! E L M E N T SE "#! $!%&' &( "#! )!*(+, !"#$%&!'(&!"' &)$ $#*+,&!*" *- &)$ .$""/ .0$%% ("1 &)$ $22(",$+ 3),03) 2,01$0% ALSO FEATURING • The Digital Pandemic • The Force on the Front!"# $%&#'(')&$)!# '#*#)'+" ,-$'%). -/ 0-*!-% +-..#(#-. +/ ' 0 2 0 21 · 1 &* 2 % ! 1 7 · / -- 2 ! 1 !"#$# #%&'!' ( '"&)!&*+ ,(-(*.# /) 0/1#$ &* #('! ('&(. ."&*(, !"# $&'&*+ 0/1#$, &' (!- !#20!&*+ !/ 3&'2(*!-# (2#$&.(* "#+#2/*4 &* !"# &*3/-0(.&)&.. !/ ./5*!#$ +$/1&*+ ."&*#'# .(0(,&-&!&#', !"# !$520 (32&*&'!$(!&/* "(' (3/0!#3 ( 0/-&.4 /) (.!&6# ./*- !(&*2#*!, #'.(-(!&*+ 5.'.-."&*( !#*'&/*'. !"&' 0(0#$ 1&-- #%0-/$# ."&*(’' $&'# )$/2 !"# 0#$'0#.!&6# /) +$#(! 0/1#$ 0/-&!&.', #'!(,-&'" !"#$# &' ( 0/1#$ !$(*'&!&/*, (*3 -('!-4, ($+5# !"(! !"# !$520 (32&*&'!$(!&/*’' ./*!(&*2#*! '!$(!#+4 "(' ,##* )5*3(2#*!(-- -4 ./5*!#$-0$/35.!&6# !/ (2#$&.(* &*!#$#'!' &* !"# $#+&/* (*3 5*'5..#'')5- (! 2/3- #$(!&*+ ."&*#'# ,#"(6&/$. -#''/*' .(* ,# 3$(1* )$/2 !"# !$520 (32&*&'!$(!&/*’' 2&'- '!#0' !"(! .(* ,# 5'#3 !/ )/$25-(!# 2/$# #))#.!&6# ."&*( 0/-&.4 5*3#$ !"# ,&3#* (32&*&'!$(!&/*. !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! Evaluating the Trump Administration’s China Containment Strategy on Eastern Regions and Beyond 3(*&#- )5 “...containment has exacerbated Chinese concern regarding strategic encirclement, compelling Beijing to double down on assertive behavior in the Taiwan strait and the South China Sea.” INTRODUCTION In East Asia, a power transition is occurring in which Chi- na is actively trying to displace the U.S. as the primary re- gional hegemon. China’s rising military and economic ca- pabilities, and the U.S.’ diminishing capacity to balance China’s rise, have contributed to a shifting balance of power in the region. In response, the Trump administra- tion has adopted a policy of active containment to con- strain China’s rise, escalating Sino-U.S. tensions. These tensions have led academics such as Graham Allison to warn about the “Thucydides trap,” which assumes that the U.S. and China are “destined for war.”1 Such tensions have seen Washington, as realists such as John Mearsheimer have predicted,2 move to curtail the number of Chinese students studying at American universities, launch a trade war, and bolster deterrence-building in the Indo-Pacific through cooperation with security partners. This paper will outline China’s objectives in the region, establish a power transition, and argue that Trump’s China strategy has been fundamentally counter-productive to U.S. objec- tives in the region and unsuccessful in moderating Chi- nese behavior. Instead, containment has exacerbated Chi- nese concern regarding strategic encirclement, compelling Beijing to double down on assertive behavior in the Tai- wan Strait and the South China Sea. Lessons from contain- ment can be drawn to formulate a more e3ective Ameri- can strategy to confront China’s continued rise. MARITIME HEGEMONY For states to consolidate maritime hegemony, it is neces- sary for them to first eliminate threats along their conti- nental periphery. This was true for Great Britain and the United States, the only great powers to have existed in the past two hundred years. Great Britain was able to project its naval capabilities overseas because of maritime bu3ers that separated it from continental Europe, both against France3 and Germany.4 The United States could not consolidate regional hegemo- ny until it possessed the land borders necessary to enable naval buildup. When the U.S. first gained independence in 1783, it faced a perilous periphery, with threats on all sides. The British and Spanish Empires surrounded the country, and hostile tribes of Native Americans continued to con- trol large swaths of territory5. The U.S. responded by insti- gating an aggressive campaign of expansionism under the guise of ‘manifest destiny’. Throughout the 17th century, the U.S. gained continental-based security through a se- ries of purchases from European and other North Ameri- can powers.6 The U.S. then set out to achieve regional he- gemony by pushing European powers out of the Western hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. At that time, the United States did not have the capabilities to ful- fill the doctrine’s objectives. By the end of the 19th century, however, the U.S. had pushed the great European powers out of its backyard, allowing the U.S. to consolidate region- al hegemony and ultimately, great power status.7 China is now in a similar position to how the United States was at the end of the 19th century. Traditionally, China has had a contentious periphery: seven out of fifteen of the largest countries in the world, with a collective population of over 90 million, border China. Five of those countries have engaged China in a war since 1949, and Beijing maintains border disputes with nearly all of its neighbors. Over time however, China has gradually eliminated threats along its borders. Tensions stemming from the Sino-Sovi- et split have disappeared as Sino-Russian ties grow in- creasingly robust. Furthermore, Russia’s preoccupation with NATO forces in Western Europe, and domestic challenges in a slowing economy, declining population, and growing internal un- rest, has rendered Moscow unable to balance China’s ris- ing military capabilities.8 Relative to China, Russia is a de- clining power. Likewise, India does not possess the military, economic, or technological capabilities to balance China or challenge Chinese security. GDP and technology gaps expand between Beijing and New Delhi every year, rendering India a declining power.9 Having consolidated a 74 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 secure periphery, China has “followed in Uncle Sam’s footsteps,”10 and invested significantly in consolidating ro- bust naval capabilities. POWER TRANSITION IN EAST ASIA As Paul Kennedy notes, the rise and fall of great powers is most often the result of “di3erentials in growth rates and technological change, leading to shifts in the global eco- nomic balance, which in turn gradually impinge upon the political and military balances.”11 Under Kaiser Wilhelm and Bismarck, Germany’s rise was enabled by rapid expan- sion in industrial potential that allowed it to instigate a na- val buildup outpacing shipbuilding rates seen in Great Britain and France.12 Similarly, China’s military rise has been facilitated by increasingly robust economic capabili- ties that have enabled China to contest the U.S. for hege- mony in the maritime domain. ECONOMIC TRENDS Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978, China’s economy has grown at astonishing rates. Between 1979 and 2018, China’s annual real GDP growth averaged 9.5% a year—essentially, China’s economy doubled in size every eight years.13 China’s GDP, measured according to domes- tic purchasing power, is already more significant than that of the U.S., and is also on the verge of overtaking the U.S.14 to become the world’s top consumer goods market.15 By 2049, China aims to be a fully developed nation.16 By 2050, China’s economy is projected to be the world’s larg- est, surpassing that of India and the U.S, projected to rank second and third respectively.17 As economic trends continue to favor China, Beijing has steadily become the primary architect for Asian-Pacific economic relations. Long dissatisfied with structural disadvantages it perceives in U.S-dominated multilateral financial institutions, Beijing has actively sought to create its own. In 2015, for example, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has since become a mechanism for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) financing and RMB internationalization.18 In the AIIB, China’s vote share is disproportionately large at 28.7%, compared to that of the second-largest AIIB nation, India, which has 8.3%.19 China also maintains de facto voting power over important issues, such as deciding the board of directors’ size and election of the president.20 Despite stark U.S. warnings cautioning allies not to partake in the AIIB, U.S. security partners such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, and South Korea joined the initiative. The creation of the AIIB and the subsequent reactions of U.S. allies led to concerns in Washington about its ability to sustain leadership in international economic order21. China has also steadily become the primary architect of trade relations in the Asia-Pacific. The CCP has long pri- oritized the creation of trade flows, setting up trade zones in Shanghai in 2013 and Tianjin, Guangdong, and Fujian in 2015. Beijing also signed FTAs with countries such as Switzerland, Australia, and South Korea in 2015.22 Xi linked free trade with the BRI in 2014, stating that “radiat- ing Belt and Road” would “gradually build a network of 1-!#%!2). *2(%)!-'2#*, *2(%)!-'2#* )%& 1)'!2#* !- !"# )*2)% 2%/')*!'$+!$'# 2%3#*!4#%! 0)%5 ('##%: 4#40#'* ('#(2-%).) .2("! ('##%: 1'-*1#+!23# 4#40#'* ('#(2-%).) 0.$#: 4#40#'* (%-%-'#(2-%).) .2("! 0.$#: 1'-*1#+!23# 4#40#'* (%-%-'#(2-%).) (!"#$%&'( )*+*,&-*. !",,"/') “Similarly, China’s military rise has been facilitated by increasingly robust economic capabilities that have enabled China to contest the U.S. for hegemony in the maritime domain” 75 !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! free trade zones.”23 Through enabling 6 trillion USD in new trade,24 the BRI also provides opportunities for Chi- na’s export-oriented economy. The recent promulgation of China’s first multilateral trade deal, the Regional Compre- hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), further bolsters China’s status as an economic leader.25 RCEP will cover 48% of the world’s population, 30% of total world GDP, and 28% of global trade flows.26 Shenmeng Hui and Li Tianguo, researchers at the state-a4liated Chinese Acade- my of Social Sciences (CASS), estimate that RCEP will add 0.22% to real GDP growth and 11.4% to China’s total ex- ports.27 Chinese elites have also extensively discussed the prospects of joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).28 The U.S, notably, is absent from both these agreements. Chi- nese elites have asserted that China should capitalize on Washington’s recent skepticism of free trade to further its economic objectives. Wang Huiyao for example, president of the state-a4liated China Center for Globalization (CCG), has written that “the 2017 withdrawal of the U.S. from TPP” has provided “China the window to join the CPTPP.”29 As the U.S. retrenches from the liberal econom- ic order Washington created, China’s global leadership has become increasingly notable. Thus, China has actively pursued the internalization of the RMB to decrease its reliance on the USD. In 2008, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, criticized the status quo international monetary system and called for an international reserve currency “discon- nected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country.”30 Chinese concerns were exacer- bated by the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, which sparked anxiety about the volatility of the USD.31 Xiao Lisheng, deputy director of the International Finance Research Of- fice at the CASS Institute of World Economics, has argued that RMB internationalization can minimize the impact of “external shocks or crises” and thus improve China’s “fi- nancial security level.”32 Through the creation of the Cross- Border Inter-Bank Payments System (CIPS), a funds trans- fer system created to process RMB transactions independently of the American-dominated SWIFT, China has pursued RMB internationalization. Between 2017 and 2018 for example, CIPS processed an additional 26 trillion RMB, enabling an 80% increase in the number of global RMB transactions.33 Through initiatives such as Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025), China has also pursued growth via high-tech, advanced industries in information technology, artificial intelligence, aviation, and energy vehicle sectors. The plan’s primary goal is also to achieve self-su4ciency in tech, aiming, for example, for 70% self-su4ciency in core imports and basic materials for Chinese aerospace and telecommunications industries.34 Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He recently stated that China will continue to bolster technological capabilities to accommodate growing demand from a wealthier population while also citing foreign containment in Chinese tech sectors as a reason to pursue increased self-su4ciency in tech.35 Through compelling foreign firms to enter into joint ventures with Chinese ones in exchange for market access, the provision of government subsidies of over 426 billion USD, acquisition of foreign firms, and improved human capital, MIC 2025 has motivated substantial improvements in China’s high-tech sectors.36 Experts note that China’s severe economic challenges, in- cluding negative total factor productivity (TFP),37 overca- pacity a5icting its state-owned enterprises (SOE’s), rising youth unemployment, and associated internal unrest among others, could stymie planned improvements in China’s military capabilities. Beijing, however, will likely do everything possible to keep its economic growth afloat, including artificially propping up its economy. Thus, it would be remiss to assume that China’s economic chal- lenges will restrain its expansionist foreign policy vision; in fact, the opposite may occur. As Jack Levy’s “scapegoat hypothesis” suggests, states may instigate conflict abroad to distract from growing discontent at home.38 Particularly vulnerable is Taiwan, which expects U.S. intervention dur- ing prospective cross-strait conflict under the provisions of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Furthermore, Chi- na’s economic troubles must be assessed relative to those a5icting the U.S. economy. In 2020, the American econo- my is expected to contract by 8% and rebound by 5.2% in “Thus, military trends provide the most accurate measure of power in security competition. Particularly important are China’s growing maritime capabilities.” 76 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 2021,39 in contrast to China’s economy, which is expected to grow by 2% in 2020 and 7.9% afterwards.40 Relative to China, the U.S. is a declining power. Economic power, however, is of secondary importance to military power. As John Mearsheimer notes, states maximize survival over the preservation of economic ties.41 Furthermore, Robert Ross notes that economic power is not “fungible in international security a3airs”, pointing out that Chinese market control over Singapore, Malaysia, and Australia grew at the same time those countries were deepening defense ties with the U.S.42 Thus, military trends provide the most accurate measure of power in security competition. MILITARY TRENDS Military trends in East Asia, similar to economic trends, are favorable for China. China’s primary goal in East Asia is to displace the U.S. as the primary hegemon in the re- gion. Having eliminated threats along its continental pe- riphery, China has investigated significantly in bolstering its naval capabilities to counter U.S. maritime hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, China has actively in- creased its fleet size while aggressively pursuing military modernization. Between 2010 and 2017, the number of PLA Navy (PLA-N) vessels increased from 210 to 320, mak- ing it larger than the U.S. navy.43 It has also accelerated the production and commission of destroyers, frigates, cor- vettes, and submarines. Between 2015 and 2017, China launched almost 400,000 tons of new naval vessels, twice the output of American shipyards during the same peri- od.44 Robert Ross estimates that by 2033, China could pos- sess a fleet consisting of 430 surface ships and a hundred submarines.45 A 2016 U.S. Naval War College study esti- mated that the PLA-N could possess an active fleet of 530 warships and submarines by 2030.46 Chinese naval spend- ing indicates that an emphasis on bolstering maritime ca- pabilities will persist. Between 2015 and 2021, Chinese defense spending is expected to increase 55% from 167.9 billion to 260.8 billion USD, with the PLA-N’s share of the budget increasing 82% from 31.4 billion to 57.1 billion USD.47 Additionally by 2023, China is expected to launch a new aircraft carrier, its third following the commission of the Liaoning and Shandong.48 At the same time, the PLA-N has undergone substantial modernization. In 2010, less than 50% of PLA-N ships could be classified as modern; by 2017, over 70% of PLA-N ships were modern.49 The PLA-N has acquired capabilities in carrier operations and ballistic-missile submarine patrols,50 and has benefited from increasingly sophisticat- ed ship-launched and air-launched cruise missiles with precision targeting capabilities.51 China’s submarines, for example, are now equipped with 290 nm-range YJ-18 anti- ship missiles.52 The PLA-N has also shown improved com- mand, coordination, and operational capabilities, integral to what Barry Posen calls the “command of the commons.”53 In April 2018, the PLA-N’s new aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted its first carrier strike group operations in the Philippine Sea.54 In August 2020, the PLA-N demonstrat- ed the ability to conduct military drills in four regions across the eastern Pacific ocean simultaneously.55 It has also shown an ability to assert global presence. In August 2018, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richard- son stated that the PLA-N is “ready and capable of operat- ing wherever Beijing wants,” noting that the PLA-N had already conducted operations in the North Atlantic.56 Simultaneously, China’s intermediate and long-range bal- listic missile capabilities have improved. Long-range DF- 15s, of which the PLA could have 730,57 can strike U.S. bases in Japan, the Korean peninsula, and targets in Tai- wan and India. They have been shown to be highly precise, with a circular error probability (CEP) of less than fifty me- ters.58 In August 2020, China successfully tested the DF- 21D and DF-26B “carrier-killer” and Guam-killer” mis- siles in the South China Sea.59 Wang Xiangsui, a former PLA colonel, has stated that the missiles could hit a mov- ing target.60 Andrew Erickson estimates that China may have more than two hundred DF-26 missiles in its arse- nal.61 China’s strides in missile R&D has also led to the creation of the DF-5B liquid-fueled intercontinental ballis- “Having eliminated threats along its continental periphery, China has investigated significantly in bolstering its naval capabilities to counter U.S. maritime hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.” 77 !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! tic missile (ICBM), and the JL-2 submarine-launched bal- listic missile (SLBM), the latter of which can equip China’s Jin-class ballistic-missile submarines.62 Such improve- ments have made U.S. bases in areas of Southeast Asia vulnerable to Chinese ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, U.S. navy capabilities are diminishing. In twelve years, the U.S. navy will consist of 237 ships, a de- crease from the 282 currently in its fleet.63 Moreover, the U.S.’ capacity to respond to China’s growing capabilities is constrained. In 2015, the U.S. developed a plan to increase the size of the active fleet to 308 ships by 2022.64 In 2017, the Trump administration announced its desire for a 355- ship navy.65 To reach 355 ships, however, the navy would have to increase its budget by 50% more than the average of the past six years.66 A shift in spending would also in- evitably entail decreased spending on the army and air force, a move that would spark infighting in the Pentagon. Compounding these problems are challenges facing other service branches and prior U.S. commitments in Europe and the Middle East. First, rising demand for additional funding from other service branches hinders the navy’s ability to receive the resources necessary for U.S. balancing of the PLA-N. In a 2020 report, for example, retired Gen. Mike Holmes (USAF) warned that “because the Air Force has not been allocated enough money to maintain the number of units required to meet current demands, ensure the readiness for countering peer adversaries, and transform force structure to meet the new threats, the service is at a breaking point.”67 Second, the U.S. still has to contend with challenges posed by developments in the Middle East, in addition to a prolonged campaign of Russian expansionism. This stands in stark contrast to China, whose navy’s primary goal is to consolidate maritime hegemony in its region. The PLA-N already possesses geographical advantages over the U.S. in this regard, given the proximity of contested areas in the South and East China Sea to Chinese port facilities. In this sense, the U.S. is languishing under what Paul Kennedy describes as “imperial overstretch,” in which the global commitments of great powers become too costly to maintain.68 Hal Brands and Evan Montgomery argue that the U.S. must inevitably “pare back its commitments to bring them into alignment with existing resources,” a move that would inevitably diminish Washington’s global credibility.69 Analysts note that congressional budgetary irresponsibility, in addition to hesitancy within the navy to advance necessary reforms, are challenges that hinder plans to bolster naval capabilities.70 American naval leaders have already warned of diminishing American maritime capabilities vis-à-vis China’s. In 2018 the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phillip Davidson, testified that in all scenarios “short of a war with the United States,” China is “capable of controlling the South China Sea.” He also warned that “there is no guarantee that the United States would win a future conflict with China.”71 In February 2020, the U.S. O4ce of Naval Intelligence stated that by 2030, China’s force of “major surface combatants” including aircraft +"2%)’* -%(-2%( !#''2!-'2). &2*1$!#* (!"#$%&'( "0 )*+*,&-*. !",,"/') “the U.S. is languishing under what Paul Kennedy describes as ‘imperial overstretch,’ in which the global commitments of great powers become too costly to maintain.”78 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 carriers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes will exceed those possessed by the U.S.72. In December 2020, retired Adm. Joe Sestak warned that the “Navy has now lost its assured command of the seas- for the first time in the post- World War II era – to China in the Western Pacific.”73 TRUMP CONTAINMENT STRATEGY In response to China’s rise and growing assertiveness, the Trump administration has espoused a policy of contain- ment, as is consistent with the behavior of any declining power. Great power competition has since become a cen- tral theme of U.S. foreign policy, as exemplified by the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS).74 Elbridge Colby and Wess Mitch- ell, two former Trump administration o4cials, wrote in Foreign A3airs that “beneath today’s ephemeral head- lines, it is this shift, and the reordering of U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic behavior that it entails, that will stand out and likely drive U.S. foreign policy under presi- dent from either party for a long time to come.”75 RHETORIC, HUMAN RIGHTS, SANCTIONS The first element of Trump’s containment strategy is rooted in heightened criticism of China in o4cial statements, briefings, and strategies. In October 2020, National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien named China “the threat of the century.”76 In December 2020, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Ratcli3e asserted that China was “national security threat no.1” in an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal.77 The Trump administration has also emphasized China as a national security threat in several strategic documents, including the NSS and NDS, which labeled China a ‘revisionist power’. In November 2020, the policy planning sta3 at the State Department also released a 70-page paper titled “The Elements of the China Challenge”, which details a U.S. response to China’s “hegemonic ambitions” and desire to “revise the world order.”78 On human rights issues, the U.S. has actively emphasized the plight of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the pro- democracy movement in Hong Kong. In October 2020, Robert O’Brien stated that “something close to genocide” was occurring in Xinjiang.79 In December 2020, the U.S. o4cially banned imports of all Chinese cotton products made by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) due to concerns regarding forced labor.80 Washington has also made symbolic moves to highlight its support for the Uyghurs. In October 2019, the White House appointed Uyghur-American Elnigar Iltebir to be the director for China a3airs at the National Security Council (NSC).81 A similar story exists with Hong Kong. In November 2019, Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, authorizing the U.S. to sanction Hong Kong o4cials. The administration also signed an executive order ending Hong Kong’s preferential trade status with the U.S. following Beijing’s imposition of the National Security Law (NSL).82 Moreover, Washington has actively rallied allies to partake in such causes. In November 2020, for example, the five-eyes intelligence- sharing alliance of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the U.S. released a joint statement urging China to revise their imposition of authoritarian measures in Hong Kong.83 In October 2020, the State Department appointed Assistant Secretary of State Robert Destro to be Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, signaling a renewed commitment to raising awareness for the issue of religious repression in Tibet.84 The U.S. has also put pressure on China through high- profile diplomatic challenges. In July 2020, the U.S. or- dered China to shut down its consulate in Houston, label- ing it a hub for Chinese espionage and influence operations. This prompted the Chinese to shut down the U.S. Consulate-General in Chengdu.85 In June 2020, the State Department imposed new limits on the number of Chinese journalists allowed in the U.S., and designated specific Chinese media entities as “foreign missions,” as- serting that the latter were “essentially owned by the “In response to China’s rise and growing assertiveness, the Trump administration has espoused a policy of containment, as is consistent with the behavior of any declining power.” 79 !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! PRC.”86 Furthermore, in several key speeches, American o4cials have designated China as the U.S.’ primary na- tional security threat. This began in October 2018, when Vice-President Mike Pence delivered confrontational re- marks at the Hudson Institute.87 In July 2020, U.S. Secre- tary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech called “Com- munist China and the Free World’s Future,” asserting that engagement with China had failed.88 In September 2020, President Trump lambasted China for its mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic in front of the UN General As- sembly.89 The U.S. has also specifically targeted CCP o4- cials for sanction and punishment. In July 2020, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Chinese Po- litburo member Chen Quanguo for his involvement in hu- man rights abuses in Xinjiang.90 In December 2020, the Trump administration also released new guidelines limit- ing all members of the CCP to single-entry visas.91 ECONOMIC REALM The second element of the Trump administration’s con- tainment strategy has occurred in the economic realm, where the U.S. has actively sought a redress of trade con- cerns regarding a growing trade deficit, the dumping of Chinese products such as steel, and lack of intellectual property (IP) rights, through relying on tari3s and coercive economic measures. In 2018, the Trump administration imposed a 25% tari3 on Chinese imports worth a collective 34 billion92 USD. Following the imposition of retaliatory tari3s by Beijing, the U.S. imposed 10% tari3s on Chinese imports worth an increased total of 200 billion USD.93 Fol- lowing negotiations over the Phase One trade deal, tari3s were reduced, although they have remained. The U.S. has reduced tari3s to 7.5% on Chinese imports worth 120 bil- lion USD, and China has reduced tari3s on U.S. goods worth $75 billion from 15% to 7.5%.94 In August 2019, the U.S. also labeled China a currency manipulator, noting that China’s central bank has arbitrarily weakened the RMB on several occasions.95 In December 2020, Trump is also expected to sign a bill that prevents Chinese compa- nies from listing on American stock exchanges, unless they submit to U.S. auditing standards.96 Furthermore, the Trump administration has sought to contain the success of Chinese technology giants such as Huawei, instructing Canadian authorities to arrest its CFO in 2018,97 issuing new export controls in May 2020, and o4cially naming Huawei a national security threat in June 2020.98 In November 2020, NSA Robert O’Brien named Huawei “the number one concern for democracy going forward.”99 To this end, the U.S. has actively pressured al- lies to espouse similar policies against Huawei, including Great Britain and India.100 It has also placed Huawei, along with telecom firms such as ZTE, on “entity lists” published by the Commerce Department, which essentially prohibits “...the Trump administration has sought to contain the success of Chinese technology giants such as Huawei, instructing Canadian authorities to arrest its CFO in 2018, issuing new export controls in May 2020, and o4cially naming Huawei a national security threat in June 2020.” $.*. )'!4#%! -/ ,$*!2+# )4-%( -!"#'* )%%-$%+#& 23 +'242%). +")'(#* )()2%*! "$)6#2 7 2!* +/- 6)%8"-$ 4#%( (!"#$%&'( "0 )*+*,&-*. !",,"/') 80 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 American firms from conducting transactions with them.101 China’s Ant Group, formerly known as Alipay, has also been blacklisted.102 The Trump administration has also placed thirty-five Chinese companies with alleged links to the PLA on defense blacklists, most recently add- ing chip making giant SMIC and gas producer CNOOC.103 Such moves block their access to U.S. investors and re- strict their supply of critical equipment from American suppliers. American concerns regarding semiconductor supply-chain security have also motivated the Department of Commerce to bar entry for Chinese firms, mandating companies to obtain a license before they can be allowed to provide goods and services to firms such as SMIC.104 In November 2020, the U.S. drafted another list of eighty- nine Chinese firms with ties to the PLA.105 MILITARY REALM The third element of Trump’s containment strategy is in the military realm, where the United States has actively built an emerging coalition in the Indo-Pacific to check China’s increasing assertiveness in the East China and South China Seas. Together with members of the “Quad,” namely India, Japan, and Australia, the U.S. has increased the number of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) it conducts in the South China Sea and has par- ticipated in a growing number of multilateral naval exer- cises. In November 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mat- tis stated that the U.S. would “demonstrate resolve through operational presence in the South China Sea.”106 Between 2018 and 2019 alone, U.S navy vessels sailed in a twelve- mile range of Chinese-claimed territory over twelve times, a substantial increase in numbers seen during the Obama administration.107 In November 2020, naval ships and air- craft from all Quad members participated in the Malabar 2020 Exercises, in the Bay of Bengal.108 In the same month, the U.S. navy conducted a four-day mine warfare exercise with naval vessels from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).109 Defense ties between the U.S. and Indo-Pacific partners have also deepened. In No- vember 2020, for example, NSA Robert O’Brien an- nounced the delivery of precision-guided missiles among other weapons to the Philippine military, while a4rming that an attack on a Philippine vessel in its territorial waters would trigger American defense obligations.110 American defense contractors have also cooperated with Japan to produce joint weapons capabilities, most recently complet- ing the development of the SM-3 ballistic missile intercep- tor, which was successfully tested in November 2020.111 The U.S. has also actively expanded defense ties with Tai- wan, which China considers a wayward province. Arms sales to Taiwan have occurred at a far greater frequency, and weapons sold to Taiwan have become increasingly so- phisticated. In 2018, the Trump administration approved the sale of submarine-related subsystems to aid Taiwan’s fledging indigenous submarine program.112 In July 2020, the U.S. approved the sale of Patriot missiles to replenish Taiwan’s aging arsenal.113 In October 2020, the U.S. ap- proved the sale of AGM-84H SLAM-ER missiles and HI- MARS batteries, which when deployed in Taiwan, will be capable of striking targets on Chinese bases and airfields.114 The U.S. navy has also conducted operations aimed at bol- stering deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. In June 2020 for example, the Aegis destroyer USS Russell crossed the Tai- wan Strait.115 Moreover, the U.S. has adopted additional advisory and logistical support roles for Taiwan’s military. In June 2020, the U.S. Army took the rare move of publi- cizing joint military training between American and Tai- wanese special forces in annual “Balance Temper” train- ing sessions.116 In November 2020, o4cials from Taiwan’s Naval Command confirmed reports that members of the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC) Marine Raider Regiment had conducted training alongside Taiwanese troops in Tai- wan.117 In the same month, two-star Navy admiral Michael Studeman, who oversees U.S. military intelligence in the Asia-Pacific, paid an unannounced visit to Taiwan.118 Lastly, the U.S. has highlighted the Indo-Pacific as the priority theater for its armed forces now and moving into the future. In June 2020, three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups conducted simultaneous operations in the Indo- Pacific in a robust show of force.119 In September 2020, the Ronald Reagan carrier strike group integrated over eleven- thousand personnel and one hundred aircraft between four service branches to conduct Operation Valiant Shield in the Philippine Sea.120 The following month, the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) released a report stating that U.S. spy planes had conducted flights targeting China sixty times across the span of September.121 In October 2020, a Chinese military spokesperson stated that “The U.S. has also actively expanded defense ties with Taiwan, which China considers a wayward province.” 81 !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! the USS John McCain had entered disputed waters near the Paracel Islands.122 In November 2020, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy called for the establishment of a U.S. 1st Fleet, to be based at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.123 It has also sought increased engagement with allies to facilitate U.S. hegemony. In October 2020 for example, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged Indonesia to find “new ways” of cooperation in the South China Sea.124 Lastly, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, recently authorized by the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), will see the U.S. allocate an additional 6 billion USD in military funding to bolster deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.125 EFFECTIVENESS AND CHINESE RESPONSES The Trump administration’s containment policy has not led to productive trade relations with China, stability in the Indo-Pacific, or more robust alliances. Washington’s trade war has hurt the American taxpayer and firms more than it has the Chinese economy. More FONOPSs and in- creased cooperation with the Quad have not compelled China to moderate its assertive behavior in the South Chi- na Sea. The imposition of sanctions on Chinese o4cials over human rights concerns, has similarly not compelled China to cease its campaigns of ethnic cleansing and re- pression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, respectively. Instead, China’s exports have grown while the U.S. trade deficit has ballooned, Chinese military activity in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait has increased, and vulnerabilities in U.S. alliance structure have become more apparent. Chi- na’s economic and military capabilities, furthermore, con- tinue to grow. In this sense, Trump’s containment policy has failed to reverse trends favoring China in power rela- tions with the U.S. TRADE WAR VULNERABILITIES: Despite the Trump administration’s touted successes, the U.S.-China War has imposed high costs on American tax- payers rather than Chinese firms. The nonpartisan Tax Foundation notes that the U.S.-China trade conflict has imposed 80 billion USD worth of new taxes on the Ameri- can public due to U.S. tari3s on thousands of Chinese products.126 Tari3s imposed by the administration are esti- mated to reduce long-term GDP by 0.23%, wage levels by 0.15%, and result in the loss of over 179,000 full-time jobs.127 A September 2019 study by Moody’s Analytics was even more pessimistic, estimating that the trade war had already decreased U.S. real GDP by 0.3% and resulted in the loss of 300,000 American jobs.128 Furthermore, a re- port from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Co- lumbia University concluded that the trade war would re- sult in the loss of 316 billion USD for the U.S. economy by the end of 2020.129 Especially hurt are U.S. soybean, pork, and dairy farmers, who have seen revenue decline as Chi- na’s tari3s hurt exports.130 Concerns prompted a spokes- person for the American Farm Bureau to warn that farm- ers have “lost the vast majority of what was once a $24 billion market in China.”131 Furthermore, the trade war has not succeeded in achieving its primary goal of lessening the U.S. global trade deficit. In October 2020, the U.S. trade deficit ballooned to 67.1 billion USD, a fourteen-year high.132 The trade deficit with China has not decreased substantially either. Between 2017 and 2018, the U.S. trade deficit with China in goods actually grew from 375 billion to 418 billion USD, although it has since decreased to $252 billion in 2020.133 Addition- ally, the trade war has not succeeded in slowing China’s economic growth. China’s economy is projected to grow even amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, and growth in ex- ports recently reached its highest rate since February 2018. The amount of Chinese exports in December 2020 was 21.1% greater than total exports in December 2019.134 Firms such as Huawei have also continued to see growth in revenue, hitting a record 122 billion USD in profits dur- ing the 2019 fiscal year.135 Moreover, targets in the Phase One trade deal have been shown to be simply unrealistic. In the first half of 2020, China had only purchased 23% of the goods they were supposed to purchase annually. China has pledged to )4#'2+)% (.-0). !')&# &#/2+2! (!"#$%&'( "0 '%.%*'%.) 82 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 spend an additional 60 billion USD on American goods in 2018, but this would be practically impossible, given that American exports to China have declined significantly year-on-year.136 Lastly, the trade war has bolstered perceptions among Chinese elites that Washington feels threatened by its rise, reinforcing Chinese confidence. Wei Jianguo, a former top Chinese trade o4cial, has stated that “the essence of the trade war is to destroy” an increasingly capable China.137 Fu Ying, former Vice Minister of Foreign A3airs, has stated that U.S. policy towards China is to “slow it down through suppression”, as it contends with a fight “the declining superpower cannot a3ord to lose.”138 As the U.S. pushes economic containment, Chinese elites become increasingly aware of the shortcomings in U.S. capacity to respond e3ectively. COMPOUNDING CHINESE FEARS OF ENCIRCLEMENT: Trump’s China policy has also exacerbated Chinese fears regarding its external security infrastructure, motivating increased assertiveness from the PLA, as opposed to less. Fears regarding encirclement were particularly evident fol- lowing Obama’s pivot to Asia in 2012, and have accelerated rapidly in the context of U.S. containment policy. The pivot to Asia first emerged in 2011, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote an article in Foreign Policy titled “America’s Pacific Century”. Clinton a4rmed that “the future of politics will be decided in Asia”, and that the “United States will be right at the center of the action.”139 Through “forward-deployed diplomacy”, Clinton articulated U.S. desire to “build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent with American interests...as the web we have built across the Atlantic.”140 In 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that the U.S military would bring “enhanced capabilities to this vital region.”141 Key features of the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” included the proposed deployment of 60% of U.S.’ submarines to the Asia-Pacific by 2020.142 During the pivot, the U.S. announced arms sales to Taiwan,143 started annual exercises with the Vietnamese Navy, expanded naval exercises with Japan, signed new arms agreements with the Philippines, and bolstered U.S. military capabilities on the Korean peninsula.144 In 2012, Australia, Japan, and South Korea participated in U.S.-Philippine military exercises for the first time.145 In November 2011, Clinton announced U.S. opposition to bilateral negotiations over China’s territorial claims, opting to support ASEAN’s calls for multilateral talks. In 2012, she asserted that Chinese claims violated the law of the sea.146 This contrasted with the approach of previous administrations, which emphasized only U.S. interests in freedom of navigation and peaceful dispute settlement.147 Chinese leaders understand that Beijing’s own aggressive maneuvering, rooted in rising confidence and regional ambitions, was the catalyst for these developments. Re- gardless, they have long viewed these attempts as a multi- lateral e3ort to encircle China with a network of U.S. al- lies.148 In the 2000s, former President Hu Jintao said in private deliberations that “the United States has strength- ened its military deployments in the Asia-Pacific region. They have extended outposts and placed pressure points on us from the east, south, and west. This marks a great change in our geopolitical environment.”149 PLA Air Force colonel Dai Xu warned in 2010 that American interests in Japan, the South China Sea, India, and Afghanistan create a “C-shaped encirclement ring” that restricts China’s “stra- tegic space.”150 A Ministry of Defense White Paper, pub- lished in 2015, asserted that China must “safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity, and development interests” as “the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the Asia-Pacific region.”151 The Trump administration has exacerbated these concerns through bolstering force posture in the re- gion, and expanding security cooperation with China’s neighbors in the Indo-Pacific. While these deterrence-building moves are perceived as defensive by Washington, they are likely perceived di3er- ently in Beijing, given challenges associated with Robert Jervis’ notion of the “security dilemma.”152 Jervis contends that it is di4cult for states to di3erentiate between o3en- sive and defensive capabilities. The deployment of ballistic missile defense by an actor may be defensive in orienta- tion for example, but it still increases the threat perception “Trump’s China policy has also exacerbated Chinese fears regarding its external security infrastructure, motivating increased assertiveness from the PLA...” 83 !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! !'$'&"!- 1. “Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?”, Belfer Center for Science and International A3airs, at https://www. belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/overview-thucydides-trap. 2. John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The National Interest, October 25, 2014, at http://www.eastlaw.net/ wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Can-China-Rise-Peacefully_-_- The-National-Interest.pdf. 3. Robert S. Ross, “The Rise of the Chinese Navy: From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?” in China’s Global Engage- ment: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2017). other states hold of the actor given that it diminishes their o3ensive capabilities. This happens despite neither side intending to escalate tensions.153 Moreover, in an anarchic structure, the intentions of other states are always obfus- cated, leading to potential misconceptions in any great power relationship. In response to increased American activity in the region, China has ramped up military activity. In Ladakh during June 2020, the PLA engaged in skirmishes with Indian troops, ultimately claiming the lives of twenty. Gen. Zhao Zongqi, head of the PLA Western Theater Command, has suggested that the motivation behind China’s attack was to ensure it did “not appear weak” during “exploitation by the U.S.”154 In the Taiwan Strait, on an almost-daily basis, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Y-8 and Y-9 surveillance aircraft have incurred on Taiwan’s declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In October 2020, Taiwanese Defense Minis- ter Yan De-fa announced that Taiwan’s air force had scram- bled fighters 2,972 times throughout the year, marking a 129% increase in scrambles from 2019. This had aroused worries among analysts that China is pursuing ‘grayzone’ warfare through gradually weakening Taiwan by exhaust- ing its air force.155 The PLA has also conducted an increased number of drills and exercises aimed at Taiwan.156 On Tai- wan’s National Day in October 2020, the PLA conducted a large-scale exercise featuring drones, special forces, and airborne troops meant to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. Following the exercise, the PLA announced a four-day, live- fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait. In the South China Sea, Chinese assertiveness has been growing as well. In May 2019, China deployed its Coast Guard to harass Vietnam- ese and Malaysian vessels servicing a drilling platform o3 Vietnamese waters.157, 158 In March 2020, China built two new research stations in Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, equipping them with defense silos and runaways that can support PLA air force (PLAAF) fighter jets.159 In April 2020, Vietnam lodged an o4cial complaint after a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel sunk a Viet- namese shipping boat.160 In July 2020, the PLA-N con- ducted exercises in the South China Sea centered around amphibious assault activities.161 Thus, it is clear that increased deterrence-building in the Indo-Pacific has not moderated China’s military assertive- ness. Instead, it has compounded long-held Chinese fears of encirclement, driving increasingly aggressive behavior as Beijing seeks to discourage renewed American commit- ment to the Indo-Pacific. The beginnings of an arms race and naval buildup between the two sides, as seen prior to WWI between Britain and Germany, have substantially de- creased the prospects for peace and stability in the region. CONCLUSION Ultimately, the Trump administration’s containment policy against China has failed to slow China’s economic growth or moderate assertive Chinese behavior. Instead, the Chinese have benefited from continued growth in export demand, seen record profits for flagship companies such as Huawei, and ramped up military activity in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The U.S-China trade war has provided comprehensive proof that de- coupling with China is unfeasible, and that full-fledged, Mearsheimer-style containment against Beijing does nothing but exacerbate Chinese insecurities regarding strategic encirclement, motivating arms races and thus, regional instability. This is not to say, that decline is inevitable. Indeed, the U.S- the only multicultural great power in the history of the world- possesses a host of advantages in its geography, and pre-existing economic, military, and technological ca- pabilities that could be leveraged to sustain the continua- tion of Pax Americana. Under President-elect Biden, Washington is expected to eschew an isolationist mentali- ty, bridge divisions at home, and place renewed emphasis on American alliances. It is also expected to upgrade U.S. defense capabilities, specifically in high-tech domains such as AI and 5G, make C4ISR networks more resilient, and test new joint operational concepts such as multi-do- main operations as part of a broader shift in defense policy away from power in mass.162 Whether the Biden adminis- tration succeeds in these endeavors will determine wheth- er this remains the American century. 84 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 4. Robert S. Ross, “The Rise of the Chinese Navy: From Regional Naval Power to Global Naval Power?” in China’s Global Engage- ment: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2017). 5. John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The Na- tional Interest, October 25, 2014. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Robert S. Ross, “Sino-Russian Relations: The False Promise of Russian Balancing,” International Politics, vol 53, no. 1 (2019). 9. Robert Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN”, The National Interest, December 12, 2019, at https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/keeping-chinas-plan-25383. 10. John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The National Interest, October 25, 2014. 11. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1989). 12. Ibid. 13. Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States”, Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2015, at https://fas. org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf. 14. Melanie Hart and Kelly Masgamen, “Limit Leverage, and Compete: A New Strategy on China”, Center for American Progress (CAP), April 3, 2019 at https://www.americanprogress. org/issues/security/reports/2019/04/03/468136/limit-leverage- compete-new-strategy-china/. 15. Frank Tang, “China to overtake the US to become world’s top consumer goods market ‘very soon’”, SCMP, November 30, 2020, at https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3111954/china-overtake-us-become-worlds-top-consumer- goods-market. 16. 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Phillippe Le Corre, “Dividing the West: China’s new invest- ment bank and America’s diplomatic failure”, Brookings Institution, March 17, 2015, at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2015/03/17/dividing-the-west-chinas-new- investment-bank-and-americas-diplomatic-failure/. 22. Wang, Yong. “O3ensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy.” The Pacific Review 29, no.3 (2016): 455-463. 23. “Xi Jinping: Speed up implementing free trade zones and accelerate construction of a new open economic system (⃯扠 ㄂᧶┯㉺⸭㡌呹䟀忇㢢◉㒧䟴 ┯㉺㨓ㆉ㆏㟍⨚兞㿝㠿⇢Ⓟ)”, Xinhua News, December 6, 2014 at http://www.xinhuanet.com// politics/2014-12/06/c_1113546075.htm. 24. Zhu, Zhiqun, Critical Decade, A: China’s Foreign Policy (2008-2018). (Bucknell, NJ: World Scientific). 25. Robert Ward, “RCEP trade deal: a geopolitical win for China”, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), November 25, 2020, at https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/11/rcep- trade-deal 26. 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Wang Huiyao, “ We should show the attitude of joining CPTPP and start negotiations as soon as possible (䘚战劏᧶ ㄣ⻌㉺⻤䘿┯⏴CPTPP䤓Ⲏ㊐ㄅ㆏⻤店⒳)”, ce.cn, October 13, 2020, at http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202010/13/ t20201013_35881042.shtml. 30. “Will China’s Push To Internationalize The Renminbi Suc- ceed?” ChinaPower Project (CSIS), 2020, at https://chinapower. csis.org/china-renminbi-rmb-internationalization/. 31. Rolland, Nadège. Security the Belt and Road: Prospects for Chinese Military Expansion Along the Silk Roads. Washington DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019. 104. 32. Xu Yanyan (㈟䑤䑤) and Wang Jiaxin (䘚∂㢤), “BRI has become a driving force for RMB internationalization (₏サ₏恾” 㒟ⅉ㺠ゐ⦌棔▥㠿┷┪)”, China Business News, August 1, 2017 at https://www.yicai.com/news/5324679.html. 33. “Will China’s Push To Internationalize The Renminbi Suc- ceed?”, ChinaPower Project at CSIS, 2020, at https://chinapow- er.csis.org/china-renminbi-rmb-internationalization/. 34. Kim Min-hyung, “A Real Driver Of US–China Trade Con- flict: The Sino–US Competition for Global Hegemony and Its 85 !"# $%&!'&('&) $%&!*'&+#&! Implications For The Future,” International Trade, Politics and Development, vol. 3, no. 1 (2019). 35. Frank Tang, “China’s Liu He says foreign hostility spurring nation’s push for high-tech independence”, SCMP, October 22, 2020 at, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/ article/3106644/chinas-liu-he-says-foreign-hostility-spurring- nations-push-hi. 36. “Made in China 2025: Industrial Policies and Issues for Con- gress”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), August 11, 2020, at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10964.pdf. 37. Yang, Yao. “China’s Economic Growth in Retrospect.” In Chi- na 2049: Economic Challenges of a Rising Global Power, edited by David Dollar, Huang Yiping, and Yao Yang, 3-28. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2020. 38. Jack S. Levy. “Domestic Politics and War.” The Jour- nal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 653-73. doi:10.2307/204819. 39. “IMF releases most pessimistic economic projections for the United States to date”, Peter G. Peterson Foundation, August 3, 2020, at https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2020/08/imf- releases-most-pessimistic-economic-projections-for-the-united- states-to-date; Beth Ann Bovino and Satyam Panday, “Economic Research: The U.S. Faces a Longer and Slower Climb From the Bottom”, S&P Global Rankings, June 25, 2020 at https://www. spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200625-economic- research-the-u-s-faces-a-longer-and-slower-climb-from-the- bottom-11547633. 40. “World Bank October 2020 Report Says China Economy to Grow by 7.9% in 2021”, China Briefing, September 29, 2020, at https://www.china-briefing.com/news/world-bank-october- 2020-report-says-china-economy-to-grow-by-7-9-in-2021/. 41. John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The National Interest, October 25, 2014. 42. Ross, Robert S. “On the Fungibility of Economic Power: China’s Economic Rise and the East Asian Security Order.” European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 1 (March 2019): 302–27. 43. Robert Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN”, The National Interest, December 12, 2019, at https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/keeping-chinas-plan-25383 44. David Lague and Benjamin Kang Lim, “The China Chal- lenge- Ruling the Waves”, Reuters, April 30, 2019, at https:// www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/. 45. Robert Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN”, The National Interest, December 12, 2019. 46. David Lague and Benjamin Kang Lim, “The China Chal- lenge- Ruling the Waves”, Reuters, April 30, 2019, at https:// www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/. 47. Ibid. 48. “Carrier likely to deploy third aircraft carrier by 2025: report”, Nikkei Asian Review, November 4, 2020, at https://asia.nikkei. com/Politics/China-likely-to-deploy-third-aircraft-carrier-by- 2025-report. 49. Ibid. 50. James E. Fanell, “China’s Global-Navy- Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 4 (Autumn 2020), pp. 14-39. 51. Robert Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN”, The National Interest, December 12, 2019, at https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/keeping-chinas-plan-25383 52. James E. Fanell, “Asia Rising: China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure”, Naval College War Review, 72, no.1 (2019): 11-50. 53. Posen, Barry R. “Command of the Commons: The Military Strategy, Force Structure, and Force Posture of Restraint.” In Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, 135-63. Cornell University Press, 2014. 54. Ibid. 55. Kristin Huang, “China’s navy drills in 4 regions show abil- ity to counter US, observers say”, SCMP, August 25, 2020 at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098671/ chinas-navy-drills-4-regions-show-ability-counter-us-observers 56. James E. Fanell, “China’s Global-Navy- Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 4 (Autumn 2020), pp. 14-39. 57. “DF-15 (Dong Feng-15/M-9/CSS-6)”, MissileThreat CSIS, at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-15-css-6/. 58. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the West- ern Pacific,” International Security 38, no.4 (Spring 2014), pp. 115-149. 59. Kristin Huang, “Chinese military fires ‘aircraft-carrier killer missile into South China Sea ‘in warning to the United States’”, SCMP, August 26, 2020 at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/ military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-mis- siles-south-china-sea-warning 60. Ibid. 61. Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D and DF-26 ASBMs: Is The U.S. Military Ready?’, 19FortyFive, November 15, 2020, at https://www.19fortyfive.com/2020/11/chinas-df-21d-and-df-26b- asbms-is-the-u-s-military-ready/. 62. “China’s ballistic missiles”, Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS), 2016, at https://www.iiss.org/publica- tions/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2016/mb2016- 01-essays-2. 63. Robert Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN”, The National Interest, December 12, 2019. 64. Christopher P. Cavas, “New US Navy Fleet Goal: 308 ships”, DefenseNews, April 5, 2015, at https://www.defensenews.com/ home/2015/04/05/new-us-navy-fleet-goal-308-ships/. 86 !"!#!$%& : : &'()$* 2021 65. Robert Ross, “Keeping Up with China’s PLAN”, The National Interest, December 12, 2019. 66. Robert Ross, “The End of U.S. Naval Dominance in Asia”, Lawfare, November 18, 2018, at https://www.lawfareblog.com/ end-us-naval-dominance-asia. 67. Gen. Mike Holmes, “Air Force Structure in the Next National Defense Strategy”, Center for New American Security (CNAS), December 7, 2020, at https://www.cnas.org/publications/com- mentary/air-force-structure-in-the-next-national-defense-strategy. 68. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1989). 69. Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competi- tion,” Texas National Security Review, 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020). 70. Robert C. O’Brien, “Why the United States Needs a 355-Ship Navy Now”, National Review, October 18, 2017, at https://www. nationalreview.com/2017/10/us-navy-355-ships-needed/. 71. Adm. 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