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The Making of "Woman" 
The Evolution of Chinese State Feminism(s) Under Three Chinese Leaders  

Jessica Yang, Stanford ’24 
 

 
Abstract: Every nation harbors a dynamic “feminism” owing to unique cultural traditions, 
national experiences, and women’s own experience of “gender inequality.” The nuanced 
“feminisms” make historical contextualization of national feminisms essential to crafting a 
more culturally-inclusive feminist rhetoric. Chinese feminist rhetoric is one of the most 
dynamic in the world. In the last century, China experienced two dramatic socio-cultural 
transformations with consequences reverberating in every aspect of Chinese society, 
especially gender relations and feminist rhetoric. While numerous scholars analyzed how the 
fundamentally-different Maoist and Post-Mao Era “state feminisms” transformed gender 
relations, very few extended their analyses to contemporary Chinese feminism. It is crucial 
that we analyze the state feminist rhetoric of the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping to 
understand the evolution of Xi’s gender rhetoric and its connections to earlier state 
feminisms. A combined analysis of Maoist, Post-Mao Era, and Xi’s state feminisms will 
craft a more encompassing picture of the dynamic nature of Chinese feminisms and the 
fluidity of gender constructions since 1900s China. While Xi’s state rhetoric frames the 
return to traditional female roles as establishing China’s cultural autonomy and elevating 
China as a whole, in reality, the emphasis on family and women’s empowerment only serves 
the state’s interests. Ultimately, Xi draws upon both Mao’s and Deng’s state feminisms to 
impose his own, arguably more oppressive idea of “gender equality.” 

  



 

“Feminism is never monolithic or static.”  
—Estelle B. Freedman, History of Feminisms 

Every nation harbors a distinctive and dynamic “feminism” owing to unique cultural 
traditions and national experiences. Each woman’s experience of “gender inequality” is 
different depending on their ethnicity, class, and religion (Noh, 2003). These nuanced 
“feminisms” make historical contextualization of national feminisms essential to crafting a 
more culturally-inclusive feminist rhetoric–to ultimately empower all women with the self-
agency they deserve.  

Chinese feminist rhetoric is one of the most dynamic in the world and shaped 
dramatically by state politics and China’s political leaders. China experienced two dramatic 
cultural and sociopolitical transformations in the last century, with consequences 
reverberating in every aspect of Chinese society—especially gender relations and feminist 
rhetoric. Without analyzing how China’s feminist rhetoric emerged with its sociopolitical 
context, it becomes virtually impossible to advocate for a culturally-appropriate “gender 
equality” that empowers, rather than constrains, Chinese women. 

For centuries, Chinese gender relations were defined by a Confucian patriarchal 
system that degraded women into inherited objects passed from father to husband to son, a 
concept known as the “Three Obediences.” Since then, China’s political leaders have played 
a critical role in shaping gender roles, due to the tremendous power they wield as the 
Chinese Communist Party (CPP) leader (Qin, 2019; Rauhala, 2015). When Mao established 
his Communist regime, the People’s Republic of China, in 1949, he radically overturned 
Confucianism’s debasing rhetoric of women: desexualizing women and proclaiming gender 
neutrality (Leung, 2003). However, after Mao’s death in 1976, the new modernist leader 
Deng Xiaoping implemented economic reform and an open-door policy aimed at reversing 
Mao’s communist policies and modernizing China (Huang, 2018). Deng’s new government 
ushered in the Post-Mao Era, precipitating another fundamental transformation in Chinese 
gender relations and feminism (Leung, 2003; Wu, 2010). Unlike Mao’s asexual gender 
rhetoric, Deng’s state rhetoric in the Post-Mao Era reflected an essentialist view of gender 
that reemphasized women’s “femininity” and sexual differences (Limin, 2013; Zheng & 
Zhang, 2010). 

While numerous scholars analyzed how the fundamentally-different Maoist and 
Post-Mao Era “state feminisms” transformed gender relations, very few extended their 
analyses to contemporary Chinese feminism. Contemporary Chinese feminism is heavily 
influenced by Chinese legislation, sociocultural trends, and increasing global 
interconnectedness. Therefore, it is crucial that we analyze the state feminist rhetoric of the 
current, paramount Chinese leader, Xi Jinping—arguably as powerful as both Mao and 
Deng—to understand the evolution of Xi’s gender rhetoric and its connections to earlier 
state feminisms (Fincher, 2012b; Lewis, 2020a; Qin, 2019; Rauhala, 2015). A combined 



 

analysis of these state feminisms will craft a more encompassing picture of Chinese 
feminisms’ dynamic nature and the fluidity of gender constructions since 1900s China.  

To analyze the evolution of what we now understand as “Chinese feminisms,” I 
begin by examining historians’ different interpretations of how Maoist and Post-Mao Era 
state feminisms impacted gender inequality and women’s self-perception. I will extend these 
analyses to incorporate Xi Jinping’s state feminist rhetoric and its response to a vastly-
different sociopolitical context. By analyzing Xi’s propaganda and media statements, I argue 
that Xi’s government is pursuing an aggressive political campaign reemphasizing traditional 
Chinese values of family and encouraging nationalism, consequently revitalizing Confucian 
female roles of motherhood and wifehood. While Xi’s state rhetoric frames a return to 
traditional female roles as establishing China’s cultural autonomy and elevating China as a 
whole, in reality, the emphasis on family only serves the state’s interests. By pressuring 
women to marry and reproduce for national “advancement,” Xi—like Mao and Deng—
continues to frame women’s rights as subordinate to other state goals and as a means to an 
end. Ultimately, Xi draws upon both Mao’s and Deng’s state feminisms to impose his own, 
arguably more oppressive idea of gender equality. Xi uses state rhetoric to reinforce 
traditional Confucian values of women’s inferiority, effectively oppressing women both 
legislatively and socio-culturally—all to strengthen the CCP’s authoritarian control.  
 
Pre-Mao Era “Womanhood” 
 Until Mao Zedong took power in 1949 and radically uprooted traditional Chinese 
values, Confucianism dominated social rhetoric (Liu, 2013). For centuries, deeply-
entrenched Confucian values of filial piety and the “Three Obediences” underscored 
women’s inferiority and rendered women powerless both in public and in the home. Its 
debasing rhetoric cultivated traditions like “foot-binding” to restrict women to the domestic 
sphere and to undermine women’s intellectual capacities (Liu, 2013). Confucianism’s 
patriarchal ideals emphasized how social order depends on the “Wu Lun” 五伦 or “five 

relations”: “ruler-ruled, father-son, elder-younger brother, husband-wife, and male friend-
friend” (Leung, 2003, p. 360). The rhetoric of social and familial order made traditional 
Chinese society patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal (a practice where couples settle in the 
man’s home or community) (Leung, 2003).  

In contrast to Western individualism, Confucianism teaches obedience and every 
individual as morally obligated to society—especially women (Liu, 2013; Wu, 2010). 
Historians agree that Chinese women were consistently defined in relation to men rather 
than as individual beings, deprived of self-agency, and characterized as tools for social 
advancement (Leung, 2003; Liu, 2013). Knowledge of Chinese collectivistic culture allows 
us to better understand how Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping framed their 
feminist rhetoric within the context of societal benefit.  
 



 

Mao Zedong’s State Feminism (1949-1976) 
With the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao Zedong 

reversed centuries-old Chinese traditions of women’s subordination by radically proclaiming 
women’s social equality and by using social-constructionist language: language emphasizing 
how “gender” is created by society rather than gender-essentialist language suggesting 
“gender” is created by innate biological differences (Limin, 2013). To free women from 
confining Confucian gender ideals, Mao desexualized women through social-constructionist 
language like “nüquan” 女权 (female power) versus gender-essentialist language like 
“nüxing” 女性 (female sexuality) (Angeloff & Lieber, 2012; Liu, 2013). Mao specifically 
departed from “funü” 婦女—a term connoting Confucian values of women as wives and 
mothers—to liberate women from their subservient, domestic roles and propel them into 
public labor (Huang, 2018; Bo Wang, 2010). Both Huang (2018) and Wu (2019) explained 
how Mao’s famous proclamation, “women hold up half the sky,” elevated an unprecedented 
number of Chinese women into public life. However, while agreeing that Mao’s feminist 
rhetoric affirmed women’s equal capabilities with men, many scholars contend that Mao’s 
state feminism was still rooted in a patriarchal revolutionary system. 

Scholars disagree over the extent to which Mao’s gender reconstruction undermined 
or strengthened Chinese patriarchy by transforming women’s public and domestic roles. A 
leading historian in Chinese gender discourse, Zheng (2005) explains how, because 
women’s subordination mainly stemmed from the family hierarchy, Mao's Communist 
policies dissolving the family unit partially weakened Chinese patriarchy. However, other 
historians argue that Mao’s policies extolled women’s public contributions while 
emphasizing domestic responsibilities as women’s primary roles (Angeloff & Lieber, 2012; 
Huang, 2018). They point to how Mao grandly touted the elimination of gendered division 
of labor with his tailored female ideal, the “iron woman,” who simultaneously embraces 
economic labor and fulfills family responsibilities. While this ideal positively reshaped 
women’s self-perception, it also imposed compounded public and domestic burdens on 
Chinese women—known as “double burden”—and only paid “lip service” to domestic 
equality (Gao, 2017b; Limin, 2013). A professor of Chinese women’s labor inequalities at 
Hong Kong Baptist University, Leung (2003) more harshly condemns Maoist feminism as 
“officially-sanctioned, subordinative … gendered division of labor and reproductive 
activities” (p. 365). According to Wu (2019), Mao’s superficial gender reforms did not 
uproot the patriarchal system. Mao only suppressed traditional gender discourse. Evidently, 
Mao’s “gender equality” or “nannü pingdeng” 男女平等 rhetoric did not equate to 
“women’s liberation” (Limin, 2013). 

Some scholars go even further to suggest that Mao did not simply desexualize but 
actually “masculinized” women. Mao attempted to “re-mold” women by masculine 
standards, demanding they wear “shapeless clothes … behave exactly like men” and show 



 

little affection for their children (Leung, 2003, p. 366). By only superficially changing 
women without uprooting structural patriarchal values, Mao suppressed women’s femininity 
and stripped them of self-agency (Wu, 2010). Gao (2017a) explicitly condemns party 
propaganda as rooted in gender prejudices—like the idea of women’s weaker 
constitutions—despite the “iron woman” ideal. This echoes previous scholars’ views that 
state propaganda deformed women’s images with patriarchal standards (Limin, 2013). 
Reading these analyses of Mao’s state propaganda and rhetoric in combination, Huang 
(2018) concludes that Mao desexualized women only for the purpose of state labor and 
forcibly redefined women’s identity through their political, family, worker, and communist 
roles. Consequently, many authors assert that official state discourse firmly decided 
women’s gender identities. Gender equality remained subordinate to Mao’s collective goals 
(Leung, 2003; Wu, 2010). Such was Mao’s “passive liberation” or “pseudo liberation” of 
women (Limin, 2013, p. 95). 

Mao’s gender equality policies failed because they denied women self-determination 
and were a “state-down” approach to gender reform (Huang, 2018; Leung, 2003; Limin, 
2013). Mao’s demand for complete equality was too radical in a time when Chinese women 
were struggling to be recognized as human—much less equal humans (Liu, 2013). Before 
Mao rose to power in 1949, traditional Confucian rhetoric debased women as lesser 
creatures without the privileges of femininity like Western women had. As such, Zheng 
(2005) points to how Mao introduced ideas of women's “equal rights” when women 
themselves had no idea what “gender equality” entailed. Importantly, Gao (2017) and Limin 
(2013) depart from focusing on male perspectives to instead analyze women’s perspective 
on Mao’s gender reform. Both argue Mao stripped women of their “private language” of 
femininity derived from personal experiences. Lacking feminist consciousness and 
autonomous sexuality, women’s experiences under Maoist "gender equality" policies were 
more confining than liberating. Consequently, many Chinese women sought to reclaim their 
femininity and openly embraced the Post-Maoist Era’s re-emphasis of their sexuality 
(Limin, 2013). 
 
Post-Mao Era State Feminism (1978-1995) 
 When Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978 following Mao’s death, Deng radically 
reversed Mao’s state feminist rhetoric and promoted a gender-essentialist view of women, 
fostering another fundamental transformation in Chinese gender relations. In contrast to 
Mao’s gender-neutral state rhetoric, Deng’s new government believed and used scientific 
rhetoric to underscore women’s biological differences with men (Huang, 2018). State 
rhetoric proclaimed it was restoring “the right order of the nation” by rebalancing gender 
differences, harkening to Confucian beliefs of “yinyang” 阴阳 harmony between genders (L. 
Wang, 2013). This led to the renewed use of “xingbie” 性别 (“difference between sexes”) 



 

and “nüxing” 女性 (“female sex”) to describe women, terms popular before the Mao Era 
(Angeloff & Lieber, 2012).   
 Researchers widely agree that Post-Mao Era state feminist rhetoric was rooted in “an 
implicit gender code” that patronized women and denied them self-determination (Angeloff 
& Lieber, 2012; Wu, 2010; Zheng & Zhang, 2010). Leung (2003) critiques Deng’s policies 
as using “presumed sexual differences” to group women with the “elderly and young” (p. 
367), therefore suggesting women need special protection because of their biological 
differences. While these laws may have endowed women with unique protection, their 
paternalistic natures rendered them restrictive and debasing. It helped craft a “social 
harmony” based on men’s absolute domination over women (Zheng & Zhang, 2010).    

Coupled with China’s expanding market-economy, Deng’s gender-essentialist state 
rhetoric increasingly commodified female sexuality (Leung, 2003; Wu, 2019; Zheng & 
Zhang, 2010). Leung (2003) reveals how state advertisements celebrated female 
attractiveness to “fulfill their sex role”; popular media almost exclusively associated women 
with fashion and beauty (p. 370). This cultivated women’s internalization of themselves as 
the “second sex,” as “woman” became synonymous with “femininity.” L. Wang (2013), 
however, provides a contrasting perspective. Placing Post-Mao state rhetoric in historical 
context with Mao’s masculinized “iron women,” L. Wang (2013) explores how the new 
state rhetoric could be seen as positive because it reemphasized women’s femininity, 
something that Mao had forcibly stripped away from many women. However, in both 
instances, the state defined “womanhood” and women were given no self-agency. 

The Fourth U.N. World Conference of Women (1995) in Beijing was a crucial 
turning point in helping Chinese women recognize the importance of self-agency and begin 
challenging state-imposed gender roles. The Conference introduced new ideas of “self,” 
“gender,” and “women’s empowerment” into Chinese feminist rhetoric. With these new 
concepts of self-autonomy and women’s equal rights, the state changed its terminology from 
“gender equality” (“nannü pingdeng” 男女平等) to “social equality between men and 
women" (“shehui xingbie pingdeng” 社会性别平等) (Zheng & Zhang, 2010). This change 
gave Chinese women the conceptual framework to free themselves from Marxist and 
socialist rhetoric of “gender equality” that subordinated women’s equality to other collective 
state goals (Huang, 2018; Leung, 2003). “Gender” unlocked new meanings for women’s 
“equal rights,” and pressured the Chinese government to acknowledge international 
democratic trends and women’s own perspectives in the new contemporary age.  

Theoretically, the Conference and burgeoning transnational feminist dialogue should 
have transformed China’s feminist movement from a state-sanctioned entity into an 
independent movement powered by women themselves. However, this is not the reality.   
 
21st-century State Gender Rhetoric 



 

 After the 1995 U.N. Women’s Conference, the CCP did indeed change its state 
rhetoric to reflect new ideas of “gender”—but only on the policy level. In the early 2000s, 
the CPP amended China’s constitution to emphasize its “recommitment” to gender equality; 
state organizations formalized “gender” into state rhetoric (Bin Wang, 2019). After Xi 
Jinping became the Chinese president in 2013, his speeches particularly underscored his 
attention to gender inequality, frequently alluding to Mao’s proclamation, “women hold up 
half the sky” (Qin, 2019). Most recently, in his 2020 U.N. Speech to commemorate the 1995 
Women’s Conference, President Xi declared that “equality between men and women is a 
basic state policy in China."      

In reality, however, gender inequality is increasing across Chinese society under Xi, 
compared to its declining trend under both Mao and Deng (Rauhala, 2015). Just one 
example is how China had one of the highest percentages of women in the labor force at 
75% in 1990, a percentage which has declined to 61% in 2019 (Qin, 2019). Moreover, 
China’s economic transformation has overwhelmingly benefitted men. On the World 
Economic Forum’s global gender gap index, China’s ranking declined from 57th out of 139 
nations in 2008 to 103rd in 2018 (The Global Gender Gap, 2018).  

Evidently, despite the CCP’s enduring emphasis on gender equality as a founding 
principle, Xi’s government is reversing decades of progress in women’s rights. This 
phenomenon could partly be driven by Xi’s revitalization of traditional Confucian values of 
family that both legislatively and culturally pressures women into conformity with his idea 
of “gender equality.” Characterized by women’s domesticity and patriarchal domination, 
Xi’s “gender equality” is more oppressive than either Mao’s or Deng’s. In the final section, I 
reveal that Xi’s gender reform is aimed at perpetuating the CCP’s autocratic power—now 
that the Party faces potential instability arising from China’s sex-ratio imbalance and 
younger generations’ challenging of traditional, patriarchal hierarchies.   
 
Xi’s Family-Focused Rhetoric  

Since 2013, Xi’s state propaganda reemphasizing traditional Confucian values, 
especially of family, has propelled women’s decreasing public involvement and inequalities. 
One of the most preeminent scholars of Xi’s state feminism, Fincher (2014) describes Xi’s 
new political theory for the CPP as “Confucian-style morality,” which blends Confucian 
values with Mao’s Marxist ideology. The influence of Xi’s political ideology is extensive. 
Xi became the first Chinese president since Deng to have his political ideology with his 
name attached immortalized in the Chinese Constitution, evidencing his ascension to be one 
of China’s paramount leaders comparable to Mao and Deng (Buckley, 2018). Xi draws upon 
both Mao’s and Deng’s rhetorical strategies to preserve the CCP’s supremacy. In contrast to 
the indirect effects of Deng’s policies on women and similarly to Mao, Xi deliberately 
reshapes women’s gender roles, asserting that China’s success depends on such state-
imposed social order. However, Xi builds upon the gender-essentialism and sexist 



 

Confucian ideals of Deng’s government to craft Xi’s new vision for China: one 
characterized by male-centered, Confucian values of family that effectively fortify state 
control.  

Xi’s aggressive family-values campaign is nowhere more evident than in his 
rhetorical characterization of China as “one family” under an indisputable patriarch: himself. 
This lays the foundation for the state media to portray Xi as the nation’s “Confucian father” 
(Fincher, 2014). In the 2010s, state media intensified Xi’s personality cult by affectionately 
deeming him “Xi Dada,” translating into “Uncle Xi” or “Big Daddy” (Fincher, 2018). 
Reinforced by popular culture, his state-cultivated persona embodies the perfect husband, 
father, grandfather, and leader all in one. The propaganda particularly evokes the nation’s 
god-like idolization of Mao to celebrate Xi as the national patriarch (Burckhardt, 2016).   

By framing Xi as the national patriarch, state media uses traditional Chinese values 
of filial piety and obedience to justify the CCP’s authoritarian control and gender roles as 
necessary for “family” and social harmony. China Daily, the state-owned newspaper, praises 
Xi for stressing the importance of family, explaining how Xi’s values for the “little family” 
embody his hopes for the “big family”: the nation (An, 2018). By drawing upon Confucian 
values of filial piety in the nuclear family, Xi establishes that Chinese citizens or the 
“children” are culturally, morally, and politically obligated to obey their “patriarch”—and 
therefore, not question the existing gender roles. This reinforces the legitimacy of Xi’s and 
the CCP’s control over China’s moral and cultural character, and ultimately, their vision for 
gender roles.   
 
Women’s Compounded Legislative and Cultural Oppression 

Due to deeply-rooted Confucian values of the “Three Obediences” and women’s 
subservience, Xi especially pressures women into conforming with the CCP’s gender roles. 
Xi is the first president to explicitly break from Mao’s and Deng’s state rhetoric rooted in 
Marxist ideals of women’s liberation and declare that women must “shoulder the domestic 
burden” (Qin, 2019). Although women’s domestic responsibilities were implicit under Mao 
and Deng, both had openly encouraged women into the public sphere. One avenue that both 
Mao and Deng used to spread messages promoting gender neutrality was through the All-
China Women’s Federation or ACWF, formed in 1949 and the only state-sponsored 
women’s organization. In stark contrast, today, Vice President Meng Man of the ACWF 
uses traditional ideas of the gendered division of household labor to justify Xi’s emphasis on 
women’s domestic roles in a 2018 statement. She explains how the ACWF is inspired by 
Xi’s belief that women have “certain abilities that can help them naturally play an important 
role in health, education and charity undertakings,” notably excluding other professional 
fields (Newly-Elected, 2018). Therefore, Xi’s government distorts and paradoxically 
entwines the Communist Party’s core philosophy that “women hold up half the sky” with 
Confucian values of women’s family responsibilities. It redefines women’s role in “holding 



 

up half the sky” as limited to their domestic roles, effectively stripping women of self-
determination.  

Xi adds moral impetus to his call for traditional gender roles by portraying it as a 
necessary precondition for China’s cultural autonomy and national elevation, especially in 
the context of increased globalization. Through the deliberate contrast of his 2013 “Chinese 
Dream” movement with the “American Dream,” Xi stresses China’s need to revitalize 
traditional values and distinguish itself from America as a global superpower (Sun, 2019). 
Ubiquitous “Chinese Dream” propaganda such as that urge citizens to prioritize and work 
towards China’s “national rejuvenation” and cultural individuality (Youth Urged, 2013).  

Xi’s message directly targets women. Xi highlights the importance of family 
values—therefore, women’s domestic roles—to national glory. At the 19th CCP National 
Congress (2017), Xi pointedly declared that a women’s civic duty is to raise “family virtues 
and personal integrity.” Xi further linked “good” with “family” in his 2018 address to the 
ACWF, tying women’s traditional duties with the preservation of “national virtues.” He 
urged women to “possess the spirit of patriotism...use their own development for the great 
cause of the reform and development of the motherland” (Xinhua, 2018). In these speeches, 
Xi explicitly calls on Chinese women to “reform” themselves for China’s advancement, yet 
rarely mentions men and otherwise states, “Chinese people.” 

Even in 2020, Xi continues to characterize women as the “means” and “drivers” of 
social progress—instead of identifying women’s rights as its own important goal—to impel 
women to fulfill state gender roles (Full Text: Xi’s UN Speech, 2020). In his 2020 U.N. 
speech, Xi even endeavors to reshape women’s understanding of their own happiness. He 
asserts that women deserve to “feel satisfied, happy...live life in full.” But what does “live 
life in full” truly mean? Xi deliberately, ambiguously defines what women’s “full 
happiness” means to veil his hidden meaning; to him, women’s “full happiness” should 
derive solely from their familial duties, rather than their self-autonomy. By inseparably 
linking women’s traditional responsibilities of marriage and motherhood to patriotism, 
national rejuvenation, and cultural autonomy, Xi reshapes women’s self-perception and 
doubly oppresses women into conformity. If women do not conform, they now face state-
supported, social ostracization as women who “selfishly” prioritize their individual rights 
and wellbeing.   

Xi uses the derogatory “sheng nü'' or “leftover women” to describe single, 
independent, and highly-educated women over the age of 27 to shame women who do not 
conform to their “moral, civic duty” of domesticity. While the term was coined by the 
ACWF and formalized into state law by the Ministry of Education in 2007, “sheng nü'' was 
popularized as official rhetoric under Xi due to his state initiatives encouraging women’s 
marriage and reproduction (Fincher, 2014). It is important to contextualize how Chinese 
culture teaches women to prioritize their families over their other interests. Single women 
interviewed in the SK-II short film, “Marriage Market Takeover” (2016), and the New York 



 

Times Op-Doc, “Leftover Women” (Shlam & Medalia, 2020), illuminate how traditional 
Chinese culture perceives unmarried women as “incomplete humans''—an idea that Xi’s 
emphasis on marriage now reinforces and cultivates. Essentially, Xi exploits these 
entrenched cultural beliefs to both legislatively and culturally compel women to fulfill these 
state gender roles for societal advancement. His blurring of government-imposed and 
cultural morality has strengthened the relationship between state feminist rhetoric and 
Chinese gender relations more than either Mao and Deng. 

The ACWF has been instrumental in disseminating Xi’s gender rhetoric and shaping 
public perception of family and marriage (Zhou, 2019). ACWF newsletters and propaganda 
address all aspects of women’s lives, from offering relationship advice to strategically 
castigating “leftover women.” Some ACWF articles endorse traditional Confucian ideals for 
women, such as encouraging women to internalize their inferiority and marry quickly. They 
shame women for being too “picky” regarding marriage, urge women to lower their 
standards, and even tolerate husbands who disrespect women. The following excerpt was 
taken from the ACWF’s March 2011 column posted days after International Women’s Day 
(Fincher, 2012b): 

“When holding out for a man, if you say he must be rich and brilliant, romantic and 
hardworking [...] this is just being willful. Does this kind of perfect man exist? 
Maybe he does exist, but why on earth would he want to marry you?” 
The ACWF goes as far as to condone men’s infidelity and vices, asserting such 

behaviors are women’s faults. They instruct women to never challenge gender roles but, 
instead, reform themselves to fulfill these ideals, directly tying to state rhetoric framing 
national success as solely dependent on women’s “self-improvements.” Rather than 
acknowledging patriarchy as a foundational problem, the ACWF actively encourages 
women to help perpetuate patriarchal ideals and gender inequality—all for the so-called 
“national interest.” An excerpt from the ACWF’s article, “Faced With A Marital Crisis, 
Women Need to Improve Themselves,” states: 

“When you find out that he is having an affair, you may be in a towering rage, but 
you must know that if you make a fuss, you deny the man “face” [...] No man is 
capable of spending a lifetime being loyal to an outmoded wife who never changes ... 
Try changing your hairstyle [...] Women must constantly change for the better.” 

 ACWF further enforces social conformity by vehemently castigating “leftover 
women” as disrespecting Chinese culture and inhibiting national development. Yet, they 
hypocritically label “leftover women” when it is actually “leftover men” due to China’s 
surplus of 30 million men (Lewis, 2020a).  

“Many highly educated ‘leftover women’ are very progressive in their thinking and 
enjoy going to nightclubs to search for a one-night stand [...] It is only when they 
have lost their youth and are kicked out by the man, that they decide to look for a life 
partner. Therefore, most ‘leftover women’ do not deserve our sympathy.” 



 

The state’s dehumanization of single women fosters a self-reinforcing cycle in which 
women internalize Xi’s narrowly-defined “womanhood” and accept their inferiority and 
subordination. “Sheng nü” becomes a form of government “language policing” (Feldshuh, 
2018), reinforced by pervasive popular culture stigmatizing and branding “leftover women.” 
Much like women’s experiences under Mao and Deng, such social stigma renders women 
unable to achieve full equality and ultimately serves to perpetuate state control. 
 
The Motives behind Xi’s Gender Reform 

Xi’s ultimate motive for gender reform is using women’s subordination to solve 
China’s reproduction problem and perpetuate the state’s autocratic control. China’s State 
Council addressed how the “unprecedented population pressures” of sex-ratio imbalance and 
“low quality of general population” (uneducated rural families) are a “threat to social 
stability” (Fincher, 2014). Confronted with declining birth rates and an aging population, the 
Chinese government seeks to increase reproduction. However, they only want high-quality 
reproduction by young, educated, and urban women (Chang, 2020). Consequently, the CCP 
portrays traditional family values as liberating women and their “natural” duties, when, in 
reality, it unfairly demands women to sacrifice their wellbeing for state interests. 

Xi also emphasizes women’s domestic responsibilities to address the CCP’s fear of 
potential instability. Especially as there is an excess of 30 million single men in China due to 
the Single-Child policy, a feminist revolt against a patriarchal society that could overturn the 
Party’s entire political legitimacy (Lewis, 2020b). The CCP perceives gender equality as a 
threat to its autocratic power rooted in sexism (Fincher, 2012b; Lewis, 2020a; Qin, 2019). In 
a Washington Post article, Fincher (2018) asserts that, “it is impossible to understand the 
longevity of China's Communist Party without recognizing the patriarchal underpinnings of 
its authoritarianism. In short, China's ultimate strongman, Xi, like other autocrats around the 
world, views patriarchal authoritarianism as critical for the survival of the Communist 
Party.” Thus, by reducing women into “reproductive tools for the state, dutiful wives, 
mothers, and baby breeders,” the CCP can reinforce traditional power imbalances, minimize 
social disorder, and strengthen its authoritarian power (Fincher, 2012a). Yet, the CCP’s 
increasingly “fragile masculinity” symbolizes its increasingly fragile state control owing to 
growing international dialogue and citizen consciousness (Fincher, 2018).  

Undeniably, Xi’s traditional Chinese culture and family initiative predominantly 
serve his state interests. Like under Mao and Deng, women’s rights remain subordinate to 
broader state goals. All three leaders demand women to sacrifice their rights and wellbeing 
for “Chinese society,” which essentially means the CCP. While women’s so-called 
“liberation” was defined differently under all three regimes, the uniting similarity is their 
framing of “women’s liberation” as a means to an end for national “advancement” and the 
perpetuation of patriarchal authoritarianism. 
 



 

Conclusion  
All three Chinese leaders—Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping—deny 

women self-empowerment under their inherently-oppressive state feminisms. None establish 
gender equality as its own distinctive goal. None place women at the forefront of their own 
so-called “liberation.” Even in the context of 21st-century globalization and 
democratization, Xi expands Mao’s and Deng’s oppressive state feminisms to forge his 
vision of “gender equality” and “womanhood.” It is one that undoubtedly represses women 
under law and culture by revitalizing outdated, sexist Confucian values of women’s 
inferiority to promote CPP agendas, all while hiding under the facade of restoring China’s 
cultural autonomy and catalyzing national development.  

However, culture is continually evolving: Chinese feminisms and definitions of 
“gender equality” with it. While Xi may frame traditional Chinese gender norms as 
unchanging, Mao’s and Deng’s regimes evidence the fluidity of gender constructions and 
dynamism of Chinese culture. Xi’s state feminism exists in a new sociopolitical context 
characterized by a contemporary understanding of women’s equal human rights and 
increasing Chinese grassroots-feminist voices. To continue denying women choice, self-
autonomy, and fundamental human rights would be incompatible with modern civilization.  

The Chinese women’s movement no longer simply advocates for equal rights 
between men and women. They now demand equal rights for all individuals against an 
authoritarian state. Xi’s increasing disenfranchisement of women evidences his 
consolidation of power, paving the path for his expanded authoritarian control over all 
Chinese citizens and their rights. It is this intimate entwinement of women’s rights and 
human rights that the international community must recognize and support. We must all be 
aware that patriarchal ideology is its own form of oppression.   

As such, the Chinese government cannot be the only entity deciding women’s rights. 
Grassroots-feminists and other Chinese women must have an active role in shaping Chinese 
gender reform and determining their lives. We can all play a role in supporting the Chinese 
women’s movement: not by imposing our definitions of “gender equality” upon them, but 
by amplifying their voices, spreading their message, and giving them the platform to speak 
for themselves.          



 

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