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18 

HUSSERLIAN ‘EPOCHE’ AND THE 

EXPANSION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 
 

Sylvester Idemudia ODIA, Ph.D 
Senior Lecturer, Dept. Of Philosophy, University of Benin 

sylvester.odia@uniben.edu; slyodia2002@yahoo.com 
Website: https://sylvesterodia.com 

 
Abstract 
Husserlian ‘epoche’ requires the researcher to intentionally set aside 
prejudices, biases, presumptions and presuppositions previously acquired 
from culture, religion, and society. This 'epoche' will enable the 
individual to have his or her own personal unbiased or unprejudiced 
assessment of the phenomena – objects, persons, events. Most, if not all 
cultures, religions, and society seem rigid and dogmatic in imparting 
knowledge to younger generations. Most persons who can reproduce the 
knowledge imparted to them are often celebrated as intelligent persons 
even when they may not have expanded the knowledge in question; thus 
ignoring those who may produce an unbiased or unprejudiced 
assessment of the phenomena – persons who may contribute to and 
expand knowledge. While the reproduction of cultural or communal 
knowledge by a given generation has historical values, it limits the 
generation in question to the limits of the knowledge community. This 
paper, using the analytical and phenomenological methods, argues for the 
expansion of human knowledge by encouraging researchers to have their 
encounter with the phenomena using the Husserlian ‘epoche’. Such 
knowledge acquired by the individual should be seen as an expansion of 
or additional knowledge to that of the knowledge community. 
 
Keywords: Epoche, Knowledge, Proposition, Phenomenology, Testimony 
 
Introduction 
Knowledge is essential to human survival. What to do or not do, what to 
eat and drink, the best environment to live in towards enhancing human 
life, the extent of what we know of other persons, objects, places and 
things, and so on are essential to human survival. 



248 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

Now, nature seems to be evolving. And humans, as part of 
nature, seems to be acquiring more skills by the day which enable 
humans to have a better knowledge of nature as well as other persons. 
Thus the knowledge we currently possess of the nature of the person and 
reality, in general, seems to be the best of all knowledge hitherto 
produced by the human race because we have further expanded, via our 
own experiences, the knowledge we acquired from our predecessors. 
With all sense of sincerity and commitment to the survival of the human 
race, the knowledge we possess today we will also pass on to other 
persons (scholars or researchers inclusive).   

However, despite our genuine commitment to the survival of the 
human race, humans are still plagued with viruses, natural and man-
made disasters, famine and hunger, poverty and premature death, 
terrorism and wars due to our inability to manage ourselves as 
temperamental and sensual beings who, more often than not, are prone 
to be irrational than rational. 

Finding solutions to the above challenges require handing over 
or transmitting knowledge from one generation to another. This is often 
done through the propositional knowledge of scholars or researchers. 
Such knowledge helps the scholar or researcher to be up to date with the 
historical development of the knowledge in question. But if all that the 
scholar or researcher does is to memorise and reproduce the knowledge 
imparted to him or her, then meeting the challenges of the seemingly 
changing nature and human behavioural patterns may be difficult. 

There is, therefore, the urgent need to impart knowledge to 
scholars or researchers at all levels in such a way that they will be able to 
have their own experiences of the phenomena. Such experiences of 
theirs will be their contribution to the knowledge community and 
expand their knowledge of reality. To adequately expand human 
knowledge and resolve now challenges that threaten human existence, 
the phenomenological method of Husserl, especially his epoche is of great 
importance. 

Thus, this paper will expose the phenomenological method of 
Husserl as captured in his epoche towards revealing how it can help 
expand human knowledge. Before doing this, it will expose what 
knowledge is and argue that knowledge, as taught in schools, are 
fundamentally propositional, historical and ultimately testimonial in 
nature. Testimonial knowledge attests to the need for epoche in expanding 
knowledge for the survival of the human race. 
 
What Knowledge Is 
To the epistemologist, the knowledge that is of importance is 
propositional knowledge, which is often in the form of ‘I know that...” 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    249 

Such knowledge presupposes that the knower has experienced 
phenomena – persons, objects, things, events and state-of-affairs. From a 
phenomenological point of view, especially as espoused by Husserl, such 
knowledge also include things like universals or essences, numbers, 
values, and so on. Knowledge here is an expression of the knower’s 
experience (directly or indirectly) with a phenomenon via sense 
perception, rational or cognitive inference or judgment, testimony 
(knowledge from other persons’ experiences), revelation, authority or 
experts, memory, and so on. 

Traditionally, knowledge has been defined as ‘justified true belief ’ 
(Plato, Theaetetus, 201 c-d). The main challenge with this definition, 
especially as captured by Gettier's counterexamples (Gettier, 1963: 123), 
is how to justify knowledge claims. It is not enough to claim to know 
something, to claim to have an experience of something, to claim to have 
come in contact with something or to claim to have reflected on 
something and, thus, have an idea of it without providing a satisfactory 
and reasonable explanation for one’s knowledge claim. 

Attempts to justify knowledge claims have led to different criteria 
of justification which largely depend on the school of thought of the 
knower. Materialists are likely to limit themselves to that which is 
perceptible to the senses and, if they are scientists, they are generous 
enough to include the conclusions reached by the senses with the aid of 
scientific instruments that help to meliorate the limits of sense 
perception. 

Idealists seek the certainty of knowledge beyond the limits of 
sense perceptions. They are likely to place more trust in reason or 
inferential knowledge in their search for essences or universal qualities 
that can endure through time. If they are religiously inclined, certainty in 
knowledge will be sought for in the relationship they have with the 
divine or supernatural being who is believed to have created all things 
that can be known, and who infuses into the human mind the lacuna in 
sensual and cognitive knowledge via revelation, intuition, dreams and 
feelings. 

For instance, as it concerns an idealistic conception of 
knowledge, Abanaku (2018: 52) is of the view that the ultimate reality 
(the One or the Supreme Being) is the sole criterion of truth for the One 
is truth itself. The most humans can know of reality is to some certain 
degree of certainty. Thus “human knowledge could be described as 
characterized by degrees of clarity, distinctness and truth as it deepens 
from individual through communal to ultimate knowledge.” (Abanaku, 
2018: 53) 

But Teichman and Evans (1991: 65) negate the idealistic notion 
of knowledge because it seems to ignore the notion of propositional 



250 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

knowledge. Propositional knowledge is seen by them as the testimony of 
a knower about an event that took place at a time in history, and the event 
is about nature that seems to be evolving. 

However, irrespective of the school of thought one may adhere 
to, once the subject of knowledge (a knower) believes that he or she 
knows anything, the knowledge acquired becomes propositional at the 
point of communicating or transmitting it to others. 
 
Propositional Knowledge as Testimonial Knowledge 
The subject of knowledge (the knower or epistemic agent) believes that 
he or she knows when there is some reasonable degree of conviction. 
This reasonable degree of conviction is put to the test when the knower 
presents the knowledge he or she claims to have to another person or 
group of persons. This presentation of a knowledge claim is in the form 
of a proposition, that is, the knowledge claim is presented as a claim that 
can be true or false, even though the knower presents it with the 
conviction that the claim he or she makes is true. 

On propositional knowledge, Hegel (1892: 144) is of the view 
that it gives us a partial picture of reality; partial idea from the perspective 
of the knower. While a full knowledge of reality can be attained at the 
level of 'Absolute Knowledge', before attaining absolute knowledge via 
dialectic, the knower produces propositional knowledge from a given 
perspective and groups things into different classes. 

Now, propositional knowledge allows other epistemic agents 
(who are being presented with the knowledge claim of the knower) to 
verify whether or not the knowledge claim of the knower is true or false. 
It also brings to the awareness of epistemic agents that the knowledge in 
question is as understood and expressed by the knower; that is, it is the 
testimony of the knower concerning the knowledge claim. 

Propositional knowledge, therefore, becomes the testimony of 
the knower at the point of dissemination. If epistemic agents (hearers) 
are convinced of the veracity of the knowledge claim or are reasonably 
satisfied with the justification provided by the knower, then it becomes 
knowledge for the epistemic agents based on the testimony of the 
knower. But if epistemic agents doubt the knowledge claim of the 
knower, then the knowledge claim becomes probable. 

Furthermore, testimonial knowledge is historical in the sense 
that it is the proposition of a knower containing a knowledge claim of 
phenomena or state-of-affairs acquired in some distant or immediate 
past. Since reality is interpreted differently from the experiences of 
different epistemic agents, and what we claim to know seems to 
constantly evolve, then there is a need to constantly keep track of what 
we can know of the phenomena or present state-of-affairs. But if we 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    251 

bring into our experience of the phenomena or present state-of-affairs 
the previous conclusions we deduced from our past experiences or 
previous conclusions reached by culture, religion, society, other 
researchers and epistemic agents from previous phenomena or similar 
state-of-affairs, then we may fail to detect what the present phenomena 
or present state-of-affairs is revealing or has evolved into. These previous 
experiences of ours or conclusions reached by culture, religion, society, 
other researchers and epistemic agents are what Husserl referred to as 
biases, prejudices, presuppositions, etc. To experience phenomena or a 
present state-of-affairs as it currently is or as it is currently revealing itself 
without bias, prejudice or presuppositions requires one to practice 
Husserl's epoche. The practice of Husserl’s epoche will lead to a meaningful 
growth of knowledge. 
 
Husserlian Epoche and the Growth of Human Knowledge 
For Husserl, viewing the world from the opinions and conclusions of 
others is the “natural standpoint”. The natural standpoint is the 
conventional way of learning or imparting knowledge to others. Also, 
this conventional way of perceiving reality limits reality to sense 
perception and trivializes our ability to know things inferred by reason – 
the idea of the mind, universals or essences. 

To attain knowledge of things as they are (which is not possible 
for Plato and Kant), Husserl developed a method that requires the 
bracketing away of the opinion, bias, prejudice, and presuppositions of 
the natural standpoint to be able to experience the phenomena as it is. 
This method is known as epoche or the “phenomenological reduction”. It 
is the reduction of experience to the level of not being influence by the 
judgments and conclusions of previous epistemic agents. This 
"phenomenological reduction" also known as "transcendental reduction" 
leads to the experience of the pure act of consciousness about the 
phenomena or state-of-affairs. 

According to Lawhead (2002: 530 footnote) "Epoche was the 
term used by the Greek sceptics when they recommended we withhold 
our commitment and suspend judgment about things that were 
uncertain." Thus, we can say that Husserl is challenging us to suspend all 
previous judgments, conclusions, opinions, and presuppositions about a 
phenomenon or state-of-affairs. We should approach the phenomenon or 
state-of-affairs with the mindset of allowing the phenomenon or state-
of-affairs to reveal itself to us. With the revelation we have experienced 
we can form our judgment about the phenomenon. The phenomenon is 
explicated from one’s own experience without the bias or influence of 
any philosophizing (Husserl, 1960: 151). Such an experience of the 
phenomenon is pure and will help us know things as they are in 



252 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

themselves because it brackets away biases and attitude acquired at the 
level of the natural standpoint. 

This method of epoche also known as ‘bracketing’ is an intuitive 
process similar to Descartes methodic doubt. Descartes, armed with 
experience, doubted the knowledge of reality he previously had on the 
bases that the sources of such knowledge had limitations. During this 
process, he could not doubt that he was doubting or thinking. Thus he 
concluded that essentially he was a thinking being that exists. This idea 
of a thinking being that exists was something he could not doubt and he 
believed that the sceptics, no matter how much they try to doubt it, will 
not be able to doubt it (Descartes, 1912: 26 – 27). 

Descartes method of doubting everything he used to believe to 
be knowledgeable to be able to arrive at the "thinking being" with all 
clarity and certainty is similar to Husserl's epoche. Husserl believes that 
with the method of epoche he can arrive at the knowledge of things as 
they are. 

Looking at the limitations of the senses and reason as sources of 
knowledge, and given that propositional knowledge is dated for they are 
about past experiences, in order not to live in the shadows of the past 
(especially if we want to know things as they are today), we must bracket 
away from the knowledge of the past. Ojong and Ibrahim (2011: 185) 
have both stated the problems with some sources and theories of 
knowledge and, taking a clue from the works of Kant and Kuhn they 
opined that today's knowledge claims are a product of the experience of 
the knower with interpretation arrived at by the workings of the mind of 
the knower. And, given that reality changes, the interpretation arrived at 
when reality changes produce new paradigms that "make us see the 
world from a different perspective." 

Besides, Ojong (2010: 39, 44) encourages any epistemologist 
who is experiencing "epistemic loneliness" (egocentric predicament) over 
false ideas, to overcome his or her fears and scepticism by engaging in 
epistemic discourse with other epistemologists. He or she will effectively 
engage the external world using the tool of language to avoid the 
challenge of 'private' language. 

But given that the idea of the epistemologist is relative to some 
degree, the researcher or scholar need not bother too much about 
objectivity or truth as defined or presented to him or her by the 
epistemic community. His or her main concern is to explain reality as 
currently experienced or as it currently presents itself. 
 Furthermore, from Kant and Kuhn's idea of a paradigm shift, one can 
infer that if indeed, reality undergoes changes, each major change will 
produce a new paradigm. Every new paradigm will produce new 
knowledge. Thus the researcher or scholar needs to bracket away 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    253 

previous paradigms to enable him or her detect possible new changes of 
reality to be able to acquire knowledge current to the reality of his or her 
time. Such knowledge acquired becomes a contribution to the 
knowledge of the epistemic community. Knowledge, as collectively 
owned, has thereby expanded or grown. 
 
Glorifying the Past 
Husserl does not condemn the past. He did not play down the 
importance of customs and traditions. He also did not condemn the 
knowledge of our past experiences or from experts. He was, however, 
against dogmatising or canonising the experience of the past to the 
detriment of what the phenomena or state-of-affairs is currently 
revealing. Thus, if we are to find new patterns in the phenomena or 
state-of-affairs, if we are to solve today’s emerging problems and 
challenges, and if we want to expand the frontiers of knowledge then we 
need to include our own unique experiences through the practice of 
Husserl’s epoche.   
 
Conclusion 
Humans are communal beings. We live in communities and share things 
in common with members of the community in which we live. 
Knowledge is one major thing we share in common especially as it is 
essential to the survival of the human race. 

However, as beautiful and essential the knowledge we acquire 
from the epistemic community is, it is dated. If the researcher or scholar 
is to contribute meaningfully to the epistemic community he or she 
belongs to, he or she should practice the Husserlian epoche especially 
since the world in which we live seems to be evolving. Whatever the 
pure act of consciousness intuitively deduces or produces from epoche is, 
according to Husserl, the way the phenomena or state-of-affairs is. This 
knowledge from the pure act of consciousness will further be 
implemented by reason and senses in our everyday experiences. Such 
knowledge, if different from what was previously thought about the 
phenomena or state-of-affairs, will be a genuine contribution to 
knowledge. It will be an advancement of knowledge. But then, it will not 
be proper to dogmatise it or to canonize it as the ultimate truth as far as 
the phenomena or state-of-affairs is. To dogmatise or canonize will 
amount to using this conclusion to assess subsequent or similar 
phenomena or state-of-affairs, and this will be against the principle of 
Husserl’s epoche. 
 In other words, each time we approach familiar or strange 
phenomena or state-of-affairs we should apply epoche so that the pure 
state of consciousness can intuitively know the phenomena or state-of-



254 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

affairs as it is. If the phenomena or state-of-affairs has evolved, the 
subject of knowledge that is investigating it phenomenologically will 
detect it and add the experience to that of the knowledge community. If 
the phenomena or state-of-affairs has not evolved, it will reveal itself as it 
did the previous time it was experienced. 
 However, as difficult as it is for many to practice epoche or 
“Transcendental reduction,” it produces and expands the frontiers of 
knowledge, conquers new challenges, and keeps humanity surviving. 
 
 
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Hegel, G. W. F., 1892. The Logic of  Hegel, translated from the Encyclopaedia of the 

Philosophical Science by W. Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 

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