id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
expositions-209	none	Aquinas’s Sheep: A Note on Anscombe on Freedom	2009	6	.pdf	application/pdf	2325	86	55	To make an initial contribution, Anscombe’s remark that it is a “mistake to think that the relation of being done in execution of a certain intention, or being done intentionally, is a causal relation” suggests that describing an action as intentional does not rule out giving a causal explanation of it in different terms (Anscombe 2005, 95).1 To close, I want to consider briefly Anscombe’s oft-cited remark that there is nothing unacceptable about the idea that [the] “physical hap- hazard” should be the only physical correlate of human freedom of action; and perhaps also of the voluntariness and intentionalness in the conduct of other animals which we do not call “free.” Putting this claim in different words, he also says that, “if determinism turns out to be true, then all our talk about human actions and human agents…would be ‘just a highly convenient, nay indispensable, façon de parler’” (Sullivan 2007, 236, quoting Anscombe 2005, 103); and “if one were to hold that a given movement were necessitated by prior perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions, then…there would be nothing for the intention embodied in that action to explain” and it would make no sense to count that movement as an intentional action (Sullivan 2007, 237).	cache/expositions-209.pdf	txt/expositions-209.txt