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[page 72] [Emergency Care Journal 2013; 9:e24]

Experimental data on authority
of source bias in decision 
making 
Pier Luigi Baldi
Department of Psychology, Catholic
University of the Sacred Heart, Milan,
Italy

Dear Editor,
The psychological approach to reasoning

and decision making has shown i) the restrict-
ed cognitive resources available to people (see
for example, the notion of bounded rationality
by Simon1); ii) the inferential errors attributa-
ble, at least partly, to limited working memory
capacity2; iii) the use of heuristics, i.e. strate-
gies which allow saving cognitive resources by
simplifying elaboration yet at the risk of bias-
es, etc. These errors, or distortions, do not
appear to be negligible but rather important
and recurring behavioral anomalies.3,4

Moreover, since 1950s several psychological
studies have highlighted the role of emotions
in decision making, a role that has been evi-
denced also by the neurosciences.5

The three experimental studies presented
here were aimed to evaluate the influence of
authority of source on decision making, each
one examining the following fields: logic,
grammar, and figurative art. 

In the first experiment, 120 university stu-
dents were administered the three questions
of the Cognitive Reflection Test and a fourth
question of logic; they were provided with the

answers (all of which deliberately wrong) and
were asked to express whether they agreed
with them. The experimental group was told
that the answers had been given by a mathe-
matics teacher; the control group was told that
the answers had been given by students with
some difficulties in mathematics. 

In the second experiment 90 university stu-
dents were administered five pairs of sen-
tences; one sentence in each pair was gram-
matically correct, the other was wrong. The
experimental group was required to evaluate
the exactness of the answers (all of which
wrong) given by a non-existent grammar
teacher; the control group was required to indi-
cate the exact sentence in each pair.

In the third experiment, 60 participants
were shown five pairs of pictorial reproduc-
tions; only one reproduction in each pair was
of great artistic value. The experimental group
was asked to accept or reject the judgements
(all of which wrong) of a non-existent art crit-
ic; the control group was asked to indicate the
picture deemed most valuable in each pair.

In conclusion, statistical analysis, conducted
through the χ2 test, has shown a significantly
higher number of errors in the experimental
group than in the control group all through the
three experiments. The results emphasize the
conditioning exerted by a source considered to
be authoritative on the decision-making
process of participants.

References

1. Simon HA. Models of bounded rationality.

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 1982.
2. Johnson-Laird PN, Byrne RMJ, Schaeken

W. Propositional reasoning by model.
Psychol Rev 1992;99:418-39.

3. Tversky A, Kahneman D. Judgment under
uncertainty: heuristics and biases.
Science 1974;185:1124-31.

4. Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A.
Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics
and biases. New York: Cambridge
University Press; 1982.

5. Damasio AR. Descartes’ error: emotion,
reason, and the human brain. New York:
Avon; 1994.

Emergency Care Journal; volume 9:e24

Correspondence: Pier Luigi Baldi, Department of
Psychology, Catholic University of the Sacred
Heart, largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milan, Italy.
Tel. +39.02.7234.2284 - Fax: +39.02.7234.2280.
E-mail: pier.baldi@unicatt.it

Key words: authority of source, bias, decision
making.

Conflict of interests: the author declares no
potential conflict of interests.

Received for publication: 26 September 2013.
Accepted for publication: 26 September 2013.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0 License (by-nc 3.0).

©Copyright P.L. Baldi, 2013
Licensee PAGEPress, Italy
Emergency Care Journal 2013; 9:e24
doi:10.4081/ecj.2013.e24

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