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[Expositions 12.1 (2018) 20–32]  Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747–5376 
 

The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal 

 

LISA SOWLE CAHILL 

Boston College 

 

 

Introduction 

I envision that just war theory will continue to have a place in Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and 

social ethics, but that its role will become increasingly marginal to the positive advocacy of 

peacemaking or peacebuilding. This is already evident in the “growing edges” of just war theory, 

such as jus post bellum, just ante bellum, just policing, and the reinvigorated nuclear disarmament 

movement.1 All of these iterations of just war theory make its role restrictive, stringent, and even 

prohibitive in relation to the use of armed force. They push its function away from the justification 

of war and toward alternative methods of avoiding or resolving conflicts, with an emphasis on the 

moral imperative of protecting or reconstituting just and peaceful social life. Even more indicative 

is the increasing emphasis of CST since Vatican II on the Christian responsibility and the realistic 

possibility of finding diplomatic and other nonviolent ways to avoid and end conflicts. Recent 

popes in particular have made extremely strong statements against the political use of armed force. 

An important historical factor is that the dominant type of conflict in today’s world is no longer 

“war” in the sense of conflicts between or among nation-states. These have declined since World 

War II. Today most conflicts occur within nation-states, or across their borders, including civil 

wars, insurgencies, religious and ethnic conflicts, and terrorism. Of course, such conflicts can be 

fueled by and become proxy wars for national governments, including those of the nations in which 

they occur. Nevertheless, “just war” criteria formulated for use by heads of states and their advisors 

are no longer adequate to this changed situation, both because national governments have 

diminished control of armed force and because those who do control it are not always motivated 

by concerns of justice as just war theory defines it. 

Due to the proliferation and intransigency of sub-state and trans-state conflicts, the salient area 

in which CST still retains a place for armed force is humanitarian intervention. However, even in 

cases in which it is clear that massive human rights abuses are resulting from the inability or 

unwillingness of a state to protect its citizens or resident aliens, the use of force by outside powers 



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has only a tenuous ability to bring long-lasting peace.2 Outside force may be the only alternative 

to stop killing, for example in Rwanda (where a failure of international will permitted ongoing 

genocide), East Timor (where force stopped military violence against civilians and led to 

independence), and potentially in Myanmar (where military violence has, as of early 2018, killed 

over 7,000 and displaced over 600,000 people belonging to the Rohynga Muslim minority). On 

the other side, however, the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo in response to Serbian ethnic 

violence against the Albanians exacerbated ethnic tensions and led to more violence; the 2003 

U.S.-led invasion of Iraq destabilized the entire society and increased anti-Western terrorism; and 

more recent interventions in Libya and Syria were in important ways misguided and ultimately 

failures. 

For these practical reasons, as well as because of the formative, long-standing, and gospel-based 

commitment to forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, Catholic social teaching since the Second 

Vatican Council, especially papal teaching, has constantly reiterated the immorality and self-

defeating character of violence. It has urged nonviolent solutions to political conflicts and to armed 

violence actually occurring. Catholic social ethics and activism increasingly highlight the 

importance and promise of constructive peacemaking or peacebuilding toward the goal of a just 

peace.3 This trajectory is captured in the title of Pope Francis’s 2017 World Day of Peace Message: 

“Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace.”4 While the popes do not completely eliminate the 

idea or possibility of justified use of armed force, they minimize its effectiveness and moral 

acceptability. Instead, they train their attention on nonviolent conflict transformation as a 

concomitant of Christian identity, a moral obligation, and a social-political strategy that can be 

effective and successful.5 

 

Restrictive Just War Theory 

The Christian just war ethic (and most of its secular counterparts) has evolved over sixteen 

centuries to include two categories of criteria: jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) and jus in 

bello (justice in war). The criteria within these categories can be formulated in somewhat different 

ways, but standard versions include, within jus ad bellum, defense of the peace and common good, 

last resort, right intention, proportionality of destruction caused to good results, and legitimate 

authority in declaring war. Within jus in bello, the primary criteria are noncombatant immunity 

and proportionality of means used to the objective.6 In a “classic” assessment, John Courtney 



The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  22 
 

   

Murray defines the purposes of the just war ethic, especially as a Christian ethic, as the 

condemnation of war as evil, the limitation of the evil war entails, and the humanization of the 

conduct of war as far as possible.7 Regarding this definition, two fairly obvious points may be 

made. First, the premise of the entire just war tradition and its criteria is that war is a tremendous 

evil, to which the fundamental moral response is not “justification,” but limitation and restraint. 

Second, in reality, neither this premise nor the limiting functions of just war criteria that Murray 

envisioned have always governed the popular conception of just war theory or its use by war-

making governments. Many would aver, to the contrary, that what passes for just war theory and 

criteria is often a thinly veiled rationalization of national or group self-interest. 

A keynote for the emergence, since World War II, of a more skeptical Catholic stance toward 

the justifiability of war and the possibility of keeping war’s conduct within just parameters is 

certainly John XXIII’s Pacem in terris (1963). Asserting that international disputes “must be 

resolved by negotiation and agreement, and not by recourse to arms,” the pope warns that “it no 

longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of 

justice.”8 A special threat for this pope, writing at the height of the Cold War, is the danger of 

nuclear weapons (including the economic burden of the arms race), plus “the terrifying destructive 

force of modern weapons” in general. To these we can add the unrestrained violence and atrocities 

that inevitably accompany all war and have been among the intentional means of means of war in 

conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, 

and Cambodia. 

Following John XXIII’s lead, the United States bishops, in their 1983 peace pastoral, The 

Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,9 maintain that pacifism and just war theory 

are united by a presumption in favor of peace and against war. This means that the burden of proof 

is on those who would justify war, and that such justification must meet a very high bar.10 

Militarism and the militarization of international problems are thus ruled out. As Gerard Powers 

maintains, “War is the failure of politics, not its extension […]. The resort to military force is 

sometimes necessary, to be sure, but it is not a primary means of achieving even a negative 

peace.”11 A negative peace is one in which violent conflict has ended or subsided, but access to 

basic needs, and just and participatory institutions of civil society and government, may be lacking. 

A positive peace is peace with justice: rule of law, human security, and equitable social institutions 

and structures.12 In the perspective of CST today, war or more limited types of armed force can be 



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justified only if, as a last resort, they are the most viable way to achieve a just and sustainable 

peace. However, since war ordinarily destroys the social trust, infrastructures, and material goods 

necessary to a just peace, it also ordinarily is not “just.” 

According to Powers, the presumption against war creates a “hermeneutic” for the use of just 

war criteria in which they do not “readily justify war,” but instead “severely limit it.” The 

restrictive just war hermeneutic “reinforces the notion that just war criteria are strict restraints on 

when, why and how to use force, and it creates a heavy obligation to find and pursue nonviolent 

means of resolving conflict—i.e., to develop an ethic and praxis of peacebuilding.”13 In fact, 

Powers even regards just war theory so conceived as an essential part of preventing war and 

building peace, insofar as it both provides rationales against the use of force that does not meet 

strict criteria such as last resort, proportionality, reasonable hope of success, and protection of 

civilians and also requires securing the conditions of just and peaceful social life going forward. 

 

The Growing Edges of Just War Theory 

It is precisely such considerations that have led to the recent development of new categories of just 

war theory, especially jus post bellum, but also jus ante bellum.14 These categories support and 

extend the restrictive hermeneutic of just war criteria, and serve as a set of brakes on the advance 

toward war, rather than as a further impetus or set of rationalizations. The foremost theological 

proponent of jus ante bellum is Maureen O’Connell.15 Jus ante bellum envisions whether a 

particular use of force will or will not be conducive to a later just peace. Yet, similarly to the 

criterion of last resort, it also demands that pro-active peacemaking measures are adopted before 

war occurs, with the purpose of averting resort to force in the first place. Jus ante bellum, more 

than last resort, calls attention to structural violence and ongoing lower-level conflict and the need 

to find creative solutions. Thus jus ante bellum can be seen as a positive approach to building 

relationships, practices, and structures of peace.  

Jus post bellum has been developed for Christian social ethics preeminently by Mark Allman 

and Tobias Winright.16 Allman and Winright remind us that just cause and just intention have an 

inherent relation to the effects of any particular use of armed force. If defense of the common good 

and a lasting peace are really the cause intended by the wagers of war, then the relevant decision-

makers will also be invested in ensuring that post-conflict conditions will be conducive to social 

restoration. For example, the means of war must not destroy sources of livelihood and material 



The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  24 
 

   

and social infrastructures requisite to the later building of a just peace. In addition, the war must 

be concluded on just terms (in brief, no victor’s justice). Just punishment that avoids an ethos of 

impunity, but does not feed back into cycles of vengeance, is imperative. Social processes of 

reconciliation must be consciously and formally undertaken so as to heal the wounds and rifts of 

war. This involves the repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation of former combatants, even in 

cases in which atrocities have been widespread. In light of these criteria, it is obvious that the 

justice of war is always an imperfect justice. For, how rarely will the criteria of justice after war 

be met! With this in mind, the criteria of jus post bellum serve as a warning that it is extremely 

difficult to meet the criteria of just war. Therefore, this new just war category likewise works as a 

warning light against justifying war. 

 

Humanitarian Intervention 

Humanitarian intervention was validated by the United Nations in 2005 under the rubric “the 

responsibility to protect” (R2P).17 Although sovereign states have the right and the duty to protect 

their own populations, other nations and the international community as a whole have a 

responsibility to intervene fairly and effectively in the face of atrocities such as occurred in 

Rwanda and Kosovo. John Paul II was the first pope to acknowledge this obligation when in 1993 

he declared that state sovereignty “cannot constitute a screen behind which torture and murder 

may be carried out.” In the face of unjust aggression against innocent civilians, “States no longer 

have a ‘right to indifference.’”18 

Such interventions must be subject to the same criteria as any other use of armed force, 

including noncombatant immunity and reasonable hope of success and, by implication, the ability 

to secure the ongoing safety of the populations at risk.19 Again, this sets a high bar. The U.S. 

bishops warn that humanitarian intervention could devolve into an excuse for “imperialism” or 

lead to “endless [and often fruitless] wars of altruism.” What the bishops call “effective nonviolent 

means” are always preferable and better the serve the end goal of establishing a just peace.20 

Elias Omondo Opongo, S.J., is a scholar and practitioner of transitional justice and post-conflict 

reconstruction. He heads the Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations in 

Nairobi, Kenya. Taking the example of intrastate conflict in Africa, he shows some of the pitfalls 

of humanitarian intervention, which he does see as justified in cases of “gross violation of human 

rights.”21 But what may be justified in theory is not easy to put into practice. The use of force by 



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external parties with limited familiarity with the complexities of local situations will have limited 

success in the challenge “to settle grievances and disputes; end political, ethnic, and economic 

marginalization; and prevent genocide.”22 These are no doubt huge challenges for any would-be 

interveners, so Opongo recommends local alliances of intervention, for instance, forces sponsored 

by the African Union, as preferable. At the same time, “the historical evidence of military 

intervention indicates that there are limited success stories to demonstrate their effectiveness,” no 

matter who undertakes them.23 

 

Papal Teaching 

The possibility of using armed force has not been entirely excluded, with Popes Paul VI, John Paul 

II, Benedict XVI, and Francis all leaving the door open to limited justifications of humanitarian 

intervention or self-defense.24 However, this permission is far from central to their outlook. Instead 

they are motivated by the hope, expressed by Gaudium et spes, that positive peace and justice can 

result from human cooperation inspired by the gospel and humanity’s highest values.25 The 

integral connection of peace and justice was affirmed in the landmark exhortation of Paul VI, who 

declared that, “If you want peace work for justice,”26 and that “the new name for peace is 

development.”27 

In fact, and even paradoxically, the popes frequently make statements that seem to rule out 

armed force entirely. This serves to underline the immense priority of peacebuilding and reduce 

the likelihood that armed force will be considered a reasonable option. In a line repeated by every 

successive pope up to and including Francis, Paul VI exhorted the United Nations, “No more war, 

war never again! Peace, it is peace which must guide the destinies of people and of all mankind.”28 

Ultimately, “the Church cannot accept violence, especially the force of arms.”29 Benedict XV, Pius 

XII, John XXIII, and Paul VI all had experienced war and were extremely critical of “the utility 

of widespread violence,” even “at the service of defending or restoring an order of justice.”30 They 

reinforce the presumption against war as a just and effective means to gain political objectives. 

They stress the self-defeating nature of violence and the vocation of peace. 

This trend gains momentum under John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis. John Paul II insists 

that “[v]iolence is evil,” “a lie,” and “the enemy of justice.”31 He titles his 1987 World Day of 

Peace Message “Development and Solidarity: Two Keys to Peace.”32 Yet, like the popes of the 

two World Wars, John Paul II is influenced by specific experiences of violence in his own era. He 



The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  26 
 

   

validates the new concept of “humanitarian intervention,”33 and allows for a nation’s right of 

defense against terrorism.34 

Following John Paul II, Benedict endorses humanitarian intervention under the rubric 

“responsibility to protect.”35 Yet Caritas in veritate (2009) adds that the responsibility to protect 

must be implemented “in innovative ways.”36 He calls “love your enemies” the gospel’s “magna 

carta.”37 “Violence never comes from God.”38 Benedict insists that peace cannot exist without 

justice, as confirmed in his World Day of Peace Messages (2009, 2010, 2011). Pope Francis 

likewise calls international parties in conflict to seek peace by dialogue, reconciliation, negotiation, 

and compromise, for war is the “suicide of humanity.”39 Taking forward themes of Pacem in terris, 

he denounces not only the use of nuclear weapons, but also their possession.40 Given the possibility 

of a 2013 military intervention in Syria by U.S. and French “superpowers,” Francis is insistent that 

“War brings on war! Violence brings on violence.”41 In a potent symbolic move, he led a peace 

vigil for Syria at the Vatican that attracted over 10,000 people. Francis is strong on the importance 

of putting all possible efforts into nonviolent methods of addressing conflict. Even in the case of 

the so-called Islamic State or ISIS, he calls for stopping aggression through less than lethal force. 

“The means by which [the unjust aggressor] may be stopped should be evaluated. To stop the 

unjust aggressor is licit, but we nevertheless need to remember how many times, using this excuse 

of stopping an unjust aggressor, the powerful nations have dominated other peoples, made a real 

war of conquest.”42 

Pope Francis’s most important statement on peace is his 2017 World Day of Peace Message, 

which underlines the futility of violence in bringing just and sustainable peace. Active 

nonviolence, faithful to the gospel, is “a way of showing that unity is truly more powerful and 

more fruitful than conflict.”43 “‘The name of God cannot be used to justify violence. Peace alone 

is holy. Peace alone is holy, not war!’”44 

 

In Conclusion 

The presence yet marginality of the just war framework in post-Vatican II papal teaching is evident 

from the fact that, without prohibiting armed force as immoral in every case, the popes do not 

dwell on or amplify the criteria of just war, nor do they present any specific use of force as justified. 

Instead, the emphasis is unequivocally on peace, nonviolence, justice, and peacebuilding. It is 

undoubtedly the case that some Catholic theologians and social ethicists will continue to refine 



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just war thinking and criteria, but the direction in which such work is heading is clearly toward 

more vehement critiques of war and more energy around peacebuilding, even when advanced 

under “just war” criteria, such as jus post bellum. In fact, it is debatable whether the best way to 

characterize these developments is as refinements of just war theory, rather than as ethical 

collaboration under a bigger umbrella, such as just peace or peacebuilding. It is certainly 

conceivable that some Catholic ethicists will propose armed force as an appropriate and necessary 

response to specific atrocities, now or in the future. Even so, it might be better (or at least more 

consistent with the direction of recent papal thought) to understand such arguments, not as 

expanding “just war theory,” but as applications of positive concepts of CST such as human 

dignity, the common good, and sustainable just peace. 

It is difficult to imagine that either the popes or mainstream theologians would in the 

foreseeable future justify “war” in the sense of the full-scale military engagement of nation-states, 

especially given the danger of nuclear weapons. For now, just war theory is not totally out of the 

magisterial or social-ethical picture. But it is marginal to the enterprise of reducing global violence 

and establishing justice, peace, and internationally cooperative societies in the present volatile and 

dangerous century. 

In fact, as exemplified by Francis’s 2017 World Day of Peace Message, the vocabulary and 

framework of CST’s approach to intranational and international conflicts centers on just peace and 

nonviolence, not just war. This positive, constructive, peace-oriented social-ethical vision is key 

to the promotion of nonviolent conflict transformation and peacebuilding as realistic political 

possibilities and not only ecclesial ideals. The Catholic Church has a countercultural message 

about military force, but it is not a sectarian “peace church.” The purpose of CST, including its 

peacebuilding profile, is to contribute to more just societies and to increase justice in civil society 

and governance globally. 

 

 

Notes 

 

1. Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante 

bellum, jus post bellum, and Imperfect Justice,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 

32/2 (2012): 173–91. In this essay, I will focus on the explicit expansion of just war 



The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  28 
 

   

categories (jus ante bellum and jus post bellum). For just policing, see Gerald Schlabach, 

Just Policing, Not War: An Alternative Response to World Violence (Collegeville, MN: 

Liturgical Press, 2007) and Tobias Winright, “Just Policing and the Responsibility to 

Protect,” The Ecumenical Review 63/1 (2011): 84–95. 

2. Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Kosovo Report, available 

at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC125698900

5CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf. 

3. See the website of the Catholic Peacebuilding Network 

(https://kroc.nd.edu/research/religion-conflict-peacebuilding/catholic-peacebuilding-

network/), and Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Gerard F. Powers, eds., 

Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 

2010). 

4. See Pope Francis, “Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace,” January 1, 2017, 

https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/peace/documents/papa-

francesco_20161208_messaggio-l-giornata-mondiale-pace-2017.html.  

5. See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 

Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Maria J. 

Stephan, “How the Catholic Church Can Bolster Alternatives to Violence: As the Vatican 

Considers a Shift on ‘Just War,’ Nonviolent Action Could be Key,” November 1, 2017, 

United States Institute of Peace, 

https://www.usip.org/index.php/publications/2017/11/how-catholic-church-can-bolster-

alternatives-violence; as well as other works on nonviolent resistance on the website of the 

USIP (https://www.usip.org/people/maria-j-stephan). 

6. For a historical discussion, see James T. Johnson, “Just War: International Law,” 

Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/just-war. Johnson is a major 

historian of Christian just war thought. 

7. John Courtney Murray, S.J., “Remarks on the Moral Problem of War,” Theological Studies 

20 (1959): 40–61. 



29  Cahill 
 

 

8. John XXIII, Pacem in terris, April 11, 1963, §§126–127, 

http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-

xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html. 

9. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s 

Promise and Our Response, May 3, 1983, http://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-

gods-promise-our-response-1983.pdf. 

10. Ibid., §51. 

11. Gerard F. Powers, “From an Ethics of War to an Ethics of Peacebuilding,” in From Just 

War to Modern Peace Ethics, eds. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and William A. Barbieri, 

Jr. (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 289. 

12. See Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., “Peacebuilding and Catholic Social Teaching,” in 

Peacebuilding, 268–273. 

13. Powers, “From an Ethics of War,” in From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics, 289. 

14. See Allman and Winright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory.” 

15. Maureen O’Connell, “Jus Ante Bellum: Faith-Based Diplomacy and Catholic Tradition on 

War and Peace,” Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 21/1 (2011): 3–30. 

16. Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition 

and Post-War Justice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010). 

17. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 

http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html. 

18. John Paul II, “Address to the Diplomatic Corps Credited to the Holy See,” January 26, 

1993, §13, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-

ii/en/speeches/1993/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19930116_corpo-diplomatico.html. 

19. See Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., “Humanitarian Intervention and the Just War Tradition,” 

in Can War Be Just in the 21st Century? Ethicists Engage the Tradition, eds. Tobias 

Winright and Laurie Johnston (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis), 61–64. 



The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  30 
 

   

20. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, 

November 17, 1993, §4, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-

believe/catholic-social-teaching/the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm. 

21. Elias Omondo Opongo, S.J., “Just War and Its Implications for African Conflicts,” in Can 

War Be Just in the 21st Century?, 150. 

22. Ibid., 146. 

23. Ibid., 154. 

24. The tone is set by Paul VI, Populorum progressio, March 26, 1967, §31, 

http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-

vi_enc_26031967_populorum.html.  

25. Gaudium et spes, December 7, 1965, §78, 

http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-

ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.  

26. Paul VI, 1972 World Day of Peace Message, January 1, 1971, 

https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_p-

vi_mes_19711208_v-world-day-for-peace.html, citing the 1971 Synod of Bishops’ Justitio 

in mundi, §6. 

27. Paul VI, Populorum progressio, §87. 

28. Paul VI, 1965 Address to the United Nations General Assembly, October 4, 1965, 

https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-

vi_spe_19651004_united-nations.html.  

29. Paul VI, Evangelium nuntiani, 1975, §37, http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-

vi/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-vi_exh_19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi.html.  

30. Himes, “Peacebuilding,” in Can War Be Just in the 21st Century?, 279. 

31. John Paul II, Homily at Drogheda, Ireland, September 29, 1979, §§18–20, 

https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-



31  Cahill 
 

 

ii_hom_19790929_irlanda-dublino-drogheda.html; quoted in the 2006 Compendium of the 

Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 496. The pope further comments that “violence destroys 

what it claims to defend: the dignity, the life, the freedom of human beings.” 

32. John Paul II, 1987 World Day of Peace Message, “Development and Solidarity: Two Keys 

to Peace,” January 1, 1987, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-

ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19861208_xx-world-day-for-peace.html. 

He entitles his 2002 World Day of Peace message “No Peace without Justice, and No 

Justice without Forgiveness,” which extends Paul VI’s phrase “no peace without justice” 

in a way that clarifies justice as restorative and further illuminates the meaning of just 

peace. 

33. John Paul II, 2002 World Day of Peace Message, January 1, 2002, §11, 

https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-

ii_mes_20011211_xxxv-world-day-for-peace.html.   

34. John Paul II, 2002 World Day of Peace Message, §5. 

35. Benedict XVI, Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, April 

18, 2008, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-

xvi/en/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit.html.  

36. Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, 2009, §7, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-

xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html.  

37. Angelus Address, February 18, 2007, https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-

xvi/en/angelus/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20070218.html; see also Good Friday 

message, April 22, 2011, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-

xvi/en/speeches/2011/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110422_via-crucis-

colosseo.html.  

38. Benedict XVI, Angelus Address, 2007. 

39. Pope Francis, “War is the suicide of humanity,” Vatican Radio, June 2, 2013, http:// 

media01.radiovaticana.va/audiomp3/00374893.MP3. 



The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  32 
 

   

40. See Gerald O’Connell, “Nuclear disarmament now a ‘moral imperative’ as Pope Francis 

rejects deterrence,” America, November 13, 2017, https://www.americamagazine.org/ 

politics-society/2017/11/13/nuclear-disarmament-now-moral-imperative-pope-francis-

rejects. 

41. Pope Francis, Angelus Address, September 1, 2013, 

https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/angelus/2013/documents/papa-

francesco_angelus_20130901.html.  

42. Pope Francis, 2014 Press Conference, during return flight from South Korea, as quoted in 

Francis X. Rocca, “Pope talks airstrikes in Iraq, his health, possible U.S. visit,” Catholic 

News Service, August 18, 2014, https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/pope-talks-

airstrikes-iraq-his-health-possible-us-visit?_ga=2.180740327.1546312816.1511305791-

2123628133.1507130389. 

43. Francis, “Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace,” 2017, §6. 

44. Ibid., §4. 

 


