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[Expositions 12.2 (2018) 176–190]  Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747–5376 
 

The Political Role of the Public University 

 

LUIGI BRADIZZA 

Salve Regina University 

 

 

What Is a University? 

The public university has a proper political role: it must, if only for properly self-interested reasons, 

openly support a culture of political liberty. Understanding the proper political role of the public 

university requires that we reconcile the demands of politics with the proper demands of the public 

university. If we are to understand the proper demands of the public university, we must first 

understand what a university is. 

To understand what a university is, one might think to study institutions that describe 

themselves as universities and then come to a definition of the term by discerning the essential or 

common qualities that make an institution a university and not some other thing. Unfortunately, 

such a bottom-up, inductive approach cannot work in our day because of a significant divergence 

among universities in what they understand their mission to be. Some universities are dedicated to 

liberal education. Some are centered on vocational training. Some have a religious mission. Others 

see themselves as contributing to societal transformation by means of social justice activism. These 

aims are so different from each other that the only significant features that today’s universities all 

have in common, and that continue to distinguish them from other institutions, are professors and 

students. And therefore, if we try to define what it means to be a university by examining 

institutions that call themselves universities, we must abstract both from the content of what is 

taught and from the goal that the university aims at. We must, in other words, abstract from the 

university’s substantial purpose. And yet, if institutions in general are tools of human construction, 

then surely, as with any tool, an institution must be most centrally defined with reference to its 

substantial purpose. 

Because what we call “universities” no longer share a common purpose (if they ever did), we 

must instead look for a definition, not to what universities are, but to what they should be. 

Universities are the institutionalized form of the highest activity within them. The highest activity 

is thought and not action. Action cannot be the highest activity of the university because thought 



177  Bradizza 
 

does not always lead to, or is not always intended to produce, action. That is, thought can be 

pursued for its own sake, for the sake of contemplation and not action.1 When action is the goal of 

the university, thought must guide and evaluate action. However, the converse is not true; when 

thought is the goal of the university, action need not guide or evaluate thought. And even in cases 

where action is used to verify thought (for example, when experiments are used to verify scientific 

theories), action must nonetheless always be evaluated on the basis of thought. In other words, the 

results of an experiment must be thought through. When bad thought produces bad action, then 

that bad thought must be replaced by better thought intended to produce better action. Thought 

therefore has a ruling or governing function over action that action does not have over thought. 

Thought is therefore higher or more authoritative than action. 

The kind of thought that a university properly aims at is knowledge of the truth, which is the 

highest fulfilment of the human soul, because knowledge of the truth exercises the highest faulty 

of the soul, that is, the faculty that raises it above the lower, merely animal aspects of the soul. The 

disciplines of philosophy and theology aim at the most comprehensive truth. Of course, philosophy 

and theology are not the only appropriate subjects of study at a university. We should understand 

modern natural science as a branch of philosophy. Modern natural science is therefore a proper 

subject of study at a university. Approached philosophically, the arts also become fit subjects of 

study. But as architectonic disciplines, philosophy and theology lay claim to being the highest, 

most important, and central disciplines of study. 

If we consider the way in which philosophy is conducted, we can see that by the very nature of 

philosophy, philosophy’s method and findings rest on a universal, unassisted human reason. The 

claims of philosophy are therefore open to all people. By contrast, theology is closed to non-

believers. If theology is to be approached with the greatest seriousness, one must first be open to 

the faith that a particular theology explores. That is, one must study a religion as if it might simply 

be true. The claims of theology must therefore be confined to those who have voluntarily accepted 

the particular faith that underlies a theology. Despite this closed nature, theology makes 

comprehensive claims, and therefore it has a central place in a university. But it makes its claims 

only to those who accept the faith, and therefore it has no proper place in a public university 

operating under the strictures of the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause. The university is 

therefore properly understood as the institutionalization of, or an institutionalized form of, the 



The Political Role of the Public University  178 
 

philosophic life and perhaps also the life of pious inquiry. And the public university is properly 

understood as the institutionalization of the philosophic life. 

But the institutionalized form of the philosophic life is not precisely the same thing as the 

philosophic life. If a university is to remain an institution—that is, if it is to persist over time—it 

cannot rely on the appearance of actual philosophers engaged in the philosophic life. Such men 

are infrequent and their appearance is unpredictable.2 The university must therefore rely on 

professors who are professionally trained from a cadre of students. It is the rare professor who is 

also a philosopher. But even so, professors who are not philosophers can be capable of transmitting 

philosophy from generation to generation, and thus they can make more possible the appearance 

and flourishing of actual philosophers. Professors do not, of course, live the philosophic life, in 

the most thoroughgoing and austere version of that life. In particular, the institutionalization of 

philosophy in universities means that we cannot expect professors to live like Socrates, in “ten-

thousand-fold poverty.”3 Few professors would philosophize in a condition of poverty, and 

therefore impoverished professors are inconsistent with the continued existence of universities. 

Professors must be paid. As we will see, this fact means that they are exposed to material and 

professional pressures by some who are unhappy with their ideas. Such pressures must be resisted 

because if it is to remain a university, the university, like the philosopher, must be radically open 

to truth and radically question all received opinion. In short, it must be Socratic. To the extent that 

a university pursues a Socratic mission, it can properly be described as a university. To the extent 

that it does not, it cannot properly be described as a university.4 

With respect to the character of philosophy, we should note that by definition, philosophy is 

love of wisdom. It is not the possession of wisdom. Whether pursued by an individual philosopher 

or institutionalized in a university, philosophy is subject to corruption when the philosopher or 

professor loses sight of either its aim or its methods. Indeed, philosophy is perpetually at risk of 

descending into sophistry or dogmatism. And so, the university too is perpetually at risk of 

sophistry and dogmatism. It is also perpetually at risk of being distracted from its main aim 

(wisdom) in pursuit of worldly goals.5 As Sidney Besvinick puts it, “if the university, voluntarily 

or under duress, undertakes duties and accepts assignments that do not relate to its purposes or 

detract from them, then the university loses its integrity and, at least in part, steps out of its 

characteristic role and ceases to be a university.”6 



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The understanding of a university that I have proposed is somewhat at odds with that of Cardinal 

Newman. Newman tells us that a university “is a place of teaching universal knowledge. This 

implies that its object is … the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement. 

If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have 

students.”7 He goes on to distinguish philosophic research and teaching: “The nature of the case 

and the history of philosophy combine to recommend to us this division of intellectual labor 

between Academies and Universities. To discover and to teach are distinct functions; they are also 

distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person. He, too, who spends his day 

in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers is unlikely to have either leisure or energy to 

acquire new.”8 But in fact, no one can properly teach philosophy without the ability to evaluate 

critically the philosophy he teaches. For otherwise, he merely parrots views that he has not quite 

understood. The ability to evaluate a philosophy requires the ability to analyze and conduct 

research aimed at understanding. And so, there is no sharp dividing line between a philosopher 

and philosophy professor. All philosophy professors (should) aim at philosophic understanding. 

We can distinguish them from philosophers by noticing that originating (or discovering) a 

philosophic idea is different from merely understanding and evaluating it. 

 

The Special Problem of Public Universities 

As a creature of the government, a public institution must be centrally concerned with the aims of 

the regime.9 The aims of the regime are, first, self-preservation and, second, the advancement of 

its distinctive public goals. That is, a public institution is centrally concerned with self-preservation 

and more generally the preservation of the regime, and with the advancement of justice, as the 

concept of justice is understood within the context of the regime. We can see this in the typical 

mission of a public university: research, teaching, and public service, with the last understood as 

the promotion of a certain public understanding of justice.10 Some scholars embrace the public 

service component of the mission of a public university to such a degree that they make it the 

central purpose of a public university. We see a striking example of this embrace in the “Wisconsin 

Idea” that marries academic research to progressive political reform.11 Such scholars fail to see 

that they have subordinated the noble life of the mind to merely worldly concerns. 

The subordination of the public university to the aims of the regime raises a problem. A public 

institution cannot be permitted the sort of radical openness that characterizes the life of the mind, 



The Political Role of the Public University  180 
 

if that openness threatens the regime. In particular, because all regimes rest on their own particular 

understanding of justice, no public institution can question the regime’s understanding of justice 

to the extent that such questioning threatens the regime. In other words, so far as the regime is 

concerned, with regard to the public university’s mission of research, teaching, and public service, 

the first two might well come into conflict with the third. And so, we should not be in the least 

surprised to read accounts of scholars such as Dennis Fox and Ron Sakolsky, who complain of 

political micromanagement of the University of Illinois at Springfield (formerly Sangamon State 

University) by a Republican-controlled state government. The scholars identify themselves as 

radically left-wing and their school as a radically left-wing institution. As their account makes 

clear, they alienated their political masters with their radicalism, and earned for their troubles a 

political backlash.12 

We arrive at an apparent contradiction in the notion of a public university. To the extent that a 

public university is a university, it must be radically open to alternative understandings of justice. 

To the extent that it is a public institution, it cannot be permitted to threaten the regime’s 

understanding of justice. Some scholars disagree that such a contradiction exists or downplay the 

contradiction. Rebecca Lynch is in partial agreement and partial disagreement. She argues that the 

courts should defend academic freedom for professors: “[C]ourts protect professorial academic 

freedom rights when restriction of academic expression is not functionally necessary to the state’s 

legitimate goals.” But surely regime survival is one of “the state’s legitimate goals.” Thus, she 

appears to provide space for government restrictions on academic expression. But she goes on to 

write: “In fact, where the state's goals are critical democratic education or the promotion of new 

discoveries, academic freedom is not a hindrance but rather is crucial to the accomplishment of 

the state's mission.”13 This may be true, but these goals are a narrow part of the proper mission of 

the university. Other goals of the university might well hinder “the accomplishment of the state’s 

mission” if those other goals are in contradiction to the state’s mission. Hannah Forsyth makes a 

stronger claim in defense of academic freedom: “It is obvious to scholars that the public interest 

is compromised when academic freedom is undermined.”14 The “public interest” is a broader 

category than “the state’s mission,” and includes within it some understanding of the common 

good. And the common good is a goal that is higher than “the state’s mission” because it is what 

any state’s mission should aim at. Yet despite Forsyth’s claim being stronger than Lynch’s, it is 

simply false for Forsyth to write that her claim is “obvious.” It is certainly obvious that research 



181  Bradizza 
 

is compromised when academic freedom is undermined. But to argue that the public interest is 

compromised is to imply that the research that flows from unimpeded academic freedom is always 

beneficial to the public. A moment’s reflection shows that this view is false even with respect to 

the disciplines that most clearly lead to public benefits. For example, the scientific disciplines have 

given us tremendous benefits in healthcare, communication, and transportation, but they have also 

given us weapons of mass destruction. It may be true, but it is not at all obvious, that the existence 

of such weapons is a net public benefit. 

Of course, it could be argued that in terms of philosophy and politics, the university aims at 

justice, which, unlike technology, is supposed to guarantee its own good use. Moreover, the tension 

between research and public benefits would perhaps not exist if there were a final, certain 

understanding of justice to which the university could dedicate itself. On this premise, more 

research would result in greater justice. But any such claim of final and certain status must be seen 

by the university as dogmatism and not knowledge, and therefore a departure from its goal of 

wisdom. Neither are attempts at incremental improvements in justice guaranteed to produce good 

results. Professors might be in error about their findings concerning justice, and might therefore 

unleash theories that cause grave public harm. For example (and drawing from both ends of the 

political spectrum) universities have at various times promoted both “scientific” racism and 

affirmative action in their efforts to advance the cause of justice. It would be difficult or impossible 

to find any individual who simultaneously believes that both theories have made America more 

just. In sum, research is risky to the public. In light of this, we must ask: Is free speech truly 

possible if speech must respect the boundaries of the regime’s understanding of justice? The 

answer must be no. Any dangerous questioning of the regime must take place sotto voce, that is, 

in a manner apart from the open inquiry typically thought to be necessitated by the university’s 

philosophical character. Public universities, like universities generally, are therefore restricted in 

what they can say. 

And as a public institution, the public university presents us with a second problem: It is public, 

that is, funded by the government and therefore at risk of being co-opted by the government. 

Silence or apparent silence will not fully protect the public university; it must in addition be 

attentive to the positive demands that the regime and the regime’s instrument, the government, 

make of it. It is therefore subject to corruption at the hands of the regime to the extent that the 

regime’s demands conflict with or distract from the proper aims and methods of the public 



The Political Role of the Public University  182 
 

university. We can see this in complaints from both the left and the right. Writing a few years ago, 

leftist James Slevin laments that “[n]onflagship state colleges and branch universities are being 

amalgamated increasingly to serve the defined purposes of the state (including serving industrial 

and postindustrial development). States’ interests are expressed and forwarded by legislatures 

directing, sometimes even micromanaging, educational matters through demands for 

accountability.”15 From the perspective of the right, we can see a partial co-option of public 

universities in their support for the administrative state. In the right’s telling, the administrative 

state is an unconstitutional departure from republican self-government and an unconstitutional 

violation of the separation of powers.16 Public universities have been drawn into propagating these 

alleged injustices by means of programs in “Public Administration” which train future 

administrative state bureaucrats. 

A public university will therefore have little to no choice but to support with positive action the 

demands of the government and the aims of the regime. This might seem to make the idea of a 

public university an impossibility. But in fact, a public university is possible, and perhaps just as 

possible as a private university, because positive action is called for in the case of both public and 

private universities if only because, in addition to their higher and distinctive goals, both 

institutions must aim at self-preservation, and their self-preservation is more possible under some 

regimes than others. In particular, liberal democracy presents universities with the greatest 

opportunity for openness while placing the fewest (but not insubstantial) limitations on them. 

Universities therefore have an interest in promoting as open a society as possible, one most 

conducive to their continued survival.  

The survival of any university depends on a significant degree of support by the regime for due 

process, free speech, free press, and a political culture that supports these political goods. In the 

absence of these political goods, a university is less able to carry out its mission. The good that 

comes from freedom of speech and freedom of the press is obvious. But due process is also 

essential. Due process directly protects dissident professors and students from persecution by the 

regime. It also indirectly protects dissident professors and students from persecution by school 

authorities. That indirect protection is a consequence of the tendency—apparent in our day—to 

extend the public benefit of due process to universities, both public and private. Strictly speaking, 

private universities should perhaps not be subject to due process requirements. But when public 

funding supports an institution, the tendency is for citizens to demand that public funds not support 



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institutions that treat their employees arbitrarily. A culture of legal due process among citizens 

therefore tends to produce due process protections for intellectual dissidents at both public and 

private universities. It is therefore in the self-interest of a public university for it to promote 

constitutionalism and a respect for civil rights and liberties, a self-interest which harmonizes with 

the interests of a liberal democratic regime. 

The public university should also promote free speech, freedom of the press, and democracy. 

Indeed, it should promote as open a democratic society as is compatible with public order. An 

open, democratic society offers the greatest latitude to dissident opinion, if only because, as Plato 

argues in the Republic,17 it takes all ways of life to be equally worthwhile. This democratic 

prejudice concerning openness works in favor of the university, for it permits it its particular 

concerns unmolested. In particular, philosophers within the public university can privately hold 

philosophy to be nobler than the regime does. Democratic equality leads to a toleration of 

supporters of nonpolitical aristocratic inequality. Speech and press freedoms therefore contribute 

to the maintenance of aristocratic institutions within a democratic polity.18 

The public university’s promotion of democratic openness might generate the objection that it 

makes the university a partisan of a particular regime. The proposal that I have described does 

indeed make the public university a partisan of a particular regime: liberal democracy. No 

university can be indifferent to the sort of regime under which it exists, because the regime quite 

clearly affects the capacity of individuals and institutions for philosophic reflection. We might 

here recall that in the Apology, Socrates was unwilling to leave Athens because he knew that he 

could not practice the philosophic life anywhere else.19 The regime killed him, but, despite not 

being a liberal democracy in the modern sense, it was the most open of the ancient polities and it 

permitted him to philosophize until he was 70 years old.20 He was in many ways a critic and 

certainly not a flatterer of the Athenian regime, but he also knew that its value to philosophy 

exceeded that of any other regime available to him. 

A related objection would be that a partisan to a regime cannot be truly philosophic. Yet being 

a partisan to a particular regime is compatible with philosophic openness if one refuses to accept 

that thought and action are necessarily connected. Because the highest aim of the public university 

is thought and not action, it can tolerate and even express support for an imperfect regime and 

imperfect political action provided the regime tolerates the public university’s highest aim. In other 

words, a necessarily imperfect liberal democracy is not the highest aim of the public university, 



The Political Role of the Public University  184 
 

but rather a condition of its functioning. In supporting an imperfect means to its highest aim, the 

university does not necessarily compromise its highest aim. Indeed, it makes its highest aim more 

possible. By contrast, were liberal democracy to become the highest aim of the public university, 

then the public university would cease to be a university in the proper sense. So long as the regime 

is seen as a means and not an end, partisan allegiance to the regime is compatible with one’s 

ultimate loyalty being to philosophy. 

Moreover, in the case of the American liberal democratic regime, its particular character 

demands of its citizens a degree of philosophic openness and therefore partisan loyalty to the 

American regime that significantly overlaps with loyalty to philosophy. Alexander Hamilton tells 

us that the American regime is the product of “reflection and choice” and not “accident and 

force.”21 American citizens therefore have a special obligation to reflect as philosophically as 

possible upon their regime and the alternatives to it. In other words, the demand for an enriched 

civic loyalty to the American regime’s origins challenges Americans to retrace and reflect upon 

the statesmanship that produced the regime. And that retracing and reflection should produce a 

philosophical openness both to liberal democracy and to the alternatives to it that were considered 

and rejected during the American founding. Political philosophy must therefore be a concern of 

the most thoughtful adherents of the American regime. 

A further objection to my proposal would note that universities have flourished under prior 

regimes. And so one would be led to question why a public university must commit itself to one 

particular regime, liberal democracy. However, this objection is unsound. Every regime demands 

loyalty to itself; no regime is exempt from this requirement. And so no regime has ever been 

perfectly open. There are many sorts of regimes. But in light of the public university’s interest in 

the greatest philosophic openness, it should especially support the most open regime. And because 

any open regime is perpetually at risk of becoming less open, the public university has an 

obligation to itself continuously to promote political openness and to contribute to a culture of 

liberty. 

One might also object that liberal democracy is not necessarily the best regime. Perhaps one 

should favor aristocratic elevation of some people over the alleged flatness of liberal democracy. 

And so perhaps the university is being too self-interested or partial to itself in promoting liberal 

democracy. A reply to this objection would be to accept the premise that aristocratic elevation is 

desirable, and would point to the university as a mechanism for that elevation. Provided that a 



185  Bradizza 
 

university advances toward or accomplishes its mission of philosophic reflection and liberal 

education, it (together with other universities) elevates those best fit for elevation. In other words, 

the public university can be part of those elements of civil society that aim at broadening 

aristocratic excellence within a democratic polity. If one aims at the aristocratic elevation of a 

society, then the alternative to this sort of decentralized, non-regime-based elevation is a regime-

based elevation of the society by means of legal compulsion. And that legal compulsion might 

have the effect of restricting the highest aims of the public university. The public university should 

oppose such legal compulsion. It should have the self-confidence that it can function as part of a 

network of institutions of higher education (and, more generally, as part of the various institutions 

of civil society) in pursuit of the general elevation of society.22 Indeed, that proper public goal of 

higher education was perhaps the central argument of Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American 

Mind.23 If higher education in our day is unable to contribute to the aristocratic elevation of the 

society because of its own defects (as Bloom’s critique holds), then the response should be an 

internal reform of higher education, and not the promotion of an aristocratic regime to replace our 

liberal democracy. 

This defense of aristocratic elevation within the context of liberal democracy might be met with 

the reply that liberal democracy may contain within itself the seeds of its own destruction. This is 

a radicalization of the previous argument, as if to say: Not only is liberal democracy low but it is 

headed for collapse. In a variation on this objection, liberal democracy will make of us Nietzschean 

last men. If this objection is sound, then it is a damning and decisive refutation of liberal 

democracy, because it implies that in its mature practice, liberal democracy is unjust. This is 

obviously a question of the deepest importance to liberal democrats. Answering it requires the very 

best scholarship and philosophic reflection, and the public university can be a part of that important 

research project. If we arrive at the answer that some alternative to liberal democracy is required, 

then the public university will have contributed to that important finding. In the meantime, a liberal 

democratic regime can offer public universities the freedom to investigate the defects of liberal 

democratic regimes. 

A final objection would point to contemporary campus dysfunctions to help make the general 

point that the freedom offered by liberal democracy is not always used responsibly, often, and 

perhaps especially, in universities. This objection certainly hits the mark. In fact, and more 

generally, any freedom can be abused. In consequence, we permit and support restraints on our 



The Political Role of the Public University  186 
 

freedom of action because we want to avoid harming each other. Actions (including some speech) 

can sometimes be connected to consequences as cause to effect. Where a clear cause/effect 

connection can be made between actions and harms, we can establish principled limits on how 

much we restrain the actions of our fellow citizens in an effort to avoid harms. In a liberal 

democracy, those principled limits are defined by the police power of government, or its power to 

restrain our actions for the sake of health, safety, and morals. But with respect to speech, caution 

is here in order. There are no principled limits in attempts to silence dissenting political or 

philosophic views, including harmful ones. While free speech can be used irresponsibly, legislative 

authority to stifle irresponsible speech can also be used irresponsibly. Whether we choose free 

speech or regulated speech, we will be exposed to irresponsibility. We must therefore choose the 

least dangerous of two paths to possible irresponsibility. The solution to cultural decay is a better 

culture, not legislative action that stifles free inquiry. That better culture can and should have as 

part of its support our universities, including our public universities. In brief, we should be cautious 

about giving up on liberal democracy and its freedoms because we don’t like some of the abuses 

of freedom that we are witnessing in our day. 

 

Conclusion 

Universities are fragile because it is a short step from philosophy to dogmatism, and from 

independent thought to conformism. As creatures of the state, public universities are especially 

fragile. The task of professors and administrators is to recognize this fragility. And it is also their 

task to recognize that notwithstanding their own very real and exceptional talents and accomplish-

ments, most of them have a modest place in world intellectual history. They should be satisfied to 

preserve and transmit and, within their capacities, advance civilization by defending the life of the 

mind that universities have institutionalized. This task is inherently political. Having willed the 

ends, they must will the means. Those means include support for liberal democracy, a careful study 

of alternatives to liberal democracy, and a willingness to resist regime pressures. The life of the 

mind—the best life—demands nothing less. 

 

 

  



187  Bradizza 
 

Notes 

1. Nemetz 426. 

2. Strauss, “What Is Liberal Education?” 3. 

3. Plato, Apology 23c1. 

4. Again, this philosophic mission can encompass modern natural science and the arts. 

5. This, in turn, carries with it, among other risks, the risk of mediocrity. See Heimberger, 

especially 1085–1086. 

6. Besvinick 568. 

7. Newman ix; emphasis his. 

8. Newman xiii. 

9. This has been a constant idea in public higher education. See Chase, especially 65; and 

West 195–97. 

10. John Scott counts six missions of universities. His descriptions of each of these six missions 

overlap sufficiently that all six could be redescribed as simply “public service” (Scott 4). 

11. Garlough and Pryor. 

12. Fox and Sakolsky. 

13. Lynch 1063. 

14. Forsyth 20. 

15. Slevin 64. 

16. Hamburger 2014. 

17. See Plato, Republic 557b2–558c6. 

18. Tocqueville 668–69 (III.4.7). 



The Political Role of the Public University  188 
 

19. Plato, Apology 37b–38a. 

20. Strauss, “What Is Political Philosophy?” 36. 

21. Hamilton 27. 

22. This general elevation should be conducted one person at a time. See Piel 150. We should 

be wary of proposals such as that of Anthony Nemetz, in which the university would lead 

an otherwise rudderless liberal society. See Nemetz 434. 

23. Bloom. 

 

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Chase, Harry Woodburn. “The State in Higher Education.” The Journal of Higher Education 

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Forsyth, Hannah. “Disinterested Scholars or Interested Parties?: The Public’s Investment in 

Self-Interested Universities.” In Through A Glass Darkly: The Social Sciences Look at the 

Neoliberal University. Edited by Margaret Thornton. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 

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Fox, Dennis, and Ron Sakolsky. “From ‘Radical University’ to Agent of the State.” The 

Radical Teacher 53 (Fall 1998): 13–18. 

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Wisconsin Idea.” Western Folklore 70.3–4 (Summer-Fall 2011): 243–253. 

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Hamilton, Alexander. “No. 1.” In Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. The 

Federalist Papers. Edited by Clinton Rossiter and Charles Kesler. New York: Signet, 2003. 

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