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Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

International University of Sarajevo

ISSN 1840-3719 / No. 2

Spring 2009

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina1:
A Brief Historical Sketch

Dzevada Šuško

International University of Sarajevo

Introduction

Whenever Bosnia and Herzegovina´s political issues are discussed, the

starting point is the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in December 1995

(Chandler; Bieber 2006). However, already in May 1992 with the beginning of the

aggression, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for a special guest status at the

European Council aiming to prevent human rights abuses as a result of war.

During the first months of the aggression it became obvious that the Bosniaks

were systematically executed, expelled and brought to concentration camps. Yet,

guest status to Bosnia and Herzegovina was not given until January 1994. Finally

in April 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina was accepted with full membership to the

European Council (Solioz 2006 98). Nonetheless, the Dayton Peace Agreement is

often seen as the milestone for the relationship between the European Union

(EU) and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Besides the Presidency of the EU and the European Commission, some EU

countries such as France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom were already

involved in the Dayton Peace Agreement and the subsequent creation of the

Peace Implementation Council (PIC).2 Dealing with the high number of Bosnian

refugees in EU countries and bringing political stability in the EU region were

1 I would like to thank Dr. Ali Gunes and Mustafa Bal for kindly supporting me in publishing this
article. Furthermore, I am thankful to Dr.Mirsad Karić and Dr.Muhidin Mulalić who reviewed the
manuscript and offered constructive comments.
2 The PIC represents 55 countries and agencies that were involved in the Dayton Peace
Agreement in order to give financial support, provide troops or run directly operations in BiH.
The London Conference nominated Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United
Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission and
the Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by Turkey (OHR General Information).

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 100

surely the PIC’s main goals (for Germany´s insisting on the question of return in

Dayton see Bendiek 2004, 89). Since the Dayton Peace Agreement is designed to

“end a war not to build a state”, as the former OHR High Representative Lord

Paddy Ashdown (15) contended, it is obviously now the task of the EU ‘to build a

state’ with solid and stable institutions. This means that the economic, political,

juridical and civil transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina from communism,

aggression, ethnic cleansing and genocide to a democratic peaceful state is closely

linked with its adaptability to be a part of the EU.

This process evokes usually a variety of questions: Are Bosnian state

institutions EU-adaptable? What are the main obstacles? How much time will take

a full membership to the EU? What advantages and disadvantages will Bosnia and

Herzegovina have with EU membership?

The resources used for this research paper originate to a great part from

the internet, starting with documents from the websites of the international

community: OHR-Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo, European Union,

Council of the European Union, European Commission in Brussels and in Sarajevo

as well as the Bosnian Directorate for European Integration (DEI). Few Bosnian

authors explicitly deal with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU, such as Nerzuk

Ćurak, Nikola Kovač, Mirko Pejanović and Emir Hadžikadunić. As far as non-

Bosnian authors are concerned, Florian Bieber, Solveig Richter, Marie-Janine

Calic, Christophe Solioz, Robert Belloni, Bruno Sergi and Qerim Qerimi as well as

Graham Timmins and Dejan Jovic delivered relevant contributions. David

Chandler, though, gives a critical analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia including its

approach to the EU. Whereas Chandler advocates a less interventionist approach

by the international community to stabilize democracy other scholars like Richter

and Calic tend more to the view that the lack of consensus among the political

elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires a rather strong hand from outside to

impose the needed constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and hence

to clear the path for the EU. As soon as a feasible constitution is set, then the state

system of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a real chance to start functioning properly.

Dzevada Šuško 101

This research analysis will offer mainly a historical overview of the

relations between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore

some reconsiderations regarding the above mentioned meta- questions of the

process are given.

A Prelude to Membership

As far as the EU in general is concerned, there are three main bodies that

decide on the enlargement strategy of the EU and thus about the membership of

Bosnia and Herzegovina. They include the European Commission representing

common EU interests, the European Parliament representing the people of

Europe, and the Council of the European Union representing national

governments. Although, the views of individual member states towards the

integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina differ to great extent3.

The openness to integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU is confirmed

in June 1998 with the “Declaration on Special Relations between EU and BiH”4.

Thus the primary condition is fulfilled. In terms of membership conditions, the

1992 Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, Article 6, says that any

European state which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights,

fundamental freedoms and the rule of law qualifies for EU membership.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen meeting in 1993 added requirements which new

members must have achieved before entering the EU. Hence, these Copenhagen

criteria include: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,

human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market

economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces

3 This issue cannot be discussed in detail at this point. A critical assessment of British foreign
policy in the region was provided by Brendan Simms’ Unfinest Hour. Britain and the destruction
of Bosnia, (London: Penguin 2002); for a comparative perspective stressing also differences
within the countries Brian C. Rathbun’s Partisan interventions: European party politics and peace
enforcement in the Balkans, (Ithaca et al.: Cornell University Press 2004).
4 In comparison to Turkey the EU is reluctant in accepting Turkey as a partly Asian state. The
openness to integrate BiH to the EU is confirmed in June 1998 with the “Declaration on Special
Relations between the EU and BiH”.

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 102

within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including

support for the aims of the political, economic and monetary union; furthermore

a public administration capable of applying and managing EU laws in practice as

it was underlined by the Madrid European Council in 1995 (European Council in

Copenhagen. Conclusions of the Presidency).

1995-1999 Extension of powers of PIC High Representative

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a special case: since World War II genocide and

concentration camps experienced a repeat on European soil. According to the

report “Repairing reconstructing reconnecting” from 1998, the EU had to deal

with 750.000 refugees from war zones while 1.2 million citizens had to flee

abroad. After signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina

had to deal with a complete devastation of the infrastructure, high

unemployment, displaced people, and a ruined economy. These conditions

seriously threatened the region’s stability. Consequently, the EU committed itself

with donations to reconstruct Bosnia and Herzegovina, to provide democracy and

a viable market economy. The first parliamentary elections held in 1996 were

seen as the first step towards democracy building in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since then, four more parliamentary and presidential elections have been held

(1998, 2000, 2002, 2006; Bieber 2008). Apart from the DPA -architecture, the EU

and EC have become strong partners with Bosnia and Herzegovina and cooperate

intensely with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), United Nations (UN),

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the NATO Stabilization Forces

(SFOR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). EU

governments even insisted that the Office of the High Representative should be

run by a European representative (Cousens and Cater 46). Chandler states that

the DPA was made so flexible that it has in fact facilitated external regulation

rather than restricting it. DPA, as Chandler continues, thus enabled international

actors to shape and reshape the agenda of post-war transition:

Dzevada Šuško 103

Dayton´s flexibility has been the key actor enabling
external powers to permanently postpone any
transition to Bosnian ‘ownership’. The only transition
which has taken place has been from the ad hoc policy-
ownership of self-selected members of the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) to direct regulatory
control under the aegis of the European Union (EU).
(Chandler 30)

During the first period, 1995-1999, PIC extended the powers of the High

Representative but with little clear policy direction or end point for the ad hoc

international administration. PIC was established to provide international

legitimacy in absence of UN involvement and to include EU and cohere

international management in the Dayton process. Several PIC meetings such as in

Florence (June 1996), Paris (November 1996), Sintra (May 1997), and Bonn

(December 1997) enabled PIC to rewrite its own powers and those of the High

Representative (OHR). For example, it was decided at the Sintra meeting that

obstructive Bosnia and Herzegovina representatives may receive visa restrictions

on travel abroad, and any media network or programme which was

counterproductive to DPA may be suspended (PIC Sintra Declaration). The so-

called “Bonn powers” are until today often mentioned, especially in everyday

politics because the High Representative was since then empowered to impose

legislation giving international officials executive and legislative control over

Bosnia and Herzegovina (PIC Bonn Conclusions). This included the dismissal of

elected representatives and government officials who obstruct the

implementation the DPA. From 1998 to 2005, following the webpage of the Office

of the High Representative (www.ohr.int), there were in total 117 officials which

were removed by the High Representative from their respective posts, out of

which were 48 Serbs, 45 Croats and 24 Bosniaks. Therefore by 1999 the PIC and

OHR had accumulated an array of powers, particularly the Bonn powers,

unforeseen in 1995 when Dayton Agreement was signed.

On the other hand there are disputes and severe doubts on the PDA-

“constitution” which was designed most of all “to end a war” and is not yet

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 104

functioning properly in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future as a member

state of the European Union. The ethnic division of the country even among the

youth is deeper than ever before and confirms these doubts. Kasim Trnka, a jurist

and legal scientist, stated that for the past 12 years after the war 279 laws were

passed. Additionally, 112 laws were imposed by the High Representative.

Furthermore, 260 bills were discussed in parliament and were not passed. 136

bills were not approved by the House of Representatives due to entity voting. Out

of these 136 bills, 20 bills were vetoed by entity voting in Federation and the left

116 bills were vetoed by entity voting in Republika Srpska (TV debate on BHT1 in

December 2008). Interestingly, the main objective of the House of Peoples (Upper

House) is to protect vital national interests. However, only four times since the

first establishment of Parliament in 1996 constituent peoples have used veto in

House of Peoples and stopped passing the law. No one of these has been used by

Serbs - because the Serb national interest can be protected in the House of

Representatives which is supposed to promote and protect individual rights and

not national interest of one ethnic group. Consequently, many political actors

have realized that there is urgent need for constitutional changes. And this has

even been said by the Parliament of the European Council in 2007:

For the international community, the adoption early on
in the new legislature of the already agreed
constitutional amendments remains as the pre-
condition for any serious attempts to embark into the
more far-reaching reforms which are necessary to
consolidate the statehood of BiH and its full integration
in European and Transatlantic structures. (Council of
Europe. Information Documents SG/Inf(2006)16final 7
February 2007)

The “Regional Approach” in 1997 established political and economic

conditionality for the development of bilateral relations between Bosnia and

Herzegovina and the EU, in terms of trade, financial assistance and economic

cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina´s official approximation towards the

Dzevada Šuško 105

membership of the EU, though, started on 8 June 1998. At the Luxemburg Council

the Declaration on Special Relations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina

was adopted and the EU/BiH Consultative Task Force (CTF) established. The aim

was increasing cooperation and assisting in policy-making in the crucial fields of

judicial reform, education, media, good governance and economic reform (PIC

Luxembourg Declaration). Nonetheless, Chandler states: “However, despite an

increasingly direct EU input into policy-making, the EU played a subordinate and

supporting role within PIC Dayton framework rather than dictating its own

terms” (Chandler 35). Still the DPA was of major importance and the impact of

the EU was more on civilian level then.

After the NATO intervention in Kosovo (March 1999) new approaches for

stabilizing the whole region were required. They were drafted in the Stability

Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which was agreed in Cologne on 10 June 1999

between the states of South-Eastern Europe, the EU, the US and Russia

(http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/constituent.asp). The idea was to link

improvement of intraregional cooperation between the countries, with the

perspective of membership to the European Union – accompanied by political

and economic conditionality. In the following years the most effective instrument

became the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which should via a

subsequent Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) finally pave the way

for all the countries to full membership. With this perspective and the financial

assistance of the CARDS Programme, from 2000 on the influence of the EU in the

region became increasingly greater.

2000-2007 Transformation of external regulative mechanisms

This period saw within the post-Dayton process a gradual transformation

of external regulative mechanisms to Bosnian ownership under the leadership of

the EU. Thereby mechanisms of regulation shifted informally from the PIC to the

EU, and Dayton became subordinate to the requirements for an eventual EU

membership.

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 106

The Road Map announced in March 2000 by EU Commissioner Chris Patten

was a first step for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Stabilization and Association

Process (SAP). This document contained 18 conditions which Bosnia and

Herzegovina had to fulfil beginning with the preparation of a Feasibility Study

which would set the framework for the Stabilization and Association Agreement

(SAA). These conditions were related to elections, civil service, state institutions,

border services, judiciary, trade regulations, foreign direct investment, property

laws and public broadcasting.

The shift from DPA to EU accession was constantly confirmed on summits

and meetings. In June 2000, the Feira European Council declared all South-

Eastern European countries as “potential candidates” for EU membership. The

Zagreb Summit in November 2000 introduced a Community programme of

Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) and a

programme of EU technical assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Final

Declaration). The CARDS programme supported Bosnia and Herzegovina with €

240 million (Chandler: 36) focusing on public administration reform (customs

and taxation), justice and home-affairs (police reform, border management,

judicial reform) and investment climate (trade, education, environment,

infrastructure). Furthermore, in 2001 the European Commission adopted a

Country Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period of 2002-2006. In

November 2000, an autonomous preferential customs regime between EU and

Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted allowing products from Bosnia and

Herzegovina to enter EU duty free. However, statistics of the Foreign Trade

Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that this policy has increased trade

deficit in favour of EU and at the cost of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens

(Pregled uvoza i izvoza BiH-EU 2000-2007).

The gradual transfer of power from the PIC to the EU became more evident

in OHR´s 2002 reform when joint actions were adopted for the appointment of an

EU Special Representative and the launching of the EU Police Mission (EUPM).

Thus, OHR Lord Paddy Ashdown (2002-2006) became the first EU Special

Dzevada Šuško 107

Representative and simultaneously the High Representative. A Board of

Principles was established chaired by the EU Special Representative as a weekly

meeting in Sarajevo to coordinate the activities of the OHR with SFOR, OSCE,

EUPM, UNHCR, EC, World Bank, IMF and UNDP. OHR´s growing dependence on

the EU is also indicated by the OHR´s financial contributors. In the current term

(2008/09) EU provides 53%. Further contributions stem from USA (22%), Japan

(10%), Russia (4%), Canada (3%) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference

(OIC, 2,5%). However, the OIC does not seem to have any visible influence on

decision-making process (Office of the High Representative. General

Information).

Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the eight month rotation of the Chairman

of Council of Ministers (CoM) was abolished after the elections in 2002. Since

then the CoM remained for the whole legislative period (the first was Adnan

Terzić, 2002-2007), adopting a high level of executive authority and becoming de

facto Bosnia and Herzegovina’s prime minister. This was important because

CoM´s task was besides coordinating strategies and policies among state

institutions, ensuring harmonization Bosnia and Herzegovina’s laws with the

acquis communautaire of the EU. In April 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina was

accepted to the European Council and adopted the European Convention on

Human Rights. In September that year the “Road Map” was adopted as

“substantially completed” by the European Commission. Soon the Directorate for

European Integrations (DEI), founded in early 2003, has become the main

partner to the EC in the Stabilization and Association Process. DEI has been

tasked with negotiating and supervising the implementation of further

agreements made with the EU, especially the Feasibility Study, which should

estimate its capacity to implement the SAA during 2003. On the Thessalonica

Summit in June 2003 the EU committed itself to integrate countries from the

Western Balkans presenting additional instruments to enhance EU regulation.

The most important tool were the new “European Partnerships” made to

strengthen the SAP (Chandler: 36-38).

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 108

On the basis of the results of the Feasibility Study presented in November

2003 as the “Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of

Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement

with the European Union”, the EU decided in June 2004 for a first “European

Partnership” with Bosnia and Herzegovina to define the country’s political,

economic and other priorities preparing SAA negotiations. The Bosnian

government was expected to respond to this Partnership by working out and

implementing action plans with a timetable and details of how they intend to

address the Partnership’s priorities. Particularly, the intensity of EU engagement

in Bosnia and Herzegovina necessitated the reinforcement of (a) meetings of

EU/BiH Consultative Task Force to assist in Annual Reports and annual Action

Plans (established already in 1998) and (b) the Coordination Board for Economic

Development and EU Integration as the main steering body between the central

government and the entities.

The same year, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

reviewed the quality of Bosnia and Herzegovina´s democracy. It demanded the

strengthening of central state institutions and questioned the extent to which the

current role of the High Representative is compatible with the membership of

Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Council of Europe (“Strengthening of democratic

institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina”). A further step toward the

empowerment of the EU was the replacement of NATO´s SFOR with EUFOR

(Althea operation) in December 2004 which meant the end of the UN

International Police Task Force (IPTF) (Chandler 39).

The negotiations on SAA between Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU were

officially opened on 25 November 2005 in Sarajevo. The main stakeholders in

negotiations were the Directorate General for Enlargement of the European

Commission headed by Olli Rehn and the DEI, the negotiating team of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, under the leadership of Osman Topčagić. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s

domestic problems which are visible through a lack of consensus among the

elected political elites who represent the three constituent peoples of the country

Dzevada Šuško 109

lead to a lack of progress in implementing necessary reforms. Thus it took two

years to conclude the negotiations on SAA. New instruments of monitoring,

consultation and steering had to be defined. In 2006, the Consultative Task Force

(CTF) was re-named Reform Process Monitoring (RPM) to mark the start of a new

phase in EU-BiH relations, the start of negotiations of a SAA. A year later the

CARDS programme was replaced by the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) which

focuses on institution building and socio-economic development. In the end of

2007, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report was made including the

Council Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008.

2007 First serious step to EU: SAA

The informal process of EU regulation became a contractual one when

Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled the Stabilization and Association Agreement

(SAA) on 4 December 2007. The meaning of that step was then pointed out by

Dimitris Kourkoulas, Head of Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia

and Herzegovina: “The SAA is the first step in the EU integration process. It

confirms that the prospect of EU membership is open for BiH” (TV Debate 13 Dec

2007). For the implementation of the agreement the European Commission

required progress in six key priorities which are (1) ICTY cooperation, (2) police

reform, (3) establishment of a public self-sustainable broadcaster, (4) public

administration reform, (5) uniting the entities’ economies to a single economic

space, and (6) providing conditions for the work of all institutions in terms of

financing, personnel, equipment.

After having been signed on 14 June 2008, the agreement becomes

enforceable when it has been ratified by the Bosnian government, European

Parliament and the national parliaments of EU members. The adoption of the SAA

in the Bosnian State Parliament was a prerequisite for its ratification in EU

countries. In October 2008, the Bosnian State Parliament's House of

Representatives and the House of Peoples gave their consent for ratification of

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 110

the SAA. Under the Bosnian Constitution, SAA had still to be ratified by the

Bosnian State Presidency as well.

The SAA is an international agreement entailing mutual rights and

obligations that has precedence over any other law of the country and is seen as

starting point for further constitutional amendments which are necessary for the

future normal functioning of the country. The EU Special Representative and the

executive policy-making institution of the Directorate of European Integration

maintain full regulatory control over the SAP. For the coming period of 2007 to

2009 the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIDP) provided Bosnia

and Herzegovina with € 226 million in order to realize Bosnia and Herzegovina´s

development strategy to EU Integration.

Furthermore, the SAA, if properly implemented, is regarded as the first

rung on the long path towards the membership of the 27-member bloc.

Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina has legal obligations in the fields of SAA

within strict time limits. These necessary conditions are named in the 10 chapters

of the SAA such as political dialogue, regional cooperation, free movements of

goods, movement of workers, business plans, provision of services, capital, justice

and home affairs. These chapters include 1.200 regulations and directives which

must be gradually transposed from European legislation in order to meet the

criteria for an EU membership.

The main advantages of the SAA to Bosnia and Herzegovina are credibility

building among the international public, establishment of a free trade zone

between Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU which should increase investments and

employment, better efficiency of institutions, liberalization of a visa regime, and

democratic-political as well as economic stability in general. Furthermore, the

struggle against organised crime and corruption is a serious problem to be solved

since the achievements of these objectives depend to a large part to the country’s

own political will to align with European standards and values.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s adaptability to the European Union

Dzevada Šuško 111

EU interests are strategic in terms of integrating South-Eastern European

states in EU structure and global in terms of security and peace all over the

European continent, as the International Commission on the Balkans stressed:

We should clearly bring the region into the EU. Rather
we need to establish the sequence of policy steps to be
undertaken and the structure of the incentives that will
make them work. We need policies so that the region
can get on, get in and catch up with the rest of Europe.
(The Balkans in Europe’s Future 9)

The EU is the main trade partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is visible in the

regularly updated statistics about Bosnia and Herzegovina and its bilateral trade

with the EU and trade with the world. In 2007, imports coming from the EU made

up 66.7% of total imports by Bosnia and Herzegovina, while exports to the EU

accounted for 71.4% of its total exports. In the same year, EU imports from Bosnia

and Herzegovina grew by 6.1% year on year to reach over 1.8 billion euros, while

exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina grew by 8.3%, reaching over 3 billion Euros.

Exports go mainly to Italy, Germany and Slovenia and imports originate from

these countries, and to some extent from Austria.

In terms of reforms toward the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s approach to

the European Council needs to be included. According to Solioz, until February

2006, 51 treaties were signed and ratified, 21 treaties were just signed but not

ratified yet, and there were still 129 treaties neither signed nor ratified. Several

reports monitoring Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated problems with the

implementation and with self-responsibility during the realization of reforms

(Solioz 99-100). On the other hand, Topčagić claims that greatest progress has

been made in the fields of border management, migration, asylum; internal affairs;

judiciary through establishing the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High

Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the Prosecutor’s office of Bosnia and

Herzegovina; establishment of independent regulatory bodies such as the

Regulatory Communications Agency (Bulja and Subasic 3). This progress was also

EU Enlargement and the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Brief Historical Sketch 112

confirmed by the European Commission in November 2007 (Enlargement Strategy

and Main Challenges 2007-2008).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are still many internal obstacles and

challenges to face. The police reform was finally achieved (Richter), but the

constitutional reform in today’s perspective decides the fate of the present two-

entity structure. While the Bosniak politicians consider the Republika Srpska a

genocidal creation, Serb politicians threaten with secession from Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Croats ask for a tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovina where every

constituent people has its own federal unit (Loza 1-4). This implies that there is a

need of a stronger intervention from the EU with a clear vision of Bosnia and

Herzegovina’s state configuration when it comes to the constitutional changes.

The Bosnian constitution set up by the Dayton Peace Agreement established a

“complicated, non-efficient and expensive state” as Srđan Dizdarević contends

(90).

Whereas usually other states spend about 14-16% of the budget for the

administration, Bosnia and Herzegovina spends 60% of the GDP for its heavy

administration which has 14 governments and 180 ministers (Dizdarević 90). No

doubt that this dysfunctional system must be radically changed. The constitution

is to begin with, it is actually the main obstacle within Bosnia and Herzegovina for

the development of stable, transparent and efficient democratic institutions. The

constitutional reform was planned after the local elections are held in October

2008. As soon as the constitution gets successfully changed to the benefit of a

sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the adaptability to EU standards is no