"The great armies of the Turks may be attributed to their small skill and rare use of fighting with guns, which only some part of the Janissaries use, though they have a great store of artillery, which in like sort they cannot generally so well manage as the Christians." Fynes Moryson, Itinerary, Seventeenth Century1 G U N P O W D E R E M P I R E The Mighty Ottoman Military Outpaced C O N O R M C G O V E R N T H E O T T O M A N E M P I R E ' S A D O P T I O N O F G U N P O W D E R A S A W A R - W I N N I N G W E A P O N P R E D A T E D O T H E R E U R O P E A N S T A T E S A N D S I G N A L E D T H E B E G I N N I N G O F T H E M I L I - T A R Y R E V O L U T I O N W H I C H C H A R A C T E R I Z E D T H E E A R L Y M O D E R N E R A T H A T B E G A N I N 1453 W I T H T H E F A L L O F C O N S T A N T I N O P L E A N D E N D E D A R O U N D 1800. H O W E V E R , T H E T U R K I S H A D V A N T A G E I N A R M S W A S S H O R T - L I V E D, A N D B Y T H E E N D O F T H E E R A , T H E E M P I R E ' S M I L I T A R Y W A S O U T D A T E D A N D A T T H E M E R C Y O F I T S E U R O P E A N N E I G H - B O R S . F O C U S I N G O N T H E T H R E E M A J O R A R E A S T H A T C H A R A C T E R I Z E D T H E M I L I T A R Y R E V O L U T I O N — A R T I L L E R Y , F O R T I F I C A T I O N S , A N D F I R E P O W E R — T H I S P A P E R E X A M - I N E S H O W T H E O T T O M A N E M P I R E ' S M I L I T A R Y S T A G N A T E D A S A R E S U L T O F I T S R E - F U S A L T O I N N O V A T E . I N T R O D U C T I O N The Ottoman Empire lasted over six centuries; like most empires, its rise was astronomical, and its decline long and drawn out. At its height i n the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it spanned three continents, stretching from Gibraltar i n the west to the edge of Persia i n the east, from the edge of Ukraine i n the north to Somalia i n the south. During those days it was one of the world's great powers, the mighty vanguard of the Muslim hordes that Christians saw knocking on the doorstep of continental Europe. Even the year that many historians set as the beginning of the modern era (if one must set a date) is inherently connected with the Turks, as 1453 marks the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the end of the last ancient empire i n Europe. Arthur Goldschmidt refers to the Ottomans as the greatest of the "gunpowder empires" of the early modern Middle East.11 One of contemporary scholarship's great debates in- volving the early modern period involves the notion of a military revolution, and it stands to reason that the Ottomans must have participated i n such a revolution. A closer examination of Ottoman history i n the context of the military revolution debate, however, is required. Unlike its Christian neighbors who became considerably stronger and more stable as time passed, the Ottoman Empire stag- nated and declined, militarily and structurally, after a cer- tain period. If, indeed, the Ottomans were a "gunpowder empire," then what sort of role did advancing technology, and the Ottoman's use of i t i n a revolutionary context, play i n the rise and fall of the Ottoman military? This essay wi l l focus primarily on Rogers' infantry, artillery, and fortifica- tion revolution, as well as a further examination of the turn of the 18-century firepower revolution, to provide an an- swer. T H E I N F A N T R Y R E V O L U T I O N First we turn towards Clifford Rogers' first stage of the mi l - itary revolution, the 14th-century infantry revolution. This period, he says, was revolutionary i n character on the European battlefield because it saw a switch from a focus on heavy cavalry as the determinant factor of battle to dom- inant infantry wielding polearms and missile weapons ca- pable of high maneuverability.1 1 1 "The Ottomans retained their taste for melee and horsemanship ... even as cavalry became a supporting unit on the battlefield and the gun-line became the norm for European armies." This switch from cavalry to infantry elite on the battlefield was achieved by the Ottoman's own elite infantry, the Janissaries, though such a change occurred later than it did elsewhere i n Europe and only up to a point. The Janissaries, a unique unit created by weaning the male chil- dren of non-Muslim subjects of the Ottomans on a dose of Islam and war, were first mentioned as early as 1396, and their adoption of firearms as their weapons of choice must have occurred sometime before the 1449 Battle of Kossovo Polje, making them the first elite battle-winning infantry unit i n Europe to adopt gunpowder weapons as their weapon of choice. That said, the Janissaries never gained the tactical flexibility of other European battle-winning troops. John Guilmartin attributes this to Janissary mus- ketry's core role i n victories over the musket-less Mamluks, postulating that they became too set i n their ways as their system had worked too well for too long. The Ottomans were never beneficiaries of Guilmartin's Combined Arms Revolution, which originated with the Spanish around the turn of the sixteenth century and allowed for compact, rap- idly maneuverable bodies of infantry armed with the cor- rect combination of shock and shot. i v Aside from the Janissaries, however, the Ottomans re- tained their taste for melee and horsemanship for too long to change into an infantry force even as cavalry became a supporting unit on the battlefield and the gun-line became the norm for European armies. Their famous cavalry had ruled the battlefield for too long and was too ingrained i n the structure of battle. While i n the seventeenth century, according to Geoffrey Parker, proportions of infantry to cav- alry i n European orders of battle were climbing steadily, i n Ottoman armies the proportion remained at one infantry- man to every three horsemen. The strength of the Janissary corps peaked at 40,000 men i n the second half of the sev- enteenth century with just over half of those actually avail- able for service, when troops with handguns were winning battles and the numbers of infantry i n European armies were rising exponentially.v Such was the Ottoman infantry revolution, encapsulated i n the muskets of the Janissary corps. Was it, indeed, revolu- tionary? To a certain extent it had to be since it led to early victories over other Muslim powers that lacked similar elite units wielding modern firearms and because it anticipated such developments on the European battlefield by several years. However, its universal success was limited as the Janissaries refused to adopt modern tactics to go along with their guns, and their numbers were always less than those of the cavalry, even at a time when cavalry was being rele- gated to a secondary role on the battlefield; though the rev- olutionary candor of this parallel innovation cannot be de- nied, its overall legacy appears to be negligible. For the Ottomans, success i n the short-term for their gunpowder- armed troops would lead to long-term stagnation. T H E A R T I L L E R Y R E V O L U T I O N We turn to the year 1453 to find the first truly revolutionary expressions i n the Ottoman military machine. Here is the siege of Constantinople, the boldest expression of the might of the Ottoman military and the first example of Rogers' artillery revolution of the fifteenth century, when advances i n artillery technology caused it to become devas- tatingly powerful, thereby rendering old-style masonry for- tifications obsolete/1 Though gunpowder artillery had been i n use by both Muslim and Christian forces i n Europe prior to the siege of Constantinople, there is no finer example of the power of gunpowder against old style fortifications. Sir Steven Runciman acknowledges that earlier artillery had been un- able to damage solid masonry; it was not unti l Sultan Mehmet's foundries and the Hungarian engineer Urban devised a mighty cannon "that would blast the walls of Babylon itself" i n 1452 that artillery became an important factor i n siege warfare against heavily fortified city and cas- tle walls/ 1 1 While smaller, more mobile artillery was used to take the less-fortified outlying towns of Therapia and Studios, the mighty mortar of the Urban cannon, drawn by sixty oxen over a bridge specifically built to hold its heft, was used to blast away the walls of Constantinople herself/1" Though this one gun—the basilisk—was by far the largest, the Ottoman army was equipped with further batteries of heavy gunpowder artillery, the like of which had never been seen on a battlefield before. This represents both a revolu- tion i n technology, with the first mighty cannon capable of devastating heavy masonry, and tactical thinking, as the ex- pertise required to move and handle such a weapon must IMPRESSIVELY LARGE C A N N O N S WERE I N S T R U M E N T A L TO T H E O T T O M A N VICTORY AT C O N S T A N T I N O P L E . G U N P O W D E R E M P I R E have proven a unique challenge for engineer and general alike. How the Ottoman artillery fared i n the battle becomes an important question, as its effectiveness is an important issue i n evaluating its revolutionary value. Though one might have thought that the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople was easily achieved due to numerical supe- riority, i n personal and naval combat the Christian forces proved superior. It was only because of the work of Turkish gunpowder artillery that the siege was successful; Ottoman and thus any future revolutions i n early modern warfare. x l Clifford Rogers agrees, claiming that this "artillery revolu- tion," begun by the Turks with the invention of such heavy artillery, was one of the stages of the early modern military revolution. It was the causative factor for the "fortification revolution" of the sixteenth century, Rogers' next stage.X11 Here, at the walls of Constantinople, is the first evidence of a military revolution, years before Charles VIII 's 1494 inva- sion of Italy, the campaign most often associated with being the spearhead for the artillery revolution by modern schol- arship^ 1 1 1 "The Ottomans continued to prefer the larger, more unwieldy pieces of artillery even as the French proved that smaller, more mobile artillery was more efficient... 77 attempts to breach the city's walls by mangonels and sap- ping were ineffective. l x Kelly DeVries points out that the large guns employed by the Turks were invariably highly vulnerable to defensive artillery fire, but the Byzantines had very few of these guns, and those they did have were i l l - placed and incapable of dealing with the heavy volume of large-bore cannon fire. x Here can be seen the massive ad- vantages that an army utilizing the new devastating Turkish-style artillery during a siege had over both a besieg- ing army using old-style siege engines and a defending army that lacked batteries of gunpowder artillery of its own. There can be no doubt that the technology utilized by the Turks i n 1453 was revolutionary. I n fact, it is truly the causative and decisive factor i n all the other military revolu- tions that were to come. I f the military revolution was, as Geoffrey Parker argues, essentially driven by the spread of the tract italknne fortress, designed to withstand the roar of artillery when older style masonry fortifications could not, then it was this single invention—the Turkish bombard— which would bring about the invention of these fortresses Though the origins of the artillery revolution belong to the Ottomans, the aforementioned case of Charles VIII 's cam- paign i n Italy i n 1494 does give us some notion of why the Ottomans failed to keep up their advantage. Guilmartin ex- plains that while the mighty Turkish bombards of the mid- fifteenth century were capable of inflicting more damage shot-for-shot, the mobility and rate-of-fire of the French cannon were more impressive X 1 V Ostensibly, their smaller size also allowed them to be produced faster and cheaper and thus would allow them to be fielded i n larger numbers, to say nothing of the need for less space per artillery piece and less draft animals to move the pieces. However, the Ottomans continued to prefer the larger, more unwieldy pieces of artillery even as the French proved that smaller, more mobile artillery was more efficient than the massive Turkish bombard, despite the fact that most of the cannon- masters employed i n the foundries of the Sultans were Europeans x v It is interesting to note that England was em- ploying engineers from the same places the Ottomans were, yet the English were able to, by the mid-sixteenth cen- tury, break free of their reliance on continental founders E L E M E N T S : : S P R I N G 09 and keep pace with the modernization of artillery.X V 1 Again, the theme of Ottoman anticipation of a period of military revolution with innovative work followed by a refusal to change a winning, but quickly outmoded, formula crops up; i n reference to advances i n artillery, Paul Coles calls them "prisoners of their origins." x v l 1 Their supreme stub- bornness would, over time, undermine the Turkish mi l i - tary machine i n every aspect. Lack of materials hurt Turkish foundries as well. Iron, the material of choice for artillery manufacturing i n Europe, was scarce i n the Empire while copper was plentiful. Therefore, the Ottomans continued to predominantly make use of brass i n casting pieces. Indeed, European ob- servers noted their lack of cast-iron artillery as late as the later half of the eighteenth century, and claimed that any found i n fortifications or aboard ships had been taken or purchased from Christians . x v m Iron reduced the price of a gun enough that European armies that embraced iron founding were able to field about twelve iron guns at roughly the same cost as one bronze piece. In addition, en- gineers in the Low Countries and France made advances i n gunpowder technology that allowed for a more explosive ig- nition as well as advances i n iron cannonballs that were more damaging; both of these advances increased the dif- ference between Christian and Turkish artillery that had al- ready become apparent less than a century after Constantinople. x l x I n a sign of how little the Turks had ad- vanced from their origins, on the other hand, incredulous English sailors i n the Bosphorus i n 1807 were bombarded BY T H E SIXTEENTH CENTURY, I R O N C A N N O N S WERE AT T H E V A N G U A R D OF ARTILLERY. by stone balls which had been anachronistic elsewhere for centuries. x x The perfect example of Ottoman passion for the huge, out- dated siege guns comes as late as the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, at a time when elsewhere i n Europe founders had developed extremely mobile and efficient artillery i n a modem vein. A French officer, Baron De Tott, who had been placed i n command of the defense of the Dardanelles, related an episode involving such an artillery piece. A bronze gun of preposterous size that fired a marble ball was placed i n the castle overlooking the strait. In event of a siege, it would take so long to fire that it would be nearly useless, but the Turks were obsessed with the idea of such a massive gun and urged that a single shot would be enough. The officer decided to give it a test run, which caused the entire Turkish crowd to run away; the shock from the blast was "like an earthquake," and the marble ball divided into three pieces at three hundred fathoms.™ Such an artillery piece, so revered by the Ottomans, would have been next to useless i n defense, as the French officer who was well-acquainted with European artillery knew, yet this serves as a perfect example of the Turkish obsession with large, unwieldy, outmoded cannons made from and firing anachronistic materials. Furthermore, the Ottoman obsession with these big siege guns was detrimental to their success i n the field. Coles claims the reason was that the Ottomans had originally been irresistible as a cavalry force i n the open field, so ar- tillery had never been necessary, and indeed would have slowed down their mobile forces. The Ottomans became convinced that artillery was a siege weapon and not neces- sary for success i n pitched battles.5™1 Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Turks never caught on to the revolution i n field artillery. Raimondo Montecuccoli, who routed the Turks at St. Gothard i n August 1664, wrote: . . . [This] enormous artillery of the Turks produces great damage when it hits, hut it is awkward to move and it re- quires too much time to reload and sight. Furthermore, it G U N P O W D E R E M P I R E A N O U T M O D E D T U R K I S H FORT consumes a great amount of powder, besides cracking and breaking the wheels and the carriages and even the ram- parts on which it is placed....Our artillery is more handy to move and more efficient and here resides our advantage over the cannon of the Turks.™11 A century later, during the Russo-Turkish War, Baron De Tott made similar remarks, saying that "the first work of the new foundry was to be a train of field artillery of which the Turks were entirely unprovided. " x x l v According to Carlo Cipolla, the advantage of the Europeans was relatively small while the development of light field artillery was still i n its infancy throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, but by the mid-seventeenth century enough progress had been made i n the development of highly mo- bile field-guns with a good rate of fire pioneered by the Swedes i n the Thirty Years War that the Ottomans were at a substantial disadvantage. This became a decisive reason behind their decline when, still stubbornly clinging to the notion of artillery as a mere siege engine, they simply could not stand up to mobile European artillery trains i n the field, which became increasingly evident i n the Russo-Turkish Wars. x x v Interestingly, historian Rhoads Murphey disagrees with the idea of inferiority, but agrees that the Ottomans gained no inherent advantage over their European rivals because of their early revolution i n artillery. While the Ottomans may not have had effective field artillery, it did not particularly matter unti l the latest stage of the early modern period, long after Rogers' proposed artillery revolution, because of the range of artillery pieces. Seventeenth-century field guns could only fire at a range of 200 to 300 meters, while the heavier siege guns had to be placed right i n front of their targets, and their effectiveness was often dampened by the instability of gunpowder and relied on the expertise E L E M E N T S : : S P R I N G 09 of the artillery crews. Murphey claims that Ottoman suc- cess against non-gunpowder states such as the Mamluks and Safavids had more to do with the Janissaries and their handguns than artillery, an idea Cipolla agrees w i t h . 5 0 ^ 1 Between the lack of materials and the seemingly perpetual theme of the Ottomans being unwilling to change a win- ning formula, no matter how outmoded it had become as their European rivals developed further innovations, the pathway to stagnation had been laid. The innovative Ottomans of 1453 turned into the stagnating Ottomans just a century later, though it would take further revolutions be- fore the lag became evident. T H E F O R T I F I C A T I O N R E V O L U T I O N The fifteenth through seventeenth centuries are generally acknowledged as the golden age of Turkish civilization, an era when it was amongst the greatest powers i n Europe. At the beginning of this era, as we have seen, it had toppled the once-mighty Byzantine civilization with the use of the most devastating gunpowder siege artillery ever deployed on a European battlefield. Though they refused to adopt field ar- tillery when other European powers did, they continued to produce impressive siege pieces. In the sixteenth century, the preponderance of artillery fortresses that began to spread across Europe following the Turkish innovation i n heavy-bore artillery and the subse- quent adoption of such heavy guns by European armies strangled the Turkish military head-start i n its infancy. McNeill notes that by the 1560s, modern style fortifications had spread throughout Europe enough to halt Ottoman ex- pansion and render their advantages i n siege technology useless. His basis for this assumption is the failure of the 1565 Siege of M a l t a . x x v u Guilmartin believes that the forti- fication revolution had come as early as 1532, when a seven hundred man garrison at Guns withstood the entire Ottoman army for twenty days. x x v n i Whatever the case, it appears clear that by the mid-sixteenth century, the Turks' European rivals had developed technology that blunted their previous advantage i n siege weaponry. However, Murphey disagrees with this notion. He con- cludes that: .. .the expense of introducing these improvements removed in terms of the everyday practice of warfare any theoretical advantage such improvements might have conferred. Several of the fortresses, newly constructed or thoroughly up- graded to conform with the 'modern style' and considered by then-current standards virtually impregnable, still suc- cumbed in the face of determined Ottoman attack.xxlx His examples are Uyvar i n 1663 and Candia i n 1669, two sieges that occurred at the twilight of the Ottoman military machine and over a century after the two dates offered by Guilmartin and William M c N e i l l . x x x According to h im, rel- atively few of the fortresses protecting the border between Ottoman and Habsburg territories were "contstructed elab- orately enough . . . to withstand even the haphazard attacks "Like with their attachment to cavalry and giant guns, the Turks continued to prefer old medieval style castles with very few modifications of Hungarian insurgents, let alone more determined as- sault by fully-equipped and well-trained Ottoman armies." X X X 1 However, Murphey does not address the siege of Malta, one of the best examples of the failure of Ottoman siege warfare facing a new-style of fortification. Though he makes it clear that these innovative designs were not neces- sarily as impregnable as Parker may have claimed, they still obviously existed as a massive barrier to Ottoman forces, even i f their use was not as widespread as imagined. G U N P O W D E R E M P I R E While the Ottomans were challenged to besiege their rivals' new trace italienne fortresses, they themselves never actu- ally participated i n the fortification revolution. Like with their attachment to cavalry and giant guns, the Turks con- tinued to prefer old medieval style castles with very few modifications to account for modern siege engines. Logically, the Habsburgs should then not only have been able to contain the Ottomans with their own forts but also to rollback their advances and capture swathes of territory for themselves. In practice, this did not occur unti l much later, and Turkish armies continued to advance into Habsburg territory and besiege their fortifications and cities unti l the end of the seventeenth century. Likewise, the Habsburgs failed to gain any territory worth mention- ing unti l the Treaty of Karlowitz i n 1699. I f the new style of fortifications were indeed revolutionary, the existence of trace italienne fortresses i n one realm and the lack of them i n the other should have produced rapid and noticeable changes i n military outcomes; as i t stood, however, there was no distinguishable advantage gained unti l long after the end of the fortification revolution.50™1 While the Ottomans displayed their characteristic attach- ment to the past when dealing with new style fortifications, this seems to not have had the blatant debilitating effect that their backwardness i n other realms of the military rev- olution did. They were able to effectively besiege new style bastions on several occasions and their own outdated fortresses did not begin to fall unti l the end of the seven- teeth century, which was long after the fortification revolu- tion as proposed by Rogers and Parker. Its particulars else- where i n Europe notwithstanding, the idea of a fortification revolution had only a minimal discernible effect on the mi l - itary realities of the Ottoman Empire. T H E F I R E P O W E R R E V O L U T I O N Though guns and field artillery had begun to rule the open battlefield, shock weapons still had their uses i n warfare up unti l the eighteenth century. Murphey writes that despite their diminishing importance i n the field, they were of ulti- mate importance i n the siege when it came time for an as- sault. Handguns were restricted to providing cover for sol- diers rushing i n with swords, hatchets, and halberds. Firing muskets was too risky i n the midst of a general melee; stopping to reload would put soldiers i n a fatally vul- nerable position, and any non-fatal shot would undoubt- edly result i n the musketeer being killed by an enemy armed with an outmoded, but more useful, hand w e a p o n . x x x m I n an assault on a fortification, it remained numbers and personal skill and not technological superior- ity that determined the victor. That lasted unti l two infinitely important innovations, the flintlock handgun and the socket bayonet, were adopted i n the seventeenth century by the vast majority of European armies. x x x l v A flintlock firing mechanism allowed a gun to be reliably fired i n wet conditions, while matchlock guns had suffered when powder became wet. Additionally, the quick-fire at the pull of a trigger as opposed to a slow burn- ing match meant that it was much easier to aim and thus hit a moving target, rendering the guns more practical for use up close. The elimination of the match also drastically reduced casualties from accidental discharge or ignition of nearby sources of powder. The socket bayonet was intro- duced around the turn of the eighteenth century, and al- lowed an infantryman to serve as both a missile and shock troop at once (earlier models of bayonets had plugged the muzzle of the bayonet, preventing the gun from firing). This eliminated the need for pikes and meant that soldiers with firearms were no longer susceptible to cavalry charges, ending their most glaring vulnerability. These two inven- tions changed the lay of the battlefield forever, as the stan- dard infantryman became quite versatile, capable of laying down fire, defending against charges, and counter-charg- ing itself; the Ottomans, by this time a "third tier arms pro- ducer" according to Jonathan Grant, had to rely on European imports to get these weapons, as their factories i n Istanbul were incapable of producing them. The matchlock without a bayonet remained their weapon of choice until the nineteenth century. x x x v E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 O T T O M A N S O L D I E R S D I S P L A Y T H E I R T E C H N O L O G I C A L M I G H T IN T H E V I C T O R I O U S S I E G E A G A I N S T C O N S T A N T I N O P L E . For the Ottomans, the results of this firepower revolution were devastating. As we have seen, the Ottomans contin- ued to rely on their cavalry, and now that cavalry had no ad- vantage i n the open field as it had before. Without flintlock weapons or bayonets, the Janissaries, formerly able to keep pace with their European counterparts i n the period of rel- atively little change between 1500 and 1700, were quickly outmoded. Due to their lack of any sort of light, mobile field artillery only served to compound the problem. Beginning with the Treaty of Karlowitz i n 1699, the Ottomans began to lose large amounts of territory irrevoca- bly. Belated attempts i n the eighteenth and early nine- teenth centuries to reform the military were either resisted by the old guard or too late to be any use i n preventing the ultimate decline of the Ottoman military machine. The military revolution had, at last, taken its toll. C O N C L U S I O N In a greater context, what does the Ottoman case tell about the early modern military revolution? Starting from the end of the era, it certainly fits into Jeremy Black's theory of a later revolutionary period rather than an earlier one; de- spite their eventual backwardness, the Ottomans managed to keep pace militarily with their European rivals and even continue to threaten them up unti l the all-important flint- lock and bayonet were introduced. x x x v i It also holds up Clifford Rogers' infantry and artillery revolutions, and even i n some ways helps to impel them, courtesy of the Janissaries and artillery. Parker's fortification revolution, however, while existing i n the Ottoman context, provided very little actual change i n the realities on the ground. The case of the Ottomans is a particularly interesting one because of how the Empire's military history truly begins with a revolution of their own i n firearms, from handguns to artillery, and ends with their inability to join another rev- olution on similar grounds several centuries later. Were they a "gunpowder empire"? Because Goldschmidt never defines what, exactly, a gunpowder empire is, the answer is open-ended. However, despite Murphey's reluctance to use such a term to describe the Ottomans, the evidence re- mains that, at least i n the early modern period, the Turkish military establishment first lived by its revolutionary use of handguns and artillery and later died by its inability to do the same.™™ E N D N O T E S i . Cipolla (99) i i . Goldschmidt (111-135) i i i . Rogers 1995 (56-60) iv. Guilmartin (302-3) v. Murphey (35-40, 47); Parker (340-341) vi. Rogers (109-10) vii. Runciman (77-8) viii. Nicolle (41-2) ix. Ibid. (64-5) x. DeVries (160) xi. Parker (338-345) xii. Rogers (63-70) xiii. Raudzens (407) xiv. Guilmartin (304) xv. Adyuz (n-13) xvi. Krause (40) xvii. Coles (186) xviii. Cipolla (99) xix. McNeill (85-88); Carlo Cipolla (40-42) says that the cost of a cast-iron gun was three to four times less. Regardless, it is ap- parent that it was far cheaper to field iron pieces than bronze pieces, and the lack of cast-iron guns was a major deficiency in the Ottoman army long into the modern period. xx. Cipolla (98) xxi. Ibid. (96-97) xxii. Coles (186) xxiii. Cipolla (98-99) xxiv. Ibid. (99) xxv. Ibid. (98) xxvi. Murphey (13-15); Cipolla (93) xxvii. McNeill (91) xxviii. Guilmartin (309) xxix. Murphey (15) xxx. Ibid. xxxi. Murphey (113) xxxii. Guilmartin (310-312) xxxiii. Murphey (121) xxxiv. Guilmartin (308) xxxv. Grant (196-197) xxxvi. Black (95-108) xxxvii. Murphey 13-14 E L E M E N T S : : S P R I N G 09 REFERENCES Adyuz, Salim. "Artillery Trade of the Ottoman Empire." . Accessed 23 April 2008. Black, Jeremy. "A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective" in Rogers, ed. The Military Revolution Debate, pp. 95-116 Cipolla, Carlo. Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion. London: Collins, 1965. Coles, Paul. The Ottoman Impact on Europe. London: Thames and Hudson, 1968. DeVries, Kelly. Medieval Military Technology. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press Ltd, 1998. Goldschmidt, Arthur. Concise History of the Modern Middle East, 8th. ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2005. Grant, Jonathan. "Rethinking the Ottoman 'Decline': Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries." Journal of World History 10:1 (1999), pp. 179-201 Guilmartin, John. "The Military Revolution: Origins and First Tests Abroad" in Rogers. Krause, Keith. Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. McNeill, William. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since AD 1000. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700. London: UCL Press, 1999. Nicolle, David. Constantinople 1453- Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2000. Parker, Geoffrey. "In Defense of the Military Revolution" in Rogers, ed. The Military Revolution Debate, pp. 337-362. Raudzens, George. "War-Winning Weapons: The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military History." Journal of Military History 54:4 (October 1990), pp. 403-434. Rogers, Clifford (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995. Rogers, Clifford. "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War" in Rogers, ed. The Military Revolution Debate, pp. 55- 94. Runciman, Sir Steven. The Fall of Constantinople: 1453. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. 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