

























116

PREAMBLE
     Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Bradley is much closer to our 
time. Born in 1846 in England, Bradley is one of the most 

th 1
important philosophers in the 20  century.  He contributed to 
virtually every area of the philosophical discipline. However, 
he is mostly known for his work in metaphysics which finds a 
systematic exposition in his magnum opus: Appearance and 
Reality: An Essay in Metaphysics (1893) His other important 
writings include Ethical Studies (1876), Principles of Logic 
(1883) and Essays in Truth and Reality (1914). Bradley's 
concept of metaphysics is implicit in all his writings, 
especially in his account of morality as self-realization in 
Ethical Studies and of course the theory of judgement and 
inference he develops in the Principles of Logic. Same is true 
in respect of his discussion of the problem of truth and allied 
matters in Essays on Truth and Reality. Nonetheless it is in 
Appearance and Reality that his concept of metaphysics, 
receives its explicit articulation.

BRADLEY'S CONCEPT 
OF 

METAPHYSICS

Damian ILODIGWE



     Bradley holds metaphysics in high esteem, seeing a close 
2affinity between religion, mysticism and metaphysics.  

Hence, he regards metaphysics as one of the highest 
vocations to which a human being is called. No human being 
can realize his full potentials unless he learns how to think and 

3
more importantly to think properly.  As a form of thinking, 
metaphysics provides us with an important avenue for 
understanding the nature of things as they are in themselves 
rather than merely in terms of their accidental determinations, 

4that is to say, rather than merely as appearances.  
   Indeed as Bradley makes explicit in his definition of 
metaphysics in Appearance and Reality,
 

We may agree perhaps to understand by 
metaphysics an attempt to know reality as against 
mere appearance, or the study of first principles, or 
ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend 
the universe not as piecemeal but as a whole. (AR, 
1)

METAPHYSICS AND THE IDEAL OF KNOWLEDGE
     This definition gives us a point of entry into Bradley's 
concept of metaphysics. We should start by making a number 
of remarks about the definition. First, it is significant that 
Bradley's says that “metaphysics is an attempt to know” (AR, 
1). The use of the word “attempt” suggests a note of caution in 
respect of the possibilities of metaphysics. Bradley is 
certainly not in doubt that the object of metaphysics is 
knowledge but he is concerned about the extent of knowledge 

5that is attainable.  Bradley's cautious optimism is reinforced 
also by the fact that he qualifies his statement with the phrase 
“we may agree perhaps.” (AR, 1) Combine this phrase and the 
word “attempt” as they function in Bradley's definition and it 
becomes immediately clear he has reservations about the 

6project of metaphysics.
 While Bradley does not deny the possibilities of 
metaphysics, he is certainly at pains to underscore its 
limitations. When we attempt to do anything, or make an 
effort in respect of any goal, there is the implicit 
understanding that we may not succeed in what we set out to 
do. But there is also the implicit understanding that we may 

117



succeed. It is a case of we may or we may not succeed. In other 
words, success is more probable than certain. The probability 
of success allows for the possibility of failure as far as the 
project is concerned.   
     In respect of Bradley's presentation of metaphysics as an 
attempt to know we must guard against two possible extremes 
-  the extreme of absolute failure and the extreme of absolute 
success. Our attempt at anything can end in absolute failure 

7
and it can also end in absolute success.  When these two 
extremes become effective philosophy and skepticism may 
come across as enemies, but the truth is that there is a common 
ground between skepticism and philosophy so that one is not 
necessarily exclusive of the other. One cannot be a true 
philosopher unless one is a skeptic of a sort, so far as a basic 
requirement of philosophy is a certain critical attitude in 

8
relating with issues.  Yet to realize the philosophical 
standpoint, there is need for the philosopher to transcend 
skepticism. Bradley seems aware of this double requirement 
of the philosophic spirit and all the time his concern is to 

9strike a balance between them.  
     Consequently, Bradley's cautious optimism in respect of 
the possibilities and limitations of metaphysics lies 
somewhere in between the two extremes, for while he thinks 
that the object of metaphysics is the pursuit of knowledge, he 
does believe that we can attain absolute knowledge of reality 
in practice. Nor does he take the denial that absolute 
knowledge is possible in practice as a denial that knowledge 
is not possible at all. 
     The point is that our attempt to know reality always results 
in knowledge, but because of the gap between reality and our 
concept, we cannot speak of one to one correspondence 
between reality and concept, so that there is something of 
reality that escapes conceptual representation. So, for 
Bradley, we are dealing with a case of success and failure in 
the same vein rather than a case of outright success or outright 

10failure.
We should remark the affinity between Bradley's 

definition of metaphysics and that of Plato and Aristotle. 
Indeed some commentators argue that Bradley's definition 
combines the chief features of Plato and Aristotle's 

118



11definitions.  As we have seen Plato says that metaphysics is a 
“science of the supra-sensible” while Aristotle says that 

12metaphysics is “the science of being qua being”.  Bradley's 
contention that metaphysics involves an attempt to know 
reality as against mere appearance reminds us of Plato and 
Aristotle's definition. The pivotal point here is the distinction 

13
established between reality and mere appearance.  The 
distinction presupposes that there are levels in reality as well 

14as levels in knowledge.  
     Moreover a certain hierarchy subsists in respect of the 
levels of reality and levels of knowledge, so that we can speak 
of the higher and the lower and indeed the highest. In this 
context when Bradley speaks of reality, he has in mind the 
category of the highest, not higher or lower. Reality is 
properly understood only in the sense of absolute reality. In 
Bradley's parlance, anything short of absolute reality is 
nothing but appearance, albeit within this domain of 
appearance the category of higher and lower realities is 
effective. Nonetheless both the categories of higher and lower 

15realities are subsumed under the category of absolute reality.  

METAPHYSICS AND THE LOGIC OF PART AND 
WHOLE
     Another way to make sense of Bradley's distinction 
between reality and appearance is in terms of the logic of part 
and whole. That which is said to be appearance is not the 
whole but part of the whole, while only that which is said to be 
reality is properly designated as the whole. To this extent 
reality is defined by its completeness while appearance is 
defined by its incompleteness. Reality includes everything 
while appearance by virtue of its incompleteness is only a part 
of the whole, meaning that it is essentially one-sided and 
cannot be taken as the whole without falsifying the nature of 

16things.  
     In the sense that appearance is part of the whole of reality, 
appearance is always appearance of reality, so that we can say 
that appearance is reality. This emphasis represents the 
continuity between appearance and reality and it means that 

17
appearance cannot be divorced from reality.  Yet within this 
continuum there is also the burden of working out the proper 

119



18relation that subsists between appearance and reality.  
     It is understandable that appearance always belongs to 
reality and to this extent cannot be conceived without 
reference to reality, as a part is inconceivable without 
reference to the whole in which it subsists. Nonetheless in 
belonging to reality, the question concerns the mode in which 
appearance belongs to reality. While appearance is always 
appearance of reality, there is a sense in which appearance is 
not reality, since appearance is part of the whole and never the 
whole itself. The gap between absolute reality and 
appearance forbids a one to one correspondence between 
appearance and reality, meaning that in the final analysis 
reality is defined by its absoluteness whereas appearance is 

19defined by its relativity.  
     In Appearance and Reality and Essays on Truth and 
Reality, Bradley distinguishes between three levels of reality 
with epistemic corollaries, namely, immediate experience, 
relational experience and supra-relational experience. As the 
designation suggests the distinction is predicated on the 
reality of relation. There is a level below relation, there is a 

20
relational level and there is a level beyond relation.  
     Immediate experience is level of reality below relation, in 
other words, a pre-conceptual level of reality, whereas 
relational experience is a level of reality in which relation is 
effective, a level of reality in which we can conceptually 
distinguish between object and subject of knowledge and in 
which an object exists for the subject as object of 

21knowledge.  Supra-relational experience is a level of relation 
that exceeds relational experience and in which there is a 
realization of a higher unity in which the subject-object 

22
distinction is supplanted.  As the highest level of experience 
it is an absolute experience that includes all the other levels 
with respect to their possible developments. 
     It is evident that the foregoing levels of experience 
exemplify the moral of Bradley's distinction between 
appearance and reality which we have presented in terms of 
the logic of part and whole. In this parlance both immediate 
experience and relational experience are appearances albeit 
one is higher than the other. Relational experience is higher 
than immediate experience. But neither of them is the whole 

120



given that each suffers from a basic incompleteness as a 
consequence of its appearance status. Supra-relational 
experience is the all-inclusive reality and contains 
everything. It includes both immediate experience and 

23
relational experience.  
     Indeed as Bradley maintains there is a dialectical principle 
at work in each level such that in quest of completeness, each 
level of experience finds its fulfilment in the next level of 
experience with its incompleteness made up for by the 
succeeding level of experience. Such is the case with respect 
to the relation between immediate experience, which is a 
lower form of experience and its successor, relational 

24experience which is a higher form of experience.  The same 
is true of the relation between relational experience and 
supra-relational experience and by implication immediate 
experience and supra-relational experience. The breakdown 
of immediate experience in search of completion witnesses 
the emergence of relational experience just as the breakdown 
of relational experience also witnesses the emergence of 

25supra-relational experience.  
     Consequently, properly understood, both immediate 
experience and relational experience are appearances and not 
reality, whereas only supra-relational experience is properly 
designated as reality. So too is any other thing that Bradley 
designates as appearance such as self, space and time, 
causality, philosophy, morality, religion and indeed anything 
that is infected with relation. They are all appearances of the 
absolute as all other realities designated as appearances are 

26
appearances of the absolute.  
     Notice however that it not just that a certain hierarchy 
subsists within the kingdom of appearances but there is a 
dialectic of appearance relative to which the incompleteness 
that infects one appearance is overcome by another 
appearance. The dialectic issues in a metaphysics of the 
Absolute so far as the Absolute is the ultimate point of 
reference for mediating the incompleteness that bedevils the 

27kingdom of appearances and its constituents.

LEVELS IN REALITY: BRADLEY, PLATO AND 
ARISTOTLE     

121



  Bradley is certainly not alone in dividing reality into several 
levels. As noted a similar categorization of reality into levels 
can be found in Plato and Aristotle. In structuring reality into 
two basic tiers, the world of forms and the world of sensible 
particulars, Plato installs a hierarchy between the two levels 
such that the reality of the world of sensible particulars is tied 
to the world of forms as derivatives are bound to their original 
to the extent that one is said to participate in the other as its 

28imitation.  
     Yet beyond this hierarchical structure that binds the world 
of forms and the world of particulars, certain hierarchy 
similarly subsists within the domain of forms that allows us to 
categorize one form as higher than another form until we 
reach the peak of the hierarchy occupied by the form of the 

29good.  The hierarchical ordering of the forms within the 
world of forms is without prejudice to the fact that all the 
forms belong to a community of originals that are variously 
instantiated in the world of sensible particulars. Just as it is the 
case with the forms, there is also logic of hierarchy at work 
within the kingdom of sensible particulars that enables us to 
categorize particulars hierarchically, even though they all 
belong to the kingdom of derivatives and so are not 

30originals.   
     In jettisoning Plato's metaphysical dualism of universal 
and particular, Aristotle says that every particular thing is a 
substance, so that the universal does not exist separately but 

31inheres in the sensible particular.  Aristotle's division of 
reality into several levels takes the form of recognition of 
various categories of substance. Essentially Aristotle 
recognizes three divisions of substance. First, there is the 
sensible and the perishable substance. Second, there is the 
sensible and eternal substance and third, there is the non-
sensible and eternal substance. Aristotle does not just divide 
substance into categories but a certain hierarchy subsists 
within the division so far as the category of higher and lower 
is operative. Sensible and perishable substances occupy the 
lower strata. Sensible and eternal substances occupy the 
middle strata while non-sensible and eternal occupy the 

32
highest strata.  

122



     The point of Aristotle's division of reality into three 
categories of substance becomes evident, once we consider 
his metaphysics of motion. The governing presupposition of 
course is that there is causal interaction between communities 

33
of substances as no substance exists in isolation.  Yet in 
accounting for the motion in the universe, Aristotle 
recognizes that we cannot persist in an infinite regress of 
causes as it will mean that we cannot account for the original 
cause of motion in the universe and to this extent nothing is 

34accounted for in the end.  
     In view of this consideration he is impelled to postulate a 
first cause, the unmoved mover which itself is uncaused as the 
original cause of the motion in the universe. Unlike other 
substances which are made of matter and form, the uncaused 
cause is pure form, the understanding being that given that 
matter is the principle of potentiality, if the uncaused cause 
was to contain matter it would be invariably open to further 
determination which will undermine its status as uncaused 
cause and does render superfluous the explanation it 

35guarantees in respect of metaphysics of motion.
     From our account of Bradley's distinction between 
appearance and reality it is evident that Bradley basically 
appropriates Plato and Aristotle's division of reality into 
various levels. Bradley's theorization is somewhat a synthesis 
of Plato's theory of forms and Aristotle's metaphysics of 
substance. Plato's world occupies a position akin to Aristotle's 
third division of substance, that is, non sensible and eternal, 
with the highest substance at the peak just as the Platonic form 
of the good. Following Aristotle in jettisoning Plato's 
dualism, Bradley recuperates both schemes in his 
metaphysics of the absolute with three basic divisions, non-
relational, relational and supra-relational experience, which 
levels in the end collapse into the distinction of reality and 
appearance, with the all inclusive reality serving as point of 
reference for the mediation and constitution of the kingdom 

36
of appearance.
     Just like Plato and Aristotle Bradley locates metaphysics 
in the domain of absolute reality and not in the domain of 
particular reality. This is what he means by saying that 

123



metaphysics involves knowledge of reality rather than mere 
appearance. Understood in terms of his peculiar use of the 
term appearance, metaphysics seeks the whole rather than the 
partial. Of course it does not mean that metaphysics cannot 
start with appearance but while it engages with appearance its 
concern is with the reality that reveals itself in appearance. 
Metaphysics can do this since in truth every appearance is 

37appearance of reality.  
     Thus by interrogating appearance the goal is to transcend 
appearance and attain reality. To be engaged with mere 
appearance therefore does not represent the preoccupation of 
metaphysics. In its engagement with reality, the sort of 
knowledge that metaphysics seeks is also important. Here we 
must distinguish between forms of knowledge. We can speak 
of metaphysical knowledge of reality as contradistinguished 

38
from scientific knowledge or historical knowledge.  
     Compared to the latter, the former represents a higher form 
of knowledge and is the sort of knowledge involved in the 
metaphysical interrogation of the nature of reality. This 
emphasis become evident once we consider a further element 
from Bradley's definition of metaphysics, namely, the claim 
that “metaphysics is the study of first principles or ultimate 
truths.” (AR, 1) Both points are not really new points if we 
consider as we have seen that Aristotle says in the 
Metaphysics the concern of metaphysics is to investigate the 
fundamental causes of being. It is in this respect in fact that he 

39says that metaphysics is first philosophy.  
     Bradley's use of the term “first principles” immediately 
invites the distinction between first principles and secondary 
principles just as his use of the term “ultimate truth” also 
invites the distinction between ultimate truth and proximate 
truths. Both distinctions can hardly be understood except in 
the light of Bradley's concept of reality. The point is that the 
principles in question as well as truth are functions of reality. 
First principles are on the side of reality, while secondary 
principles are on the side of appearance. If one's concern was 
with secondary principles this does not count as metaphysical 
pursuit since one is preoccupied with a lower reality, 
appearance and not reality. The same is true of the distinction 
between ultimate truth and proximate truth. Ultimate truth is 

124



on the side of reality while proximate truth is on the side of 
appearance. 
     The point of metaphysics in investigating reality is the 
ultimate truth of reality. Were we to be concerned with the 
proximate truth of things, we could not say we are engaged in 
metaphysical investigation. Without spurning proximate 
truths the point of metaphysics is to transcend it and penetrate 

40
the ultimate truth of things.

THE QUESTION OF THE PRE-EMINENT STATUS OF 
METAPHYSICS: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF 
REASON 
     So like Plato and Aristotle Bradley will also regard 
metaphysics as the queen of sciences so far as in 
preoccupying itself with first principles and ultimate truths, 
metaphysics presupposes other sciences. What entitles 
metaphysics to pre-eminence therefore, is that its province is 
the province of reality, while other sciences are preoccupied 
with appearance. 
     In view of the dialectic of appearance that drives his 
metaphysics of the absolute it means that the interrogation of 
the foundation of the other sciences will end up in a full blown 
metaphysics of absolute since as appearances the sciences 
cannot ground themselves but must look up to metaphysics 
for their grounding, so far as the principles which define the 
foundation of the sciences fall to metaphysics to investigate.
     There is a further element in Bradley's definition of 
metaphysics we need to examine in order to come to terms 
with his concept of metaphysics. I refer to the claim that 
metaphysics involves an “effort to comprehend the universe 
not as piecemeal but as a whole” (AR, 1). This element, as it 
were, further elaborates the contributions of the earlier 
elements in Bradley's definition by clarifying the scope of 
metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysics is not only 
preoccupied with knowledge of first principles or ultimate 
truth, but the ideal of knowledge it pursues is one that is as 

42comprehensive as possible.  
     The basic point here is that “truth is whole”; moreover in 
interrogating the truth of reality, metaphysics wants to see 
how everything fits together. It may begin with the 

125



determination of truth of reality as appearance but its goal is 
43to understand the nature of things as they are in themselves.  

Of course, partial determination is always possible. But the 
truth is that metaphysics is not content with partial 
determination. On the contrary only a full determination of 
the truth of things can satisfy the metaphysical 
consciousness. It is not satisfied with half-truths, but is keen 

44to uncover the whole truth.  
     This demand for comprehensiveness in respect of the 
understanding of the truth of reality is one of the key features 
that distinguish metaphysics from other disciplines. In its 
pursuit of knowledge of reality, the sphere of the particular 
sciences is limited. But this is not the case with metaphysics 

45which specialises in every department of reality.  Its sphere is 
seemingly unrestricted. As it were metaphysics is jack of all 
trades, claiming membership of every community of being as 
its legitimate object as far as its quest for knowledge is 
concerned. Fundamentally metaphysics claims that its 
findings are valid in respect of all possible worlds and not 

46only in respect of this or that particular world.
     The holistic nature of the metaphysical knowledge that 
metaphysics guarantees concerning the nature of ultimate 
reality is what confers pre-eminence on metaphysics. But this 
feature of metaphysics has also been one of the chief points in 
respect of which metaphysics is attacked by its critics. The 
complaint is that this ideal of knowledge presupposes a 

47concept of reason that is rather too grandiose.  It is not denied 
at all that there a basic identity between the structure of reason 
and the structure of reality. Of course, without such identity, 
we can hardly vouch for the possibility of metaphysical 
knowledge and this in turn would mean outright that the 
project of metaphysics is impossible. As it were, therefore, 
the very possibility of metaphysics depends on the claimed 
identity between the structure of reason and the structure of 
reality. On the contrary what critics of metaphysics deny is 
that the claimed identity between the structure of reason and 

48
reality is an absolute identity.  
     Of course if it were an absolute identity, the implication is 
that nothing of reality could be hidden from reason in the end. 
In other words, it means that reason would be sovereign over 

126



being and there is no aspect of being that would resist 
conceptual schematization. In this respect therefore not only 
can reason determine things as they are in themselves, but it 
can secure full determination of the nature of things as they 

49
are in themselves.  
     Given that Bradley says that metaphysics involves an 
“effort to comprehend things not in piecemeal but as a whole” 
(AR, 1), we may be tempted to associate him with this 
position. But that would be a mistake for while Bradley in 
principle accepts that metaphysical knowledge is as 
comprehensive as it can possibly be, he is quite hesitant in 
affirming the view on which there is no difference between 

50existence and reality.  Given his confidence in reason, he 
certainly believes that if our metaphysical capacities are 
properly exercised we can understand the nature of reality as 

51
it is in-itself.  
     Yet as desirable as it is to know everything about the nature 
of reality, Bradley believes that the metaphysical ambition to 
fully determine the nature of reality through the agency of 
pure reason is doomed to fail in the end, so that without 
prejudice to the possibilities of metaphysics, metaphysics is 
nonetheless limited with respect to the extent of knowledge it 
can attain so far as the difference between existence and 

52thought is irreducible in the final analysis.
     So in other words while Bradley is basically in sympathy 
with the basic insight of Hegelian dialectic in respect the 
dynamism of reason in its attempt to grasp the nature of 
reality, he recoils from any attempt to annul the difference 
between thought and reality. For this reason, he will prefer a 
more humble dialectic of appearance to the ambitious 
speculative dialectic that we find in Hegel on which, “the real 

53
is rational and the rational is real.”  
     Because he has basic confidence in the powers of reason 
and because he believes that being is intelligible, Bradley will 
endorse the first part of the foregoing thesis, that is, that the 
real is rational. This optimism invariably means that the 
project of metaphysics is feasible and by all means we can 
attain metaphysical knowledge of the nature of reality 
through the agency of reason. (See AR, Introduction) 
     But because he has his reservations concerning the claims 

127



of rationalistic idealism (or speculative idealism) he will not 
endorse the second part of the foregoing thesis, that is, that the 
rational is real. The presupposition of course is that the sphere 
of rationality is co-extensive with the sphere of reality. If this 
were the case, it means nothing could escape the gaze of 
reason in the end. But apparently, as we have noted, Bradley 
finds this thesis problematic given that it does not allow us to 
maintain the difference between thought and existence, a 
difference which is vital to the very possibility of existence as 

54distinct from thought.
     In view of this submission what is evident is that Bradley is 
in support of rationalism at the same time he is also a critic of 
rationalism. He is in support of rationalism so far as he is 
optimistic about the powers of reason as far as the ideal of 
rational determination of reality is concerned. He is confident 
that this is a viable project and through such rational 
determination we can arrive at knowledge of the true nature of 
things as comprehensive as possible. 
     But paradoxically Bradley is also pessimistic about the 
powers of reason, so far as he thinks that because of the final 
difference between reason and reality, there is a limit to which 
we can know reality through the means of our rational 
determination no matter how sophisticated such 
determination may be. Because of the final difference 
between thought and reality, no matter how comprehensive 
our knowledge may be, our rational determination falls short 
of the nature of things. The implication of all this is that 
Bradley's attitude towards metaphysics is ambivalent. While 
he will not deny the possibility of metaphysics, he will be 

55
keen to avoid a grandiose concept of metaphysics.

ASSESSMENT
     At the start of our exposition we indicated that there is a 
close affinity between Bradley and Plato and Aristotle's 
concept of metaphysics. We noted that Bradley's definition 
indeed incorporates several features of the Platonic and 
Aristotelian metaphysics such that Bradley's concept is 

56
arguably a synthesis of Plato and Aristotle.  While this point 
is essential in understanding Bradley's account of 
metaphysics, especially his distinction between reality and 

128



appearance with the core element of his metaphysics of the 
Absolute, it is equally important to stress the difference 
between Bradley, Plato and Aristotle which often is not so 
evident. 
     But there are clues in his definition no matter how indebted 
to Plato and Aristotle the definition may be. The classical 
account of metaphysics is usually associated with Plato and 
Aristotle, the two philosophical giants that have shaped the 
fortunes of metaphysics over the course of the last two 
millennia. Until the emergence of Kant the portrait of 
metaphysics they sketched held sway and it was one that 
assumed the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason. 
     However, with Kant the era of critical metaphysics started 
in the sense that Kant set up a tribunal to investigate the 
metaphysical possibilities of pure reason as a prolegomena to 
any future metaphysics. This approach is not only novel but 
the result is revolutionary because of the embargo Kant 
subsequently placed on the traditional province of 
metaphysics, that is, that the Platonic supra-sensible world 
and the Aristotelian being qua being are inaccessible to pure 

57
reason.  
     With this development emerged the era of what has been 
called categorical metaphysics in contradistinction from 

58
traditional metaphysics associated with Plato and Aristotle.  
With Kant we begin to have complaints about the claims of 
metaphysics to investigate the transcendent reality and the 
attempt to reconceptualise metaphysics in terms of the 
science of synthetic a priori, that is, the so called 
transcendental condition for the possibility of knowledge. 
With the dispensation inaugurated by Kant, the ideal of 
metaphysics as investigating the realm of noumena through 

59
the agency of pure reason becomes problematic.  
     We need to take into account this entire development in 
order to understand the nuances of Bradley's concept of 
metaphysics. Bradley is on the side of Plato and Aristotle but, 
as it were, it is as if the Copernican revolution of Kant comes 
with the effect of the need to limit the possibilities of 
metaphysics even if not in the Kantian sense. Thus while 
Bradley remains basically in sympathy with the traditional 
concept of metaphysics as science of being qua being or again 
as science of the supra-sensible as laid down by Plato and 

129



Aristotle, he is also keen to insist that there is a limit to which 
60we can know reality through the agency of pure reason.  

     From the Kantian standpoint therefore he is positive about 
the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason. Yet like Kant 
but with a different motivation, he is also concerned to stress 
the metaphysical limitation of pure reason. Interestingly the 
recognition of the metaphysical limitation of pure reason 
does not issue in the deconstruction of traditional 
metaphysics as Kant does but it simply signals that a 
grandiose concept of metaphysics may hurt metaphysics than 

61help it.  
     Hence one way to shield metaphysics from attacks that 
seek to deconstruct it is to make concessions and tone down 
its claims with respect to the sovereignty of reason without 
losing the substance of its claim. I think this toning down 
exercise is what is at issue in Bradley's ambivalent attitude 
towards metaphysics and in the final analysis it is meant to 
protect metaphysics from deconstruction by reckless critics. 
     I suggest that this exercise of toning down the claims of 
metaphysics in order to protect metaphysics from 
deconstruction is what we find in the seeming uncertainty that 
hovers round Bradley's definition of metaphysics. I mean the 
fact that he will say it is an attempt to know reality as against 
mere appearance instead of saying more assertively as 
Aristotle or Plato says that “it is a science of being qua being” 
or “a science of supra-sensible.” Or again the fact that he says 
it is “an effort to comprehend the universe not as piecemeal 
but as a whole.” (AR, 1)
     As noted both phrases does not suggest he is taking off on a 
confident mood. It suggests rather a note of reservation. 
When you ask someone to do something and he tells you he 
will try or that he will make an effort, it is clear it is a humble 
submission and in truth it may make us down the prospect of 
success in such endeavour. But, as we have also noted, 
Bradley's use of these terms is deliberate and is meant to 
indicate already his intention to develop a more humble 
concept of metaphysics in contradistinction from the 
grandiose concept of metaphysics that is associated with the 
classical traditions of metaphysics as defined by Plato and 
Aristotle. 

130



     In Bradley's case, he feels compelled to make allowance 
for failure in the project of metaphysics  an allowance which 
he thinks strengthens metaphysics rather than weaken it if it 
will protect it from deconstruction by those who will be quick 
to notice its grandiose claims. To this extent the way to save 
metaphysics from the sort of self-destruction that stems from 
intellectual pride is to tone down its claims. 
     In this respect it is clear that the environment in which 
Plato, Aristotle and Bradley are operating is quite different. 
While Bradley is familiar with the classical traditions, he 
could not ignore the modern tradition but, especially, it's 
suspicion about metaphysics. So while he will take what is 
best in the traditions of metaphysics he will also be keen to 
strengthen metaphysics in its modern context, even if it 
means making concessions that do not alter substantially the 
claims of metaphysics. 
     In this sense, Bradley's concept of metaphysics could be 
seen as a subtle critique of traditional metaphysics, so far as 
he is raising the sort of critical question that Kant raises about 
the metaphysical possibilities of pure reason. But unlike 
Kant, he remains optimistic in respect of the overall 
framework laid down by traditional metaphysics. 
     On the other hand, Bradley's concept of metaphysics, 
especially his position on the problem of relation of thought to 
reality could be seen as a critique of the Kantian position in 
respect of its dualistic formulation of the relation between 
thought and reality. In retrieving the matter from the 
problematic dualistic formulation, Bradley will then develop 
a view of the relation of thought and reality that is both 
cautious and optimistic such as to sustain the possibility of 
metaphysics while at the same time delimiting its claims.

CONCLUSION 
     When we take into account Bradley's relation to the 
traditions of metaphysics as defined by Plato and Aristotle 
and then his response to the challenge unleashed by Kant's 
Copernican revolution and the entire modern assault on 
metaphysics, we begin to understand the sense of humility 
that pervades his definition of metaphysics and his 
motivation to save metaphysics from deconstruction by 

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toning down its claim. 
     In this respect, Bradley must be seen as a transitional 
figure so far as the odyssey of metaphysics is concerned 
especially in its modern context. One of the features of 
contemporary philosophy has been its anti-metaphysical 
bias. Against this backdrop the caution and optimism that 
Bradley combines in the portrait of metaphysics he sketches 
is understandable. A humble concept of metaphysics is more 
likely to survive in the unabashedly anti-metaphysical 
environment of contemporary philosophy than a concept of 
metaphysics that is blown out of proportion. 
     The bottom line is that a balanced concept of reason in its 
relation to reality must be put in place to forestall the event of 
the “death of metaphysics”. The attempt to secure this 
consideration seems to be the most important aspect of 
Bradley's contributions as far as the situation of metaphysics 
is concerned. Little wonder Bradley says in the appendix to 
Appearance and Reality that:

The solution to this dilemma (of thought's relation 
to Reality) offered in chapter xv, is I believe, the 
only solution possible. It contains the main thesis 
of this work, views opposed to that thesis 
remaining, it seems to me caught up in and 
destroyed by the dilemma. And we must notice 
two main features of this doctrine. It contends on 
the one side that truth or thought essentially does 
not satisfy its own claims (and this will be 
applicable to any finite existence or appearance) 
that it demand to be, and so far already is 
something which it completely cannot be. Hence, 
if thought carried out its own nature, it both would 
and would not have passed beyond itself and 
become also an Other. And in the second place, this 
self-completion of thought, by inclusion of the 
aspects opposed to mere thinking, would be what 
we mean by reality; and by reality we can mean no 
more than this. The criticisms on this doctrine, 
which I have seen, do not appear to me to rest on 
any serious inquiry either as to what the demands 
of thought really are, or what their satisfaction 
involves. But, if to satisfy the intellect is to be true 
and real such a question must be fundamental (AR, 
493)

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END NOTES
1.  Cf. P. A. Schipp (ed.) The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Evaton: The 

Library of Living Philosophers, Inc. 1946), p. 10 The following 
abbreviations are used in the text to designate Bradley's works: 
ES=Ethical Studies, AR=Appearance and Reality, PL= Principles of 
Logic and ETR=Essays on Truth and Reality.

2.  Cf. AR, 5. See also W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol 2, 
ndThe Medieval Mind, 2  edition (New York: Harcourt Brace 

Jovanovich, Inc., 1969), pp. 84-85
3.  Cf. AR, 3-4. See also James Allard and Guy Stock, “Editor's 

Introduction” in F. H. Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, 
edited by James Allard and Guy Stock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), pp. 103-114

4.  See Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the Problematic Status of 
Metaphysics (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2006), 
Chapter 1

5.  Cf. AR, 485
6.  Cf. AR, 5-10. See also Damian Ilodigwe, “Hume's Criticism of 

Metaphysics”, WAJOPS West African  Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, Volume 14 December 2011

7.  Cf. AR, 5-6
8.  Cf. AR, 5-10, ETR, Chapter 1
9.  AR, Chapter 15
10.  Ibid. See Damian Ilodigwe, “Bradley's Account of the Self as 

Appearance: Between Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Hegel's 
Speculative Idealism”, Paper presented at the Oxford International 
Conference on British Idealism and the Concept of the Self, Harris 
Manchester College, Oxford University, United Kingdom, 27-30 
August, 2013, pp. 1-21; See also his “Bradley's Account of Truth: 
Between Epistemology and Metaphysics” in Collingwood and British 
Idealism Studies, 19: 2 (2013), pp. 219-250

11.  See J. H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), Chapters 22; See also G. R. 
G, Mure, An Introduction to Hegel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 
Chapters 1-3 

12.  See W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol 2, The Medieval 
ndMind, 2  edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1969), 

pp. 84-85. See also J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 116-121

13.  D. J. Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), Chapters 8-9

14.  See Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Elements of Philosophy: An Introduction, 
rd3  Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1993), pp. 399-413

15.  Cf. AR, 120-123
16.  See Damian Ilodigwe, “Bradley's Account of the Self as Appearance: 

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Between Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Hegel's Speculative 
Idealism”, Paper presented at the Oxford International Conference on 
British Idealism and the Concept of the Self, Harris Manchester 
College, Oxford University, United Kingdom, 27-30 August, 2013, pp. 
1-21;

17.  In concluding the first part of Appearance and Reality which is devoted 
to an account of the nature of appearance, Bradley takes care to 
accentuate the community between Reality and its appearances, 
maintaining effectively that appearance cannot be divorced from 
reality. In his words, “All appearances must belong to reality. For what 
appears is, and whatever is cannot fall outside the real. And we may now 
combine this result with the conclusion just reached. We may say that 
everything which appears is somehow real in such a way as to be self-
consistent. The character of the real is to possess everything 
phenomenal in a harmonious form. I will repeat this same truth in order 
to words. Reality is one in this sense that it has a positive nature 
exclusive of discord, a nature which must hold throughout everything 
that is to be real.” (AR, 123)

18.  See Appendix AR, 491-495
19.  See Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the Problematic Status of 

Metaphysics, Chapter 2
20.  AR, 403-431, ETR, 159-201
21.  Cf. W. J. Mander, “Levels of Experience in F. H. Bradley” Southern 

Journal of Philosophy 33, 1991: 485-498
22.  See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Volume V111 

Bentham to Russell, p, 187
23.  See W. J. Mander, “Levels of Experience in F. H. Bradley” Southern 

Journal of Philosophy 33, 1991: 485-498
24.  See AR, Chapter 24. See also  “On Our Knowledge of Immediate 

Experience” in Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1914), pp. 159-201, first published in Mind, number 18, 1909

25.  See Damian Ilodigwe, “Bradley's Account of the Self as Appearance: 
Between Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Hegel's Speculative 
Idealism”, Paper presented at the Oxford International Conference on 
British Idealism and the Concept of the Self, Harris Manchester 
College, Oxford University, United Kingdom, 27-30 August, 2013, pp. 
1-21.

26.  See AR, Chapters 1-12. What Bradley does in the first part of 
Appearance and Reality basically is to explicate the concept of 
appearance in terms of the various elements of our experience. In the 
second part of Appearance and Reality, he applies the general moral of 
his concept of appearance in dealing with the vexed issue of the nature 
and essence of thought and its relation to reality, concluding, as it were, 
that thought's effort to qualify reality unconditionally ends in failure as 
a consequence of its appearance status. It is the same logic at work in his 
analysis of morality, religion and judgment and philosophy in Ethical 
Studies, Principles of Logic and Appearance and Reality respectively. 
See Ethical Studies, Essays 3-6, Principles of Logic Chapters 1-2 and 

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Appearance and Reality, Chapter 25
27.  AR, Chapter 24
28.  See W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol 2, The Medieval 

ndMind, 2  edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1969), 
Chapter 4; See also Alan White, Method of Metaphysics (London: 
Croom Helm, 1987), Chapter 1

29.  See Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Elements of Philosophy: An Introduction, 
rd3  Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1993), pp.  251-267

30.  Ibid. pp. 155-159
31.  Norman Melchert, The Great Conversation Volume 1: Pre-Socratics 

ndthrough Descartes, 2  Edition (California: Mayfield, 1995), pp. 160-
165 

32.  Ibid. 
33.  See Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Elements of Philosophy: An Introduction, 

rd3  Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1993), pp.  251-267
34.  Cf. J. L. Ackril, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 

1996), Chapter 9
35.  Norman Melchert, The Great Conversation Volume 1: Pre-Socratics 

ndthrough Descartes, 2  Edition (California: Mayfield, 1995), pp. 160-
165

36.  See AR, Chapter 24; Cf. Alan White, Method of Metaphysics, Chapter 5
37.  See AR, Chapters 23-24
38.  See Alan White, Method of Metaphysics, Chapter 9. The concern of 

metaphysics is always with the universal in the particular and not 
merely the particular in its particularity. Metaphysics is interested, in 
other words, in the reality behind the appearance or rather the reality of 
the appearance.

39.  See J. L. Ackril, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), Chapter 9

40.  Ibid.
41.  Cf. AR, Introduction
42.  Cf. See Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Elements of Philosophy: An 

rdIntroduction, 3  Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1993), Chapter 
23

43.  Cf. AR, Chapter 14. See also Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the 
Problematic Status of Metaphysics, Chapter 2.

44.  Cf. AR, Chapters 14 and 27
45.  Stumpf, pp. 399-402
46.  See E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2003), Chapter 1; See also Brian Carr, Metaphysics: An 
Introduction, Chapter 1 and Michael Loux, Contemporary Introduction 
to Metaphysics, Introduction

47.  We find such criticism in thinkers such as Whitehead and Heidegger. 
Indeed this criticism informs much of the reaction against idealism at 
the turn of the century and to this extent provides the backdrop for the 
emergence of contemporary philosophy as can be seen in the various 
philosophical currents that condition the inheritance of contemporary 
philosophy such as phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism, 

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hermeneutics and deconstructionism. For the most part, these currents 
of philosophy are anti-essentialist in orientation. See Alfred Whitehead, 
Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Free Press, 
1969), Chapter 1; Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics 
(London: Yale University Press, 1987), Chapters 3 and 4. See also 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: 
Blackwell, 1958) and Alan White, Method of Metaphysics, Chapter 8

48.  See Damian Ilodigwe, “Hume's Criticism of Metaphysics”, WAJOPS 
West African  Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 14 December 
2011 

49.  Of course this understanding of the nature of reason is usually 
associated with Hegel in view of his account of Absolute knowledge in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans A. V. Miller with analysis of the text 
and forward by J. N. Findlay ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
one which implies that there is no gap between our concept and reality. 
This overly optimistic view of reason finds expression in Hegel's 
submission that “the real is rational and the rational is real”. The entire 
post Hegelian criticism of idealism adopts the general strategy of 
weakening the relationship between thought and reality by denying that 
a one to one correspondence subsists between concept and reality, 
meaning effectively that existence is more than thought and cannot on 
any condition be reduced to thought. See for instance, Dale Snow, 
Schelling and the End of Idealism Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), Chapters 1-4. Also Cf. Damian Ilodigwe, “Bradley's 
Account of the Self as Appearance: Between Kant's Transcendental 
Idealism and Hegel's Speculative Idealism”, Paper presented at the 
Oxford International Conference on British Idealism and the Concept 
of the Self, Harris Manchester College, Oxford University, United 
Kingdom, 27-30 August, 2013, pp. 1-21; See also his “Bradley's 
Account of Truth: Between Epistemology and Metaphysics” in 
Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 19: 2(2013), pp. 219-250

50.  See James Allard and Guy Stock, “Editor's Introduction” in F. H. 
Bradley: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, edited by James Allard 
and Guy Stock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 103-114

51.  See AR, 127-152
52.  See AR, 143-153
53.  See Principles of Logic 585-591
54.  As Bradley notes in the concluding paragraph of the Principles of 

Logic, 590-591, “Unless thoughts stands for something that falls 
beyond mere intelligence, if “thinking” is no used with some strange 
implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering 
scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can be purely rational. It 
may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or form a weakness of the 
flesh which continues to blind me, but the notion that existence could be 
the same as understanding strikes me as cold and ghost-like as the 
dreariest materialism.” 

55.  In the light of this reservation, it is instructive that Bradley's 
Appearance and Reality, supposedly a metaphysical essay, ends on the 

136



note of scepticism as the final chapter carries the title Ultimate Doubt. 
Unless the ambivalence in Bradley's overall attitude towards 
metaphysics is understood one is always bound to misunderstand him 
as his sceptical submission could easily be taken as vote of no 
confidence in metaphysics when in actual fact, it is a strategic attempt to 
tone down the claims of metaphysics so as to save it from 
deconstruction in the anti-idealist and anti-essentialist environment of 
contemporary philosophy. Cf. Damian Ilodigwe, “Bradley's Account of 
Truth: Between Epistemology and Metaphysics” in Collingwood and 
British Idealism Studies, 19: 2(2013), pp. 219-250

56.  Cf. Alan White, Methods of Metaphysics, Chapter 5
57.  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Everyman edition, edited by 

Vasilis Politis (London: J. M. Dent, 1993), BXV and Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics, edited Gary Hatfield, with selections from the 
Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997, p. 10.

58.  See Brian Carr, Metaphysics: An Introduction, Chapter 1
59.  Michael Loux, Contemporary Introduction to Metaphysics, 

Introduction
60.  See AR, Chapter 14. See also Damian Ilodigwe, Bradley and the 

Problematic Status of Metaphysics, pp. 234-264
61.  AR, Introduction

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