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INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE POLITICS OF MANAGING 

RWANDAN CRISIS: LESSON FOR DEVELOPING STATES 
 

Okechukwu, Groupson-Paul  UC. PhD 

groupsonpaul@yahoo.com 

Department of Political Science, 

Alex Ekweme Federal University Ndufu Alike Ikwo (FUNAI),  

Ebonyi State, Nigeria. 

 

Abstract 

The Rwandan crisis of 1994, still fresh in the mind of many over the loss of about 1,250,000 

people – mostly Tutsis and Modulate Hutus in one hundred days of ethnic genocide that was 

planned and executed by the Hutu government, with no help from anywhere in the world to rescue 

the victims turned out to be an international embarrassment of abandonment. Diplomatic 

inaction being the climate of the time however cast doubt on the notion that diplomacy is the 

peaceful conduct of relations. The study, therefore, in adopting primary and secondary data 

utilizes descriptive, in-depth interview method of key informants drawn from the Nigerian 

Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Military Observers (MILOB) and the academe as an 

analytical concept to arriving at its goal as it is situated on national interest model of the power 

theory framework. The study notes that diplomacy and diplomatic intrigues pervaded the whole 

situation unchecked; that this abandonment though might have being deep rooted in the poverty 

of no oil, no diamond, no gold, and no timber among others, encouraged the          

degree of ethnicization; that the theoretical context of diplomacy is quite different from the 

practical context as actors’ behaviour are modulated by their avowed interest, which allowed 

the disparity in the treatment of small state like Rwanda by the international system in the period 

under investigation. These absurdities, these maltreatments and misplaced priorities that seek 

numerous answers however, informed the revisit of the Rwandan crisis. 

          

Key Word: Diplomacy, National Interest, Disparities, Genocide, Ethnicization 

 

INTRODUCTION 

With the end of cold war in 1989, the 

focus of International politics thus 

shifted to re-alignment and the 

formation of new alliances, especially 

among states of Eastern Europe while 

Africa was turned a dumping ground to 

the dangerous weapons used in the cold 

war threat era. At the same time, Africa 

was also designated as only good for 

charity recipient (Okigbo, 1992). A 

factor that its scramble and struggle 

coupled with bad political leadership 

helped to plunging the continent into 

unabated conflict. In the preceding 

decade, conflicts and wars in Africa was 

fought primarily within states by rebels 

and national armies, with the victims 

being predominantly civilians and the 

vulnerable groups in the society.  

 

These rebels, militia groups, and state 

armies use conspicuous terror such as 

rape, looting, and massacre as part of 

their war and military strategies.  It is a 

situation characterised by mass killings, 

 

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ethnic cleansing which the actors 

regarded as the inevitable consequences 

of war, rebellion and conflict 

(Rupesinghe, 1998).  By 1990, the 

Burundi and Liberia wars took between 

100,000 and 500,000 lives each (Gott, 

1998). From 1995 onwards, there were 

ongoing wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra-

Leone, Somalia, Sudan, among others. 

Several other countries that were prone 

to severe crises or civil cum political 

instability, at one time or the other were 

Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Togo and 

Congo DR (then Zaire). In some other 

countries, however, low-level ethnic and 

political conflicts remained contained, 

but unresolved in such countries as 

Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 

Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, 

South Africa and Uganda. According to 

Stedman (2004:237), as at 1996, an 

estimated 19 major internal conflicts 

were fought worldwide. Added to this 

are a further 42 lower intensity wars and 

74 lethal violent political conflicts 

experienced within this period. A close 

review of the period under study clearly 

shows that Africa, with 13 conflicts at 

home, is ranked amongst the highest in 

the number of distribution of the world’s 

conflicts and crises. Berridge (1997) 

observed that these crises were escalated 

by foreign friends or foes alike, who, in 

the midst of such crisis, usually 

concealed their real intentions and hid 

under the canopy of providing assistance 

in terms of funds and advice, to pursue 

their national or selfish interests. 

      

Arguably, no nation has been able to 

solve all of its problems as such can only 

be reduced to barest minimum or 

otherwise. Thus, Massimirano (2010) 

noted that the challenges of a nationhood 

or nation-state are complex and mostly 

demanding. With Rwanda inclusive in 

this category, even after the events of 

1994 that was caused by the colonial 

German/Belgium – indirect rule 

system’s favouritism and designation, 

beginning from 1849 to 1959 with the 

seed of discord sown amongst the Hutus, 

Tutsis and Twas respectively, which did 

not only help to torn the country apart, 

but had allowed outside influence that 

capitalized on their impoverished status 

to explore the land to the detriment of the 

general society (Nyankanzi,1998), 

thereby explaining the high profile and 

depth of the country’s political 

quagmire.  

           

This outside influence – diplomacy, 

which had explored a great deal on the 

people, though, may not be said to have 

allowed the people to experience total 

stability or social civility at any 

particular point in time, but instead were 

said to be the root cause of the problem 

in Rwanda, as it encouraged and 

supported bad ethnic political leadership 

of the Hutu Government. Rwanda, then, 

was seen faced with a great element of 

disunity with persisting misgivings in 

the polity with inept diplomatic 

hypocrisy. 

             

Thus, in this study, diplomacy, both 

preventive, small state, and or coercive 

diplomacy amongst others, which 

seemed to have dominated the event of 

1994 in Rwanda were put on trial toward 



 

 

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attending to the Rwandan crisis. Also 

disparities in the treatment of small state 

in the international political system were 

also examined among some selected 

states toward arriving at the desired goal 

of the study.  

 

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 

This study adopts the National Interest 

Model” of the Power Theory 

Framework. National interest is the 

totality of state’s values. It is an 

instrument of action, which evaluates 

the sources of nation’s diplomatic 

foreign policy. It serves as a means of 

justifying, denouncing, or proposing 

policies. The notion of National interest 

tends to confine the intended meaning of 

what is best for a nation in foreign 

affairs. National interest in a simpler 

term rests on the notion that a state 

cannot engage in anything without 

having interest attached to it. Hence, it is 

as old as mankind itself. With theorists 

like Joseph Frankel, Hans Morgenthau, 

and Hugo Grant amongst others, the 

model had argued that state’s interest is 

always in anything that will be of benefit 

to it. Hence, to the state, it is inevitable, 

as she selfishly devices means of 

actualizing her goals in any particular 

situation. 

   

Frankel (1993), agreeing to this view, 

postulated that people maintain social 

order in a bid to satisfying their selfish 

national interest. He contended that 

national interest is a fundamental notion 

that defies definition by reference to 

other terms, because it is analytically 

convenient although often empirically 

impossible to determine whether the 

value found in the formulation of a 

specific interest had been internalized by 

the decision-makers or introduced only 

in response to environmental pressures, 

generally domestic but sometimes also 

international.  

           

Morgenthau (1960) sees National 

interest in terms of power. To him, 

National interest is the perennial 

standard by which political action must 

be judged and directed, hence the 

objective of a foreign policy must be 

defined in terms of National interest.  

 

He went further to posit that the interest 

of the state is that peace should be 

maintained, but whereby such fails 

against an aggressor, that the state 

should alternate her interest for war.  

Hugo (1969), one of the protagonists of 

the school aptly noted that states behave 

the way they do because it is in their 

interest to do so. 

  

Construing from the above contentions, 

and in relation to the subject under study 

– international diplomacy and the 

politics of managing the Rwandan crisis: 

lesson for developing states, certain 

questions that needs to be asked to 

further this investigation are: namely, 

why are African states known for 

continual crisis and high incident of 

political instability? Why were the 

problems of Rwanda and her politics of 

succession a major issue to African and 

the world, particularly in the period 

under study? Why was it that in the post-

cold war-Africa, certain forms of 



 

 

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government, especially the type that 

encouraged the Rwandan conflict was 

recognized unlike in the present time? 

Why was the west divided and ready at 

the same time to make mockery of their 

fellow state that had failed in their area 

of sphere of influence in the course re-

alignment? Why did the kind of contours 

that enveloped diplomacy in the 

Rwandan crisis allowed for the 

annihilation of such a great number of 

citizens? Why was African diplomacy 

dwarfed of any kind of remedy against 

the abandonment of the people of 

Rwanda? Why, in comparism was the 

kind of treatment meted to Rwanda 

exceptional in relation to the way other 

small states that had passed through the 

same situation of crises different?  

  

While the above questions may sound 

rhetoric or answered in thoughts, the 

major reasons for such intuition are the 

place and roles of National interest in 

state qua state and government qua 

government relations. It suffices to notes 

that these characters are always found in 

a conflictual paradigm of their 

separately avowed National interest that 

needs to be satisfied. A fact to which 

might have contributed in creating the 

situation leading to the escalation of 

conflict in Rwanda.  

  

Thus, while we further observe the role 

of national interest, it will suffice to 

highlight with reason that the French 

interest in Rwanda are vacillated 

between the desires to preserve her 

traditional sphere of influence in the 

region where her economic interest in 

tea and cash crop prospecting is at stake 

owing to other states’ interest. Just as 

Vassilier (1997), notes that Africa lies in 

the sphere of the United States and 

Europe global interest, which might 

have led to abandonment of Rwanda in 

the crisis days to French failure. This 

could be an outward demonstration, 

rather than a sign of real national interest 

of states’ mentioned above.  

         

The high incidences of political intrigues 

sequel to power successions problems in 

Rwanda and Africa in general informed 

the reasons for this revisit to the 

Rwandan war/genocide of 1994. The 

role of diplomacy and power struggle in 

African states and the ominous reasons 

why the spatial problems had remained 

and left many African states in a state of 

perpetual sympathy with Rwanda 

inclusive before the rest of the world 

explains the awful decadence of 

leadership problems amongst the people. 

  

The salient features that had been 

masking the cyclical leadership 

problems in Africa, leading to the 

abysmal diplomacy role as occurred in 

the Rwandan crisis, however, also lay its 

contradictions as experienced and seen 

in the Rwandan conflict since all actors 

were directly or indirectly modulated by 

its national interest model. 

 

THE VALUE CONCEPTS OF 

DIPLOMACY 

Diplomacy has been defined in different 

ways by different people. Hamilton 

(1996:1-2) defines diplomacy as the 

peaceful conduct of relations amongst 



 

 

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political entities, their principals and, or 

accredited agents.  It is a process that is 

sometimes regarded as a necessary evil 

but; regrettably, at other times with a 

deep respect. Accepting this 

observation, Lund (1996) reiterated that 

diplomacy had played a more significant 

role in human affairs in the present than 

ever. Although as old as mankind, 

diplomacy, according to Richard and 

Hamilton (1996) had made the necessity 

for organized dialogue in an era when 

the relative certainties of a bipolar states 

system have so recently given way to a 

disorderly, confused multipolarity, as 

witnessed in the frenetic pace of 

contemporary diplomatic activities.        

 

In another dimension, diplomacy, 

according to Wolton (1954:12) is an 

honest man (an ambassador) sent to lie 

abroad for the good of his country. To 

McJohnson (1976), diplomacy is 

concerned with the management of 

international relations. This is because 

diplomacy deals with tact, skill, and 

cunning to achieve a set of goals Thus, 

its application in the old was seen as a 

necessary evil, because then, it was 

agreed that it was better to hear the 

message than to kill the messenger. This 

acceptance in the classical Greek 

philosophical doctrine, however, gave 

rise to the first tenet of diplomacy, which 

is the principle of diplomatic immunity.  

 

According to Alken (2005:3) the 

political scheming and intrigues are well 

sustained in the political disagreement 

and agreement when the level of 

diplomacy employed becomes 

successful, meaning that diplomacy 

helps to bring systematic skill to apply 

on the negotiations or dialoguing of 

issues in most political spheres. Stranger 

cited in Hamilton (1996: 3) observed 

that in a world where war is everybody’s 

tragedy and everybody’s nightmare, 

diplomacy is everybody’s business. 

Consequent upon the collapse of long – 

established hegemonies and the re-

emergence of long neglected enmities, 

the art of diplomacy has placed a high 

premium on the work of those skilled 

mediators, negotiators and 

representatives.  

 

Therefore, in collating the views of the 

scholars above, particularly in the 

assertion of Wolton, in terms of  practice 

of diplomacy as observed in the Ancient   

Byzantine empire, Hamilton (1996:15-

17) revealed:  

that in the late tenth Century, 

during the visit of envoys of Prince 

Vladimir of Russia to Byzantine, 

they seemed to  behold amid 

wreaths of incense and the 

radiance of candle young men, 

wonderfully arrayed, floating in 

the air above  the heads of the 

priests and singing in triumph, 

“Holy, Holy,  Holy is the eternal. 

 

In explaining the motion on the air to the 

envoy: “the Emperor noted that if you 

were not ignorant of the Christian 

mysteries, you would know that the 

Angels of God themselves come down 

from heaven to celebrate the office with 

our priest”. 

 



 

 

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 It is comparatively easy to understand 

what an irresistible effect this would 

likely have, and did have, on the visiting 

dignitaries and those who might have 

had the intention of attacking or 

engaging the empire in war and how it 

was achieved because of this diplomacy 

at work.  In another instance, the 

Byzantine Emperor, in carrying out her 

state functions, especially on the issue of 

foreign relations, had in her Code 515, 

stated that there was a law in the Code 

which empowered and ordered the 

Emperor to lie and to violate his oath if 

it was necessary to do so for the well-

being of the empire, implying that in 

diplomacy, if it means to tell a lie to save 

the state, one should not hesitate to do so 

(Hamilton, 1996). 

 

Agreeing with the above contention, Sti

nnett (2005:26) reiterated that diplomac

y has a chequered history. It is the 

practice of verbal discussion with the 

intent to influence, transmit a position or 

negotiate on a given issue or situation for 

a mutually acceptable outcome. 

Diplomacy is an art because it requires a 

unique mixture of empathy, persuasion, 

bluster, cajoling, amongst other things 

(Goldberg, 2005:6). Shultz and Moltang 

(2005) also noted that in modern 

diplomacy, roles and intrigues in 

intergovernmental organizations and 

non-governmental organizations has 

helped the workings of globalization of 

communication and transportation to 

opening up new avenues for the conduct 

of diplomacy     

Emanating from the various definitions 

of diplomacy given above, several types 

of diplomacy, which according to 

Woldspring (2009), include economic 

diplomacy, multi-tracks diplomacy, 

preventive diplomacy, coercive 

diplomacy, panda diplomacy, ping pong 

diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, small 

state diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, 

gunboat diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, 

appeasement diplomacy amongst others.   

However, away from the several types of 

diplomacy, there are also processes 

through which diplomacy works. These, 

according to Zartman (2007), include 

negotiation, mediation, reconciliation, 

reporting and representation, which help 

to quicken the workings of diplomacy. 

Meanwhile, against the conditions of the 

events that informed the topic under 

study, beginning from 1990 to 1994, that 

is, from the period of the build-up of the 

crisis to the period of conflict escalation 

in Rwanda, scholars had argued in 

respect of the application of any of the 

three – preventive diplomacy, small 

state diplomacy and or coercive 

diplomacy, among others as they affect 

the Rwandan crisis on either success or 

failure of the practice. Premised on this, 

the study in consideration of the 

Rwandan crisis, will seek permission to 

briefly examine the above-mentioned. 

 

a. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 

AND RWANDAN CRISIS 

In this sub-section scholars were critical 

of what preventive diplomacy is, what 

constitutes it, how it is applied and 

where, if possible, had it been 

successfully utilized or otherwise. Thus, 



 

 

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Calhill (2000:37) observed that the 

essence of preventive diplomacy is not 

only to employ tact in dialoguing among 

the conflicting parties, but the act of 

employing persuasion to stop conflicts 

or wars before they start or escalate. 

This, according to him, is because lives 

are more saved and protected than when 

the battle or conflict escalates to destroy 

more than imagined.  To Zartman (2007) 

preventive diplomacy focuses on 

negotiation as practiced in different 

issue areas. Agreeing with the scholar’s 

assertions as above, Lund (1996:11) 

argued that preventive diplomacy is the 

international movement toward 

responding to early warnings of conflict 

and attempting preventive measures 

before it escalates to severely violent 

levels. To him, this includes knowing 

the root cause of the conflict, and 

dialoguing out the differences towards 

ending any escalation. Accepting the 

emphasises, Touval (1996) queried 

reasons for the failure of diplomatic 

attempts to prevent war and maintain a 

unified Yugoslavia instead of allowing 

its disintegration. He critically blamed 

the idea of preventive diplomacy as 

lacking clarity and credibility owing to 

the lapses in the former. Disagreeing 

with Touval, Cohen (1997:23-39) 

argued that cross-cultural differences 

have significant effects on preventing 

crisis and diplomatic negotiations. 

Yugoslavia was an example of failed 

diplomacy because there was failure to 

understand and appreciate these 

differences. Meaning that, for 

preventive diplomacy not to lack clarity 

and purpose, then the content, process 

and style of negotiation must go hand in 

hand with the cultural differences.   

 

However, being specific on international 

conflicts like the Rwandan crisis, Lund 

(1996) observed that one of the major 

reasons why preventive diplomacy was 

somehow ignored in the 1990s was due 

to the complexity of the problems and 

the multiplicity of conflicts going on at 

the same time, just as the Rwandan crisis 

caught everybody napping. Could the 

contentions above be a cogent reason for 

the failure of preventive diplomacy in 

Rwanda? Against the backdrop of the 

above notion, and with the event 

catching everybody unawares, Dallaire 

(2003) disagreed and argued that 

preventive diplomacy was the best 

method needed to avert the Rwandan 

holocaust, but it was not there. To him, 

the failure could be located in the lack of 

the major characteristics of preventive 

diplomacy, such as adhering to early 

warning that the risk of conflict exists, 

the causes and the nature of the potential 

conflict being identified and the consent 

of the parties within the jurisdiction to 

which preventive action is to be taken. 

Supporting Dallaire’s analogy, Nye 

(2008) posited that the element of timing 

is also crucial. The potential conflict 

should be ripe for the proposed 

preventive action. This was absent in 

Rwanda. This assumption, in both 

conflict prevention and preventive 

diplomacy, shows that intractable 

conflicts are easier to avoid before they 

happen rather than being fixed once they 

have occurred. There is a great deal of 



 

 

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truth in this assumption, although some 

conflicts are likely to be unavoidable. 

 

In view of the reasoning that preventive 

diplomacy is usually used in the 

international arena and that it refers to 

efforts of outside nations or groups of 

nations to prevent the escalation of 

conflicts between or within other 

nations, Perry (2001) further argued that 

conflict prevention is the best approach 

to managing conflicts but it was not 

there in Rwanda. These preventive 

measures include early warning, fact – 

finding, early deployment to 

demilitarized zones and confidence-

building measures. Accepting the 

assertions above, Ghali (2002) noted 

that preventive diplomacy has had a long 

and instrumental role in international 

relations.     

 

Meanwhile, Reye (2000) in total 

disagreement with the issue of absence 

of preventive diplomacy in Rwanda 

noted that track one of the preventive 

diplomacy was duly applied at Arusha 

because in the field of preventive 

diplomacy, track one, which is the 

formal negotiation between official 

representatives of the parties involved 

was carried out until the breakdown of 

peace in April 1994. 

 

However, Nye (2008), reasoning from 

the Reychler standpoint, argued that if 

track one of preventive diplomacy was 

applied in Rwanda and it failed, then, 

should one accept the fact that the lapses 

may be located on small states 

diplomacy incapacitation?  

b. SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY 

AND RWANDAN CRISIS  

According to Shultz and Moltang 

(2005:43), the issue of small state 

diplomacy could be viewed from two 

angles:  one, the small states are always 

at the receiving end of every event in the 

international system, whether positively 

or negatively motivated. Two, small 

states lack developments that are 

determined beyond their borders such as 

climate change, water, security and 

shifts in global economy; hence, it is 

through diplomacy that they can address 

their desires to attain expected goals, as 

it is obvious that with the absence of 

these factors the small states have strong 

incentives to support international co-

operations.     

 

Corgan (2008), however, argued that 

when a small state takes up a task that is 

above its strength, even if that small 

state were to devote its entire diplomatic 

service to the project, only half the 

required task could be completed. This 

is the sort of problem that any small state 

faces in dealing with global politics. 

Given the right circumstance, they could 

prevail against far larger powers and 

could even have palpable influence on 

the world stage. Meaning that, in 

modern times, some small states, 

notably Switzerland, Iceland, Norway 

and Finland, amongst others had shown 

how a focused and well – informed 

diplomacy could produce remarkable 

results, especially when vital economies 

or security are involved in the 

interactions.  

 



 

 

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In addition, Sperling (1999:17) argued 

that when a small state is in trouble, the 

urge to help such a state is quickened 

when it is realized that such a state 

belongs to the same alliance with the 

great powers. The hope of rescue 

depends on how cooperative the small 

state is to global issues. Citing a recent 

instance, Corgan (2002) noted that the 

general response to the Kuwait invasion 

in 1991 was successful because of 

Kuwait’s general interest in the global 

happenings, even when the invasion was 

a clear violation of international norms.        

Furtherance to this, Henrikson (2006) 

noted that small states are viable and 

active partners within the international 

community: a common characteristic of 

small states is the thrust and nature of 

their diplomacy that goes with 

persuasion and consensus building. In 

the view of Payne (2004:63) small states 

are highly dependent on development 

beyond their own borders. For example, 

in the environmental field, small states 

are highly vulnerable to the adverse 

impacts of natural disasters. On security, 

small states are quickly and deeply 

affected by regional and global conflicts 

and instabilities. In this regard, Otienno 

(2000) aptly stated that one of the 

problems of Rwanda in the dark days of 

her trouble was the limited resources at 

her disposal. This was among the 

reasons why Rwanda could not conduct 

effective diplomacy that posed a great 

challenge to her in the days leading to 

the genocide, a  factor, which made her 

fall an easy prey to the several kinds of 

diplomacy that were dictated from 

outside. Accepting this assertion, 

Dallaire (2003) still went ahead to query 

the great powers; saying, should we 

agree that the previous cooperative 

nature of small states diplomacy has 

been eroded by the heated competition 

in an increasingly globalised world, 

thereby making vulnerable states like 

Rwanda to be abandoned and betrayed 

in the days of the war/genocide in her 

domain or should we accept the 

exacerbated differences amongst small 

states as a reason for not attending to the 

Rwandan crisis?  

            

Against the backdrop of the fact that 

Rwanda was among the small states left 

behind in her days of trouble due to 

incapacitation and inability to fend for 

itself, could it be agreed that this 

abandonment might have compelled her, 

owing to different interests, to yield to 

some element of coercive diplomacy as 

observed amongst quarreling parties to 

the Rwandan crisis? And, how could a 

small state like Rwanda employ 

diplomacy to help build stability which 

is vital for her own existence when there 

were several interests attached to the 

political conflict?  

  

c. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND 

RWANDAN CRISIS 

Going by the manner through which 

preventive diplomacy and small states 

diplomacy were examined in the 

preceding sub-sections, it is imperative 

also if the act of coercive diplomacy is 

probably considered as having 

something to do with the issue or 

approach which had been employed in 

the process leading to the Rwandan 



 

 

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war/genocide.  In the course of this 

review, scholars, apart from offering 

definitions, also seem to be divided, 

even as they went ahead to explain to 

what extent such could be employed in 

conflict situations. Thus, emphasis is 

also placed on the conflict between the 

Rwandan government and the 

opposition towards achieving or failing 

to achieve their aspirations. 

 

According to Woldspring (2000), 

coercive diplomacy is the attempt put 

forward towards achieving aspiration or 

a target by a state, a group within a state 

or non-state actor – to change its 

objectionable behavior through either 

the threat to use force or the actual use 

of limited force. Coercive diplomacy 

presupposes the use of threat or military 

force to achieve political objectives. 

Thus, Otienno (2000:99), in agreeing 

with the above-held view noted that 

coercive diplomacy is essentially a 

diplomatic strategy, one that relies on 

the threat of force rather than the use of 

force.  If force must be used to 

strengthen diplomatic efforts at 

persuasion, as adopted by Rwandan 

Patriotic Force (RPF) against the 

Rwandan government in the 1990s, it is 

employed in an exemplary manner, in 

the form of quite limited military action, 

to demonstrate a resolution and 

willingness to escalate to high levels of 

military action, if necessary.      

 

In support of the above contention, 

Byman (2008) asserted that coercive 

diplomacy is a political diplomatic 

strategy that aims to influence an 

adversary’s incentive structure. It is a 

strategy that combines threats of force, 

and if necessary, the limited and 

selective use of force in discreet and 

controlled increments, in a bargaining 

strategy that includes positive 

inducements. The aim is to induce an 

adversary to comply with one’s 

demands, or to negotiate the most 

favourable compromise possible, while 

simultaneously managing the crisis to 

prevent unwanted military escalation. 

          

The aforementioned assertions, 

however, may not have been ruled out in 

the Rwandan crisis. Thus, in support of 

the use of coercive diplomacy by states 

to achieve their goal, Art and Kristol 

(2003) observed that in the 1990 - 1991 

Gulf war, the USA applied it but it failed 

to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit 

Kuwait and the result was the use of total 

force on the former. Another instance of 

coercive diplomacy was the Cuban 

missile crisis between the USA and the 

former USSR in 1962 in which Kennedy 

used coercive diplomacy to blockade the 

USSR Naval passage until the 

withdrawal of the missile by the USSR, 

which was achieved instead of using 

total force against the USSR.  

 

In this regard Otienno (2000), states that 

there is, indeed, the  confirmation that 

the RPF used coercive diplomacy from 

its military base at Uganda/Rwanda 

border to compel Habyarimana to accept 

negotiation as a way out of the Rwandan 

quagmire.  In the same vein Anyidoho 

(1998:2-3) argued that a guerrilla force 

of the RPF using limited force invaded 



 

 

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Rwanda in 1990 to persuading the 

government of Habyarimana to change 

policies on the treatment of citizens, a 

failure which led to invasion. It is 

possible therefore, that RPF used 

coercive diplomacy to checkmate the 

Rwandan government of General 

Habyarimana.  

 

DISPARITY AND TREATMENT 

OF STATE: RWANDA RE-

EXAMINED 

The main trust of this study is: “that the 

disparity in the treatment of small states 

in the international diplomacy might 

have provided the contour that led to 

the abandonment of Rwanda in the 

1994 war/genocide”. This is examined 

based on the situations of things at 

Rwanda in 1994, to which different 

intrigues were brought to play in the 

process of suspicion and the actual 

conflict period. All the situations were 

meant to meet the demand of the actors 

who in turn makes the people to feel 

depraved and neglected against their 

suffering. Rwandan crisis and its 

interrelationship with the outside world 

within the context of the international 

system was a huge challenge, to the 

international community, the United 

Nations, and Africa in particular. These 

adduced reasons and questions are 

tackled referencing the raised main trust. 

Such questions are: what could be 

considered as the negative treatment of 

small states in the international politics, 

Rwanda inclusive? In relation to the 

Rwanda situation in 1994, could she 

have been considered less importance in 

the international politics vis-à-vis the 

kind of treatment meted out to her in the 

period of war/genocide? Comparatively, 

under small states diplomacy, can 

Rwanda, Israel and Kuwait be equated in 

any positions in the context of 

international politics or is there any 

difference? Could there be an element of 

international conspiracy to the Rwandan 

crisis? And presently, with the 

assistance of foreign aids, direct foreign 

investments, trade liberalization, neo-

democracy and opening up among other; 

could this be part of the western world 

ploy to appease Rwandans for long years 

of neglect and abandonment leading to 

the 1994 war/genocide? 

            

However, going by the raised questions 

and the guiding main trust in this section 

as stated above, the study, which had 

earlier adopted national Interest model 

in all of its analysis, may resolve to 

utilizes some tenet of “power 

framework” and, “conflict theory” in 

furthering its explanations. This is 

specifically, in addressing the negating 

value and the interplay of national 

Interest model within the context of the 

Rwandan crisis. It is evidence that the 

complexity, challenging and prolonged 

phases of the conflict was aided by the 

role of the outside powers, the 

weaknesses in OAU and the structures 

of the indigenous Rwandan. 

            

Power framework, which is the ability to 

make one do whatever the other wants, 

even when there are dislikes or likes, 

accepted or not accepted, might be 

considered as one of the tool in the 

treatment of small states in the 



 

 

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international system, since power is an 

important variable in all political 

equations. Thus, Machiavelli (1532) and 

Hobbs (1662) conceived politics in 

terms of power. Dahl (1953), also, 

argued that power is the capacity to 

change the probability of outcomes, 

while Deutsch (1964) asserts that power 

is the ability to make things happen that 

would not have happened otherwise. 

 

The implication is that the interplay of 

power and its ability was not ruled out in 

the Rwandan crisis. There was a strong 

indication of the existence of power 

intrigues. The intrigues and functions of 

power as displayed by the actors made 

the conflict unique in the annals of 

African history.  

 

Conflict, on the other hand according to 

Boulding (1962:1) is an activity that is 

found almost everywhere in the world of 

man.  Amongst all the categories of 

conflicts, political conflict seems to be 

most devastating and destructive, both in 

idea and actions. Laue (1990:17-18), 

further  postulated that conflict is a 

natural and inevitable part of all human 

social relationship.  It is the escalated, 

natural competition between two or 

more parties about scarce resources, 

power and prestige. Banks (1996:439), 

also, argued that conflict is both 

inevitable and necessary.  It is 

inevitable, because both people and 

groups have basic needs, expressed in 

society through competing values, 

clashing in order to provide the catalyst 

for development.  

             

Beside, on the consideration of the issue 

of small states’ diplomacy, it is 

important to state some of the elemental 

make-up of small states vis-à-vis their 

place in the international system. 

According to Dokubo (2011) small 

states emerged during the Westphalia 

treaty of 1648. At that period they 

projected some degree of collective 

voice or vote to balance the dominance 

of the then super powers, even to this 

day. Their diplomatic activities on the 

UN were for one vote per sovereign 

state. The essence being according to 

Henrikson (2006:8), for the greatest 

chance of safety and survival of small 

states, which lies in law, in institutions 

and, especially in diplomacy. 

          

However, in determining the strength 

and capability of small states in the 

present world order, opinions are 

divided on what constitute a small state 

coupled with the hiccups of small states 

diplomacy. Thus in respect of Rwanda, 

Power (2003) asserted that the UN did 

not shot its door to the situation there, 

but was doing little as less priority and 

less concerned of a small state 

diplomacy as Rwanda. An allegation 

that was never debunked by the UN. 

These allegations of negligence to the 

crisis in Rwanda were not hidden as the 

UN fell more negligent in the later 

incident in Rwanda, amongst which, 

were the failure of the Belgium and 

France to implement the delegated 

function on the Rwanda crisis by the 

UN. Against the adamancy of the UN 

when the Arusha peace talks resumed on 

16 March 1993, the body resolved not to 



 

 

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participate fully as a negotiator, which 

too many critics and analyst like 

(Melvern, 2000) and Power (1997) 

noted as a betrayal of trust for the body 

held to protect and save lives, in lieu to 

the charter principle.   Henrikson (2006) 

in this respect, while sympathising with 

Rwanda, argued that a small state is one 

that cannot protect itself by it, own 

efforts. Small states require allies or to 

be ally. 

           

In the same vein, Richard (1999:10) 

asserts that small states diplomacy is 

particularly affected by developments 

which are determined beyond their 

border against the fact that diplomacy is 

the main vehicle by which small states 

are able to ensure that their goals are 

addressed in the global arena. But 

analyst being critical of the UN lip 

service in the Rwandan crisis as noted by 

Melvern (2004:16), that there was more 

of UN interest in Liberia, Somalia, 

Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, 

Mozambique and Georgia amongst 

other than Rwanda, a small state with 

nothing to offer, to which even ally had 

abandoned. Supporting the contention, 

Dallaire (2003:10) notes that the UN had 

a low priority over the mission in 

Rwanda. To the same effect, Buggingo 

(2005) aptly stated that Rwanda was 

never of any importance to the UN less 

worried about of whatever happens to it. 

 

To Williams (1970:23), small states are 

pawns. They are not the knights, the 

bishops or the rooks in the international 

chess – but merely the pawns, counting 

for only one each in points. On the 

positional advantages, Richard (1999) 

reiterated that small states under the 

right circumstances can prevail against 

far larger powers and can even have 

palpable influence on the world stage. A 

case in point was the role of Israel, 

Kuwait, Qatar, Switzerland, and Vatican 

in international politics.  Small States 

can only manage and manoeuvre to 

promote their interests within a 

framework established by and for larger 

powers. This Means that Rwanda, 

though being an impoverished small 

state, possess such opportunity. 

           
It is also evidence that the small state 

status greatly affected Rwanda in all 

ramifications, especially, at the period of 

its crisis. This singular act made the 

peace talk to look more unrealistic and 

unreliable, as Power (1997) aptly opined 

that the UN participated in the peace 

deal as an observer, which indicates how 

unserious the body had been with the 

Rwandan crisis from the onset.  The 

analyst blamed the UN’s non-chalant 

attitude and kind of diplomacy even 

under the Security Council resolution 

812 (1993) is unbecoming of the 

behavior of an International body meant 

to maintain peace. Also, under the 

Security Council resolution 846 (1993) 

(Melvern 2000:24-28) and Destexche 

(1995:34) blamed the UN’s role as 

trying to pave way for unhealthy 

competition in Rwandan conflict.   

             

The level of diplomatic interplay 

between the UN, SRSG and the people 

of Rwanda according to Anyidoho 

(1998:11) created a great gap that was 



 

 

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exploited by the warring factions leading 

to war/genocide, which probably made 

people to accused the UN of bias. Added 

to this, Keane (1996:37) argued that 

while the UN and Security Council in 

New York were polarized and nursed 

sympathy to one group or the other the 

UN and UNAMIR in Rwanda was seen 

to have been considerably compromised.  

             

Premised on these analogies above about 

small states, especially on the positional 

advantages (strategic importance) in the 

international system in relationship with 

big actors; the manner of fate suffered by 

Rwanda in the period of her crisis and 

her influence in the global politics, 

speaks nothing than an abandoned small 

state left to fend for itself.  In the same 

continuum, the research will hereby, 

takes our minds back to the drawn 

questions above and the raised main 

trust while examining the issues of the 

position and importance of Rwanda to 

the international system, and, the 

comparism of Rwanda and the rest 

(Israel and Kuwait) preferably in the 

context of international system with 

regard to differences. 

 

i. THE POSITION AND OR 

IMPORTANCE OF RWANDA IN 

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Agreeing with Schultz and Moltang 

(2005) and Rana (1999), that small states 

are viable and active partners within the 

context of international community; that 

for a small state to succeed well in 

diplomacy, it must completely be a 

sovereign entity, not merely in the sense 

of having legal independence and 

international recognition, but in the full 

sense of national self-possession. On 

whether to this effect that Rwanda has 

self-possession. Rwanda, since 1962 is a 

sovereign and independence state, and a 

non-veto member of UN Security 

Council in 1994, has the status of small 

state. Then, if that be the issue, the 

question that readily strikes one is: why 

is the treatment of small states like 

Rwanda in 1994 done with such 

disparity and impunity, given its status?  

According to Dokubo (2011) in 

international politics, with respect to 

Rwanda, the big states swallows’ small 

states and the small states in turn eat 

worms. This is because the small states 

cannot work miracles in the globalized 

world that is still dominated by great 

powers unless they follow their fellow 

Lilliputians. Furthermore, international 

constraints, domestic politics and 

foreign policy create uneasy change in 

small states (Fredrick, 2010:13). Shultz 

et al (2005:43) had argued that small 

states are always at the receiving end of 

every event in the international system, 

whether positively or negatively 

motivated, and that small states lack 

developments that are determined 

beyond their borders. Rwanda, in 1994, 

was found wanting in this regard. 

Upholding this view, Nani (2011), 

Agwu (2011) and Agbu (2011) argued 

that Rwanda was less important, 

insignificance and extremely poor. Nani 

(2011), further states that the less 

position of Rwanda in the international 

politics might have encouraged the 

international community and the United 

Nations to probably allow the event that 



 

 

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took place to happen. Agwu (2011), 

also, notes that Rwanda, from all sense 

of purpose, is not viable in the 

international system. The less 

importance of Rwanda, as in lacking any 

strategic importance and cooperation in 

international politics and governance, 

also weakened any attempt at helping. 

Thus, the UN failure and abandoned the 

people of Rwanda as confirmed in what 

Dallaire (2003) posited as the devil 

incarnated in form of human being, 

came down from hell to feast on 

innocent blood was never false. 

      

Arguing from the angle of international 

diplomacy, Adeleke (2011) noted that it 

is true that diplomacy is the main vehicle 

through which small states like Rwanda 

can voiced its predicament in the global 

arena, but Rwanda’s lack of the 

necessary natural supporters for 

international cooperation had helped to 

put it in a disadvantaged position. He 

agreed with Nani (2011) that there was 

international conspiracy among the UN, 

USA, Belgium, France and the rest of 

the international community over the 

issues in Rwanda. This is because even 

when their (UN peacekeepers) strength 

was reduced from 2700 troops to 250 

men and moved to Kenya, UN trucks, 

vehicles, equipment and communication 

gadgets were left behind only for the 

invading RPF to use same to over run the 

country against the Rwandan Armed 

forces and the Hutus government. 

Implying that the international 

community wanted what took place to 

actually happen. 

          

 It could be summarised that there is 

disparity in the treatment of small states 

like Rwanda in the international system, 

especially in the period of its crisis in 

1994. It was noted that some of the 

negating factors which provided the 

contour to that kind of treatment were 

due to lack of relevancy in the power 

configuration of states that are less 

important and who contributes 

minimally to the advancement of the 

international system.  Coupled with the 

fact also that national interest is the 

totality of states’ values, just as power is 

the means to national end (Morgenthau, 

1964). It is absurd for any state to invest 

where its interest is not protected. 

Hence, going by the preceding analogy, 

the research adduced main trust above, 

however, could be said to have merit. 

 

ii. COMPARISM OF RWANDA 

AND THE REST (ISRAEL 

AND KUWAIT) IN 

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM  
Comparatively, in looking at Rwandan 

crisis and other small states like Israel 

and Kuwait amongst many others, vis-à-

vis the kind of negative attention given 

to it in the days of crisis in 1994, and the 

kinds meted out to others like Israel in 

the middle East conflict and Kuwait in 

the days of its invasion in 1991, this 

study which tends to state the difference, 

also link the events to the staggering 

evidences on the disparity in the 

treatment of small states in the 

international system. 

 

 

 



 

 

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a) ISRAEL  

According to Agbu (2011), in the 

treatment of small states like Israel, 

Rwanda and Kuwait based on their 

position, importance and influence in the 

global politics, the state of Israel, is 

overwhelm above all others. Israel, 

though a small state, has power and 

influence over many states. The Jewish 

lobby which is a strong force of the 

Israel descent in New York had made the 

country to see itself as Most Favoured 

Nations (MFN) in the world. Nani 

(2011) asserts that in the international 

politics, it is not the size of a state that 

matters, but the state’s capability and 

strength, which speaks of its strategic 

importance, military might and 

technology, and to which Israel is 

strategically placed and at advantage. In 

the same continuum, Dokubo (2011) 

explained that apart from Israel being 

the western world strategic interest in 

the Middle East, it has a developed 

educational system with a profound link 

to the World, highly skilled diplomats 

that are technically advanced and sound. 

To Adeleke (2011) Israel possesses the 

quality that makes it to be taken 

seriously in every actions and situations. 

As a small state, Israel is able to prevail 

on superior powers outside its domain 

and cannot be commonly treated in the 

international system as Rwanda was 

treated in 1994. 

 

b) KUWAIT 
Kuwait is a small state and could be 

likened to what Corgan (2008:18-19) 

argued as has been given occasional 

successes against the agendas of larger 

states owing to its wealth and resources 

in most critical arena that enhanced its 

influence. Agwu (2011) who agrees with 

the notion above argued that Kuwait, 

which is located at the international 

strategic importance of the U. S’s policy 

in the Middle East, is a small state whose 

oil and wealth has provided a viable link 

to world economy and politics, thus, 

agreeing with Williams (1970) that 

small states have limited range, and can 

rarely enter into large, complicated and 

strategic international power play. Thus, 

Kuwait was rallied round against Iraq 

invasion because of its economic 

importance to the international 

community. 

         

Collaborating this view, Agbu (2011) 

argued that it was because Kuwait was a 

strong ally to the western world; hence, 

ignoring it at that period was like giving 

a strong economic bloc away to a new 

comer. He submitted that Kuwait, 

located in the geopolitical configuration 

of America in the Middle East, cannot be 

abandoned.  Kuwait oil and wealth 

explains the manner in which it was 

treated in the international system, 

which differ greatly from the treatment 

meted out to Rwanda and mostly same 

to many Africa states in crises. 

 

RWANDA 

According to Schultz (2001) a small 

state that is highly dependent on 

development beyond its border hardly 

survive in a period of crisis. This is 

because such a small state is highly 

vulnerable to the adverse impact of 

climate change and natural disasters and 



 

 

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other internal problems, be it political 

or  otherwise.  Adding to this 

observation, Fredrick (2010:16) noted 

that the foreign policy of such a small 

state like Rwanda, is seen as a response 

to the constraints and politics of 

international system that at times may 

abandon it as was in the case of Rwanda 

in 1994.  

         

Although the contention seemed to be 

disputed upon, owing to the fact that the 

importance of such a state domestic 

politics is expected to determine its 

foreign policy, he quickly added that 

Rwanda’s domestic policy is a make-up 

of what was imported from outside its 

domain with implications. Agbu (2011) 

argued that Rwanda, unlike Israel and 

Kuwait, has nobody to speak for it. 

Furthermore, being a natural forest 

country of trees, wide life and 

interlocked – hilly state, which the 

possibility of help was ruled out such 

might have informed the event of 1994. 

Agwu (2011) in furthering assertion, add 

that it is because Rwanda is not strategic 

to any power configuration, it is a small 

country with no oil well, no diamond 

and of no importance in the international 

system compared to Israel or Kuwait, 

thereby prompting its abandonment in 

1994.  

           

Inference to the contentions above and 

in the re-examinations of the tool of 

analysis mentioned above to explaining 

the political dynamism that led to the 

war/genocide in 1994 at Rwanda and the 

interpretations or consideration of the 

element of power relations it is evidence 

that Rwanda was negatively treated by 

the international community.  Rwanda, a 

small state that was inexperience, was 

left to experience the momentum of 

international power struggle in the 

emerging new international system. The 

power play of the international 

community, especially between 

America and France left much to be 

questioned on their role in the 

abandonment and failed diplomacy. As 

the factors in the lapses also left the Hutu 

government to annihilate both Tutsis and 

modulate Hutus alike in the peak of the 

crisis. In the context of position and 

relevance in the international system, 

Rwanda was found wanting and 

missing.   

  

CONCLUSION 

In view of the foregoing, it is evidence 

that the role of actors in international 

conflict, internal state political crisis, 

and regional conflicts alike had been 

modulated by national interest backed 

by element of politics and power, to 

which most crises had leaned on as a 

supporting beam in either escalating the 

propensity of the of conflicts or the 

longevity of its duration with diplomacy 

being the end point of either the 

execution or stayed-execution in the 

world context.  

 

Imperatively too, there are huge politics 

in the treatment of state in the 

international system. More especially, 

small states who may not be able to 

make any impact in the affairs of 

international system beyond their 

capacity. At times they are neglected or 



 

 

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seldomly ignored in case of any internal 

upheavals as was in the situation of 

Rwanda. Rwandan people being close in 

interaction and relationship to outside 

world against such treatment might have 

seen that they are the architect of their 

own misfortune. This is sequel to the 

fact that its abysmal relationship to the 

outside world actually played on the 

kind of diplomacy that was used to 

addressing its political crisis in the 

period between 1988 to 1994. 

     

This means to say that the relationship a 

state puts up towards a neighbour, either 

inside or outside its domain or the world 

in general at times modulates the kind of 

treatment apportioned to it in time of 

trouble or conflict. Moreover, it is 

evidence that even before then, and 

thereafter, that diplomacy in Rwanda 

from the period of build - up to the time 

of conflict escalation in 1994 was 

already a complete failure. If the role of 

individual states to the Rwandan crisis 

had portrayed a negating adventure from 

the onset, it then means that it is these 

hiccups that created the several contours 

that in turn led to the conflicts and the 

consequent abandonment and wilful 

neglect of the people in the period. 

  

The superior base of power struggle 

between United States and France also, 

perhaps, displayed the intrigues, denial 

and delay to act and the consequence 

lapses in the diplomatic practices of the 

states to the crisis in Rwanda that 

enhanced and encouraged the kind of 

diplomacy witnessed in Rwanda in 1994 

war/genocide.   

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