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[Expositions 11.1 (2017) 31–43]  Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747–5376 
 
 

Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate 

 

CHARLES F. CAPPS 

The University of Chicago 

 

 

I. 

In 2010, U.S. President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 

popularly known as the “Affordable Care Act” (ACA) or “Obamacare.” The ACA authorizes the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to enumerate a list of “preventative care” 

services that must be included in employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Qualifying 

employers who fail to sponsor health insurance that includes such coverage are subject to financial 

penalty.1 

The list the HHS published in 2012 included all Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-

approved contraceptives, including some that some believe can act as abortifacients. A number of 

employers filed suit, arguing that the HHS mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration 

Act (RFRA). According to RFRA, the federal government may impose a substantial burden on a 

person’s exercise of religion only if this burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a 

compelling government interest. 

In 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 

Being required, under threat of fines, to provide insurance coverage for services they deem 

objectionable on religious grounds constitutes a substantial burden on employers’ exercise of 

religion, the Court found, at least for employers that are “closely-held corporations.” And the Court 

found further that, even if the government has a compelling interest in ensuring coverage for all 

FDA-approved contraceptives, requiring employers to provide this coverage themselves is not the 

least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Court pointed to the accommodation that the 

federal government had already extended to religious non-profits as an example of a less restrictive 

means. Under the final version of this accommodation, which was revised after Hobby Lobby, if a 

religious non-profit submits notice to the HHS stating its objections, then the HHS will submit 

notice to the non-profit’s insurer, upon which notice the insurer will be required to provide 

coverage for the relevant services without contracting with the religious non-profit to do so. 



Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate  32 
 

   

In Hobby Lobby, although the Court pointed to an earlier version of the accommodation as a 

less restrictive means of furthering the government’s interests than the original mandate, it did not 

rule on whether the accommodation would itself violate RFRA. This is the question the Court 

faced in Zubik v. Burwell. In 2016, reduced to an even eight because of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 

death, the Court made the unusual move of calling for supplemental briefings from the parties 

regarding a possible settlement in which, if a religious non-profit were to select a plan that does 

not include contraceptive coverage, the insurer would be required separately to provide free 

contraceptive coverage for that non-profit’s employees. Evidently, the idea was that, under this 

arrangement, the government would still further its relevant interests, but the religious non-profit 

would not be required to trigger the provision of coverage of the relevant services by submitting 

formal notice of its objections to the HHS. 

The parties’ respective supplemental briefings indicated that, while the petitioners would be 

willing to accept this compromise, the government was less eager to settle. Ultimately, the Court 

vacated and remanded the split appeals court decisions rather than ruling on the merits of the case. 

At the time of this writing, it remains to be seen whether the change in presidential administration 

in 2017 will result in the resolution of the dispute. 

In this essay, I will explore whether, accepting for argument’s sake religious doctrines that 

prohibit absolutely the use of contraception, compliance with the HHS mandate is intrinsically 

impermissible—i.e., impermissible regardless of the circumstances. This question is of interest for 

a number of reasons. Most obviously, given the uncertain status of ongoing litigation, it is of 

interest to executives, whether of religious non-profits or of closely-held for-profit corporations, 

who accept religious doctrines that prohibit the use of contraception, as well as those who believe 

that some forms of FDA-approved contraceptives can act as abortifacients and who accept 

religious doctrines that prohibit abortion.2 More broadly, however, it is of interest to lawyers on 

account of its implications regarding the merits of Hobby Lobby and Zubik, as well as to 

philosophers on account of the difficult issues it raises in ethics and the philosophy of action. 

The most prominent religion whose doctrine prohibits absolutely the use of contraception is 

Roman Catholicism. As it turns out, Catholic moral theologians have also developed a robust 

framework for assessing the permissibility of cooperation with evil. I will be borrowing the central 

distinction in this framework—viz., the distinction between formal and material cooperation with 

evil—for use in my own analysis. Doing so has the advantage of facilitating dialogue with Catholic 



33  Capps 
 

commentators who have weighed in on the question of whether compliance with the mandate is 

permissible under Catholic doctrine. But it does not thereby have the disadvantage of closing 

dialogue with everyone else. For although the distinction between formal and material cooperation 

with evil comes to us from eighteenth-century Catholic moral casuistry, it is properly speaking 

action-theoretical in character and should be acknowledged by anyone who acknowledges a 

distinction between intention and foresight. 

Slightly more controversial is whether this distinction rightly has the moral salience that it is 

accorded in the Catholic moral theological tradition. In what follows I will assume that the tradition 

is correct in at least this regard: if -ing is intrinsically impermissible, then acting with the intention 

that another  is intrinsically impermissible. Philosophers who hold that, special cases aside, the 

intentions with which an agent acts are relevant only to the moral evaluation of her character, not 

her action, will likely reject this assumption. Still, to the extent that the Catholic moral theological 

tradition is representative of the religious convictions of those who object to the mandate, the 

assumption that, if -ing is intrinsically impermissible, then acting with the intention that another 

 is intrinsically impermissible, is dialectically innocent. In any case, my conclusion in this essay 

would stand even if we were to relax this assumption. 

My argument will proceed as follows. In Section II, I will articulate the distinction between 

formal and material cooperation with evil in a way that preserves the traditional judgment of 

Catholic moral theologians that formal cooperation with evil is intrinsically impermissible. Much 

of the debate among Catholic scholars concerning whether compliance with the mandate is 

intrinsically impermissible has focused on the question whether it intrinsically constitutes formal 

cooperation with evil. In Section III, I will examine two common arguments against the view that 

compliance with the mandate intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil. I will maintain 

that these arguments are unconvincing because they fail to engage with the best case for the view 

that compliance with the mandate intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil. Still, I will 

argue in Section IV, the best case for this view is unsuccessful. In Section V, I will draw the 

tentative conclusion that it is not the case that compliance with the mandate is intrinsically 

impermissible, even given religious doctrines that prohibit absolutely the use of contraception. 

 

 

 



Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate  34 
 

   

II. 

The distinction between formal and material cooperation with evil is usually traced back to St. 

Alphonsus Liguori, although there is evidence that the terms were already in use by the time of his 

writing in the eighteenth century. The distinction is usually defined along the following lines: C’s 

cooperation with P’s impermissible action is formal if and only if C shares the intention of P in 

virtue of which P’s action is impermissible; and any cooperation with evil that is not formal is 

material.  

While this definition may be satisfactory for the purposes of most discussions, it could use some 

refinement. For one thing, it fails to explicate the notion of sharing an intention. One might worry 

that intentions are indexed to agents and therefore cannot literally be shared across them. I think 

we can avoid this concern by speaking instead about ends. There seems nothing problematic about 

saying that two agents intend the same end, even if their intentions of that end are distinct. 

The concept of an “end” in play here is intensional: one and the same event might realize two 

or more distinct ends under different descriptions. In addition, one and the same action can be 

performed with two or more distinct ends in view. This highlights a second deficiency of our initial 

formula. Suppose that Jay is building a machine to destroy Los Angeles, and he wants to destroy 

Los Angeles in order to impoverish Kat, whose net worth consists largely in Los Angeles real 

estate. Liz helps build the machine because she believes that the world would be better off without 

Hollywood. In this case, one and the same action of Liz’s counts as both formal cooperation with 

evil and material cooperation with evil with one and the same action of Jay’s, only with respect to 

two distinct ends Jay has in view in performing that action: the intermediate end of destroying Los 

Angeles and the further end of impoverishing Kat, respectively. Formal and material cooperation 

with evil are thus relative to an end of the principal’s action, something that our initial formula 

failed to capture. 

The intensionality of the concept of an end leads to an additional complication that will be 

relevant later. Very plausibly, the fundamental form of expression of an end is, at least in some 

cases, infinitival rather than propositional. Thus: Billy intends to eat his vegetables; not (except in 

a special case): Billy intends that Billy eat his vegetables. Yet when what an agent intends is for 

another agent to do so something, then it seems that the fundamental form of expression of an end 

has to be propositional (otherwise, the identity of the other agent would go unspecified). Thus: 

Billy’s mother intends that Billy eat his vegetables. Yet I take it that Billy and his mother share 



35  Capps 
 

the same end. Therefore, while the intensionality of the concept of an end requires something like 

identity of description as the criterion of identity of ends, this criterion must be loose enough to 

admit instances of -ing, intended by A, and that A , intended by B, as identical. 

A third and final deficiency of our initial formula is that it is in tension with the traditional 

understanding of formal cooperation with evil as intrinsically impermissible. It is plausible that, 

for some ends E, the fact that A is acting with E in view constitutes defeasible grounds for holding 

that A is acting impermissibly. Suppose that, in cooperating with P’s pursuit of such an end E, C 

also intends E. Then the presence of a defeater to the impermissibility of C’s acting with E in view 

but not to the impermissibility of P’s acting with E in view may yield the result that, although C 

cooperates formally with evil by the formula above, C acts permissibly. E.g., suppose that stealing 

$1B from Jay is necessary and sufficient to prevent him from completing his machine. Unmoved 

by the threat of Los Angeles’s destruction, Max wants to steal $1B from Jay in order to make 

himself rich, but he needs help. Surely it is permissible for Ned to lend a hand with the intention 

of saving Los Angeles by bringing it about that Max steals $1B from Jay. In the case of Ned’s 

action but not Max’s, it seems, the pro tanto impermissibility of intending a theft is defeated by 

the circumstances and the agent’s further intentions. If so, then we have an action that our initial 

formula classifies as formal cooperation with evil but that is nevertheless permissible.  

In light of these considerations, we can reformulate the distinction between formal and material 

cooperation with evil as follows. If by doing  C is cooperating with P’s pursuit of end E, then  

 

(FC)  constitutes formal cooperation with evil relative to E if and only if (a) P’s 

pursuit of E is impermissible in virtue of the fact that in doing it P intends 

E, and (b)  is impermissible in virtue of the fact that in doing it C intends 

E; 

 

whereas 

 

(MC)  constitutes material cooperation with evil relative to E if and only if (a) 

P’s pursuit of E is impermissible in virtue of the fact that in doing it P 

intends E, but (-b) it is not the case that  is impermissible in virtue of the 

fact that in doing it C intends E. 



Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate  36 
 

   

This formulation of the distinction has the virtues of rectifying the three deficiencies of our initial 

formula by (i) circumventing concerns about the notion of sharing an intention, (ii) relativizing the 

concepts of formal and material cooperation with evil to an end of the principal’s action, and (iii) 

reconciling an absolute prohibition on formal cooperation with evil with the existence of merely 

pro tanto prohibitions on acting with the intention of certain ends. Further refinement of the 

distinction may be possible, but (FC) and (MC) will do for our purposes. 

We are now ready to consider whether compliance with the mandate intrinsically constitutes 

formal cooperation with evil. With respect to which end(s) of which action(s) of which principal(s) 

would compliance with the mandate intrinsically constitute formal cooperation with evil, if indeed 

it does? There are two (compatible) possibilities. First, compliance might constitute formal 

cooperation with evil with respect to the pursuit, by those who acquire contraceptive coverage as 

a result of one’s compliance, of the end of using contraception. Second, it might constitute formal 

cooperation with evil with respect to the pursuit, by the officials at the HHS who issued the 

mandate, of the end that those who acquire contraceptive coverage as a result of one’s compliance 

use contraception. 

By the criteria we settled on when considering Billy, these ends are identical. Therefore, if 

compliance with the HHS mandate intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil, then—

regardless of relative to which action(s) of which principal(s) it does—it necessarily involves 

intention of the end that those who as a result acquire contraceptive coverage use contraception. 

Hence, if we can show that compliance with the mandate need not involve intention of that end, 

then we will have shown that it is not the case that compliance with the mandate intrinsically 

constitutes formal cooperation with evil. 

 

III. 

Many commentators are quick to dismiss the notion that one who complies with the mandate 

necessarily intends others’ contraceptive use. Their grounds for their dismissals fall into two 

categories. First, some commentators think that intention of an end requires “approval” of, 

“endorsement” of, or at least a lack of “personal opposition” to that end. Because one can comply 

with the mandate without having such attitudes towards others’ contraceptive use, these 

commentators conclude, one can comply with the mandate without intending others’ contraceptive 

use. 



37  Capps 
 

This way of thinking about formal cooperation with evil is common. Here is Robert Miller: 

 

In formal cooperation, the cooperating party endorses the wrongful act of the 

primary wrongdoer.3 

 

Given this gloss, it is no surprise that Miller thinks it obvious that it is not the case that compliance 

with the mandate intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil. 

 

Everyone in the debate agrees that, because the objecting employers obviously do 

not want to provide the coverage they find objectionable, there is no question of 

their compliance involving them in formal cooperation with evil.4 

 

Because reluctance indicates a lack of endorsement, compliance is not formal cooperation with 

evil as long as it is reluctant. 

Ultimately, I want to defend Miller’s conclusion, which is that it is not the case that compliance 

with the mandate intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil. I do not, however, wish to 

rest that conclusion on his reasoning. Many, myself included, find dubious the notion that an agent 

intends only those consequences of her action that, independently of the practical reasoning that 

issued in her action, she approves of or endorses. Elizabeth Anscombe, for example, famously 

identified the order of intention with the order of practical reason.5 According to her, “it is the 

agent’s [practical knowledge] that gives the descriptions under which what is going on is the 

execution of an intention.”6 Recently, much attention has been given to the contrasts between 

Anscombe’s approach to the philosophy of action and that of the New Natural Lawyers.7 But at 

least on this point, Anscombe and the New Natural Lawyers seem to be in agreement. According 

to John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, 

 

intentions are constituted by acting persons’ reasons for making their choices and 

by precisely what they choose to do, not by what they feel, or would like, or are 

reluctant or eager to do, or regret the “necessity” of doing.8 



Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate  38 
 

   

If we wish to present a robust defense of the view that it is not the case that compliance with the 

mandate constitutes formal cooperation with evil, then we will have to do more than point out that 

one can comply with the mandate without approving of others’ contraceptive use. 

Christopher Tollefsen does not subscribe to the conception of intention that lies behind Miller’s 

remarks; he is a champion of the New Natural Law theory of action. Yet he too is quick to dismiss 

the notion that one who complies with the mandate necessarily intends others’ contraceptive use: 

 

Where the HHS mandate is concerned, there should be little doubt that formal 

cooperation is not at issue. If the president of a Catholic college is compelled to 

offer the coverage and complies, it will not be done for the sake of enabling his 

employers [sic] to contracept, but for the sake of complying with a legally 

authoritative, even if unjust, policy. Accordingly, the form of cooperation at stake 

is material, not formal.9 

 

Tollefsen invites us to consider the orthodox Catholic employer who offers coverage for 

contraception only when compelled by law. Presumably such an employer offers the coverage not 

in order to secure an independent interest in others’ contraceptive use, but rather in order to comply 

with the legally authoritative mandate, avoid fines, etc. From this, Tollefsen infers that the 

employer complies with the mandate without intending others’ contraceptive use. 

Again, I want to defend the conclusion that it is not the case that compliance with the mandate 

intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil. But I do not wish to rest that conclusion on 

Tollefsen’s reasoning either. Surely the defender of the view that compliance with the mandate 

intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil thinks just that: that compliance intrinsically 

constitutes formal cooperation with evil, not compliance only when done in furtherance of an 

interest that one who complies could just as well not have. On this account, compliance with the 

mandate involves intention of a teleologically loaded means. Intention of such a means entails 

intention of the ends intrinsic to it. In the case of compliance with the mandate, the account would 

go, these ends include the end that those who acquire contraceptive coverage as a result of one’s 

compliance use contraception. While Tollefsen may not agree,10 I think that it is at least plausible 

that a means can be teleologically loaded in this sense. 



39  Capps 
 

In the next section, I will consider whether compliance with the mandate might be intrinsically 

ordered to others’ contraceptive use in one way in which it is plausible that a means can be 

intrinsically ordered to an end, viz., the way in which a part of a collective project is intrinsically 

ordered to the end that unites the project as a whole. Although there may be other ways in which 

one might argue that compliance with the mandate is intrinsically ordered to others’ contraceptive 

use, this way strikes me as the most plausible. Thus, by ruling it out, we will warrant a tentative 

conclusion that it is not the case that compliance with the mandate intrinsically constitutes formal 

cooperation with evil. 

 

IV. 

Suppose, borrowing a classic example from Anscombe, that Ann is plotting to assassinate some 

political leaders gathered in a rural cottage for a secret meeting. She pours poison into the house’s 

water source. Then she pumps the poisoned water into the cistern so that, next time the party 

leaders go for a drink of water, they will ingest the poison and die. 

Like many actions, Ann’s project of assassinating the party leaders divides into parts. She has 

to acquire the poison; she has to get it in the water; she has to pump the water into the cistern. The 

sense of “part” here is teleological; not just anything that happens during any arbitrarily chosen 

stretch of time during which Ann’s project is ongoing counts as a “part” in this sense (just as not 

just anything that occupies an arbitrarily chosen region of a living body counts as an “organ”). The 

parts of an intentional action, in the sense of “part” I have in mind, are themselves intentional 

actions performed for the sake of the whole of which they are parts. Thus Ann acquires the poison, 

pours it into the well, pumps the water, etc., all with the intention of assassinating the party leaders. 

Intuitively, it seems that the teleological structure of the project remains intact if Ann decides 

to outsource one or more parts to an accomplice. For example, suppose she pays Bob to pump the 

water. Intuitively, it seems that pumping the water remains for the sake of assassinating the party 

leaders even though it is now Bob who is doing it. I am not suggesting that Bob pumps water with 

the intention of assassinating the party leaders simply because it is a part of Ann’s plan that he 

pumps water. If Bob is the cottage attendant going about his usual job, having no idea that the well 

is poisoned, then “executing a part of Ann’s plan” can hardly be a description under which he is 

acting intentionally because it is not a description under which he is aware that he is acting at all. 

And even if Bob knows that the well is poisoned, he may not care, and may be going about his 



Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate  40 
 

   

daily responsibilities without intending to cooperate with Ann. In these cases, it is not qua part of 

Ann’s project of assassinating the party leaders that pumping water is Bob’s means to his further 

ends (doing his job, making a living, etc.). 

But if Bob is hired by Ann specifically to play a part in the assassination, then he cannot pretend 

that his means to collecting the money that she offers is anything other than playing that part in 

the assassination.11 And to play the water-pumping part in the project of assassinating the party 

leaders just is to pump water in order to assassinate the party leaders. To be sure, the further ends 

to which Bob subordinates this means in his own practical reasoning may not include the death of 

the party leaders. For example, suppose that Bob is paid up-front, as soon as he is finished pumping 

the water, so that he will receive his pay regardless of whether the party leaders end up dead. In 

this case, it is true, the death of the party leaders is not itself instrumental in Bob’s practical 

reasoning to the end of making money. But that does not change the fact that pumping water 

intending the death of the party leaders is instrumental in Bob’s practical reasoning to the end of 

making money. In a case like this, we do not have two intentions in order: pumping water with the 

intention of assassinating the party leaders, and assassinating the party leaders with the intention 

of making money. Instead, we have two orders of intention: pumping water with the first-order 

intention of assassinating the party leaders, and all that with the second-order intention of making 

money. 

One could argue that the compliance with the mandate is structurally similar to pumping 

poisoned water as part of the assassination. Among the government’s stated objectives in enforcing 

compliance with the mandate is to promote contraceptive use. Getting employers to provide 

insurance for contraception—or, under the accommodation, getting employers to submit notice the 

purpose of which is legally to obligate their insurers to provide coverage for contraception—is the 

government’s means to that end, just as getting Bob to pump poisoned water is Ann’s means to 

assassinating the party leaders. True, whereas Ann is using the carrot of a reward to motivate Bob 

to play the relevant part in her project of assassinating the party leaders, the government is using 

the stick of fines to motivate employers to play the relevant part in its project of promoting 

contraceptive use. But this difference is of no significance. Changing the further intention with 

which one plays a part in a collective project does not change what it means to play a part in a 

collective project. Therefore, one might conclude, just as Bob pumps water intending the death of 

the party leaders, so those who comply with the mandate, whether in its original form or under the 



41  Capps 
 

accommodation, do so intending that those who as a result acquire contraceptive coverage use 

contraception. 

This strikes me as the best case for the view that compliance with the mandate intrinsically 

constitutes formal cooperation with evil. Still, I do not think that it is successful. In the water-

pumping case, Bob’s reward hangs directly on his participation in the assassination. This means 

calculating his performance of the role that is his to play with an eye to the end that unites the 

project as a whole (again, this is just what it means to perform a part, in the relevant, teleological 

sense of “part,” of an action). If Bob complies with the letter of Ann’s instructions but not their 

spirit, and Ann finds out, then she would correctly hold him in breach of their agreement. So Bob 

does not announce to the party leaders that their water supply is poisoned; nor does he draw 

attention to the empty poison cans in the garbage; if the poison was deposited in one part of the 

water source but not another, then he takes care to pump from the poisoned stock; etc. Quite 

generally, assuming that he is indeed playing his part in the enterprise and not double-crossing or 

otherwise cheating Ann, Bob calculates his performance to promote the assassination of the party 

leaders according to plan. This is true even if he does not take additional steps beyond playing his 

part in the enterprise in order to ensure that it is successful. 

In the case of the mandate, on the other hand, employers’ immunity from fines hangs not on 

their furtherance of the objectives that the officials at the HHS had in view in issuing the mandate, 

but rather on their compliance with the mandate itself. And what it means to comply with a law is 

independent of the further objectives the lawmaker had in view in enacting it. A law is not an 

invitation to participate in the projects of the lawmaker; it has a public meaning that is opaque to 

the further, private intentions with which the lawmaker enacted it. As a result, there is no 

expectation that employers will calculate their compliance with an eye to promoting contraceptive 

use. For example, suppose, rather fancifully, that employer X awards the company contract to 

insurer Y even though X’s employees have a superstitious aversion to using contraception 

purchased under insurance plans issued by Y. If the government took X to court for failing to 

further the ends that the officials at the HHS had in view in enacting the mandate, then the judge 

would rightly rule in favor of X. As long as X selected a plan that includes coverage of the 

mandated services, X is in compliance with the law. So it is not qua playing the insurance-

providing part in the lawmakers’ project of promoting contraceptive use, but rather qua complying 

with the law, that compliance with the mandate conduces to the end of avoiding fines. 



Religious Doctrine and the HHS Mandate  42 
 

   

V. 

Where does this leave us? We have ruled out what strikes me as the best case for the view that 

compliance with the mandate intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil. This is enough 

to establish a presumption, albeit tentative, against the view that compliance with the mandate is 

intrinsically impermissible on account of the intentions of the one complying. And it is not as if 

an unfair or otherwise disproportionate balance of consequences is somehow baked into the 

concept of compliance with the mandate. I tentatively conclude, then, that it is not the case that 

compliance with the mandate is intrinsically impermissible, even given religious doctrines that 

prohibit absolutely the use of contraception.12 

That said, for the reasons given in Section III, I do not think that this conclusion is as obvious 

as some commentators seem to suppose. The philosophical issues it implicates are difficult enough 

that what I characterized as the “best case” for the view that compliance with the mandate 

intrinsically constitutes formal cooperation with evil is hardly an unreasonable application of a 

body of religious doctrine such as that of the Catholic Church, even if it is, as I have argued, 

ultimately mistaken. Getting clearer on these issues would be worthwhile and would pay dividends 

for moral theory far beyond resolving questions of relatively parochial interest concerning 

compliance with the HHS mandate. 

 

 

Notes 

 

1. I am grateful to John Sauer for reviewing a previous draft of this paper. 

2. Henceforth, to bracket the question of which if any FDA-approved forms of contraception 

can act as abortifacients, I will speak only of religious doctrines that prohibit contraception, 

using Catholic doctrine as the paradigm example. That said, if indeed any of the FDA-

approved forms of contraception can act as abortifacients, then what I say applies also to 

the many non-Catholic religious doctrines that prohibit abortion. 

3. Robert T. Miller, “The HHS Mandate, Cooperation with Evil, and Coercion,” Public 

Discourse, February 22, 2012, available online at http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/ 

2012/02/4817/. 



43  Capps 
 

4. Ibid. 

5. G.E.M Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 

79–80. 

6. Ibid., 87. 

7. See, for example, Matthew B. O’Brien, “Elizabeth Anscombe and the New Natural 

Lawyers on Intentional Action,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13 (2013): 47–56. 

8. John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, “Direct and Indirect: A Reply to Critics 

of Our Action Theory,” Thomist 65 (2001). 1–44, at 8. 

9. Christopher O. Tollefsen, “Mandates and Bad Law,” Public Discourse, February 20, 2012, 

available online at http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/02/4779/. 

10. See Tollefsen, “Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien’s ‘Objects of Intention: 

A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,’” American Catholic 

Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2013): 751–778, especially at 752. 

11. Cf. Anscombe, Intention, 41–55. 

12. This is not to deny, of course, that compliance with the mandate may be impermissible in 

certain circumstances given religious doctrines that prohibit absolutely the use of 

contraception. 

 


