"Amid the debates, there remains one thing that is uncontested ... Another failure is not an option.'" T H E D I S A S T E R A F T E R T H E D I S A S T E R The Evolution and De-Evolution of FEMA P A T R I C K G A R D N E R S I N C E T H E F E D E R A L E M E R G E N C Y M A N A G E M E N T A G E N C Y ' S ( F E M A ' s ) I N C E P T I O N D U R - I N G T H E C A R T E R A D M I N I S T R A T I O N I N 1979, I T H A S U N D E R G O N E A T U M U L T U O U S H I S - T O R Y M A R K E D B Y A S E R I E S O F P R A I S E D S U C C E S S E S A N D G R A V E F A I L U R E S . I N I T S E A R L Y S T A G E S , I T W A S H I G H L Y C R I T I C I Z E D F O R S L U G G I S H R E S P O N S E S T O C R I S E S A S W E L L A S P E R V A S I V E M I S M A N A G E M E N T . J A M E S L E E W I T T R E V O L U T I O N I Z E D T H E A G E N C Y , C R E A T I N G O N E O F T H E M O S T R E S P E C T E D A N D E F F I C I E N T O R G A N I Z A T I O N S I N T H E G O V E R N M E N T . A L T H O U G H M A N Y P E O P L E T H O U G H T T H E P R O G R E S S H E M A D E W O U L D B E L O N G - L A S T I N G , T H E A G E N C Y F E L L B A C K I N T O P U B L I C C R I T I C I S M W I T H A S E R I E S O F P O O R O P E R A T I O N S A F T E R W I T T ' S D E P A R T U R E , B E G I N I N G W I T H T H E 9/11 A T T A C K S A N D P E A K I N G W I T H I T S M I S M A N A G E M E N T O F T H E H U R R I C A N E K A T R I N A R E - S P O N S E . T H I S P A P E R E X A M I N E S H O W W I T T T R A N S F O R M E D F E M A I N T O A F U N C T I O N A L O R G A N I Z A T I O N , A S W E L L A S W H Y I T F E L L A P A R T D U R I N G T H E B U S H A D M I N I S T R A T I O N . I T F O C U S E S O N T H E K E Y D I F F E R E N C E S B E T W E E N H O W J A M E S L E E W I T T A N D H I S S U C - C E S S O R S H A N D L E D T H E S T A G E S O F E M E R G E N C Y M A N A G E M E N T S T R A T E G Y . I N T R O D U C T I O N DISASTER. It strikes anytime, anywhere. It takes many forms—a hurricane, an earthquake, a tornado, a flood, afire or a hazardous spill, an act of nature or an act of terrorism. It builds over days or weeks, or hits suddenly, without warning. Every year, millions of Americans face disaster, and its terrifying consequences.1 So begins the description listed on the mission page for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This passage captures the frequency and unpredictability of dis- asters. In times of such crises, victims need help creating order out of chaos as local public services come to a halt. To this end, i n 1979, President Carter combined many of the separate federal agencies related to disaster response into one over-arching organization, FEMA. The agencies ab- sorbed included the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. In addition, civil defense re- sponsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency." The primary mission of the newly formed organ- ization was: . . . to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards . . .by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency manage- ment system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.111 Despite the clarity with which FEMA's objectives are out- lined i n the agency's mission statement, many believe its performance i n handling national emergencies has been less than satisfactory. This paper examines the mecha- nisms through which Director James Lee Witt transformed the agency into an efficient organization, as well as why these changes did not persist under the Bush Administration. Finally, I wi l l describe the current opin- ions on reforming the organization i n the future. O V E R C O M I N G A LEGACY OF F A I L U R E Known to many as "the disaster after the disaster," FEMA's reputation was that it "would lumber i n after a catastrophe, and anger local officials with its ineptitude." 1 V FEMA lived up to its reputation most egregiously after Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida, causing the agency to PRESIDENT C L I N T O N A N D JAMES LEE WITT ANTICIPATE H U R R I C A N E FLOYD. come under public scrutiny. The hurricane leveled a 50- mile area, leaving 200,000 residents homeless and 1.3 mi l - l ion without electricity. Necessary materials such as food, clean water, and medical supplies where scarce, but FEMA was nowhere to be found unti l three ful l days after the cri- sis. When representatives finally arrived, "their incompe- tence further delayed relief efforts. " v The aid workers who arrived were grossly underprepared to meet the victims' needs. Food and water distribution centers did not have enough supplies, causing lines of hungry victims to stretch for miles. Even mobile hospitals arrived later than planned, adding to the chaos.V1 Many wanted to have the organiza- tion disbanded after this debacle, but the Clinton adminis- tration decided to reform i t . V 1 1 Part of this process included appointing a more capable management team, at the head of which Clinton placed James Lee Witt i n 1993. This was, perhaps, the decisive move that allowed the organization to enjoy what some have called "one of the most remarkable E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 transformations of a government agency i n recent mem- ory. " v i i i Only a year into his tenure as head of FEMA, Witt received widespread acclaim for his performance i n handling the 1993 flooding of the Mississippi River. Congressman Norman Mineta, then chair of the committee that oversees the agency, was so impressed that he pronounced, "FEMA has delivered finally on its promise to stand with the American people when [natural disasters] . . . devastate their communities." 1 X The newfound success appeared to be a lasting change for the agency. With approval levels higher than ever before, optimism for FEMA's future sky- rocketed. Jane Bullock, Witt's chief of staff and a member of FEMA since 1980, went as far as to claim, "the reorgan- ization and new systems that Witt installed at the agency ensure that we wi l l never be the FEMA we were before." Such optimism, however, becomes almost ironic i n light of FEMA's rapid descent into disfavor soon after Witt left of- fice. T H E L E A D E R S H I P OF JAMES W I T T Since President Carter's Administration formed FEMA i n 1979, the agency had been known as one of the biggest abusers of the patronage system i n the government. When George H . W Bush took office, the number of political ap- pointees to FEMA exceeded those named to other organiza- tions tenfold. x Many of these individuals were "terribly in- experienced'^1 for the job—a trait which impaired the agency's ability to respond to disasters effectively/11 The presence of so many political appointees later gave President Clinton and James Witt freedom to replace them with new, more qualified individuals of their own choosing. Clinton also agreed to let Witt interview all potential ap- pointees himself to ensure that he could surround himself with a proper managerial team. Witt restructured the organization around such people as Elaine McReynolds, head of the Federal Insurance Administration, who served as the insurance commis- sioner of Tennessee for over seven years, and Carrye Brown, head of the Fire Administration, whose resume in- cluded working for eighteen years on Capitol H i l l as a spe- cialist i n disaster and fire legislation.5 4 1 1 1 By replacing many members of upper management with more experienced candidates, Witt was empowered to begin instituting re- forms and taking action because he had a team he could trust to get the job done effectively. Another of Witt's early innovations included asking senior civil servants at FEMA to rotate jobs, providing fresh perspectives on how all facets of the agency operated. x l v After strengthening the managerial team with highly qual- ified individuals, Witt conducted a thorough review of FEMA's mission, personnel, and its resources that lasted nearly two years. This included closing several redundant field offices and bolstering programs to prepare individual states for natural disasters. Witt also managed to decrease internal regulations by 12 percent i n this time period, and he planned to reduce them by 50 percent by the end of the third year. Finally, Witt is noted for conducting a thorough inventory of FEMA—something which had never been done i n the agency's fourteen year history. x v FEMA's performance had historically been hampered by the fact that it was still preoccupied with preparing for nu- clear attacks—part of the legacy of its inception during the Cold War. Nearly half of its budget and resources were re- served for such an attack, creating a severe handicap i n han- dling natural disasters.XV1 Witt decided to shift many assets, such as mobile communications vehicles that had been held i n reserve i n case of a nuclear war, to the front lines of disaster-stricken areas. x v n This new focus freed up one hundred disaster specialists, previously concerned with a nuclear attack, to deal with the organization's new major focus: natural disasters.5™11 M I T I G A T I O N A N D PREPAREDNESS U N D E R W I T T Prior to joining FEMA, Witt had served as the head of the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services—a distinction which made h i m the only director i n FEMA's history to T H E D I S A S T E R A F T E R T H E D I S A S T E R have had previous disaster management experience.55155 As a result, part of his success i n turning around the agency can be attributed to his thorough understanding of success- ful emergency management strategies. These strategies, as described by Otto Lerbinger, follow four main processes: 1. Mitigation: attempting to minimize harm to human life and property; 2. Preparedness: improving the ability to respond to a crisis event; 3. Response: reducing damage through the activities undertaken immediately before, during, and after a crisis event; and 4. Recovery: stabilizing the stricken area and helping victims return to normalcy. 5 0 5 While Witt was successful i n all four strategies, the major- ity of his success resulted from efforts i n mitigation and preparedness. These strategies involved anticipating disas- ters and preparing for the types of relief they would re- quire—actions that would make response efforts exponen- tially more effective. Witt first displayed his sharp foresight i n his response to the 1993 Midwestern floods, the first major test he faced as FEMA director. Witt instituted a pro- gram to buy out property owners who were subject to chronic flooding and costly federal assistance so as to re- duce the damage future floods would inflict. This process would have normally taken the program years to accom- plish, according to Jerry Uhlmann, director of the Missouri Emergency Management Agency; however, Witt's persist- ence ensured that when floods hit parts of Missouri again i n 1995, thousands of flooded parcels had already been va- cated. x x l This is an excellent example of what Lerbinger de- scribes as "passive" or nonstructural responses within the mitigation strategy. Passive responses are principally regu- latory, usually involving zoning regulations to l imit devel- opment i n highly vulnerable areas.55x11 RESPONSE A N D RECOVERY U N D E R W I T T FEMA's inefficiency prior to Witt was largely due to the agency's overly bureaucratic nature. FEMA workers would routinely suspend vital aid requests for lack of a single sig- nature on a particular f o r m . x x l i l Kate Hale, director of the Dade County Emergency Services, attributes this passivity to the fact that "a mistake could cost [FEMA employees] their career." x x l v The fear of losing one's job as a result of a single misstep was a considerable force for Witt to tackle. "Before Witt assumed office, relief efforts were discussed in terms of days and weeks; under his new direction, plans were implemented within hours." This problem had long handicapped FEMA, and i n 1990 it cost the people of Puerto Rico severely. As Hurricane Hugo raced towards Puerto Rico with 120 mile per hour winds, Governor Rafael Hernandez-Colon sent the proper federal aid request forms to FEMA headquarters i n Washington. Unfortunately, as Franklin writes, "One scrupulous bu- reaucrat . . . noticed that the governor had failed to check one section of the form. Dutifully, the FEMA worker sent the request back—via the U.S. m a i l . " x x v This caused the forms to reach the island after Hugo hit, when the Puerto Ricans were recovering from the worst hurricane they had experienced i n a century. They did so without federal aid, which did not arrive unti l several days later, after Hernandez-Colon had resubmitted the request forms with the appropriate check mark. Such behavior was found intolerable i n Witt's agency. The Oklahoma City bombing illustrates how the emphasis shifted from formalities to practical rapid disaster re- E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 sponse. The bomb blasted at 9:02 A M . At 9:30, Tom Feuerborne, director of Oklahoma's Civil Emergency Management Department, called FEMA to request assis- tance. Less than five hours later, FEMA's advance team ar- rived, which included damage assessors and members of Witt's staff. Witt personally arrived on the scene at 8:10 that evening to be briefed on the situation. I n the wee hours of the following morning, FEMA's search and rescue teams began to pour in , supplementing the efforts of the Oklahoma City fire department. Of the situation, Feuerbone says, "My office is very happy with the quick re- sponse of FEMA." x x v i Before Witt assumed office, relief ef- forts were discussed i n terms of days and weeks; under his new direction, plans were implemented within hours. Witt had no interest i n bureaucratic hang-ups. Instead, he demonstrated a genuine interest i n bringing relief to the af- U N D E R W I T T ' S D I R E C T I O N , F E M A P U R C H A S E D P A R C E L S O F F R E Q U E N T L Y F L O O D E D L A N D I N M I S S O U R I . flicted areas and ensuring that victims received the aid they needed. Witt also understood that the previous policy of waiting to mobilize unti l asked for help by the local government was a mistake. As Witt himself said, "Before, it was wait for a governor to ask for help. You can't do t h a t . . . I understood their problems, I understood what they wanted to d o . " x x v u He continued to stress the importance of pre-disaster plan- ning, saying, "It's very important to understand that we're here to support the state and local governments as a re- source . . . [We're] proactive. Instead of waiting on the hur- ricane to come in , we get there, pre-position everybody." x x v i i i Thus, before a disaster even reached, Witt had sent resources such as food, water, ice, and generators rolling toward the scene. After deploying approximately 1,000 workers to aid victims of Hurricane Floyd, FEMA of- ficials faced a new problem, that of "restraining] their workers from going out into the field while the storm was h i t t i n g . " x x i x Witt's emphasis on action contributed greatly to his success i n office. The true test of FEMA's success lay i n the responses of vic- tims of natural disasters. I n 1994, FEMA issued 5,000 sur- veys to victims i n order to gauge public perceptions of the agency's performance. They found that over 80 percent of the respondents approved of the way the agency was han- dling its duties—a percentage that would have been un- thinkable i n the days following FEMA's mishandling of Hurricane Andrew. x x x While Witt acknowledges that his experience as a local official i n a rural county and later as the director of the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services provided invaluable training for his position atop FEMA, x x x i he points out a different reason for his success: " I t is absolutely critical that you . . . redefine [an agency's] role and mission to what you feel is important for that agency to be responsible for ." X X X 1 1 This statement becomes especially provocative in light of the changes that took place during the Bush administration. T H E D I S A S T E R A F T E R T H E D I S A S T E R R E S T R U C T U R E I N POST-9/11 A M E R I C A James Witt turned FEMA around virtually overnight under his strong leadership and clear objectives, and it appeared as i f his reforms would leave a lasting impression on the agency for years to come. In the year following his depar- ture, however, America was struck with the worst attack on home soil i n its history. After September n , 2001, when ter- rorists hijacked two domestic jets and flew them into the World Trade Center, the nation's priorities changed drasti- cally. Suddenly, terrorism was the primary threat and natu- ral disasters became secondary. I n 2002, FEMA was removed from its independent status as an agency and restructured as a branch within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). President George W. Bush envisioned a new FEMA, which was to be- come a $6 billion agency within DHS, but with a signifi- cantly different primary interest. Instead of being the pri- mary responder, supervising and distributing major disaster relief, it was to become primarily a national secu- rity grant-giver, trainer, and coordinator for meeting terror- ist threats . x x x m Many, including new FEMA Director Joe M . Allbaugh, tried to reassure Congress that the homeland se- curity functions would not deter the agency from its tradi- tional role. Still, many people were not convinced that the newly reformed agency would still be able to respond to nat- ural disasters i n the same efficient manner that it had V I C T I M S OF H U R R I C A N E KATRINA DESPERATELY SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM T H E S E E M I N G L Y ABSENT FEMA. under Witt. Rep. Don Young (R-AK), Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, quickly pointed out that, under the Bush proposal, i f the new homeland security secretary wanted to shift its main focus to terrorist attacks, he could reduce "other [FEMA] missions and direct those resources entirely to security."X X X 1 V I n response, select committee chairman Richard K. Armey (R-TX.) redrafted the Bush FEMA pro- posal. He proposed moving FEMA to DHS but preserving its role i n responding to natural disasters. This would have lessened its burden for developing relief responses to ter- rorist attacks. President Bush quickly vetoed Armey's pro- posed measure i n favor of a new FEMA concerned prima- rily with terrorist attacks. Witt sharply criticized the action, stating that relocating FEMA would be "a mistake. ' , x x x v He warned that the reor- ganization of FEMA had cost the organization many disas- ter response, recovery and mitigation specialists. He ad- vised putting the preparedness office inside the new department, as Armey's bi l l would have done, but leaving FEMA outside and making i t the coordinator under a fed- eral response plan so that the Secretary of Homeland Security would have jurisdiction over it should there be a terrorist attack.500™1 Later that year, Witt wrote a memo that was critical of the newly reformed agency. He reprimanded officials for not paying enough attention to how it would re- spond to a natural disaster because of its increased focus on terrorism. He argued further that the agency had moved away from the civil defense efforts that had increased natu- ral disaster resources i n the 1990s. He expressed his fear that i n the post-9/11 hysteria, emphasis on homeland secu- rity was creating a potentially dangerous situation.5™™11 F A I L E D P R E P A R A T I O N U N D E R T H E B U S H A D M I N I S T R A T I O N Under the new direction of the Bush Administration, FEMA became a shell of the organization Witt strove to re- build. President Bush did not have the same interest as Clinton i n strengthening federal response to natural disas- ters. Furthermore, he did not seem concerned with ap- E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 pointing the most qualified candidates to top positions i n the organization. After Joe Allbaugh stepped down i n March, 2003, Bush reverted to overt patronage by appoint- ing his friend, Michael Brown, as Agency Undersecretary for FEMA. Before joining FEMA i n 2001, Brown's prior ex- perience consisted of nine years as commissioner of an Arabian horse association, making h i m the virtual opposite of Witt i n terms of credentials. x x v m This is merely one ex- ample of a larger trend including many senior appointees, such as Patrick Rhode and Daniel Craig. Rhode previously worked for Bush's 2000 campaign while Craig served as a lobbyist for electric cooperatives. x x 3 a x FEMA's failure to prepare becomes even more apparent when one considers its inexperienced leadership i n light of its new focus on terrorism. According to DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner, preparing responses to terrorist attacks overshadowed preparations for all other types of dis- asters.xl Over 75 percent of the agency's preparedness grants for 2006 were reserved for state and local responses to terrorism, which a Government Accountability Office re- port described as "a mismatch to reality" x l [ Many leaders of the National Emergency Management Association feared what might result from such negligence. This prompted five of the group's leaders to go to Washington to warn Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff of the impending danger just days before Hurricane Katrina struck. They argued that the change i n FEMA's role was weakening their readiness for disasters. As the nation would soon find out, this message was highly prophetic. x l u S T A F F I N G H A N D I C A P S On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast. Hours later, and strangely one ful l day after being warned of the massive storm, Michael Brown sent a memorandum to his boss requesting 1,000 volunteers to support rescuers i n the area. According to Brown, the volunteers were to be sent for training within 48 hours. Unfortunately, FEMA neglected to maintain its re- serve force, which, i n past emergencies, had been the heart and soul of its relief efforts . x l m This left the agency short- "President Bush did not have the same interest as Clinton in strengthening federal response to natural disasters.77 handed i n its relief efforts for the hurricane. FEMA is structured to have a full-time workforce of roughly 2,500 employees, so the reservist program is designed to help the agency double or triple i n size overnight when fac- ing a disaster. These reservists perform many of the same tasks as full-time FEMA employees, such as helping to run disaster response centers, inspecting damage, manning telephone hotlines, assisting victims with claims, and coor- dinating relief activities with state and local officials x l l v The reserve force had withered i n the years leading up to Katrina, with both the number of people on call and aver- age training diminishing. George Haddow, FEMA's Deputy Chief of Staff under Clinton, believes that the agency's decision to increasingly use contractors hurt its ability to respond to disaster because the reservist force in- cluded some of the agency's most knowledgeable people. "They were an invaluable asset," he stated. "All FEMA's senior staff put together doesn't have as much experience with disasters as a single one of them." x l v I n fact, a report by the House committee investigating the response to Katrina, identified the lack of qualified reserves as one of the biggest problems hampering FEMA's ability to act. The report explains that FEMA officials could only meet about half of their designed responsibilities. I n the words of Scott Wells, the Deputy Federal Coordinating Official for the state, "We did not have the people . . . that we needed to do our mission." x l v i The same report also found that FEMA had deep staffing T H E D I S A S T E R A F T E R T H E D I S A S T E R problems, which had worsened since 2002 when the agency was absorbed into DHS. The agency had lost a sub- stantial number of its top disaster specialists, senior leaders and other experienced hands i n a brain drain, which many experts believed would "negativefly] impact. . . the federal government's ability to manage disasters of all types." x l v n Homeland Security officials could not preserve their em- ployees through traditional human resources manage- ment, the House committee report explains, "and this fail- ure hindered the response to Hurricane Katr ina . " x l v m The extent of the staffing shortage was so great that when Katrina struck, nearly 500 jobs were vacant, and eight of ten regional FEMA directors were i n acting capacity only. l l x Those who did remain were unprepared to respond. By 2004, the report indicates, the readiness of FEMA's emer- gency response teams "had plummeted dramatically" due to a decrease i n funding after 2002, which caused them to lose communications equipment as well as team training and exercises. While FEMA officials warned that the teams were unprepared, the report notes that "no actions were taken to address the problems." 1 WASTED F U N D S FEMA's inefficiency is, perhaps, most clearly revealed by the hundreds of millions of dollars it wasted while respond- ing to Hurricane Katrina. Carelessness i n issuing hurri- cane assistance exposed the agency to widespread fraud. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which serves as an independent watchdog, randomly sampled 250 pay- ments made to Katrina victims and found that 16 percent had been issued to fraudulent recipients.1 1 I f this is repre- sentative of FEMA's spending overall, then fraudulent re- lief funds would amount to $1 billion i n misspent money, the GAO says.111 I n addition to poor background checks. FEMA made extravagant expenditures on renovations. For example, the agency spent $7.9 mil l ion to renovate a for- mer army base i n Alabama to shelter evacuees, but was only used for ten people each night, at a cost of roughly $419,000 per person. This continued through 2006, as one government report estimates they spent $30 mil l ion i n maintaining trailers for evacuees i n Mississippi. 1 1 1 1 The GAO further estimated that by not awarding jobs to the contractors with the lowest bids, FEMA misspent as much as $16 mil l ion. Another $15 mil l ion were spent on damage inspections that the agency could not prove had been per- formed. 1^ Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), chairman of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, expressed his dispproval, "The American taxpayer should be outraged . . . that i n a six-month period FEMA managed to waste approximately half of the $60 mil l ion it spent on trailers i n Mississippi alone." l v P O S T - K A T R I N A D I S C O U R S E Since the "disaster after the disaster, " l v l many people have tried to sort through the wreckage—literally and metaphor- ically—and figure out who is exactly to blame, and what needs to be done to ensure that such a catastrophic failure never occurs again. Many have pointed to Michael Brown as the root of FEMA's failures. His obvious inexperience made h i m a poor choice of leader during such a time, and e-mails between his press secretary and relief crews showed a lack of compassion for afflicted residents.1™ The ful l attention of the public eye turned to his performance following President Bush's misguided praise, "Brownie, you're doin' a heck of a j o b . " l v m Although it is important for the president to express confidence i n his appointees, his statement seemed like a bad joke i n light of the poor relief efforts along the Gulf Coast, particularly i n New Orleans. Brown eventually had to resign under the intense scrutiny following this comment. Recently, though, disaster specialists and top government officials have argued that Brown is less to blame than pre- viously thought. Videotapes and transcripts of disaster ses- sions that took place i n the days surrounding Katrina show Brown and his team sounding the alarm of an impending disaster. Bush and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, by contrast, were almost indifferent the day be- fore Katrina as officials predicted that the levees around New Orleans would fail. The president asked no ques- tions. l l x While the Bush administration attacked Brown for "sidestepping the chain of command," many of the same E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 disaster experts who had criticized his performance came to his defense. l x General Julius Becton, former FEMA di- rector under Reagan, said he agreed with Brown's claim that he sidestepped Chertoff i n order to bypass the "fog of bureaucracy" and speed up the relief effort. In other words Brown's belief that his superiors were not acting i n FEMA's best interest left h i m "duty-bound" to bypass them i n order to f i l l his role of disaster relief. 1 x 1 Clinton, by contrast, understood this dynamic and praises his elevation of FEMA to ful l Cabinet status. Schneiders ar- gues that the only effective solution would be to remove FEMA from the DHS and return it to independent, Cabinet-level status, where it can once again focus its atten- tion to natural disasters and have direct access to the presi- dent. Restoring this access, Schneiders believes, wi l l allow FEMA to be there to respond and do its job effectively. l x v i "Successful disaster relief begins with sympathy for the victims and dedication to the national response effort." Knight Ridder interviewed twelve disaster specialists and produced similar findings. Eleven of the twelve inter- viewed believed that Bush was at greater fault than Brown for the mishandling of the federal relief response i n Katrina. l x i ' Seven believed Brown's depiction of events, while four believed both Brown and Chertoff were respon- sible, but that Bush was especially to blame for hiring them. More importantly, nearly all specialists interviewed chided the Bush administration for demoting FEMA from an inde- pendent agency into a branch of the massive Department of Homeland Security. Michael Lindell, director of the Natural Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center at Texas A & M University, placed the majority of blame on Chertoff because of his dual agenda of dealing with terrorism and fragmenting F E M A . l x m James Witt summarized this sen- timent well, saying, " I believe Brown . . . He tried to warn t h e m . . . and nobody listened. I don't think DHS is ready to be i n that coordinating role . " l x l v Such lack of confidence i n the DHS FEMA has prompted major discourse about the organization's future. Greg Schneiders, who directed the reorganization project that originally created FEMA i n 1979, attributes FEMA's ability to operate effectively to its "independence, stature, and di- rect access to the President," all of which had been lost under the Bush administration. l x v Schneiders notes that Though the need for reform is virtually uncontested, many doubt that restoring FEMA's independent status is the ap- propriate action. James Loy, former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security believes that those who advocate restoring FEMA's independent status are oblivi- ous to the new environment that has developed since 9 / n . l x v u He argues that separating FEMA from the DHS would l imit the agency's access to many of the relief agen- cies which were incorporated into the new department i n response to 9/11. The difference, he argues, is that FEMA should be given independent status within the DHS so that it can have direct lines of communication with the Secretary of Defense i n times of crisis. The bureaucratic hang-ups must be disposed of and independent status would help the director of FEMA make quick and effective decisions. A bipartisan Senate investigation i n 2006 left senators call- ing for Bush to scrap the organization and begin anew, as Katrina exposed flaws i n FEMA "too substantial to m e n d . " ) x v i u This may be an unrealistic aspiration, however, as it would take far too long to rebuild a new agency with the sole focus of preparing for and responding to natural disas- ters. There are simpler ways to begin improving FEMA, such as electing agency directors based on disaster man- agement experience rather than abusing the patronage sys- T H E D I S A S T E R A F T E R T H E D I S A S T E R tem. The agency cannot move forward without knowledge- able and confident leadership, such as that of James Lee Witt. He is spoken of as the wonder-child of FEMA's past, but perhaps he was only able to bring success to the organ- ization because he was the first director i n its history to have disaster management experience. Successful disaster relief begins with sympathy for the victims and dedication to the national response effort. While opinions differ i n re- gards to what needs to be done with FEMA, its future de- pends entirely upon the next administration. Unless the Obama administration exercises genuine concern for staffing it with qualified individuals and making the sweep- ing reforms needed, the government might be forced to disband the agency. A m i d the debates, there remains one thing that is uncontested: i n the words of Harold Rogers, Chairman of the House Appropriations Panel for Homeland Security, "Another failure is not an option. " l x i x There is simply too much at stake to be left i n the hands of another incompetent FEMA. E N D N O T E S i . FEMA 2008a i i . Ibid. i i i . Ibid. iv. Borenstein and Davis v. Franklin vi. Ibid. vii. Ibid. viii. Walsh ix. Franklin x. Ibid. xi. Ibid. xii. Ibid. xiii. Ibid. xiv. Walsh xv. Franklin xvi. Ibid. xvii. Walsh xviii. Franklin xix. Lerbinger xx. Ibid. (65) xxi. Walsh xxii. Lerbinger (65) xxiii. Franklin xxiv. Ibid. xxv. Ibid. xxvi. Ibid. xxvii. Walsh xxviii. Ibid. xxix. Borenstein & Davis xxx. Franklin xxxi. Walsh xxxii. Franklin xxxiii. Pincus xxxiv. Ibid. xxxv. Ibid. xxxvi. Ibid. xxxvii. Witte xxxviii. USA Today xxxix. Ibid, xl. Lipowicz xii. USA Today xiii. Ibid, xliii. Witte xliv. Ibid. xiv. Ibid, xlvi. Barr xlvii. Ibid, xlviii. Ibid, xlix. Ibid. 1. Ibid. Ii. Harper Iii. Ibid, l i i i . Hsu liv. Ibid. Iv. Ibid, lvi. Walsh lvii. Associated Press lviii. Harper lix. Borenstein lx. Ibid. lxi. Ibid. lxii. Ibid. lxiii. Ibid. lxiv. Ibid. lxv. Schneiders lxvi. Ibid. lxvii. Loy lxviii. Reid lxix. NY Times R E F E R E N C E S Associated Press. (2005, October 20). Excerpts from FEMA officials' e-mails. Retrieved August 1, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Barr, S. (2006, February 16). Staffing shortages loom large in report on woeful response to Katrina. The Washington Post, B2. Retrieved August 2, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, Borenstein, S., & Davis, M. R. (1999, September 16). Now FEMA is easing, not adding to, disasters. The Philadelphia E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 09 Inquirer, A16. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Borenstein, S. (2006, March 3). Survey: disaster experts now say Brown shouldn't be fall guy; of 12 polled, n said they did not buy the Bush administration's line on response to Katrina. Retrieved August 1, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008a). FEMA mis- sion. Retrieved August 1, 2008, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency Web site: . Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008b). FEMA his- tory. Retrieved July 30, 2008, from the Federal Emergency management Agency Web site: . Franklin, D. (2005, July). The FEMA phoenix-reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Washington Monthly. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from . Harper, T. (2006, August 26). Scale of FEMA waste'breathtak- ing'. The Toronto Star. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis- Nexis Academic Universe. Hsu, S. S. (2007, November 16). FEMA accused of wasting more Katrina funding; $30 million misspent last year on trail- ers in Miss., GAO says. The Washington Post. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Lerbinger, O. (1997). The crisis manager: facing risk and responsibility. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Lipowicz, A. (2006, April 14). Skinner: FEMA lacked common IT system during Katrina. TechNews. Retrieved August 2, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Loy, J. (2006, July 3). Lessons learned; restore FEMA's independence. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. New York Times. (2006, April 5). No hands on deck. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Pincus, W. (2002, July 24). FEMA's influence may be cut under new department. The Washington Post, A17. Retrieved July 29, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Reid, T. (2006, April 28). Scrap FEMA and begin again, Bush is advised. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Schneiders, G. (2006, March 20). Katrina disaster shows value of restoring FEMA's status. PR Week (U.S.) 11. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. USA Today. (2005, September 8). Exposed by Katrina, FEMA's flaws were years in the making. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Walsh, E. (1998, August 19). It took a county judge to bail out FEMA; James Lee Witt's Arkansas experience reshaped agency and its approach to disaster. The Washington Post, p. A19. Retrieved July 30, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Witte, G. (2005, September 26). FEMA let reserves wither, hurting response, some say; as it seeks more workers, agency relies on contractors in Gulf Coast. The Washing Post, pg. A15. Retrieved July 29, 2008 from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. T H E D I S A S T E R A F T E R T H E D I S A S T E R http://www.fema.gov/about/index.shtm http://www.washing-tonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.franklin.html http://www.washing-tonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.franklin.html