"[Spates can expect to continue to struggle to resist proliferation within their borders as new tribes, governors, and state politicians try to claim their share of the action." A RAW D E A L Conflicts Over Tribal Sovereignty and Casino Proliferation T l M M O O N E Y F E D E R A L I S M H A S P L A Y E D A N I M P O R T A N T R O L E I N T H E E X P L O S I O N O F L E G A L I Z E D G A M - B L I N G I N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T H E L A S T T W O D E C A D E S . I N D I A N G A M I N G , I N P A R - T I C U L A R , H A S C H A L L E N G E D S T A T E A N D N A T I O N A L G O V E R N M E N T S T O C O M E T O T E R M S W I T H T H E P L A C E O F A M E R I C A N I N D I A N T R I B E S W I T H I N T H E F E D E R A L I S T S Y S T E M A N D O R G A N I Z E A M E A N I N G F U L F R A M E W O R K F O R T H E E X P A N S I O N O F G A M I N G O N T R I B A L L A N D S . N O W L A R G E L Y C O N T R O L L E D B Y A F E D E R A L S T A T U T O R Y F R A M E W O R K , I N D I A N G A M I N G H A S L E F T S T A T E S I N A S U B O R D I N A T E P O S I T I O N I N N E G O T I A T I N G T H E E S T A B - L I S H M E N T O F M A J O R C A S I N O E N T E R P R I S E S W I T H I N T H E I R O W N B O R D E R S . C O N F U - S I O N I N S T A T E S ' R I G H T S D U R I N G N E G O T I A T I O N S H A S F U R T H E R W E A K E N E D T H E I R B A R - G A I N I N G P O S I T I O N , L E A D I N G T O E X T E N S I V E T R I B A L C A S I N O D E V E L O P M E N T . T H E C O O P E R A T I O N B E T W E E N S T A T E S A N D T R I B E S A N D S T A T E S A N D C A S I N O C O R P O R A T I O N S H A V E F A C I L I T A T E D C A S I N O P R O L I F E R A T I O N T H R O U G H O U T T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S , A T R E N D T H A T A P P E A R S D E S T I N E D T O C O N T I N U E U N T I L T H E M A R K E T I S F U L L Y S A T U - R A T E D . Less than 30 years ago, a legal slot machine or high stakes poker game could not be found anywhere outside Las Vegas or Atlantic City. That all changed i n 1987 when the Supreme Court handed down the landmark California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians case affirming the right of Indian tribes to operate casino enterprises on their sover- eign land. Drawing on historical and judicial traditions of American Indian sovereignty, the Cabazon court confirmed American Indian tribes as important actors i n the Federalist structure and placed their sovereignty on equal footing with that of the states. These developments have strongly affected the way i n which states control gambling within their borders. Indian gaming is largely controlled by a federal statutory framework, leaving states i n a subor- dinate position i n negotiating the establishment of major casino enterprises within their own borders. Confusion over states' rights during negotiations has further weak- ened their bargaining position, leading to tribal casino de- velopment almost by default. The continued expansion of tribal gaming, especially Vegas-sized projects, unleashed strong pressures for other states to get i n on the action by encouraging their own tribal gaming and sanctioning com- mercial casinos. Since the Cabazon case and the subse- quent federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), both tribal and commercial gaming have exploded. Casinos can now be found i n 35 states, 28 of which have tribal gaming.' The combination of state competition and tribal rights has put a strong wind behind casino gambling expansion, mak- ing it one of the fastest growing businesses i n the country.11 This growth, however, has come at the expense of some of the most time-tested elements of Federalism—local con- trol, state police powers, and democratic accountability. Established as a legitimate (and very profitable) business, the gaming industry has successfully co-opted state govern- ments into a "deal with the devil" to compete with other states and save their bottom lines. T R I B E S AS C O N S T I T U T I O N A L E L E M E N T S OF F E D E R A L I S M American Indian tribes occupy an ambiguous position within the U.S. federal system. Most scholars and politi- cians typically consider localities, states, and the federal government to be the constituent parts of Federalism i n the United States, but miss the important position granted American Indian tribes by the Constitution. By giving the power to make treaties and regulate commerce with tribes to the Federal government1 1 1 and divesting states of their leading role i n relation to American Indians, the Constitutional Convention made tribes and states essen- tially equal sovereign bodies under the national govern- ment.^ Established at a time when many tribes were still considered foreign nations, the Constitution grants them a large measure of sovereignty.v Legally, the status of Indian tribes has slowly settled on what Steven Light and Kathryn Rand call "semi-sovereignty." Pointing toward complex sovereignty case law, they conclude that: The contemporary legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty essen- tially means that the United States recognizes tribes as in- dependent sovereign nations whose location within the boundaries of a state does not subject them to the applica- tion of state law. At the same time, as "conquered" or "dis- covered" nations, tribes retain only the political and legal authority that Congress has not expressly abrogated under its asserted plenary power pursuant to the U.S. Constitution's "Indian Commerce Clause." The federal legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty effectively means that tribes, in fact, are "semi-sovereign.'^1 T H E C O N S T R U C T I O N O F A C A S I N O O N I N D I A N T E R R I T O R Y IN C A L I F O R N I A E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 This reading of American Indian rights leaves states with almost no control over tribes within their borders. days after it opened, sparking the lawsuit that eventually af- firmed the right to Indian gaming. Citing Ronald Reagan's 1983 statement calling for increased tribal self-government "States took the passage of this act as an opportunity to air their grievances about the Cabazon case and their general lack of authority over pieces of territory within their boundaries." Though some judicial and scholarly arguments hold that tribal sovereignty precludes any state interference/" many politicians, especially local and state actors, detest being unable to control their own jurisdictions. According to the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, "State politicians have tended to act on the belief that they have responsibility for and attendant regu- latory jurisdiction over all people and activities that occur within their geographic boundaries." v i i i As long as tribes were politically weak and remote from their primary inter- ests, state politicians allowed the federal government to take the lead on American Indian policy. As tribes reorgan- ized and attempted to foster economic activity using bingo parlors and card rooms they set the stage for intergovern- mental conflict between their interests and those of the states and the national government. Paul Pasqueretta iden- tifies this phenomenon, saying, "Although state lawmakers and law enforcement officials continually fought to l imi t the development of the Indian gambling industry, federal courts consistently ruled i n favor of the tribes." With more fundamental interests now at stake, states were much less will ing to defer to the federal government on Indian policy. This conflict finally came to a head i n the California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. I n 1980, the Cabazon band of Mission Indians opened a card room and bingo parlor on their reservation 18 miles outside of Palm Springs. State police raided the operation and self-sufficiency, Justice Byron White wrote i n the ma- jority opinion that "the federal interests i n Indian self-gov- ernment, including the goal of encouraging tribal self-suf- ficiency and economic development, are important, and federal agencies, acting under federal laws, have sought to implement them by promoting and overseeing tribal bingo and gambling enterprises."x The decision turned on White's reading of California gaming statutes. White held that " i n light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must con- clude that California regulates rather than prohibits gam- bling i n general and bingo i n particular. " x i Though Congress had granted states the right to intervene into tribal affairs i n criminal cases, White's distinction between regulation and prohibition (one which Steven's dissent re- jects) allowed the federal government to pre-empt the state's right to regulate Indian gaming by removing it from the sphere of criminal law. The court affirmed tribes' sov- ereign rights over state regulation while at the same time calling for federal legislative clarification on the issue. I G R A A N D T H E STATE F I G H T FOR G A M B L I N G R E G U L A T I O N Congress responded to the court's call for federal leader- ship on Indian gaming with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. States took the passage of this act as an opportunity to air their grievances about the Cabazon case and their gen- A R A W D E A L eral lack of authority over pieces of territory within their boundaries. Arizona Attorney General Robert K. Corbin testified before the House Committee of Interior and Internal Affairs, arguing for state control, saying: I firmly believe that since most of the people who will be gambling will be State [citizens], non-Indians, that there should be State control. If people in my state get rooked off, get loan-sharked and everything else that comes with gam- bling, I am going to be the one they are going to come to. They're going to say why aren't you protecting me, why aren't you doing something about it?xn Tribes were equally vocal i n asserting their right to self-de- termination. According to Jim Hena, governor of Tesuque Pueblo: [Though] the Pueblo support Federal legislation to regulate gaming . . . we do not and will not support any bills which provide for state jurisdiction over gaming on Indian land . . . Tribal governments are part of the federal system of the United States. As a result, proposals to place Indian gam- ing under state jurisdiction are contrary to the Constitution ... and inconsistent with 200 years of Federal policy.xm What emerged was a compromise. The 1988 law reaf- firmed tribal sovereignty with regard to gaming, but al- lowed some state agency i n the regulation of particular types of gambling on American Indian land. IGRA divided gaming into three classes: Class I—"social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged i n by individuals as a part of, or i n connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebra- tions," Class II—"the game of chance commonly known as bingo including pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, in- stant bingo, and other games similar to bingo" as well as any card game allowed i n the state, and Class I I I — " a l l forms of gaming that are not Class I gaming or Class I I gaming" (usually slot machines, blackjack, and baccarat) . x i v Like Cabazon, the provisions of IGRA allow tribes to oper- ate gambling up to the point that it is legal for charitable or- ganizations (usually Class II) without any state interference or tax.^ This means that even without an agreement with the hosting state, tribes can usually open at least a bingo parlor or card room. IGRA compromises with the states, however, by allowing them to negotiate terms and condi- tions on methods of gaming not legally allowed i n the state. x v l Because bingo and cards only allow for small-scale gaming and therefore small-scale profits, tribes wanted the life-blood of any casino: slot machines. x v n Since these are illegal for all organizations i n most states, tribes and states were usually forced to negotiate a fee or percentage pay- ment for the right to operate a Class I I I casino within the state. As with any good compromise, neither side was entirely satisfied by the new law. As W. Dale Mason points out, "Rather than resolving intergovernmental conflict over gaming the Congress had i n some ways opened the door to more conf l ic t . . . the result was a classic intergovernmental confrontation, sovereign against sovereign on an issue of fundamental import: which government, federal, state, or tribal had the greatest authority on deciding what occurs i n its respective borders." X V 1 U Tribes resented any state impo- sition on their sovereignty, while states felt railroaded into hosting gaming they did not approve. With so much at stake, both sides were compelled to negotiate. With each party perceiving the other as violating its sovereignty, these negotiations often faltered. As Bays and Fouberg point out, "Since tribes and states have so little experience working to- gether and negotiating, and since the relationship between tribes and the states is often contentious and concerns vital issues to both parties, the tribes and the states frequently end up i n court or i n long, drawn-out negotiations."™ In many cases, this frustration resulted from difficulties in- herent i n the compacting process. L O A D E D D I C E I N T H E C O M P A C T I N G PROCESS The requirement that states and tribes meet at the negotiat- ing table was an attempt by the federal government to allow E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 Indian gaming expansion without totally excluding the states. Provisions within IGRA, however, seemed to make Class I I I compacts a forgone conclusion. According to the National Indian Gaming Association's IGRA facts: Under IGRA, a state is obligated to negotiate compacts that lay out the conditions, regulations and limitations for Class III gaming operations. If a state refuses to negotiate or to negotiate in good faith, tribes can sue in federal court to force mediation. If a state refuses to implement a media- tor's recommendations, the Secretary of the Interior establishes the proce- dures for Class III gaming within the state.™ Needless to say, states hostile toward gaming violently resisted this provi- sion. Eventually, states won a legal vic- tory over this provision i n Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida where the court held that states could claim sov- ereign immunity under the n t h Amendment to avoid forced media- tion.™ A series of court cases further muddled the issue, however. In Northern Arapaho Tribe v. State of Wyoming, the court forced Wyoming to reach a gaming agreement with the Arapaho Indians, and, when it re- fused, imposed a Class I I I compact written by the Secretary of Interior.™1 Inconsistent rulings and confusion about so-called "compact forcing" favored tribes. By grant- ing Class I I I gaming with no compensation or regulatory authority, federally established compacts like Wyoming's were a worst-case scenario for states. In order to protect themselves from the possibility of being shut out entirely from future gaming revenue, states typically approached the negotiating table with settlement as the only possible option. In Michigan, the Gun Lake Band of Pottawatomi Indians used the Wyoming case to bring pressure on Governor Jennifer Granholm to come to the negotiating table. In a re- lease following the Arapaho decision, the tribe argued that "The decision paves the way for the Gun Lake Tribe to oper- ate a Class I I I casino without a compact should the Governor fail to sign the Tribe's compact" and that the "de- cision confirms that the State of Michigan wi l l lose the abil- ity to obtain any revenues from the Gun Lake casino unless it enters into a compact."™1 1 Though a spokesperson for Granholm denied that the situa- • tions were as yet analogous (the tribe was still embroiled i n lawsuits over the status of its reservation), she did not deny that the Department of Interior could force a compact on the states.XX1V After settling outstanding lawsuits over its reservation, the Gun Lake Band and the State of Michigan signed a gaming compact. In her letter ex- plaining her decision to State Senate Majority Leader Mike Bishop, Granholm said: Once the tribe's land goes into trust, the tribe will almost certainly have the right under federal law to open a commercial gamingfacility—with or without a compact with the state. Given these circumstances it is in the best interest of the state to enter into a gaming compact to ensure that the state has both some say in the operation of the facility and an opportunity to share its revenue.™ With all forms of gaming seemingly on the table even i n the face of state opposition, Granholm felt compelled to come to an agreement to ensure Michigan received some benefits from tribal gaming. C R E E K T O W N C A S I N O IS MAJORITY O W N E D BY T H E S A U L T S T E . MARIE T R I B E O F C H I P P E W A I N D I A N S . A R A W D E A L Confusion i n other elements of IGRA further hamstrung states i n negotiations. Technology increasingly blurred dis- tinctions made by IGRA's classes of gambling as slot ma- chine companies created video machines that look and feel like slots, but technically are still considered Class I I gam- i n g . x x v l Again, this gave leverage to the tribes. Should states fail to cooperate i n compacting for Class I I I gaming, IGRA's provisions have allowed them to circumvent many prohibitions on slot machines and threaten to create full- scale, but still technically Class I I , casinos.*™1 Like com- pact forcing, Class I I casinos threaten to establish full-scale gaming without any payment to states or localities. Confusion over what types of gambling are allowed creates serious disincentives for states to obstruct tribes trying to build major casinos within their borders. The conse- quences of saying "no" may be a casino that looks and feels like a real casino but doesn't pay a dime to its host commu- ni t i es .^" 1 S L O T M A C H I N E S ARE A C O M M O N S O U R C E O F R E V E N U E FOR MANY C A S I N O S . The end result of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida demon- strates the danger of Class I I casinos. As cited above, Seminole upheld Florida's sovereign right to resist court-or- dered mediation for Class I I I gaming, seemingly granting the state veto power over full-scale gaming within its bor- ders. When the state refused to negotiate with the tribe, however, the Seminoles responded by opening seven Class I I casinos on their reservations. Using electronic bingo machines i n lieu of slots, the tribe was able to sustain even large-scale casino enterprises.X X 1 X As of 2005, the Seminole tribe operated 7,840 electronic bingo machines i n its vari- ous locations. x x x Assuming these machines bring i n the national Class I I machine average of $156 per day,50™ the seven casinos bring i n a total of $446.4 mil l ion a year i n revenue through electronic Class I I gaming. Of this flood of gambling money, not one drop goes to the state of Florida. Left on the outside looking in , Florida has begun rapprochement with the Seminoles. According to the Miami Herald, Governor Charlie Crist has called for a Class I I I compact to " give the tribe new games [slot machines] at their seven casinos i n exchange for as much as $200 mi l - l ion a year i n revenue." x x x n With major gaming already going on without a compact, Florida has backed off its re- fusal to allow slot machines i n order to gain a stake i n the casino revenue. I N C E N T I V E S TO P R O L I F E R A T E Amidst these serious disincentives for opposing gaming expansion are equally compelling reasons to approve plans. States stand to gain enormous sums of cash from casino projects i n their states. Connecticut's two tribal mega-casi- nos have paid over $4.1 billion to the state over the course of their fifteen years of existence , X X X 1 U amounting to almost 3 percent of the state's annual revenue. x x x l v Casino prolif- eration, once affirmed i n its legitimacy by the Cabazon case has sustained itself on its own momentum, building pres- sure to expand both tribal and commercial gaming. While gaming was confined to Las Vegas and Atlantic City, states resisted the urge to try their luck because of the perceived social costs and stigmas associated with gambling. x x x v After IGRA, however, gaming rapidly expanded within the borders of many different states. This removed many of the cultural pressures not to gamble and created many of the incentives discussed above. As states became aware of the benefits of casino cash, they often encouraged tribal casi- nos and moved to license their own private ones. Casino expansion is a classic "race to the bottom," with growth driven by taxation envy. Each state bordering a casino state watches as its residents cross state lines and hemorrhage precious taxable dollars on the other side of the border. Michael Nelson uses the spread of casinos from Iowa to Illinois to demonstrate this fact, saying that "be- cause a state leaks revenue when its citizens cross the bor- der to [gamble in] neighboring states, it has a strong incen- tive to keep its betters at home. " x x x v l Pressed to react by dwindling tax returns, non-casino states responded by es- tablishing gambling of their own. This trend has only ac- celerated as states struggle to keep abreast of the rising cost of administering a large bureaucracy and satisfying the reg- ulations and mandates coming down from the Federal gov- ernment. In a political climate where tax increases are met with recalls and referenda,X X X V 1 1 "sin taxes" like gambling have become ever more p o p u l a r . x x x v m Additionally, casinos have come to be regarded as agents of urban renewal. Their ability to provide many jobs while bringing out-of-state customers conforms to the model of urban planning that Altshuler and Luberoff see i n contem- porary state and local capital investment. Describing changing trends, they point out that "while cities have al- ways competed to attract investment, they had traditionally directed their services . . . toward local residents and busi- nesses. Today by contrast, they are often engaged i n 'the "By affirming tribal rights to operate casinos on sovereign land, the Cabazon court hoped to provide for economic self-sufficiency for Indian tribes." construction of expensive entertainment amenities, often i n partnership with private investors, designed to appeal primarily to out-of-town visitors." , X X X 1 X Casinos have joined convention centers and sports facilities as new fads of urban planning. Like the other venues, the hope of these public-private partnerships is to draw i n visitors using en- tertainment attractions and capitalize on the spin-off ef- fects of tourism. As with other private partners, the gam- ing industry has pressed the government to relax restrictions on its development. Casino expansion follows what Altshuler and Luberoff call "the most notable recent trend i n American politics"—"the ascendancy of organized business at all levels of American government . . . [and thereby] growing pressure to relax or eliminate many of the barriers to physical development. " x l As a result of the grow- ing cooperation between states and the gaming industry, state laws and constitutions have been changed to provide a more liberal gaming environment. The current gambling debate i n Massachusetts provides a good example of these mechanisms at work. Facing a bal- looning budget and sick of watching his citizens cross state lines into Connecticut to gamble, Governor Deval Patrick proposed three commercial casinos and moved to help fos- ter an Indian casino within Massachusetts. Galled by the profits made off Bay Staters at the two massive tribal casi- nos i n Connecticut,5511 Patrick's proposal expressed the hopes of raising revenue, boosting tourism, providing jobs, and revitalizing different regions of the state. In a press re- lease on the proposal, Housing and Economic Development Secretary Dan O'Connell, explained that the proposal would "expand economic development and job creation broadly throughout the Commonwealth" and "di- versify employment, support tourism and convention in- dustry and continue to position Massachusetts as an eco- nomic leader. " x l n Further analyzing the proposal, Fr. Richard McGowan, an economist at Boston College, ex- plained the competitive side of the governor's rationale to the Boston Globe, saying, "For Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun, this wil l hurt them to no end, but i f I am the governor of Massachusetts, I don't care. I ' m reclaiming revenue for my A R A W D E A L state, thank you very m u c h . " x l i i i The pressure of out-of- state competition and in-state needs have combined to make casino gaming an attractive option for Massachusetts. C O N S E Q U E N C E S FOR F E D E R A L I S M The rapid changes i n gambling policy throughout the United States have made a serious impact on the federalis- t s structure of its government. By affirming tribal rights to operate casinos on sovereign land, the Cabazon court hoped to provide for economic self-sufficiency for American Indian tribes. On one level, the case affirmed the sovereign rights of tribes that date back to the Constitution and the Marshall court. On another, however, it fostered in- tergovernmental conflict. Unti l the 20th century, state- tribal conflict remained i n the background because of the relative weakness of tribes. After Cabazon, tribes were af- firmed i n their authority to create major gaming develop- ments—a power normally squarely within states' police powers. This created classic intergovernmental conflict: "sovereign against sovereign conflict on an issue of funda- mental import. " x l l v IGRA, the Congressional answer to the Cabazon case, at- tempted to balance state concerns with tribal sovereignty. In actuality, it created a system that established a new major industry with almost no state regulatory power. The frame- work it provided contained a confusing series of mecha- nisms for establishing gaming that essentially compelled states to accept gambling within their territory as a forgone conclusion. With gaming revenue and regulatory authority on the line, the risk of opposition was too high. These fac- tors, combined with recent trends i n urban renewal and competition between states, created positive incentives to proliferation. With no real ability or incentive to dissent, state governments increasingly focused on tribal and pri- vate casinos as panaceas for unemployment, state budget shortfalls, and gaming drains. The lack of a strong negative check for states on the indus- try allowed gaming to grow far out of proportion with the original aims of IGRA. As a National Indian Gaming Commission summary put it, "Since the enactment of IGRA i n 1988, Indian gaming has grown into a $26 billion business, perhaps far eclipsing any limits which Congress may have envisioned [at that t ime] . " x l v This has brought sovereignty conflict between states and tribes to a new level. As The State of the Native Nations points out, "Controversies continue to roil tribe-state relations i n some locales as tribes spar with each other and with states over taxation and revenue sharing, off-reservation gambling, reservations for G A M B L E R S AT F O X W O O D S R E S O R T C A S I N O IN C O N N E C T I C U T E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 newly recognized tribes, regulation, campaign contribu- tions and other issues." x l v i As tribes continue to see real gains i n political power, it wi l l be interesting to watch to see i f the court intervenes to shore up states' powers over gam- ing within their boundaries. As the situation stands, the momentum behind gaming makes it seem all but unstoppable. The sheer size and in- fluence of the gaming industry have made rewriting regu- lations extremely dif f icul t . x l v 1 1 Increasingly, it appears that market forces, not governmental ones wi l l finally restrain gaming. With the current incentives for proliferation, po- litical opposition is almost unsustainable. As Eadington points out, saturation, not political opposition, wi l l likely be the force that finally retards proliferation: If permitted gambling continues to expand in society, then the role of gaming in tourism will likely decline unless gam- bling—especially casino-style—becomes part of a wider range of complementary entertainment offerings... Usually, casinos become tourism generators primarily because of prohibitions of gambling in places where people live. As those prohibitions disappear, then much of tourism-based gambling will diminish as well.xlym Unti l then, states can expect to continue to struggle to resist proliferation within their borders as new tribes, governors, and state politicians try to claim their share of the action. Barring a major change i n public feeling over taxes or clear federal leadership on the issue, casino gaming, both tribal and commercial, wi l l continue to expand across the United States. ix. Reagan (98-102) x. California v. Cabazon Band Of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) xi. Ibid. xii. House Committee on Interior (28) xiii. House Committee on Interior (373) xiv. Indian Game Regulatory xv. Ibid. xvi. Ibid. xvii. Ranjana (401-412) xviii. W. Dale Mason (89) xix. Tribes and the States (XIV) xx. National Indian Gaming Association xxi. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida xxii. Northern Arapho expands gaming xxiii. The Gun Lake Tribe xxiv. The Grand Rapids Press xxv. Granholm xxvi. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act xxvii. Ibid. xxviii. Federal Register (60484) xxix. Casino City's North American Gaming Almanac (166) xxx. Ibid. (165) xxxi. Meister (39) xxxii. "Crist set for showdown over gambling deal" xxxiii. State of Connecticut Division xxxiv. FY 2008-2009 Governor's Budget xxxv. Nelson xxxvi. Ibid. (5,8) xxxvii. Ibid. (9) xxxviii. Douglas (10) xxxix. Altshuler and Luberoff (18) xl. Ibid. (31, 43) xli. New England Gaming Research Project xlii. Thee Commonwealth of Massachusetts xliii. Market will support multiple casino (A12) xliv. Ibid, (xviii) xlv. Federal Register (60484) xlvi. The State of the Native Nations (156) xlvii. Indian Country Today xlviii. Eadington (134) E N D N O T E S i . Bloom and Opton (100) i i . Ibid. (100-103) hi. U.S. Constitution (Article I.Section 8 and Article I I . Section 2) iv. Jay (37-38, 39) v. Ward (150, 153) vi. Rand and Light (13) vii. Ibid. viii. The State of the Native Natons (70) REFERNCES Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff, Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2003) p. 18. 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