"... the Nixon Doctrine more than 
any other U.S. or Iranian policy 

contributed directly to the rise and fall 
of Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi." 



I R A N A N D T H E N I X O N D O C T R I N E 

American Arms and the Rise and Fall of the Shah 

ALEX C U I T T A R D 

T H E 1969 N I X O N D O C T R I N E — W H I C H CALLED FOR E M P O W E R I N G A M E R I C A N ALL IES I N 

ORDER TO REDUCE T H E I R D E P E N D E N C E O N T H E U N I T E D STATES FOR S E C U R I T Y — H A S 

L O N G BEEN T I E D TO P R E S I D E N T N I X O N ' S A I M OF R E D U C I N G T H E A M E R I C A N M I L I T A R Y 

PRESENCE I N V I E T N A M . H O W E V E R , NOTES F R O M N I X O N ' S 1967 M E E T I N G W I T H T H E 

S H A H OF I R A N S U G G E ST T H AT T H E M O N A R C H H E A V I L Y I N F L U E N C E D F O R E I G N POLICY 

P U R S U E D BY T H E FUTURE P R E S I D E N T . T H E D O C T R I N E ALSO A L L O W E D T H E S H A H TO 

F U L F I L L H I S R E G I O N A L P O L I T I C A L A M B I T I O N S BY F A C I L I T A T I N G T H E SALE OF B IL -

L I O N S OF DOLLARS W O R T H OF T H E M O S T S O P H I S T I C A T E D A M E R I C A N W E A P O N R Y TO 

I R A N . H O W E V E R , AS O I L PRICES B E G A N TO DROP I N T H E LATE 1970s , T H E S H A H ' S DE-

FENSE S P E N D I N G B E G A N TO HAVE A N I N C R E A S I N G L Y ADVERSE EFFECT O N T H E I R A N -

I A N E C O N O M Y , U L T I M A T E L Y C O N T R I B U T I N G TO T H E O V E R T H R O W OF T H E PAH LAV I 

D Y N A S T Y . 



T H E D E V E L O P M E N T O F T H E N I X O N 

D O C T R I N E 

I n 1969, newly elected President Richard N i x o n l a id the 

cornerstone o f his presidency's fore ign policy w h e n he an-

n o u n c e d an in i t ia t ive w h i c h w o u l d become k n o w n as the 

N i x o n Doctr ine . A i m e d at r educ ing the U n i t e d States' m i l -

i tary c o m m i t m e n t s i n Southeast Asia, the Doctr ine called 

o n America 's allies to provide for the i r o w n defense, rather 

t h a n depending solely o n the U n i t e d States for the i r secu-

rity. Breaking w i t h the past c o n t a i n m e n t strategies that en-

gaged A m e r i c a n forces i n l o n g and costly conflicts i n Korea 

and V i e t n a m , the new doctr ine st ipulated, 

In cases involving other [non-nuclear] types of aggression we 

shall furnish military and economic assistance when re-

quested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation 

directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of 

providing the manpower for its defense.1 

"The U n i t e d States w o u l d become the arsenal rather t h a n 

the po l i ceman o f the n o n - C o m m u n i s t w o r l d , " 1 1 p r o v i d i n g 

weapons and t r a i n i n g to regional allies to conta in the Soviet 

threat. 

"Eventually, his ambitions 
became 'considerably more 

grandiose' as the Shah 
began to see himself as the 

regional hegemon—'the 
ruler from whom all had to 

seek permission and 
indulgence.'" 

T h o u g h th is course o f act ion was or ig ina l ly f ramed as a 

shift i n U.S. pol icy towards Southeast Asia, the N i x o n 

Doctr ine h a d its real roots i n Tehran. There , i n 1967, for-

m e r Vice President N i x o n m e t w i t h the Shah o f I r a n , w h o 

argued that i t w o u l d be "better for U.S. to have I r a n able to 

defend [it]self t h a n have [a security] guarantee and another 

V i e t n a m . " 1 1 1 Th i s counsel f r o m America 's foremost M i d d l e 

Eastern ally predates the Doctr ine by over t w o years and u n -

doubtedly played a cr i t ica l , format ive role i n the develop-

m e n t o f Nixon's fore ign policy. 

I n m a k i n g his suggestion, the Shah was n o t mere ly offer-

i n g advice, b u t was also seeking A m e r i c a n support for his 

ambi t ions to play a m o r e d o m i n a n t role i n the M i d d l e East, 

especially i n the Persian Gulf . Such ambi t ions were l o n g i n 

the m a k i n g and were the product o f the Shah's ardent 

Persian n a t i o n a l i s m and distrust o f " the motives o f h is 

A m e r i c a n a d m i r e r s . " 1 V M u h a m m a d Reza Pahlavi k n e w he 

h a d only come to the Peacock T h r o n e after his father was 

deposed by the Al l ies i n 1941. H i s restorat ion by the C I A i n 

1953 fur ther added to his insecur i ty by d e m o n s t r a t i n g the 

inf luence that outside powers wie lded over his k i n g d o m . 

I t was i n this v e i n that the Shah's early m i l i t a r y goals started 

as b e i n g defensive, "seeking to deter a Soviet invas ion" so 

that he may " u l t i m a t e l y become s t rong e n o u g h to w i t h -

stand any fore ign pressure." v However, as the I r a n i a n 

economy developed i n the mid- 1960s , " Iran 's g r o w i n g o i l 

wea l th . . . a l lowed [the Shah] to t h i n k about p lay ing a b ig-

ger role i n the M i d d l e East." v l Eventually, h is ambi t ions be-

came "considerably m o r e grandiose" as the Shah began to 

see h i m s e l f as the reg ional h e g e m o n — " t h e ru ler f r o m 

w h o m al l h a d to seek p e r m i s s i o n and i n d u l g e n c e . " v n 

W h e n Great B r i t a i n announced that i t w o u l d w i t h d r a w its 

forces "east o f the Suez" by 1971, the Shah d i d n o t pass u p 

the o p p o r t u n i t y to replace B r i t a i n as guard ian o f the Gulf . 

Speaking w i t h N i x o n i n 1967, the Shah made a t h i n l y vei led 

compar i son to Britain 's i m m i n e n t w i t h d r a w a l and 

America 's prob lems i n V i e t n a m , t e l l i n g N i x o n that "the 

B r i t i s h are spread too t h i n to be s trong e n o u g h every-

E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 



1 . — - j - '-

X &y 70 **. y / - J w . <f ^M*^rJ?^^  
^-^''"^--/^A"^-^^ _____ •••••• 

C4***~£z(? L*£~. ^L-n^/ 

7 s - — - - -

n i x o n ' s n o t e s f r o m h i s 1967 m e e t i n g w i t h t h e s h a h o f i r a n i n c l u d i n g an e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e n i x o n 
d o c t r i n e i n t h e l e f t h a n d m a r g i n . 

where . " v l 1 1 Instead, the Shah argued, I r a n cou ld become an 

"adequate force to deter Russia f r o m attack and b l a c k m a i l " 

and that w i t h increased U.S. support , "by 1970 or 1971, I r a n 

w i l l be able to help the Saudis, i f requested . " l x U.S. 

Ambassador A r m i n Meyer hypothesized h o w the Shah 

m i g h t have f ramed his pos i t ion w h e n he spoke w i t h N i x o n : 

J don't want another Vietnam here. In Vietnam, the 

Russians get behind one side, you get behind the other. In 

the end, there is a negotiation—and I lose part of my oil re-

sources . . . . Let me do the job myself x 

America 's fore ign policy s i tuat ion i n 1967 made N i x o n 

amenable to the Shah's proposal . W h e n the B r i t i s h an-

n o u n c e d the i r i n t e n t i o n to w i t h d r a w forces f r o m the 

Persian Gulf , the U.S. m i l i t a r y was bogged d o w n by the 

confl ict i n V i e t n a m and unable to f i l l the v o i d o f the re-

g ional protector. The Six-Day War h a d made the s i tuat ion 

i n the M i d d l e East even m o r e delicate, p u s h i n g ant i -

A m e r i c a n A r a b nationalists fur ther i n t o the arms o f the 

Soviet U n i o n . Fearing the absence o f the B r i t i s h navy 

w o u l d al low a Nasserite r e v o l u t i o n to sweep i n t o Saudi 

Arabia and the l i t t o r a l states, A m e r i c a needed a pro-

Western guarantor o f regional stability. I n a d d i t i o n to 

s t r a i n i n g the A m e r i c a n mi l i t a ry ' s abi l i ty to exert force i n 

the Gulf , the V i e t n a m confl ict also made such a deploy-

m e n t a pol i t ica l l iabi l i ty , b o t h w i t h conservatives w h o 

sought to l i m i t America 's invo lvement overseas and l iber-

als w h o were opposed to such exertions o f A m e r i c a n force 

a l together/ 1 E m p o w e r i n g the Shah was Nixon's only feasi-

ble means o f m a i n t a i n i n g stabil ity i n the Persian G u l f w i t h -

o u t s t r a i n i n g the U.S. m i l i t a r y or his o w n pol i t ica l pos i t ion . 

I n Ambassador Meyer's es t imat ion , th is calculus led to the 

Doctr ine 's g e r m i n a t i o n w h e n N i x o n vis i ted I r a n i n i 9 6 7 . X H 

Nixon's actions and words f o l l o w i n g his r e t u r n to the 

U n i t e d States support Ambassador Meyer's assertion. A t 

some p o i n t between Nixon's discussion w i t h the Shah and 

the u n v e i l i n g o f the Doctr ine i n 1968, N i x o n consulted his 

notes f r o m the m e e t i n g , w r i t i n g a n d u n d e r l i n i n g " R N 

I R A N A N D T H E N I X O N D O C T R I N E 



D o c t r i n e " i n the m a r g i n to the left o f the Shah's request for 

increased U.S. support for the defense o f I r a n . I n an 

October 1967 article i n Foreign Affairs, N i x o n echoed the 

I r a n i a n monarch ' s earlier statements, a r g u i n g that "other 

nat ions m u s t recognize that the role o f the U n i t e d States as 

w o r l d po l i ceman is l ike ly to be l i m i t e d i n the f u t u r e . " 

Instead, nations should be prepared to "conta in the threat 

by themselves" w i t h assistance f r o m the U n i t e d States." 1 1 1 

I n July 1969, w h e n N i x o n announced his new doctr ine i n a 

televised address, he also made s imi la r c o m m e n t s to the 

Shah, saying, " W h e n y o u are t r y i n g to assist another n a t i o n 

defending its f reedom, U.S. pol icy should be to help t h e m 

f ight the war b u t n o t to f ight the war for t h e m . " x l v 

Even H e n r y Kissinger's o w n account o f the development o f 

the Doctr ine also places the i m p e t u s o f America ' s massive 

m i l i t a r y sales to I r a n o n the Shah. A c c o r d i n g to Kissinger, 

b o t h the B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l and America 's s i tuat ion i n 

Southeast Asia forced the Shah to realize " that I r a n w o u l d 

have to rely o n its o w n strength" and that his country 

needed "to carry its share o f the defense b u r d e n . 

A c c o r d i n g to Kissinger, U.S. pol icy was i n t e n d e d "to help 

I r a n a r m itself," so that i t cou ld cont inue to contr ibute " i m -

portant ly to the stabil ity o f the reg ion a n d to in te rnat iona l 

security. " X V 1 

T H E R E G I O N A L I M P A C T O F T H E 

D O C T R I N E 

The significance o f the o r i g i n o f the Doctr ine is he ightened 

by the dramatic effect i t h a d o n the M i d d l e East, namely the 

massive i n f l u x o f U . S. arms and sophisticated m i l i t a r y tech-

nology i n t o I r a n . F r o m 1950 to 1970, the total U.S. m i l i t a r y 

a id to I r a n a m o u n t e d to $1.8 b i l l i o n . x v n "By the t i m e o f the 

B r i t i s h departure f r o m the Persian G u l f i n 1971, I r a n h a d al-

ready emerged as a formidable m i l i t a r y power i n the area" 

and was " m o r e t h a n a m a t c h " for the c o m b i n e d Arab forces 

o f the G u l f . x v i i i I n 1974, the Shah's m i l i t a r y purchases 

swelled to over six b i l l i o n dollars i n A m e r i c a n weapons, 

c o m p r i s i n g over seventy percent o f the total U.S. arms sales 

that year X l x 

"As the ShaKs military 
power grew, so too did 

Washington's reliance on 
Iran's ability to act as the 

region's gendarme." 
Far f r o m invest ing i n land-based weaponry to repel a poten-

t ia l Soviet or I r a q i offensive, the b u l k o f these purchases 

were for air and sea-based systems that were in tended to 

enhance Iran's p o s i t i o n i n the Gulf . I n 1973 alone, I r a n 

purchased over 2 0 0 attack helicopters, 248 f ighters a n d 

fighter-bombers, 24 surface vessels, 100 C-130 transports , 

a n d 14 Hovercraft. 5™ I n add i t ion to these massive orders, 

I r a n also began const ruct ing a large harbor-dry dock facil-

i ty at Chabahar, outside o f the shal low waters o f the Persian 

G u l f and beyond the possible e n t r a p m e n t o f the Arab 

nav ies . x x i A d d i t i o n a l naval bases were b u i l t at Khark a n d 

Kish islands, as w e l l as Bandar Abbas and Bushir. I n 1974, 

I r a n and the U n i t e d States agreed to focus especially o n the 

fur ther development o f Iran's air force a n d navy by adding 

6 Spruance-chss destroyers a n d 250 F-17S to Iran's m i l i -

t a r y . ™ 1 Th i s focus o n naval and air weapons indicates that 

the Shah used the pretext o f the N i x o n D o c t r i n e — d e t e r r i n g 

C o m m u n i s t forces f r o m the r e g i o n — t o pursue his o w n 

goal o f c o n t r o l l i n g the Persian Gulf . 

"The dramat ic increase i n Iran's m i l i t a r y capabil ity" was " o f 

great importance i n enabl ing I r a n to exert its increas ing i n -

fluence as a regional p o w e r . M x x i i i The f irst exercise o f this 

newly developed capabil ity and the Shah's propensi ty to act 

as a regional power occurred i n November 1971, o n the eve 

o f the B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l , w h e n the I r a n i a n m i l i t a r y seized 

A b u Musa and the Tunbs islands. W i t h i n m o n t h s o f occu-

p y i n g the d isputed islands, w h i c h l ie i n close p r o x i m i t y to 

the Strait o f H o r m u z , I r a n h a d already erected g u n em-

placements w h i c h i t equipped w i t h sophisticated anti-ship 

E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 



miss i le batteries. Rather t h a n u p b r a i d the Shah for breach-

i n g in te rnat iona l law and seizing the islands by force, 

N i x o n instead acquiesced, descr ibing the Shah shortly af-

terwards as "our best f r i e n d . , , X X 1 V 

As the Shah's m i l i t a r y power grew, so too d i d Washington's 

reliance o n Iran's abi l i ty to act as the region's gendarme. 

W h e n K i n g Faisal o f Saudi Arab ia was assassinated by a 

m e m b e r o f his coterie i n 1975, 

the U n i t e d States was deeply 

concerned that fur ther insta-

b i l i t y i n the K i n g d o m could 

exacerbate the already serious 

energy crisis p l a g u i n g the 

West. Fearing a "Qaddafi-hke 

development , " President 

Ford, at the insistence o f 

Kissinger ("whose power 

arched across the N i x o n and 

Ford administrat ions" 5 0 ™), af-

f i r m e d the Secretary o f State's 

earlier support i n July 1973 for 

the Shah to conduct "a para-

t roop operat ion i n Saudi 

Arabia i n a c r i s i s . " 5 0 ™ F r o m 

the t ranscr ipt o f the Shah's 

conversation w i t h Ford and 

Kissinger, i t is clear that such 

an idea d i d n o t or ig inate o n 

the A m e r i c a n side. Ford t o l d 

the Shah that he was fami l iar 

w i t h the I r a n i a n contingency 

p l a n n i n g and was i n support 

o f the measure, whereas the 

Shah "was clearly anxious to 

discuss operat ional logistics," specifically the i n c l u s i o n o f 

Egypt i n the assault i n order to mi t igate any resistance to a 

"total ly non-Arab" f o r c e . x x v i i 

R e m e m b e r i n g the Shah's earlier w a r n i n g that "colonial 

cont ro l w i l l n o t be tolerated" i n the Persian G u l f , x x v i n N i x o n 

S H A H M U H A M M E D REZA PAHLAV 

was eager to avoid the appearance i n the A r a b w o r l d that the 

U n i t e d States had t u r n e d over cont ro l o f the G u l f to the 

Persian "Ajamiin." To achieve th is , the U n i t e d States rel ied 

o n a " t w i n p i l l a r " strategy that "paired Saudi Arabia w i t h 

I r a n " as the two pi l lars o f A m e r i c a n p o l i c y . ^ However, 

this arrangement was d is ingenuous , as "Saudi Arabia was 

nei ther w i l l i n g n o r able to act as a 'p i l la r ' o f the U.S. re-

g iona l security pol icy i n the sense that I r a n d i d . " x x x Saudi 

Arabia never invested the 

funds that I r a n d i d i n t o its m i l -

itary, p re fe r r ing instead to 

focus o n domestic moderniza-

t i o n . 5 0 0 4 1 Indeed, Kissinger 

and the Shah's cont ingency 

plans to seize the Saudi o i l 

fields suggests that the 

Amer icans recognized that 

the Saudis were s ignif icantly 

weaker t h a n the i r I r a n i a n 

"partners , " as no s imi la r plan-

n i n g was under taken regard-

i n g I r a n . 5 0 ™ 1 Addi t ional ly , 

Saudi Arabia was "hardly keen 

about act ing u n d e r U.S. and 

I r a n i a n auspices," w h o were 

perceived as threats to the pan-

Arabis t sent iments o f the G u l f 

a n d the M i d d l e East. Lee 

H a m i l t o n s u m m a r i z e d the 

U n i t e d States' p o s i t i o n i n 

1973: "One o f our p r i m e chal-

lenges i n the Persian G u l f w i l l 

be to avoid any conf rontat ion 

between our t w o close 

f r i e n d s . ' , x x x i i i 

Despite these s ignif icant differences w i t h his A r a b ne igh-

bor, the Shah was t rans formed i n t o the Persian Gulf ' s re-

g ional po l i ceman by the N i x o n Doctr ine , a role that earned 

h i m "considerable praise i n U.S. government c i r c l e s . ' , x x x i v 

Enforc ing Iran's p o s i t i o n as a status quo power, the Shah 

I R A N A N D T H E N I X O N D O C T R I N E 



deployed three thousand counterinsurgency troops, backed 

by artillery and sophisticated air support, to Oman between 

1972 and 1977 in an attempt to assist the sultanate in crush-

ing the Soviet and Chinese-backed rebellion in Dhofar. I n 

addition to providing the "untested Iranian military [with] 

valuable field practice," x x x v the campaign also reflected "the 

shah's concern about the stability of the sultanates i n the 

Gulf reg ion. ' , x x x v i 

T H E T A I L WAGS T H E D O G 

Although the Shah was a driving force behind the develop-

ment of the Nixon Doctrine, in the early years of its imple-

mentation Iran re-

mained very much a 

client state that con-

veniently "fit into" 

the Doctrine.5™™" I n 

fact, as late as 1967, 

Iran was still the re-

cipient of large 

amounts of U.S. eco-

nomic and military 

aid. According to an 

April 1967 State 

Department memo-

randum, most of 

Iran's weapons pur-

chases from the 

United States were 

made on credit. (The 

same report also stated that the "most dynamic relation" be-

tween the two countries "continues to be a military 
o n e - " x x x v i i i ) 

By 1972, however, the tables had effectively turned, and 

Iran assumed a position of dominance i n its relationship 

with the United States. Several incidences best character-

ize this development and indicate that, in U.S.-Iran rela-

tions during the mid-1970s, "the tail was i n fact wagging 

the dog . ' , x x x l x The foremost area in which the Shah directly 

challenged his American benefactors was oil. As one of the 

THE S H A H A N D N I X O N SHAKE H A N D S W I T H KISSINGER S M I L I N G IN AP-

PROVAL FROM B E H I N D . 

leading price hawks in OPEC, the Shah had long sought to 

drive up the price of oil by suppressing the cartel's quotas 

(and subsequently "cheating" by overproducing and selling 

an increased quantity at artificially increased prices). Faced 

with a more finite supply of oil than most of the other OPEC 

members, the Shah's long-standing position was to maxi-

mize Iran's short-term profits in order to finance his lavish 

defense spending. x l 

After the West was plunged into the energy crisis following 

the 1973 Arab boycott, such a hawkish position on oil prices 

was viewed by Western governments as inimical to global 

economic and politi-

cal stability. Though 

the Shah earned a 

reputation for prag-

matism by his wil l-

ingness to provide oil 

despite the boycott, 

he was also responsi-

ble for "the 

December 1973 

Tehran Oil 

Agreement that saw 

oil prices quadruple 

within twelve 

months. " x l i When 

Ford publically called 

for a reduction in 

prices in September 

1974, the Shah openly challenged his American patrons, 

"No one can dictate to us. No one can wave a finger at us, 

because we wi l l wave a finger back." x l i i The Shah's intran-

sigence went further. On May 17, 1975, just one day after 

meeting with Ford in Washington and promising further 

cooperation with the United States on energy, the Shah an-

nounced to the press, only a few blocks from the White 

House, that Iran would seek another increase in the price 

of oil as high as thirty-five percent. x l i i i Such rhetoric was 

reminiscent of Mossadegh and his bid to achieve oil inde-

pendence a generation earlier. The major difference be-

E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 



tween 1953 and 1974, however, was that the Shah now com-

manded the largest and most modern military force i n a re-

gion devoid of a sizable U.S. military presence. One intel-

ligence official remarked at the time, "He was our baby, but 

now he has grown u p . " x l l v 

As the Shah's military and economic clout grew, "he em-

barked on his political ego trip in the early 1970s." x l v The 

exchange of draft versions of the joint communique issued 

by the American and Iranian governments during Nixon's 

visit to Tehran in May 1972 illustrates the Shah's increased 

desire to assert Iran's role in the region, as well as the U.S. 

government's increased willingness to accede to the Shah. 

The proposed American text of the communique read: 

The President and His Imperial Majesty agreed that the se-

curity of the Persian Gulf and the continued availability of 

its vital natural resources were of the utmost importance to 

the free world. Both were of the view that the countries of 

the region bore the principal responsibility for providing for 

their security and defense. His Imperial Majesty noted 

Iran's determination to bear its share of this responsibility. 

The President promised the United States would, as in the 

past, continue to assist Iran in strengthening its own secu-

rity.^ 

However, the draft approved by the Iranian government 

narrowed the parties responsible for the security of the 

Persian Gulf from "the countries of the region" to "the lit-

toral states. " x l v i l The Iranian version also removed the ref-

erence to the assistance provided by the United States, stat-

ing that "GOI [Government of Iran] wants to stress 

determination to build up defensive capabilities." The GOI 

also found the reference to the continued availability of 

Persian Gulf resources to be "troublesome" and removed it 

from the final draft x l v i i i 

The most notable power reversal in the U.S.-Iran relation-

ship occurred when Nixon visited Iran on May 30 and 31, 

1972. According to Gary Sick, the two and a half hours 

Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah spent i n formal meetings 

"radically restructured the U.S.-Iranian relationship" by 

"guaranteeing the shah access to some of the most sophis-

ticated non-nuclear technology in the U.S. military arse-

n a l . " x l i x The weakness of the U.S. position was encapsu-

lated by Nixon's near pleading at the end of the meeting, 

when the president "looked across the table to the Shah and 

said simply, 'Protect me.'" 1 

This was truly a stunning development. As Tyler com-

mented, Nixon and Kissinger had effectively ceded the se-

curity role of a major superpower to a "regional autocrat." 1 1 

Also, by providing the Shah with carte blanche to obtain vir-

tually any U.S. weapons system he desired, the United 

States further enhanced Iran's power in the Gulf, thereby 

weakening its ability to exert influence over the Shah. As 

the Shah's military power increased without challenge, so 

too did his willingness to act on Iranian feelings of distrust 

of the United States and pursue an increasingly nationalis-

tic foreign policy. By 1976, the inspector general of the U.S. 

Foreign Service concluded that "the Government of Iran ex-

erts the determining influence" in its relationship with 

Washington. 1" In Sick's estimation, the Nixon Doctrine 

placed "U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf almost 

exclusively in the hands of the shah" who held U.S. security 

policy "hostage to the social and economic experiment that 

[he] was conducting in Iran. Whether one liked it or not, 

Iran was the regional tail wagging the superpower dog . " l m 

T H E N I X O N D O C T R I N E A N D T H E R O A D TO 

R E V O L U T I O N 

Ultimately, the Shah's addiction to military spending and 

desire to dominate the Gulf were to be central components 

of his downfall. After Nixon and Kissinger opened the 

"candy store" to the Shah in 1972, Iran became the world's 

largest importer of arms. l l v As noted above, from 1973 to 

1974, Iran purchased six billion dollars worth of "the most 

sophisticated and expensive weapons systems sold by the 

United States to a foreign country. " l v When the Iranian 

economy was buoyed by the massive increase in oil prices 

in 1973, the Shah actively pursued the strategy of short-

term maximization of oil revenues and encouraged mas-

I R A N A N D T H E N I X O N D O C T R I N E 



"By relaxing his control on Iranian society, the Shah 
opened the valve of public expression that he would never 

again he able to close." 
sive overspending on the military. However, "by the spring 

of 1975, Iran was spending well in excess of its oil revenues; 

$30 billion worth of commitments had been made against 

$21 billion in revenues." l v i 

When the astronomical oil prices of 1973 triggered a reces-

sion in the West in 1974, oil demand and price declined 

considerably. As Iran followed the West into recession, the 

Shah's government was faced with a considerable chal-

lenge to its legitimacy. As income disparities increased, the 

Iranian public began to regard their government's defense 

spending as "unnecessary i f not altogether harmful to the 

economic prosperity of the country" and chiefly designed to 

"benefit the US arms industry." 1™ Additionally, "Iranians 

believed, rightly or wrongly that the shah's foreign policy 

[for which they were paying with their oil revenues] did not 

serve Iranian interests; that it only served to perpetuate his 

own regime and United States influence on I r a n . " l v m Such 

sentiments contributed to the belief that the Shah was com-

plicit in U.S. imperialism, which further weakened his le-

gitimacy to rule . l l x 

The Shah's costly military imports leaked billions of dollars 

out of the Iranian economy each year. I f that money had 

stayed in Iran where it would have been subject to a multi-

plier effect, it would have enabled hundreds of billions of 

dollars in domestic growth. Instead, the Shah's weapons 

purchases left the Iranian economy too underdeveloped to 

cope with an overall macroeconomic crisis which pushed 

inflation past thirty percent in 1975. By 1976, this astro-

nomical inflation led to food shortages, power blackouts, 

and a sizable influx of rural Iranians flocking to cities in 

search of work—all of which placed an incredible strain on 

the Iranian people. l x Faced with these challenges to his le-

gitimacy and pensively watching the presidential victory of 

Jimmy Carter in 1976, the Shah decided to ease censorship 

and reign in his security establishment. By relaxing his 

control on Iranian society, the Shah opened the valve of 

public expression that he would never again be able to 

close. The unrest that originally manifested as a response 

to the Shah's unpopular foreign policy and economic mis-

management evolved into a revolutionary movement that 

eventually deposed the Pahlavi dynasty. 

From its beginnings i n Tehran in April 1967 to its heyday 

from 1973 to 1974, the Nixon Doctrine played a profound 

role in U.S.-Iran relations. I n addition to enhancing the po-

sition of Iran as the chief client state of the United States in 

the Middle East, the Doctrine also became the means 

through which the Shah developed into the dominant 

power in the region. The Shah's military ascendance per-

mitted h i m a level of political and economic clout which he 

used to enforce his vision of a stable and prosperous Iran. 

Unfortunately for the Shah, this vision was only tenable in 

the short-term: his nation's massive military spending led 

to an economic crisis that brought about revolution and his 

exile from power. I n this respect, the Nixon Doctrine more 

than any other U.S. or Iranian policy contributed directly to 

the rise and fall of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. 

E N D N O T E S 

i . Acharya (21) 
i i . Rubin (128) 
i i i . Richard Nixon's handwritten notes from his meeting w i t h 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (April 21,1967) 
iv. Cooper (575) 
v. Pollack 2004 (104) 
vi . Ibid. 
v i i . Ibid. 
v i i i . Richard Nixon's handwritten notes from his meeting wi th 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (April 21,1967) 

E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 



ix. Ibid. 
x. Afkhami (303) 
xi . Kissinger (669) 
x i i . Afkhami (303) 
x i i i . Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam" (114) 
xiv. Nixon, "Vietnamization" 
xv. Kissinger (668) 
xvi. Kissinger (669) 
xvii. Rubin (128) 
xviii . Banuazizi (495) 
xix. Ibid. 
xx. Ibid. 
xxi. Rubin (129) 
xxii. Banuazizi (495) 
xxiii . Banuazizi (494) 
xxiv. Cooper (570) 
xxv. Bill (203) 
xxvi. Cooper (576) 
xxvii. Ibid. 
xxviii. Richard Nixon's handwritten notes from his meeting 
wi th Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (April 21,1967) 
xxix. Pollack 2004 (103) 
xxx. Acharya (27) 
xxxi. Acharya (28) 
xxxii. When the Saudis learned of the US-Iran contingency 
planning, they furiously warned that, " I f Iran should succeed i n 
occupying part of the Arabian coast, it would find only smoking 
ruins, and the Western oil consumers would face catastrophe." 
Cf. Cooper (579) 
xxxiii. Acharya (27) 
xxxiv. Acharya (26) 
xxxv. Acharya (27) 
xxxvi. Banuazizi (494) 
xxxvii. Tyler (218) 
xxxviii. State Department memorandum (1967) 
xxxix. This phrase was first used to describe US-Iran relations 
under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine by Gary Sick i n All Fall 
Down. 
xl. Pollack 2008 (18) 
xl i . Cooper (570) 
x l i i . New York Times (September 27,1974) 
x l i i i . Cooper (578) 
xliv. The Washington Post (November 1, 1974) 
xlv. Bil l (197) 
xlvi. Haig Cable (11) 
xlvii . Haig Cable (8) 
xlvi i i . Haig Cable (5) 
xlix. Sick (13) 
1. This account was provided to Gary Sick by Alexander Haig. 
Cf. Sick (14) 
l i . Tyler (125) 
l i i . Sick (20) 
l i i i . Sick (21) 
liv. Banuazizi (495) 

lv. Ibid. 
lvi . Cooper (588) 
lv i i . Ansari (247) 
lv i i i . Rubin (160) 
lix. Gasiorowski (209) 
Ix. Cooper (589) 

R E F E R E N C E S 

Acharya, Amitav. 1989. U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: 
Origins and Evolution under the Carter and Reagan 
Administration. New York: Routledge. 

Afkhami, Gholam Reza. 2009. The Life and Times of the Shah. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 

Ansari, A l i M . 2007. Modern Iran. New York: Pearson 
Longman. 

Banuazizi, A l i . 1976. "Iran: The Making of a Regional Power" 
i n The Middle East: Oil, Conflict el Hope edited by A.L. Udovitch. 
Lexington: Lexington Books. 

Bill , James A. 1988. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of 
American-Iranian Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press. 

Cooper, Andrew Scott. 2008. "Showdown at Doha: The Secret 
Oi l Deal That Helped Sink the Shah of Iran." The Middle East 
Journal, 62, p. 575, Autumn. 

Gasiorowski, Mark J. 1991. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 

Kissinger, Henry. 1982. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company. 

Declassified cable from Henry Kissinger to Alexander Haig, 
May 27, 1972. Iran Visit. Box 481. President's Trip Files. 
Richard Nixon Presidential Library, College Park, Maryland. 

"Kissinger to Press Shah on Oil Costs," The Washington Post, 
November 1,1974. 

Nixon, Richard M . Handwritten notes from meeting wi th 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Apri l 21,1967. Far East and Middle 
East Trips, 1967. Box 10. The Wilderness Years. Richard Nixon 
Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda California. 

Nixon, Richard M . 1967. "Asia after Viet Nam." Foreign 
Affairs, p. 114, October. 

Nixon, Richard M . 1969. "President Nixon's Speech on 
Vietnamization." Retrieved from 
http://vietnam.vassar.edu/doc14.html. 

I R A N A N D T H E N I X O N D O C T R I N E 

http://vietnam.vassar.edu/doc14.html


Pollack, Kenneth. 2008. A Path Out of the Desert. New York: 
Random House. 

Pollack, Kenneth. 2004. The Persian Puzzle. New York: 
Random House. 

Rubin, Barry. 1980. Paved with Good Intentions. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 

State Department memorandum, "US-Iran Relations," 1967. 
Far East and Middle East Trips, 1967. Box 10. The Wilderness 
Years. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba 
Linda California. 

"Shah rejects Bid by Ford for Cut i n Prices of O i l , " The New York 
Times, September 27, 1974. 

Tyler, Patrick. 2009. A World of Trouble. New York: Farrar 
Straus Giroux.