T H E T R U T H I N T H I N G S ( A N D LOVE I N T H E W O R L D Accessing the Natural Law's Metaphysical and Theological S H A N E ULBRICH T R O U B L E D BY T H E FRUITS OF C O N T E M P O R A R Y P H I L O S O P H I C A L A N D S P I R I T U A L N I H I L I S M A N D H A V I N G D I S C E R N E D T H E I N A D E Q U A C I E S OF P O S I T I V I S M , A G R O W I N G N U M B E R OF PEOPLE EXPERIENCE P R O F O U N D D I S S A T I S F A C T I O N W I T H M O D E R N I T Y A N D ARE R E N E W I N G T H E SEARCH FOR " T H E T R U T H I N T H I N G S , " AS A N S E L M E OF C A N T E R B U R Y O N C E STATED. S O M E SEEK A CORRECTIVE E L E M E N T T H R O U G H A T R A D I T I O N A L U N D E R S T A N D I N G OF N A T U R A L LAW, A N D A N U M B E R OF C A T H O L I C S C H O L A R S HAVE M A D E IT T H E I R TASK TO R E - A P P RO P R I AT E A N D A R T I C U L A T E T H E N A T U R A L LAW FOR T H E M O D E R N A G E , B O T H W I T H V A R I E D SUCCESS. T H I S ARTICLE TRACES S O M E OF T H E F O U N D A T I O N A L N O T I O N S T H A T G R O U N D N A T U R A L LAW T H I N K I N G . IT I LLUSTRATES H O W T H E N A T U R A L LAW M I G H T BE BETTER RECOVERED A N D C L A R I F I E D I N L I G H T OF M O D E R N P H I L O S O P H I C A L A S S U M P T I O N S . F I N A L L Y T H E ARTICLE SUGGESTS T H A T T H E N A T U R A L LAW M U S T BE V I E W E D T H R O U G H T H E T H E O L O G I C A L LENS OF C H R I S T I A N C H A R I T Y FOR ITS FULL S U B S T A N C E TO BE A P P A R E N T . A T W E N T Y - F I R S T C E N T U R Y S E A R C H F O R N A T U R A L L A W I n many ways, the intellectual history of the twentieth cen- tury is the history of the dissemination of nineteenth cen- tury philosophy, particularly its hermeneutics and lan- guage, into popular consciousness. In the twentieth century, various strands of nihilistic philosophy, avant- garde literature, and scientific theory—once the preserve of an intellectual elite—came to influence various social, po- litical, cultural, and religious institutions and were sud- denly (and subtly) thrust upon popular sensibility. Darwinian and Marxist theory, the modern literary turn begun by Baudelaire, and Nietzsche's challenge to the en- tire western tradition are some of the intellectual move- ments which profoundly affected everyday men and women, creating a mixed modern consciousness unlike any other in human history. The dominant values of the century were those of liberal democracy, especially equality, with appeals to human rights as the preeminent moral cat- egory. Beneath this, though, the century held a strongly positivistic view of law and politics (i.e. the view that the ex- istance and content of the law depend primarily on societal positivism and nihilism. Young people in particular tend to seek a movement, a way of thinking, a group, or a person in which they can believe and to which they can commit them- selves. Some seek a return to traditional wisdom, often connected to religious conversion, in which natural law seems to play an important, i f unclear, role. It has mostly been particular historical events of the past century, rather than abstract philosophical ruminations, that have prompted the new search for the natural law. In the rise of National Socialism, the Nazis seem to have used pseudo-Nietzschean thought as the philosophical ra- tionale behind their project, or at least to have seized upon the weaknesses of the modern soul that Nietzsche so well understood. But Nietzsche's thought, as well as the prob- lems of modernity that he both saw and created, appears elsewhere—even in Boston. Allan Bloom indicates the ways in which late nineteenth-century German thought and language have quietly infiltrated American sensibili- ties to the detriment of the liberal arts." Parallels may be found in the legal sphere; a well-known opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) i l - "The dominant values of the century were those of liberal democracy, especially equality, with appeals to human rights as the preeminent moral category." conditions). Nietzsche shows, moreover, that once modern optimism fades, a deadly nihil ism is revealed as that which dwells deepest in the contemporary psyche. Prominent Catholic intellectuals like Karol Wojtyla and Joseph Ratzinger tend to believe that philosophical develop- ments have real consequences for human communities. In light of the troubling history of the twentieth century, their belief seems compelling. 1 It is this realization that has prompted many people from different walks of life to seek an alternative to modern—and now postmodern— lustrates some of the strange notions at the end of the twen- tieth century: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni- verse, and of the mystery of human life." Absent the incul- cation of nineteenth-century philosophical conclusions, it would be hard to imagine that such a view of liberty could ever be taken seriously. Such a philosophical climate does not much countenance appeals to natural law. Those interested in the natural law tradition often find themselves teetering on the fringes of E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 what is politically and academically permissible; those who take it seriously in turn find it difficult to be taken seriously themselves. It is then a cause for wonder to see a number of people responding to contemporary crises of interna- tional crime, global atrocities, and racism, as well as ques- tions of reproductive rights, marriage, and abortion, from the perspective of the natural law. They seem to believe that the present age, despite its successes, is weak in its inabil- ity ever to provide satisfactory solutions, from sound theo- retical bases, to these serious problems. A positivistic mind and a nihilistic spirit are not up to the task. Some then have turned to the natural law because it pro- vides something that positivism cannot. Prosecutors at the Nuremburg International War-Crimes Trials of 1945-1946 found it necessary to appeal to natural law arguments in the absence of any positive law that could account for the crimes of the Third Reich. Jacques Maritain, as a member of the Commission on Human Rights that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, considered it a great step forward to enlist the natural law in support of nat- ural rights. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., frequently appealed phy: what Ernest Fortin has described as "unconscious but rampant" n ih i l i sm. l v A n examination and re-appropriation of the natural law and its theoretical foundations promises to save contemporary men and women from an otherwise dismal fate. On one level, it guards society from the totali- tarian rule of a purely positive human law, wherein might defines what is right and naked power is able to revoke to- morrow the rights it protects today. Even more profoundly, the natural law and its foundations could save modern man from the prospect of the "existential" individual standing fi- nally alone, without any truth or good worth living for, over- come by what Charles Taylor calls the "spectre of meaning- lessness."v Many Catholics in particular have taken up this task of ar- ticulating the natural law anew. They have in their philo- sophical and theological tradition some of the richest re- sources for undertaking the task. I n such a context, the natural law should be newly appropriated in terms of a comprehensive Thomist realism, smartly aware of present and past challenges, and with a sound understanding of its roots in the Christian theological tradition. "Even more profoundly, the natural law and its foundations could save modern man from the prospect of the 'existential' individual standing finally alone." to the natural law and to its traditional sources as he strug- gled in the 1950s and 1960s against segregation statutes. He saw that justice would only be guaranteed in civil soci- ety i f natural law were to inform and check the positive law. In 1963, from Birmingham City Jail, he wrote to fellow cler- gymen, "Never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was legal." 1 1 1 For many twenty-first century men and women, the natural law offers a corrective not only against positivism, but also against that second prong of nineteenth century philoso- TOWARDS U N D E R S T A N D I N G N A T U R A L LAW T H R O U G H IS-AND-OUGHT It is necessary to articulate, even i n limited scope, some of the foundational underpinnings of the natural law. To ac- complish this, it wi l l be helpful to engage some modern philosophers, and to address some of the difficulties—of both tacit sensibility and explicit philosophical understand- ing—that hinder the modern mind's grasp of the meta- physical and epistemological foundations of the natural law. T H E T R U T H I N T H I N G S ( A N D L O V E I N T H E W O R L D ) One way to enter into such theoretical considerations is through the problem of is-and-ought. In some sense, all problems in natural law thinking of intellect-and-will, and duty-and-right, first require some grasp of the is-ought question. The modern philosophic tradition, beginning with Machiavelli, has long rejected the classical conception of is-ought. It has replaced it with a hermeneutic that makes it difficult for the modern mind to sympathize with Thomist realism. A brief exposition of some key moments in the history of modern philosophy and modern scientific and political theory may enlighten consideration of this subject. This exploration should make clear what was lost when classical theories were sidestepped. M O D E R N D O C T R I N E S OF IS-AND-OUGHT The issue of is-and-ought provides a powerful lens for view- ing the history of Western philosophy at its most important moments. The most revolutionary thinkers each propose, more or less explicitly, new definitions of is and ought and a new understanding of their relationship. We begin at the end of classical political philosophy with Niccolo Machiavelli who, in the midst of the flourishing of Renaissance humanism, proposes what seems to be a pro- foundly anti-humanist doctrine. Machiavelli turns the mind to practical considerations in a radically new way. He definitively breaks from the entire tradition before h im, from metaphysics and virtue, when he writes i n The Prince: . . .my hope is to write a hook that will he useful. .. and so I thought it sensible to go straight to a discussion of how things are in real life [la veritd effettuale della cosa] and not waste time with a discussion of an imaginary world . . .for the gap between how people actually behave and how they ought to behave is so great that anyone who ignores every- day reality in order to live up to an ideal will soon discover he has been taught how to destroy himself not how to pre- serve himself?1 Machiavelli here defines what is simply as "how things are RENE DESCARTES EXPOUNDED V O L U M I N O U S L Y O N T H E IS- AND-OUGHT D I C H O T O M Y . in real life"; human nature is simply "how people actually behave," observed empirically.V 1 1 The old ought is identified with is in an entirely new way: in his political realism, one simply pursues, by whatever calculated, even cruel means possible/ 1 1 1 those goals that "all [men] share" and do not question: "the acquisition of glory and riches." 1" One can see how Machiavelli opens the way for what fol- lows, including Hobbes' "warre of every man against every man." x It begins with Machiavelli's repudiation of the clas- sical moral is—of the Platonic forms, the Aristotelian virtues, Christian beatitude—for the sake of the is-and- ought of "practical realities" and self-preservation. Machiavelli says something with which everyone before h i m agrees—that "we do not live in an ideal world"—but he means to say much more: that effectively there is no ideal world. Rene Descartes accomplishes a parallel recasting of is- ought, through science rather than political philosophy. Despairing over his own uncertainties after years of serious education, and only further discouraged by the perennial clashes among great philosophers past and present, Descartes resorts to a new understanding of is-and-ought, of our capacity for knowledge and the role of nature. Descartes would ultimately have students grow into techni E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 cians mastering nature, rather than lovers after wisdom who learn from nature: . . . it is possible to arrive at knowledge that would be very useful. . . in place of that speculative philosophy taught in the schools, it is possible to find a practical philosophy, by means of which [we might be able] to use [the force and ac- tions of nature]for all the purposes for which they are appro- priate, and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature. This is desirable not only for the inven- tion of an infinity of devices that would enable one to enjoy trouble-free the fruits of the earth ... but also principally for the maintenance of health, which unquestionably is the first good and the foundation of all the other goods of this life.xl Descartes here dramatically redefines the scope of philoso- phy. Whereas speculative philosophy—and even common sense—might question in what sense health is the "first FRI EDRICH NIETZSCHE URGED M A N TO EMBRACE HIS I N N E R " W I L L TO POWER." good," Descartes' practical philosophy accepts it as "un- questionably" the first and foundational good, and pro- poses to redirect the whole potentiality of human reason to purely instrumental work. His Discourse on Method and its philosophical progeny laid the foundation for a profound technologization of the Western mind, which is trained to seek the most effective means to presupposed ends, not un- like the schema of Machiavellian realism. What is are the certainties of math and science, subjected to methodical doubt, that can bring man and society to axiomatically as- sumed "oughts," such as health and mastery over nature. Modern philosophy's treatment of is-and-ought moves for- ward through variations in Bacon, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant (who, uniquely, seeks to preserve something like the old moral law, though on a rationale that has definitively dis- carded the old metaphysics), Darwin, and Nietzsche. Nietzsche offers a radical reevaluation of all former concep- tions of is-and-ought—from the Platonic to the Darwinian. He does to modern philosophy what Machiavelli had done to classical political thought. In light of the "death of God," Nietzsche rejects classical idealism, Machiavellian realism, and Cartesianism, along with the emptiness of technologi- cal progress. I n their place, Nietzsche proposes that man has another kind of ought to answer to: a responsibility to himself by virtue of his own potential for greatness, seeking security and solace from the traditional moralities. The truly great are called to abandon life-denying religious i l lu- sions and Kantian rationality. Instead, man must seek his self-divinization and embrace the greater potentiality within himself, the "wil l to power" which a true view of his- tory reveals as the deep driving force of humanity. Instead of a passive conformity to the natura naturata—created na- ture as the non-existent God has fashioned it or as the everyday world simply operates—to be pursued is the ac- tion of natura naturans, a singular "creating nature" that pronounces "so things ought to be" rather than a passive, stupid "so it is."xu For Nietzsche, at the center of reality, of what is, are the wi l l and strength of the singular man who becomes a law unto himself, and who creates meaning and his own ought out of chaos. x m T H E T R U T H I N T H I N G S ( A N D L O V E I N T H E W O R L D ) This survey of modern intellectual history begins to sug- gest how Thomistic metaphysics and its natural moral law have been rendered radically foreign and therefore incom- prehensible to the modern mind. Natural law can only be grasped through an intelligent criticism of these many lay- ers that form the contemporary consciousness. It is a diffi- cult project, to say the least. T H E M E T A P H Y S I C S U N D E R L Y I N G T H E N A T U R A L LAW To see the classical theory against which modern thought defines itself, we may begin with Josef Pieper, a popular Catholic philosopher of the twentieth century. He provides some keen insight into the clash of the classical and mod- ern, and also indicates what Thomist realism positively consists of. In a lucid exposition of the realist ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas, he begins by capturing a key metaphysi- cal insight of the scholastics by two brief statements: "Omne ens est verum," (all that is real, is true); and "omne ens est bonum," (all that is, is good). x l v With different historical emphases than those of this paper, Pieper demonstrates how this key metaphysical principle of "the truth of all things" has been impatiently dismissed in modern philos- ophy. Hobbes characterized the old metaphysical principle as "inane and childish," x v Spinoza claimed that truth "could only reside in a statement," since things on their own are "mute," X V ] and Kant judged the scholastic doctrine sterile and tautological. x v n In the understanding offered by "omne ens est verum," how- ever, knowledge of being yields moral knowledge; is teaches ought. This view involves a conception of reason different from the one to which the modern mind, as a product of the Enlightenment, is accustomed. The modern, technolo- gized mind envisions a sharp division between practical and theoretical reason. It devotes its energy to instrumen- tal rather than contemplative reasoning (a la Descartes). Theoretical contemplation and reason is tacitly dismissed as idle, uncertain speculation—the preserve of irrelevant hermits—while progress in technology bears real fruit for the world. But Thomas' understanding is fundamentally different. His epistemology assumes the underlying unity of practical and theoretical reason; both operate in the same human person. The theoretical reason at bottom involves seeing reality, grasping real things' essences (in some mys- terious fashion). Having grasped a res in intellection, hav- ing come to a theoretical knowledge of it—through experi- ence and the senses as much as any purely cerebral activities—the mind also gains a practical knowledge of what is its nature, and what that nature demands and seeks as an end. What someone or something is indicates how it ought to be approached, treated, and used . x v m Thomas Fay offers a clear summary of Jacques Maritain's understanding of this approach by his understanding of the ontological and "gnoseological" aspects of the natural law: . . . man has a being-structure which is the locus of intelligi- ble necessities. . . . He possesses ends which necessarily cor- respond to his essential constitution and which are common to all men. This means that there is, by virtue of human na- ture itself, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and according to which the human will should act if it is to attain the necessary and essential ends of being human.xlx Maritain soundly appropriates Thomistic realism and nat- ural law, including its integral philosophic foundations, which commentators like Ralph Mclnerny consider crucial for recovering the natural law in the present age. T H E O L O G I C A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S : T H E N A T U R A L LAW A N D C H R I S T I A N LOVE Yet even while articulating the natural law's classical philo- sophical foundations, we may ask whether something the- ological is also necessary for a coherent account of the nat- ural law. Given the natural law's historical development, it may be asked whether the natural law can substantially sur- vive i f abstracted from its original, Christian theological set- ting. Several scholars have recently suggested that the structure of the Summa Theologiae implies the necessity of E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 theology for the natural moral law. Aquinas' Treatise on Law is located in the Secunda Pars, which is couched by the Prima Pars (on natural and sacred theology), and the Tertia Pars (on Christ). This structural decision may be more than a coincidence; it may indicate something about a necessary interrelation of the three parts. I n a recent essay, Brian J. Shanley, O.P., suggests exactly this in terms of human be- ings as imago Dei: fiat—imposes arbitrary laws, an arbitrary ought, upon chaotic creation.™ 1 Instead, the classical understanding af- firms: omne ens est verum. Indeed, it maintains not only that intellect has priority over wi l l , but also that, absent God and his act of creation, the natural law can have no ultimately coherent foundation.™ 1 1 Yet, as St. Thomas understood, this does not mean that natural law can only be known by the "privileged communication" of revelation. 5 0^ The doctrine of imago Dei means that human action . . . can only be understood in the light of the exemplar of the Trinity. The Secunda Pars makes sense only in the light of the Prima Pars and as pointing to the Tertia Pars™ To similar effect, Glenn W. Olsen writes in a recent issue of Communio: Thomas' account of the relation between natural and divine law . . . reveals its deepest meaning SAINTTHOMAS AQUINAS, FOREM when read against the background of his doctrine . . . that nature, as such, de- sires a fullness that it can attain only within the context of gracious elevation to the visio beatifica™ Claiming the necessity of Christian theology as the sure locus of natural law does not necessitate fideistic conclu- sions, such as the argument that the natural law is some- thing inaccessible to man's reason, dependent completely upon divine revelation. In such a case, there would be noth- ing natural about the natural law. The involvement of the- ology in our speculative considerations does not necessar- ily mean that simply the wi l l of God—by voluntarist, divine Natural law thinking, in the way that we understand it from the High Middle Ages, could not have developed as it had were it not for the setting of Christian theology. Though in- timations are made of it in Stoic philoso- phy, its high develop- ment in the Christian tradition is unique. Ernest Fortin ex- plains that the natu- ral law came to fruition out of the need "to complement the moral teaching of the New Testament by means of a law that takes into account the realities of the politi- cal and social life."50™ As a crude but sug- gestive simplifica- tion, it could be said that this need became more apparent as Christians realized in the first centuries that the Second Coming was not so imminent as was first believed. They would have to sojourn—to live, think, and participate in the world down through the generations—and would have to involve themselves in ordinary work, family, and even gov- ernment—mundane matters no doubt relativized by the Gospel, but nonetheless a necessary part of the earthly life to which God calls his people for his purposes. The New Testament itself by no means provides concrete guidance for all worldly concerns, and Christians needed some sup- OST SCHOLAR OF NATURAL LAW. T H E T R U T H I N T H I N G S ( A N D L O V E I N T H E W O R L D ) "Natural law thinking, in the way that we understand it from the High Middle Ages, could not have developed as it had were it not for the setting of Christian theology." plementary wisdom. Fr. Fortin spells out this problem and illustrates the function that natural law came to serve: The great novelty of the New Testament is that, while it be- gins by abrogating the Old Law, it does not replace it by a new one but by something that transcends all divine and human law, namely, faith in Christ. . . . Nowhere does the New Testament give us any specific rules to live by or any inkling as to how the general rules that it does give us might apply to society at large. In all interesting cases, one is at a loss to draw any definite conclusions from the universal commandment of love, which lends itself to the most diverse interpretations. . . . [The natural law] injected an element of rationality into the moral ideal of the Gospel, enabled people to discover in that ideal a universality that it might otherwise be thought to lack, insured its effectiveness by spelling out some of the modalities of its application to concrete situations, and pro- vided an added safeguard against the misuses to which it easily lends itself. [This] explains why medieval Christendom is the only society in which the natural law ever played anything like a determinative role.™1 The natural law thus fills a "gap" in the New Testament by complementing it. Moving beyond Fortin's analysis, i f we consider that the Secunda Pars is only comprehensible in light of the doctrine of imago Dei and the Christ to whom it points as fulfillment, we see that the natural law employs human reason and the metaphysics of a classical realism, ultimately to carry out the mandate of Christian love on earth. I n this theological view, the Natural law is eminently rooted in love and repre- sents an authentic movement of deepening Christian love for the world and humanity, rationally rooted in the ontol- ogy of "the truth of all things." The use and development of the natural law i n the Christian tradition down to the pres- ent is i n one way an attempt to spell out rationally the promptings of love—love for the created world in which Christians find themselves, a world which in turn finds its end in love itself, in love's natural, human forms as well as its divine fullness. The natural law then appears as an element of Love's Incarnation in Jesus Christ and His loving affirmation of creation—of man's own mundane life and mundane loves, which he desires to see flourish as the beauty of created na- ture grafted onto the Gospel's grace. Divine love does not obliterate natural, human love—there is no radical opposi- tion between agape and eros, for instance—but rather draws it up into completion. As Thomas writes, "gratia perficit naturam secundum modum naturae": "grace perfects nature according to the manner of nature. ' , x x v i l This connection between the natural law and love is pre- cisely what seems, i f quietly, to lay at the center of many contemporary Catholic philosophical searches for the natu- ral law. I n this hermeneutic, the natural law is not at heart a matter of casuistic theorizing, of reactionary traditional- ism, or even primarily of justice, but of love, and love in two senses. First is the Christian, Gospel-motivated love for the world which seeks the integral good of man and society; as St. Ignatius of Antioch wrote, "the glory of God is man fully alive." Second, and perhaps more interesting, is love as the end to which the natural law itself, with its primary and sec- E L E M E N T S S P R I N G 10 ondary principles, strives. I n Christian natural law, then, even the virtue of justice is incomplete as an end: it must it- self serve love. 5 0™ 1 1 1 Especially striking in this vein is a pas- sage from Heinrich Rommen. In the midst of treating con- temporary legal issues, he suddenly and surprisingly places love at the center of the classical vision, and in very concrete terms: We do not start with a fictional status naturalis in which man existed as a quasi self-sufficient individual and which he left for utilitarian, even material, reasons or for greater economic security. We see man being begotten of the union of man and woman in the protected and protective enclo- sure of the family. We see man being begotten of an emi- nently social act, however much it be surrounded by emo- tions and the urges of the animal part of man. We see man being born and growing up in the loving circle of the family, the first, foremost and indispensable educative society. We see the family again as the member of many societies. . . . That man is by nature social means also that to man, in his essence, belong certain acts, spontaneously, freely elicited from the innermost center of the person which are social in- sofar as they find the fulfillment of their intentional essence only by the answer of another person. The act of love in all its forms and "objects"—if such a term is at all permitted— such as friendship, conjugal love, patriotism, comradeship, brotherhood, parental and filial love, and finally Divine Charity, all involve another person, and are a trustful sur- render of ourselves to other persons with a readiness to sac- rifice self-interest and material things. We grow, we gain in personal values by love which is value-producing and im- plies the most tender respect for the other person. Love in all its forms is so fundamentally an essential human act, a community-building act, that the man without any love be- comes "inhuman." The "Ego" then demands the "Thou" and becomes conscious of itself in the form of "We." Love in all its forms is an unconditionally essential act of man's na- ture. A world without love is an inhuman world.xxlx The classical natural law, then, is preeminently conscious of man's social nature, at the center of which is love of all kinds: spousal, familial, fraternal, and divine. The facilita- tion of authentic love, the source and summit of coherent human society, is thus a preeminent concern of the classi- cal natural law. A realist, Christian ethics based on the nat- ural law looks to such love, the greatest good of man, and seeks to understand its complex workings, so as to refine and protect it for fellow man and society. C O N C L U S I O N This essay has hopefully illuminated some aspects of the natural law in St. Thomas' thought, in his metaphysics, and in its larger theological setting. At times, the contemporary situation seems to present insurmountable obstacles to es- tablishing the legitimacy of natural law thinking, even amongst Christians. There is pressing need for serious and resourceful reflection on the foundations of natural law. Clarity about metaphysical and theological issues is neces- sary for recovering a full-bodied understanding of the nat- ural law that wi l l be viable and responsive to the needs of the present day. E N D N O T E S i . Weigel (no) i i . Bloom (67) i i i . King (294); i n the same letter, Dr. King cites Aquinas: "An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony w i t h the moral law. To put it i n the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: A n unjust law is a human law that is not rooted i n eternal law and natural law." iv. Fortin, "Natural Law and Social Justice" (1-20) v. Taylor (717) vi . Machiavelli (48) v i i . Machiavelli provides a few cutting examples of "how people actually behave," how the world "really" operates: "all armed prophets are victorious, and disarmed ones are crushed" (20); "men are quicker to forget the death of their father than the loss of their inheritance" (50) v i i i . Moral considerations are effectively abolished: "Those who use cruelty well may indeed find both God and their subjects are prepared to let bygones be bygones" (30) ix. Machiavelli (75) x. Hobbes (no) xi . Descartes (34-35) x i i . Nietzsche, Advantage and Disadvantage (48-49) x i i i . Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (50-51) xiv. Pieper, "The Truth of A l l Things" (13); Pieper additionally cites two other equivalent expressions: "ens et verum convertun- T H E T R U T H I N T H I N G S ( A N D L O V E I N T H E W O R L D ) tur," and "omnis res est vera et nulla res est falsa" (Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate I , 10) xv. Pieper, "The Truth of A l l Things" (16) xvi. Pieper, "The Truth of A l l Things" (17) xvii. Pieper, "The Truth of A l l Things" (19); Kant writes: "... the concepts o f unity, t ruth , and perfection . . . are, i n themselves, empty. . . . I t is the same regarding truth; for t ruth be i n this: that every thing would be what it is—which is tautological as well ." (fn.19) xvii i i . Summa Theologiae, la q. 79 a. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, c.25 xix. Fay (439-48); See also Mclnerny, "Natural Law and Human Rights" (1-14) xx. Shanley (345-69) xxi. Olsen (367) xxii. Ibid; ". . . the path to holiness revealed i n Scripture is not a positivistic decree only fideists can accept, but has a purchase on the inner rational structure of human nature." xxiii . Olsen (366); ". . . the natural law is God's command as found i n nature, though, as Thomas is quick to point out, com- manding belongs to reason, not to voluntaristically understood w i l l . " xxiv. Bourke (92-96) xxv. Fortin, "Natural Law and Social Justice" (10) xxvi. Fortin (5-9) xxvii. Summa Theologiae, la q. 62 a. 5 xxviii. Pieper, "On the Limits of Justice" (111); "the man who strives for justice ... realizes (Thomas says) that fulfi l l ing an ob- ligation and doing what he is really obliged to do are not all that is necessary. Something more is required, something over and above, such as liberality, ajfabilitas, kindness, i f man's commu- nal life is to remain human." xxix. Rommen (128-140) R E F E R E N C E S Anselm of Canterbury. De veritate, IX. Bloom, Allan. 1987. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster. Bourke, Vernon J. 1956. "Two Approaches to Natural Law." Natural Law Forum. 1, pp. 92-96. Descartes, Rene. 1998. "Discourse on Method." Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 34-35. Fay, Thomas A. 1991. "Maritain on Rights and Natural Law," The Thomist, 55, pp. 439-48, July. Fortin, Ernest L. 1985. "Natural Law and Social Justice." The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 30: pp. 1-20. Fortin, Ernest L. 1996. Human Rights, Virtue, and the Common Good: Untimely Meditations on Religion and Politics. Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, pp. 159-164. Hobbes, Thomas. 1971. "Leviathan, Chapter X I I I : Of the Natural Condition o f Mankind, as Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery." The Great Legal Philosophers: Selected Readings in Jurisprudence. Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, pp.110. King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1986. "Letter from Birmingham City Jail." A Testament of Hope: the Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 294. Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1994. "The Prince," Selected Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 48. Mclnerny, Ralph. 1991. "Natural Law and Human Rights." The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 36, pp. 1-14. Mclnerny, Ralph. 1980. "The Principles of Natural Law." The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 25, pp. 1-15. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1980. On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 48-49. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1990. "How the 'Real World' at last be- came a Myth." Twilight of the Idols and the Anti Christ. London: Penguin Books, pp. 50-51. Olsen, Glenn W. 2008. "Natural Law: The First Grace." Communio, 35(3), pp. 367, Fall. Pieper, Josef. 2003. "On the Limits of Justice." The Four Cardinal Virtues. Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, pp. i n . Pieper, Josef. 1989. "The Truth o f A l l Things: A n Inquiry into the Anthropology o f the High Middle Ages." Living the Truth. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, pp. 13. Ratzinger, Joseph. 2006. Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam. New York: Basic Books. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Rommen, Heinrich. 1955. "Natural Law: Man and Society." Fordham Law Review. 24, pp. 128-140. Shanley, Brian, O.P. 2008. "Aquinas' Exemplar Ethics." The Thomist, 30, pp. 345-69. Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Harvard U Press, pp. 717. 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