ENUGU STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES

Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Enugu State University of Science And Technology

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Prof. Oby Omeje

MANAGING EDITOR
Prof. Barnabas Nwankwo

PUBLISHED BY

Volume 7 Number 1, 2022Volume 7 Number 1, 2022



  
 

 
 

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THE ROLE OF USA IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN, 2016-2020 

 

Netchy Mbaeze 
Department of Political Science 

Enugu State University of Science and Technology 

 

Abstract 

Events throughout history have been necessitated some response from humankind. One of such 

major events that appear to have changed the global security scene was the September 11, 

2001 attack on the US by an Afghan based terrorist group. This study thereby sets out to study 

the role of US in combating terrorism in Afghanistan. The set objectives are to examine the 

impact of terrorism on the political development of Afghanistan; to examine US responses in 

combating terrorism in Afghanistan. The researcher made use of ex post facto research design. 

Documentary method of data collection and content analysis were also adopted. The study was 

anchored on strategic theory. Findings revealed that terrorism has impacted negatively on the 

political development of Afghanistan. Terrorist activities in Afghanistan have not just 

destabilized the political system but also made them largely dependent on external forces for 

their protection. It also revealed that the US response helped in combating terrorism in 

Afghanistan by dislodged terrorists from major cities thereby reducing incidences of human 

right abuse. Among others, the researcher recommends an increased international pressure on 

the Taliban regime to run an all-inclusive government to help stabilize the political system. 

Keywords: Afghanistan, humanity, human rights, protection, terrorism,  

Introduction 

Background of the Study  

Throughout history, events that impact on humanity have necessitated diverse 

responses by mankind in an attempt to forestall recurrence or minimize its repercussions. 

Occurrences of this nature engender unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions to deal with 

them. There are many examples of these events and the resulting responses. In the first half of 

the Twentieth Century, the First and the Second World Wars are examples of events that have 

drawn global responses.  Due to the massive loss of life and the untold hardship the First and 

the Second World Wars caused, the world responded by forming the League of Nations and 

the United Nations (UN) respectively to prevent futures wars of such magnitude.   

In contemporary times, one event has drawn international reaction and seems to have 

changed the international security system, arguably since the end of the Cold War. The US-

led intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001 and the subsequent international peace-building 

and peacekeeping effort marked a significant shift in the pattern of international military 

intervention, reflecting the changed international circumstances of the post -11 September 

2001 world. During the 1990s there was much debate on the subject of humanitarian 

intervention. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Somalia and Yugoslavia, major powers 

undertook military interventions motivated in significant part by humanitarian concern to 

prevent or end large-scale loss of life and human suffering. Arguably, this represented a 

significant shift away from more traditional military interventions motivated by narrow 



  
 

 
 

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national interests and towards what became known as humanitarian intervention. The 

legitimacy of such interventions, however, remained controversial as was the extent to which 

they might become part of a significant longer-term trend in international politics. 

Many countries responded by initiating measures to bolster their internal and external 

security systems against terrorism. In the United States (US) for instance, responsibility for 

airport security screening was swiftly put under the US Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA), with US airports carrying out hundred percent screening of checked baggage for 

explosives and passengers subjected to much more thorough screening procedures. Many 

countries also adopted similar procedures, including all the major European countries. Yet, 

there were major terrorist attacks in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq, Pakistan, London and 

Madris. 

Africa has also had its share of major terrorism prior to and post-September 11, 2001. 

Kenya and Tanzania suffered simultaneous terrorist attacks in 1998 when car bombs destroyed 

the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the capitals of Kenya and Tanzania 

respectively. These attacks killed at least eighty people and injured over 1600 others. Post-

September 11, Kenya, especially, has suffered other terrorist attacks, including a major attack 

on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi which lasted from September 21 to 24, 2013. The 

attack was claimed by Al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group, killed sixty-seven people and 

injured 175 more. These attacks in various parts of the world and in Africa appeared not to 

have triggered the required response from most West Africa countries. However, recent events 

have dramatically changed the situation. The emergence or indeed, the resurgence of terrorism 

has brought the threats of terrorism to the attention of governments, corporate bodies, civil 

societies and ordinary citizens alike.  

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, the US-led coalition in 

Afghanistan was motivated more by extended national interests than by humanitarianism. The 

rationale and the formal legal basis for the US-led intervention were self-defense. However, 

the coalition involved goals that were radically different from those of most past interventions 

the dismantlement of an international terrorist network and the removal of the regime that had 

given support to that network. Despite the reluctance of the USA to engage in what it termed 

nation building, the US-led intervention quickly led to a parallel international peace-building 

and peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan motivated in part by humanitarian concerns but at least 

as much by the fear that instability in Afghanistan could all too easily reproduce the 

circumstances that had allowed the country to become a base for international terrorism. The 

international intervention in Afghanistan has thus been characterized by the distinctive 

combination of parallel, separate but interrelated counter-terrorist and peace-

building/peacekeeping operations. The longer-term impact of this intervention, and in 

particular the success or failure of its peace-building and peacekeeping component, remains to 

be seen. 

Statement of the Problem 

The comparatively weak security in some countries, worsened by weak economics 

makes issues of security a great concern. The security sector of most African countries is 

characterized by ill-equipped security agencies, inadequate collaboration among the various 

agencies, poor communication network and general lack of logistics support. Low budgetary 

allocation for training, poor intelligence sharing mechanisms and outmoded concept of security 

has compounds the situation. More so, the emerging security threats appear to be mostly 

transnational in nature. Meanwhile, the international borders of most countries are porous. The 



  
 

 
 

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porosity of the frontiers is exacerbated by the Economic Community of West Africa State’s 

(ECOWAS) Protocol on free movement of people goods and services.   

Terrorists could therefore operate across borders easily, making all countries 

susceptible to terrorist attacks. Additionally, it could facilitate terrorists and criminal gangs to 

also elude apprehension, as has been demonstrated by Boko Haram to a large extent. For 

instance, the activities of Boko Haram are not limited to only Nigeria. Boko Haram has also 

carried out attacks and abductions in Chad as well as in Cameroon, including the abduction of 

the wife of the Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister on July 27, 2014. So far, Boko Haram has 

successfully carried out their operations and gotten away as reported by the media almost daily. 

For instance, December 1 and 5 2014, a number of attacks were carried out by Boko Haram 

without any of the militants being apprehended, as reported by the Muscat Daily Newspaper. 

Another area that makes most countries, including Afghanistan, vulnerable to terrorism is the 

fact that terrorists do not need to travel across borders to attack a country like Afghanistan. 

There are people in Ghana who share similar ideology like those espoused by groups like al-

Qaeda. The emerging threats of terrorism are therefore a danger to the security and economic 

development not only for the countries experiencing activities of terrorists. Nonetheless, the 

obvious security implications of disclosing U.S response preparedness, a cursory look at the 

existing structures, including the training doctrines of key agencies such as the US Special 

Operations Forces (SOF), U International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the UN 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) appear to suggest some guidelines this direction 

and help in combating it.  

Research Questions 

1. How has terrorism impacted on the political development of Afghanistan state? 

2. How has the U.S response helped in combating terrorism in Afghanistan? 

Objectives of the Study  

The study censoriously examined the issue of terrorism in the Afghanistan and the role 

of Untied State in combating them from the specific year of 2016-2020.  

The specific objectives of the study are:  

1. To examine the impact of terrorism on the political development of Afghanistan state.  

2. To examine the U.S responses in combating terrorism in Afghanistan   

Significance of the Study 

The study has both theoretical and practical significance. 

Theoretically, this study will add to the knowledge of existing literature on terrorism, the role 

of US in the fight against terrorism and the mechanisms required to fight against terrorism in 

Afghanistan.  

Practically, this study   brings to fore the measures and preparation that are required by the 

states, through its security agencies, other state/non-state organs and civil society to help deal 

with the emerging threats of terrorism. It also proposes measures that the country could adopt, 

in collaboration with other sub-regional and regional agencies, to prevent or minimize terrorist 

attack against Afghanistan. 



  
 

 
 

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Literature Review 

Background to the Intervention in Afghanistan. 

The principal objective of U.S. policy in Afghanistan since the 9-11 attacks has been 

and appropriately continues to be to ensure that the country does not become a haven for 

virulent Salafi (radical anti-Western jihadi) terrorist groups like al Qaeda.  The premise 

underlying this policy subsequent to the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001 is that if any 

part of the liberated territory once again comes under the control of Salafi groups or a Taliban 

sympathetic to such groups, their capacity to increase the lethality and frequency of their 

terrorist attacks including against U.S. assets will increase since they will be able to use the 

safe-havens to plan and train for their operations and more easily escape retaliation by the 

United States and the international community. 

The last few years have seen the rise in interest on matters relating to terrorism in 

Africa. This has partly arisen from the frequent occurrences of terror attacks, the extreme 

violence involved and the increasing number of terrorist groups in different parts of the world. 

Some of the common concerns that has generated a range of literature include the causes of 

terrorism, how to end the current spate of terrorism and measure to prevent terrorism in other 

parts of the country. There are various views by scholars and commentators to achieve these 

goals. These views are nearly as diverse as the number of writers and commentators who have 

tried to make sense of this new and compounding challenge confronting the entire sub-region.   

 In his article, Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support 

for Boko Haram, Akinola Olojo examines the key drivers of public support for Boko Haram in 

northern Nigeria. The paper suggested that in addition to the generally held view that the 

underlying causes of terrorism in Nigeria are internal factors including poverty, age-old 

economic inequality and structural violence, there is a growing believes that the Boko Haram 

insurgency has an international dimension. This assertion stems from the strategy and extreme 

violence, including suicide bombing, that Boko Haram has adopted in the conduct of their 

terrorist activities. According to Olojo, this strategy is typical of international terrorists 

elsewhere and this type of terrorism is unprecedented in Nigeria. Olojo argued that in spite of 

their violent activities, Boko Haram has been able to win support among the uneducated, 

unemployed and impoverished young people in areas where they are based.  

The paper alluded to the influence of politicians and elite interest in the insurgency of 

Boko Haram. It also highlighted the manner in which Boko Haram has taken advantage of 

providing social services to the poor in the community to alienate the people against the state 

for the latter’s failure to meet the needs of the former. This goes to affirm the general believe 

that where the state fails in its responsibility to provide the basic needs of the masses, other 

non-state actors may fill the gap, and if such actors have extreme views, they could easily 

influence the masses against the state.   

The role of non-state institutional leadership at the local, national and state levels in 

resolving the Boko Haram issue is addressed by the paper. The paper focuses on the role of 

religion and how it is manipulated by Boko Haram to generate mass appeal among the people 

in the North-eastern part of Nigeria. It also assesses the linkages that exist between Boko Haram 

and other terrorist groups in West Africa and beyond. The paper also discusses some measures 

that could be adopted by the Nigerian authorities to resolve the Boko Haram crisis.   



  
 

 
 

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Olojo suggests effective formulation and implementation of a proactive counter-

terrorism strategy. He proposes an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and 

religious/ideological drivers of public support for the group to help stem the group’s ability to 

elude counterterrorism efforts. Since the Boko Haram crisis in Northern Nigeria seems to 

challenge conventional approaches to addressing violent conflicts, Olojo advocates the need 

for a bold mix of interventions and partnerships that combine elements of both hard and soft 

power.   

Edward Newman in his article "Exploring the Root Causes of Terrorism" classifies the 

causes of terrorism into root causes and precipitant causes. The root causes are the main focus 

of his paper in which he argued that "certain conditions provide a social environment and 

widespread grievances that, when combined with certain precipitant factors, result in the 

emergence of terrorist organizations and terrorist act." The article attempts to clarify what is 

meant by “root causes”. The paper also considers if the analysis of root causes helps to explain 

how, where and why terrorism occurs.    

The author identified factors such as poverty, demographic factors, social inequality 

and exclusion, dispossession and political grievances as being some main underlying causes of 

terrorism. Newman further grouped the underlying causes into Permissive Structural Factors 

and Direct Root Causes. With respect to the former, Newman noted poverty, demographic 

factors and urbanization. The paper looked at poverty at the individual and state levels, with 

the author arguing that at the individual level, "poverty can breed resentment and desperation 

and support for political extremism". At the state level, the paper suggested that, “poor societies 

often make for weak states, which may not have the capacity to prevent terrorist activity or 

recruitment. They also lack the capacity for the type of educational programmes that might 

help reduce support for terrorism.” Under the demographic factors, Newman says that issues 

such as rapid population growth, particularly among the male population and skewed 

distribution of this male population across diverse ethnic groups may contribute to the start of 

hostility. Newman believes that urbanization, compounded by poverty and worsened by 

unemployment, can adversely influence dissatisfied society. This disaffection could then be 

exploited be extremists’ groups to enable them recruit and mobilize in deprived urban 

communities.   

Newman argues that the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism is 

attributable to the “clash of values.” According to Newman, leadership, funding, state 

sponsorship and political upheaval are just precipitant factors. They are only catalysts that 

trigger terrorism. He therefore argues that emergence of terrorist groups and their activities 

could be viewed as being dependent upon the root causes. The paper concludes with the view 

that no matter how prepared a society is militarily, it will not be immune from terrorism until 

the sources of terrorism are appreciated and appropriate mechanisms put in place to combat 

them.  

U.S. Counter-terrorism and other Interests in Afghanistan 

While al Qaeda has been severely degraded, it has lost none of its zeal to strike Western 

countries and undermine governments in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The group 

continues to look for opportunities to exploit and territories to colonize, even if only vicariously 

through proxies, such as in Western and Eastern Africa, even if some of its local alliances are 

only fleeting and unreliable. In Afghanistan, the terrorist group has also experienced a 

resurgence in territories where the presence of the Afghan government and international 



  
 

 
 

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military forces is limited and weak. The Islamic State in Afghanistan, a newer terrorist group 

in name, consisting of various Taliban splinter elements and other relabeled militant groups, is 

also a prime U.S. target. 

However, U.S. interests in Afghanistan go beyond terrorism. An unstable Afghanistan 

risks also destabilizing Pakistan, and as a result, the entire region of Central and South Asia. 

Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as Baluchistan and other areas deep in Pakistan, including 

Karachi, for example, have been host to many of the salafi groups, and the Afghan Taliban and 

its vicious Haqqani branch use these areas as safe-havens. Thus, Pakistan’s cooperation is 

crucial for effectively countering terrorism in Afghanistan, even if as yet largely not 

forthcoming. But the reverse is also true: If Afghanistan is unstable and contains salafi groups 

that leak over into Pakistan, Pakistan itself becomes deeply destabilized and distracted from 

tackling its other crises, including militancy in the Punjab and a host of domestic calamities, 

such as intense political contestation, a distorted economy, widespread poverty, and a severe 

energy crisis. A disintegration of the Afghan state or an outbreak of a full-blown civil war will 

be a great boost to salafi groups throughout the world: once again, a great power will be seen 

as having been defeated by the salafists in Afghanistan. From a 

strategic perceptions’ standpoint, few areas are as important as Afghanistan. The view that the 

United States has been defeated does not require that the Taliban retake over the country. From 

the salafi perspective, merely a gradual, but steady crumbling of the Kabul government, with a 

progressively greater accretion of territory and power by the Taliban, would be sufficient to 

claim victory. 

The U.S. reputation and self-regard as a country that can be relied upon to honor its 

commitments are at stake in Afghanistan. In mobilizing support for Operation Enduring 

Freedom, the mission to topple the Taliban regime in the wake of 9-11, the United States made 

a pledge to the Afghan people to help them improve their difficult condition and not abandon 

them once again. Although often caricatured as anti-Western, anti-government, anti-modern, 

and stuck in medieval times, Afghans crave what others do – relief from violence and insecurity 

and sufficient economic progress to escape dire, grinding poverty. But on its own, the altruistic 

concern for the people of Afghanistan is not sufficient for the U.S. to undertake or to perpetuate 

what has turned out to be an immensely costly effort. Nor should the tyranny of sunk costs 

determine U.S. policy in Afghanistan. To paraphrase U.S. strategist George Kennan’s counsel 

to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about the U.S. war in Vietnam, the hallmark of 

a great power is to know when to liquidate unwise commitments. However, U.S. engagement 

in Afghanistan, including our deployment of adequate military force, still advances key U.S. 

interests and provides a crucial lifeline for the Afghan government and the country’s pluralistic 

post 9-11 political dispensation. Moreover, once the United States made its initial decision to 

intervene, consideration for the elemental needs of the Afghan people whose lives we have 

altered so profoundly must matter. 

Background on Terrorism Threats from Afghanistan 

In February 2020, the U.S. government signed a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban to 

withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan. This landmark pact intended to end the United States’ 

longest war against the insurgency of the Afghan Taliban. It centered on an agreement to 

withdraw U.S. troops in return for guarantees by the Taliban that Afghan territory will not be 

used for mounting international terrorism. For much of the negotiation process, American 

negotiators pushed the Afghan Taliban to commit that it would not adopt the same policies as 

before the 9/11 attacks in the United States seeing those policies as the cause of the terrorist 

attacks. Back then, the Afghan Taliban provided refuge to al-Qaeda, who in turn reportedly 



  
 

 
 

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paid up to $20 million a year for the haven to the Taliban. Al-Qaeda used the sanctuary in 

Afghanistan to set up training camps, where it trained a large army of foreign jihadists. Within 

these camps, it created a dedicated covert faction to engage in international terrorism 

operations. It also devoted some capital to a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

operation in Afghanistan.  

The U.S. government’s insistence on guarantees from the Taliban against al-Qaeda was 

not misplaced. Despite intense U.S. counterterrorism pressure in the years after 9/11, the 

Afghan Taliban maintained a strong alliance with al-Qaeda. As per multiple accounts, al-Qaeda 

helped the Afghan Taliban in organizing the insurgency against U.S. forces, especially in the 

east of the country. In this period, al-Qaeda only maintained a nominal presence of its own 

organization inside Afghanistan and instead supported the Taliban’s insurgency with strategic 

advice and material aid from bases in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The most significant al-Qaeda 

operation inside Afghanistan was located in the eastern province of Kunar. But this balance 

changed after 2014, when al-Qaeda shifted much of its Pakistan-based operation to 

Afghanistan’s eastern and southern provinces In the early years of the insurgency, Taliban 

leaders embraced and publicized their alliance with foreign jihadists, such as al-Qaeda. Even 

as late as 2010, Taliban leaders espoused a commitment to the ideology of transnational jihad 

and sought to mobilize the support of jihadist constituencies in the Middle East. At the same 

time, despite this, some in the Taliban ranks showed discomfort with support of al-Qaeda. This 

view can even be traced to the pre-9/11 years. Select leaders argued that association with al-

Qaeda was not in the early years of the insurgency, Taliban leaders embraced and publicized 

their alliance with foreign jihadists, such as al-Qaeda.16 Even as late as 2010, Taliban leaders 

espoused a commitment to the ideology of transnational jihad and sought to mobilize the 

support of jihadist constituencies in the Middle East 

. At the same time, despite this, some in the Taliban ranks showed discomfort with 

support of al-Qaeda. This view can even be traced to the pre-9/11 years. Select leaders argued 

that association with al-Qaeda was not worth the wrath of the U.S. government and the loss of 

what the Taliban had before the 9/11 an “Islamic emirate.” Starting in the late 2000s, possibly 

under internal pressure as well as U.S. battlefield pressure, the Afghan Taliban sought to 

conceal its ties with groups of foreign fighters in Afghanistan, including alQaeda. This appears 

to have been done in consultation with al-Qaeda, as its top central and region leadership 

continued to publicly pledge a religious oath of loyalty called the Bay’ah to the Taliban. Al-

Qaeda ideologue Atiyyat Allah al-Libi is reported to have informed al-Qaeda members on the 

Taliban’s public stance toward the group: “Of course, the Taliban’s policy is to avoid being 

seen with us or revealing any cooperation or agreement between us and them. That is for the 

purpose of averting international and regional pressure and out of consideration for regional 

dynamics. We defer to them in this regard.” In line with expectations of a continued alliance, 

the U.S. government regularly found evidence of battlefield cooperation between alQaeda and 

the Taliban, including al-Qaeda camps and leadership in the security of or proximate to the 

Taliban’s insurgent rankand-file. In addition to Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, since 2014, 

another armed actor grew in salience: the Islamic State. Following the emergence of the Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the Islamic State started obtaining pledges in eastern 

Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. The group’s Iraq-based leadership appointed Hafiz 

Saeed, a former leader of the Pakistani insurgent group TTP, as the first leader of the 

movement, with a purview of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This branch was known as the 

Islamic State’s “Khorasan Province.” Saeed built on Salafist enclaves in the east of Afghanistan 

and successfully poached fighters from various jihadist groups in the region, such as the Afghan 

Taliban, the TTP, and al-Qaeda. 



  
 

 
 

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In the initial years after its founding, the Islamic State gained in eastern and select parts 

of northern Afghanistan, making major inroads in the provinces of Jowzjan, Kunar, and 

Nangarhar. In the east, the group gained control of large swathes of territory. It also set up 

state-like institutions, modeling itself on the caliphate in Iraq and Syria. The group attracted a 

stream of foreign fighters, primarily from South and Central Asia, and regularly conducted 

attacks against military and civilian targets in major urban areas. Among civilians, the Islamic 

State prioritized targeting of vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities.  

In 2014, the U.S. government, along with Afghan security forces, launched a targeted 

campaign against the Islamic State in Afghanistan. This campaign was a part of the Global 

Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The Taliban also mounted separate military operations to target the 

Islamic State. 

Gap in Literature 

It was perhaps the effort to come to terms with the awful security dilemma presented by the so 

called fourth generation warfare-terrorism that has led to the impressive spawning of literature 

about its nature, causes and global implications as well as the the role of U.S in combating 

terrorism in Afganistan. The extant literature focuses on the conceptualization, history, and 

causalities of terrorism.  

From the literature review, it was found that there are extensive literature in the field of 

terrorism and counter - terrorism, most of it written after 1968. However, most of these works 

either fall into the trap of being ideologically biased (Wilkinson, 1987; Krueger, 2001; Krueger 

& Maleckova, 2002), purely psychological (Crenshaw, 1990; Black 2004; Silke, 2004). 

Furthermore, the bulk of the research is dedicated to conceptual or definitional problems 

(Senechal de la Roche, 1996; Black, 2004; Kimmel, 2003; Eckstein, 1972; Gurr, 1970; 

Skjolberg, 2000) and only limited effort was put into systematic, empirical work. Thus, the 

existing literature suffers from lack of good empirically grounded research on the role U.S 

played in combating terrorism with reference to Afganistan. 

Theoretical Framework  

A theoretical framework is a scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations 

and principles of a theory in the description and analysis of a research problem. However, the 

confines and focus of a research influence the choice of the theoretical framework to be adopted 

in a particular study. Hence, for appropriate examination of role of the United States of America 

in combating terrorism in Afghanistan Strategic theory was adopted. 

 

Strategic Theory 

Strategic theory, over the course of 40 years, permeated the domain of International Relations 

and Political Science through the works of Thomas Schelling and Colin Gray and has been 

increasingly used and acknowledged as a tool to assist in the comprehension of decision making 

(Yarger, 2006).  

Henry Eccles (1979) one of the strategic theorists described strategy as the comprehensive 

direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives. This description 

captured much of the essence of strategy. It provides direction, its purpose is control, and it is 

fundamentally concerned with the application of power. 



  
 

 
 

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In this context, strategy is the employment of the instruments (elements) of power (political/ 

diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the 

state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives. 

 

Assumptions of Strategic Theory Include: 

1. States and other competitive entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their 

abilities. Interests are desired end states such as survival, economic well – being, and 

enduring national values. The national elements of power are the resources used to promote 

or advance national interests. 

2. There is a deployment of available resources to gain any objective and this is an endeavour 

to relate ends to means. 

3. Political actors are the central unit of analysis. Therefore, understanding the political actors 

value system and preferences are imperative. 

4.  There must be a study of how the political actors construct their interests, which, thereby, 

inform the objectives they strive for and the manner in which they seek to attain them. 

5. The actor behaves rationally in pursuit of its aims. That is, an actor’s decisions are made 

after careful cost – benefit calculation and the means chosen seem optimal to accomplish 

the desired end. 

Strategic theory is the most appropriate theory to explain this research work. The application 

of this theory was done using the ends (objectives), ways (strategic concepts/ courses of action) 

and means (resources) paradigm of the theory. 

United States of America has a clear cut objective in the Middle East which is to combat the 

rising terrorist activities. The strategic theory states that political actors formulate objectives 

that are guided by interest. Consequently, Byman and Moller (2016) opined that the following 

are the interests of U.S.A in the Middle East: To ensure the free flow of oil at a stable price; 

Champion non-nuclear proliferation course; Guarantee the security of Israel and foster 

democracy in the Middle East. Unfortunately, these interests in the Middle East are threatened 

by the rampaging catastrophic terrorist activities. Hence, USA has devised some courses of 

action (ways) which are political (diplomatically), military, economic and social to combat 

these terrorist activities. Consequently, USA has deployed resources (means) to pursue the 

greater end. These means are both tangible and intangible in nature, they comprised: 

deployment of systematic air campaigns against the terrorists (strategy of aerial bombardment); 

training, advising and supplying of equipment to local allied forces; global partnership against 

terrorism. 

Hypotheses 

1. Terrorism has impacted on the political development of Afghanistan state 

2. The U.S response has helped in combating terrorism in Afghanistan 

Research Design 



  
 

 
 

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This is the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. This research work 

had a qualitative orientation. This means that it collected and worked with non – numerical 

data and sought to interpret meaning from these data. 

Explanatory research design was utilized in the present study. Explanatory research is used to 

identify any causal link between the factors or variables that pertain to the research problem. 

Explanatory research focuses on explaining the aspects of a study in a detailed manner. It 

allowed the researcher to explore the research with a varying level of depths; connect different 

ideas; understand the different reasons, causes and the effects of variables.  

While exploring the explanatory research design, the researcher narrowed down the very broad 

field of the research - the activities of ISIS in the Middle East - into two easily researchable 

case studies which were (the ISIS activities in Iraq and Syria). This helped the researcher to 

understand and tackle the problem more efficiently by dealing with the carefully selected cases 

of the phenomenon. 

 

Method of Data Collection 

Documentary method of data collection was employed. Contents of documentary materials 

with literature related to the subject matter such as text books, newspapers, magazines, 

conference papers, bulletin, published and unpublished articles, official gazettes online 

materials were examined. 
 

Method of Data Analysis 

This study employed content analysis as the method of data analysis. This helped in making 

replicable and valid inferences by interpreting textual materials and systematically evaluating 

them. In line with this, there was thematic selection and focus on qualitative data to address 

our research questions and hypotheses.  

Using this method of analysis, meaning were extracted and based on logical chains of evidence, 

inferences were drawn upon and conclusion made.  

Terrorism has impacted on the political development of Afghanistan state 

Taliban, Al Qaeda and Is-K in Afghanistan 

The Taliban have reassured the global community that they will forbid terrorist groups, 

especially Al Qaeda and the IS-K (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan 

Province), from committing terrorist acts in other countries. Al Qaeda is neither as strong nor 

as influential as it was in 2001. However, many fears Al Qaeda’s revival under the Taliban 

regime, considering the latter still defends Osama bin Laden and denies his involvement in the 

9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda’s leadership also recently issued a statement congratulating the Islamic 

Emirate (read: Taliban) for its victory in Afghanistan. An excerpt from the statement noted: On 

this historic occasion, we would like to offer our congratulations to the leadership of the Islamic 

Emirate, specifically Haibatullah Akhundzada. It is worth noting that Ayman al Zawahiri, in 

the past, has given "bay'ah" (or pledge of allegiance) to all Taliban heads, including Mullah 

Omar, Mullah Akhtar Mansur and Hebatullah Akhundzada. This statement and the group’s 

pledge also mean that Al Qaeda does enjoy a working relationship, however, due to 



  
 

 
 

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international pressures and prior commitments, the Taliban may allow Al Qaeda to carry out 

limited tacit activity within Afghanistan; which may be limited to recruitment or social media 

propaganda.  

As for the IS-K, the group remains a problem for the Taliban. The Kabul airport attack 

on August 26, 2021, which claimed nearly 200 lives (mostly Afghans), brought into perspective 

the seriousness of the IS-K threat in Afghanistan. China quickly called on the Taliban to take 

stern action against the IS-K after the attack, with Chinese spokesperson Zhao Lijian claiming 

that the Taliban had assured Beijing of not allowing any forces to harm China through 

incursions made via Afghanistan. On paper, statements from the Taliban suggest that the group 

intends to act against the IS-K. When it comes to action, the practicalities of such actions are 

both vague and complex. In their local media talks, Taliban spokespersons have hoped that the 

US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which marks an end of foreign occupation, will encourage 

IS-K fighters to stop conducting terrorist attacks. Such statements sound more like wishful 

thinking than a pragmatic policy layout. 

Afghan Taliban’s Relationship with Al-Qaeda: The Ties That Bind 

As part of the agreement with the U.S. government, the Afghan Taliban has pledged to 

break from al-Qaeda and ban the use of Afghan territory for terrorism against other countries. 

But important senior U.S. officials continue to be skeptical. For example, CENTCOM chief 

McKenzie recently stated: “…we believe the Taliban actually are no friends of ISIS and work 

against them. It is less clear to me that they will take the same action against al-Qaeda.” For 

now, the evidence points to no significant break in the relationship between the Afghan Taliban 

and al-Qaeda. The U.N. recently reported that al-Zawahiri personally negotiated with senior 

Afghan Taliban leadership to obtain assurances of continued support. To the extent this 

information is correct, these talks appear to have been successful; the Afghan Taliban has 

neither publicly renounced al-Qaeda nor taken any discernible action to crack down against it. 

Representatives of the Afghan Taliban who interact with the press also remain evasive when 

asked to clarify their position on al-Qaeda. In select instances, the Taliban insist that there are 

no foreign fighters in Afghanistan. 

 

Scholars of al-Qaeda pointed to the history between the two groups, which can be traced 

back to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. Some argue that alQaeda and an important 

sub-group of the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, are bound by ties of marriage among families 

of key leaders. Al-Qaeda also remains popular among the rank-and-file of the Taliban. Per 

some accounts, the experience of fighting together against a common foe, like the United 

States, has brought them closer. While all these factors are important, there appears to be a firm 

political basis for the relationship. Both groups fit into each other’s ideology-based political 

projects. Al-Qaeda sees the Afghan Taliban as an able ideological partner in its stewardship of 

global jihad a group whose virtues al-Qaeda can extol before the Muslim world. It also 

potentially sees the Taliban as a powerful ally, whose resurgence in Afghanistan offers major 

political and material advantages. Among political gains, the Taliban’s continued rise validates 

that jihadist victories against powerful states like the U.S. are realistic and viable. Among 

material gains, the relationship provides the opportunity to move leadership and personnel from 

Syria, Iran, Pakistan, and Jordan to Afghanistan. In the medium term, al-Qaeda may look to 

establish a base in Afghanistan for a global jihadist movement. The Afghan Taliban’s 

perception of alQaeda is more complex but, on balance, favorable.  



  
 

 
 

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The Afghan Taliban likely views he group through the lens of its ideological vision 

drawing on the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic theology, the centrality of jihad in its 

interpretation of Islamic theology, and its role and status as guardians of Islam in Afghan 

society. Despite some tensions and theological differences, alQaeda aligns with key parts of 

the Taliban’s project. One major source of alignment is al-Qaeda’s jihadist project, which 

fulfills a major perceived religious obligation. Significantly, al-Qaeda pursues its jihadist 

project by subordinating its Salafist ideology, at least in rhetoric, to the Taliban’s status as the 

final arbiter on matters of theology. This contrasts with the Taliban’s opposite perception of 

the ISIS’s ideological project, which is dismissive of both the Taliban’s Hanafi precepts and 

its status as guardians of Islam in Afghanistan. 

Consequently, even in the face of major costs, important Afghan Taliban leaders, such 

as deputy leader Siraj Haqqani and senior military Chief Ibrahim Sadr, remain sympathetic to 

al-Qaeda. Based on propaganda releases and the rhetoric of Taliban leaders, there may also be 

some sympathy for al-Qaeda’s grand strategy of bringing about an American downfall. 

However, it remains unclear which of the Afghan Taliban leaders who sympathize with al-

Qaeda are supportive of direct attacks against the United States. For example, staunch former 

supporters and sympathizers of al-Qaeda in the Taliban, like the leader of the Haqqani Network 

Jalaluddin Haqqani, did not appear to approve terrorism against the U.S. before 9/11, even if 

they did little to stop it. At the same time, it is important to note that parts of the Afghan Taliban 

are wary of a relationship with al-Qaeda. Some have lobbied against the relationship altogether, 

both before and after 9/11. Others have come to oppose al-Qaeda due to the costs of the U.S. 

government’s coercive policies since the American invasion. It appears that the size of the 

constituency opposed to al-Qaeda inside the Taliban has grown, but its political status within 

the group is uncertain. 

Defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda: Operation Enduring Freedom  

Almost immediately after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the USA and other 

states identified al-Qaeda as the likely perpetrators. In his 20 September address to the US 

Congress and the American people, President George W. Bush said: ‘Who attacked our 

country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist 

organizations known as al-Qaeda’. The British Government subsequently published evidence 

linking al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden to the attacks. It also claimed that: ‘There is 

evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of bin Laden and his associates that is 

too sensitive to release’. In his 20 September address, Bush demanded that Afghanistan’s 

Taliban regime: 

Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide 

in your land. Release all foreign nationals . . . Protect foreign journalists, 

diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and 

permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over 

every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate 

authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, 

so we can make sure they are no longer operating. He added that ‘These 

demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act 

and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share 

in their fate. 

 

The USA received unprecedented international support. On 12 September the UN 

Security Council unanimously expressed its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks, 



  
 

 
 

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stated its determination ‘to combat by all means threats to international peace and security 

caused by terrorist acts’, reaffirmed the ‘inherent right of individual and collective self-

defence’ and expressed ‘its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist 

attacks of 11 September 2001’. On the same day, the UN General Assembly also strongly 

condemned the attacks and called for international cooperation to bring the perpetrators, 

organizers and sponsors to justice. 

The Collapse of the Taliban  

By the end of October 2001, a number of factors caused a decisive turn in the war, 

resulting in the collapse of the Taliban on the battlefield in November and December. First, 

there was growing concern in the West about the conduct of the war. Despite nearly a month 

of bombing by the coalition and its complete control of Afghanistan’s airspace, the Taliban 

remained in control of most of Afghanistan and no major gains had been made on the ground. 

On 29 October General Tommy Franks, Commander of the United States Central Command 

(CENTCOM), was forced to deny that the war was in ‘stalemate’. At the same time, little 

progress was being made in efforts to broker agreement on a possible post-war regime for the 

country. Hopes of the emergence of significant Pashtun opposition to the Taliban or widespread 

defections from the Taliban were also proving overly optimistic. On 26 October the Taliban 

captured and executed Abdul Haq, further undermining the prospects for the emergence of 

opposition to the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the south of Afghanistan. The USA therefore appears 

to have decided to escalate the air war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and to increase its 

support for the Northern Alliance. 

At the end of October and beginning of November the USA carried out ‘carpet 

bombing’ of Taliban and al-Qaeda front-line positions north of Kabul and in Mazar-i-Sharif 

and Taloqan in the north of the country. On 30 October General Franks met with Northern 

Alliance Commander-in-Chief General Mohammed Qassem Fahim in Dushanbe, the capital of 

Tajikistan, resulting in an agreement to improve cooperation between the USA and the 

Northern Alliance. In particular, agreement was reached on doubling the number of US Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) working with the Northern Alliance on the ground. The SOF played 

a key role by using laser target designators to enable US and coalition aircraft to target Taliban 

and al-Qaeda forces on the front line with a high degree of accuracy. Russia’s supply of 

equipment to the Northern Alliance also played a very important role. Russia also reportedly 

equipped Uzbek and Tajik special forces who were integrated into the Northern Alliance forces, 

and Russian soldiers commanded the tank and helicopter forces that attacked Taliban front 

lines. Although at this stage Taliban and al-Qaeda forces remained numerically stronger than 

the Northern Alliance, the combination of intensified US air strikes, the use of US SOF 

operating alongside the Northern Alliance on the ground to guide those air strikes, and Russian 

equipment and support triggered a rout of Taliban forces in November. The withdrawal of the 

Pakistani InterServices Intelligence (ISI) agency, which had played a central role in moulding 

the Taliban into an effective fighting force and coordinating its successful military campaigns 

in the late 1990s, may also have greatly weakened the Taliban in military terms. The initial 

focus was the northern town of Mazar-iSharif, strategically important because it provided 

control of access to the Friendship Bridge between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan—a key means 

of bringing military supplies and humanitarian aid into the country.  

In the week to 9 November, two-thirds of all US munitions dropped on Afghanistan fell 

on the Taliban forces in Mazar-i-Sharif. In the face of this onslaught Taliban defences collapsed 

and Northern Alliance forces took Mazar-i-Sharif on 9 November. Once Mazar-i-Sharif had 

fallen, the Taliban began to unravel as a political and military force. In the next few days 



  
 

 
 

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Northern Alliance forces took towns across northern and central Afghanistan, including 

Samangan, Bamian, Taloqan, Baghlan, Pul-e Khumri, Herat and Shindand. In many cases, 

rather than fight, Taliban forces fled, surrendered, negotiated deals with the Northern Alliance 

or simply swapped sides. The USA supplied significant funds to ‘buy off’ Taliban commanders 

and soldiers, helping to alter the political and military situation on the ground. By this point 

Northern Alliance forces had reached the areas north of Kabul and US air strikes were putting 

pressure on the front-line Taliban positions there. Under pressure from the USA and Pakistan, 

the Northern Alliance agreed not to enter Kabul until the details of a new government had been 

agreed.  

 

However, on 12 November the Northern Alliance reneged on its commitment and 2000 

of its troops entered Kabul, taking control of key buildings as Taliban and al-Qaeda forces fled. 

On 15 November the eastern town of Jalalabad also fell to the Northern Alliance. Two major 

concentrations of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces remained—the northern city of Kunduz and the 

Taliban’s home city of Kandahar in the south. At Kunduz about 20 000 Taliban/al-Qaeda 

soldiers remained, including several thousand foreign fighters considered to be among the hard 

core of the most committed Taliban/al-Qaeda members. By mid-November Kunduz was 

surrounded by Northern Alliance forces under the command of General Dostum and the USA 

was undertaking heavy bombardment of the city. Northern Alliance forces held talks with the 

Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters, giving them a deadline to surrender, but no agreement was reached. 

On 22 November Northern Alliance forces initiated military action in Kunduz, taking control 

of the city over the next few days, amid reports of summary executions and atrocities. The 

majority of Taliban forces surrendered or swapped sides but the foreign fighters put up 

sustained resistance. Several thousand Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were taken prisoner. After 

the fall of Kunduz on 24 November, attention shifted to Kandahar, with US aircraft continuing 

to bomb Taliban forces in the city. By the beginning of December, Northern Alliance forces 

were approaching Kandahar from the north but were far from their bases of support there. At 

the same time, various groups of Pashtun forces loyal to different leaders had re-emerged in 

the south and/or defected from the Taliban, and tensions were emerging over who would regain 

control of Kandahar. On 26 November about 1000 US marines established a forward airbase, 

Camp Rhino, south-east of Kandahar, bringing in transport helicopters, attack helicopters, 

vertical take-off and landing jet aircraft and armoured personnel carriers - the largest 

deployment of US ground forces in the conflict up to that point. In this confusing context, 

Pashtun leaders-initiated negotiations with the Taliban.  

The Taliban surrendered and withdrew from Kandahar on 7 December 2001, with Gul 

Agha Sherzai, the governor of the city until the Taliban took control of it in 1994, reappointed 

as governor under an agreement between the various local Pashtun factions. Despite the USA’s 

insistence that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar be detained, and the presence of US 

marines nearby, Omar appears to have escaped from or been permitted to leave Kandahar at 

this point. The surrender of Kandahar was the fall of the last significant city under Taliban 

control. The regime had therefore totally collapsed. The situation in the south of the country, 

however, remained chaotic. As one observer put it, ‘This is no-man’s-land, controlled neither 

by the Taliban nor the Northern Alliance, a lawless place where anything goes and fact is 

difficult to distinguish from fear’. With the Taliban regime removed from power, the Taliban 

and al-Qaeda leadership and the remaining core of Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters became the 

USA’s priority. About 1200 fighters, believed to include bin Laden and possibly Mullah Omar, 

were reported to be hiding in a complex of caves and tunnels near Tora Bora and Khost in the 



  
 

 
 

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White Mountains close to the Afghan border with Pakistan. In December 2001, the USA 

initiated heavy bombing of the Tora Bora cave complex with B-52 bombers, including the use 

of highly destructive fuel-air explosives. The USA also formed alliances with local factions, 

mobilizing a force of about 1500 soldiers to attack the Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters.  

The operations proved more prolonged and difficult than expected, with the Taliban/al-

Qaeda fighters retreating higher into the mountains and the local allies of the USA proving 

militarily ineffective and politically unreliable. Reports suggest that negotiations between the 

USA’s local allies and the Taliban/ al-Qaeda fighters may have allowed some of the latter to 

escape. The USA succeeded in detaining more than 500 Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters, 300 of 

whom were subsequently sent to the US military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. However, 

the US forces and their allies failed to completely encircle the Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters, 

allowing many of them, reportedly including bin Laden, to escape across the border into 

Pakistan.41 The battle for Tora Bora was thus a significant failure in the USA’s campaign to 

capture or kill the remaining core of Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters and key leaders, including bin 

Laden. It soon became clear that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had not been entirely defeated. In 

March 2002 over 1000, mainly Arab, Taliban/al-Qaeda fighters regrouped in the Shahi-kot 

valley in north-eastern Afghanistan, near the city of Gardez. The USA’s response, Operation 

Anaconda, was again to use heavy air strikes while working alongside local Afghan allies on 

the ground. An initial assault at the beginning of March by about 1000 local Afghan forces and 

60 US soldiers proved unsuccessful. Three Afghans and one US soldier were killed. Fighting 

escalated as the USA deployed nearly 1000 troops in what the US Central Command described 

as a ‘fight to the death’.  

There were an estimated 100–200 Taliban/al-Qaeda casualties. Seven US soldiers died 

when their helicopter was shot down. By mid-March the USA had gained control of the Shahi-

kot valley. Reports suggest that US troops were dissatisfied with the performance of their local 

allies, holding them responsible for the failure of the initial assault and the subsequent need to 

call in a much larger US ground force and intensify air strikes. With the USA concerned about 

the danger of further Taliban/al-Qaeda attacks and doubtful of the military effectiveness of 

local allies, it sought increased assistance from its coalition partners. Australia, Canada, 

Denmark, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway and the UK all deployed special forces in 

March 2002 to help in the fight against remaining Taliban/al-Qaeda forces. The UK sent a force 

of 1700 marines to support US operations. After Operation Anaconda, the USA and allied 

forces failed to find further concentrations of Taliban/al-Qaeda forces, creating differences 

between the USA and some coalition members, in particular the UK, over the scale of the threat 

and the necessity to maintain the special forces in Afghanistan. In June the UK announced that 

it would be withdrawing its marines at the beginning of July, leaving the USA to take over 

most combat duties in Afghanistan. After June 2002 the scale of US and coalition combat 

operations against Taliban/al-Qaeda forces were gradually wound down. 

 In November a US Department of Defense spokesman acknowledged that ‘we are 

going through a new phase where it is less about combat and more about stabilization. The 

efforts in this phase are about 75 per cent reconstruction and humanitarian, and 25 per cent 

security and combat operations. This compared with a roughly even split between the two types 

of operation three months earlier. In late 2002 and early 2003, attacks on US forces, 

international representatives and the Afghan Government increased. Reports suggested that a 

new alliance had emerged between warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and remnants of the Taliban 

in order to oppose the USA and the central government. In January 2003, US forces and their 

Afghan allies came under fire at Spin Boldak south of Kandahar, near the Pakistan border.  



  
 

 
 

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The USA responded to the escalating attacks on its forces with a series of operations 

against Hekmatyar and the Taliban’s forces (including Operation Valiant Strike in March 2003, 

which involved 1000 US soldiers supported by helicopters and armoured vehicles). 

 

The US response has helped in combating terrorism in Afghanistan 

International Peace-Building Efforts in Post-Taliban Afghanistan 

The nature of the international intervention in Afghanistan has evolved considerably 

over the last 42 years, evident by significant changes in international strategy intended to 

address the deteriorating security situation, a growing insurgency, and deepening grassroots 

dissatisfaction with the overall political, economic and security environment. The roles of 

different international actors have varied greatly during these war from 2001 to 2014, as have 

their perspectives on the goals of the intervention and notions of local ownership. Nonetheless, 

coalitions with local actors have been present from the very beginning of the intervention when 

the US relied on anti-Taliban militias as allies in the war effort. These initial partnerships have 

shaped the overall state building effort and have complicated subsequent attempts to broaden 

local participation in security and development efforts. If warring parties can reach an 

incentive-compatible, bargained settlement, then all have much to gain from the cessation of 

ongoing hostilities. Beyond benefiting parties within Afghanistan, a stable Afghanistan would 

benefit neighboring states and the international community, who have dealt with the negative 

externalities of Afghanistan’s civil conflicts. It is widely recognized that a political settlement 

among Afghan parties is the most practical way to end the fighting and attain lasting stability. 

Given the large risks associated with Afghanistan’s civil conflict continuing, the United States 

should assess the viability of an international peace-keeping operation (PKO) that may alleviate 

Government of Afghanistan (GOA) uncertainties in negotiations with the Taliban and support 

compliance with an eventual intra-Afghan peace settlement.  This chapter presents the 

peacebuilding, aids provided for Afghanistan focusing on the Peace-keeping Operation (PKO),  

so-called Bonn peace process and the formation of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 

Regional Cooperation 

  Since my previous report, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have remained 

strained. Nevertheless, dialogue continued, including on economic cooperation. President 

Ghani met the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, on 

the margins of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. Pakistan pledged $500 million in 

economic assistance to Afghanistan and was publicly thanked by both the President and Mr. 

Abdullah. However, several members of the lower house of the National Assembly, as well as 

demonstrators in Paktika Province on 7 October, called upon President Ghani to reject the 

assistance from Pakistan and accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism, calling for its cessation. 

President Ghani condemned the attack in Quetta, Pakistan, on 24th October, during which at 

least 61 Pakistani police cadets were killed, and reiterated his call for regional cooperation 

against terrorism.  

Afghanistan and India continued their close cooperation: on 14 and 15 September 

President Ghani visited New Delhi, where he and the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, 

called upon those concerned to cease providing support and safe havens to terrorists, including 

those who target Afghanistan and India. The Government of India pledged an additional $1 

billion in development assistance to Afghanistan and renewed its commitment to the trilateral 



  
 

 
 

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Islamic Republic of Iran - Afghanistan-India transit corridor through the Iranian port of 

Chabahar. On 16 September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan reiterated concerns 

that Afghanistan was increasingly being used by “a neighbour” for subversive activities inside 

Pakistan. On 21 September, a trilateral meeting was held between Afghanistan, India and the 

United States in New York, during which the countries reaffirmed a shared interest in 

advancing peace and security in the region and countering terrorism. On 4 October, the 

European Union hosted a dinner with international partners and countries, including those from 

the region. The European Union stated that common ground existed for regional political 

support of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.  

Afghanistan undertook efforts to deepen engagement with Gulf States, including on a 

peace process and cooperation on counter-terrorism. Mr. Abdullah visited Saudi Arabia from 

17 to 19 October and received pledges from King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud for supporting 

a peace process, countering terrorist financing and providing development assistance. On 25 

October, President Ghani travelled to Qatar, whose leadership committed to supporting the 

peace process and announced plans to open an embassy in Kabul.  

Infrastructure development and security cooperation continued between Central Asian 

countries, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. On 7 September, construction began 

on the Afghan section of a railway linking Herat in western Afghanistan to the Iranian rail 

network. Trade and connectivity were also the focus of a visit to Herat on 30 October by the 

Governor of Khor asan-e Razavi Province in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Turkmenistan and 

Afghanistan inaugurated a rail sector connecting the Atamyrat-Imamnazar railway in 

Turkmenistan to Aqina in Afghanistan on 30 October. Regional cooperation on addressing 

security challenges and initiatives to strengthen regional economic cooperation featured at the 

centre of discussions at the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Senior Officials Meeting held in 

New York on 23 September. The need to link infrastructure development with regional policy 

cooperation was further emphasized during the Regional Economic Cooperation side event 

held on 4 October on the margins of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, during which 

regional countries welcomed five regional connectivity projects on the movement of goods, 

energy and data identified as priorities by Afghanistan. On 2 and 3 November, at a meeting of 

the Council of Heads of Government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, 

Kyrgyzstan, Mr. Abdullah called for support for the full membership of Afghanistan in the 

Organization, describing it as an important platform for regional security cooperation.  

 Afghanistan and Uzbekistan increased their engagement during the reporting period. 

President Ghani discussed bilateral economic cooperation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs 

of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz Kamilov, on 4 October, on the margins of the Brussels Conference. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Mr. Rabbani, visited Tashkent to attend the 

forty-third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic 

Cooperation on 18 and 19 October. During his visit, he signed an extradition treaty with Mr. 

Kamilov, who reaffirmed his country’s commitment to strengthening bilateral cooperation and 

to participating actively in all international meetings and conferences on Afghanistan. 

Assistance of Peace-Keeping (PKO) 

The US–Taliban settlement, signed on 29 February 2020, provides a starting point for 

intra-Afghan talks and a conditional exit strategy for remaining US and NATO forces. If the 

Taliban continue negotiations with GOA (Government of Afghanistan), maintain a reduction 

in violence, and uphold their commitment that Afghanistan will not be used as a terrorist safe 

haven, then all US and NATO forces could be completely withdrawn from Afghanistan by 



  
 

 
 

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2021. Increasing US domestic pressure to end the 19-year US military mission is impacting 

political decision making, and it is unlikely that US/NATO forces will remain in Afghanistan 

for the long term, despite the Taliban’s continuing offensives against the GOA. Widespread 

uncertainty remains regarding the possibility of a bargained settlement between the Taliban 

and the GOA, as evidenced by the latter’s May 2020 announcement that Kabul would continue 

large-scale offensive operations against the Taliban. Uncertainty over an intra-Afghan 

settlement is manifested in two primary forms.  

First, it is unknown if warring parties can reach a feasible settlement, especially without 

US/NATO forces maintaining coercive pressure to compel the Taliban to negotiate with the 

GOA. Potential impacts to Afghanistan’s political structure, legal system, security forces, 

disarmament, reintegration, and civil liberties all remain unknown, and there is deep, mutual 

mistrust. Second, if a settlement is reached, there is significant uncertainty as to whether 

internal parties would comply with the settlement’s provisions, especially without a credible 

enforcement mechanism to deter violations. If intra-Afghan parties do reach a bargained 

settlement, the historical record and conflict research suggests there will be incentives to cheat 

or spoil the peace process among Afghanistan’s numerous armed groups, complex tribal 

networks, and regional power brokers.  

Further, given Afghanistan’s rugged terrain, remote villages, and the GOA’s limited 

reach, covert defections will likely go unobserved, increasing incentives to cheat. Non-

cooperative bargaining models in civil conflict settings provide helpful starting points for 

analyzing these complex problems. These models advance information asymmetries and 

commitment problems as driving factors resulting in bargaining failures. If unaddressed, these 

problems may prevent combatants from reaching settlements or lead to relapsed fighting after 

a settlement is reached. Conflict research also suggests monitoring and verification 

mechanisms may offer partial relief from commitment and information problems and 

incentivize compliance with peace settlements. Given the US strategic interest in fostering 

long-term stability in Afghanistan, the US government should advocate for a proven 

monitoring and verification mechanism in post-conflict environments an international PKO. 

While the United States cannot direct other states to contribute to a PKO, Washington can 

leverage US diplomatic and economic power to identify willing contributors, secure financial 

donors, and shepherd the process through the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two critical scope 

conditions are required for a PKO to be a viable option in Afghanistan.  

First, the Taliban and the GOA must successfully negotiate an incentive-compatible, 

intra-Afghan peace settlement. Second, Afghan parties (including the Taliban, the GOA, 

opposition, and civil society leaders) and the future Afghan government must consent to an 

international PKO. Objectively, these scope conditions seem improbable given ongoing 

violence and the Taliban’s insistence on the complete withdrawal of foreign forces. However, 

it is also improbable that 150,000 Taliban could decisively defeat the GOA’s 300,000 soldiers 

and take over Afghanistan. As ongoing fighting imposes large costs on the GOA, it also 

imposes costs on the Taliban costs that may not be sustainable in the long run. To end a costly 

status quo and gain desired reforms, the Taliban may willingly accept a short-term, consent-

based PKO in the future, in exchange for bargained concessions that produce an incentive-

compatible agreement. If the United States and the international community lay the 

groundwork for a credible PKO and it becomes a viable option during intra-Afghan 

negotiations, then it may offer both sides relief from information asymmetries and commitment 

problems and incentivize settlement compliance during the implementation phase. Since an 

Afghanistan PKO has not been seriously discussed, this article analyzes the conditions where 



  
 

 
 

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a PKO may become viable and provides initial analysis for a hypothetical PKO’s ideal 

composition and disposition. This article proceeds as follows. First, I review contemporary 

research on non-cooperative bargaining in civil conflicts and how PKOs can alter conflict 

dynamics. Leveraging historical lessons, I then review the 1988–1990 UNGOMAP to explain 

why that PKO was unsuccessful in creating stability in Afghanistan following the Soviet 

withdrawal. I close with policy recommendations, where I explore several possible PKO 

options and analyze their potential for incentivizing compliance with a future peace settlement. 

If designed properly and paired with an incentive-compatible intra-Afghan settlement, an 

Afghanistan PKO can fill a critical monitoring and verification capacity and bolster 

Afghanistan’s prospects for long-term stability. 

The Light Footprint Approach of the Bonn Process 

Unlike the intrusive trend towards transitional administration that entrusts executive 

and legislative powers to the United Nations or specially created external institution, the 

international community in Afghanistan adopted a “light footprint, or a minimalist approach, 

which emphasized local ownership” and Afghan sovereignty”. It put a premium on bolstering 

local capacity and stressed the need for increasing “Afghanization” of both security and 

reconstruction efforts over time. In doing so, it limited the role of the United Nations and 

multinational forces to supporting and assisting a sovereign and independent Afghanistan, with 

few external factors involved, thereby leaving a light external footprint. In order to give 

Afghans, the lead role and legitimate the international engagement, the Bonn Agreement laid 

out a process to develop the political and democratic infrastructure of the country but entrusted 

it to an interim. 

Ironically, however, this approach exemplified the failure to listen to many ordinary 

Afghans who, at that time, believed a heavier footprint was necessary, particularly in providing 

a security shield for the internationally supported peace-building effort and implementing 

transitional justice. In 2001, the international community and US had failed to appreciate that 

the country had endured nearly thirty years of war that had significantly destroyed social trust 

and capital. The international community, namely the United Nations, was in fact, the only 

popular and legitimate authority in the country, and had come in with high expectations from 

the population. For instance, one community elder in northern Afghanistan suggested that the 

international community should have taken initial formal responsibility for the development of 

Afghanistan: 

For fifty years, we have had three T’s: Tariak (poppy); Tufang (gun); 

Taraj (robbery/thieving). We have always had violations…over the last 

eight years, we have been promised justice but this has failed. So, we need 

to make a new world and create new human beings. This is the only way 

of solving problems. The Afghan government should have been in the 

hands of the international community, directly through the United 

Nations. They shouldn’t be occupiers; they should be there by agreement, 

not force. This needs a five-to-ten-year process and during this period, our 

new generation will emerge and will be educated and skilled so 

commanders will tire and leave. Then the new power of Afghanistan will 

emerge. (Theros, 2016. p 12) 

 

A complicating factor has been the continuation of the American led military effort – 

Operation Enduring Freedom, which fights remaining Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives on 

Afghan soil, without a status of forces agreement. This marked the contradiction inherent in 



  
 

 
 

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the US-led approach that began at the Bonn Peace Agreement: a light political footprint that 

entrusted national sovereignty and political development to an unelected and unpopular set of 

Afghan elites, paired with a heavy military strategy acting without a clear mandate from that 

national sovereign government. Consequently, the Bonn Agreement has never been fully 

realized: the country’s new overly centralized political institutions became dominated by a set 

of factional leaders who quickly established networks of nepotism, bribery, and corruption. 

Their continued relationships with international actors, namely the US, further reinforced a 

personalized style of politics in the country, rather than promote the institutions and processes 

necessary to broaden participation and engender accountability and good governance.  

Bonn Agreement—Bonn 2001  

The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-

establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, or Bonn Agreement, was signed in Bonn, 

Germany, on December 5, 2001. It was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 

(2001). Under U.N. auspices, Afghan participants met to outline a process for the political 

transition in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement established an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) 

on December 22, 2001, which was made up of 30 members and headed by Chairman Hamid 

Karzai. An Emergency “loya jirga” (traditional Afghan assembly) held in June 2002 replaced 

the AIA with a Transitional Authority (TA). The TA brought together a broad transitional 

administration to lead the country until a full government could be elected. A constitution, 

considered the most progressive in Afghan history, was approved at a “constitutional loya 

jirga” in January 2004. Hamid Karzai was elected president in October 2004, and parliamentary 

and provincial elections were subsequently held in September 2005. The Bonn Agreement also 

called for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Afghanistan and a Judicial Commission. It 

requested the U.N. Security Council to consider authorizing the deployment of a U.N.-

mandated security force, outlined the role of the United Nations during the interim period, and 

referred to the need for cooperation with the international community on a number of issues, 

including reconstruction, elections, counter-narcotics, crime, and terrorism. The Bonn 

Agreement was fully implemented in 2005. 

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 

This section shows the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan (UNAMA) with the goal of assessing the Mission’s efficiency and effectiveness 

in order to optimize the division of labour to ensure better cooperation between United Nations-

related organizations. 

The United States and the international community continue to rely on the central role 

of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as coordinator of 

international donor activity and assistance. Within a broader, ongoing debate focused on U.S. 

and other assessments of efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, UNAMA’s role has been emphasized 

in different contexts, particularly in the past several years. For example, U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1806 (2008) significantly expanded UNAMA’s authority. The Declaration of the 

International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, which took place in Paris in June 2008, 

also underlined UNAMA’s role in leading all aspects of civilian coordination. Since the 

establishment of UNAMA, the Mission’s role has been defined by its support for the transition 

process outlined in the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the 

Re -establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn, Germany, in 

December 2001, also referred to as the Bonn Agreement. The implementation of the Agreement 

was premised on the transition to a post-conflict environment, with an armed opposition acting 



  
 

 
 

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against rather than as a serious hindrance to the achievement of peace and prosperity. In 

subsequent years, the adoption of a constitution, expanded protection for human rights and civil 

liberties, democratic elections for the President and parliament and the establishment and 

growing effectiveness of government and State institutions have been seen. All of those 

processes were closely supported by UNAMA. Despite progress in those areas, the Taliban-

led insurgency began to gain ground, particularly after 2006. Against that backdrop, 

Afghanistan entered a new phase in 2014 with the peaceful transition from one elected 

President to another and the transfer of security responsibilities from the International Security 

Assistance Force, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to the Afghan 

National Defence and Security Forces. 

The role of UNAMA evolved as the situation in Afghanistan changed, and the 

Mission’s mandate and scope of activities expanded. Following a phase of expansion, the 

Mission’s strength has been contracting since 2011. In recognition of the sovereignty of 

Afghanistan and as Afghan State institutions continued to gain capacity, UNAMA increasingly 

played a supporting role in alignment with the priorities of State institutions. However, real and 

meaningful progress notwithstanding, the Afghan State currently continues to rely heavily on 

the international community, both financially and in terms of security support. More than 60 

per cent of the Government’s budget is financed by foreign donors, and despite immense 

resources spent on institution-building, at moments of crisis Afghan institutions are at times 

perceived to be insufficiently effective at mediating between powerful interests and factions 

that retain autonomous capacities for violence. 

These internal political rivalries take place in a context in which the legitimacy of the 

State is contested by the Taliban insurgency. During the early years of the implementation of 

the Bonn Agreement, it was predicted that the insurgency could be contained or diminished. 

Subsequent developments proved contrary to that assumption.  

A political settlement is therefore required. Efforts to begin negotiations towards that 

end have been made over the past few years, but so far have gained little traction. It is this 

overall environment defined by a fragile political consensus among those who recognize the 

constitutional order and an increasingly violent and sustained insurgency by those who reject 

that order in which the United Nations is now operating. Doing so demands a reorientation of 

its activities. 

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was created at the 

request of the Afghan government and is a political mission of the United Nations (UN) in 

Afghanistan. UNAMA aims to help lay the groundwork for peace and sustainable development 

in Afghanistan. UNAMA was established on March 28, 2002 by the UN Security Council 

through Resolution 1401. The mandate of the UN Security Council is renewed annually 

depending on the needs of the beneficiary countries. Based on information from the official 

UNAMA website, UNAMA carries out various forms of activities such as political assistance, 

humanitarian assistance, human rights, and regional cooperation. The main objective of 

UNAMA is to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan. UNAMA has been involved in 

efforts to bring about peace in various fields. UNAMA has also played an important role in 

helping Afghanistan through the political transition and rebuilding Afghanistan's integrity. 

In carrying out its mission, UNAMA has 2 operational pillars. The first pillar is political 

affairs. This pillar is the part that deals with political issues. This field is divided into several 

work units such as government units, law enforcement units, election assistance units, military 

advisory units, and police advisory units. The second pillar is the part that deals with the 



  
 

 
 

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reconstruction process and the restoration of infrastructure stability in Afghanistan. This 

section is an area that assists in coordinating all agencies working to rebuild Afghanistan. This 

section is also assisted by several work units, such as the human rights unit, the coordinating 

unit for aid providers, special advisors in the field of development, and other important 

departments. In addition, UNAMA is also assisted by other working bodies, such as the human 

rights sector, the security sector, and the communications and publications section. 

UNAMA Work Program in Afghanistan UNAMA which is engaged in the field of 

human rights is the main field that supervises and implements preventive and repressive actions 

in the event of things that violate human rights. UNAMA makes every effort to “instill human 

rights values in Afghanistan” or human rights at all times and for all people”. The team from 

UNAMA attempted to implement this strategy through, subject, reporting, advocacy, and 

collaborating with colleagues and discussing with the government, military, community groups 

and international groups. In achieving its goals, UNAMA sets 4 priority areas of work such as 

protection of civilians, protection of women from violence, peace and reconciliation, and 

detention. 

In an armed conflict, the belligerent parties are likely to ignore the rules of international 

humanitarian law (IHL), particularly regarding the protection of civilians. Protection of 

Civilians UNAMA and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) 

consider that the armed conflict in Afghanistan is not an international armed conflict. UNAMA 

considers that the conflict is a conflict between the government and international military forces 

that are pro-government against anti-government groups. Anti-government groups consist of 

all individuals and groups consisting of various backgrounds, motivations, and command 

structures which generally come from the Taliban Group, the Haqqani network, Hezbi Islami, 

and Al-Qaida groups such as the Uzbekistan Movement, the Islamic Jihad Association, 

Lashkari Tayyiba and Jaysh Muhammad. All groups belonging to the pro-government group 

are obliged to minimize the impact of the actions of anti-government groups on the civilian 

population and civilian infrastructure. Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions establishes 

the minimum standards for groups to understand a non- international armed conflict. Article 3 

also extends humanitarian law to situations involving territory that is the sovereignty of a state 

and binds not only states but also non-state actors involved in the conflict.  

In 2009, UNAMA recorded as many as 2,412 civilians died. A total of 1630 of them 

were caused by anti-government groups and another 596 victims were caused by pro-

government forces. Meanwhile, as many as 186 other victims died as a result of gunfire, or 

were killed by explosions. The conflict that occurred in Afghanistan continued into the 

following years. The death toll in 2010 increased when compared to the previous year. 

UNAMA reported that as many as 2,777 people died during 2010. A total of 2,080 of them 

were caused by anti-government forces. Anti-government forces used suicide bombing and 

bombing with homemade bombs as their main strategy against the government which caused 

1,141 deaths or 55 percent of the total number of deaths caused by antigovernment groups. 

During 2010, what was quite worrying was the increasing number of clandestine killings by 

anti-government groups. A total of 462 civilians were secretly killed. 

Protection of Women Against Violence against women in Afghanistan is very common. 

The freedom of Afghan women is severely restricted, including the possibility to enjoy human 

rights. The conflict that lasted for almost 3 decades characterized by the absence of law, 

insecurity, and weak government has had a significant impact on the status and situation of 

women in Afghanistan in their efforts to achieve their emancipation. During the period of the 



  
 

 
 

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Mujahideen group from 1992 to 1996, various wars occurred that damaged various aspects of 

Afghan society's life. Women's human rights are severely restricted. They even received unfair 

treatment such as in the legal field, were tortured, experienced sexual violence, kidnapped, 

forced into marriage, and trafficked. This period describes the darkest period in the history of 

women's lives in Afghanistan. The emergence of the Taliban actually worsened the condition 

of women in Afghanistan.  

The Taliban with their harsh and ideocentric interpretation of Sharia law actually makes 

women even more marginalized. Based on a distorted Islamic rule, the Taliban seeks to 

establish absolute rulership in Afghanistan. In April 2009, a spokesman for the Taliban group 

claimed responsibility for the killing of Sitara Achakzai. She is a member of the provincial 

legislature who seeks to inspire women to work and fight for their rights in Kandahar. This 

incident certainly reduces the participation of women in the Afghan parliament. From April to 

May 2009, 3 gas explosions were reported at various schools in Afghanistan. An explosion 

occurred in Parwan province in April which led to many girls being rushed to hospital for 

inhaling an unhealthy odour. A few days later, another explosion occurred in Parwan, sending 

61 girls and a teacher to hospital. In May, an explosion occurred in Kavisa province which 

caused 90 girls aged 8 to 12 to be rushed to hospital from poison gas. In August 2009, the 

Afghan government adopted the Law on Elimination Violence Against Women (EVAW law). 

EVAW law is a collection of laws that seek to eliminate customs, traditions, or practices that 

can cause violence against women that are contrary to Islamic teachings. This law prohibits 

contract marriage, forced marriage, marriage before the age, forced isolation, prohibits women 

from obtaining education, work, and access to health services, and other discriminatory 

practices. The EVAW law is a major step in making official rules to protect women's human 

rights. 

Peace and Reconciliation Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghans have 

hoped the war would end. However, although the acts of violence are decreasing, the war is 

not over. Beginning in 2006, the security situation has only worsened. One third of Afghans 

continue to live in poverty and more than 3 million Afghans are refugees in Iran and Pakistan. 

One of UNAMA's roles in creating peaceful and conducive conditions is to support The 

Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). This program is a program led and 

implemented by the Afghan government in order to create peace in Afghanistan. This program 

began with a Presidential decree issued in June 2010. The fighters, UNAMA supports the 

process of mobilizing and strengthening community groups and women's groups. UNAMA 

works with Afghan social groups to strengthen their participation in discussions on politics, 

peace, reconciliation and reintegration. UNAMA together with other fields seeks to provide 

technical assistance to APRP, Peace Council, and other relevant actors. UNAMA to integrate 

human rights practices into peace and reconciliation processes. 

Establishment of the International Security Assistance Force  

ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Afghan 

opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country 

by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The 

concept of a UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan 

Transitional Authority was also launched on this occasion to create a secure environment in 

and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. On 11 August 2003, NATO 

assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, bringing the six-month national rotations to an end. 

The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, 

including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan. 



  
 

 
 

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At this conference, 21 countries offered forces. The United Kingdom, after evaluating the 

offers, preferred 17 countries to deploy troops alongside the UK forces as part of ISAF. Major 

General John McColl, from British Army, was designated force commander. 

ISAF provided support to the Afghan government and international community in 

security sector reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The aim was to build 

professional, independent and sustainable forces that were able to provide security to the 

Afghan people throughout the country. This work was carried out jointly by the NATO 

Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and ISAF’s Joint Command (IJC), together with the 

European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and other important 

national actors. NTM-A focused on training initial recruits and building the institutional 

training capability of the ANSF, while the IJC was responsible for developing fielded ANSF 

units through advice and assistance. 

Mandate of ISAF 

ISAF was first deployed in 2001 on the basis of a request for assistance by the Afghan 

authorities and a United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate, which authorised the 

establishment of the force to assist the Afghan government in the maintenance of security in 

Kabul and its surrounding areas in particular to enable the Afghan authorities as well as UN 

personnel to operate in a secure environment. At that time, the operation was limited to the 

Kabul area, and its command was assumed by ISAF nations on a rotational basis. 

In August 2003, on the request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. Soon after, the UN mandated ISAF’s gradual 

expansion outside of Kabul. While not technically a UN force, ISAF was a UN-mandated 

international force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Eighteen UN Security Council 

Resolutions (UNSCRs) related to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 

1776, 1817, 1833, 1890, 1917, 1943, 2011, 2069, 2096, 2120, and 2145. A detailed Military 

Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional 

Authority in January 2002 provided additional guidance for ISAF operations. 

UN Security Council Resolution 1386  

The UK formally informed the Security Council that it was willing to become the initial 

lead nation for ISAF with a letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative 

of the UK to the President of the Council. According to the letter, the responsibility for 

providing security throughout Afghanistan resides with the Afghans themselves, and ISAF 

would assist the IA in maintaining security. On December 20, 2001, the Security Council, 

determining the situation in Afghanistan constituted a threat to international peace and security, 

passed Resolution 1386 authorizing the establishment of the ISAF, for six months, to assist the 

IA in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas. It also welcomed the UK’s offer to 

take the lead in organizing and commanding ISAF.45 Being voted unanimously, Resolution 

1386 passed under chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized participating countries to 

“take all necessary measures” in carrying out their responsibilities. It called on Member States 

to contribute personnel, equipment, and other resources to the Force. It also called upon ISAF 

to work in close consultation with the IA and the Special Representative of the Secretary 

General. 

Resolution 1386 also called on all Afghans to cooperate with the Force. It welcomed 

the commitment of the parties to the Bonn Agreement to “do all within their means and 

influence” to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN and other 



  
 

 
 

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international personnel in Afghanistan. Resolution 1386 urged the Afghans to withdraw all 

military units from Kabul in cooperation with the ISAF. Member States participating in ISAF 

were called on to help the IA in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and 

armed forces. 

The Military Technical Agreement  

Major General John McColl, with a reconnaissance unit, went to Afghanistan to meet 

and determine the details of ISAF with the members of the IA. There occurred several points 

of disagreement. The most important issue was the size of ISAF. The Afghans, in particular 

Defense Minister General Fahim Khan, insisted on a force no larger than 1,000, while Western 

leaders wanted a force 5,000-6,000 strong. They also insisted that ISAF would be restricted to 

a static security role, guarding key buildings and political figures, while patrolling the city 

would remain under the responsibility of Afghan police and military personnel. This reflected 

Fahim’s view that the presence of ISAF on the streets would undermine his control of the city. 

On the contrary, ISAF’s view of the task was for a force that was able to patrol freely 

throughout the city, in many cases as a joint activity with the Afghan police, but with no 

restriction on its freedom of movement. After intense negotiations, McColl and the IA signed 

a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) on January 4, 2002.  

The MTA set out the relationship between ISAF and the IA. It gave ISAF the powers 

it required to operate freely and without hindrance, and defined the legal status of ISAF, its 

deployment, authority, and the support that the IA would provide. It also specified the location 

of barracks in Kabul to which Afghan forces would be confined. Moreover, it clarified what 

the ISAF would do and where it would operate. After the MTA was signed, the participation 

of TCNs was formalized through the signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” in 

London. The MOU set out the arrangements, responsibilities, general principles, and 

procedures by which the TCNs would implement. This represented the final step in agreeing 

on the structure of ISAF for its period under UK leadership. 

Role of ISAF effort in Afghanistan  

ISAF operates separately from other forces operating in Afghanistan under OEF. The 

character of OEF is different from that of ISAF. OEF is best described as a combat-focused 

mission aiming to counter Taliban and Al Qaeda threats. Nevertheless, the end state for both 

missions is the same: to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan under the auspices of an 

elected and democratic government. Therefore, ISAF and OEF have to work together to 

achieve their objectives. To prevent overlap between ISAF and OEF forces and for reasons of 

effectiveness, it has been agreed that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) activities would 

take precedence and CENTCOM would have operational authority over ISAF. In addition, the 

OEF forces have provided logistical, communications, and intelligence support to ISAF, and 

have been ready to act as a quick-reaction force to rescue ISAF units if they get into trouble. 

ISAF is a UN authorized mission, but it is neither a UN mission nor is it led by the UN. It is a 

“coalition of the willing” and has been deployed under the authorization of the UN Security 

Council. Therefore, it operates separately from the UNAMA. However, UN Security Council 

Resolution 1386 called upon ISAF to work in close consultation with the UN Special 

Representative of the Secretary General, who leads UNAMA. Moreover, a “Joint Coordination 

Body (JCB)” was set up on January 13, 2002 to ensure close cooperation between the IA, ISAF 

and the UN on matters related to the security issues. The JCB has met on a bimonthly basis, 

and included the Ministers of Defense and Interior of Afghanistan, the COMISAF and the 

Special Representative of the Secretary General. 



  
 

 
 

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Human Rights and the Future of Afghanistan under the Taliban Regime  

Concerns for human rights particularly gender rights in Afghanistan arise from the 

Taliban’s harsh treatment of women in the 1990s. Then, the Taliban imposed a ban on women's 

education and proactively discriminated against women by allowing them to work outside their 

homes. Today’s women in Afghanistan, who have until now enjoyed relative freedom, equal 

rights and access to education and work are reminded of the suffering, restrictions and curbs of 

the 1990s when they see the Taliban patrolling streets and governing the country. Therefore, 

since the Taliban’s takeover, a common sight in Kabul has been the protests carried out by 

young Afghan women against the Taliban. The Taliban have deliberately remained vague in 

their response when it comes to their policy direction on women, with the women’s ministry 

more or less also disbanded. When asked to clarify their policy on the matter, the Taliban’s 

generic answer is their “support for women’s rights under the Sharia law”. No further 

explanation is provided on what that means in practice. In a recent interview with the BBC, 

Taliban leader Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai had clearly indicated that “women will not 

be in the cabinet or top government positions (in their government). But they could work at a 

lower level”. This statement reaffirms that the Taliban’s perception of women in Afghanistan 

has not changed. They see women as ‘incapable’ of holding senior or decision-making roles. 

This is a problematic hyper-masculine understanding of women’s role in society, particularly 

in Afghanistan. 

  



  
 

 
 

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Conclusion 

In terms of its immediate goals, the US-led intervention in Afghanistan from 2016-2021 

was in many ways a remarkable success. The study offers analytic guidance on where key 

actors stand and their plausible trajectory in light of the U.S. posture of withdrawal and the 

gradual rise of the Afghan Taliban. While the findings of this report are important in their own 

right, they should also be considered in the broader political context of Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, the USA achieved this without deploying large numbers of US ground forces, 

being drawn into a quagmire or suffering significant casualties. Although figures on Afghan 

casualties remain contentious, the most pessimistic forecasts for civilian casualties proved 

inaccurate and the predicted region-wide humanitarian disaster was avoided. The defeat of the 

Taliban also brought an end to its extreme form of Islamic rule and, arguably, an improvement 

in the lives of most Afghans. It is widely assumed that these successful aspects of the 

intervention in Afghanistan encouraged the USA to attempt a similar regime change operation 

in Iraq in April 2003. 

For one, with the intra-Afghan negotiation process underway, Afghanistan appears to 

be at a crossroads. There is reason to believe that Afghanistan is looking at a difficult but 

realistic path toward peace. The ongoing process is especially significant as major warring 

parties have struggled to meaningfully engage in peace talks over four decades of conflict. 

Given the enormous generational suffering of Afghan civilians, this pathway deserves 

sustained support of and prioritization by the U.S. government and the international 

community. If the intra-Afghan talks are not given a chance, the country can descend into 

another long cycle of violence. At the same time, the terrorism challenge remains multifaceted 

and likely to endure. This requires new frameworks of management by the U.S. government, 

its allies, and other key regional countries. The precise makeup of the country’s armed 

landscape and the role of terrorist groups of international concern in that context remains 

challenging to predict.  

However, it is realistic to assume that a number of groups with varied local, regional, 

and transnational aims will find ways to persist. In turn, their presence will generate regular 

risks for Afghan civilians, the region surrounding Afghanistan, and Western countries. 

Members of Islamic State stand alongside their weapons, following their surrender to the 

Afghan government in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, on November 17, 2019.  

UNAMA, which is an extension of the United Nations in Afghanistan, has made various 

efforts to realize a peaceful and conducive condition in Afghanistan. In achieving its objectives, 

UNAMA moves through two areas of work, namely the field of political affairs and the field 

of recovery and reconstruction. In an effort to protect human rights in Afghanistan, UNAMA 

established a special unit for human rights. This unit works all over Afghanistan. Since 

UNAMA's involvement in Afghanistan, UNAMA has worked hard to protect the human rights 

of people in Afghanistan. This effort was carried out in several ways, such as providing 

protection for human rights for civilians, providing protection for women, assisting the 

reconstruction and reconciliation process, and providing protection against violence for 

detainees. In addition, UNAMA is also considered to have succeeded in attracting the sympathy 

of other countries to help in the recovery of the Afghan condition. This is evidenced by the 

involvement of ISAF, other UN humanitarian missions, and major countries as donors for the 

Afghanistan reconstruction process such as the United States, Japan, Britain, Germany, and 

other donor countries to cooperate in restoring conditions in Afghanistan. 

Summary of Findings  



  
 

 
 

 132 

 1.Terrorism has impacted negatively on the political development of Afghanistan. Terrorist 

activities in Afghanistan have not just destabilized the political system but also made them 

largely dependent on external forces for their protection. Afghan government have reached 

several agreements with the West led by the US for military assistance.  

Beyond this, fear has made a lot of people distance themselves from Afghan politics as they 

became the targets of these terrorists. Again, terrorism have strained Afghan’s regional 

cooperation starting with its neighbor Pakistan. 

2. The US response has helped in combating terrorism in Afghanistan. With the US led military 

operation in Afghanistan, terrorists were dislodged from major cities. Terrorist activities such 

as illegal execution, beheading of individuals and other punishments by these terrorist groups 

were greatly reduced as a result of the presence of US (and NATO) forces in Afghanistan. 

Recommendations  

1. There should be an increased international pressure on the Taliban regime to run an all-

inclusive government. The pressure should also extend to incorporation and adherence of 

human rights in the Afghan constitution as this will help stabilize the political system. 

2. The US and the international community should play a role in the stabilization of the state 

by not withholding their support and assistance for the socio-economic well-being of common 

Afghans. In the long run, the 20-year achievements, under the US and coalition forces, in 

education, healthcare and the economy need to be consolidated and protected in order to avoid 

a humanitarian crisis in the country. The World Bank has estimated the gross domestic product 

(GDP) of Afghanistan to be around USD 19.87 billion in 2020; compared to 4.055 billion in 

2002.17 Annual growth averaged 9.4 per cent between 2003 and 2012, driven by a booming 

aid-driven services sector, and strong agricultural growth.18 Aid flows decreased from around 

100 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 42.9 per cent of GDP in 202019. Now that the Taliban are in 

control of Afghanistan and the foreign aid to Afghanistan has dried up, this could cause a 

serious economic and humanitarian crisis in the country including the possibility of refugee 

influx to other countries. A policy layout on aid provision, for the long-term well-being of the 

Afghan people, is therefore urgently required. 

 

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