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THE FALLACY OF DIPLOMACY OF    INTERVENTIONS 

IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS 

 

BY 

 

Okechukwu, Groupson – Paul 

Alex Ekweme Federal University Ebonyi State 

groupsonpaul@yahoo.com 

 

Okechukwu Prisca Chinyere 

Enugu State College of Education (Technical), Enugu        

prispelladiag@gmail.com 

 

 

ABSTRACT 

Africa, yes, was bedevilled by several conflicts and crisis. Occasioned by incompetent 

leadership, styled to tyranny, greed, corruption, primitive accumulations and wanton self 

– eliminations of other an enterprise that was applauded, condemned, and yet funded by 

friends, sympathizers, and neighbours alike in the name of intervention. 

 

In different manners they came; in different manners they aided conflict, and in different 

manners they exploited the empty state to perpetual abjection. True or false interventions 

are meant to diminish the state. No state experienced it and remains the same. Yet we 

were  informed that diplomacy is a peaceful conduct of relations among  states, only for 

it be for the Africans an awful  fallacies of   interventions in state crisis. 

 

Key Words: Diplomacy, Leadership, Primitive- Accumulation, Interventions, Arms-Aid 

 

INTRODUCTION  

Intervention to either save lives and or to help in ameliorating problems occasioned by 

wars, conflicts, rebellion, disasters, and displacements against persons, people, groups, 

and society amongst others are seen as a noble course meant to uphold the respect for 

human life, dignity and rights to existence. It also acted as the basting of hopes to many 

as preached by diplomacy, which is the peaceful, conducts of relationship among 

political entities, their principals and accredited agents, Hamilton (1996). The 

debasement and defaming of these notions in the African context however had made 

many to believe in the reverse of Strang (1961) view that in the World where war is 

everybody’s tragedy and everybody’s nightmare, that diplomacy is everybody’s business 

 

This is due to the facts that in the midst of African several crises, interventions have being 

taken to mean different thing to different people, groups, organization and even 

mailto:prispelladiag@gmail.com


 

 

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neighbours. This is because many at times the rich, poor, strong, and even the weak pray 

that the richly endowed or the have not countries and otherwise should experience crisis 

so that they can help to either plunder or dismember the frontier. The victims of such 

distortions are mostly the states endowed with crude oil, gold, diamond and uranium 

among others. Most of the struggles are centered on political power and control of the 

state. Berdal (2002) noted that the economy of war profits interveners in several ways to 

confirm the intention of many interveners. To some, the respect for human life and 

dignity allows them to see destruction, disaster and gross displacement in the fleeing state 

as something that needs voluntary desires to be helped if it warrants intervening. Be that 

as it may, the United Nations general guideline for intervention and peacekeeping (1995) 

sees intervention in the current dispensation as a necessary evil, but how necessary and 

urgently desired becomes a question the body has not been able to find an answer to. 

 

Premised on this notion, diplomacy of intervention in African states several conflicts are 

viewed from different perspectives in this discourse. For it is in this manner of 

interventions, expressed in different diplomatic intrigues, that confront our sense of 

reasons to argue whether there are actually interventions in itself; is intervention a hocus 

– pocus fallacy of states’ pride to display her strength; another dimension of 

impoverishing and exploiting the state in crisis to total abjection; and or an act meant to 

arm and encourage a continual crisis while the visitors consistently loots and plunder the 

state treasury and values. 

 

Instances has shown that from the religious injunctions of the old (Holy Bible) that 

unnecessary looting and plunder of state to some extent attracts divine punishments to 

even the fourth generation, compared to today’s practice under globalization, which such 

act are meant to enhance the participators riches and provide wealth to the impoverished 

and enslaved soldiers of peace. Thus, Jetley (1999) observed that the Nigerian officers 

and soldiers connived with RUF rebels to trade in diamond and exchange of arms against 

their basic responsibility of being here (Sierra Leone).  In faraway Ruhengeri – Rwanda, 

Punnier (1997) reiterated that the French soldiers were seen exchanging Tutsi girls from 

their captors (Hutu soldiers and the Interahamwe militias) for a grenade. At Niger – 

Delta, Nigeria members of Dokubo/MEND (2004) accepted exchanging crude oil with 

sophiscated weapons in the high sea with some international arms dealers. Such also 

existed in Sudan-Darfur crisis, Angola crisis, and Uganda crisis among others. All these 

were the kind of interventions in conflicts going on in Africa if you care to ask me. 

Meaning that none ever intervene without thinking of what will be gain, either in the long 

or short run. More so, since it is rare and hard to find genuine interventionist. In 

furtherance to this, the followings discussions after the theoretical arguments drive home 

our points: 

 

THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 



 

 

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Mindful of the level of destruction, devastations, dislocation and distortions in the Africa 

towards the end of the 21st century into the new millennium, to which Africa has never 

been the same due to the kind and manner of interventions in African politics and 

governance, this section, co-opts to adopt the National Interest Model of power 

framework as a point of emphasis, also establishes it as a link or complementary tools to 

the research investigation of the events and activities of the subject under study while 

bringing the anomalies to the fore. 

 

National Interest Model of Power Framework 

The study is situated on the National Interest Model of power framework. This is because 

interest is the main cause of actions as found amongst the Sahel nations relationship to 

Arab Springs (Libya in particular) and, the Libyan government foreign policy and 

diplomatic affair in African is also centred on interest, if we agrees with Morgenthau 

(1960:8) that national interests is the totality of state value. He further argued that 

national interest is the perennial standard by which political actions must be judged and 

directed, hence the objective of a foreign policy must be defined in term of national 

interest, which are those things that constitute the interest of the nation. Scholars of this 

school had argued that no state ever go into anything without having interest attached. 

They noted that state’s interest is always in anything that will be of benefit to it. They 

concluded that state’s interest is always inevitable, as she selfishly devices means of 

actualizing her goals in that particular situation. 

 

Furtherance to this, Frankel (1993:76-80) agreed that people maintain social order in a 

bid to satisfying their self - national interest; that national interest is a fundamental notion 

that defy definition by reference to other terms, because it is analytically convenient 

although often empirically impossible to determine whether the values found in the 

formulation of a specific interest had been internalized by the decision-makers or 

introduced only in response to environmental pressures, generally domestic but 

sometimes also international. 

 

Beard (1934:22-24) opined that national interest is a national honour, the public interest 

and general will of a state; as employed by the state. Meaning that national interest enjoys 

a considerable favour as a basis for action.  Buchan (1975:30) posits that the interest of 

the state is that peace should be maintained, but whereby such fails against an aggressor, 

that the state should alternate her interest for war.  

Construing from the above contentions, and in relation to the subject under study – the 

Arab Springs and insecurity in the Sahel region: the precarious impacts on local 

governance, certain questions is further adduced in this investigation, such as, why are 

the events in the Sahel region a bye-product of the Arab Springs crisis? What are the 

factors aiding the spread of the crisis in the Sahel region of Africa long after the end of 

Libyan war? How has this crisis in the Sahel region affected local governance in the 



 

 

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African continent? What are the stake of the aggressors in the Sahel region vis-à-vis the 

rapid spread of the crisis from Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria and the far North 

of the African continent among others, Is there any effort been made by the regional 

bodies like ECOWAS and others towards tackling and possibly ending same in the 

shortest period? What does ECOWAS protocol and Instrument say about regional 

insecurity? and what are the possible panacea to ending the effects on local governance?  

 

While the above questions may sound rhetoric or answered in thoughts, the major reasons 

for such initiation are that the National interest of state qua state, government qua 

government, state qua government, and government qua citizens are always found in a 

conflictual paradigm of their separately avowed interest, that are needed to be satisfied. 

In this realm, it suffices then to accept that national interest embraces and synthesizes the 

voluminous work on the relationship between domestic and foreign policies, on self-

sufficiency and independencies vis-a-vis as currently taking place in the Sahel Region of 

Africa. 

 

In a simplistic evaluation then, it is obvious that the role of national interest of all the 

parties to the Africa problems are centred on the struggle of whose interest will outwit 

the other, thereby displaying all manner of interventions on the African soil. The prime 

agenda and motive, not minding the consequential implications that had come to play 

itself in making the African conflict states ungovernable and unstable due to the shift in 

base of the illicit arm struggles that had overtaken the whole of the continent owing to 

arms migration, interests and poverty of the people of Africa, the following discussion 

will further explicates the level of fallacy of diplomacy in African politics and 

governance. 

 

 

 (a) ARMS-AID IN AFRICA AS A RESPONSE TO CONFLICT 

Aid is an assistant given to a needy person, people, group or country by way of help 

toward alleviating, rehabilitating, and resettlement among others.  It is meant to giving 

the victims a sense of belonging against the injury, devastation, damages and lost suffered 

in the course of war or disasters.  Thus, aid in this respect is not viewed from the monetary 

value, loan grant and or something that has to be paid back. They are aid for either saving 

lives or help in continual destruction of lives.  Hence, according to Suhrke (2004) aid 

regime as otherwise called is a loosely organized entity, held together more by common 

norm and purposes than authoritative arrangements of funding and decision-making, a 

sort of governance without government.  But this notion had been long debunked due to 

the fallacy of role that the bodies play in recent time.  This regime includes the set of 

actors, national, international, UN agencies, government and humanitarian groups; which 

are widely recognized and shared key characteristics across Africa conflict zones in the 

name of humanitarian intervention agencies (ibid). But how interventionist they are, 



 

 

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becomes a question yet unanswered, because there had been several arguments made by 

scholars and observers to conflicts zone, particularly in Africa that most agencies or 

bodies who comes in the name of Humanitarian intervention agencies never mean well 

vis-à-vis their aim and objectives, both to the victims and to the state in conflict. 

 

The above notion, stemmed from the investigation and analysis that followed, 

referencing the role and presence of the agencies in the conflict zones; of which most 

conflicting parties are no longer at peace receiving or welcoming them as partners of 

peace or peace initiators due to their awful different roles in conflict zones. 

 

Premises on the existing arguments, this sub-section of the study looks at the issue of 

arming by-and-of both the victims and perpetrators in conflict while portraying the action 

that the existence of such humanitarian group are to help in rescuing, resettlement, 

reconstruction, rehabilitating and refocusing among others, the vulnerable.  An act aimed 

at giving the victims a sense of belonging in the society they once cherished and existed, 

but due to the struggle for power, wealth acquisition and fame, they had been displaced, 

dislocated and devastated with harms done to them by way of injury and lives destruction. 

These kinds of war crime do most occur in state experiencing conflict with the issue of 

arms-aid playing a vital role in keeping the conflict unabated.  It becomes more intensed 

and volatile in an area favoured by mineral resources, such as gold, diamond and possibly 

crude oil among others, which invariably aggravates the crisis. 

 

This does not mean that there are no sincere and genuine humanitarian agencies in 

conflict zone.  It suffices to explain from the observation that these are the reasons why 

problem in this area at times goes on and on in a conflict zone. Such issues unknown to 

either the major humanitarian agencies or the international bodies such as the UN blue 

helmet and other donating nations make mess of the project for peace. 

 

However, on the same inference, while arms-aid and arms-trade are not new in African 

conflicts, it is also obvious to affirm that both acts are quite different in practice and 

conduct, although at the same times they are mitigated by those who supposedly by 

indication of interest to lending a helping hand on a needy state or people, who had been 

devastated by the calamities of war. Arms-aid seeks to rearm the dispossessed rebels or 

losers so that the war can continue.  To Shearer (1998), it encourages a dissatisfied group 

to take-up arms against a constituted organization or government. It is done at times by 

way of exchange of which the losers might be willing to forfeit certain goods to the aiding 

organization or party. At times, these rehabilitating group indulges in stealing diamond, 

gold or uranium among others only to exchange it with the humanitarian agencies who 

in turn make a shipment of arms for the regrouping of the former so that the war can take 

another dimension; while at times the arming is done out of sympathy by the agency who 

stands out to gain, perhaps if the beneficiary succeeds in reclaiming power. 



 

 

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In this regard (Shearer, 1998) arguably noted that the image of aid agencies as protectors 

of the weak and victims of violence has been tarnished by those who accuse them…arms-

aiding, helping warring parties, feeding fighters rather than beneficiaries – or, more 

seriously, fueling war economics and prolonging conflict.Accepting that it is this 

changing nature of war, the explosive growth in the humanitarian aid industry, and the 

diminishing political will on the part of states to intervene in domestic conflicts that had 

helped in the escalation of conflicts, especially in Africa. 

 

A particular instance to this act of arms-aid according to Human Rights Armed Watch 

(2004) is noted in the Rwanda conflict of 1994, Liberia in 1993 – 1995, Sierra Leone in 

1998 – 2000, Congo DR/Zaire in 1995 – 1998, and Sudan 2000 – 2004 onward among 

others.  The Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi and moderate Hutus by the Hutu 

extremist government was brought to an end by the RPF who chased the former out of 

Rwanda. According to (Human Rights Armed Watch, 2004) and UNHCR (2000), this 

dislodged ex-Rwanda soldiers, and interahamwe rebels of the population between 1.2 to 

1.5 million people had fled into the French safe zone at Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the 

South-West Rwanda, where they were welcomed by the French soldiers who before now 

had joined them at checkpoints to victimized the Tutsi. The French zone was perceived 

by many as a place of asylum for large numbers of people involved in the massacres. 

 

The French and its humanitarian agency re-armed those they could, and a month later, in 

anticipation of the French withdrawal from the zone, some 60,000 to the 80,000 only 

about half of who were in identified camps, left the Southwest to Zaire, Turner (2001) 

revealed. Agreeing with this revelation, (Shearer, 1998) who places the role of the 

humanitarian agency on what he called aiding or abetting syndrome, reiterated that 

perhaps the most disquieting example of where aid (arms) had distorted a war economy 

in recent years was the relief assistance given to the refugee camps established in Eastern 

Zaire (Congo DR).  Humanitarian assistance not only ensured the existence of the Hutu 

refugees’ camps in Eastern Congo DR but also Rwandaise who were of former Rwandan 

Army joined to exploit the opportunity.  It is this rearming in the form of aid that had 

prolonged the conflict in the great Lakes region till today, he concluded. A submission 

that the persistency of the crisis with pockets of several rebel groups continually 

springing up shows that they are still in possession of arms and weapons of several 

calibers. 

On the other hand, the role of Ugandan in the Rwandan conflict according to Mahmood 

(2001) was glaring as Yoweri Museveni was determined to aid by re-arming the RPF, 

even when they were defeated in October 1990 invasion, towards their capturing power 

in Rwanda.  The RPF paid no money but they were aided as a compensation for their 

efforts in seeing Museveni to power in 1986.   Porteous (2004), agreeing with the 

observation as noted above asserts that Africa’s wars were remarkable for the brutality 



 

 

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of the tactics used by belligerents to secure their strategic objectives.  These heinous 

atrocities, which range from mass murder and ethnics cleansing, to amputation, 

starvation, forced labour, rape and cannibalism among others are more noticeable 

amongst the rearmed group in the conflict zone. 

 

In a further reaction (Porteous, 2004), while examining the role of arms –aid in the 

Liberia cum Sierra Leone conflict aptly noted that the ECOMOG became as much part 

of the problem in those conflicts as the solution.  This is because ECOMOG, and 

particularly Nigeria who was the leading interventionist single handedly armed the 

ULIMO-J rebel group of Roosevelt Johnson and partly also arms –aided the INPFL of 

Yormie Johnson who has so many Nigeria citizens as fighters and combatants in the 

game.  These actions did not only help in factionalizing the conflict but it speedy up its 

prolongation. 

 

Nigerian Army officer and soldiers according to Jetley (2000) identified the exchange of 

diamonds with arms at Kono, Tongo field and Kiodu in Sierra Leone with members of 

the RUF rebels of late Foday Sankoh.  These dual roles of the Nigerians also made her 

to loose more of her soldiers in the conflict than any other states, because the rebels uses 

the same arms against the ECOMOG groups of which Nigeria is part and parcel. 

 

Another instances of arms-aid are the role of the United States in ending the treacherous 

regime of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire/Congo DR.  Madson (2001:1) noted , while 

examining the covert and overt operation of America in the Great Lakes Region conflicts 

affirmed that the military aid programmes of the U.S, largely planned and administered 

by the US Special operations command and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), have 

been both overt and covert meant to aid intervention and invaders against Mobutu. 

America had seen the out-usefulness of Mobutu and suggested a strong interest in Zaire 

by way of changing him.  The America MPRI – a Virginia private military company was 

used to armed the Rwandan and Uganda soldiers and the oppressed Banyamulenge Tutsi 

in Goma, Bukavu, Ituri and Kivu area.  The Rwandan and Ugandan government willing 

to pay back to Mobutu for his nasty role in the genocide of 1994 in which Mobutu 

supported the Hutu extremist and equally provided them a safe haven after the RPF 

capture of Kigali was never forgotten. In a further revelation (Madson, 2001) asserts that 

America single handedly sponsored this action by arming the coalition known as the 

AFDL-CZ, under the command of Laurent Kabilla.  The US embassy official when 

accosted conceded that he was in Goma to do more than meet rebel leaders for lunch.  

Explaining his presence, he said. “What I am here to do is to acknowledge them (the 

rebel coalition) as a very significant military and political power on the scene, and, of 

course, to represent American interest. 

 



 

 

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In a further collaboration, according to Kathi (2001) of the Human Rights Armed Watch, 

(a specialist in monitoring arms transfer), confirmed that American’s role in arming the 

coalition to overrun Kinshasa was real, and that under the Enhanced Inter-national 

Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program, which was like killers training 

killers squad, there were over 100-armed U.S troops in the area to help actualize the aim. 

The essence of this arming of Uganda, Rwanda troops, the Banyamulenge Tutsi and 

Kabila groups to overthrown Mobutu (Madson,2001) noted, was of two significant 

values; first to establish American influence in the Great Lakes Region and Eastern 

Africa against the several abuses and lost of influence by the French, who had been a 

problem of the Region. Two, with the elimination of Mobutu, American could assert its 

total control of the mining fields and regions without any competition.  Thus, the arming 

and all other cost incurred by America are not to be paid instantly or directly but the 

payment would be made by their exploration of the minerals of the DR Congo 

uncontrolled. These were however achieved in part as Mobutu lost out and Kabila 

assumed power, but in all, they are part of intervention to the Great Lakes Region crisis. 

A question then raises in this situations suffices to argue are there any thing like genuine 

diplomacy of intervention in crisis when power, wealth, and personality interest had 

priced the citizenry unknown to their changeling dismay.  

 

The same weep that was used in chasing out Mobutu was used against Kabila after few 

months because he (Kabila) was not only selfish and greed but was not mindful that the 

instrument used in destroying others can equally be destroyed. Following the failure of 

Kabila to respect and honour the agreement entered into with his backers, which saw 

Mobutu out, he booted out on a more tactical paradigm. This is what was termed the 

second intervention in Congo DR conflict. A case many had described as the invasion of 

the latter by outside powers of Rwanda, Uganda and their chief ally. In the process arms 

and funds were provided to settle score with Kabila. This is because, Turner (2005) in 

his own words, noted that’ before then Kabila was known as a wretched socialist, 

struggling to survive, who engaged in illegal diamond thievery and deals for sustenance”, 

so it would be naïve and sheer greed for him to think of abandoning his backers without 

paying back their expenses. 

 

It is evidence to note that in this respect that betrayal of Western interest never goes 

unpunished. A situation to which the American over zealousness and desires to lead 

arms-aid programs in the region was never negotiable. The detestation expressed by 

(Turner, 2005) convincible showed the abysmal role of America and CIA in always 

arming ex-rebel against incumbents who are against their economic and military interest. 

While arms-aid are of two edge-swords, of both gains and lost, it is pertinent to note that 

unlike arms-trade, the arms-aid had a lot of string attached while the deals are on, whereas 

in arms-trade, it is your money that speaks and not what you use the arms to cause or 

achieve, that matters. 



 

 

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The cases of arms-aid in the Darfur crisis in Sudan saw the government of Omar El-

Bashirbeing accused of backing and arming Arab-tribal militiamen known as the 

Janjaweed. This group has caused a great mayhem against the non-Arab civilian, who is 

opposed to the government at Khartoum.  The ethnic cleansing in Darfur are against the 

background that the leading rebel groups from the West, the SLA, the JEM and the SLM 

had been opposing Omar El-Bashir government. Based on that, the Janjaweed instead of 

confronting the Justice and Equality Movement rebel (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army 

(SLA) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) had to resorts in killing civilian 

population from that region while claiming that it is a war against the rebels.  The reason 

behind the role of the Khartoum government was not only to keep the rebel groups in the 

Western region on-check, but also to enable them contain one problem at a time. The 

battle with the SPLA since 1966 had caused a great wastage and destruction than to 

contend with more from the western region.  Hence, the Arab tribal men of Janjaweeds 

militias are armed and sponsored by the Khartoum government to keep those rebels busy.  

Moreso, the government felt that economically, it might spell doom for them, if they do 

not checkmate the western Darfur opposition properly. The entire North and Khartoum 

itself survive on the revenue accruing from oil and diamond from the Southern and 

Western (Darfur) Sudan axis. Thus, the government cannot afford to loose out on both 

side.  On the gain of the Janjaweed, several promises were made and treaty entered into 

in the wake of successful out lodging of the JEM, SLA, Beja and SLM amongst others 

on government behalf.  Tom (2004) in this regard noted that to facilitate the activities of 

the Janjaweed, some government military and police personnel were drafted to aid and 

train the fresher of the Janjaweed rebels toward keeping the course on. 

 

However, of all this arms-aid programs embarked upon by nationals and international 

groups in the pretence of response to conflict, one remarkable questions that the study 

raised are how is an arms-aid a response to conflicts in Africa, when it suggests that most 

of the interventionist are men and women with different economic interest.  David 

Shearer, Tom Porteous, Wayne Madson, Vacler Havel and Jeffrey Bontwell among 

others had come to argued on a three separate notions: one, the view of (Shearer, 2004) 

and Vacler (2004) had noted that probably the so called arms-aides presumed that their 

presence in the pretence of interventionist while aiding the victims to survive, is to scare 

and deterred some major contenders. Moreso, peradventure, when peace returns, they 

can solely appropriate the state unabated. This does not negate them from giving the 

refugees or victims the hope and opportunity that they are still human whose happiness 

and welfare are still paramount in their nation’s affairs.  The second, according to the 

inference made by (Portoeus, 2004), is that the armed victims still have the rights to fight 

their course even when the persecutors might felt that they have won. 

 



 

 

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The third as observed by (Madson, 2001) who argued that by arming either group means 

that they can still defend themselves despite the odd. Showing that with a great 

determination, they can still ascend or assert themselves on the state. Implying also, that 

they had not all being exterminated, bearing in mind that the state belongs to all of them, 

and that he who fight and run away, will live to fight again. 

 

These reasons, however, no matter how they are viewed, may tally with some instances 

above, whereas in some it is totally not admissible. But be that as it may, it is very clear, 

and known that not all who run to conflict zone are actually there for the purpose of 

helping the victims and displaced persons.  Most agencies are not only spies, but also 

agent of dismembering the state further. This is because their most avowed interested is 

on the economic gains of war among others.  Thus, no wonder the growing level of 

humanitarian agencies and non – governmental organizations had been on the increase 

in the present times. 

 

(b)   ARMS -TRADE IN AFRICAN AS A RESPONSE TO CONFLICT 

Arms-trade in African conflict is not new. They are bargains made by either the 

government in power or the rebel cum dissatisfied groups fighting the national 

government and or rebel qua rebel groups, with outside power influence under cover.  It 

is the need to procuring arms to execute their course at a particular cost that led them into 

arms trade.  It is one of the most illicit and illegal arms deals that had kept many wars or 

conflict in Africa going.  Although, at times where the arms deal are negotiated officially, 

the selling party may not know the reasons for the request other than that the host country 

has surplus weapons in its armoury and would want to disposed-off some. 

 

Arms-trade, unlike arms-aid, is totally based on profit making.  Hence, what determines 

the extent and quantity of purchase is the amount such a buyer has in making their 

purchases, as the price at which the dealer are willing to trade the goods are also 

important. Thus, Melvern (2004) argued that Nigeria is the highest importer of weapons 

in Africa because of surplus wealth. Meaning that in most cases, it is the rich country that 

procures weapons for safekeeping. But where otherwise, the small ones engage in such, 

it becomes a problem, as its devastating effects outlaws its usefulness.  These also 

informed that there are several arms dealers with varying price list; with differing 

manners of shipments; and with categories of weapons at a particular stage. Due to the 

fact that arms trade is the bane of all economics of war and conflicts. 

 

Arms-trade, apart from drug and oil cum diamonds’ proceeds are adjudged the most 

attractive, lucrative and profiting. Although illegal but termed the fastest moving 

business in the world.  Despite the treaties on arms reduction and proliferation, the scale 

of illicit arms deals-both small and medium range, light and lethal weapons among others 

has grown. These dealers had consistently violated the tenets of the treaty in their drive 



 

 

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for making huge profits from the world’s most lucrative and destructive trade that 

habours no respects and obedient.  These are done and dispatched by states and or 

mercenary groups who are employed at times as experts to training the user on weapon 

handling and test-firing of the weapons to ascertain how operable they are.  Rowe (2005) 

in drawing attention to the problem of the illegal trade and arms transfer of small weapons 

and light tanks noted that most manufacturer are not worried without appropriate 

legislation, that those weapons get into the hands of rebels movement and government 

who have nothing to do with weaponry.  He further asserts that arms embargoes, travel 

restrictions against arms, and the checkmating of rebel movements and their possession 

of arms among others are not obeyed.  To him, these are one of the major problem hunting 

almost every states and people in Africa, because there are many arms in several hands, 

which had rendered government agents inactive and even afraid at every conflict. In 

Nigeria alone, the approaching of electioneering season amongst the politicians are fever 

induced nightmare itself to the electorates. A culture that had become a common 

phenomenon in African electoral parlance. 

 

Attesting to this, observation from some states that are always tensed at every internal 

crisis particularly election matters such as Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya, Togo, Congo DR, 

South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau among others, shows that the number of 

light and medium range weapons with high sophistication and caliber in individual hands 

are more compared to the number, army and police weapons put together. This is because 

the only thing that can differentiate theirs from the latter is the national army’s armoured 

tanks.  For, remove the armoured tanks from the army armoury, Pascal (2003) opined 

that the types of sophisticated weapons in the hand of individuals and groups on the street 

will chase the army and police - combined into the most hidden forest in the east or 

southern part of Africa. 
 

In line to the above, Kimberly process (2004) has also identified another area that had 

tremendously encouraged arms-trade as the illicit trade on diamond, gold and crude oil. 

Money made from this is easily channel into procuring arms to execute unnecessary wars 

by rebel groups, corrupt government officials and agents who want to remain in control 

of power among others. Asari Dokunbo, a militant leader in the Nigerian Niger-Delta 

conflict in 2003 proudly affirmed that the government is aware of their exploits and 

exchange of crude oil in the high sea with weapons and arms dealers. The weapons they 

in turn used to terrorize the Nigerian people and government over the control of resources 

in their region. Agreeing with this open confession, Agboola (2009) posits that it is the 

wealthier of money from crude oil that availed Henry Okah of MEND in Nigeria to 

engage in arms trafficking in far away Angola. A project he could not complete before 

the long arm of the law caught up with him.   On the other hand, according to Amnesty 

International (2002) and Global witness (2004) to many people, diamonds symbolize 

love, happiness or wealth.  While for many others, it means conflict, misery and 



 

 

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poverty.This evidence was noticed in Angola, Congo DR, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 

Sudan among others during and after their wars. Profits from this unregulated diamonds 

trade are used to fund armed conflicts.  As a result, tens thousands of African civilians 

have over the past years been killed or tortured and millions have been displaced.  

Conflict diamonds accounts for some four percent of the international diamond trade… 

to which proceeds from it had promoted arms trade to a great magnitude… and to which 

its impacts has devastated communities in the West, Central and North Africa.         

Agreeing that the proceeds from diamonds, gold and crude oil and other lucrative 

minerals has helped to ember violent conflict in African by way of illicit arms trade and 

conflicts enhancements armed trade in itself are a big contributor to the destruction, 

devastation and gross human rights abuses and violations in Africa.  The questions that 

appeals for concerned are: what are the world community doing to stop this dispersal of 

illicit trade on arms; why has the world community kept quite on seeing big nations or 

agents of such merchants of death or of such states selling arms to a weaker and poverty 

ridden ones without minding the consequences on both parties, especially the already 

depreciated one that want final extinction; what are the role of the United Nations, 

Security Council and other peace agents on the issue of enforcing arms embargoes and 

why are the initiators of these regulations violating the rules themselves? 

 

The United Nations ( 2001) under this perspective noted that virtually all the conflicts 

studied, especially in Africa elicited the direct political, economic or military 

involvement of other states and multinational organization who mostly at times, act as 

conduit to arms trade.  The illicit trade in arms and the transit across border of rebel and 

government forces tended to sustain conflict and destabilize neighbouring states.  The 

illicit trades in natural resources coming from Zaire (Congo DR) are conflicts of both 

transnational phenomena. This is because it provides groups and government engaged in 

conflict with an impetus to continue to fight. Thereby, making the Great Lakes Regions 

uninhabitable. But when these are narrowed down to the Rwandan crisis from 1959 to 

1994, many questions are then posit as to how has this issue of natural resources affected 

the Rwandan situation. 

 

Analyst in this regard was quick to reiterate that the former French president Francois 

Miterrand and his son, Jean-Christopher run and maintain a big tea and coffee farms at 

Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in collaboration with the Akazu cabinet of late Habyarimana. 

Jean-Christopher Mitterrand, who represents his father empire, uses the wheel of both 

states to do everything humanly possible to protect the estate. This coupled with other 

alliance and dealings, explains the role of France in making sure that Rwanda remains 

the fiefits of its cronies. 

 

According to Walker (2004), France did not play a different role in the crisis that 

confronted Habyarimana regime of terror and scapegoating from 1973 to 1994.  To 



 

 

13 | P a g e  

 

 

explain these roles further, the human rights watch armed project (1995) reported that 

prior to the genocide, in January 1994 that the country was being flooded with weapons.  

These were so readily available that anyone could exchange two beers for a grenade. 

According to the report France was the principal sources of arms shipment to the 

Rwandan Army, the interahamwe militias and the gendarmes during the period. And 

today the same initiators are amongst the propagators of peace where conflicts and war 

had been teleguided to the elimination of oppositions. The above evidence was concurred 

by the view of Prunier (1996) who asserts that a few weeks to the outbreak of genocide, 

arms had become plentiful in Rwanda, grenades were sold alongside mangoes and 

avocadoes on fruit stands at markets around Kigali.  He added that UN mission in 

Rwanda (UNAMIR) official were aware of, but could not cope with or monitor, the scale 

of illicit arms trading.A trade modus that had not only failed to leave the African region 

since 1990s to date, but had consistently set the regions ablaze with fires and cross-fires 

of rebels and national armies’ bullet.        

 

Another inference in support of this notion was as noted by Alusala (2004) when he 

asserts that it was the arming of citizen and loyalist to the government of late 

Habyarimana, which was the order of the days in that period, that astronomically 

encouraged the zeal of the killers to kill as much as they could against the common 

enemies. He further reiterates that the real aim, according to a secret government 

documents, was to distribute close to 2,000 assault rifle to civilian and members of 

MRND under the guise of self-defence.  Some of the victims interviewed such as Vincent 

Kamahirimana and others attested that the government and France armed the 

interahamwes, soldiers, Gendarmes and civilians to kill the Tutsi.  They further assert 

that some of the arms are still with the interahamwes and ex-soldiers of the Rwandan 

Army at Congo DR forest. 

 

In explaining the degree of arms trade in Rwandan crisis Melvern (2000) confirmed that 

Celestine Kabanda, the then foreign minister of Rwanda in 1990 negotiated arms deal 

with Egypt of which the foreign minister signed s surety in favour of the Rwanda 

government before his President Hosni Mubarak on the 28 October 1990.  Rwanda made 

a purchase, which cost US $5.899million of 60,000 grenades, 2 million rounds of 

ammunitions, 18,000 Mortar bomb (82 and 120 mm), 4,200 assault rifles, rockets and 

rockets launchers.  The shipment also cost Rwanda about US$65,000 dollars.  The money 

was paid into the commercial international bank of Egypt.  This revelation further stated 

that an estimated US $112 million was spent on arms by the tiny Africa country of 

Rwanda, thereby becoming the third largest importer of arms in Africa behind Nigeria 

and Angola.  Hence, there was a seemingly unstoppable flow of small arms and light 

weapons into Rwanda through arms trade bargain circuits.         

 



 

 

14 | P a g e  

 

 

At the same period, according to Power (1996) the lateHabyarimana and his allies had 

diverted US $216million of international funding from European Union, Germany, 

Belgian and USA meant for SAP projects to procuring of weapons in preparation for the 

final solution. A syndrome the government of Sassou Ngueso, Museveni, and Robert 

Mugabe amongst others had in several occasions fingered as projecting in the continent. 

Agreeing with this observations, (Melvern, 2000) asserts that while the Arusha Accords 

were been negotiated, a project began to import arms, huge number of machetes and 

other agricultural tools from China and Japan under the supervision of a businessman, 

George Rutaganda, who was the vice chairman of the Interahamwe currently serving life 

sentence. 

 

In ascertaining the role of France, Egypt and South Africa on the issue of arms deal and 

importation to Rwanda prior to the committing of the genocide by the perpetrators, 

Vincent and Muregira (2005) in an interview agreed that, with others inclusive, France 

is the principal sources of arms flooding of Rwanda. 

 

Inference to this agreement was the revelation of a French news paper, Le Figaro (1998), 

in confirmation of the French involvement as stated in its report that the serial number of 

the two surface-to-air missile that struck the aeroplane carrying Late Habyarimana and 

others in April 1994 matched those missiles seized from Iraq by the French troops during 

the Gulf war of 1989 – 1991. The report according to Exupeny (1998) also disclosed that 

his source were French soldiers, who had claimed that after the missile had been 

confiscated, it was later sold to Rwanda government force between 1992 – 1994 as arms 

trade deal. 

 

Considering the records of arms trade and the categorical indictments that followed, it is 

evident that Rwanda prior to its genocide 1994, was a center where numbers of small 

arms and light weapons were sold to ember the already plagued ethnic society into flame, 

of which its consequence result had been a disastrous effects in the history of man and 

African losses.  Thus, Goose et al (2004) in accepting the observation and assertions 

made above posit that the post-cold war era has seen profit motives replacing East-West 

rivalry as the main stimulus behind weapon sales in the context of arms trade.  In addition 

to this, countries of the WARSAW Pact and NATO (2002) have been indicted for selling 

off their arsenals on open markets, with the result that the prices of some weapons, such 

as AK 47s have been fallen below cost. 

 

A categorical question that could be asked in these respects is: why? and for what purpose 

was French flooding Rwanda with arms, if there are no hidden agenda. And what could 

Rwanda do with arms of such magnitude in the midst of negotiations and mediation going 

on at Arusha? and who is the one funding Rwanda arms purchases?, among others 

 



 

 

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Although France claimed that all the arms shipped to Rwanda at the period was to help 

late Habyarimana in deterring the encroaching menace of RPF.  France also argued that 

there was never an arms deal with Rwanda, instead all what she did was to arms-aid the 

small state to protecting its sovereignty.  This, also informed the keeping of about 1,190 

French military men, made up of 300 paratroopers, 600 troops, two company of 

parachutiste and paramilitary of the French secret service among others in Rwanda, to 

help the government.  On the same accusation against Egypt’s role in the Rwandan 

conflict, (Melvern 2000) contended that the Egyptian government were short of words 

over the outcome of the effects of the arms sold to Rwanda, but were at the same time 

never regretted their roles.  According to her, Ghali when accosted after his secretaryship 

of UN claimed that he was bidding his country’s duty then, and that there was nothing 

wrong in selling the arms that was no longer in use by its military to a country that needs 

it.  Ghali in submission reiterated that his action in 1993 would still be performed again 

and again if given the opportunity. On the issues as affecting the arms trade in the period 

of Sierra Leone conflicts, neither Liberia, Libya and or any of the Arab nations had 

owned up why Sierra Leone and Sankoh were supplied some catchments whose shortfall 

encouraged the RUF to resorts to arm, leg and body mutilations and amputations with 

machetes and club among others. On the on-going Sudan conflicts, China a major player 

and backer of the General El-Bashir and janjaweeds with current actions and supports of 

Osama Bin Laden had failed to see reasons that the victims are mostly the vulnerable and 

not the main oppositions who had fled the country to take refugee in neighbouring 

states.These underline statement above therefore re-emphasis the controversy 

surrounding arms deal and violation as a chimera, because it is the same group of actors 

who pretends to enforce arms embargo, non-arms proliferation among others that are 

actually the groups violating same, and making mess of the system due to their interest 

on the lucrative business. To many of these states, they are trying to intervene to maintain 

peace just as France admitted above.  Seybolt (2001) in confirming the accusation asserts 

that the major armed conflicts revealed a diverse set of antagonistic groups, variously 

driven by political ambitions, economic motives, ideology and fear.  The ultimate 

objective of all the groups was to sell their arms while stopping others to do same, to 

secure control over governmental power or territory while declaring respect for sovereign 

state whereas individuals within the groups and their supporters or government were 

motivated by greed.A game African primitive and poor leaders like a pawn on the chess 

board had been manipulated to destroyed inn-self while remaining underdeveloped and 

good only for charity recipients.   

 

It is justifiable to agree with (Alusala 2004) who had noted that it is this greed and 

economic of war as shown in the French, Egypt and South Africa role in arming     

Rwandan extremist and government among other that encouraged the end of action in 

Rwanda by way of genocide.  This is because, he further reiterated that there is arming 

in the name of arms trade and arms aid as weapon flood strife torn states and region, not 



 

 

16 | P a g e  

 

 

only fanning warfare as was in Rwanda, but also undermining international efforts to 

embargo arms and to compel opposing parties to respect human rights. In another 

continuum, role of Uganda, Ethiopia, America, Britain, China, Russia, Egypt, Eritrea and 

some Arab nations in the Sudan conflict, where ethnicity and religious war are been 

fanned by few of the Arab nations had replicated the same atrocities as committed in 

Rwanda. To complement this antics, the role some Africa state like Nigeria, Libya, 

Liberia, and Apartheid South Africa among others with the aid of Lebanese traders 

activities in Sierra Leone, however made the old historic state a sorry state of itself. The 

case of French Aquaina oil arms trade to Nguesso Congo Republic is neither different 

from the role some big actors like Russia, America, China, Britain and Arab world among 

others are exhibiting in Sudan.  

 

Chossudovsky (1999) and Pierre (2004) who made a study of banking records and 

conflict funding in Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the torn Somalia cyclical 

conflicts among others concluded that without international finance the money would not 

have been available for the purchase of  guns, mortar, mines laying, machetes and tools 

to be distributed to the rebels, militias or for expanding the army, or for substantial arms 

deals or for the beer, petrol, clothes and food given to the armed forces, rebels, the militia 

and their families.  Simultaneously, this led to the public service collapse and there was 

famine and a rise in unemployment. They also confirmed the fact that South Africa 

dealers sold arms worth US $36.263 million to Rwanda between 1990 and 1992, 20,000 

R-4 rifles, 10,000 hand grenades, machine gun, 1.5mm rounds of ammunition. And the 

Chinese provided weapons, but under a credit scheme of US $1million for Mortar, 

machine gun, multiple rocket launcher and grenades.  The quantities of these weapons 

especially the hand grenades made it that everyone associated to the genocide 

perpetration was seen having enough to commit the act in the wake of the genocide.  

Thus, (Mamdani, 1998) in this respect aptly noted in his own word on visit to post-

genocide Rwanda at Ntarama Church, that ‘I scanned the walls with their gaping holes.  

The guide explained to me that those were made by the interahamwe so that they could 

throw grenades into the building.  Those in the church were lucky, because they died 

instantly, compared to those outside who had a protracted, brutal death, in some cases 

drawn out over as long as a week with one part of the body cut daily, he noted. Moreso, 

I raised my eyes, away from the heaps of skeletons of those mostly killed by grenades.  

Indicating that the availability of hand grenades and other weapons like the common 

avocado pears on the street of Rwanda was in circulation. Recently too, in Darfur, the 

Janjaweed cuddle AK47 and sub-machine gun like a mother cuddling her baby with 

jealousy going by what Abdulrasheed (2007) noted that the weapons are commonly 

abused and used in committing genocide even as AMIS and subsequently the UNAMIS 

patrolled passes the villages. 

 



 

 

17 | P a g e  

 

 

Evident to these assertions are noted when considering the role of some states in African 

crisis.  Such states as Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d’ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria in 

the Liberian/Sierra Leone conflicts vis-à-vis arms trade and passage, that did not only 

escalate the conflict but factionalized the parties interest.  The roles of the above 

mentioned states in the Sudan conflict to some extent are called interventionist tendency, 

whereas their interest had made the whole scenarios fallacy. The importation of ethnicity 

and religious bigotry, which in turn acts as the major force escalating the conflict had 

also helped in factionalized as arms rebellion spring up from every corner.  The roles of 

America, Russia, France, Congo DR, China, Cuba, Congo Republic and Apartheid South 

Africa in the Angolan wars of many years was not only noted as devious and destructive 

but it goes a long way to explicates the degree of arms trade in African conflict fanned 

by diamond and gold trade of exchange. An act that had not only undermines the degree 

of diplomacy in practice but had also destroyed the concept of genuine diplomacy and 

state tact. These remarkable failure of diplomatic intercourse explains not only the level 

of biasness of states in treating issues that needs urgent attention, such as conflicts in the 

aforementioned states but avail the readers and spectators the opportunity to accept that 

what matters in terms of such actions and state diplomatic practice is interest. Thus, 

agreeing with the view of (Abdulrasheed, 2007) that intervention in African conflict 

(Sudan) is negative and never serious in term of what the AU actually wants to achieve 

in Sudan. The African Union (AU) was in Sudan only to observe the fight and killings 

and not to counter or stop the fight. The UN, on the other hand, are afraid of staff 

casualties, hence, her presence is only welcomed after the killings, destruction and 

damages had been awfully concluded. A bad idea of intervening in conflicts.  For, if you 

cannot quench the fire, don’t add more firewood. It is political… the mandate or 

documents are not being followed… it is a matter of figurehead presence, he concluded. 

 

The flooding of state in conflicts to this effect, with arms from arms trade had made most 

ongoing conflicts proved difficult to end, with the majority having lasted for over fifteen 

years or combatants haven the will and capacity to continue to fight due to plentiful of 

arms. 

 

One pertinent thing about armed conflicts in Africa is that apart from the fact that all 

categorical conflicts has been engendered by the level of arms proliferations and arms 

deals, it was only the Biafran – Nigerian war of the late 60s and the Rwandan RPF course 

against National Army of Rwanda in 1994 that had gone by  the way of victorious end, 

allowing the victor to remain in power, but away from this observation, and in contrast 

to the findings of historical studies where major armed conflicts have subsided or ended 

in recent time, this has been the result of negotiation, not victory.  The RPF victory was 

propelled by the level of arms sophistication of the rebels who were in a strong arms aid 

and arms trade deal with Uganda, America and Britain among others.  All arms 

bargaining were carried out via Ugandan government with outside world. Thus, showing 



 

 

18 | P a g e  

 

 

that every party to conflict is not only involved in arms deal but try to be more 

sophisticated than the other parties.  It was also obvious in this regard to argued that due 

to the sophistication, determination and fearlessness of the RPF rebels made for the easily 

over running of the National Army of late Habyarimana and the Hutu extremist so called 

self-defence group, who were busy killing innocence and armless citizens. The reality is 

that arms trade not only enthrone insecurity in states, but it also allows the ground for 

agents of destabilization as noticed in Congo DR where the ex-Rwandan soldiers and 

interahamwes, with their run away arms are causing great deal of havoc and blood letting 

in the Great Lakes Region. Arms trade which had added up as both backer and engine 

house to several conflicts in Africa (Burundi, Liberia, Cote d’ivorie, Sudan, Uganda, 

Niger – Delta, and Rwandan) cases in particular had not only contributed in fanning more 

destructive crisis and human wastage in Africa but it had deprived those states the needed 

human labour and human capital toward development owing to the kind of diplomacy in 

practice. Going by the analogue posits above it is obvious that western scholars, however, 

might sees all the states act in conflict towards Africa crisis predicament as a diplomatic 

intervention and overtures, but one thing  is so evidential against whatever notion or 

opinion that most –so- called interventions in African conflicts are situated. This is 

because; they majorly patterned and foisted on falsehood against any kind of diplomatic 

posture. A contention that stemmed on the flawed workability of all known principles 

towards ending conflict and instability paradigm as characterized in African situations. 

 

(c)    FOOD AID TO AFRICA AS A RESPONSE TO CONFLICT 

Food insecurity in Africa derives from a number of causes amongst which are human 

created socio-political and armed conflictual causes had entailed a great deal of suffering 

on the average African citizens, especially those in conflict or just coming out from war.  

Several arguments in this respect had concluded that the multiplicity of the Africa food 

crisis and war are great influence to food shortage and the behaviour of persons in conflict 

zones, those helping people in conflict to survive and those agencies or government who 

suppose to distribute food accordingly to the needy.  Keen (2000) noting this from the 

economic function of conflict, to which food crisis are one of its elements, reiterated that 

a short-term economic function of conflict may lie in the benefits extracted from aid that 

is sent during the conflict in form of food.  Messer (2004) in support of this observation 

noted that the prospect of appropriating relief foods appears to have encouraged raiding, 

stealing and even killings of those termed hindrance to reaching food sources, since 

raiding can create predictable suffering and a predictable windfall of aid.  Violence may 

lead to providing food in conflict and in gaining access to the food once it arrives, she 

added. 

The information emanating from conflict zones and the general Africa food problem had 

made scholars such as Tabaiyaka (2003) to argue that Africa remains the most food 

deficient continent in the world. The predictions are so grim, that unless radical measures 

are undertaken, starvation in the continent will be much worse into the next decade than 



 

 

19 | P a g e  

 

 

it is today.  This is stemmed from the investigation that food crisis is particularly 

exacerbated by armed conflict in many countries and region with more than 20 Africa 

countries being directly or indirectly affected by armed conflict since 1990s.  The crises 

in these countries has not only led to destruction of food production and trades, barren 

land and dwarf crops production but also created huge refugee populations- about 30 

percent of the global refugees’ population. Fashina (2007) adds that oppositions to peace 

in Sudan had made food security and arrival impossible and death casualty on the 

increase due to hunger. An imperative that had defeated food aid and response to Darfur 

crisis.  Acute food shortages have been caused in many regions, with a decline of 12 

percent in sub-Saharan Africa alone due to conflict Azeeh (2007) affirmed in support of 

the above observations. 

 

Going by the deductions above, and in reference to the emphasis of this study, it is of 

good intention to first examine the situation of Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and Angola and 

Sierra Leone among others vis-à-vis food crisis problem, before the advent of crises and 

war. Three elements combined to add to the situations in the above mentioned countries. 

The socio-economic crisis, the state crisis and the internal or proximity heterogeneity.  

The socio-economic crises dooms such or such other group to exclusion and toughen 

collective identifying perception of group around ontological needs.  The state crisis 

results in its incapability of properly assuming its duties and the state places itself in the 

service of a minority of the privilege by giving its backings to injustice and frustration 

against other groups.  These were the characteristics of the first two Republic of Rwanda, 

the government of Omar El- Bashir in Sudan, the lacking of the government of Dos 

Santos in Angola, and the inherited confusion of Johnson from Taylor in Liberia.  

Rwanda, like other EasternAfricanState is engulfed in Land crisis that had lasted for 

many centuries and had continued unabatedly.  Rwanda as inferred is land of thousand 

hills to which food production was greatly affected by the hilly and sloppy elevation of 

the environment.  The non-existence of arable land also made it impossible for the 

country to grow food on commercial basis, instead and even at a subsistence level, the 

country was still not able to feed itself.  Against land scarcity and environment 

deficiency, the Tutsi Oligarch and the Belgian administrator controlled the few available 

lands before independence. During these periods, the ruling oligarch and their mentor 

did not only dispossess the people their land, but the victims and others were turned into 

force labour. According to (Melvern 2000) force labour was customary and strictly 

enforced.  In these periods, food scarcity was high and many people went into exile in 

the neighbouring Tanzania and Burundi in search of food. 

In Sudan – Darfur, according to (Azeeh 2007), since 1983, the major crop of millet, 

groundnut, and guinea corn among others had not been planted or cultivated due to 

refugees over flow and wanton devastation caused by war. Drought in some manner also 

helped the fleeing and displaced people to beg for food, while the vulnerable dies out of 

hunger and disease. Evident available show that the perpetrators steal the expected food 



 

 

20 | P a g e  

 

 

aid, whereas it is on record that food has been delivered – in – aid to the needy. A situation 

that raises questions of what kind of food aid is it to the people in conflict zone who are 

deprived of the food in the long run. How can the hungry and victims’ dies before the 

foods meant to save lives get to the them? Evident in many conflict zones through 

observation indicates that hijackers and rebels, causing more casualty than those who fell 

by bullets, plunder food aid. A case in point is the long Angolan war where apart from 

the landmines that had made farming and the forest unfriendly to the people, the UNITA 

rebels are notorious for diverting and stealing foods meant for the depraved people. 

Angola conflict houses the highest landscape of landmine in African sub-Sahara. Thus, 

in the words of Cornnard (2004), most food comes in through Congo DR and Zambia to 

Angola. The foods, an aid from outside are captured at times by rebels, smugglers and 

conflict promoters to make the refugees slaves of many years. Youths who cannot 

exercise patient and frustrated ends up accepting to fight on the side of the rebels or 

government force so that they can have a taste of food.  In Liberia, ECOMOG camp was 

turned into feeders/welfare home as the hungry and devastated take refugee against the 

non-availability of food aid. The level of helplessness according to Oman (2001) makes 

them to do all sorts of odd jobs for the interveners so that there could be peace in their 

stomach each day. ‘Chop-chop as they cry out to oga man (Nigerian soldier man)…’ 

shows that no food. The aid received is only for the few privileged.     

 

A flash back on the Rwandan case shows that the animosity of these atrocities was also 

visited on the Tutsi when they were overthrown in 1959.  Food crises and non-availability 

of land was identified as major issues aggravating the Rwandan crisis.  With high density 

of population, poor and difficult land and inadequate soil, suffering erosion and draught, 

Rwanda was faced with an irregular rainfall and the basic problem of how to feed all the 

people.  Hence, Otunnu (1998) observed that most of the Tutsi who went into exile in 

Uganda and Tanzania witnessed severe food starvation to which many died in the 

Refugees camp at Luwenro Triangle in Uganda.  In the same vein the treatment of 

refugees then were not taken serious as refugees are only left at the mercy of their host.  

Idi Amin and Milton Obote were implicated for having starved the Rwandans at the 

Luwenro Triangle of food and several denials to death against non-availability of food 

aid. 

 

Moreso, in the period of the Post-Rwanda crisis, the issue of food crisis and food aids 

was prevalent.  For the Rwanda conflict took its multi-year toll in the country-level of 

food production and importation; in community-and household-level livelihood and in 

individual nutrition health, and longevity.  These were facilitated in the manner by which 

those who came after the 1994 genocide treated the matter on food aid and the existing 

problems of starving and dying.  Evidently, there was no food relief in the course of the 

crisis but after many had died, gone into exile in Tanzania, Congo DR, Burundi and 

Uganda, food aid actually arrived (Tabaiyaka,2003) noted.  But as (Duffield, 2004) 



 

 

21 | P a g e  

 

 

noted, starvation, disentitled or deprived, failure and hitches on relief efforts made mess 

of the issue toward those who actually need the food in Angola and Liberia.  The failure 

of the UN in Rwanda also led to consequent failure in food distribution due to insecurity 

(Melvern,2004) argued. One noticeable phenomenon in all the examined conflict zones 

is that while there is insufficient food, the warring factions continued to amass and store 

up food while the depraved suffers uncontrolled and unattended to. 

 

Many at times, noted (Prunnier 1997), the rebels are issuing themselves with the food 

meant for refugees and at times the interahamwes would hijack all the relief meant for 

the vulnerable. Likewise as noted by Sach (2003) in Liberia and Sierra Leone as 

perpetrated by the RUF and LURD rebels. Onu (2007) agreeing to this evident inferred 

that in  Southern Darfur that the Janjaweed were also seen doing same against the people 

of Zaghaim and Sarlfi Umara  In this respect (Messer, 2004) posit the questions that if 

food aid are relieves meant for those in critical starvations, and it did not reach them, 

instead hijacked by those who had no pity on the vulnerable, then how do you call it food 

aid? This is because from the simplicity of what we saw on the ground, the food meant 

for refugees at Bukavu and Goma was diverted to feeding those rebels of interahamwes 

and ex-FAR soldiers instead of the displaced Hutu/Tutsi populations.  Are we not 

encouraging them to muster courage and strength in keeping the fight on she retorted. 

 

Analytically, the fact remains, but for the reasons that it is always very hard to define 

refugee proper and those mixed in their midst who pretend to be one. Whereas they are 

only after food and other relief materials as they still have the intent of causing havoc.  

The same situation was noticed at the camp in the Tanzania border with Rwanda.  The 

food meant for refugees are stolen or hijacked by the rebels to the detriments of the 

vulnerable (Messer,2004) further reiterated.  Thus, in this situation, many refugees died 

of hunger due to the act of diverting food relief from intended beneficiaries, and or acts 

of siege warfare includes seizing or destroying food stocks, livestocks and other relief 

materials.  The Post - war Rwanda according to IDPs (2004) shows that over 650,000 

Rwandaise need food assistance, and that many deaths recorded after the war were 

mostly those who had no access to food and those who were depraved of food. 

 

Although (Messer,2004) on the other hand had argued that most food aid are turned into 

food war, because the seizure or hijack are done as a deliberated use of hunger as a 

weapon or hunger suffered as a consequence of armed conflict.  Agreeing with this view, 

Waal (2004) noted that the essence of the Rwanda Interahamwe seizing the food meant 

for refugees at Goma in Congo DR and down Akagera camp in Tanzania was because 

the Hutu had not finish dealing with the Tutsi as the act recorded several deaths in 

Rwanda apart from those killed with machetes. 

 



 

 

22 | P a g e  

 

 

Premised on these arguments, it is evident that food aids to some respect are response to 

conflict for those who are starving, if actually it will reaches them. It is also not a response 

to conflict since it was not well protected and allowed to fall into the hand of the rebels 

who use it to punish the refugees who supposedly to be the beneficiaries.  Based on these 

existing skepticism about what constitute food aid in terms of the needs that it solve their 

problem of hunger and starvation and in respect to the aid donors who might claim that 

it was a response to the existing crisis, whereas the aim are defeated by those who work 

as aid workers and voluntary personnel. One pertinent thing about the issue of relief or 

food aid as observed by Sambivura (2005) in the Byumba province was that ‘it is 

understanding that everything that come from outside Rwanda in form of food are aid 

but it does not happen the way it is acclaimed because most food that came in were meant 

to sustain the rebels, whereas the people in Kajemba camp are dying of hunger. This had 

continued to happen in many conflict zones where aid meant for refugees are diverted, 

even in the eye of the international aid agencies but still they claim that their food or 

material aid are in response to the on going conflict. Particularization of aid after delivery 

should be the point of contention and not the arrival of food without the 

acknowledgement by the recipients. 

 

Although, while one may be forced to criticize the internal characteristic models of both 

aid – workers and the government or agencies, it still boiled down to the assertions that 

most aid donors do take side in conflict zone, and that determines also the place, where 

and which vulnerable groups or victims and otherwise affected persons vis-a-vis what 

angle or direction aid should be channeled to, because many conflict victims or deaths 

are due to denial from food, water, and health among others. A problem that presented 

itself as noted to have cause between 1.2 and 1.5 percent of deaths in Rwanda in 1994; 

just as it is happening elsewhere in Africa today Kageriaria (2005) noted. 

 

However, in whichever way one look at the notion behind aid and especially food aid, 

the reasons posting its abuses are facts that need to be investigated. Then the intentions 

of aid donor and interest, if at all also, need to be examined since it is obvious that not 

all agencies or groups that tend to be a helper in conflict zone are actually performing the 

expected roles.  Moreso, the need for a stronger security to guide relief aids should be 

the first priority in embarking on any aid donation to people in conflict, because 

knowledgeable information had also attested to the fact that even where food resources 

are available from domestic or external (relief) sources, access is selective, which ought 

not to be so since it has been earmarked as a relief for people in need in conflict zone.  

As already noted in the case of Rwandan aged-long crisis, to which government had 

selectively deny access to the Tutsi and moderate Hutus, owing to the fact that certain 

members of households and communities at Byumba, Gisenyi, Gitarama and Gikongoro 

commune of greater Kigali has less access to regular food, causing many deaths without 

any weapons attack. 



 

 

23 | P a g e  

 

 

 

Finally, agreeing to the view of Keen (1999), food aid in a conflict zone as existed in 

Rwanda in 1994 was real, but many factors tend to undermine the distribution, with the 

notion of the arrival of aid, and to which hand it falls into.   These are because not all 

people, communities and or regions are equally affected by the hijack, stealing or raiding.  

After all, some individual always profit in times of shortage and conflict, while some raid 

to punish the rebelling groups, and in recent conflicts, asset-stripping of political 

marginal peoples and the relief and development aid business have provided windfalls 

for certain groups. The Darfur situation being the most recent dread of power and 

political struggle as (Onu, 2007) revealed that the Janjaweed and the rebel groups who 

were found among the AMIS at every instance knows where the food is going and how 

to stop it or intercept it against the expectation of the poor people in the villages who had 

been informed of the food arrival before hand.  Suggesting that food aid were actually 

delivered but situational circumstances within the forces of the conflict denied the 

refugees and hungry people of Africa the relief meant for them. 

 

(d)     ABANDONMENT 

Abandonment is a terminology deducing left to fate, deserted, forsaken and or demanding 

that you should defend yourself and fed for yourself amongst others.  Clear reasons that 

many could attribute the case of the Rwanda people in the 1994 genocide or the long 

delay of Africa and the World agreeing to intervene in the Darfur crisis. The people of 

western Darfur in the 2002 – upward was caught in conflict of power and resources 

control with northern Sudan just as the Igbo of Nigeria in the 1967 civil war/genocide 

was systematically forgotten by the then OAU and Britain in the catastrophic human 

annihilation of that decade.  To the view of (Buggingo 2005), who in an interview x-

rayed issues down the memory lane, recounting the several abandonments that the people 

of Rwanda has suffered in the time past and asserts that the 1994 was the climax of 

International communities abandonment, because even when the United Nations took 

over from the League of Nations in 1923, the Rwandan people and the Tutsi in particular 

had experienced series of abandonment. Such as the 1959 social revolution against the 

Tutsis rule, the 1963 massacres of Tutsi for protesting and the 1973 Tutsi Pogrom by late 

Habyarimana to revenge the past misrule of the Tutsi. All these atrocities was never 

questioned or rallied round to save lives at the period seen by the international 

community.  Against these explanations, it is obvious that the issue wasn’t new in 

Rwanda. 

 

Most importantly, one may desire to examine by questions on what constitute 

abandonment in conflict zone, even if we refuses to deduce reason and understandings 

of what (Buggingo,2005) was driving at.  Abandonment occurs in every conflict situation 

and environment but what make up the level might differ from conflict to conflict.  The 

act of those having the well withal, forsaking those in pains, dyeing, dislocated, 



 

 

24 | P a g e  

 

 

threatened for annihilation among others, since their living (the latter) or dyeing mean 

nothing to them (former) was obviously on display by their inactions against the 

perpetrators, which was prevalent also in Rwandan case. On the issue of Sierra Leone, 

the world might have viewed Gen Abacha action in the latter as honouring their 

protectionist treaty of early 1990s, but the average man in Sierra Leonean whose arms or 

legs had not been amputated or maimed by Fodday Sankoh, Moris Kalone and or Hing 

Norman atrocities felt relief and protected by Gen Maxwell Kobbe advancing force to 

save lives. The poor in the forest of Yale, Bubuna Masebi, Gbolounhun,Braimah-Kant, 

Port Loko, Lunsa, Massaka, Matutuka, and Cambia district among others were happy 

that Nigeria came promptly to save lives without any ceremony or delay, compared to 

the Darfur villages of Abu-sufiyan, Angabor, Kelie-Kelie, Labado and Muhiajilia among 

others that were allowed and neglected to go on flame, both human and materials 

unprotected.  

 

Informed by this thinking, it is understandable to infer that most conflict in Africa 

experienced the same act of abandonment, which made the study to fault the concept of 

ethics of humanitarian intervention in the former. No conflicts in Africa have ever 

witness immediate counter-confrontation with the perpetrators excepts that carried out 

by Nigeria in the former.  All had always been after several months or years, which also 

faulted the United Nations Peacekeeping Mechanism.  Moreso, to what Dallaire (2003) 

observed as understanding the events in Rwanda in 1994, means the understanding of the 

moral minefield our peacekeepers are forced to negotiate when we ask them to step into 

the world’s dirty wars… because they that sent the troops, may instigate their betrayal, 

project racism and promote international politics to abandon them and the victims.  This 

implies that the Rwandan case of abandonment was not only termed as usual, normal but 

as despicable as it was, indicates international involvement, since everything evil, 

killings, abduction, hacking and maiming among others was carried out in the front of 

the intentional and watchful eyes of the UN blue helmet soldiers and observers due to 

orders, thereby making them to be the chief witness to the death of the Rwandaise and at 

the same time making them the helpless spirit of sympathizing men who could question 

self by saying “why should this be happening without action to stop it”, by the same UN 

soldier and observers (Melvern, 2000) revealed. 

 

Against the statement of an eyes witness, who was not only betrayal and abandoned by 

the UN as affirmed above by (Dallaire, 2003) a Belgium Lieutenant Lemaire retorted in 

retrospect “there were explosions nearby and the sound of grenades and shooting. There 

were roadblocks. Then came the news that ten Belgian peacekeepers had been murdered 

by Rwanda soldiers….the Belgian government had decided to pull out its soldiers.  It 

was unbelievable.  The Belgians were the backbone of the missions.  And what would 

happens to the people they were protecting?” No one had an answer.  Of course the 

muteness confirmed the words abandonment.  He, even went ahead to address the over 



 

 

25 | P a g e  

 

 

20,000 people saying “that while the UN flog flew over the camp they are safe, but that 

would not last, because the politician in Brussels were withdrawing the soldiers, so they 

should endeavour to slip away under cover of darkness  Lemaire in (Melvern, 2000) 

contended.sss The helpless officer who would want to continue to protect the would be 

victims laments in dismay of what a fate, what a future and what a doom for the 

abandoned people, whose killers were hanging around by way of surrounding the camp 

in wait of the departure of the UN peacekeepers in the second week into the one hundred 

days of the carnage. The people did not slip off as advised, instead they approached him 

saying in the event of a pull-out, ‘you should shoot us first, telling him that a bullet was 

preferable to being cut to piece with a machete Keotane Mboneye explain. The above 

revelation did not only informed us of the kind of abandonment, but it conferred on the 

over 20,000 people that they are doomed to die come what may.  “I did not want to leave, 

but I did not think there was any other solution, was Lemaire last statement”, to confirm 

the helpless spirit of sympathy… who asked why is this happening, but he cannot take 

any action to stop it because of order of the UN and its allies. 

 

In another instance, by chance a French jeep was passing and as it drives on to the playing 

field its soldiers was applauded by the crowd. One by one the UN vehicles left the school 

grounds.  But it was soon obvious what was happening, that the peacekeepers were 

sneaking away, ‘we could not believe what they were doing… just abandoning us when 

they know the place was surrounded….there were thousands of unarmed refugees….it 

seemed unthinkable’. 

 

Against this scenario, an excerpt from (Melvern,2000) further explained that: 

People tried to hang on to lorries the Belgian soldiers 

brandished their weapons, and fired into the air so that 

the people will never think of following them… 

The French soldiers prevented others from getting too 

close to the peacekeepers… At 13.45pm the last Belgian 

soldiers pulled out of the camp…. People started 

to cry.  The PSD members tried to calm everyone 

and told them that they must defend themselves. 

But we had no weapons, not even a stick, someone 

Said…we have no choice now, death or survive is the 

Closest answer.  Immediately, soldiers and militias 

Started firing at the people and throwing grenades 

into the crowd.  In the crowd were pro-democracy 

opposition politicians and human rights activists, 

but the vast majority of people carried 

identification cards with the designation Tutsi. 

There were  both young and old people and some 



 

 

26 | P a g e  

 

 

who could barely walk. 

In another development, but still over the issue of abandonment, it was noted that: 

Most people, having been abandoned 

by those who supposed to protect them, 

decided to try to escape to UN headquarters. 

But instead they were herded along the road by the 

militia and soldiers. As we walked… the soldiers 

And militia terrorized us with their grenades and guns… 

they slapped and beat people up, stealing their money…… 

it was a long walk and the militia were everywhere. 

As we walked along, the militia were hitting people with 

machetes.  Some of the people who were wounded fell 

down and were trampled upon.  There were militia 

coming from different directions and they had machetes. 

some people tried to break through the militia but were 

struck down with machetes.  We were so stunned that no 

one cried out….. it was only afterwards 

That you heard the voices moaning in agony…… 

then the interahamwe came in and started with 

the machetes, knives and spears…..people 

in pain were told that they would be finished of 

quickly with bullet if they paid money.  There were 

children crying over the bodies of their dead parents. 

And on regret of abandoning the innocence to die, on the tarmac and in front of television 

camera, one of the peacekeepers slashed his blue beret with his combat knife to explain 

how he felt on the UN terrible role in Rwanda (Melvern, 2000) observed.  

 

However, in looking at the issue of abandonment, away from what was observed and 

narrated on the ground by the few survivals, one is poised to demand explanation from 

the international community, which passed laws over sixty years ago with the specific 

mandate of ensuring that genocide was never again perpetrated.  Scholars such as 

Melvern, Power, Prunnier, Fergal, Doyle, and Walker amongst others had noted that the 

international community had not only failed to prevent it happening in Rwanda but, by 

pumping in funds intended to help the Rwandan economy, actually helped to create the 

condition that made it possible.  This is because the whole of international community 

was involved while genocide was being planned as noted by (Melvern, 2000), for: the 

UN and many of its agencies, independent aid groups and two of the most powerful 

international institutions, the World Bank and IMF, who gave loan without monitoring 

its expenditure… and when it was time to utilize the resources to exterminate others, the 

givers abandonment them (the helpless minority) for the extremist who collected the 

loans and spend it to carry out the carnage. 



 

 

27 | P a g e  

 

 

 

The same thing would have happened in Sierra Leone, after British soldiers was captured 

by the RUF rebels, if Nigeria and others had waited for the UN intervention. Just as the 

ambushing of the American soldiers by the Somalia warlord led to the withdrawal of the 

American troops and the subsequent abandonment of the Somali people in an over 

sixteen years of protracted conflicts that had wrecked havoc on the horn of Africa to this 

day.      

 

Against the foregoing, it is imperative, consequence the records as had show that the 

manner of intervention in African crisis itself had in many ways compounded the existed 

crisis situations as sympathy-role of agents of peace had become more detrimental in 

different respect with differed role to parties in conflicts, thereby leaving victims of 

conflicts at the mercy of the different warlords as observed in Somalia, Angola, and 

Rwanda respectively. There had been interventions in Africa conflicts in the real sense of 

intervention, but the moderality and phases of actions is what portrayed the intentions of 

actors as a hocus-pocus fallacy. For incident as noted by the research in 2004, from January 

to December, saw the British – IMAT Organisation and the UN-backed Canadian jets flies 

from Hasting Airfield to Kono Airstrip, transporting and protecting war-diamond for the 

war merchants of whereas the Nigerian soldiers, the Ukraine choppers transport soldiers, 

and the Bangladesh radio signal soldiers among others were only meant to protect the 

Kossoh/Hasting axis of the UN operations. A situation that it was only the late Gen. 

Maxwell Kobbe advancement was able and fit to contend with the ruthless RUF coalition 

in 1997 April to 1998 most deadly war as the then war-diamond merchants were no where 

insight at Sierra Leone. The presence of the merchants later were considered intervention 

thereafter in the Sierra Leonean conflicts, just as on the international markets the war-

diamonds were sold on UN designated price as all other diamonds coming from that 

conflict zone were termed blood-diamonds with a drastic devaluation of the values, 

because Sankoh and his allies were in the opposition. The world had not been able to tell 

us the differences between war-diamonds and blood-diamonds of Sierra Leone, who buys 

them and carat values or is it a mere nomenclatures. This propaganda paradigm, however, 

were noted to be a terminology employed to diminish the opposition in conflict under 

power debacle in economics of war parlance (Keen, 2000) argued. Meaning that in African 

pains and sorrows, the dealers on blood-diamonds and war-diamonds are guilty of the same 

offence as all actions are done to the detriments of the poor and vulnerable in conflicts 

who strove in pain and mystery as victims of war.  

Permit this research therefore to argue that intervention and the role of interveners should 

not only be seen as good in gaining and neither only at contributing to make peace. Every 

intervener should equally see losses as part of the sacrifices in ensuring peace and not only 

on what would be gain either in long or short run. Hence, the idea of exploiting the victims’ 

land, abandoning the vulnerable in need and or aiding only those having access to minerals 

like gold, diamonds, and crude oil among others which in turn promote crisis should be 



 

 

28 | P a g e  

 

 

discarded as peacemakers apart from been agents of peace can equally fall as a victim in 

the midst of separating the fighters.   

 

 

ANALYSIS,  DEDUCTION AND CONCLUSION 

Agreeing that arms-aid, arms-trade, food-aid and element of abandonment are the intrigues 

that had dominated African conflicts situations in the last six decades, it is also obvious to 

note that the initiators of this projects are not charity – producers of these goods that they 

gives out to the displaced, victims and the vulnerable even when it comes from separate 

donors. And why the poor African people appreciate these enormous donations, it should 

also be noted that at any context of this actions the interest of the giver and that of the 

receiver are always seen in contention and in equilibrium and vise –versa. For where 

balances are stroked gains are made and where betrayal is experienced disequilibrium are 

encountered.  

         

In this discourse, the research means to state that the kind of intervention in Africa had not 

wholly being done with utmost sincerity and intent of ensuring a lasting peace 

enthronement. This had been the major reason why several African conflicts had not only 

been exacerbated, prolonged, and protracted due to interests that sees it happen and would 

wants to see it continue to their separate gains against the suffering of the people in 

conflicts zone. 

      

  

Currently, the conflicts in Nigeria Niger-Delta is growing with arms and exchanged with 

crude oil going on as weapons of complex nature are being delivered in open air into the 

creeks with no one criticizing the game of arms trade nor intervening until the pillage 

defiles all known warehouses in the creeks of Warri, Okirika, Bayelsa and environs among 

others, thereby calling for usage when the opportunity avails. Of which then, those termed 

as hawk to conflict zones would arrive to add to the tempo and propensity of the await 

destruction of the region and the Nigerian nation. As we awaits this fallacy of intervention 

and the in pending war, it is agreeable to notes that there was the element of fallacy of 

diplomatic of intervention in Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Congo DR, 

and Sudan among others. This fallacy had permitted the long duration and messmerization 

of several states in conflicts into destructive and awful charity recipients.    

Consequent the extensiveness of this discourse, there are clear evidence as illustrated 

above that the degree of fallacy of diplomatic interventions in African crisis are 

abysmally chimerical. This contention also stemmed from several scholars held view that 

had been argued as different from what is obtainable in Europe, Latin America and or 

Asian continents. In the midst of this dirty game however, one does not rule out the fact 

that African have some bad leaders whose activities had being problematic, but the pains 

of the teeming vulnerable should the main priority. 



 

 

29 | P a g e  

 

 

 

It is of necessity and reasonable to argue that African conflicts/crisis are not at instance 

being given the necessary attention toward ameliorations, instead most at times the 

prolongation with intentional exacerbation makes the complexity of the conflicts difficult 

to understand. Moreso, the abandonment, the uninteresting nature and the irrelevancy 

compared to other regions or continent conflicts are source of worry and problematic. No 

matter how sentimental scholars might argue or contest the highlighted reasons as 

portending fallacy in African conflicts from outside attention and assistance, one thing 

stood assured that the degree of fallacy surpassed the level of genuineness, sincerity and 

actuality in meeting the ending point of the various crises in Africa timely with prompt 

resolution. This poor performance and initiatives are the major reasons contributing to say 

why African crisis and conflicts had been part of the world’s nightmares in recent time. 

 

 

SUGGESTIONS  

Against the background, and from the analogical bases of this discourse, it is real and 

evident to reiterate that time had come and gone when element of hocus-pocus are 

combined with dummy diplomacy as part of state propaganda game in the process of 

intervention in saving lives in conflict zone. 

 

Premised on this reason, to curb the exacerbated degree of fallacy in intervention be it 

political or diplomatic initiations, the followings are possible suggestions: 

i. That the international mandate on intervention be it local or internationally 

       based with respect to conflicts should be reinvigorated to observe the required rules 

by participant nations. 

ii. The rate at which organizations and state agencies flood and involves in 

Interventions should be checked with possible stringent measures to allowing only 

those who possess the necessary clout, integrity and business to be  welcome to 

conflict zone. 

iii. That actors to conflict or crisis arena from the onset of intervention should       be 

implored to make their intentions known against any breach of       procedures. 

iv. States nursing the intention to be in conflict should be only those who obeys 

       the international treaty on arms embargo and arms proliferation treaty.  

v. That African leadership should strengthen internal security and the level 

       insecurity in borders to disallowed arms smuggling and arms trade as currently 

rampaging the continent. 

vi. That national laws should be redefined to checkmate security excesses and 

       provision of arms-aid and arms-trade in the continents by security agents and highly 

placed individuals, especially during the period of election and electioneering 

campaigns. 



 

 

30 | P a g e  

 

 

vii. The African Union regional bridges should enact a law that could possible be use as 

a measure to challenge individuals or agents within the continent who indulges in 

promoting conflicts and arms trade among others. 

viii. That time had come when measures put in implace will not only discourage big time 

conflicts promoters, who sees every conflict as a veritable ground for arms trade and 

arms trafficking; even those who disguised under arms-aid toward goals, to never 

dream of intervening in conflict any possible humiliations. 

ix. The UN intervention mechanism if must be taken serious now, should re-examined 

their peace-enforcement mechanism and enforce it against the present peacekeeping 

posture in Africa as the latter had not confidently favoured the people in the past six 

decades, instead escalated and prolonged many conflicts. 

x. The UN should equally disabuse her staff and agents in sensitive position from 

putting their national interest first before the international objective of peace making 

as a viable option for global village, than allowing the events that occurred in 

Rwanda, Balkan and other regions where there had been salient annihilations and 

abandonments in conflicts zones caused wholly by the activities of the body 

members from repeating itself. 

 

 

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