain important features of our moral 
experience, and thus, should not be given up entirely, simply based on 
one's exercise of freedom and responsibility. 

53W. O. Aso, Rudiments of Philosophy for Undergraduates,  36.

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