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EXPLORING THE NEXUS BETWEEN 
HUMAN DIGNITY AND JUSTICE 

 

 

 

 

Abstract 

This paper examines the concept of human dignity and its 

relation to justice in the society. It argues that in order to 

ensure that human dignity is protected and given due 

recognition, human beings should be treated with respect 

that is intrinsic to their existence and not simply as a means 

to an end. The paper establishes the relationship between 

human dignity and justice. It asserts that dignity and justice 

are closely linked. The paper then argues that protecting 

human dignity and according a person his/her dignity are 

ways of guaranteeing justice. That respect for human dignity 

brings about the realization of justice for members of the 

society.  

 

Keywords: Human Dignity, justice, person, respect, autonomy. 

 

Introduction 

The way in which human beings are treated determines any society. 

There has been much attention given to the concept of human 

dignity in recent decades for a number of reasons. One major reason 

for this relatively recent phenomenon would certainly be the horrors 

of the 20th Century that have occurred on such grand scales. Such 

thinkers as John Paul II, Avery, Dulles, Vaclav Havel, Immanuel 

Kant, and other have tried to elevate the problem of human dignity 

(or lack thereof) to the consciousness of the general public. This 

paper argues that the answer to the problem of human dignity is in 



  Exploring the Nexus between Human Dignity and Justice      |    19 

 

treating all people and the world with the respect that is intrinsic to 

their existence and not simply as a means to an end. 

 Much of the history of ethics is marked with literature on 

various teleological, deontological, and consequential ethical 

systems and their superiority or inferiority. The thinkers that are 

most concerned with the concept of human dignity are attacking 

ethical systems that dominate modern society. There is a calling 

back to concepts that have seemingly been lost, forgotten or simply 

discarded. Pope John Paul II is certainly one who has called all 

Christian and Non-Christians alike to recognize basic truths about 

the human person that are absolute in every age and culture. Such 

absolute truths about each human person would be that all have a 

right to life, the right to be free, and the right to be treated back to 

fundamental truths by the Pope resonates to the depths of our being 

and somehow have come to influence what we experience in the 

world on a daily basis. The idea of human dignity, he says, is 

impossible to divorce from this truth.1 

 In this paper, we shall be discussing the notion of human 

dignity as a moral concept whereby showing that human dignity 

should not be used as a means to an end, but an end in itself. We 

shall start by giving conceptual analysis of what we mean by the 

human person and the bases of human dignity where human choices 

play an important role. This will then lead us to the relationship 

between human dignity and justice. The next ethical theory to be 

considered in this work is utilitarianism that has reduced the human 

person to a means and not an end in itself. Many philosophers 

criticized this theory but Immanuel Kant will be our point of 

reference. After this, we move on to show why the human dignity is 

not a means to an end, but an end in itself, and this will serve as our 

critique. After which we shall have an evaluation and then the 

conclusion. 

 

Conceptualizing the Human Person and Dignity: 

The Human Person  

What, then, is the human Ego? Whatever in man is bodily and 

mental, physical and psychical, material and spiritual, is referred by 

the Ego to itself: The physical and the psychical represent the whole 



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man. The Ego therefore is the whole man. Body and soul are 

integrated into one thing, the whole man, the Ego. The Ego, 

therefore, “is not the body, not the soul, not the intellect, not the will, 

not consciousness, not life. All these things “belong” to the Ego as 

constituting ‘the whole man”.2 The Ego is a substance. A 

“substance” “is an individual being whose nature it is to exist in 

itself and not in another as in a subject. A being whose nature it is 

to exist, not in itself, but in another as in a subject, is called, in 

philosophical terminology, an accidents”.3 Shapes, color, motion, 

thought, feelings, etc. are modifications of some ultimate reality; 

they do not exist in and for themselves, but exist in the substance, 

which they modify. Man, considered as a totality, is a self-contained 

being with a naturally independent existence of its own; man, 

therefore, is a ‘substance’ and since the Ego is the whole man, the 

ultimate reality, which possesses everything, pertaining to man’s 

being. It is evident that the Ego is substantial and not merely 

accidental. 

 The individual has an innate tendency or drive to fulfill its 

potential. This is termed the actualizing tendency. The actualizing 

tendency is “holistic in its mechanism, constant in its state and 

directional in its process”.4 It is a tendency towards autonomy and 

at the same time is vulnerable to environmental circumstances. 

 The Ego (man) is a person. Boethius has given us the 

following definition of a ‘person’ naturae rationalis individual 

substantia -- an individual substance of a rational nature. A ‘person’ 

is, therefore an individual, complete, subsistent, rational 

(intellectual) substance. A moment’s consideration will reveal the 

fact that the human Ego, or whole man, is indeed a substance, which 

is individual and complete and subsistent and rational. 

Consequently, the human Ego, or man in his totality is a ‘person’.5 

To give a final analysis of the human person we can say that, Man 

synthesizes the sense data, imagines, remembers and performs 

instinctive actions. Man strives for sensuous good, avoids sensuous 

evil, and experiences various emotions. Man forms ideas, 

judgments, and processes of reasoning. Man exercises free will and 

desires spiritual values. Man is conceived, lives and dies. The 



  Exploring the Nexus between Human Dignity and Justice      |    21 

 

immediate principles of functions are powers or faculties, but the 

ultimate agent is man, the person, the Ego.6 

       Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, 

must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that every 

human being is a person, that is, his nature is endowed with 

intelligence and free will to make choices. Indeed, precisely because 

he is a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and 

simultaneously from his very nature. 

 

Basis of human Dignity 

The word dignity is used in different contexts and with different 

issues. What is human dignity? Can it be defined? Is dignity an 

arbitrary cultural construction conditioned by the times and 

pragmatically tied to preferences for this or that agenda? Certainly 

not, for dignity touches on something more profound. There really 

is such a thing as human dignity. From a Christian perspective, 

dignity is defined because of God. We are all created in the image 

of God and that fundamentally is the source of our dignity. For 

secular societies that presupposition is not accepted. So where do 

we go in this debate?              

          Two major senses in which the term is mostly employed are, 

firstly, as moral status, in particular, the inalienable right to be 

treated with basic level of respect and autonomy. Secondly, is 

defined as the “state of being worthy of honour and respect.” It can 

also be “quality of being worthy or honourable”.7 But the important 

question of why to respect people, of what to respect about them, 

remains open. What is to be referred to here is their dignity. Insofar 

as there is a philosophical conventional wisdom on dignity at all, 

however, it seems badly in error in tracing an individual’s dignity to 

his capacity for choice. For example, Pico della Mirandola in his 

Oration on Dignity of Man set the ball rolling when portraying God 

as boasting to Adam: 

I have given you, Adam, neither a predetermined place nor 

a particular aspect nor any special prerogatives in order that you may 

take and possess these through your own decision and choice. I have 

made you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, 



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so that like a free and sovereign artificer you might mold and fashion 

yourself into that form you yourself have chosen..8 

 Kant, buttressing this ancient link between dignity and 

autonomy, holds that “a man leads a dignified existence worthy of 

moral respect because he is self-legislating, overcoming natural 

necessity and willing his own actions”.9 This analysis largely 

dominates contemporary discussions of human dignity and the 

respect for persons it requires. Taking a critical look at the phrase 

‘respect for person’, Benn for example gives capacity for choice a 

central role: 

To conceive someone as a person is to see him as actually or 

potentially a chooser, as one attempting to steer his own course 

through the world… To respect someone as a person is to concede 

that one ought to make account of the way in which his enterprise 

might be affected by one’s own decisions.10 

Kant’s intention as they may, it has now become 

commonplace to substitute “capacity for choice” for “dignity”. This 

makes the injunction to “respect the dignity of people” very close to 

the injunction to “respect the choices of people”. The point of the 

former principle was just the opposite, that we should respect people 

rather than their choices. If the capacity to choose is what we respect 

about people, the two principles become virtually equivalent. 

We can all agree with Skinner that people without freedom 

of choice deserve no blame or credit for their performances. To say 

one is dignified for his freely chosen actions is not how the word is 

being used. The man who saves drowning children may be ‘heroic’ 

or ‘virtuous’ but is not necessarily dignified or noble. Dignity refers 

to “what one is rather than what one does”.11 This is to say that we 

respect people’s choices because we respect people, not the other 

way round. According Thomas Hill; 

A person must, at an absolute minimum, have a right to 

‘respect as a person’, which he cannot alienate or waive. He also has 

a further unqualified claim (a right, if you will) to those social and 

economic advantages, which are somehow central to his leading a 

dignified existence.12 



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Autonomy on the other hand is not an important element of 

dignity. What is important is indicated by Kantian aphorism: “The 

fact that man can have the idea of an ‘I’ elevates him immeasurably 

above all other living beings on this earth. This is what makes him 

a person…”13 Man is, at least potentially, a self-conscious being 

capable of possessing a self-image and self-respect. The fact that 

man can respect himself provides a reason for us to respect him in 

turn. What is important here is self-respect and this can be achieved 

with the aid of others. This is to say that human dignity should be 

respected at all time. According to Spiegelberg, “human dignity is 

the kind of intrinsic worth which attaches to a human being in his 

capacity of being a responsible person”. 14 If Spiegelberg is referring 

to one’s capacity for being a morally responsible person, he is 

offering a very Kantian-sounding basis for human dignity. But 

“respect human dignity is different because the thing to be respected 

is created by the act of respecting it”.15 

The notion of human dignity has not fared well in 

contemporary moral philosophy. But philosophers on their daily 

lives can synthesize with migrant workers who complain that: 

They cannot live with dignity in the squalid, overcrowded 

shacks provide by their employers. They can admire and respect the 

dignity of those American Indians who refuse to leave their 

reservations because they do not want to become assimilated into 

the society that has treated them so shamefully. They can understand 

why blacks feel it is so important for their children to develop black 

pride. They can feel indignation at oppression, exploitation, 

degradation, and injustice in any of their forms. In short, there is a 

striking lack of parallel between their philosophical and their 

practical concern for human dignity.16 

It is not entirely clear why this is so. For some, the notion of 

human dignity may seem too unempirical to withstand philosophical 

analysis. For others it may conjure up theological specters or the 

rigorism of Kant. But before we move on with the connection 

between human dignity and justice, we need to know what justice is 

or the sense it is being used. 

What Pritchard has in mind resembled John Rawl’s ideas of 

‘The Sense of Justice’ . Rawls paraphrased Rousseau saying: “: The 



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sense of justice is no mere moral conception formed by the 

understanding alone, but a true sentiment of the heart enlightened 

by reason.”17
. Rawl’s point is that a reasonably well-developed sense 

of justice involves more than an ability to discuss matters of justice 

intelligently. There must also be a genuine concern to do what is just 

and fair. To have a sense of dignity includes concern to achieve and 

maintain various forms of integrity, as well as attitude of self-

respect, self-esteem, pride, shame, resentment and indignation. 

Therefore, whoever tries to formulate substantial principle of justice 

should reserve a prominent place for human dignity. If this is not 

done, the moral aspect of dignity will be absent; and the claims of 

justice will be best legalistic and at worst arbitrary. 

 

The Connection of Justice and Dignity 

It should be clear to us that one has dignity merely by virtue of being 

a person that is by virtue of having self-consciousness. At this point 

the notion of justice and dignity can be brought into relationship 

with each other. There are some people with broken spirit and 

consequently have been unable to maintain their sense of dignity. 

For example, a slave sees himself as inferior to his master. It can be 

seen that such feeling of inferiority has a serious effect on one’s 

sense of justice. This inferiority complex will not let the slave feel 

the injustices done to him. What we are saying in effect here is that 

the lower a person’s regard for his worth, or dignity, is the less 

sensitive he will be to injustices done to him. To imagine someone 

wholly lacking a sense of his own dignity is to imagine someone 

who regards nothing as an injustice to him. Apart from slavery, there 

are various forms of oppression that can impoverish one’s self-

esteem and his sense of justice. We have things like “housing and 

employment discrimination; being born in poverty; being a black 

child in a white man’s world of television heroes and advertising”.18 

 Aside from the injustices done to an individual, the notion of 

dignity also enters into the concern that one not being an agent of 

injustice. There are ways those with a sense of justice can show 

regard for the dignity of others. One’s genuine conviction that others 

are entitled to fair treatment in itself sows that he regards others as 



  Exploring the Nexus between Human Dignity and Justice      |    25 

 

having dignity, as being worthy of respect. Taking positive steps to 

promote justice for others (and prevent injustice) can indicate 

respect for their dignity. At this point a parallel can be drawn about 

one’s sense of justice and the regard he has for his own dignity. The 

lower one’s regard is for dignity of another; the less sensitive one 

will be to injustices done to him. If one has no regard or whatsoever 

for the dignity of another, regarding him as at best an instrument or 

means to some end, he will not regard anything as an injustice to 

him. 

 Considering the familiar and seemingly unchallengeable 

maxim of justice, “Treat equals equally” can further illuminate the 

connection between justice and dignity. This maxim applied only to 

persons and not things. But what is so special about persons that 

such a maxim applies to them? Here, some people try to compare 

persons to machines, but they are different. For example, when 

persons talk about fair wages, machines cannot say the same thing. 

Also, a person has the right to complain if he is underpaid, and to 

talk of the injustice being done to him. But what is the reason for 

this acknowledgement? Is it that persons, unlike machines, have 

certain basic trights? This may be true, but what makes it true? As 

long as an employer regards his employee only as rather 

complicated means to ends, it will seem perfectly arbitrary to insist 

that persons, but not machines, have such rights. 

 If people think of themselves as having only instrumental 

values, they will not know when their dignity is being infringed 

upon. Thus, “it is one’s sense of his intrinsic worth, or dignity, that 

is the basis of his moral demand for just treatment”.19 Even if it is 

conceded that having a sense of justice involves having a sense of 

dignity, one might still wish to know that relevance, if any having a 

sense of justice has to actually having dignity. John Rawls makes a 

very strong claim in this regard: 

One may hold that the sense of justice is a necessary part of 

the dignity of the person, and that it is this dignity ,which puts a 

value upon the person distinct from and logically prior to his 

capacity for enjoyment and his ability to contribute to the enjoyment 

of others through the development of his talents.20 



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What Rawls is trying to say here is that someone with a sense 

of justice is to some extent willing to view his practical problems 

from a standpoint that can be shared by others, in that he takes into 

consideration the interest of others as well as his own. Insofar as he 

is willing to show others the respect he desires others to have for 

him, he has moral worth, or dignity. 

 The problem with this view is that it requires one to have a 

sense of justice in order to be viewed as having dignity. But the most 

to be required is that one has a capacity for developing a sense of 

justice. Rather than an appeal to the capacity for a sense of justice, 

Pritchard prefer to appeal to the capacity for developing a sense of 

dignity as a basis for attributing dignity to persons. Now we move 

on to the next ethical theory known as utilitarianism 

 Utilitarianism is a relatively recent phenomenon in the 

history of ethics and was really founded and developed in the late 

19th Century. The conventional person associated with this ethical 

theory is John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism, as a moral theory that 

bases the morality of action on their consequences, is that “we ought 

to act in accordance with the greatest happiness principle”21 We can 

perhaps best indicate this by listing the various steps in Mill’s 

argument: “Firstly, people ought to do what produces the greatest 

happiness for the greatest number (the utility or greatest happiness 

principle). Secondly, we can discover what produces happiness by 

examining what people in fact do to bring happiness. Therefore, 

people ought to do what they in fact do”.22 This position was 

strongly criticized by many philosophers. 

 The philosophical concept of a categorical imperative is 

central to the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In his 

philosophy, it denotes an absolute, unconditional requirement that 

allows no exceptions, and is both required and justified as an end in 

itself, not as a means to some other end; the opposite of a 

hypothetical imperative. What is hypothetical imperative? A 

hypothetical imperative, in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, is a 

command that applies only conditionally: if A, then B, where A is a 

condition or goal, and B is an action. For example, if you wish to 

remain healthy, then you should not eat spoiled food. Thus, a 



  Exploring the Nexus between Human Dignity and Justice      |    27 

 

hypothetical imperative is not justified in itself, but as a means to an 

end; whether it is in force as a command depends on whether the 

end it helps attain is desired (or required). The opposite of a 

hypothetical imperative is a categorical imperative, which is 

unconditional and an end in itself.23 From Kant’s point of view, 

utilitarianism would be based on hypothetical imperatives, but he 

does not think that morality could be based on assessment of 

consequences. The kind of command Kant thought proper for 

morality was the categorical imperative. There is one thing, and one 

thing only, Kant thought, that is, the proper end of actions, and that 

is to treat humanity whether your own or that of another person - 

always as an end in itself. We should never use another person 

merely as a means but should treat everyone as worthy of respect 

and dignity.24 

To treat people with respect and as an end can pass for a 

universal law as against the utilitarian principle. The main basis of 

a categorical imperative is that “we must be able to will that a maxim 

of our action should be a universal law. The formular of the 

categorical imperative is to act so that the maxim can be applied as 

a universal law. One must act on the maxim of the action as if it 

were a universal law of nature. The principle that determines the 

action is not based on the goal of the action but on the ability of the 

maxim to be universal. 

 

Evaluation 

At this point it might seem tempting to say that it is one thing to treat 

persons as if they had dignity and another to be committed to the 

view that persons actually have dignity. However, aside from the air 

of perversity such a stance has, it seems to over intellectualize what 

it is to treat a person as if he has dignity. Is it genuine or only feigned 

indignation that one is to feel in behalf of injustices done to others? 

Is it that one only says, but does not feel, that certain ways of treating 

others are degrading? Does one only say, but does not really believe 

that others should not be treated as mere means to another’s ends? 

And what of oneself?  How is one’s own resentment, indignation, 

shame, self-esteem, and self-respect to be understood? If these 

attitudes show that one does not genuinely feel that he has dignity, 



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consistency and sensitivity, how should they lead him to feel 

similarly about others? 

 Aside from all these, the claims about the connection 

between dignity and justice are right, to challenge the 

reasonableness of our concern for justice. Having a sense of dignity 

is not merely contingently connected with those attitudes and 

feelings that express our sense of justice. Rather, indignation, 

resentment, remorse, guilt and shame are themselves expressions of 

our concern for human dignity. 

 Finally, Vaclav Havel has argued that the attempt of those 

(mostly scientists) who wish to dominate the world by science and 

therefore not respecting nature as created by God has dangerous 

consequences. This attitude of taking nature personal can lead to the 

destruction of societies. Havel points in particular to totalitarian 

political systems as being the best examples of what happens when 

this logic is followed to its ethically absurd conclusion because all 

things are subjected to the end of utility including freedom, life and 

human dignity. The only way Havel sees out of this dilemma of the 

radical degradation of human dignity in the modern world is to go 

back to being human again. He puts it saying that, we must not be 

ashamed that we are capable of love, friendship, solidarity, 

sympathy, and tolerance, but just the opposite: we must set these 

fundamental dimensions of our humanity free from their ‘private’ 

exile and accept them as the only genuine starting point of 

meaningful human community.  

Jean Bethke Elshtain buttressed this point on human dignity 

by looking at it from the social teaching of the Cathoolic Church. It 

started with Ditgnitatis Hunanae which begins by proclaiming “the 

dignity of human person” and goes on to insist that dignity involves 

“enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by 

coercion but motivated by a sense of duty”. Duty and the rightful 

exercise of rights cannot be served one from the other. 

 

Conclusion 

The only suitable conclusion to the crisis concerning human dignity 

is to be convinced that human beings are not to be treated as a means 



  Exploring the Nexus between Human Dignity and Justice      |    29 

 

to whatever end we determine, be it pleasure or anything else. 

Totalitarian governmental structure reduces the individual to what 

he can produce to help the economy, as do extreme forms of 

materialism. Ones worth dignity or dignity is therefore determined 

by what he can produce. What about the child? What about the 

unborn? Indeed, Havel, Pope John Paul II, and others have 

attempted to awake in the minds and hearts of everyone this inner 

conviction that there is more to life than simply the natural, seen 

world and its allurements.  

I think that Peter Singer has done this with regard to 

utilitarian ethical systems. Singer has taken the arguments of John 

Stuart Mill to a conclusion that is not easily accepted. The initial 

shock and uneasiness that often accompanies Singer’s conclusion 

should cause us to wonder what an alternative is to using human 

dignity as a means. Our human nature will not allow such blatant 

attacks on human dignity to continue. It is the hope of thinkers that 

see these injustices that the world will recognize that true freedom 

includes every human being and treating each one with the dignity 

and respect that is intrinsic to their very existence as a  person. 

 
ENDNOTES 

1. A Dulles, ‘Truth as the Ground of Freedom: A Theme from John Paul 

the II’, In a Recent Encyclical Veritatis Splendor, 1993. 

2. C.N. Bittle, “The Human Person: A Study and Critique”, An 

International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy, 1995, 

106. 

3. Ibid. 

4. T. Abdulezer, “The Actualizing Tendency: The Foundation Block”’ 

Journal of Social Behaviour and Personality, 1997, 1. 

5. C.N. Bittle, The Human Person: A Study and Critique”, An International 

Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy, 1995, 106. 

6. Ibid. 

7. J. A. Simpson and E. Weiner, eds. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd 

ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 

8. R. E. Goodin, ‘The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity’; American 

Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1981, 95. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid.96. 

12. T.E. Hill, ‘Servility and Self-Respect’, Monist, Vol. 57, 1973, 87. 

13. Kant, Anthropology, quoted in Spiegelberg, “Human Dignity”, 60. 



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14. M.S. Prichard, ‘Human Dignity and Justice’, Ethics, U.S.A.: Western 

Michigan University, 1971, 306. 

15. R.E. Goodin, Op. Cit., 97. 

16. M. S. Pritchard Op. Cit., 299. 

17. Ibid., 300. 

18. Ibid., 307. 

19. Ibid.,310. 

20. Ibid.,310. 

21. D. Stewarts and H.G. Blocker, Fundamental of Philosophy 2nd Ed. New 

York: Macmillan Publishing Company,1987, 322.  

22. Ibid..323. 

23. M. Martin, A Utilitarian Kantian Principles, Philosophical Studies 

Indianapolis: Hackett, 1970, 90. 

24. D. Stewarts and H.G. Blocker, Fundamental of Philosophy 2nd Ed. (New 

York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987, 331. 


