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THE GENERAL  EXPLICATIONS OF THE NATURE OF POLITICAL 

PARTIES, ELECTORAL RULES AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY AND 

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 

  

By 
 

ONWUKWE SETH NWACHUKWU 

onwukwe70@gmail.com 

Personnel Department, Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka 

And 

RACHEL NWACHUKWU SETH 

rachelonwukwe@gmail.com 

Hope Foundation School, Magbuoba Rivers State 

 

 

INTRODUCTION 

For any keen observer of event in Nigeria, it may not be far-fetched to argue that reversals 

and disruptions have over the years been the defining character of Nigeria’s political life. 

Perspectives exits that link such manifestations of instability as persistent conflicts, 

unrests and leadership turnover against the background of myriad of reasons and 

difficulties. It is true, for example, that efforts are normally made to link systematic 

breakdown of the problems of leadership (o’Donnel and Schmitter, 1986; Ali Kazancigil, 

1997). Other explanation attribute the political malaise to the inherent weakness of the 

manner by which the country came into existence, the  weakness of the existing  political 

institutions as well as the fragility of the civil society (Bert A. Rockman, 1997; and Larry 

Dramond, et.al 1987). Notwithstanding variations in interpretations, it is the dominant 

paradigm that political instability, or better still, the failure to effectively institute and 

consolidate democracy in the country, is attributable to some of the variable mentioned 

above.  

 

Our contention in this work is that over the period since independence, the country has 

witnessed the systematic erosion of those elements in the general society that are 

considered desirable for the enthronement of democratic governance. Precisely, such 

essential of democracy as political participation, electoral competition, and respect for 

fundamental human rights and freedoms, among others, have been systematically 

denigrated by different governmental policies and actions. Specifically, we intend to 

argue that given the events that unfolded in Nigeria’s march to democracy over the years, 

and  especially in the tumultuous years of the transition to democracy in the Gen. Ibrahim 

Babangida’s year and beyond, (for instance, the experience of fourth republic (1999 – 

2003) there is ample cause to believe that the fragility in the political party institution of 

society, as well as its interface with the regime of obnoxious rules in the electoral process, 

mailto:onwukwe70@gmail.com
mailto:rachelonwukwe@gmail.com


 

 

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account for the apparent lack of coherence in the democratic project in the country. In 

other words, any attempt to come to grips with the why(s) of democratic stress in the 

country, must necessarily considered the issue of the interface between the party system 

thriving in the country, the effect of rules and procedures guiding electoral contest and 

the success or failure of democracy and democratic governance.  

 

We shall proceed by dividing this paper into four sections: section one is the introduction, 

the second is on political parties, party system and the democratic project, section three 

addresses the issue of electoral rules and the electoral process while section four conclude 

the paper.  

 

POLITICAL PARTIES, PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DEMOCRATIC 

PROJECT.  

Political parties are essential features of the democratic arrangement. Defined as “an 

organized group with a clearly defined policy whose main aim is to win or retain political 

power (Ujo, A. A., 2000:98) political parties aggregate and articulate the disparate views 

of  a country’s population for effective political actions/indications. Being essentially 

important to the vitality and viability of the democratic forms of governance, not a few 

scholars have at any one time argued for the desirability of a strongly institutionalized 

party system for the flourishing of the democratic ethos in societies. As argued by 

Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje (1991:1:216), for instance, the longevity and 

vitality of democracy owes much to the ability of the party system in place to aggregate 

freely, articulate, respect and organize set limits in the quest for the use of political 

powers. Obviously, too is the fact that for the party system to be capable of discharging 

these roles effectively, require the meeting of criteria as autonomy, complexity and 

coherence (Lynne Ragodale and John J. Theis 1997).  

 

In this respect, too, Richard Vengroff’s (1994a&b) argument becomes especially 

relevant.  

 

Drawing from the experience of Mali, Vengroff has asserted that the degree to which a 

party system is able to meaningfully contribute to the political process is related to the 

existence of several factors: the development and maintenance of strong party 

organization with the depth and breadth necessary for their operation and the degree of 

institutionalization of the party as indicated by its historical roots, longevity, survival and 

continuing support. The ability to meet these conditions, according to him, is “indicative 

of their strength, their future survival and success and their potential contribution to the 

institutionalization of democratic government”.  

 

Where the above form the essential for the measurement of the party system in Nigeria, 

it then becomes logical to hold that the key party institution in the country seldom fulfils 



 

 

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its functions.  Over the years since Nigeria engage in the democratic project, what 

becomes discernible is the lack of proper organization of the political party system. 

Rather, the general tendency is one in which the party structures in the society are 

established mainly on ethnicization, regionalization, and patrimonilization of power. 

Indeed, as records have tended to show, even as the records of inter and intra-party 

squabbles of second and especially fourth republic of late depict, both in their methods 

and practices, the country’s political parties have contributed immensely to the crises that 

currently engulfs the political system. However, we must proceed with caution in order 

not to suggest that the party structures are/or organizations are, in and of themselves, the 

key determinants of democratic stability. Rather, as Rome Aniyowoshe (1982:22) 

contends:  

The establishment of a strong party system does not necessarily 

remove the potential for violent political conflict, especially between 

different ethnic groups within a political system: the determining 

factors are likely to be the discontents and loyalties of the members of 

the political parties and most especially the nature and types of 

relations between the ruling and opposition parties. Where an elite in 

power does not have a live-and-let live attitude its opponent out of 

power, and the latter are consistently oppressed and victimized, a 

party system nay actually become a source of violent political conflict. 

In particular, opposition parties are likely to direct their 

organizational activities such as subversion.  

Perhaps, an important variable that must, of necessary be taken into account in explaining 

practices in the country’s party system remains the tendency on the part of the parties to 

hardly recognize one another as legitimate representatives of opposing groups and 

therefore to continuously split and resort to mutual recriminations on every imaginable 

issue.  

As Verba et.  al( 1981:208) discovers, such antagonisms and deadly conflicts usually 

result where:  

One party resents advantages held by another and the other party 

struggles to preserve them. Or each party perceives the other to be 

advantaged, in which case the redress that each seeks makes the 

other feel even more disadvantaged. Such political conflict can be 

about any kinds of advantages …… 

In Nigeria, surely, the killing, arson and other forms of political violence that 

characterizes political competition, no less exemplified by happenings before and during 

the April 2003 elections, gives a clear indication that intense, conscious and deliberate 

negotiations towards the settlement of disputes was never part of the party system. 

Indeed, in Nigeria, recent elections as the previous ones, serve to leave no one in doubt 

that both the elites and their party structures are patently wanting in the essential 

requisites that may foster accommodation and political compromise. For instance, during 



 

 

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the party primary season the early 2003 politicians begin jockeying for position. Inter-

party rivalries emerged as a significant source of conflict, sparking violence in a number 

of areas. Results from many primary races were contested in court and on the streets.  

Indeed, the lop-sidedness of the processes that tend to reward victory and marginalize 

the looser, as exemplified in E. Gyimah Boadi’s (1998:19) “crude majoritarianism”, 

precludes the possibility of the flourishing of any positive approach to political 

contestation necessarily becomes a zero-sum affair with little or no regards for the laid 

down procedures. Such intransigence and bellicosity has been very contributive to the 

failure to develop a durable political party in the country.   

 

ELECTORAL RULES AND ELECTORAL PROCESS  

It perhaps, tantamount to stating obvious, to argue that over the years, politics and 

particularly the electoral process in Nigeria have been beset by series of problems. These 

range from excessive state control and interference, application of unpopular, often 

unorthodox methods and procedures and many other unfavourable conditions. Except, of 

course, for the arrangement which ushered in the second republic in 1979, all subsequent 

attempts tended to suffer from severe setbacks occasioned largely by the manipulative 

devices of the government overseeing their implementation. In fact, while the 

government of Murtala/Obasanjo allowed a great deal of independent action on the part 

of the regulatory body, the then Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), the same 

cannot be said of the several attempts by its successors. INEC’s performance leading up 

to and during April 12 National Assembly Election made it the object of significant 

criticism for its perceived lack of independence from the executive branch of 

government, and for a wide range of institutional and professional short comings. 

Emphatically, National Democratic Institute’s International Observer Delegation, notes 

that there were irregularities committed by officials, activists and supporters of the major 

political parties. INEC demonstrated an inability to ensure the overall secrecy and 

security to the voting and counting process. This appeared to have severely limited, and 

even denied in some parts of the country, the ability of Nigerians to express their 

franchise during both the National Assembly and the presidential/ Gubernatorial 

elections (Daily Trust, 4).  

 

Specifically, the Babangida REGIME, which run the country from 1985 – 1993 has been 

widely viewed as notorious for its incessant interference with the political transition 

process more especially the pools that were held under its close supervision. Basing its 

meddlesomeness on what it processed to be the need to sanitize the political system of 

violence, corruption and other vices, the government dabbled fully into all aspects of the 

political process, setting rules, changing them at random and excluding certain segments 

of the population from competing for elective positions. However, laudable as the stated 

intentions were, many observers were of the conviction that the unsurpassed 

meddlesomeness of the state into what should ordinarily belong on the citizen’s 



 

 

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constitutional prerogatives could be held to account for the crises and uncertainties that 

bedevilled the Babangida’s transition programme, especially the party and electoral 

system which were reduced to mere charades.  

  

The point therefore remains that electoral rules are not unknown in Nigeria. Coupled with 

administrative forces and even laxity, they often pose significant barriers to effectively 

participation (Geraint Parry and G. Noyser, 1994; and Robert H. Blank, 1973). In 

Nigeria, this was particularly true of the lapses and gross inefficiencies attributable to the 

implementers of the electoral process. Specifically, voter registration exercises in the 

country were almost always plagued by confusion delays and abuses of various 

dimensions.  

 

Nigeria’s experience, thus seem to suggest that a student variable that negatively 

impinges on the electoral process includes the official requirement or guidelines affecting 

the political parties and candidates. Often, political associations seeking constitutional 

recognition or registration are required to fulfil certain stringent conditions including the 

payment of some non-refundable fee. Other requirements such as opening of party offices 

nation-wide, manning them with personnel at all level made it imperative for associations 

seeking eligibility to incur expenditures running into several millions of Naira (Babafemi 

A. Badejo, 1997:177). If anything, perhaps, these conditions contributed to opening the 

floodgate for the domineering role of ‘money bags’ in the country’s electoral process.  

Ironically, therefore, the much publicized aversion to the salience of money in  Nigeria’s 

electoral process is no more than hypocritical. Indeed, the spill over effects of the 

aforementioned conditions are quite manifest at all levels of society with shady and 

illiberal practices beclouding the electoral process. Part of the repercussions are that, at 

the level of the electorates specifically, acute poverty, inflations, unemployment and 

other harsh conditions of life ensured the voters openly demand and receive inducements 

from the parties and their agents. This has been widely attested to in the recent elections 

in the country.  

 

Generally, the point being emphasized here is that several constraints stand in the way of 

consolidation of Nigeria’s democratic project. Of this, the undemocratic and illiberal 

behaviour or disposition of the political elites and their parties are of central concern.  

As Diamond (1996: 7) asserts:  

Consolidation is obstructed or destroyed casually by the effects of 

institutional shallowness and decay. If they are to become 

consolidated, therefore, electoral democracy must become deeper 

and more liberal. This will require grater executive (and military) 

accountability to both the low and the scrutiny of other branches of 

government as well as the public, the reduction of barriers to political 

participation and mobilization by marginalized groups; and more 



 

 

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effective protection for the political and civil rights of all citizens. 

Deepening will also be facilitated by the institutionalization of a 

political party system that stimulates mass participation, incorporate 

marginalized groups and forges vibrant linkages with civil society 

organizations and party branches and officials at the local levels. 

(Emphasis Ours).  

In other words, absence of effective party system and the prevalence of other weak and/or 

fledgling political institutions, often stand in the way of enduring democratic governance 

(Schmitter, 1994; and Mcfaul, 1999).  

 

CONCLUSION 

We have shown in the preceding discussions that Nigeria’s Journey to democracy have 

been beset by a number of problems. Part of the problems lie in the inability of the state 

to ensure the flourishing of such arrangement as well ensure the unimpedence attainment 

of the democratic goals of society. As our analysis has indicated, the nature and character 

of the political party system that the country practices over the years, has been 

instrumental in the derailment of many of the attempts at democratic sanitation in the 

country. Not only were the party system fluid, lacking in coherence and generally 

shallow, but the intra and inter-party feuds that become common place on the political 

landscape, necessarily define the textures and content or politics the continues witnesses 

thus far.  

 

Indeed, events that unfolded in the latest electoral contest in the country suggest that 

there is a long way ahead for the country in the search for democratic sustenance. The 

series of crises that dotted the electoral process and the anxiety it created in the political 

system were quite alarming. For the health of Nigerian’s democracy and deliberate 

efforts on the part of the state and its agencies, geared towards not only ensuring a hitch-

free electoral process, but the institutionalization of the party system that is necessary for 

democratic vitality and stability.  

 

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Experience (Engugu: Nok Publishers).  

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Babangida (Bonder and London: Lynne Rienner Publisher).  

Blank, Robert H. (1973), “State Electoral Structure” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 

35, No 4. November, P. 989.  

Boadi Gyimah E. (1998). “The Rebirth of African Liberalism: Journal of 

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