
































Wu FINAL


Stars Surrounded by Darkness 
Qingyun Wu, Tufts University ’23 

Abstract: K-pop has experienced a surge in global popularity, largely attributed to the 
globalization strategies implemented by the entertainment industry, including the establishment 
of a star system. Within this system, female idols have been theorized as sexualized pretty dolls 
by their companies. The aim of this study is to examine how the presentation of female idols has 
altered over time. Through the lenses of gender display and objectification frameworks, and 
employing content analysis as the research method, the study analyzes music videos from 
different generations in K-pop. From the coding results, the study concludes with the inherent 
inequality faced by female idols within the industry and explores the complexities of popular 
feminist themes in the current generation, which can simultaneously empower and constrain 
them. 



Introduction  
K-pop has demonstrated continuous success in the global music industry, with the soaring 

popularity of groups such as BTS and Blackpink. While K-pop girl idols are celebrated for their 
remarkable music and dance abilities, their appearance is equally significant. Typically 
conforming to Korean beauty standards that emphasize youthful and feminine looks, girl idols 
are often associated with reinforcing female stereotypes by performing their gender through their 
music videos and other products. This study aims to investigate whether the presentation of K-
pop female idols has changed over time. 

This study opens with a literature review of the K-pop star system and entertainment 
companies’ goal of globalization. According to Kim (2013, p. 8), K-pop is a “deliberately 
planned industry” that embodies capitalist marketing and neoliberal governmentality, where 
idols’ bodies are regulated in a market-oriented way. The entertainment agencies have created a 
systematic way of production, particularly in the case of female idols, who not only undergo 
extensive training, but also must comply with the beauty standards set by the industry. I 
conceptualize the idol industry in relation to aesthetic labor, drawing on Goffman’s framework of 
gender display and Mulvey’s concept of gazes. I then elaborate on my operationalization, which 
involves analyzing the music videos of mainstream female idol groups across generations, to 
conclude that female idols are constructed as ideal girls based on observed nonverbal behaviors. 
I also argue that although some female idols resist traditional gender roles in their music videos, 
aligning with postfeminist sentiments and the commercialization of popular feminism, these 
idols still fail to escape the capitalist manipulation by their labels. Looking ahead to the future of 
gender in K-pop, I argue that while the genre may not be a driving force behind feminist 
movements, it is an avenue for its audience to explore and navigate their own gender and sexual 
identities. 

The Idol Industry 
What makes K-pop attractive to a wide range of audiences is its unique star-making 

process that highlights physique and voice-choreography (Oh, 2013). Entertainment companies 
— notably SM Entertainment, YG Entertainment, and JYP Entertainment (or the “Big Three” 
entertainment houses) — adopt an in-house idol training system, or “academy system,” that 
incorporates “production” and “management” (Shin, 2009; Shin & Kim, 2013). 

Entertainment agencies recruit their trainees through auditions, street castings, and TV 
programs. Global auditions are also held for candidates abroad (Lee, 2013). Consider the 
example of the 2022 SM Kwangya Global. While there were no requirements for nationality, 
applicants must have been born between 2003 and 2011 (Cha, 2022). Those who passed the 
auditions then entered an apprenticeship which usually lasted two or more years (Lee, 2013). 
Training programs included singing, rapping, dancing, acting, composition, foreign language 
skills, manners, and more. (Ahn, 2011; Lee, 2013; Shin & Kim, 2013). Furthermore, trainees 
needed to participate in physical fitness lessons and beauty therapies (Oh, 2013). Visual 
appearance was particularly emphasized among girls. As Venters and Rothenberg (2022, p. 9) 
noted, in addition to a slim hourglass-shaped body, “ideal face structures, consisting of V-shaped 
jawlines, large eyes, and a small nose, are enthusiastically pursued.” As a result, idol aspirants 



were pressured to undergo extreme dieting and cosmetic surgery to conform to these beauty 
standards. 

Like an assembly line, entertainment companies focus on creating the right “formula” 
while making idols. When forming a new group, producers first think of the “image” of that 
group and then select suitable trainees (Lee, 2013). That image is also versatile to meet the 
market’s expectations. For example, the image of the famous girl band Girls’ Generation has 
evolved from innocent young girls to confident independent women (Ahn, 2011). In pursuit of 
balance, each member needs to have a distinct talent or characteristic to appeal to a wider range 
of fans. Common positions in a group include a leader, visual, vocalist, rapper, dancer, and 
“maknae,” or the youngest (Carpio, 2021).   

It is these idol-producing strategies that enabled entertainment houses to generate profits, 
by exploiting artists dependent on their contracts. Regardless of how successful a group might 
be, agencies exercise a considerable amount of control over the members’ careers. The term 
“slave contract” was used to describe the unethical terms of employment and unfair distribution 
of earnings. Even though the maximum length of trainee contracts was reduced under the ruling 
of the Fair Trade Commission in 2009 (Lee, 2013; Venters & Rothenberg, 2022), some idols, 
such as the boy group B.A.P (Lee, 2014), filed lawsuits against their label for suspension of 
contract due to mistreatment.  

An overview of the idol industry shows capitalist firms’ neoliberal governmentality 
where idols, especially females, have a lack of agency. Depicted as a “factory-like manufacturing 
system,” Kim (2019, p. 33) argued that “today’s K-pop idols are conditioned as an obedient, 
disciplined, and sexualized labor force, directly manufactured by male corporate elites in the K-
pop industry to serve the interests and needs of capital.”  

Under Globalization  
In the mid-2000s, followed by the soaring popularity of K-pop in Asian markets, Korean 

entertainment companies tried to cross cultural boundaries to break into the U.S. market. To fit 
into the Western imagination of Asian women, female idol groups were manipulated as being 
docile sexual objects under the control of their male managers. Jung (2013) analyzed two groups: 
Wonder Girls (WG) and Girls’ Generation (SNSD). While most of both groups’ music was 
girlish, romantic love songs when performed in their home country, their music switched to 
erotic songs with provocative lyrics degrading women when debuted in the U.S. — exploiting 
racial and gender stereotypes. Their on-stage facial expressions and body-touching dance moves 
further played to the male gaze. Eventually, although their songs and visual images targeted the 
U.S. market, neither accomplished establishing themselves (Jung, 2013). 

Then, in the mid-2010s, K-pop idol groups managed to penetrate the U.S. market 
following the achievement of Psy. A well-known female group among them is Blackpink. Their 
single “DDU-DU DDU-DU” reached No. 55 on the Billboard Hot 100 chart and became the 
fastest music video from a Korean girl band to gain 100 million views on YouTube (Herman, 
2018). Contrary to WG and SNSD, Blackpink pursues a girl crush concept. “DDU-DU DDU-
DU” reveals a strong and tough woman image with lyrics directly confronting “haters” and 
traditional femininity (Lee & Yi, 2020). Most significantly, Blackpink’s popularity did not fade 
in the global market. In their most recent comeback, their album “Born Pink” won No. 1 on 



Billboard’s Top Album Sales chart, breaking another K-pop record (Garcia, 2022). Inspired by 
Blackpink, more and more groups have been pursuing a girl crush concept, advocating for 
female empowerment. But today, the current K-pop market has seemed to hit a saturation point 
due to an overcrowding of “strong girls” (Daly, 2022). Amid these changing K-pop trends, my 
study is, thus, interested in the question: How do female idol groups present themselves 
differently over time, in relation to their gender performance? 

Aesthetic Labor and Gender Display 
Categorized as a type of aesthetic labor under the umbrella of display work in the service 

economy, the idol industry reveals inequalities at the intersection of gender, race, and class (see 
Mears, 2014; Mears & Connell, 2016; Otis, 2016; Balogun & Hoang, 2018). In a neo-Confucian 
male-dominated society, Korean female idols are expected to conform to either the stereotypical 
Western imagination of Asian women as sexual and vulnerable — illustrated by the examples of 
WG and SNSD — or to the traditional gender role of submissive and innocent maidens whose 
worth is dependent on men (Lin & Rudolf, 2017; Jonas, 2022). Building on Goffman’s (1956) 
notion of gender display, West and Zimmerman (1987) contend that in the interactive activities 
of “doing gender,” individuals express femininity and masculinity based on sex category, which 
sustains socially arranged gender hierarchies. 

In the K-pop world, femininity is described through the metaphor of “Asian dolls” in the 
Lolita ideal, manifesting the insulting normalization of the Westernized male gaze, instilled with 
pop obsessions (Puzar 2011). Excessive femininity is deliberately displayed in the dressing styles 
and choreographies of girl idols. Dancing with bare legs and high heels in uniformly patterned 
movements demonstrates “their sexual bodies emphatically in passive postures” (Kim 2011, p. 
339). To maintain a dollified cute image, they are decorated with youthful accessories and 
clothes such as ribbons and school uniforms when performing onstage (Kim, 2011). Since 
dollification, in conjunction with commodification, simultaneously constructs a fetishizing sense 
of flawless beauty (Puzar, 2011), female idols are often mandated to engage in beauty practices 
(Yoon, 2018). Body laborers (e.g., makeup artists, hair stylists, plastic surgeons) boost their body 
capital (Balogun & Hoang, 2018) and produce the perfect “dolls” of pureness and 
submissiveness by reflecting a hybrid of Western and Asian beauty ideals (see Leem, 2017). 
Both artists and staff must therefore maintain a constant awareness of gender norms and are held 
accountable for conforming to them in the idol industry.  

Mulvey’s (1988) concept of gaze highlights women’s “to-be-looked-at-ness” in visual 
media. The image of women is depicted as enjoyable objects to be passively looked at by the 
active gaze of men. Through the lens of dominance approach that recognizes the tenacious 
system of male dominance, the unequal treatment of women is a result of power structure 
constructed by the patriarchal society (Mackinnon, 1984). Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of 
sexuality and cuteness in the idol industry obscures this power dynamic and justifies the male 
gaze under the neo-Confucian structure. The girl idols’ fandom consists of a significant number 
of middle-aged men known as Samchon, or “uncle,” fans. The depiction of these men’s 
relationship with the girl idols as uncle and niece, and their endorsement as familial support, 
minimizes the sexual connotation of staring at teen girls’ bodies and normalizes their potentially 
pedophiliac actions (Kim, 2011; see also Epstein & Turnbull, 2014). Moreover, as beauty 



ideologies and practices are associated with global culture (see Edmonds, 2010), the influence of 
Western hegemony is shown in the widespread use of “double-eyelid surgery, rhinoplasty, and 
cheekbone surgery, [and] jaw surgery” (Leem, 2017, p. 658). Together, female idols are crafted 
for Westernized masculine gazes in conjunction with the gaze of men within Korea.  

According to Lee and Yi (2020), while the concept of “strong sister,” or ssen-unni, is 
prevalent among female idols nowadays, seemingly undermining the traditional shackle of weak 
femininity, the concept actually strengthens patriarchal perceptions. Blackpink is not the pioneer 
of embodying ssen-unni in their performances. In fact, that concept has been in K-pop since 
mid-2000, with groups like 2NE1 incorporating militaristic objects and outfits in their music 
videos. Nevertheless, the employment of these materialistic hypermasculine symbols 
demonstrates a sense of ambiguous resistance as it upholds the association between male and 
power and speaks nothing for social transformation of gendered norms, thus failing to portray the 
true liberation of women. 

Despite the ambiguity in the ssen-unni concept in confronting the underlying problem of 
gender inequality, from a Western feminist point of view, Lee and Yi (2020) noted a strong 
correlation between ssen-unni and third-wave feminism. Resonating with anti-essentialist 
ideologies, the generational feminism and youth cultures of the third wave extend the idea of 
intersectionality by suggesting flexible ways of presenting feminine identities to actualize girl 
empowerment, such as through sharing personal stories (Gilmore, 2001; Mack-Canty, 2004). Yet, 
this implies that women are personally authoring these narratives: In K-pop, it would require 
songs intended to voice female empowerment or fight societal sexism to have substantial 
authentic input from artists (Mack-Canty, 2004). Yet, for Blackpink and 2NE1, most of their 
songs are produced by Teddy Park, a famous songwriter at YG Entertainment (Taylor, 2020). To 
put it in another way, since their songs may not reflect their personal experiences or intellectual 
thinking, they are only performers and not the owners of their songs. I propose that although 
there has been an increase in the girl crush concept among K-pop female idols groups, unless 
they can actively participate in the producing scene, these idols are unable to communicate and 
embody egalitarian messages that go beyond hierarchical gender norms and are therefore 
confined as pretty “Asian dolls.” 

Methods 
Objectification theory builds on the notion of gaze to recognize how women are treated 

as mere bodies for pleasure. Their bodies are sexually evaluated by viewers, resulting in their 
deliberative objectification in visual media through these gazes (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). 
By using content analysis, scholars have conducted studies regarding portrayal of objectification 
in music and other media fields (see Flynn et al., 2016). Goffman (1979) identified a model to 
decode gender behaviors, which later scholars applied in examining music videos for the 
operationalization of gender role display (see Wallis, 2011). Therefore, to answer my research 
question about how female idol groups have changed through generations with respect to sexual 
objectification and gender display, I employed content analysis to examine the music videos of 
20 groups over time. Groups were selected through purposive sampling that deem to be popular 
or representative of that generation and their sampled songs. The generations ranged from Gen 2 
(2004-2007), when K-pop started to become a global phenomenon, to Gen 2.5 (2008-2013), Gen 



3 (2014-2015), Gen 3.5 (2016-2017), and Gen 4 (2018-present). Since there is no strict definition 
of the time period of these generations, I drew my timeline from Idology (Squib, 2020) . Three of 1

the selected groups’ most-viewed music videos  on YouTube (n = 59)  were watched numerous 2 3

times and coded accordingly.  
To measure gender display conveying dominance and subordination, this study first 

adhered to Wallis’s (2011) coding scheme for nonverbal behaviors while considering prior 
research on girl bodies by Osborn (2021). On the one hand, subordinate and overtly sexual 
nonverbal gender displays included “touching hair, delicate self-touch, smiling/[winking]…a 
childish finger to/in the mouth…suggestive dancing, a sultry look” (Wallis 2011, p. 166). On the 
other hand, the dominant counterparts involved “flinging hands/fingers, showing force…
showing passion while singing” (Wallis, 2011, p. 166), and aggressive facial expressions. 
Second, body exposures were measured. As camera work contributes to the construction of gaze 
(Dibben, 1999), the close-up shots of any exposure of the artists’ “butt cracks and/or cheeks, 
stomach/navel with belly button exposed, legs from knees to upper thighs, the back fully 
exposed…the shoulders,” and the chest line were also noted (Frisby & Aubrey, 2012). All these 
variables were coded for either presence (1) or absence (0) in a unit of 10 seconds.  Whether 4

idols are treated as objects was further analyzed to investigate sexual objectification. Third, each 
set of the artists’ outfits was coded once as “neutral [or] slightly provocative (clothing that 
reveals more of the chest, abdomen, or the thighs than in everyday work/school attire)” (Wallis, 
2011, p. 166).  Finally, the English translations of the lyrics in each video were analyzed 5

separately to determine any presence of resistance to the male gaze. Data sources are listed in 
Appendix A, and all the information is as of December 2022. The next section will discuss the 
findings in terms of gender display and objectified gazes respectively.     

Findings  
I. Gender Display across Generations 

To show how gender display has evolved across different generations of K-pop, I first 
calculated the percentage of such display for each music video in a sampled group. I then 
computed the averages for each group, taking into account the differences in the length of the 
videos. Table 1 shows the means of the percentage of gender display that occurred in a music 
video in a generation. It is evident that variables that are regarded as dominant nonverbal 
behaviors are rarely displayed in female idol groups’ music videos, while those that are 
stereotypical feminine behaviors result in higher percentages. 

 According to Koreaboo, it is the longest-running K-pop critic webzines in Korea. 1

 Some MVs were uploaded by two different channels, so their views were summed up.2

 Since one Gen 4 group debuted less than a year and only had two major comebacks by the time of data collection, 3

they had one fewer sampled MV.
 In Wallis (2011)’s study, the unit of analysis is 30 seconds. I chose a unit of 10 seconds to further increase the 4

comprehensiveness of the codes.
 Wallis (2011) divided the codes for outfits into three categories: neutral, slightly provocative, and provocative. But 5

due to cultural differences and the conservative nature in Korean idol performances, I only adopted the first two 
categories.



Table 1 

There are two reasons why the percentages of dominance display are generally low in 
female idol group music videos: calculation and coding constancy. Firstly, while some music 
videos may have higher percentages of masculine display, they are often averaged out with 
others that have 0%. For instance, in 2NE1’s (Gen 2) “I AM the Best” music video, I 
documented 32% aggressive facial expressions, 18% showing force, and 9% flinging hands. 
However, when averaged out with the rest of Gen 2 music videos, these percentages became 
significantly lower. Secondly, to maintain a consistent standard of coding, some elements that 
may symbolize masculinity are not counted. For example, in 2NE1’s music videos, aggressive 
facial expressions often connote showing madness alongside other cues from body gestures. 

Gen 2 Gen 2.5 Gen 3 Gen 4

Dominance  

aggressive facial expression 3% 3% 1% 1%

showing force 3% 0% 1% 0%

passionate singing 1% 1% 0% 0%

flinging hands 2% 0% 2% 2%

Subordination  

touching hair 0% 3% 5% 5%

delicate self-touch 0% 1% 1% 0%

sultry look 0% 11% 1% 0%

suggestive dancing 0% 9% 0% 0%

smiling (wink) 36% 36% 31% 29%

childish finger to/in mouth 1% 2% 1% 0%



Therefore, behaving solely emotionally distant and indifferent is not coded as aggressive. 
Similarly, 2NE1 shows force by destroying a physical object or firing weapons. It is not 
equivalent to holding a toy-like gun or doing a single punch in the camera. As fewer female idol 
groups pursue a straightforward “badass” concept with explicit violence, the percentages of 
dominant display become lower as the generations progress. 

For variables of subordinate display, smiling has a relatively high percentage for female 
idols in all four generations. Most early Gen 2 music videos (i.e., SNSD’s “Gee”) were made up 
of shifting between close shots of members’ smiles and choreography. Conceptualizing the idol 
industry as a form of aesthetic labor explains smiling as a practice of their commercial values. 
Associated with femininity, smiling suggests sociability by conveying a message of warmth and 
friendliness (Reis et al., 1990). As a part of aesthetic labor, emotional labor in service work often 
requires employees to smile at customers, suggesting a sign of deference. Conforming to 
heteronormativity, female workers’ projection of feminine facial expressions appeals to male 
guests’ heterosexual masculinity (Barber, 2016). Overall, as their emotions are commercialized, 
idols are also objectified as models of passivity, which confirms Puzar’s (2011) theory of 
dollification. 
  Touching hair is a variable whose percentage increases over the generations. It is a form 
of feminine touch included in Goffman’s (1979) study on gender images in advertisements. 
Goffman argued that ritualistic self-touching indicates a sense of delicacy and preciousness of 
one’s body, which separates from the utilitarian use of hands in manipulating or holding. By 
engaging in this behavior, women are aligned with the societal expectation of femininity. A 
comparative study between the U.S. and India further found no significant difference in the 
prevalence of feminine touch portrayed in magazine advertising, implying that self-touching has 
a common meaning of subordination across cultures (Griffin et al., 1994). With globalization, 
utilizing an increased occurrence of touching hair in music videos is thus foreseeable.    

In the context of outfits in music videos, it is noteworthy that a majority of female idols 
are depicted dancing in heeled shoes, including high heels, block heels, heeled boots, and heeled 
sandals (see Graph 1). High heels have historically been associated with women as sexual 
objects, and women walking in high heels are often perceived as more attractive (Morris et al., 
2013). A project by Dilley et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between wearing high-
heeled shoes and the display of “emphasized femininity,” defined by Connell (1987) as the 
compliance with men’s desires. The freedom to choose footwear may contribute to women’s 
identity-building despite the physical pain to their feet. However, if viewed from the perspective 
of female idols’ limited agency over their bodies (Venters & Rothenberg, 2022), it could also be 
argued that entertainment companies are decorating these women with heeled shoes to conform 
to sexualized gender norms and to enhance their sexual appeal in performances evaluated by 
gendered expectations (West & Zimmerman, 1987). As a result, female idols are often portrayed 
with hyperfemininity.  



Graph 1 

 
From the data, it can be seen that female idols who perform submissive feminine 

behaviors and wear feminine attire are engaging in a form of “bridgework.” This term, as defined 
by Otis (2016, p. 914), refers to the “labor that requires interaction between customers whose 
countries and cultures of origin diverge from those of workers.” In the K-pop industry, female 
idols are trained to exhibit a “universal” form of femininity (i.e., smiling and dressing 
appropriately), which is institutionalized through Western hegemony. On the other hand, it is 
important to note that the bridgework framework does not take into account the differences in 
gender display percentages across different generations of female idols. The way female idols 
perform a song may also be influenced by their group’s marketing goals or the trending concepts 
of the era, rather than a uniform construction.  

Gen 2 marked the first expansion of K-pop into broader Asian markets, with companies 
also beginning to incorporate Western markets into their agenda. The following of traditional 
gender roles and presentation of cute innocent girls’ images, as well as the pioneering of bad/cool 
female types, are both attempts by companies to search for the most effective ways to attract a 
larger fan base. These concepts all fall into the trap of patriarchy, regardless of which ones 
groups strove to pursue.  

Next, in Gen 2.5, four out of the five sampled groups emerge from small- to middle-sized 
labels. The common ground of most of this generation’s music videos and choreography is the 
prioritization of filming attractive female bodies. A predominant theme across the music videos 
and choreography of this generation is the greater emphasis on filming attractive female 
corporeal bodies. Unlike Gen 2, where innocence in facial expressions often took precedence, 
Gen 2.5 sees a heightened focus on seductive physical movements as a portrayal of femininity. 
This shift is evident in the increased percentages of displays indicating subordination, beyond 
mere smiling or winking. It could be argued that due to limited resources for international 
outreach, agencies sought to swiftly capture local audiences by resorting to the over-
commodification of female bodies. As a result of differing marketing goals, from Gen 2 to Gen 

Comparison of Percentage of Heeled Shoes Worn in MVs Among Generations

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Gen 2 Gen 2.5 Gen 3 Gen 4

88%

67%

93%

83%



2.5, there is a discernible rise in the prevalence of submissive displays among female idols, 
bordering on oversexualization. 

In Gen 3, idol groups competed with a diversity of concepts. But by Gen 4, the girl crush 
concept flourished in the K-pop industry. Female idol groups explicitly voiced empowerment, 
intending to break from the shackles of hyperfemininity. Songs released in this period focused 
less on romantic love and more on self-confidence (see Graph 2). Smiling in MVs became a sign 
of confidence instead of a presentation of innocence. 

Graph 2 

 
Lee and Yi (2020) have suggested an association between the phenomenon of “strong 

sisters” and the third wave of feminism. With a continually growing feminist movement in Korea 
following #MeToo, the role of social media platforms is prominent in disseminating feminist 
activism that is inspired by the West (Shin, 2021). Under this influence, Westernized feminist 
themes hybridized with Confucian conventions stand out in the Hallyu 4.0 (Boman, 2022). 
Rooted in media culture, feminism in today’s Korean popular culture can be understood under 
the framework of “postfeminism” (Li, 2022). By absorbing the system of neoliberalism and 
individualism, postfeminism, better conceived as a “sensibility,” articulates personal choice and 
uses beauty to feel good about oneself (Gill, 2007). Applied to performances, this idea is 
manifested in the idols’ confident attitude and intensified subjectivity (see Favaro, 2017), thus 
also explaining the rising volume of “egoistic” songs.  

I contend that the kind of bridgework assigned to female idols extends beyond simply 
exhibiting femininity. To continually “bridge” the younger generations of audiences globally, 
regardless of gender, this “work,” grounded in consumerism, is fluid and evolves with popular 
media trends. With the growth of feminist movements, it is not surprising that Gen 4 became 
committed to popular feminist sentiments. However, it remains questionable whether female 
idols internalize their aesthetic labor in line with postfeminist values as autonomous beings, or if 
they remain passive objects, adhering to neo-Confucian beliefs.  

Comparison of Percentage of Love Songs Among Generations

0%

23%

45%

68%

90%

Gen 2 Gen 2.5 Gen 3 Gen 4

24%

67%

87%

67%



Over the generations of K-pop girl groups, there has been a shift from innocent girls 
mixed with strong women, to a trend of embracing sensual femininity, to a diversity of concepts, 
and finally to a parade of “girl crushes.” While some groups have challenged gender norms 
through hypermasculinity, others have perpetuated emphasized femininity with relatively high 
percentages of submissive behavior and overt sexualization of female bodies. In the next section, 
I will elaborate on objectification theory and test my hypothesis about the correlation between 
song production credits and opposition to female oppression. 

II. Sexual Objectification 
To measure the presence of sexual objectification, I examined three variables: (1) close 

shots of “exposed” body parts, (2) provocative clothing, and (3) treatment as objects. Graph 3 
presents the average close shot units shown in a female idol group music video in each 
generation. While the results are not salient, there is a positive correlation between the feminine 
display and close-shot units. For example, close shots are used most often in Gen 2.5 – a 
generation with the highest average display of subordinate variables. One prevalent shooting 
sequence is that when the choreography incorporates a hip movement, the camera tends to focus 
on the butt. Although their flesh is not strictly exposed, they are usually wearing tight clothing 
that delineates their bodies’ curves. 

Graph 3 

 
Compared to the data in Graph 3, that in Graph 4 is more prominent. I only analyzed the 

outfits that the idols wore when dancing collectively; if individual outfits were also coded, the 
percentage would be higher. Hot shorts and miniskirts — typical symbols of fetishized 
femininity — play a central factor in the percentages. Among the 28 videos that involve 
provocative outfits, 78.6% of them pertained to being too short. By adhering to these dress 
codes, female idols’ legs are visually emphasized and take on a significant physical presence 
(Kim, 2011). For example, in Sistar’s (Gen 2.5) “Alone,” along with the reflective dance floor, 
dark setting, and leg-sliding choreography, the monochrome high-cut dresses construct a 
memorable impression of the legs. This same applies to Gen 4 girl crush groups. In Aespa’s 

Comparision of Average Close Shot Units in MVs Among Generations

0

0.8

1.5

2.3

3

Gen 2 Gen 2.5 Gen 3 Gen 4

0

0.3

2.7

0



“Black Mamba” and “Savage,” short bottoms increase the visibility of their inner thighs, 
especially with camera positions and squatting actions in the two music videos, respectively. 
Even for the clothing that I did not code as provocative, female idols’ legs can still be drawn as a 
focal point. After scrutinizing SNSD’s (Gen 2) “The Boys,” Oh (2014, p. 60) asserted how 
choreography alone brings an emphasis on their “long, white, slender, [and] nonmuscular” legs. 
Like ballerinas, tiptoeing and circular dance movements reinforce the notion of gendered legs. 

Graph 4 

 

Three music videos across generations include moments when female idols are overtly 
depicted as lifeless objects. First, in “Gee,” SNSD (Gen 2) are portrayed as animated and cute 
mannequins. Their subjectivity is activated only through the male character’s gaze and 
heterosexual affection (Kim 2019). Second, EXID (Gen 2.5) are objectified in “Up & Down,” 
where their body parts can be split in half and (disparately) stuck together by a magician wearing 
a lion headpiece. Third, (G)I-dle’s (Gen 4) “Tomboy” embeds a storyline where the girls are 
turned into Barbie dolls that move awkwardly. By treating female idols as objects, the music 
videos seem to normalize the phenomenon of female submission to male desires and exalt 
fetishism (Kim, 2019). 

The overall results affirm previous studies of objectification in music videos (Aubrey & 
Frisby, 2011; Frisby & Aubrey, 2012). Through camera techniques and provocative attire, female 
artists are sexualized and confined to stereotypical gendered appearances. Separated from their 
faces and identities, their bodies exist for public consumption and pleasure (Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997). Nevertheless, resistance can be established in some music videos characterized 
by hypersexualization and objectification. Visual imagery and lyrics can provide extra context to 
the music, such as by containing lesbian relationships, weaponized sexuality, matriarchal images, 
and other things that subvert the male gaze (Osborn, 2021). In fact, EXID’s (Gen 2.5) “Up & 
Down” and (G)I-dle’s (Gen 4) “Tomboy” illustrate resistance to the male gaze and expectations 
of women through their plots, in which the male characters who try to manipulate the girls are 
either poisoned or hanged. Instead of being cast in the roles of victims, EXID and (G)I-dle are 
portrayed as perpetrators of femme fatale violence, subverting the norms of sexuality and 

Comparison of Percentage of Provocative Outfits Appeared in MVs Among 
Generations

0%

23%

45%

68%

90%

Gen 2 Gen 2.5 Gen 3 Gen 4

41%
47%

87%

8%



violence. In this portrayal, their bodies are not objectified, but instead are presented as the 
carriers of power and control (Doane, 1991). 

Another commonality between EXID and (G)I-dle is that one of their members was 
involved in the song production process. Whether idols are credited in a song results in 
substantial disparities in the scheme of lyrics and complexity of stories. Though more songs 
feature resistance as generations progress, qualitative differences lie in the depth of lyrics and the 
overarching themes. One significant distinction between songs that credit members and those 
that do not, aside from the indication of self-agency, is that the former speaks to the experiences 
of a broader female audience. They tackle greater societal issues such as the male gaze, freedom 
of expression (i.e., political advocacy and choosing what to wear), and gender stereotypes. In 
contrast, songs that lacked member’s involvement, regardless of what generation they were 
released from, convey a straightforward message of rebellion or self-boast. Admittedly, the high 
level of confidence displayed by female idols is undeniable, at least in their music videos, and 
their lyrics can be personal. For example, in Le Sserafim’s (Gen 4) “Antifragile,” Kazuha’s and 
Sakura/Chaewon’s lines are “Don’t forget my pointe shoes I left behind / What more must be 
said” and “Don’t underestimate the path I’ve walked I go to ride ‘til I die, die,” respectively. 
These lines reflect their strong and determined personalities, especially given Kazuha’s 
background as a professional ballerina and Sakura and Chaewon’s prior debut experiences. 
However, as their previous song “Fearless” also draws attention to their tough but vibrant past, 
the resulting exaggeration of their experiences becomes a label for self-commercialization. 

Credited songs were also similar in their higher gender display percentage for 
masculinity/dominance and femininity/subordination, provoking queer sentiments. Nonetheless, 
their outfits may be subject to sexualization: EXID’s attire in “Ah Yeah” sexualizes 
businesswomen, resembling the trend in Gen 2.5, and one set of the outfits in “Tomboy” is short 
and tight, correlating to stereotypical provocative female idols’ clothing. Moreover, these videos 
all include scenes of sexy dancing, which may invite the male gaze despite being presented in an 
assertive manner. Corresponding to the postfeminist sentiment of empowerment being 
established through sexuality (Tasker & Negra, 2007), the female idols replicate the media norm 
that preaches “confidence is sexy,” and remodels self-governance to a construction of an image 
grounded in neoliberal capitalism, enlisting women to pursue aesthetic labor (Favaro, 2017).  

McRobbie (2009, p. 12) criticizes this postfeminist ideology as a “double entanglement” 
that “comprises the co-existence of neo-conservative values in relation to gender, sexuality and 
family life…with the processes of [liberalization] in regard to choice and diversity in domestic, 
sexual and kinship relations.” While the “taken into accountness” is celebrated through 
autonomy, feminist politics are dismantled “by aggressive individualism, by a hedonistic female 
phallicism in the field of sexuality, and by obsession with consumer culture” (p. 5). In the case of 
K-pop, even with the increasing volume of songs that aim to resist the societal construction of 
gender, the overwhelming use of individualistic lyrics and materialistic symbols (i.e., luxury 
cars, shopping bags, and tanks decorated by diamonds) theoretically have nothing to do with 
feminist concerns of overcoming patriarchy. Thus, McRobbie (2009) concludes that 
postfeminism is an “undoing” of feminism.  

Furthermore, in the context of popular culture, postfeminist culture incorporates and 
naturalizes various aspects of feminism to a form of compelling popular feminism (Tasker & 



Negra, 2007). Feminism is branded, wrapped in gender equality, and marketed for sale through 
the platform of media (Banet-Weiser, 2018). Based on this framework, the girl crush concept that 
advertises female empowerment is a product sold by entertainment companies on YouTube. 
Being a platform for circulation, social media provides visibility and accessibility for this 
popular feminist content where, in this cyclical process, its popularity grows as it gains more 
visibility, which in turn allows for even greater visibility (Banet-Weiser, 2018). Meanwhile, this 
visibility of popular feminism is shaped by neoliberal capitalism that has no political vision 
beyond the market and its measures (Rottenberg, 2018). In Korea, even though feminist activities 
are gaining traction, particularly in the context of sexual harassment (Shin, 2021), feminism 
remains a sensitive topic in the entertainment industry. Female idols across generations rarely 
openly state their feminist positions (if any) in public, perhaps due to concerns over anti-feminist 
backlash and marketing considerations in a society that holds certain neo-conservative gender 
values (Li, 2022). Therefore, virtually no song can escape its destiny from being commercialized, 
regardless of members’ participation in the production process. Commercialization promotes the 
idea of postfeminism as the market shapes feminist ideology. 

Conclusion  
After a systematic study of the presentation of girl groups across generations in their 

music products, my findings indicate that while the thematic messages of girl groups’ songs and 
performance styles have evolved in response to globalization and popular feminism, female idols 
continue to be confined to the norm of sexualization, with limited autonomy over their bodies. 
Acknowledging the inequality and power dynamics within the K-pop star system, I believe that 
female idols should be granted more individual freedom rather than being manipulated as pretty 
idols. One way to achieve this is by involving them more in the song production process, 
particularly in songwriting, allowing them to express their concerns and interests. However, there 
are two main obstacles that hinder this progress: age and market reality. Since the average debut 
age for idols is around 18, with some debuting as young as 14, it is skeptical whether they 
receive adequate education and socialization to develop personal values and navigate gender 
politics. In cases where female idols possess songwriting abilities, it is more common to see 
credits for their work in groups from small- to middle-sized companies. This could be attributed 
to larger entertainment agencies already having abundant resources, such as sophisticated 
production capabilities, strategic planning, and promotion teams, to ensure the outcome and 
quality of the final products. Adopting an assembly line approach is probably the most efficient 
way for these agencies to generate profits within the shortest possible time and with minimal 
risk, prioritizing addictive melodies and catchy phrases over the depth of lyrics to capture a 
mainstream audience. Producing profound songs with a small audience would miss the purpose 
of commercial production. 

Amid an era of globalization, the Korean entertainment industry is responsive to the 
changing demands of global markets. The concept of popular girl groups has transformed across 
generations to meet the changing ideals of femininity: As feminist movements gain momentum 
worldwide, the previous trend of hyperfemininity has gradually given way to the 
commodification of transnational postfeminist culture through the emergence of the girl crush 
concept. At the same time, this ambition for globalization has limited the range of themes 



explored in popular music. Even when female idols are involved in song production, their 
creativity is often constrained by market ideologies of popular feminism.  

Based on the findings of qualitative content analysis, songs that demonstrate a form of 
resistance often exhibit a “double entanglement” that undoes feminism by emphasizing 
empowerment through sexuality alongside notions of individualism and materialism. 
Consequently, considering the present obstacles and circumstances, I argue that the potential for 
K-pop to advance feminist movements is relatively limited. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that 
within the K-pop industry, the boundaries between femininity and masculinity can be blurred, as 
evidenced by the low percentages for both dominance and subordination gender displays. Under 
this queer culture, accompanied by female idols’ practice of cross-dressing performances and 
androgynous fashion styles, K-pop can be a source for its consumers to explore their gender and 
sexual identities. 

While this study contributes to the existing research on K-pop mainly within the context 
of gender, it faces some limitations. The primary one is its relatively low reliability due to the 
absence of an inter-rater in coding the music videos. While I tried to minimize inconsistencies in 
the codes by watching the videos multiple times and following a guideline, some codes may still 
contain ambiguities. Future studies could enhance the reliability by involving multiple raters in 
the coding process while completing the data on Gen 4 girl groups as this era comes to an end. 
Furthermore, to improve the external validity of the findings and explore whether the resistance 
demonstrated in female idol groups’ music videos promotes a queering effect or empowers its 
audience, it would be worthwhile to measure the public perception of the songs on social media 
platforms such as Twitter. This would allow for a broader assessment of the songs’ impact and 
reception. Extending the research to a comparative study among different nations’ viewers could 
also shed light on how cultural factors influence how fans interpret and attribute meaning to 
gender and sexuality. 



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Appendix A 

Data Sources

Lyrics and Song Interpretations Genius 
YouTube 

Seoulbeats 
AtrocityCL

Music Videos YouTube

Member Profile kprofiles

Complimentary K-pop News allkpop 
soompi 

koreaboo


