Microsoft Word - 12. The Embodied Mind.doc


 

The Embodied Mind: Perspectives and Limitations 

 

Radboud University Nijmegen 

October 27, 2010 – October 28, 2010 

 

The last decade cognitive neuroscience has seen a growing interest in an embodied 

view of cognition, according to which higher-level cognition is supported by basic 

sensory-motor structures. However, the embodied view of cognition has not gone 

unchallenged and has been criticized on both methodological and philosophical 

grounds. In addition, researchers from within the field differ in their views, ranging 

from strong claims about embodied processes as a necessary prerequisite for 

thinking to weaker claims about embodiment as merely accompanying higher-order 

cognitive processes. Crucial questions that remain unanswered include: “How 

conclusive is the support for strong or weak claims of embodied cognition?”, “How 

does an embodied view of cognition account for higher-order abstract thinking?” 

and “How do we represent concepts that we have never experienced ourselves?”. 

This workshop aims to shed light on these issues by getting together empirical 

researchers of embodied cognition from different backgrounds.  

 

Deadline for poster submissions: 4 July 2010 

 

Invited Speakers 

• Alfonso Caramazza, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA and Center for 

Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Italy  

• Pierre Jacob, Institut Nicod, Paris, France  

• Alex Martin, National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), Bethesda, USA  

• Rolf Zwaan, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands  

• Tania Singer, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive & Brain Sciences, Leipzig, 

Germany  

• Harold Bekkering, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition & Behaviour, Nijmegen, 

The Netherlands 

 

Visit the website for more information 

http://embodiedmind.cognitive-psychology.eu/