284 

21 

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY ON THE 

PLACE OF VIRTUE ETHICS IN HUMAN 

FORMATION FOR THE CATHOLIC 

PRIESTHOOD IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 

Williams Olorunfemi, ASO, Ph.D 
Seminary of All Saints 

Uhiele-Ekpoma 
Edo State, Nigeria 

olorunfemi6697@gmail.com 
 
Abstract  
The inquiries concerning the ontological status of man and its 
implications for human formation for the nobility inherent in human 
nature become evident have been deliberated and scrutinized by diverse 
philosophers that defined human nature. It is palpable that Plato 
accentuated that man is a fallen soul imprisoned in a body and needs 
liberation. Aristotle called him a rational animal while Severius Boethius 
and Thomas Aquinas admitted that man is a rational subsistent being. 
Moreover, Max Scheler and Karol Wojtyla sustained that the human soul 
makes him an incarnate spirit. A systematic and comprehensive 
examination of philosophical anthropology of these philosophers 
unambiguously affirmed that human nature is ontologically composed of 
body and soul, emotion and reason, material and spiritual entities in such 
a way that man is neither an animal nor spirit but a rational animal. This 
unique status serves as a foundation of human formation that can 
facilitate the attainment of human personality suitable for the candidates 
of the Catholic priesthood in 21st century. This paper explores how 
Aristotelian-Aquinas’ understanding of human nature and virtue ethics 
can help human formative processes for the seminarians that will later 
become the intermediaries between God and his people in the field of 
evangelization, bringing Christ to all and bringing all to Christ.  
 
Keywords: human, ontology, nobility, priesthood, formation, virtue  



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    285 

Introduction 
Human formation is a generally defined as a process of helping teenagers 
to recognise, appreciate and cooperate with available means of developing 
their inherent behavioural capacities into excellent characters to the 
admiration of others in the society. In the context of this paper, Catholic 
major seminary is the nursery bed of the church to give appropriate 
human formation to the candidates for the sacred priesthood of Christ. 
In this perspective, the primary goal of human formation in the seminary 
is to rationally cultivate the personal and emotional maturity of each 
seminarian and nurture the human qualities that are necessary to be 
rationally balanced and capable of bearing the weight of priestly 
responsibilities in our contemporary world. These responsibilities are 
often evident and evaluated in the ability “to love the truth, to be loyal, to 
respect every person, to have a sense of justice, to be true to their word, 
to be genuinely compassionate, to be men of integrity…balanced in 
judgement and behaviour” (Pastores Dabo Vobis no. 43), Hence, the 
seminary programmes of formation are defined, designed, determined, 
justified, practiced, promoted and preserved by the church authority in 
such way that seminarians are well-oriented and naturally behaved like 
those set apart from others in the society. It is the responsibility of the 
seminary authority in conjunction with the respective seminary 
commission to develop the fundamental contents and supervise the 
application of the needed principles and moral qualities of human 
formation for the seminarians of their region and time. As a matter of 
fact, there is need for regularly scheduled human formation conferences 
to address issues surrounding the seminarians’ physical well-being, 
habits of good nutrition and exercise, freedom from addictive 
behaviours, as well as addressing the essential issues in the development 
of a healthy emotional life, the establishment of mature friendships, 
maturity in dealing with qualities necessary for leadership and positive 
social interaction within community (nos. 43-44).  
 The onus is on the Dean of Seminarians’ Affairs in collaboration 
with other formators to assist the Rector in the development of 
programmes for human formation in the seminary. This is because the 
collaborative efforts and adequate monitoring of formators are necessary 
in all the various levels of human formation in the seminary. The efforts, 
progress and maturity of each candidates to the priesthood are often 
nurtured and supervised by the community of formators through 
lectures, seminars, conferences and tested effectiveness of acquired skills 
and talents through academic, social and liturgical engagements. 
 The appropriate human formation for the candidates of a particular 
nationality, region, culture and generation before ordination and 
incardination into a specific diocese is non-negotiable because noble 



286 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

characters expected of a priest cannot automatically derived from the 
grace of ordination. In his summary of Pastores dabo vobis, Cardinal Pio 
Laghi maintains, “in the normal run of things,…priestly ordination does 
not put in place a new humanity. In a personality which has not been 
moulded, in a character which has not had its rough edges smoothed off, 
in an individual who is not capable of calm and appropriate human 
relationships, the grace of ordination is discredited. In a mature 
personality, on the other hand, it shines out in all its fullness”. 
(https://smseminary.org-human-formation). Therefore, this paper 
attempts to demonstrate how the four cardinal virtues of prudence, 
temperance, courage and justice obtainable from the providence of the 
natural law can smooth the rough edges of human traits, reason and 
emotions to generate excellent habitual characters that can make the 
nobility in human nature of seminarians of our time undoubtedly 
evident. The order of expository and evaluation of the concepts and 
issues involved in this paper are largely based on Platonic understanding 
of cardinal virtues. While the articulation of arguments evident in 
Aristotelian-Aquinas tradition will be employed for the justification of 
the place of each cardinal virtue in cultivating excellent habitual 
characters appropriate for the candidates of the sacred priesthood. 
 
Human Formation and the Moral Character Suitable for Human 
Personality 
A comprehensive anthropological study of man shows that human 
beings have some characteristics that are similar with other animals like 
gorillas and chimpanzees as evident in the need for food, reproduction 
and social life. However, the distinguished rational abilities of man that 
are fundamentally rooted in advanced technology and deliberative choice 
of action set him apart from other animals in the same genus (Summa 
Theologiae, part one of second part, q. 1, art. 1). A closer look at the 
anthropological foundation of Aristotelian-Aquinas’ moral philosophy 
explicitly shows that objective standard for evaluating if a man has 
adequate human formation is based on the ability of the man to 
practically live and act excellently well the actions that are ontologically 
entrenched in human nature. This is a reality that is unanimously 
acknowledged, cherished, preserved and promoted in every culture of 
the world. Hence, there is need to scrutinize and evaluate the 
fundamental structures of the system that Aquinas defined, analyzed, 
justified and promoted to elucidate the process of human formation that 
can facilitate a practical demonstration of human personality suitable for 
the seminarians of our time. Thomas Aquinas in the second part of his 
Summa Theologiae clearly argued beyond any reasonable doubt that the 
core of the rational element that actually distinguished human beings 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    287 

from other animals in the same group is found in what is known as 
synderesis [practical reason].  

The term synderesis is described by Aquinas as the basis of inner 
principles (conscience) regulating the moral consciousness of every man 
‘to do good and avoid evil’. It is obvious that synderesis has two distinct 
natural powers governing human cognitive and appetitive dispositions 
(Summa Theologiae, first part, question 79, article 12). The cognitive 
disposition is the seat of intelligibility of the goodness that is rooted in 
the physical and metaphysical entities while the appetitive disposition is 
the power of desirability for the goodness that the rational power 
recognizes to be good and necessary. As Fagothey clearly upholds, “what 
appeals may supply a need, satisfy a desire, arouse an interest, stimulate 
an emotion, provoke a response, motivate a deed, or merely draw an 
approval” (70-71). This implies that in the process of human formation 
and character development, an action is good when it agrees with the 
rational nature of human beings and vice-versa (Aquinas Summa 
Theologiae, first part of second part, q. 18, art. 5). In human formation, 
therefore, what is morally valuable is whatever action that man judges to 
be honorably good, just, worthy, desirable and has inherent values that 
correspond to the nobility in human nature. Aquinas has come up with 
arguments to show that appropriate human formation is impossible 
without cultivating the necessary integration of animal and rational 
elements of man to generate characters needed to demonstrate to others 
the excellent characters that are feasible in human nature. In Aristotelian-
Aquinas moral tradition, this feasibility is achievable through the use of 
four cardinal virtues [courage, temperament, prudence and justice] to 
build a solid foundation suitable for admirable characters expected of 
candidates for the sacred priesthood. It is pertinent to examine the 
contextual meaning of habit to provide a robust foundation on which the 
relevance of cardinal virtues in the formation of human characters can be 
evaluated and justified.  
 
Habit and Attainment of Moral Character for Human Formation 
The term habit is ordinarily known as human way of life that has the 
capacity to enhance human to act either morally or immorally about 
himself and others in the society. In the primary sense of the word, habit 
is a disposition of man toward actions that are possible in human nature. 
As Aristotle posits, “habit means a disposition according to which that 
which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, and either in itself or with 
reference to something else” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. v, chapter 20). In 
the context of this paper, habit becomes natural capacity of man that can 
improve and strengthen the consistency of traits inherent in human 
nature. In human formation, good habits are cultivated into maturity to 



288 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

form good characters through subtle, gradual and dynamic processes that 
are spread through a period of time before it can be evident in human 
society. In the understanding of Chukwujekwu, “habit becomes one’s 
second nature in the sense that one now performs or acts in the way of 
the already acquired character with ease” (Chukwujekwu 78). Judging 
from this quotation, the failure to recognise the nitty-gritty of the 
processes and dynamism involved in the cultivation of habits into good 
characters is responsible for odious actions of moral deviants that are 
contrary to the nobility inherent in human nature. It is obvious that, 
“habits are corrupted or weakened by contrary habits. Even mere neglect 
or laziness can weaken a habit” (Gratsch 105). Hence, in human 
formation it is necessary to give adequate attention to good human habits 
that can facilitate moral characters appropriate to seminarians that are 
preparing to embrace the celibate priesthood of Christ. Aside, rational 
sanctions are necessary to deter bad habits that are capable of becoming 
the sources of inhuman tendencies and abhorrent characters in their 
lives. Thomas Aquinas demonstrated the nuts and bolts of four cardinal 
virtues in the formation of honourable characters achievable in human 
nature. 
 
Thomas Aquinas and the Relevance of Virtue Ethics in Human 
Formation 
It is reasonable to briefly examine the historical background and origin of 
the four cardinal virtues before going to the definition and relevance of 
each of them in human formation for honourable characters that behove 
sacerdotes inferi, priests in the making in our major seminary. It is on 
record that the training of young minds with ten habitual virtues for 
moral integrity and nobility were at first known with the ancient 
Egyptian priests and neophytes that came all over the world of that time 
to learn from them (James 30). As evident in the work of G.G.M. James,  
virtues were not mere…ethical sentiments, but were positive valour and 
virility [powers] of the soul. Temperance meant complete control of the 
passional nature. Fortitude meant such courage as would not allow 
adversity to turn us away from our goal. Prudence meant the deep 
insight that befits the faculty of seership. Justice meant the unswerving 
righteousness of thought and action (30 and 171, Elders 454).   

Plato was one of the Greek neophytes that visited ancient Egypt 
to learn about the Egyptian mysteries and seboyet [wisdom] between the 
sixth and seventh century BC. He later condensed the ten Egyptian 
virtues recommended for domesticating human emotions for man to 
attain appropriate moral insights inherent into four: courage, 
temperance, prudence and justice (James 3). These four cardinal virtues 
were considered as the intellectual and moral powers of human soul to 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    289 

provide solutions to practical questions of day-to-day relationship with 
the gods and others in a dignified manner. In a nutshell, the four moral 
cardinal virtues that serve as the foundational stones of Aristotelian-
Aquinas’ formation of human character are perceptible in Plato’s 
Republic (Aso The Place of Virtues in attainment of Final End, 125-126). 
It is apparent that Aristotle, a student of Plato, learnt about the four 
cardinal virtues in Plato’s academy and elucidated more on the nitty-
gritty of their interrelatedness in human formation for deliberative 
choice of action. Thomas Aquinas cherished the scholastic definition, 
analysis, justification and evaluation of the place of each of these cardinal 
virtues in human formation for noble characters that honour and respect 
human dignity (Summa Theologiae, part one of part two, q. 55, art. 4; q. 
61, art. 2). As a way of establishing a solid foundation of human 
formation in any contemporary Catholic major seminary in Nigeria, it is 
pertinent to give analysis of how each identified virtue can contribute to 
the growth and development of characters that befit the candidates for 
the sacred priesthood in our contemporary world. 

 
Aquinas and the Place of Prudence in Human Formation for 
Seminarians  
The focus of human formation in the seminary revolves around the aim 
of helping seminarians to cherish synderesis or practical wisdom to behave 
excellently well according to the noble and moral potentialities that are 
naturally realistic in human life. Aquinas in his philosophy of human 
action defined, analyzed, justified and promoted prudence as the virtue 
that governs the details of factors that are involved in the 
phenomenology of deliberative choice of human character. As Thomas 
Hibbs gathers from Aquinas “prudence involves not simply the 
subordination of particulars to appropriate universals, but the appraisal of 
concrete, contingent circumstances” (Hibbs 92). If this is indisputable, it 
follows that human acquisition of appropriate knowledge of the 
principles and circumstances surrounding attainment of noble characters 
for seminarians is highly cumbrous. Consequently, Aquinas in his 
wisdom heightened the obligation of every human being, including 
seminarians, to previously “grasp what is pertinent and to assess what 
ought to be done in complex circumstances” (98) before carrying out any 
deliberative choice of action. Judging from this perspective, “the virtue of 
prudence becomes the source of excellence performances evident in 
memory, intelligence, foresight, circumspection, caution and shrewdness 
(Summa Theologiae part two of second part, q. 47, art, 8) of human beings 
before noble actions inherent in human nature can be excellently 
demonstrated for others to cherish. Again, it is incontrovertibly evident 
that any man that ignores the relevance of prudence and its subsidiaries 



290 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

in human formation will definitely end up in moral blunders that often 
lead to improper characters that are not in tandem with human 
formation necessary for candidates to the sacred priesthood. This is 
obvious when unreasonable and cosmetic lifestyles overlaid human 
judgment and make deficient object of deliberative choice seems more 
genuine than they really are in themselves. Hence, in a house of 
formation for the sacred priesthood, Aquinas would underline the fact 
that seminarians need to know and cherish the virtue of prudence and 
employ the same to govern their emotional drives for characters that 
enhance noble characters. Nonetheless, there is need for the virtue of 
temperance to drive prudence to take its place of importance in 
honorable characters of man. 
 
Aquinas and the Significance of Temperance in Human 
Formation for Seminarians 
In part two of his second Summa Theologiae, Aquinas philosophically 
defined the virtue of temperance as necessary restraint of bodily 
pleasures like the desire for food, drink, lifestyle, sexual activity and other 
emotional needs that are capable of making ignoble and inhuman 
characters abound in human life. He is quite aware that human beings 
often indulge in short-lived pleasures at the expense of honorable choice 
of action accessible in human nature because of deficient human 
formation. In his study of human nature, Aquinas authenticated the 
requisites to nurture virtues that restrain what he called concupiscence 
drives in the eletrico-chemistry of human body that excessively indulge 
in pleasure and avoidance of displeasure. In this context, Aquinas is not 
actually condemning bodily pleasure in its entirety. Instead, he 
articulated arguments to heighten the fact that the virtue of temperance 
is essentially necessary to moderate the way and manner man enjoys 
pleasures that is not contrary to the nobility concomitant with human 
nature (art. 3). In other words, whenever the satisfaction from emotional 
drives are sufficiently governed, the attainment and demonstration of 
noble characters for others to see and admired will be adequately 
safeguarded. Therefore, it is palpable that abstinence, chastity, humility 
and similar dispositions that govern the impetuousness of bodily desires 
of man are derived from the virtue of temperance (Summa Theologiae part 
two of second part, q. 161, art. 4). In human formation for the candidates 
of celibate priesthood, the place of temperance and correlated virtues in 
governing the resilient urge for activities that are repulsive in human 
society and endanger to their vocation cannot be overemphasized. 
 
 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    291 

Aquinas and the Relevance of Courage in Human Formation of 
Seminarians 
The role of temperance as one of the cardinal virtues is very clear in 
taming excessive impulse coming from any bodily appetite for pleasure 
and habitual consequences. It is quite obvious in the phenomenology of 
human behavior that some emotional dispositions that are polygonal in 
their unique operations as often evident in emotional feeling of dilemma 
in which available options of action are equally desirable and undesirable 
Chukwujekwu 151 and Gratch 191). In the opinion of Aquinas, the 
virtue of courage and its corollaries are fundamentally meant to govern 
irascible appetites that are awkward to achieve or avoid like hope, daring, 
fear, despair and restraint (Aquinas Summa Theologiae, part one of second 
part, q. 23, art. 1; Plato The Republic, Bk. IV, 439c). Judging from this 
background, Aquinas wanted us to know that sometimes certain objects 
of good have associated risks and fear that can inhibit human beings from 
obeying the command and impulse coming from synderesis of prudence. 
For instance, the fear and risk associating with giving a helping hands to a 
victim of accident or arm robbery especially in Nigeria of today. In this 
circumstance, it is worthwhile to do good and avoid evil but any attempt 
to throw caution into the wind, one’s effort can result to stupidity and 
extraordinary regret. Therefore, Aquinas justified courage as the virtue 
that has all it takes to moderate human irascible appetites that can hinder 
human being from obeying the moral command of practical wisdom to 
prefer noble over ignoble characters in human relationship (Summa 
Theologiae, part one of second part, q. 123, art. 3). The knowledge and 
appreciation of the virtue of courage is necessary in human formation of 
seminarians for discernment in following the impulses of practical 
wisdom to courageously behave according to the nobility inherent in 
human nature and vice-versa. The upshots of the virtue of courage in 
human psychology includes: endurance, patience and confidence. 
Hence, in Aquinas’ human formation, a courageous seminarian is 
morally equipped to persistently evaluate and confront obvious direct 
and indirect obstacles against his deliberative choice of honorable 
character with a firm hope emanating from confidence and doggedness 
derived from a resolution to be a man of integrity. Justice is the virtue 
that insists on harmonious interrelatedness of all contrivances derive four 
cardinal virtues to generate conventional characters in human society. It 
is appropriate to examine how the necessary harmony among the virtues 
are practically attainable in human formation. 
 
Aquinas and the Role of Justice in Attainment of Noble 
Characters for Seminarians  
In Plato’s Republic the virtue of justice is fundamentally defined as the 



292 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

habitual disposition to determine, justify, promote and preserve the 
harmonious relationship with others in a given community without 
making anyone subservient to others but giving each member a justified 
place of honour. This is a replica of Plato’s thought on the distinct role of 
each cardinal virtue and interrelatedness among them in the generation 
of a deliberative choice of characters that are unique to human beings. 
Aquinas employed the Platonic-Aristotelian taxonomy of moral virtues 
to demonstrate that the function of justice is to ensure whatever is 
fundamentally desirable for any of the virtue is equally appropriate for 
the good of others and the harmony expected to exist among them 
(Summa Theologiae, part one of second part, q. 58, art. 5). In the final 
analysis, it is apparent that the virtue of justice is basically concerned with 
the harmony that ought to exist in a community where individuality and 
equality are cherished, promoted and preserved from any aberration; the 
virtue of prudence approves necessary motivation for deliberative choice 
of action; the virtue of temperance controls concupiscent emotions and 
courage fortify emotional drives against fear and despair in carrying out 
noble action in the society. Judging from this standpoint, it is palpable 
that “people fulfil their natural end by adhering to the cardinal virtues of 
justice, temperance, courage and prudence, of which justice is the 
Summum bonum” in accordance with the essential principles enshrined in 
the natural law. In other words, natural law becomes the knot that 
naturally tights up the bond that exists among these cardinal virtues and 
their complementary influence in the growth and development of 
habitual and noble characters of man. It is necessary to examine the 
importance of natural law in the coordination of cardinal virtues for 
human formation. 
 
The importance of Natural Law in Human Formation of 
Seminarians 
In a common parlance, the idea of law in human society is designed and 
preserved to guide man to achieve his desirable goal and to restrain him 
from circumstances that can encumbered the fulfilment of any 
anticipated objective. Aquinas in the first part of his Summa Theologiae 
rationally defined a law as “a rule or measure of human acts, whereby a 
person is induced to act or is restrained from acting” (Summa Theologiae, 
part one of second part, q. 90, art. 1). The fundamental principle of law 
and its relationship to human action is based on the fact that the criteria 
of a good character is logically depends on its conformity with rational 
justification traceable to eternal law. This is a providential reality for 
every created being to act naturally according to the proper end that is 
ontologically established in their respective nature. In actual fact, Aquinas 
clearly showed that the rational and uninhibited participation of human 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    293 

beings in this eternal order is acting in conformity with the natural law. 
This implies that natural law is the ontological platform established by 
God for human beings to naturally recognize the characteristics of what 
is good, desirable and commendable and vice versa. It is obvious in 
Aquinas understanding of human action that natural law is indisputably 
the ontological source of synderesis, the practical wisdom needed all the 
time to know what is good and do it and recognize what is evil and avoid 
it. Therefore, the rational capacity of synderesis in seminarians are to be 
cultivated and nurtured into habitual and virtuous capacities for noble 
characters. In the seminary formative processes, any attempt to overlook 
the ontological basis and contributions of the cardinal virtues to human 
deliberative choice of action, nobility will be deficient in the characters of 
the candidates to the priesthood. 
 
Integration of rational abilities and emotional feelings in human 
formation for noble characters 
The philosophical understanding of human emotions shows that they are 
natural drives of the animal cravings toward the object of desire and 
human beings share these yearnings with other animals as perceptible in 
the sensitive part of the soul (Kadankavil 160). As a matter of fact, 
anthropological studies of human formation have demonstrated beyond 
reasonable doubt that human emotions are neither morally good nor bad 
until the willpower, evaluation and intentional choice of action becomes 
obvious. This implies that human nature is naturally porous for both 
honourable and dishonourable human traits and characters. Hence, the 
waywardness that is abound in human nature needs to be tamed through 
a process of human formation to liberate human beings from barbarity 
that is capable of obstructing attainment of noble characters (Desmond 
92). Without mincing words, a closer look at Aristotelian-Aquinas 
anthropological theory of human action clearly shows that when 
emotions are govern with reason towards a good end, the action derived 
from such end becomes morally good, appropriate and correspond to the 
dignity inherent in human nature. It is also perspicuous in the 
aforementioned theory that when emotions are allowed to run wild, the 
action sourced from such disposition automatically becomes immoral, 
inappropriate and divergent to the nobility that ontologically 
characterised human nature. If this claim is incontrovertible, it implies 
that adequate integration of emotional and rational feelings in human 
formative processes basically serves as the foundation of noble characters 
associated with a gentleman in human society.  

A systematic analysis and evaluation of the four cardinal virtues 
already examined illustrated the fact that each of them has prominent 
place in the processes of the internal and efficient principles of noble 



294 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

action excellently evident in the habitual character of a man (Aristotle 
Nichomachean Ethics, bk. II, chapter 6). In the context of this background, 
the four cardinal virtues become the software while human habits 
become the hardware of actions that define, determine, substantiate, 
demonstrate, facilitate, promote and preserve the dignity entrenched in 
human nature. Hence, a virtuous man or gentleman is the one that 
knows how to tame those emotions that are contrary to reason and yield 
to emotional derives that are sourced from rational feelings to form the 
basis of the deliberative choice of action in human formation (Gratsch 
108; Garrette 67).  

A strict observation of the processes involved clearly shows that 
the animal and rational natures of man are integrated together through 
human formation to arrive at the appropriate actions that befit human 
beings. As a matter of fact, it is evident in the writings of some 
metaphysicians like Plato and Aristotle; philosophical anthropologists 
like Thomas Aquinas, Max Scheler, Battista Mondin, Karol Wojtyla and 
religious existentialists like Paul Recour, Emmanuel Levinas, Martin 
Buber and Gabriel Marcel that only human beings among other 
creatures are endowed with a character in which rational abilities and 
emotional tendencies are coalesced together as one. In other words, 
human beings are not totally spiritual to lack element of bodily structures 
and emotions as palpable among the spirits neither are they like other 
animals that have no rational abilities except instinctual drives. As a 
matter of fact, these two aspects of human personality are so 
intermingled and jointly responsible for human characters. As Joseph 
Omoregbe cleverly encapsulates, “man is a harmonious blend of reason 
and the passions. He is neither pure reason without instincts nor pure 
instincts without reason…As a result of this fact, man’s instincts are 
rational instincts, i.e, instincts permeated with rationality (103). Hence, 
no one can easily separate the influence of the two factors in human 
character and able to justify the ontological basis of human formation 
and personality with associated values in human society. As Omoregbe 
further claims, “it is because man is a blend of reason and passions that 
he is capable of weeping (sympathy, love, hatred, benevolence, judgment 
etc.), neither a god nor a beast is capable of weeping; the former is 
incapable because it is a disembodied being without passions while the 
latter is incapable because it lacks reason” (104). Judging from this 
milieu, it means that the instinctual tendencies apparent in ordinary 
animals are guided purely by regular emotional instincts whereas the 
ones ostensible with human beings are imparted by rational emotional 
dispositions. This implies that any attempt to have unblended foundation 
of rational abilities with emotional feelings in human formation would 



Section II: Philosophical Perspectives And Human Formation    295 

automatically lead to characters that are depraved and contrary to human 
dignity.  
 It is appropriate that every youngsters especially those in the house of 
formation and formators to remember and appreciate the fact that 
human nature is not purely emotional, spiritual, rational or irrational but 
fundamentally involved in the aforementioned aspects of man and 
obviously integrated into natural inclinations necessary for human 
characters. In other words, “human formation is all about the 
development of a well-rounded and competent man, possessing personal 
maturity. The basis of this is the fact that we human beings are physical, 
emotional, psychological, sexual, social, intellectual and spiritual with the 
potentiality of each being fully realized by our efforts of co-operating with 
God’s grace”. Therefore, the necessity of human formative processes for 
candidates to the priesthood can never be overstressed because seminarians 
are not angelic beings with the nature and character that is already 
determined, structured, universal, logical, fixed, immutable, eternal and 
perfectly composed to remain the same all the time like those in a 
mathematical world where 3+3 constantly equals to 6.  
 It is unmistakably clear that human beings including seminarians are 
composed of body and soul, reason and passion by which they are 
exceptionally different from other creatures and need to pass through a 
process of human formation before attaining excellent characters. This 
implies that, “since the charism of celibacy…leaves man’s affections and 
his instinctive impulses intact, candidates to the priesthood need an 
affective maturity which is prudent, able to renounce anything that is a 
threat to it, vigilant over body and spirit, and capable of esteem and 
respect in interpersonal relationship between men and women” (Pastores 
Dabo Vobis no. 44). In the context of this paper, Seminarians are obliged 
to learn how to guide themselves with rational moral calculus to gain 
foresight for avoidance of any fundamental bad habit that can primarily 
hinder honorable characters ontologically concomitant with human 
nature become evident in them. After all, “the goal of the entire seminary 
formation…should be the development of moral leadership and witness 
the seminarian manifest to others” (no. 44). This is not easily attainable 
without some disciplines, sacrifice, practice, pain, patience, perseverance, 
determination and hope. Therefore, it is required that seminarians 
assiduously cultivate the integration of four cardinal virtues to have 
appropriate human formation so that the nobility associated with human 
nature can be exceptionally obvious in their character for their good and 
the good of the church.  
 
 
 



296 Formation of the Human Person in the 21st Century 

Conclusion 
In conclusion, for an appropriate human formation of seminarians to 
reach an appreciable end, rational abilities are needed for dignified moral 
choice and precision while emotions are necessarily guided for moral 
impetus and moral virtues are gradually cultivated for habitual 
dispositions for noble characters conceivable in human nature (Harman 
1). The habitual dispositions sourced from the phenomenological 
interrelationship of reason, emotions and cardinal virtues will eventually 
become the repository of noble characters expected to characterize the 
personality and moral ideals of whoever successfully allows human 
formative processes of the major seminary to pass through him. There is 
no doubt that human nature is morally promiscuous and can easily 
wandered into habitual dispositions that are capable of disfiguring the 
ontological nobility that clearly sets man apart from other animals. 
However, the conceivable clashes between reason and emotions, good 
and bad habits, desires and deliberative choice in the process of forming 
human characters can easily dissolve into a moral disposition that 
transcends the purported phenomenological conflicts among all the 
factors that play indispensable roles in the formation of human character 
provided discipline, sacrifice, assiduousness, perseverance and nobility 
are appreciated by the seminarians of our time.  
  
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