

























TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF 

YORÙBÁ PROVERBS

Francis Kayode Fabidun

Abstract
Despite the relatively late recognition as a source of 
knowledge and justication, testimony plays a signicant 
role in our epistemic endeavours. The paper argued that 
testimony is a common practice in epistemic endeavours. 
Due to its social character, testimony provides a unique 
dimension to knowledge acquisition. This paper explored 
the social character of testimonial knowledge and argued 
that testimony is an inevitable practice to give or receive 
pieces of information within the day-to-day experience. 
Afrming the commonplace of testimony in our epistemic 
practice, Hume opines that there are no species of reasoning 
more common, more useful, and even necessary to human 
life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, 
and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators. Situated 
within Yorùbá conceptual scheme, the paper identied 
further that proverbs play a signicant role in testimonial 
knowledge among the Yorùbá. Through a historical survey 
and critical analysis of the Yorùbá conceptual scheme, it is 
evident that proverbs serve as a reservoir of wisdom and 
guide for the practical living among the people. 
Furthermore, they contain philosophical issues that cut 
across epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, logic, and 
aesthetics. This is in support of the interest of advocates of 
social epistemology that society and culture inuence our 
epistemic standard, and that knowledge is dened by 



people's experience within a particular scheme. Therefore, 
the paper concluded that less arguably, proverbs are 
veritable instances of knowledge particularly as they share 
the basic structure of epistemic testimony.

Keywords: Epistemology, Proverbs, Testimony, Yorùbá, Thought 
System

Introduction
The status of testimony, when considered along with other sources of 
knowledge, except memory, became an issue of interest just in recent 
times. According to Michael Huemer, testimony, like memory, is an 
extremely pervasive source of knowledge that has been neglected by 

1
epistemologists.  In a loose sense, testimony is any statement or other 
communication that purports to state a fact or provide information. In 
the context of epistemology, testimony is not restricted to statements 
delivered by witnesses at trial, nor does it require a face-to-face 

2
encounter.  Instances of testimony include all cases in which a person 
asserts something, and another person hears, reads, or otherwise 
witnesses the assertion. That explains the reason why testimony 
became an issue of interest since arguably a host of what we know is 
received from others either in the oral or written form. Nevertheless, 
philosophers have variedly queried its reliability and justication as a 
source of knowledge. 
 The nature of testimony is its apparent social character, which 
is a unique dimension through which testimony enhances 
epistemology. 
 This social character provides a veritable chance to explore 
testimonial knowledge in the day-to-day experience among people in 
general and of particular interest among the Yorùbá and their 
conception of reality. It is a common practice among Yorùbá people 
to exchange testimony; to give or receive pieces of information. 
 These, as it were, are taken as sources of knowledge. In this 
interpersonal or mutual epistemic attitude, proverbs play a signicant 
role.
 From the foregoing, Yorùbá proverbs serve as a reservoir of 
wisdom and guide for practical living. The content of proverbs avails 

95Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



the opportunity to learn from the wisdom of others which has been 
carefully preserved and presented from one generation to the other. 
 Hence, in the Yorùbá culture, proverbs along with other oral 
traditions have a base in historical reality, because they are the 
exploration account of group and individual's thoughts and opinions 
about their historical and reective experience. Furthermore, 
proverbs constitute a core element of verbal dissemination of 
knowledge and information among the people in the Yorùbá nation. 
 These show the social dimension of proverbs as part of 
human activities within a society. 
 Meanwhile, this social dimension favours the consideration 
of proverbs as testimony since they both furnish the individual with 
knowledge originating outside of them. It follows then that as a social 
entity, testimonial knowledge is a common phenomenon among the 
Yorùbápeople as it is evident in their daily experiences. 
 In other words, mutual exchange of testimony either in form 
of giving or receiving is prevalent among the people, and such 
instances are taken as generating knowledge. 

The Nature of Testimony in Epistemology
Epistemology of testimony is built around the fact that a host of what 
we know comes from the world of others. We give credence to events, 
places, theories, and other issues coming from people and in most 
cases, without prior investigation, and thus we simply accept and live 
with them as true. 
 Testimony is a pervasive and natural source of beliefs. Surely 
many of the beliefs it grounds are justied or constitute knowledge. 
They may even constitute basic knowledge or basic belief, both in the 
(moderate) sense that they are not grounded in premises and in the 
sense that they play a pivotal role in the life of the believer. Beliefs 
that are based on testimony are psychologically, epistemically, and 
existentially basic. However, they are epistemically basic only in the 
sense that they do not inferentially depend on knowledge or justied 
belief of prior premises. They are epistemically dependent, in a way 
perceptual beliefs are not, on one's having grounds for knowledge or 
justication, and they are psychologically dependent on one's having 
at least some non-propositional ground - such as hearing someone 

96 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



3speak - in another, non-testimonial experiential mode.
 Hume correctly noted that “there are no species of reasoning 
more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than 
that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of 

4eyewitnesses and spectators”
 There are some issues surrounding testimony, such as: When 
are the beliefs from testimony justied, and why? When do they 
amount to knowledge, and why? How reliable are the sources of 
testimony? Is testimony an autonomous source of epistemic authority 
like perception, memory, learning, and inference? Christopher R. 
Green raises other sets of queries which include: What conditions 
should be placed on the recipient of testimonial-based beliefs? Must 
the recipient of testimony have beliefs about the reliability of the 
testier or  for such a belief? Or, on the other hand, inductive support
is it enough if the testier is in fact reliable, and a recipient may 
satisfy his epistemic duties without having a belief about that 
reliability? What external environmental conditions should be placed 
on the testier? For the recipient to know something, must the 

5testier know it, too?
 Philosophers are broadly divided in the line between 
reductionism and anti-reductionism. The reductionists found the 
basis of their locus standing in Hume and Locke who gave a probative 
value to testimony.  For Locke, it is practically unreliable to base 
one's knowledge on someone else's worldview. Hume, on his part, 
testimony is simply one form of inductive evidence among others.  
 From these suppositions, they argued that any justication 
formed by testimony can be reduced to other kinds of justication, 
such as; sensory perception, memory, and inference. This implies that 
our ordinary acceptance of testimony is justied only a posteriori. 
Therefore, it is not a fundamental source of warrant because 

6
testimony replies based on other empirical sources of knowledge.
 The anti-reductionist, on the other hand, following the 
argument of Thomas Reid postulated that testimony, in itself is a 
source of knowledge; it is not reducible to other sources, even if 

7
empirically dependent on them.  Thomas Reid argued that to 
acquiesce to Hume's postulation would amount to having little 
grounds for holding on to our belief in the testimony of others. 

97Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



According to him, humans have two innate tendencies which enable 
us to much more easily to gain knowledge through testimony—our 
intuitive tendency to tell the truth and our tendency to simply believe 

8
what others say.
 The reductionist and the non-reductionist views expressed 
above have implications on justication. For the reductionists, 
justication of testimony depends on other sources of knowledge. 
Thus, testimony is not a basic source of justication but can only be 
an instance of one when reduced or considered along with perception, 
memory, inference, and the like. While for the anti-reductionists, 
testimony is just as basic a source of justication as sense perception, 
memory, inference, and the like. The central claim of the Anti-
Reductionist is that the epistemologies of perception, memory, and 

9
testimony should all look more or less alike.
 There are also arguments by those who argue for the 
receiver's background evidence in an addition to trusting a specic 
speaker for justication. In this case, Elizabeth Fricker opines that the 
onus is on the hearer to be partially disposed to deploy background 
knowledge relevant and careful analysis of the speaker's statement to 

10
detect the aspects of it that betray being trusted.  That the hearer 
deploys background knowledge constitutes some challenges and 
raises the possibility of jettisoning reductionism for anti-
reductionism. But this problem is averted since, by its very nature, 
testimony confers prima facie justication on the receiver. Tyler 
Burge opines that a person is entitled to accept as true something that 
is presented as true and that is intelligible to him unless there are 

11
stronger reasons not to do so.  Considering the high demand of the 
reductionists and the seemingly weak standard of anti-reductionists 
suppose caution in what the hearer takes as warranted testimony.
 Another issue in epistemic testimony is the interpersonal 
view of testimony where testimony is considered as a form of 
evidence, an indication of the speaker's belief in what he asserts, 
along with the background evidence of the listener (a person's 
asserting p is evident that he believes P and the hearer regard this as 
evidence that P is true). However, the understanding of testimony and 
testimony reception is more than mere evidence as in the case of 
readings on a gauge or an instrument, because there are instances 

98 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



when the speaker's evidence does not seem to be reliable enough and 
the speaker does not trust such. Hinchman and Moran believe that 
testimonial credibility which is a signicant aspect of true 
communication is missing when a speaker is treated as a mere truth 
gauge, offering nothing more than words, and does not invite the 

12
hearer to trust what he said.  In testimonial-based knowledge, 
knowledge transmission ows from the attester purported to know 
the truth of the proposition in question to the hearer believing his 
testimony. In other words, testimony-based knowledge is grounded 
in the exchange of thoughts.

The Nature of Proverbs in Yorùbá Thought System
The Yorùbá constitute the majority of people in South Western part of 
Nigeria and are also found scattered in diverse countries all over the 
world. The Yorùbá, in general, have a rich cultural heritage rooted in 

13
their traditional thought system.  They speak a general language 
which is Yorùbá and there are various dialects spoken in various 
communities to the other. Nevertheless, both the general language 
and the various dialects are rich in proverbs. Proverbs occupy a vital 
place in the Yorùbá frame work of thought and they are considered a 
strong means of communication in their daily interactions. Proverbs 
constitute a powerful rhetorical device for the shaping of moral 
consciousness, opinions, and beliefs.” They are a treasure in speech-
giving and illuminating the grey aspects of any decision-making.  
The Yorùbá people value proverbs very highly, for they are 

14considered to be the wisdom lore of the race.
 Francis Sotunde denes a proverb as a short familiar sentence 
expressing a supposed truth or moral lesson; it often requires an 

15
explanation beyond the literal meaning of the words used.  In line 
with Mill's postulation, Yorùbá proverbs possess both the 
connotative (basic idea or literary) and denotative (thought or deeper) 
delineations of meanings. A connotative meaning of a word is the 
feeling a word evokes in its usage: the implied subtext of words rather 
than their literal meaning. While a denotative meaning is what such a 

16
word literally means.  This is succinctly expressed by Oladele 
Orimoogunje thus:

Yorùbá proverbs are highly idiomatic, having both 

99Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



denotative and connotative meanings. The denotative 
meaning tends to be the signier of the connotative 
meaning, which, is the one held in high esteem. The 
semantics of the denotative structure, though in itself 
a truism, is a means to the signied end. The health-
related meanings of the proverbs are in most cases 
restricted to the denotative meaning. At the 
connotative level, the meaning of the proverb may not 
necessarily be health-related. Denotative meaning 
considers the componential meanings of the symbols 
in the proverb while on the connotative level, the 
metaphorical and idiomatic meanings generated from 

17usage context are taken into consideration.

For instance, in the proverb, “Afọwọ́ –fònnàkìídurorojọ́”(Gossiping 
is a luxury for someone whose hands are not carrying re). The 
connotative meaning refers to the meaning of the keywords in the 
proverb would just be gossip, hand, and re, and this will portray no 
lesson. Nevertheless, the denotative meaning re would be any 
unease situation for doing wrong, while hands would imply the 
freedom/free will of such an individual to execute such an act. 
Proverbial utterances are meaningful to the hearer due to the cultural 

18
afnity between the speaker and the audience. 
 It is pertinent to note that proverbs are not gures of speech, 
rather they are an ingenious manner of speaking which could be 
deductive speculative afrmative, and empirical. As such they come 
about through active rational processes, observation of facts, 
analysis, and speculation on issues of life. Every proverb is a logical, 
practical, wise, witty, and pithy statement created by generations of 
analphabetic progenitors for our good and the good of future 
generations.
 Proverbs have been, and remain, the most powerful and 
effective instrument for the transmission of culture, social morality, 
manners and ideals of a people. The reason behind the efcacy of 
proverbs is that as aphorisms or wise sayings, they are based upon 
people's experiences, and they reect the social values and sensibility 

19
of such people.  Proverbs are a signicant part of Yorùbá heritage 

100 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



and they are used within and beyond the cultural environment where 
they were fashioned. Adeyeye Ogunwusi noted that proverbs are a 
product of a thought process engaged in by our (Yorùbá) analphabetic 
progenitors who applied their power of observation and intuition to 

20fashion the proverbs.  This reveals the depth of insight, and wisdom 
that are inherent in Yorùbá proverbs. They also contain knowledge 
and wisdom intended as a guide in dealing with the vicissitudes of life 
and nding practical solutions to life's challenges. However, this is 
sometimes not always obvious, as Sotunde rightly noted, it takes an 

21
enquiring mind to absorb its philosophical underpinning.
 As against the common popular conception of proverbs as 
considered as possessing moral principles only, it has been argued 
that proverbs contain insights that are related to all branches of 
philosophy. Adegboyega Oluyemisi argued that proverbs have 
philosophical issues that cut across epistemology, metaphysics, 

22
ethics, logic, aesthetics, and so on.  This means that proverbs are 
laden with philosophy and can manifest themselves in various ways 
to diverse people and remain relevant. In other words, Yorùbá 
proverbs often state a philosophical dogma and give regulation for 
man's relationship with each other and the gods. They present both 
the positive and negative aspects of human experience, shedding 
light on them to help people make wise decisions for the good of the 
self and of others in society. Sotunde points out that 'proverbalism' 
can therefore be said to be a literary tool, a psychological device, and 

23
a philosophical vehicle of social cohesion.  Hence, Yorùbá proverbs 
give expression to the major method of inquiry into African 
philosophy, along with mythological, humanist, idiomatic, and 

24logical methods.
 Furthermore, proverbs belong to the category of oral 
traditions among the Yorùbá, and with others such as fables, 
folklores, riddles, and prose, with all having a base in historical 
reality. 
 Characteristically, oral pieces of literature provide the 
exploration account of group and individual thoughts and opinions 

25
about their historical and reective experience.  Adebayo remarked 
that of all forms of Yorùbá oral tradition, Yorùbá proverbs (owe) have 
special attributes and characteristics, which make them particularly 

101Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



unique and special. He situated this uniqueness, as stated earlier, in 
the fact that proverbs are handed down from one generation to 
another as truthful sayings having been tested by usage. Two issues 
are important in this assertion, namely that proverbs possess the two 
conditions of truth and testability. As such information, ideas, and 
thoughts obtained from them would be more reliable than those 

26gathered from other oral pieces of literature.  Speaking of all forms 
of Yorùbá oral tradition, there is a special reference given to proverbs 
as it is said, “Òwel'ẹsinọ̀rọ̀,ọ̀rọ̀l'ẹsinòwe, tíọ̀rọ̀ básọnù, òwe la fìíwa” 
(Proverbs are the prongs of discourse and if a discourse is riddled 

27with meaning it is proverbs that we use to lose it).  Such statements as 
the one above afrm the importance of proverbs among the people.
 On the issue of their sources, Olumuyiwa pointed out that it is 
said categorically that the sources of Yorùbá proverbs are unknown. 
 Proverbs are the product of human observations of what 
happens in the environment, and that is why Yorùbá 'proverbs could 
be deductive, speculative, afrmative, empirical, mythical, and 

28
superstitious'  For Wande Abimbola, Yorùbá proverbs were derived 
from the Ifá oracle from which Yorùbá proverbs received their rich 
vocabulary and high semantics from its connection to the Ifá oracle. 
Hence, Raphael Areje asserted that since the proverbs are derived 
from the Ifáoracle, which is an embodiment of Yorùbá Philosophy 
and belief, they possess the attributes of the Ifáoracle. Actually, in a 

29way, the proverbs are a microcosm of the Ifá oracle.  Proverbs are 
formed with the worship of Ifá and Orishas (gods) in songs, beating 
drums with proverbial sayings, as they settle disputes, as they make 
merry or drink palm wine (native drink from palm trees), as they tell 

30family or local histories and other social-cultural events.  It is said 
that Yorùbá proverbs have socio-cultural origins according to the 
historical, and religious experiences of the Yorùbá people. 
 However, Sotunde identied three other sources of proverbs: 
social interactions between people and the folkloric experiences of 
communities including their prejudices, beliefs, superstitions, and 
myths; and third; animism and animatism, through which primitive 
people sought and found meaning to the immediate natural 

31environment.  Proverbs are considered to be traditional and originate 
32

from the observation of natural phenomena and human relations.  

102 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



Irrespective of this discrepancy, one obvious point is the fact that 
proverbs come to play in the daily discourse and the oratory of 
Yorùbá from time immemorial and they are used to garnish, conceal 
and hint messages. They are simply informative.

Yorùbá Proverbs as Material for Testimony in Epistemology
As noted earlier, Yorùbá proverbs by their very nature are a verbal 
medium of dissemination of knowledge and information among the 
people. They are the experiences of people which have been 
philosophically woven together and presented as a compendium of 
wisdom to act as companions and guides in the life of the people. 
 There are originally transmitted orally but are now been 
preserved in written form. Nevertheless, being in oral form does not 
reduce their value: It is in the oral state that the beauty of proverbs 
becomes more eloquent. This means that Yorùbá proverbs validate 
orality as means of passing knowledge to others in African traditions. 
There have been inuential philosophical ideas that for a long time 
remained verbal. They are considered sources of instruction and 
knowledge because they are taken as materials for knowledge. It 
follows that their words constitute testimony. This is in line with 
Searle's opinion that the primary speech act of testimony is a 
speaker's saying, telling, or asserting something. Assertion puts forth 

33
a proposition that the speaker represents as true.
 An area that clearly shows Yorùbá Proverbs as possessing, 
being communally known, and shared in the society. Yorùbá 
proverbs are key in the social fabric of Yorùbá epistemic lives. This is 
in line with the interest of advocates of social epistemology that 
society and culture inuence our epistemic standard. Yorùbá 
proverbs constitute valid examples of such epistemic perspective as 
they form an irresistible part of the daily interactions among the 
Yorùbá. Just as a child learns that the stove is hot because others said 
so, it is in the same way that the proverb “Bíọwọ́ọmọdé ò 
bátìíkanẹ̀kuidà, a kìíbèéreikút'ópa baba ẹni” (This will translate 
literarily as “when a child has not gotten hold of the sheath of the 
sword, he dares not ask the manner of his father's death). The 
meaning of this proverb is that the exercise of power comes with 
maturity. Just as he lives with the knowledge he acquired through the 

103Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



testimony of the hotness of the stove, he also learns that authority 
comes with age and prudence, because he has heard it from the oral 
testimony of the people. The simple line of argument here is that 
wisdom is protable to guide. 
 The above shows the informative impulse of Yorùbá 
proverbs. 
 Earlier on in this paper, testimony is dened as any statement 
or other communication that purports to state a fact or provide 
information. Transmission of the information is the goal of 
testimony. This is also what proverbs are used for in the Yorùbá 
thought system, where the value of a proverb is based on how well it 
provides information. In other words, the value of proverbs is in their 
ability to inform people in their daily lives. This information provides 
knowledge and serves as a guide in making good judgments. This is 
succinctly expressed in the proverb 'Apeèpol'éhìnàgbà, 
àgbànbòwákàn ó, k'áwonomodér'óhun pa' (He who strips the bark 
from the back of an elder (i.e. insults him), will become old so that the 
youngsters will nd something to strip him of (i.e. insult him in turn), 
'Apeèpo' is one who strips the bark of a tree for medicinal purposes, 

34
etc and inculcates.  This proverb clearly provides instruction on 
learning to live in the right manner in line with some ethical virtues 
and injunctions.
 Interestingly, the irreplaceable nature of testimony among 
Yorùbá is attested to in some proverbs. It is the general belief among 
the people that it is impossible that one lives all by his wisdom 
without recourse to the wisdom of others to complement his. This is 
further pushed forward with the proverb: “Ọgbọ́nỌlọ́gbọń  la 
fínsọgbọ́n, ìmọ̀rànẹnìkan o t'óbọ̀rọ̀”. (One learns wisdom from other 
people's wisdom, one person's knowledge does not amount to 
anything). 
 According to AbiodunAderinto, this proverb above in the 
culture of the Yorùbá suggests that one person cannot claim the 

35
monopoly of knowledge and wisdom.  The proverb implies that we 
learn from other people and our knowledge alone cannot take us 
anywhere. If the wisdom of an individual would take him nowhere, it 
is inescapable for him to acquire the testimony of others either as a 
complement to or acquiring new knowledge altogether. This is not a 

104 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



usual practice in Western philosophy where the premium is placed on 
the self and the issue of knowledge acquisition was conducted around 
the individual. Alvin Goldman remarked that Rene Descartes created 
a roadmap for epistemology. The plan was to meditate, reect, and 
otherwise conduct one's intellectual affairs in a thoroughly self-
absorbed way. Such a plan does not consider other people's thoughts 
or opinions, to how their knowledge might inform one's own. The 
great bulk of epistemology has followed Descartes' image of an 
epistemic agent as a solitary investigator, seeking truth by his own 

36
devices.  The proverb under consideration shows that credence is 
always being given to the other and the other is regarded as 
indispensable when it comes to the issue of acquiring knowledge in 
the Yorùbá thought system.   
 Another proverb also supports the testimonial nature of 
Yorùbá. The proverb shows how Yorùbá believes in tapping from the 
knowledge and wisdom of others with particular emphasis on the 
need to appreciate the wisdom of elders. It is said that:

“Ọgbọ́nỌlọ́gbọ́n ò jẹ´ kápeàgbàniwèrè” 
(Other people's wisdom saves the elder from being 
called a lunatic).

The insights of elders on issues are usually an outcome of deep 
reection and meditation. Presenting such to a youth may sound 
nonsensical because what the elder says, for instance, in a worrisome 
situation may have deed the comprehension, and thought of the 
youth in question, who possibly have expected that such an instance 
calls for violence and that should be employed necessarily. 
 It is a given in the precinct of the Yorùbá epistemic thought 
system as in other spheres that an individual does possess what is 
sufcient for him to make an epistemic claim. Hence the common 
proverb - enìkankì í jẹ´ à wádé (it is improper for a single individual to 
refer to himself as the whole). This is because any individual along 
with others rightly constitutes the whole. In Yorùbá proverbs, 
therefore, the social dimension is always emphasized. This is aptly 
captured in the proverb below:

Mo gbọ́ tán, momọ̀ tán, lós eikúpaaláimọ̀kan.
(The claim of the fool to know it all, is the cause of his 

105Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



death).

The onus to listen to the testimony of others lies on all who desire 
knowledge and long life. Let us go back to the instance of the hotness 
of the stove and the subsequent avoidance on the part of the child 
from being hurt. The child gets to know that a hot stove hurts from the 
testimony of others, and not from experiencing it. Refusing 
testimony of others is considered an act of self-impoverishment, 
particularly when there is no hindrance to such knowledge. The 
listener in this case comes to know because he is provided with such 
information. This is explicit in the following proverbs:

Taníbáarúgbólọgbé? Talóbáàlejòwálátiileré? Ohun 
a kòmọ̀ níparẹ̀ akìí da sìí.

(Where are the old man's childhood mates? Who was with the 
stranger at home? No one should dabble into what he is ignorant 

37about).
 Ignorance in this case is because of the non-disclosure of 
information by the person in question. To know in the light of the 
proverb under consideration here, the person in question must 
disclose information. Contrary to Alvin Goldman's claim that Hume 
seems to suppose that from our observations we can infer testimonial 

38
justication,  and observation is not sufcient because there is a 
considerable amount of information about an individual or an object 
that is never available to be experienced.  

Conclusion
The paper presented the nature of Yorùbá proverbs working with the 
notion that proverbs are common means of transferring knowledge in 
the Yorùbá thought system. The use of proverbs is an integral part of 
oral tradition and a medium of communication among the people. 
 For this reason, proverbial utterances are held in high esteem 
and considered an expression of the wisdom inherent in the culture of 
Yorùbá people. The appreciation that proverbs enjoy at every 
instance is because it is an expression of the collective voice of the 
society. As a result of their ability to instruct almost at every given 
time, it is arguable that proverbs satisfy the conditions necessary for 

106 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



testimonial knowledge particularly as it shares the basic structure of 
epistemic testimony, namely that the hearer receives the utterance of 
the speaker as true. So, juxtaposing Yorùbá proverbs and testimony, 
one realizes that both focus on the same goal which is the 
transmission of information. In both cases, the content of the 
transmission is considered a true and valid means of knowledge.

ENDNOTES
1 Michael Huemer, Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Oxon: 

Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), p 217.
2 Michael Huemer, Epistemology., p 207
3 Audi Robert, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and 

Justication”, in American Philosophical Quarterly, University of 
Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical 
Publications Stable, Oct., 1997, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 405-422, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009910.

4 David Hume, “On Miracles”, in Michael Huemer, Epistemology: 
Contemporary Readings (Oxon: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 
2002), pp. 221 – 232.

5 Christopher Green, Epistemology of Testimony in Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy

6 Jonathan Adler, “Epistemological Problems of Testimony” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward 
N .  Z a l t a  ( e d . ) ,  U R L  = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/testimony-
episprob (Assessed on 11.12.2018).

7 Jonathan, “Epistemological Problems of Testimony”.
8 Huemer, Epistemology, p. 217. 
9 Christopher Green, “Epistemology of Testimony” in Internet 

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https:www.iep.utm.edu) (Assessed on 
06.12.2018)

10 Elizabeth Flicker in Michael Huemer, Epistemology, p 209.
11 Tyler Burge in Michael Huemer, Epistemology., p 217. 
12 Flicker in Michael Huemer, Epistemology., p. 210.
13 GbengaFasiku, Yorùbá Proverbs, Names and National Consciousness 

in The Journal of Pan African Studies, (Vol. 1, no.4, June 2006), p.51.
14 A. O. Oluyemisi, Philosophical Issues in Yorùbá Proverbs, 

International Journal of African Society, Cultures and Traditions 
(Vol.5, No.2, pp.21-30, September 2017), Published by European 
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107Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...



( ) (Assessed on 10.12.2018).www.eajournals.org
15 Sotunde, Yorùbá Proverbs and Philosophy with 3,225 Proverbs 

Translated, (Abekuta: F. I. Sotunde, 2016), p. 9.
16  https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/denotation (Assessed on 

16.12.2018)
17 Ọládélé Orímóògùnjé,Yorùbá Proverbs: An Insight into the Indigenous 

H e a l t h c a re  D e l i v e r y  S y s t e m  a n d  H e a l t h  E d u c a t i o n , 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2989/SAJAL.2012.32.1.11.1
134 (Assessed on 16.12.2018)

18 Sotunde, “Yorùbá Proverbs and Philosophy”, p. 23.
19 Zakariyah Moshood, “A Pragmatic Analysis of Proverbs in Selected 

Works Of Ola Rotimi”, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria unpop 
2016) (Assessed on http://kubanni.abu.edu.ng/jspui/bitstream
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20 Sotunde., p. vi
21 Sotunde, p. xi
22 Oluyemisi,“Philosophical Issues in Yorùbá Proverbs”.
23 Sotunde, p.22
24 OnIfáde, “Philosophical Signicance of Yorùbá Proverbs”.
25 OnIfáde.
26 OnIfáda.
27 Oluyemisi.
28 T. Olumuyiwa, “Yorùbá interrogative proverbs”, in European Scientic 

Journal 8(29), 2012,pp. 106-120.
29 Raphael Areje, Yorùbá Proverbs, (Daystar Press, Ibadan, 1985), p. iv.
30 David Adamo, “Ancient Israelite and African Proverbs as Advice, 

Reproach, Warning, Encouragement and Explanation”,  in HTS 
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31 Sotunde, p.2.
32 Oluyemisi
33 Searle, J., 1969, Speech-Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 1974, p. 92.
34 Gbenga Fasiku, Yorùbá Proverbs, Names and National., p. 52.
35 AderintoA biodun, “The Social Implications of Some Nigerian Yorùbá 

and Igbo Proverbs on Wisdom”, in Global Journal of Human-Social 
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36  Alvin Goldman, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 205.

108 Ekpoma Review, Volume 9, 2022



37 Francis Sotunde, Yorùbá Proverbs and Philosophy with 3,225 Proverbs 
Translated, 2016, p. 452.

38 Alvin Goldman, Contemporary Introduction to Epistemology, p. 208.

109Testimonial Knowledge and The Epistemic Value...


