

























1 

1 

LET THE REAL FEYERABEND PLEASE 

STAND: INTERROGATING THE 

ONTOLOGICAL BASIS FOR A POST-
MODERNIST EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE 

HUMAN PERSON 
 

Prof. Isaac E. UKPOKOLO 
Department of Philosophy, 

Faculty of Arts, 
University of Ibadan. 

ie.ukpokolo@ui.edu.ng 
 

Introduction 
I consider it necessary to begin this interrogation of the ontological basis 
for a post-modernist epistemology of a human person with the 
assumption that there is a necessary relationship between metaphysics 
and epistemology. It is difficult to think of an epistemological stance 
without a corresponding metaphysics. By extension, it would be difficult 
to think of an epistemology of the human person without a given 
ontological stance. Ontology is the science of ‘being’ in general, covering 
such issues as the nature of existence and categorial structure of reality. 
As a term, ‘ontology’ has some additional special uses in philosophy. It is 
used to refer to the set of things whose existence is acknowledged by a 
particular theory or system of thought: it is in this sense that one speaks 
of ‘the ontology of a theory’.1  To this extent, the post-modernist 
epistemology of the human person must rests on a given ontological 
scheme, and interrogating this ontological scheme is the point of focus 
for this essay. The work, therefore, considers the metaphysical ground or 
justification of a post-modernist theory of cognition concerning the 
human person. In other words, the work raises the question, how does 
the postmodern condition influence our cognitive process concerning 
the nature of the human person?    
 
 



2 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

The Received View of Rationality 
Since the 17th century, rationality has been understood through a matrix 
of relations between ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, ‘certainty’ and ‘reality’. This has 
been identified with a certain unique framework of principles and 
methods with reference to which we are to secure truth and objective 
knowledge; an impartial stand point for meaningful discussion, appraisal, 
comparison, and judgment. The task of identifying and characterizing 
this framework is one of the starting point of human inquiry in general 
and philosophy in particular.  

The Cartesian epistemological program initiated in the 17th 
century, presents one of the attempts at developing a system of principles 
and methods for conducting human inquiry. Inspired by the desire for 
reliable knowledge, Descartes constructed a system which he bequeathed 
to modern thought of which he is often described as the father.2 This 
system had the background assumption that, the order of nature is fixed 
and stable, and that the human mind acquired mastery of it by operating 
in accordance with principles of understanding that are equally fixed and 
universal.3 To most seventeenth century thinkers, this assumption was 
beyond question. It did not only influence the understanding of 
rationality at the time, it also determined the type of epistemological 
question that could be raised.4  
 In addition to this assumption, there is a certain disposition of the 
mind – a certain anxiety5 expressed in the belief that in our 
understanding of reality and our interaction with it, only two options are 
open to us: either we are equipped with some permanent, historical 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal or we are ineluctably led to 
relativism, historicism, scepticism, and irrationalism. And so, we are 
always faced with a choice between a certain binding set of ideals and 
epistemological chaos.6  
 It was generally believed that to resolve this anxiety, we require a 
fixed framework of universal and foundational principles. Descartes saw 
this and embarked on a search for what he called an “Archimedean 
point” in his Meditations.7 Beginning with the first meditation, he says,  
It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that 
I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and doubtful was 
everything I had constructed on this basis: and … I was convinced that I 
must once, for all, seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions 
which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the 
foundation, if I want to establish any firm and permanent structure…8  

The need for this project of establishing a securely grounded 
thought system is compared to the vision Archimedes. Thus, in the 
second meditation Descartes writes:  



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Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its 
place, demanded that one point be fixed and immovable. In the same 
way, I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough 
to discover one thing only which is certain and immutable.9  
 In Descartes’s view, the principles that guide our understanding of 
the world consists in the correspondence between “ideas” which the 
human mind found “distinct” and “clear” (such as the basic concepts of 
Euclid’s geometry) and aspects of the world. It is in this correspondence 
that we establish the foundations of knowledge as well as the standard of 
rationality. Thus, at the very base of knowledge is, according to 
Descartes, the neutral activity of reason.10  

An adequate analysis of the received view of rationality must 
consider the contribution of Descartes and Bacon to the development of 
ideas. In the 17th century, Aristotle’s science faced challenges in the light 
of new discoveries in physics, astronomy and anatomy. Francis Bacon is 
often taken to be the spokesman to the new spirit and new method of 
science. His idea about scientific method subsequently became known as 
Beaconian induction, and is expressed in his Novum Organum.11 In a 
general sense, Bacon’s contribution to modern thought can be discussed 
at two related levels. The first level concerns the classification of 
knowledge. This is laid out in book 1 of the Novum Organum. In it, he 
made what was probably the first systematic attempt to express a 
psychological motives and human interests that often lie behind various 
forms of philosophical outlooks. He discussed what he called “idols of 
the mind” which had up to his own time persistently stood in the way of 
objective knowledge, dominated and distorted men’s mind and delayed 
the acquisition of true knowledge.  The “idols of the tribe”, for instance, 
are tendencies to see things in relation to one’s own self, rather than as 
they are in themselves. In Bacons view, man is not the measure of all 
things and we unthinkingly tend to impose order on phenomena which 
is not there. If we would command nature, he says, we must first learn to 
obey her. There are “idols of the cave”, which are the predispositions of 
character and learning with which different individuals approach facts, 
rather than seeing them as there really are. The “idols of the market 
place” arise through the use of language, when we read back into nature, 
conceptions that have arisen through our using words, which actually 
stand for nothing. Bacon also identifies “idols of the theatre” which are 
due to the influence of philosophical system of our mind. In his view, we 
should not be misled by Aristotle’s talk of experimentation and 
observation. Someone in the grip of a philosophical system, he says, 
including Aristotle himself had come to his conclusion before he did his 
experiment. The second level has to do with a new method of 
investigation, set forth in the most empiricist form.  This consists in 



4 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

making experiments and drawing general conclusions from them. These 
conclusions are then tested in further experiments.12 Bacon’s position is 
primarily an attack against what he called the sterility of pure deductive 
logic, which is never really able to increase knowledge. He insisted that 
the traditional syllogism was not a means of discovery, but only an aid for 
exhibiting the deductive consequences of what is already known. He also 
attacked the older induction by simple enumeration which applies only 
when the class of “all” things referred to is finite and accessible, as in the 
statement: “the founding members of the Royal Society are all males and 
over the age of thirty years”.13 Bacon’s new method of induction was 
believed to go beyond this Aristotelian method because it is able to 
produce generalisations about “all” things, not simple about some 
property of members of a finite enumeration.  
 However, Bacon was not unaware of the fact that we cannot prove 
the truth of an induction in a general sense. The idea of “all”, he says, 
must always include the thought that there may be found an exception to 
the inductive generalisation, as this is always based on a finite number of 
instances. In this way, Bacon proposed that a single negative experience 
was all we needed to falsify an induction. Thus, although it was G.H. 
Von Wright and Karl R. Popper that expounded much later the principle 
that the laws of nature and theories are not verifiable, but only falsifiable, 
the credit of initial recognition of this principle should go to Francis 
Bacon.14 Science, he thought, would develop by compiling vast tables of 
actual data accumulated with the help of experiment and observation. Of 
course, he believed that the mere accumulation of facts would not 
necessarily yield knowledge. There must be, he argues, a selection whose 
establishment is also quite problematic.15 
 Nevertheless, many scientists are known to have expressed, in 
varying degree, their adherence to Baconnian philosophy. For instance, 
Isaac Newton in his Principia (1682), explored and extended the 
inductive method from qualities of bodies on which experiments can 
actually be performed to “qualities of all bodies universally” (Rule 3, Bk. 
3). In his words, 
The sum total facts, which are not only given in sense experience but 
also the experimental philosophical propositions gathered from 
phenomena by induction, should be considered either exactly or very 
nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, until yet other 
phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to 
exception.16  

Bacon’s writings inspired the concern by British philosophers for 
the analysis of the nature of inductive reasoning, a concern which 
culminated in J.S. Mill’s System of Logic (1843). Importantly, while 
Bacon’s classification of knowledge stands widely adopted, his 



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understanding of scientific methods presents an adequate framework. 
This is because he failed to appreciate the sense in which mathematics 
was already the language of science. He also underestimated the use of 
scientist need to make of imaginative hypotheses.17 On this, he was 
criticized memorably by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason 
(B.XII. 4).  

Yet, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Austrian 
philosopher and physicist, Ernst Mach (1838-1926) adopted Bacon’s 
epistemology in his The Science of Mechanics (1893) and The Analysis of 
Sensation (1914). In his view, science is no more than a conceptual 
reflection upon facts whose elements are contents of consciousness, and 
are given to us in sensation. This means that scientific statements or 
theoretical terms must be reducible to statements about sensations.18 
This is contained in his famous “Doctrine of Elements”. 

 
Science as the Paradigm of Rationality 
From the foregoing, we are presented with the idea of rationality as a 
privileged framework of principles and methods to which we can 
ultimately appeal in our understanding of reality. It was noted that the 
attempt to codify these principles and methods found its significant 
expression first in the programmes based on the (new inductive) method 
of inquiry advocated by Francis Bacon in combination with the analytic 
method of deductive reasoning emphasized by Rene Descartes.19 The 
concern of these men was mainly to establish a “theory of knowledge”, to 
discover a unique set of terms into which discourses may be reduced, or 
some privileged vocabulary by means of which discourses may be 
rendered commensurable. The programmes of inquiry initiated in the 
modern period were essentially attempts to establish our discourses on a 
secure foundation; that is, to justify our beliefs and actions, goals and 
policies with reference to a certain universal “tribunal of judgment”.20  
 The validity of this foundationalist task of epistemology was 
reiterated during the first half of the twentieth century in the works of 
philosophers in the analytic tradition who sought to ground human 
knowledge in, or reduce all discourses to, a certain system of formal 
language.21 Rooted in the works of Gottlob Frege, the analytic tradition 
influenced the works of Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick and several others 
whose ultimate concern was how to make philosophy rigorous and 
scientific.22 They initiated a new tendency in philosophy, re-orienting 
epistemology towards an ideal system of propositions and methods; a 
complex of principles and rules. It is with reference to such a system that 
theories are to be constructed and corroborated.23 The general aim of the 
new tendency was to sustain an adequate analysis of the character of 



6 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

scientific investigations.24 And so, epistemology as a “transcendental” 
inquiry into the meaning and conditions of knowledge was gradually 
replaced by a methodology pursued with an understanding of science as 
the source of genuine knowledge and paradigm of rationality.25 

The first significant representation of science as the paradigm of 
rationality and model of genuine knowledge, came with the positivist 
orientation. Positivism, along with phenomenalism, pragmatism, 
operationalism, and empirico-criticism, belong to the empiricist 
tendency. For the positivist, an inquiry into the conditions of knowledge 
can be meaningfully pursued only as a methodological inquiry into the 
principles and methods for the construction and corroboration of 
scientific theories. Thus, at the heart of the positivist philosophy of 
science is the belief in the exclusive validity of science. 

In his contribution, Karl Popper argued that the problem of this 
age, which is the possibility and method of achieving progress in human 
knowledge, can be resolved only in the appreciating of the growth of 
scientific knowledge. In this regard, it is in following the principles and 
procedures of scientific inquiry that we are likely to arrive at a system 
that accurately depicts the world.26 Thus, researchers in various fields of 
inquiry, ranging from history to psychology and sociology, which have, 
with much vigour, engaged in the quest for laws and theories, usually felt 
apologetic whenever their discipline fell short of the ideas derived from 
physical science. In the field of education, curriculum theorists have 
often considered science to be one of the basics, and since the time of 
Herbert Spencer it has been regarded as an indispensable component of 
liberal education.27  
 The overwhelming popularity of this image of science arises, at least 
in part, from the great successes of recent science, particularly, physics.28 
In explaining this success, scientists argue that science has evolved some 
procedures of inquiry, and that the observed developments in science 
have been determined by acting on the basis of the outcome of the 
application of these procedures. These procedures constitute the 
scientific method, a privileged method in the hands of the scientific 
community, which disinterestedly and detachedly employs it to reach the 
scientific goals.29  
 
The Post-Modernist World View30 
In recent times, particularly since the second half of the twentieth-
century, the intellectual world has witnessed the emergence of a certain 
shift in attitude towards reality (metaphysics or ontology), rationality and 
truth; a rejection of what could be referred to as the ‘received view’, and 
accompanied by a neo-Protagorean relativism. The idea of the ‘received 
view’ of rationality is here identified with the idea of a universal, 



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foundational, permanent framework of thought and discourse developed 
in the 17th century. The programs of discourse that represents this shift 
include those developed by Thomas Kuhn, Peter Winch, Donald 
Davidson, Paul K. Feyerabend and a host of others.  

In his program, Paul Feyerabend proposed a pluralist conception 
of rationality, in particular, and worldview in general and meant to 
present this to stand in place of the enlightenment program characteristic 
of the modern period. For him, the modernist project has been shown to 
be sterile.31  

The present study identifies the positivist worldview that 
constitutes the climax of modernism as well as the pluralist orientations 
of the post-modern which ushered in a rather reckless relativism. The 
study then goes further to establish a rejection of both positivist and 
post-positivist projects for reasons to be stated, and presents an 
alternative epistemology of the human person founded on a given 
ontology, while employing the methodology of education and a given 
scepticism to enhance a robust representation of the human person.  
 
Feyerabend’s ‘Post’ in the Post-Modern 
In his representation, Paul K. Feyerabend sees the commitment to just 
one theoretical framework or cognitive scheme as ‘Monomania’. The 
clearest form of this criticism today is best identified with Paul 
Feyerabend’s postmodern orientation. A number of assumptions 
underscore his position. One such assumption is that, the theories, facts, 
and procedures that constitute the scientific knowledge of a particular 
time result from specific historical developments, and any such 
information cannot be about history-independent facts and laws – a 
rejection of the idea that tradition-independent points of view can 
overrule traditions. There are different points of view, ways of thinking 
and knowing. In the same vain, scientific theories branch out in different 
directions, use different and sometimes incommensurable concepts, and 
evaluate events in diverse ways. What counts as evidence or as an 
important or sound science or scientific procedure depends on time, 
profession and the research group. Nature can be and is indeed 
approached in many ways, and for every statement, theory or point of 
view believed to be true with good reasons, there exists conflicting 
arguments. Human experience, is not restricted to merely intellectual 
matters, but includes concrete human feelings, faiths and empathy, and 
involves more than just one single medium of discussion.  And so, Paul 
K. Feyerabend is opposed to a certain program or tendency which, for 
want of a better name, is referred to as “Methodism”, the idea of a 
method that contains fixed and binding principles for conducting the 



8 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

business of science, politics or ethics. For Feyerabend, science is not the 
paradigm of rationality. It is just a belief like any other. 

From the point of view of ethics, he privileges ethics without 
ontology. Furthermore, he proposes a movement from “boundaries 
without values to values without boundaries”.32 The core of Feyerabends 
moral philosophy is what he expressed in Killing Time, concerning the 
nature of moral character. For him, “A moral character cannot be created 
by arguments, education, or an act of will. It cannot be created by any 
kind of planned action, whether scientific, political, moral or religious”.33 
Here, Feyerabend indicates what should not be associated with moral 
character or where it does not derive from. Morality is not a product of 
education or any rational intentional, planned action. He compares moral 
character with what he calls “true love, which he says is a gift, not an 
achievement”. For him, the source or basis of morality or moral 
character is accidental, such as parental affection and friendship. These, 
he says, constitute the condition for some kind of stability or balance 
between what he refers to as “self-confidence” and “a concern for 
others”.34 According to him, it is possible for us to create these 
conditions: conditions that are meant to ensure the needed balance as we 
are never able to create the balance itself. It is only when the balance is 
enhanced, that the idea of guilt, responsibility, and obligation make real 
sense. But without the balance between self-confidence and concern for 
others, these ideas become not just empty words but obstacles.35 The idea 
of self-confidence of course, connotes a reliance on ones abilities – 
abilities to engage one’s experience, one’s environment and one’s reality. 
The product of employing this ability is to enhance the individual’s 
wellbeing. The need for the project of modernity, of establishing a 
securely grounded thought system is compared to the vision of 
Archimedes. Thus, in the Meditation II, Descartes writes; 

Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out 
of it place, demanded that one point be fixed and immovable. In the 
same way I should have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy 
enough to discover one thing only which is certain and immutable.36 

This immutable foundation – ontological reference is rejected by 
the post-modernist position of Paul K. Feyerabend and replaces it with 
Heterogeneity, chaos and pluralism.   
 
Post-modern Ontology 
At this point, it is pertinent to ask the question, is there any theory of 
ontology proposed by postmodern philosophy? In response to this 
question, it is to be borne in mind that Paul K. Feyerabend, presenting a 
prototype of the post-modern worldview, rejects any attempt to propose 
one singular general ground totalizing framework that could be a 



 Commissioned Papers       9 

reference point, and that could be a foundation for any inquiry. This is 
with regards to, not only a universal theory of truth, a fixed model of 
knowledge, a standard reference to method, but, indeed a foundation. 
And so, it presents a no-foundation epistemology as well as proposing an 
ontology that is not characterized by relativism, but a pluralism. What 
this means is that reality could be created, truth is formulated, knowledge 
is fabricated such that ontology which is the study of being, could only 
be said to be presented and created or formulated as need be. Reading 
Feyerabend therefore, one is tempted to raise the question, is it not the 
case that in proposing a no-universal foundational fixed theory of reality, 
by itself, proposes a universal theory? To this extent, the post-modernist 
proposal that there is no fixed theory of knowledge, truth and reality is 
itself a theory of truth, of knowledge and of reality – a philosophical dead 
end. Perhaps, an alternative reading of the post-modernist theory of the 
human person would reject any fixed set of principles, axioms and 
assumptions, claiming that the character of the human person is hydra-
headed and its features are not just pluralistic, but actually indeterminate. 
We are not to reduce the human person to any fixed model, be it 
scientific, legal, ethical, or social. Rather, it would be a combination of all 
these and more. The human person would then be seen as a mystery that 
can be comprehended only inadequately by anyone even the self.  
 
Thesis and Concluding Remarks  
Identifying, with Bernard Lonergan this paper posit that the essence of 
the human person has to do with the fact that humanity is to be 
recognized in four characteristics. These characteristics belong to the 
human nature representing a fundamental orientation in the human 
person. These are (i) Search for truth (ii) Search for the good (iii) Search 
for the absolute/infinite and, (iv) Search for love. The human person in 
relating with these realities that is, truth, good, absolute and love employs 
the capacity of the senses, of understanding and of judging. The actions 
of these variables and their relationship with the human person are so 
complex that they can only be understood imperfectly. The human 
person, therefore, is driven to the actualization of truth, the good and 
love. These efforts remain always in the state of progress towards 
actualization. To this extent, the human person remains an ongoing 
project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 



10 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

Endnotes 
                                                      
1 Ted Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 

2005), 671. 
2 R. P. Peerrenboom, “Reason, Rationales, and Relativism: What’s at Stake in the 

Conversation Over Scientific Rationality?,” Philosophy Today, Vol. 34, No.14. (1990), 

4. 
3 Toulmin, Human Understanding, 45. 
4 Toulmin, Human Understanding, 44. 
5 Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 9. 
6 Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science and the Rising Culture, (London: Fontana 

Paper Backs, 1984), 39, John Veith (Trans.) Descartes: A Discourse on Method and 

Meditation of First Philosophy, (London: Everyman’s Liberty Press, 1979), 120-121.   
7 Meditation I, In Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), Philosophical Works of 

Descartes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 114.   
8 Haldane & Ross (Eds.), Philosophical Works of Descartes, 114. 
9 Haldane & Ross (Eds.), Philosophical Works of Descartes, 6. 
10 Haldane & Ross (Eds.), Philosophical Works of Descartes, 149. 
11 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, I, IX, In John M. Robertson ed., The 

Philosophical works of Bacon (London: University Press, 1965), 51-8. 
12 O’Hear, An Introduction to Philosophy of Science, 5. 
13 Toulmin, Human Understanding, 57. 
14 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 108-109. 
15 Isaac Newton, Principia Bk. I, Rule 4, In B.I. Cohen (Ed.), 150.  
16 Isaac Newton, Principia Bk. I, Rule 4, In B.I. Cohen (Ed.), 150.  
17 Cohen, Revolutions in Science, 150. 
18 Jostein Gaarder, Sophie’s World: A 3000 Year Adventure in Philosophy, (Ibadan, 

Spectrum Books, 1996), 181.  
19 Antiquity had its own system constructors in Plato and Aristotle. The Middle 

Ages have St. Thomas Aquinas who attempted to link Aristotle’s system with 

Christian ethics and theology. After this came the Renaissance with a welter of old 

and new beliefs about nature and science, God and man. But it was not until the 

seventeenth century that any significant attempt was made to assemble ideas into 

a coherent systematic whole.  
20 Randell, P. Peerenboom, ‘Reason, Rationales, and Relativism: What’s at Stake in 

the Conversation over Scientific Rationality?’ Philosophy Today, Vol. 34, No. 14. 

(November, 1990), 4.  
21 James L. Battersby, “Professionalism, Relativism and Rationality” In P.M.L.A. Vol. 

107, No. 1. (1992). 
22 Harre, The Philosophies of Science: An Introductory Survey, 18. Many of the 

germinal ideas of Frege’s philosophy are to be found in his Conceptual Notations 

(1879). His philosophy influenced Russell’s thought. In the preface to volume I of 

Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica (1910), the authors wrote, “In all 

questions of logical analysis our chief debt is to Frege”. In the same vein, 

Wittgenstein acknowledged Frege’s influence on his thought. In the preface to 



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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein wrote, “I am indebted to Frege’s great 

works and to the writings of Mr. Russell for much of the stimulations of my 

thoughts”. Frege’s influence on Carnap was also acknowledged by Carnap who 

studied under him at the University of Jenna.  
23 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, 65. 
24 William Bechtel, Philosophy of Science: An Overview of Cognitive Science, (New 

Jersey: Lawrence Eribaum, 1990), 1-15. 
25 Ted Benton, Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies, (London: 

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 21.  
26 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (London: Hutchinson and Co. 

Publishers Ltd., 1975), 15. 
27 A.F. Chalmers, What is this Thing Called Science?: An Assessment of the Nature 

and Status of Science and its Methods, (London: Open University Press, 1990), 1. 
28 Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, (New York: Routledge, 1981), 1. 
29 D.C. Philips, Philosophy Science and Social Inquiry, (Oxford: Perganon Press, 

1988), 3.  
30 A system of beliefs that are interconnected: not merely a collection of separate, 

independent, unrelated beliefs, but an intertwined, interrelated and interconnected 

systems of beliefs. 
31 Paul k. Feyerabend presents his position most clearly in Against Method (London: 

Verso, 1987) and Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1993).   
32 Isaac Ukpokolo, “Navigating Feyerabend’s Moral Philosophy from Boundaries 

Without Values to Values Without Boundaries” In The Ethics of Subjectivity, Elvis 

Imafidon Ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 201.  
33 Paul K. Feyerabend, Killing Time (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 

174. 
34 Feyerabend, Killing Time, 174. 
35 Feyerabend, Killing Time, 174. 
36 Elizabeth S. and G. R. T. Ross Eds. Philosophical Works of Descartes, (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1969), 149. 


