Review 4 Erfani.indd © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007, Unit 6, Th e Village, 101 Amies Street, London SW11 2JW [Expositions 1.1 (2007) 105–118] Expositions (print) ISSN 1747-5368 doi:10.1558/expo.v1i1.105 Expositions (online) ISSN 1747-5376 Th e People Has Its Political Reason, of Which Political Th eory Knows Nothing Farhang Erfani, American University Ernesto Laclau. On Populist Reason. Verso. London, 2005. 276 pp. $26.00 hc. ISBN 1-859-84651-3. Ernesto Laclau has written a timely book on populism, a subject which has been making headlines. Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela, is often referred to as a populist and as the leader of the leftward turn in South America. Th e Republican Party’s success in the United States is also attributed to right-wing populism. On January 9, 2007, seven far-right European parties created a coalition at the European Un- ion’s Parliament in order to further their conservative cause. Th is new group, “Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty,” brings together twenty EU parliamentarians who despise Europe. Each party is committed to undermining Europe and is openly antagonistic to foreign interests and foreigners at home, catering to what many refer to as populist sentiments. Even more interesting is the composition of these parties’ constituency, usually made up of the poor, the working class, and even immigrants! Th e very people who would be harmed by the new coali- tion’s policies vote them into offi ce. Indeed, we fi nd ourselves disarmed, faced with either a left- or right- wing populist movement. Both seem irrational, sentimentalist and be- yond the understanding of the political establishment. Th is bewilder- ment was very well captured in America by Th omas Frank in his book What’s the Matter with Kansas? (2004). Th e rise of populism seems like a backlash, an outburst with no rhyme or reason. But as Laclau’s book suggests, there is a “populist reason,” but we have failed to understand it. Th is is not Laclau’s fi rst treatment of the subject. In his 1977 book, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Th eory, he already devoted a chapter to populism. But the crux of Laclau’s work should be traced back to his 1985 work, co-authored with Chantal Mouff e, Hegemony and Socialist Review 4 Erfani.indd 105Review 4 Erfani.indd 105 16/06/2007 11:21:3416/06/2007 11:21:34 106 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (2nd ed. 2001). In that work, they argued that Orthodox Marxism is plagued by a real philo- sophical knot. Briefl y put, a puzzle confronted Orthodox Marxism in the twentieth century. Th e October Revolution had taken place; capi- talism had met signifi cant resistance and was, during the depression era, on the brink of a monumental collapse; but the promised interna- tional revolution wasn’t happening. To the contrary, the proletariat was divided; the workers of the world were not about to unite. It seems as though the proletariat was unable to recognize its own true economic interest. For Laclau and Mouff e, this was not a coincidence, or a mere phase. It was the result of the Marxist reductionism and the “ontologi- cal privileging” of the working class. Th ough Laclau and Mouff e have never denied the importance of the economic terrain and its strug- gles, they nonetheless criticized traditional Marxism for its neglect of other struggles, such as feminism, environmentalism, anti-racism, and anti-colonialism, all of which played key roles on the political stage of the twentieth century. In short, by reducing everything to economics, Marxism failed to appreciate the true nature of the political. Instead, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouff e turned their attention to Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which was a political construct and not a natural, a priori given site of struggle. To rid Gramsci of all remnants of essentialism, they used the best of the post-structuralist theories to argue for a notion of politics that is at home with contingency and anti-foundationalism. Anti-foundational- ism has been an important current in theoretical humanities over the past forty years or so. But its impact on political thought has been fairly limited. It is one thing to admit that there is no such a thing as a race; it is another to know how to assess racism. It is one thing to de-naturalize human rights; it is another to fi nd a way to reject oppression without falling back on modern essentialist categories. Anti-foundationalism has opened up the fi eld of possibilities; it has allowed for a prolifera- tion of complex identities, diff erences and narratives. Its translation into politics— a common ground—has been lacking. In On Populist Reason, Laclau provides us his solution for the way forward. “Th e main issue addressed in this book,” writes Laclau, “is the na- Review 4 Erfani.indd 106Review 4 Erfani.indd 106 16/06/2007 11:21:4116/06/2007 11:21:41 On Populist Reason 107 © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 ture and logics of the formation of collective identities” (ix). He also tells us that his “whole approach has grown out of a basic dissatisfac- tion with sociological perspectives which either considered the group as the basic unit of social analysis, or tried to transcend that unit by locating it within wider functionalist or structuralist paradigms.” His dissatisfaction is readily appreciable. Quantitative or rational-choice theorists fail because they assume the “people” as a category, or see it as an aggregation of rational individuals (in the best case scenario). But the “qualitative” theorists have little to off er as well. For Laclau, “the impasse that Political Th eory experiences in relation to populism is far from accidental, for it is rooted in the limitation of the ontological tools currently available to political analysis” (4). Before putting forth his own new ontology—and this book is indeed a new political ontol- ogy—Laclau retraces the history of this failure in the fi rst three chap- ters of the book. In this interesting survey of the literature on populism, Laclau shows that no one has managed to capture what populism really is. In fact, theorists are often frustrated and prefer not to address the topic because it lacks precision; it leads to an impasse. Th e few willing theorists usu- ally end up describing the phenomenon of a particular populist move- ment, refusing to do more with what presents itself as an irrational outburst. Despite their best eff orts, classical theorists of populism seem bound to “separating what is rational and conceptually apprehensible in political action from its dichotomic opposite: a populism conceived as irrational and undefi nable” (16). Most importantly, this conclusion speaks volumes to the assumptions of most political theorists. For most political theorists, populism “simplifi es the political space, replacing a complex set of diff erences and determinations by a stark dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise” (18). Th is is where we can begin to appreciate Laclau’s originality within the current spectrum of post-structuralist theory. He is content neither with the rationalist approach, nor with the postmodern advocacy of proliferation of plu- ralities. Against the rationalists, Laclau argues that populism is in fact a challenge to the political establishment which is bound to see it as ir- rational; against postmoderns (as well as traditional political theorists), Review 4 Erfani.indd 107Review 4 Erfani.indd 107 16/06/2007 11:21:4116/06/2007 11:21:41 108 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 Laclau argues that simplifi cation of the terrain, the coming together of odd political bed-fellows is the very “nature and logic” of the political. In other words, if we were to better understand populism, we would understand the way politics in general works. Early “crowd” psychologists, whose work Laclau meticulously ana- lyzes, came to this appreciation, though often unintentionally or un- systematically. Nineteenth-century psychologists came to the question of the people through a clear interest in its pathology—the crowd’s ability to pressure otherwise “normal” individuals to behave irration- ally. To them a crowd was a “group in decline” (34). But this “patho- logical” approach didn’t pan out. Whatever the novelties—even the dangers—that the transition to a mass society involved, it became increasingly clear that they could be addressed with the pathological approach…Mass society required a positive characterization (39). Later theorists, in search of a positive approach to crowds—one that would understand them but also master them—paid close attention to the role of a leader. Th e fi gure of the leader is very important in populist movements. Chavez currently occupies such a position. But few have managed to understand the political and ontological role that the leader plays. Th at the masses begin to follow the leader is often seen —in a way that is reminiscent of Nietzsche, who was a contemporary of these crowd psychologists—as a weakness, or a lack of selfhood. But for Laclau, there is more to the role of the leader. It is true that by following a leader, of any kind, plurality and diff erences among the followers disappear to a great extent—though never fully—but this is because the nature of creating a collective identity requires this mo- ment of simplifi cation, or what Laclau calls the “logic of equivalence.” In the work of Freud, Laclau fi nds the best support for this theory of identifi cation with the leader. Unlike other theorists, Freud saw that the relationship of a community cannot be captured rationally, but is only understandable libidinally. By Chapter Four, Laclau is ready to provide us with his own theory, while again emphasizing the fact that “populism is the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the Review 4 Erfani.indd 108Review 4 Erfani.indd 108 16/06/2007 11:21:4116/06/2007 11:21:41 On Populist Reason 109 © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 political as such” (67). How is that the case? Laclau begins with the category of demand, which he points out is ambiguous in English: it can mean a request, but it can also mean a claim (as in ‘demanding an explanation’). Th is ambiguity of mean- ing, however, is useful for our purposes, because it is in the transition from request to claim that we are going to fi nd one of the fi rst defi ning features of populism (73). For Laclau, there is no such a thing as a pre-defi ned society. Th e very act of this defi nition—who is “in” and who is “out” or what is meant by “we” is the very work of the political. Initially, a segment of the population has a request; it lacks something. Given its particular posi- tion in the world, this group has a particular concern, say anti-racism. But this group is not the only one with a demand. All given fragments of the citizenry have their own requests. If such requests are satisfi ed, if there is a concession by the powers, the demand plays no political role. When the demand is not satisfi ed, then it becomes a claim, something of a real concern. Or as Laclau puts it: People can start to perceive that their neighbours have other, equally unsatisfi ed demands—problems with water, health, schooling and so on. If the situation remains unchanged for some time, there is an ac- cumulation of unfulfi lled demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them in a diff erential way (each in iso- lation from the others), and an equivalential relation is established between them. (73) Th is is the beginning of populism and the beginning of a political movement in general. One particular sector’s demands—even when they go unfulfi lled—cannot amount to a political gesture. It requires the moment of equivalence whereby a multiplicity of demands are in- tegrated into a single front. Here, we can begin to see why populism usually seems incoherent and unpredictable. It is indeed its very nature to incorporate heterogeneous interests; but that, according to Laclau, is the nature of politics in the fi rst place. Given Laclau’s post-structuralist sympathies we must remember that for him the logic of equivalence and the logic of diff erence are always already at work, at the same time, in the same place. Politics needs Review 4 Erfani.indd 109Review 4 Erfani.indd 109 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 110 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 both. A purely equivalential society—one in which all diff erences have been eliminated—is not only ethically and politically undesirable, but it is, as post-structuralism and psychoanalysis have argued, impossible. Perfect coincidence is a dream, one that is in fact grounded in the frus- tration of unfulfi lled demands and the need for equivalential struggle. Th is is indeed the danger of populism, as it is commonly understood. Populism may pretend to create a permanent unity where there is only one united people, but that is impossible to achieve. Not the least, for Laclau, because oneness and unity require a frontier of separation, of diff erence, which is achieved through the contingent construction of an antagonistic front through the chain of equivalence. To concretely illustrate this matter, let me quote at length a brilliant passage from Laclau: A society which postulates the welfare state as its ultimate horizon is one in which only the diff erential logic would be accepted as a le- gitimate way of constructing the social. In this society, conceived as a continuously expanding system, any social need should be met diff er- entially; and there would be no basis for creating an internal frontier. Since it would be unable to diff erentiate itself from anything else, that society could not totalize itself, could not create ‘a people.’ What actu- ally happens is that the obstacles identifi ed during the establishment of that society—private entrepreneurial greed, entrenched interests, and so on—force their very proponents to identify enemies and to reintro- duce a discourse of social division grounded in equivalential logic. In that way, collective subjects constituted around the defense or the wel- fare state can emerge. Th e same can be said about neo-liberalism: it also presents itself as a panacea for a fi ssureless society—with the dif- ference that in this case, the trick is performed by the market and not by the state. Th e result is the same: at some point Margaret Th atcher’s sound ‘obstacles’ started denouncing the parasites of social security and others, and ended up with one of the most aggressive discourses of social division in contemporary British history. (78–79) Th is passage illustrates Laclau’s ability to navigate through concrete examples, while providing us with a genuine theory that cuts across diff erences that we take for granted—the opposition between the wel- fare state and neo-liberalism, in this instance. Th is is indeed the job of Review 4 Erfani.indd 110Review 4 Erfani.indd 110 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 On Populist Reason 111 © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 an ontology. Having established the duality of equivalence and diff er- ence, Laclau moves to the second tenet of populism: the establishment of antagonistic frontiers between two incommensurable camps. How are these camps established? How are they defi ned? A simplistic approach would defi ne them negatively, i.e., a common enemy would become the common identity. Th is is a typical analysis of populist movements. For Laclau, there is indeed an external frontier, separating the two sides. But establishing the frontier is itself the great political moment par excellence. Pointing to a common enemy is not enough. In a detailed analysis that uses a concept he has developed throughout his career, Laclau argues that when a chain of equivalence is established among similar struggles (and here the commonality among the op- pressed is made visible; or better yet, a common lack is felt), then one particular agent or only one sector becomes the representative of the entire movement. Th is is the construction of a hegemonic front (85). A genuine, powerful populist movement is born when a new dividing line is put in place: Th e meaning of such [initially isolated] demands is determined largely by their diff erential positions within the symbolic framework of soci- ety, and it is their frustration that presents them in a new light. But if there is a very extensive series of social demands which are not met, it is that very symbolic framework which starts to disintegrate. In that case, however, the popular demands are less and less sustained by a pre-existing diff erential framework: they have, to a large extent, to construct a new one. (86) Laclau correctly shows us that right-wing populism, particularly in America, is best understood through this framework. As the left-wing discourse failed to meet the demands of the people, they turned to- ward another movement, equally outside of the establishment: the ex- treme right. Th is phenomenon is easily observable in Europe as well. As each country is clearly governed through a centrist policy that de facto excludes the majority of the people and their demands, a grow- ing number of disillusioned sectors of the population—including im- migrants—turn to the Right. In these cases, “the ontological need to express social division,” the fact that most people fi nd themselves ex- Review 4 Erfani.indd 111Review 4 Erfani.indd 111 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 112 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 cluded from the political process, is “stronger than its ontic attachment to a left-wing discourse” (88). Here, we can begin to better understand the frustrations of typical analyses of populism. Political theory, we must recall, is often speech- less before populism; it fi nds itself at an impasse since the multiplicity of the demands, the “irrationality” of the alliances and of the leader puzzle theorists. But, for Laclau, the irrationality and the “vagueness” of populism are no surprise. Th e one segment of the population, that actor or that group that becomes representative of the entire move- ment indeed embodies a multiplicity of demands. Th ere is no a priori coherence; solidity and solidarity must be built (99). Focusing on this process brings Laclau to the very notions of rep- resentation and naming. What is involved when a particular actor is named a leader, or a particular cause embodies a much larger set of demands? To begin with, and this is a crucial point for Laclau, the mo- ment of hegemony which allows one group to rise to the representa- tional level necessarily means that this group loses part of its own par- ticularity. To give a more concrete example: traditional Marxism, from Laclau’s perspective, never really understood this political hegemony. When it did, as in the case of Lenin, it was not a true hegemony. Lenin saw the proletariat as the revolutionary agent that represented all other oppressions—such as sexism or racism—which were brought forth by modern capitalism. But the revolutionary agent represented itself; its identity remained insular and did not incorporate other demands. It did not modify its own platform, but asked other causes to rally be- hind it. In other words, the process of naming is itself a political move. By breaking with the dominant, analytic model of linguistics, Laclau liberates the signifi er from the signifi ed. Th e relationship between a name and its content become contingent, historically and structurally unstable. In psychoanalysis, Laclau uses Lacan’s object petit a, which for Lacan is the object of desire. What Lacan brings to the discussion is his emphasis on “the identity and unity of the object result from the very operation of naming” (104). A given signifi er—say, freedom or equali- ty—is not a priori defi ned, but through the process of hegemonization, the coming together of the chain of equivalences, the cause gets its Review 4 Erfani.indd 112Review 4 Erfani.indd 112 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 On Populist Reason 113 © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 own conception. Laclau formerly referred to this phenomenon as the “empty signifi er”; yet here, in On Populist Reason, he pushes his analysis further by replacing his own formula by a new one: “fl oating signifi er.” Not only does emptiness suggest that there is a total void, which is un- tenable, it makes it seem as though there is already an “empty place” of power, to use Claude Lefort’s phrase. Th e fl oating signifi er does justice to the instability of the social division, which itself moves through the process of naming. Th ere is no place in the fi rst place. Th e last major theoretical movement in the book—in addition to the chain of equivalences and naming—is the importance of the het- erogeneous. In a dense discussion, Laclau moves farther away from traditional Hegelian-Marxism by refusing to let the dialectic fully de- termine the scope of a struggle. In fact, when a struggle is dialectically comprehended, it is within the already established political framework and bears no revolutionary trait. By looking at Hegel’s notion of “peo- ples without history” and Marx’s own analysis of “lumpenproletariat,” Laclau shows that the presence of this political remainder—the ones that are not even part of the dialectical struggle—is key in breaking away from the status quo. A true populist movement is once again incomprehensible to traditional theory because it seeks to incorporate demands that are so far off the political radar that the claims seem absurd: Th is is what happened with the aggregative model of democracy (Schumpeter, Downs) which reduced the “people” to a pluralism of in- terests and values; and with the deliberative model (Rawls, Habermas), which found in either justice as fairness or in dialogical procedures the basis for a rational consensus which eliminated all opacity from the representation process. Once that point has been reached, the only relevant question is how to respect the will of those represented, taking it for granted that such a will exists in the fi rst place. (164) Th is is why for Laclau there is “no political intervention which is not populistic to some extent” (155). By now, it should be clear that the process is not automatic; it requires establishing equivalences, the rise of a representative agent that breaks the given social antagonisms by incorporating the heterogeneous elements of society that have been Review 4 Erfani.indd 113Review 4 Erfani.indd 113 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 114 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 excluded. In Chapter Eight, Laclau focuses on three examples where populism “misfi red” (201). American populism has failed in its goals because it refused to expand the chain of equivalence; institutional seg- regation prevented the establishment of equivalences, by focusing on diff erences. Atatürk failed in his quest to change Turkey because he adopted a top-down approach; he tried to “construct” the people in the image that he had in mind. In the case of Peron, Laclau shows that there was a collapse of identifi cation; all involved causes only identifi ed themselves through the leader (221). Th is tour of the world proves, for Laclau, that there is a way to ana- lyze populism that does not reduce it to an irrational outburst. But not only do contemporary political theorists neglect the concept of the people (the Conclusion of the book is dedicated to showing how Laclau diff ers from his principal theoretical rivals: Žižek, Hardt and Negri, and Ranciere), the Left has equally given up on constructing a hegemonic front, even though capitalism provides the heterogeneous framework for such struggles. In his own words: Th e politico-intellectual task as I see it today—and to which I have tried to make a modest contribution here—is to go beyond the hori- zon drawn by this faintheartedness, in its praises and in its condemna- tions. Th e return of the “people” as a political category can be seen as a contribution to this expansion of horizons, because it helps to present other categories—such as class—for what they are: contingent and particular forms of articulating demands, not an ultimate core from which the nature of the demands themselves could be explained. Th is widening of horizons is a precondition for thinking the forms of our political engagement in the era of what I have called globalized capital- ism. Th e dislocations inherent to social relations in the world in which we live are deeper than in the past, so categories that synthesized past social experience are becoming increasingly obsolete. It is necessary to reconceptualize the autonomy of social demands, the logic of their articulation, and the nature of collective entities resulting from then. Th is eff ort—which is necessarily collective—is the real task ahead. Let us hope that we will be equal to it (250). All in all, this is an extremely rich book. Th e argument put forth is novel, in so far as it sheds light on new and emergent forms of pop- Review 4 Erfani.indd 114Review 4 Erfani.indd 114 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 On Populist Reason 115 © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 ulism, while explaining the very nature of modern social movements, which have puzzled political theorists for a long time. At the end, I fi nd myself asking for even more. How about the dangers of populism? Laclau showed that right-wing populism has been extremely success- ful. Despite his descriptive and analytic tone, it is perfectly clear that Laclau deplores this development and assumes that left-wing populism is better, that it is more emancipatory. But since the goal is to oppose global capitalism, unless there is a genuine international movement, are populist movements, even those favoring the workers, not doomed to nationalism (and by extension racism)? Laclau would argue that we need to establish an equivalential chain between anti-racist and work- ing-class demands. We would have to change the meaning of national- ism (227). I agree, but I remain concerned that right-wing populism would always have an easier appeal. Th is brings me to my next point. Laclau convincingly argues that populism is not evil, and that it is the very nature of the political. He seems to vacillate a bit here. On the one hand, he insists that populism is the “royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as such” (67); on the other, he tells us that populism, “for political analysis, is one of the privileged places of emergence of a new political articulation” (222). Is there a non-popu- list approach that we might adapt, faced with the rise of right-wing populism? Finally, as I mentioned before, this is an ontological work. Despite its “applied” focus, it is a highly theoretical endeavor, bringing together many diff erent trends in the humanities and social sciences. Historical examples throughout the book are immensely helpful but the reader is left in a void when it comes to the future. On the one hand, it is unfair to expect Laclau to make predictions, or to give us prescriptions. After all, his very theory is rejecting the full predictability of the political terrain. Th e contingency of the political forbid him from dialectically projecting far into the future. Nevertheless, he hints—especially by the end of the book, and in the last passage cited above—that we are in an era of global capitalism which is fragmenting the world into heteroge- neous segments. Th e task, he tells us, is to reconceptualize our frame- Review 4 Erfani.indd 115Review 4 Erfani.indd 115 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 116 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 work; we must bring together the diff erent demands and struggles; we must work toward a new solidarity, a Postmodern International. But is there a way to use “class” without using the old categories? Better yet, can class be used—named again—while it is so historically charged? Laclau certainly thinks so. His work rightly emphasizes the need for better understanding discourse, rhetoric and even imagination. Is it necessary to mention how this polarization is projected today (June 2004) on the immediate American electoral alternatives? Either middle America deserts the populist right-wing camps because it no longer recognizes itself in the aggressive neo-conservative onslaught of the Bush regime, with the result that new equivalential chains are formed—that is, we move to a new hegemonic formation—or the Re- publicans will be re-elected. What is pure illusion is to think that their long-term defeat could take place without some kind of drastic reart- iculation of the political imaginary (the situation is too polarized for small changes in one direction or the other to be able to make any ma- terial diff erence). Even if Bush marginally loses the election, his succes- sor will fi nd his movements limited by the straitjacket of a hegemonic formation whose parameters remain substantially unchanged. (138) Th ough I fully admire Laclau’s work, and fi nd myself sympathetic to his goal, I remain concerned that our political imaginary is too weak for this task. In a way, this cited passage best illustrates my concern (and the unfairness of my expectation from Laclau, to fi nd the solution to the neo-conservative hegemony). In 2006, the Democrats won giv- ing the U.S. the “small changes” that Laclau mentioned. We are caught up in the same logic, once more. What’s next? How can we persuade the electorate that is seduced by right-wing populism? Th ere is no radi- cal shift in the works in America. Worse yet, could middle America, middle Europe and the middle World establish a new identity? Could it be done without falling prey to the old essentialism of the Second International? Is there an upcoming radical break, “a creatio ex nihilo” (228)? Review 4 Erfani.indd 116Review 4 Erfani.indd 116 16/06/2007 11:21:4216/06/2007 11:21:42 On Populist Reason 117 © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 References Frank, Th omas 2004 What’s the Matter with Kansas? New York: Metropolitan Books. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouff e 2001 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. [1985] 2nd ed. London: Verso. Review 4 Erfani.indd 117Review 4 Erfani.indd 117 16/06/2007 11:21:4316/06/2007 11:21:43 118 Book Reviews © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007 Review 4 Erfani.indd 118Review 4 Erfani.indd 118 16/06/2007 11:21:4316/06/2007 11:21:43