Violent Resistance as Radical Choice


Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 

Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 1 

 

 

Recommended Citation 
Fakhoury, Tamara. 2023. “Violent Resistance as Radical Choice.” Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1). Article 1. 

2023 

 

Violent Resistance as Radical Choice 
 

Tamara Fakhoury 

University of Minnesota–Twin Cities 

fakho011@umn.edu 
 



Fakhoury – Violent Resistance as Radical Choice 

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2023  1 

Violent Resistance as Radical Choice 
Tamara Fakhoury 

 
 
 
Abstract 

What reasons stand in favor of (or against) violent resistance to oppression? I 
distinguish two kinds of normative reasons that bear relevantly in such a practical 
deliberation. I argue that in addition to reasons of impartial morality, victims’ personal 
projects and relationships may also provide reasons for (or against) violent resistance. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that conflicts will not occur between such reasons. 
Thus, some acts of violent resistance may arise from situations of radical choice in 
which impartial moral reasons and personal reasons pull the agent in opposite 
directions. Regardless of what we ultimately think agents facing such decisions ought 
to do, all things considered, recognizing such conflicts is crucial for understanding the 
circumstances that give rise to violence and for better sympathizing with victims who 
are pushed to such extreme modes of resistance. 
 
 
Keywords: resistance, oppression, violence, nonviolence, radical choice, partiality, 
impartiality, morality, ethical theory, moral reasons 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 

Violence is a pervasive feature of life under oppression. In racist patriarchal 
societies, violence is used to deny basic rights and freedoms, enforce submission to 
oppressive practices, and punish those who challenge or disobey the dominant 
norms. Victims’ ability to effectively resist such treatment is severely limited by their 
oppression. Sometimes options for resistance are so constrained that using violence 
becomes a relevant option. Victims may physically fight back against the harms they 
suffer, meeting oppressive violence with violent resistance.  

For those who are victims of oppression, what reasons, if any, stand in favor 
of, or against, engaging in violent resistance? Do these reasons conflict with one 
another, thus leading to special ethical conflicts when resisting oppression? If so, how 
do these conflicts affect our ethical evaluations of violent resistance?  

Current discourse on violent resistance tends to focus on violence used by 
groups as a means of achieving political goals or in self-defense. Moreover, it centers 
what I will call paradigmatic moral reasons for or against the use of violence—that is, 
reasons that arise from impartial moral principles. There is excellent work being done, 



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for instance, to show how violent protest may advance worthy moral aims in society 
and, when properly targeted and restrained, may even satisfy citizens’ moral and 
political duties.1  

This paper aims to expand on such work by addressing violence as it might be 
used by individuals (rather than groups or political factions) as well as the personal 
reasons that these individuals may have for such actions. More specifically, I argue 
that, in addition to impartial moral principles, the personal projects and relationships 
of those who are oppressed may provide reasons to engage in violent resistance. Such 
reasons, which I call “personal reasons,” come apart from and are not always 
reducible to paradigmatic moral reasons. More importantly, they may even conflict 
with paradigmatic moral considerations. Some cases of violent resistance under 
oppression arise from what Wolf (2015) calls situations of “radical choice,” in which 
impartial reasons and one’s personal projects come into conflict. Thus, even if violent 
resistance in any given case violates paradigmatic moral reasons or constraints, this 
does not settle the question of its ethical value (at least not without further 
argument). Moreover, the cases I will discuss show that radical choice can arise from 
and can even be exacerbated by structural oppression. For victims facing a radical 
choice regarding whether to engage in violent resistance, circumstances of 
oppression may help to explain why violence becomes one of the few relevant options 
(or perhaps the only relevant option) for resistance. 

Violent resistance is an undoubtedly complex phenomenon. The question of 
what circumstances give rise to it does not lend itself to easy or definitive answers. 
My aim here is not to simplify our understanding of the reasons that bear relevantly 
on deliberations about violent resistance. Nor is it my aim to provide a way of 
resolving conflicts of radical choice that may arise in such deliberations. Instead, my 
aim is to draw out the ethical complexities that are involved in violent resistance. By 
highlighting these complexities in the conversation about (non)violence, my hope is 
to enhance our ethical understanding of violent resistance and the people who 
engage in it. Not only is such an understanding crucial for better and more accurate 
theorizing about violent resistance and the circumstances that give rise to it, but it 
may also allow us to better sympathize with the individuals who are pushed to such 
extremes. This is not to suggest that sympathy is guaranteed to be the correct 
response to such actions. Determining whether and on what conditions sympathy is 
the right response would require further argument. Nevertheless, the considerations 
that I will discuss reveal ethical complexities surrounding violent resistance that 
would be relevant to arriving at such judgments. 

 
1 See especially Betz (2020), Delmas (2018), Kling and Mitchell (2019), and Pasternak 
(2019).  



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Before we begin, it will help to clarify the question I plan to address and 
distinguish it from other questions it might easily be confused with. The question of 
this paper is, what reasons, if any, count in favor of (or against) violent resistance? 
This is different from the question of whether one should engage in violent resistance. 
That is, even if we find (as I will argue) that there are sometimes reasons that count 
in favor of violent resistance, for all that I say it might still be true that, all things 
considered, one should not engage in it.  

Likewise, the question of this paper is not whether violent resistance is 
admirable or praiseworthy. The mere fact that important reasons might count in favor 
of violent resistance does not dictate whether following such reasons makes one’s 
conduct especially virtuous or admirable. It is not an aim of this paper to recommend 
or praise any particular form of resistance. To be very clear: it is not my aim to endorse 
violent resistance either in general or in any particular case. Instead, I will make the 
much weaker point that some of the normative considerations that go into the 
balance when deliberating about whether to engage in violent resistance are personal 
reasons, and that such reasons are not guaranteed to cohere with the paradigmatic 
reasons of impartial morality. My aim is, in other words, to elucidate some of the pro 
tanto normative reasons for violent resistance that arise from individuals’ personal 
projects and relationships.  

Why should we address this weaker question about the pro tanto reasons that 
might favor violent resistance? Aren’t the important questions whether violent 
resistance is justified, all things considered, or whether such actions exemplify virtue? 
There are at least two reasons why it is worth taking up the weaker question. First, 
judging whether an agent acted virtuously or justifiably will require careful 
consideration of the pro tanto reasons that favor her actions, and how she weighs and 
balances them in practical deliberation. Second, failing to consider the variety of 
reasons for violent resistance, including those that may be less ideal than standard 
moral reasons, can easily lead to distortions or misapprehensions of actual cases. 
Thus, although this paper has a weaker aim, it is nonetheless a crucial one for 
addressing the more ambitious questions.  

It is also important to note that, as I understand them, political philosophy and 
moral philosophy are distinct inquiries with overlapping subject matter. Political 
philosophy is concerned with the just organization of society, such as its laws and 
institutions, as well as the obligations that states and citizens owe to each other. 
Morality is fundamentally concerned with treating all people as deserving of respect 
and well-being and with what we owe to other people in virtue of our shared moral 
status. In some cases, treating people with respect and giving them what they are 
owed requires contributing to justice and equality in society at large. Thus, although 
justice and equality are specifically political values and the major topics of political 
philosophy, they are also moral concerns. In short, political values are a subset of 



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moral values. When I treat morality and politics as distinct in the paper, the reader 
should bear in mind that I nonetheless view them as overlapping in that moral 
considerations also include political values such as justice and equality. 

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I define violent resistance, identify 
the range of acts of violent resistance that I will focus on, and distinguish such actions 
from self-defense. In section 3, I consider the paradigmatic moral reasons for violent 
resistance, surveying various examples from recent literature on the moral 
justifiability of violent protest and disobedience. In section 4, I argue that in addition 
to impartial moral values and principles, victims’ personal projects and relationships 
may also provide reasons to engage in violent resistance. I illustrate some of these 
personal reasons through examples of three women who physically fought back 
against racist or sexist oppression. In section 5, I argue that accepting a distinction 
between paradigmatic moral reasons and personal reasons allows us to recognize 
that conflicts may naturally occur between such reasons in practice. Thus, I suggest 
that some cases of violent resistance may arise from circumstances of radical choice, 
in which impartial reasons and one’s personal projects pull in opposite directions. We 
cannot appreciate the ethical complexities surrounding violent resistance without 
recognizing such conflicts and carefully attending to how they may affect our 
evaluations of specific cases. Finally, I raise the question of how we should judge 
people who engage in violent resistance when it is not supported by impartial 
reasons. With no intention of defending a specific answer, I briefly sketch three 
natural responses that arise from the conflict in reasons I have highlighted 
throughout.  
 
2. Violent Resistance and Self-Defense  

Before beginning our discussion, it will help to define violent resistance, 
identify the scope of violent actions that are the focus of this paper, and explain how 
such actions differ from paradigmatic cases of self-defense. To be clear, the aim of 
this paper is to address the normative question of what reasons stand in favor of or 
against engaging in violent resistance for victims of oppression, not the classificatory 
question of what actions count as violent resistance. In this section I will provide 
(rather than argue for) an assumed working definition of violent resistance, one which 
relies on definitions of “violence,” “resistance,” and “self-defense” that are either 
defended by other authors or assumed in US criminal law. It is important to note that 
the definitions of these concepts are a matter of controversy and ongoing debate.2 
The purpose of this section is to make as clear as possible how I am understanding 
the notion of violent resistance in addressing the normative question above. 

 
2 See Kling and Mitchell (2019) for a survey of some of these debates. 



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Broadly speaking, violent resistance is an act of resistance to oppression that 
aims to injure people or their property. It aims to harm and overwhelm an oppressor 
as a way of gaining power or exacting retribution for oppressive treatment. As a form 
of violence, it inflicts physical harm, often through force or coercion.3 As a form of 
resistance, it is a response to oppression and makes its agent vulnerable to 
oppression-related backlash (Fakhoury 2021, 411). Thus, violent resistance is 
qualitatively different from initiating violence against innocent people or those who 
have done nothing to perpetuate oppression because it is a response to oppressive 
treatment.  

Violent resistance is importantly different from self-defense. This is in large 
part because of its distinctive aims. For my purposes, self-defense is a matter of 
protecting oneself by averting or counteracting a harm using a necessary degree of 
force. In United States criminal law, for instance, for an action to count as self-
defense, the force used must be “necessary to prevent . . . unlawful and immediate 
violence from another” (Dix 2016, 124). Moreover, there must be good reason for the 
agent to believe “that the harm would be inflicted immediately if she did not act in 
self-defense” (Dix 2016, 124). Thus, when one defends oneself, one aims primarily to 
prevent imminent harm as a means of self-preservation. By contrast, violent 
resistance aims at harming and overwhelming an oppressor as a way of gaining power 
or exacting retribution. Where self-defense aims to counter or deactivate the 
oppressor and preserve and shield the victim, violent resistance aims to punish or 
coerce the oppressor and empower the victim. Thus, because its aims go beyond self-
preservation, violent resistance may use greater force than that which is necessary to 
merely counteract or eliminate a threat. Moreover, unlike in standard cases of self-
defense, the harm that an act of violent resistance responds to may not be imminent.4 
For instance, violent resistance may be used as a form of payback for an oppressive 
harm that has passed.  

Despite their apparent differences, there may be cases where the aims of self-
defense and the aims of violent resistance overlap or may not be easily differentiated. 
Sometimes eliminating a threat requires overwhelming an oppressor or exacting 
retribution—the threat will not be countered by any other means. Moreover, when 

 
3 Here I lean on Rawls’s (1999, 321) understanding of violence as including “acts likely 
to injure and to hurt” and Singer’s (1973, 83) understanding of violence as 
“intimidatory and coercive.” However, this is not to say that all forms of violence are 
coercive or that violence is coercive by definition. There may be instances of violence 
that do not coerce others. For examples, see Brownlee (2004, 349). 
4 As Delmas (2018, 96) notes, in defensive harm, “violence cannot be used 
preemptively or indiscriminately or in response to future probably threats. Nor can it 
be used as a form of payback after an attack.”  



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oppression targets victims’ lives, such as under circumstances of genocide or slavery, 
acts of self-preservation may become acts of resistance.5 As Kautzer (2018) states, 
“When conditions are so oppressive that one’s self is not recognized at all, self-
defense is de facto insurrection, a necessary making oneself known through 
resistance.” Under such circumstances, violent resistance and self-defense may not 
be cleanly distinguishable. Nevertheless, there are clear cases where they do come 
apart—where the aim of the act of violence is not to shield the agent from harm but 
to gain greater power, coerce an oppressor, or exact retribution.  

What makes violent resistance a form of resistance? Here I assume the 
conception of resistance that I defend elsewhere (Fakhoury 2019, 2021). As I argue in 
those papers, resistance to oppression is an action that challenges oppressive norms 
or behaviors and thereby makes the agent vulnerable to oppression-related 
backlash—that is, harm that is caused by or serves to enforce the oppression that one 
is resisting (Fakhoury 2021, 409–14). Resisters challenge oppressive norms with some 
understanding that their behavior violates or is offensive to the status quo. People 
may resist for a variety of different reasons, ranging from impartial considerations of 
justice to entirely partial considerations of love and loyalty (Fakhoury 2021, 403–4). 
People may resist individually or as part of a group. Moreover, they may resist 
different aspects of oppression, ranging from unjust laws affecting entire populations 
to interpersonal incidents of manipulation or control affecting only oneself or one’s 
loved ones (Fakhoury 2019).  

In the discussion that follows, I will focus on violent resistance as it might be 
used by individuals and on the personal reasons that these individuals may have for 
such actions. In the central examples of this paper, victims of racism and sexism 
assault men who have harmed them as a form of revenge or to seize power—and not 
merely as a means of self-defense. It is for such agents that I will argue violent 
resistance may take the form of a radical choice. Thus, my focus here differs from the 
focus of the dominant literature on political violence, which tends to address violence 
used in self-defense or as a political strategy and the impartial reasons that may 
support such actions. Indeed, violent resistance as discussed here is distinct from 
what Margaret Betz (2020, 180) calls “resistance violence,” which is “a type of 
[political] violence that attempts to defend historically and systematically vulnerable 
persons in a society,” such as in the slave rebellion led by Nat Turner in 1831. In the 
cases I will discuss, violence is not used for political ends (e.g., liberating groups or 
reforming institutions), and its aims go beyond those of defensive harm. Thus, 
although the topic at hand intersects with ongoing discussions in political philosophy 

 
5 Consider for instance Jews who survived the holocaust, as discussed by Frankl 
(2006). A similar point is made by Lorde (1988) with respect to black women’s survival 
in racist societies. 



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(such as Betz’s) about the moral justifiability of political violence, the central question 
of this paper is an ethical one about how one should live when one is being subjected 
to racism and sexism in one’s private life.6 

This is not to say however that on my view violent resistance is not political. 
Certainly, it is political in the sense that it can affect political issues like those 
pertaining to the law, public consciousness, and the institutions of the state. However, 
the acts that I discuss are not undertaken for the purpose of impacting such political 
phenomena. Rather, in the cases I will discuss, violence is a response to an 
interpersonal conflict, and it aims primarily to uphold the individuals’ personal 
projects within that limited context. Put simply, if violent resistance has a broader 
political impact, this is a side effect from the perspective of the person who is 
resisting. It is not the reason for which the agent acts violently.  

In focusing on individual acts of violent resistance and the personal reasons 
victims have for engaging in them, I do not wish to deny that violent resistance may 
take other forms than those that I discuss. Nor do I wish to deny that the conclusion I 
defend may apply to other cases of violent action apart from what I have been calling 
violent resistance, or that radical choices of the sort I describe here may also arise for 
others, such as protestors, revolutionaries, or militants using violence as a political 
tactic. Such claims, however, will require further argument than my space here 
permits.  

In sum, violent resistance is an action that aims to harm perpetrators of 
oppression in response to oppressive treatment. Its characteristic aims, which 
differentiate it from self-defense, are to make the oppressor suffer, to gain power, or 
achieve retribution. What makes violent resistance a form of resistance is that it 
challenges oppressive norms and comes with the risk of oppression-related backlash, 
such as inciting further harm from oppressors. With this working definition at hand, 
we are now ready to discuss the normative reasons for and against such actions.  

 
3. Paradigmatic Moral Reasons and Violent Resistance 

Let us turn to the central question of the paper: what reasons may count in 
favor of (or against) engaging in acts of violent resistance? I distinguish two general 
categories of reasons: paradigmatic moral reasons and personal reasons. Let’s begin 
by considering the first kind.  

Paradigmatic moral reasons are impartial reasons arising from commitments 
to abstract principles of justice and morality, such as human dignity, equality, or the 
collective good. They tend to be concerned with paradigmatically moral matters such 

 
6 This central question gives special focus to what Williams (1985) takes to be the 
fundamental question of ethics—“How should one live?”—the answer to which need 
not appeal exclusively to considerations of morality, impartiality, or justice.  



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as the difference between right and wrong action, the grounds and limits of our moral 
obligations, or protecting and promoting the equally weighted needs and interests of 
others in society. They are characteristically impartial and agent-neutral, applying to 
individuals in virtue of their shared moral status, independently of any special traits 
or qualities. Moreover, paradigmatic moral reasons often reflect the fact that each of 
us is just one person among others equally deserving of respect and well-being. 
Reasons of this sort are most explicitly represented in traditional moral theories such 
as deontology and consequentialism. Moreover, they often take the form of 
requirements or limitations on action—for instance, by stating a duty to respect a 
basic principle or to promote a certain good. Hence, when it takes the form of a 
requirement or limitation on action, I will refer to paradigmatic moral reasons as 
standard or paradigmatic “moral constraints.”7  

Paradigmatic moral reasons and constraints on the use of violence are well 
represented in the current literature, especially in discussions of the moral 
justifiability of violent protest. Some of the most commonly discussed paradigmatic 
moral reasons in this literature are (1) eliminating injustices in public policy and 
legislation, (2) effective public communication about injustice (particularly as a form 
of democratic participation), and (3) defense of human dignity and equality (including 
one’s own). Let’s consider each one in turn. 

First, philosophers have argued that like nonviolent acts of civil disobedience, 
violent protest may aim to eliminate injustices from society by inciting changes in 
public policy and legislation. Avia Pasternak (2019, 392), for instance, argues that 
“political rioters act in the service of goals that are similar to those of civilly 
disobedient protestors” including the aim “to bring about a change of public policy 
that will eradicate, or in the least ameliorate, the substantive violations of justice they 
experience at the hands of the state.” By using “shock tactics” such as “open 
confrontation with the police,” violent protesters can draw attention to the plight of 
the oppressed and “wrestle concessions from policymakers” (Pasternak 2019, 393). 
Similarly, Candice Delmas (2018, 73) holds that principled uncivil disobedience, 
including some “riots . . . and vigilantism,” can help to “repair or replace” unjust laws 
and institutions, thereby satisfying citizens’ duties of justice. 

Second, philosophers have argued that violent protest may aim at effective 
public communication with officials and public audiences about imminent or ongoing 
injustices. Jennifer Kling and Megan Mitchell (2019, 3) argue that “violent protest may 
sometimes be required to engage in meaningful, consistent public communication 

 
7 This conception of paradigmatic moral reasons is inspired by Wolf (2015), Frankfurt 
(1988), and Williams’s (1985) characterizations of morality. While I do not ascribe to 
their moral/nonmoral distinction, their understanding of morality is an apt 
characterization of the source of paradigmatic moral reasons.  



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about injustice even in a generally just society.” In particular, “violence is required for 
communication when it transmits a message about the nature of injustice that 
available forms of nonviolent protest are unable to send” (Kling and Mitchell 2019, 9). 
Moreover, Pasternak (2019, 394) argues that “through the resort to public acts of 
destruction and open confrontation with the police, rioters communicate anger 
toward that state and defiance of its political authority.” In societies where 
democratic processes are marred by systemic political, cultural, and material 
marginalization and exclusion, this may constitute “a form of effective democratic 
participation” (Pasternak 2019, 396).  

Third, philosophers have argued that violence may aim to defend or uphold 
moral principles of human dignity and equality. This is most vividly illustrated in 
Bernard Boxill’s discussion of Frederick Douglass’s fight with his enslaver, Covey. In 
his autobiographical narratives, Douglass ([1855] 2014, 197) writes that his fight with 
Covey had recalled to life his “crushed self-respect,” adding that “a man, without 
force, is without the essential dignity of humanity.” On Boxill’s (2018, 65) analysis, 
Douglass believed that “human beings, including presumably slaves, cannot honor 
themselves unless they possess power or force” and that “the power or force 
necessary to gain self-respect was not merely the capacity to defend oneself, but also 
a willingness to do so.” Boxill (2018, 76) contends that Douglass resolved to defend 
himself against the physical abuse inflicted on him by Covey “because he believed 
that his nature as a moral being required that he stand up for the principles of 
morality” which provided him with the right not to be physically abused. Not only did 
Douglass believe of himself that he had this right, but (as his fight with Covey shows) 
he was committed to showing his allegiance to those rights by “standing up for them 
and fighting for them when they are violated or even impugned” (Boxill 2018, 68).  

In a similar vein, Margaret Betz (2020, 182) argues that resistance violence 
often serves as “an attempt by members of the targeted group to regain (or gain 
anew) their dignity and sense of self-worth.” Discussing Nat Turner’s violent 
insurrection, in which he led a group of slaves “from one white residence to another 
(sixteen in all) killing every white person in the house,” Betz argues that in a context 
where one’s dignity and fundamental right to defend oneself are constantly denied, 
“resistance violence restores that dignity” by proclaiming that one is entitled to 
protection (Betz 2020, 182).  

Inciting changes in public policy, engaging in effective public communication, 
and defending human dignity and equality are undoubtedly noble and compelling 
aims. However, this does not necessarily make it morally permissible to use violence 
to achieve them. As Martin Luther King Jr. held, “Constructive ends can never give 
absolute moral justification to destructive means” (King 2015, 53). Indeed, 
philosophers and activists alike have provided numerous paradigmatic moral reasons 



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against the use of violence, even when undertaken in the name of worthy moral 
goals, such as those previously discussed.  

Martin Luther King Jr., for instance, emphasized the moral and practical risks 
of violence. He argued that violence tends to cause greater harm than nonviolence 
overall. Where nonviolent tactics may “bring about a transformation and change of 
heart” in the oppressor, violence “only multiplies the existence of violence and 
bitterness in the universe” (King 2015, 53). Similarly, Kimberley Brownlee (2004) notes 
several moral considerations against the use of violence, some of which she draws 
from the work of Joseph Raz (1979). First, violence causes direct harm to others, 
which nonviolence avoids. Second, violence—even when it is warranted—may 
“encourage violence in other situations where violence would be wrong” (Brownlee 
2004, 350). Third, violence risks alienating potential allies by antagonizing them or 
distracting them from the moral aims those violent resisters are attempting to 
achieve. Fourth, violence risks “confirming the antipathy of opponents,” potentially 
emboldening them or making them more reluctant to compromise or cooperate 
(Brownlee 2004, 350). Finally, violence may “give authorities an excuse to use violent 
countermeasures against dissenters,” potentially causing greater harm overall 
(Brownlee 2004, 350). Although Brownlee contends that violence may be morally 
permitted in certain rare situations, given these risks, it should generally be avoided. 
If it is necessary, violence should be used “prudently, discriminately, and with great 
reluctance” (Brownlee 2004, 350). 

Given the potential costs of violence, philosophers discuss several moral 
constraints on its use in resistance (particularly, in the form of violent protest and 
disobedience), many of which are drawn from the literature on just conduct in war. 
These constraints include necessity, proportionality, likelihood of success, and what I 
will call “fairness” (or, what is sometimes called the “innocent bystander exception” 
in the self-defense literature). Each one of these conditions, and their overall 
importance, is subject to intense debate, and I will not be able to provide a detailed 
analysis here. However, adopting definitions from the literature (especially from 
Pasternak’s [2019] discussion), they can be roughly summed up as follows.  

Necessity “requires that the harm inflicted on behalf of the just cause is the 
least harmful available means for doing so” (Pasternak 2019, 386). Moreover, as 
Candice Delmas (2018, 96) elaborates, “deadly force cannot be used preemptively or 
indiscriminately or in response to future probable threats. Nor can it be used as a form 
of payback after an attack.” Success “requires that the resort to defensive harm will 
have a reasonable chance of successfully averting the attack” (Pasternak 2019, 386). 
Proportionality “requires that the defensive harm inflicted is proportionate to the 
harm it aims to avert” (Pasternak 2019, 386). Finally, the fairness requirement 
prohibits resisters from harming “innocent bystanders”—individuals who are not 
responsible for the injustice being resisted. As Kling and Mitchell helpfully explain, 



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“Only when individuals have forfeited their rights to safety, security, and property, 
either through consent, or more commonly, through their responsibility for the 
injustice at issue, do they become liable to attack. Innocent bystanders, by definition, 
are not responsible for any wrongdoing, and so are not liable to be attacked, even by 
people acting in their own defense” (Kling and Mitchell 2019, 21).8  

The foregoing discussion surveyed several paradigmatic moral reasons for and 
against the use of violence in resistance. To briefly recap, paradigmatic moral reasons 
arise from impartial principles of justice and morality. They are characteristically 
impartial and agent-neutral, applying to individuals in virtue of their shared moral 
status, independently of any special traits or qualities. Moreover, they are centrally 
concerned with protecting and promoting (or at least refraining from impinging on) 
the equally weighted needs and interests of others in society. With this conception of 
paradigmatic moral reasons ready at hand, we are now in a good position to consider 
another category of reasons that is usefully contrasted with paradigmatic moral 
reasons—one that is differentiated from paradigmatic moral reasons on the basis of 
partiality.  
 
4. Personal Reasons and Violent Resistance 

Paradigmatic moral reasons for (and against) the use of violence, such as those 
previously discussed, undoubtedly provide some of the most important 
considerations when deliberating about violent resistance. However, they are not the 
only considerations that may be relevant to such deliberations. As Harry Frankfurt 
(1988) and Susan Wolf (2015) contend, alongside impartial aims and principles, many 
of us are also committed to our personal projects, to certain individuals and groups, 
or to various ideals that have authority over us but that are neither impartial nor 
paradigmatically moral. For instance, we may care about “being steadfastly loyal to a 
family tradition, or selflessly pursuing mathematical truth, or devoting oneself to 
some type of connoisseurship” (Frankfurt 1988, 258).  

Thus, independently of paradigmatic moral reasons, there are also what I will 
call personal reasons for engaging in violent resistance. Personal reasons arise from 
individuals’ commitments to their personal projects and relationships. In contrast 
with paradigmatic moral reasons, they are centrally concerned with protecting and 
promoting the resister’s own special desires and interests or those of the people with 
whom they stand in personal relationships of love or loyalty. Thus, personal reasons 
are characteristically partial and agent-relative. They apply to individuals in virtue of 
special engagements and commitments which they may not share with others and 
which may not be reasonably expected of everyone. The well-being of one’s child, the 

 
8 For defenses of the innocent bystander exception see especially Thomson (1991), 
Nagel (1972), and McMahan (2009). 



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call to continue a family legacy, or the desire to take revenge or cause the suffering 
of an enemy are all examples of personal reasons. Although some authors have 
argued that such reasons are not “moral” but instead represent a category of 
“nonmoral” values, I will not make such an assumption here. The distinction between 
paradigmatic moral reasons and personal reasons need not hinge on whether the 
latter category is genuinely “moral.” Instead, what draws personal reasons apart from 
paradigmatic moral reasons is their personal and partial nature in contrast with 
impartial concerns for human equality or the common good.9 Moreover, whereas 
paradigmatic moral reasons are by definition prima facie moral, personal reasons may 
or may not cohere with impartial morality. In some cases, such as when they take the 
form of a desire to cause the suffering of an enemy or to take revenge, they may be, 
at the very least, morally questionable.  

Personal reasons are well represented in the testimonies and narratives of 
individuals who engage in violent resistance. In what follows, I will illustrate such 
reasons via three examples. To be clear, these examples are meant to illustrate how 
violent resistance may be undertaken primarily for personal reasons which differ 
substantially from, and cannot entirely be reduced to, the paradigmatic moral 
considerations discussed earlier. They illustrate the different kinds of personal 
reasons that may motivate and count in favor of violent resistance. My intention is 
not to argue that these are cases of unjustified or immoral violent resistance. The 
question of the overall moral status of these cases remains open for discussion.  

The first is the case of Margaret Garner. Garner and her family escaped slavery 
by traveling across the frozen Ohio River to Cincinnati in the winter of 1856. They 
were later apprehended by US Marshals acting under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. 
Rather than give her back to slavery, Garner killed her two-year-old daughter with a 
butcher knife. She wounded two of her other children, preparing to kill them too, 
before she was subdued. According to an 1856 article by P. S. Bassett, an abolitionist 
Baptist minister who visited Garner in jail,  

 
She said, that when the officers and slave-hunters came to the house 
in which they were concealed, she caught a shovel and struck two of 
her children on the head, and then took a knife and cut the throat of 
the third, and tried to kill the other—that if they had given her time, 
she would have killed them all—that with regard to herself, she cared 

 
9 This leaves open the possibility that there may be partial moral reasons—i.e., moral 
reasons that arise from relationships of love or partiality. However, when I refer to 
paradigmatic moral reasons in this paper, I will only be referring to impartial moral 
reasons.  



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but little; but she was unwilling to have her children suffer as she had 
done. 

I inquired if she was not excited almost to madness when she 
committed the act. No, she replied, I was as cool as I now am; and 
would much rather kill them at once, and thus end their sufferings, 
than have them back to slavery, and be murdered piece-meal. . . . 

. . . She alludes to the child that she killed as being free from all 
trouble and sorrow, with a degree of satisfaction that almost chills the 
blood in one's veins; yet she evidently possesses all the passionate 
tenderness of a mother's love (Bassett 1856). 
 

It is important to note that Garner was not merely acting to defend her child. 
Historians argue that infanticide among enslaved women in pre-Civil War America 
was a form of resistance to slavery through which women seized control over their 
children’s fates and harmed slaveholders. As Allain (2014, 2) writes,  
 

By killing their infants, enslaved women denied slave owners the 
bodies that slavery required to function. . . . 

. . . Individual cases of infanticide resulted from a combination 
of both insurrectionary and altruistic aims, not merely one or the other. 
Indeed, resistance and altruism are not mutually exclusive; slave 
women who killed their children might have done so with the dual 
intentions of resisting slaveholder authority and protecting their 
children. 

 
Indeed, there is evidence that slaveowners in the United States “saw slave infanticide 
as a form of robbery” (Allain 2014, 2). Moreover, slavery dissolved kinship ties, 
destroyed parental rights, and alienated individuals from their blood relatives: “Slave 
women who committed infanticide thus resisted slaveholder hegemony by laying 
claim on their own children over their master’s claim” and asserting their power over 
their children’s fate (2). For such reasons, I consider Garner’s infanticide to be an act 
of violent resistance against slavery, even if it might have also been a defense against 
harms to her children. (As I noted in section 2, in certain cases there might not be a 
sharp distinction between violent resistance and self-defense, especially under 
conditions of slavery.)  

Let us now turn to the reasons in favor of Garner’s action. Bassett’s article 
makes it very clear that Garner’s violent resistance was not the result of a bout of 
madness or irrationality. Rather, it was done soberly, for reasons of maternal love 
which Garner continued to stand by well after the incident. As she stated in their 
conversation, Garner was not willing to allow her children to go through the horrors 



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she had experienced under slavery. Moreover, she was not willing to allow 
slaveholders to determine their fate. Her maternal love, which included a desire to 
determine her own children’s destiny and end their suffering by whatever means 
necessary, provided a personal reason to engage in violent resistance.  

Garner’s violent resistance was undertaken for reasons of maternal love. 
However, personal reasons may also arise from an agent’s attachments to a project 
that is important to her but is banned or discouraged by her oppression. A particularly 
striking case is that of Adrienne Bennett, the first black woman master plumber in 
North America. Bennett—who is now the CEO of her own contracting company—was 
subjected to constant sexual harassment from her all-male colleagues during her five-
year union plumbing apprenticeship in the 1980s. They did everything they could to 
sabotage her work. As she stated in an interview with PBS, “Like the women before 
me, they wanted me to leave” (Solomon and Koromvokis 2021). One day, Bennett 
decided to resist by physically assaulting a man who groped her. She describes the 
incident as follows:  

 
By this time, I was so tired of them putting their hands on me, I grabbed 
a pipe wrench out of my tool belt. . . . I came down on the top of his 
hardhat. And I said: “It stops today. You pass the word. The next fucker 
that puts their hands on me will die, and I will go to prison happily.” 
(Solomon and Koromvokis 2021)10 
 

In interviews, Bennett describes the resistance she engaged in during this time as 
stemming from her dedication to achieving her dream of being successful in her 
career. As she states, “I was not going to let myself . . . down. . . . I’m honest, 
hardworking, and I don’t let anyone get in my way and cheat me out of my dream” 
(Kavilanz 2018). Indeed, as she reports, her act of violent resistance helped her to 
complete her apprenticeship and put a stop to the harassment she was receiving. As 
she put it, “I didn’t have any problems after that” alluding to the fact that her act of 
violence allowed her to shift the balance of power to her advantage. Bennett’s story 
suggests that among the reasons for assaulting the man who harassed her—striking 
him as he was walking away, breaking his hard hat in two and nearly killing him—were 
strong personal reasons arising from her loyalty to herself and to the career that she 
had devoted her life to.  

In addition to love for another person (as in the case of Garner) and devotion 
to one’s success in a vocation (as in the case of Bennett), attachment to an idea or 
personal mission can also provide reason for engaging in violent resistance. For a final 

 
10 In a similar NowThis News (2019) video, Bennett added, “I literally split that hard 
hat in half. I could have killed him. I didn’t have any problems after that.” 



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case, consider an incident from the life of Egyptian feminist writer and activist Mona 
Eltahawy. Eltahawy has been sexually harassed on numerous occasions, including 
once while on a religious pilgrimage and once when she was just a child. In the past, 
Eltahawy tended to turn the other cheek. Now in her fifties, she has started to 
respond more aggressively. On one notable occasion, Eltahawy beat up a man who 
groped her on the dance floor by pushing him to the ground, sitting on top of him, 
and punching him repeatedly in the face (Eltahawy 2021). Describing the reasons for 
her violence, Eltahawy emphasizes that she wanted to make the man fear her and to 
make him feel the consequences of his misogynistic acts.  
 

It had been a long time since I had experienced as much clarity as I did 
in those moments. . . . I was done with men and their fucking hands. 
. . . 

Unlike in 1982, when I had frozen and burst into tears, I found 
my assaulter and I punched and I punched. (Eltahawy 2021)  

 
Elsewhere, she elaborated, 
 

I wanted him to remember that this average-height woman, whose ass 
he believed he could just reach out and grope without fear of 
retaliation, beat the fuck out of him. (Eltahawy 2019, 142)  

 
In recent writings, Eltahawy declares it her personal mission to terrify the patriarchy 
(Albawaba News 2020). In particular, she wants the men who dare to harass or 
subordinate her to fear that there will be consequences for their actions and to know 
that she is both willing and able to dole out those consequences herself, specifically 
in the form of violence. As she writes, she wanted the man who groped her to 
“remember her as the harbinger of more rage and punches to come” (Eltahawy 2021). 
In her recent book The Seven Necessary Sins for Women and Girls, Eltahawy (2019, 
143) demands that we “push beyond self-defense as the only acceptable way for 
women to respond to patriarchal violence.” She offers violence—a tool of control 
which, as she states, women are regularly subjected to but always denied—as one of 
the means through which women are able to incite fear in misogynists. Elaborating in 
interviews she states, “I’m serving patriarchy. I’m putting it on notice that I’m here to 
terrify you. The patriarchy should be terrified because I’m here to fuck you over” 
(Albawaba News 2020).11 Thus I suggest that among Eltahawy’s reasons for beating 

 
11 Eltahawy also says this in the CBC Radio (2019) story, “I Want Patriarchy to Fear 
Women.”  



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up the man who groped her were personal reasons arising from her personal mission 
to terrify misogynists and to make them suffer for their abuses against her.  

The foregoing cases illustrate some of the personal reasons that may be 
involved in deliberations about violent resistance. Such reasons differ from 
paradigmatic moral reasons due to their personal and partial nature and their explicit 
focus on an agent’s special projects and relationships. It is for her family, her vocation, 
her personal goals, her empowerment, that the agent acts when she acts on a 
personal reason. It is not for the good of all persons considered equally and impartially 
nor for the good of oneself understood as one person among others equally deserving 
of respect and well-being.  

 
5. Violent Resistance as Radical Choice 

What are we to make of the cases in the previous section, and how does the 
foregoing discussion affect the way we should think about and evaluate violent 
resistance? Certainly, this does not provide an answer as to whether such actions are, 
all things considered, morally justifiable. Even if we accept that such actions violate 
paradigmatic moral restrictions, there may be other ways of accounting for their 
moral value. Instead of considering such alternatives or attempting to reach a moral 
verdict on these cases here, I want to make a general point about violent resistance 
that is suggested by the discussion so far. Namely, accepting the distinction between 
paradigmatic moral reasons and personal reasons allows us to recognize that conflicts 
may arise between such reasons in practical deliberations. That is, when deliberating 
about whether to engage in violent resistance, there may be tensions between what 
one has personal reasons to do and what one has paradigmatic moral reasons to do.  

To see what I mean, it is helpful to consider a similar conflict that Susan Wolf 
discusses outside the context of oppression. In what Wolf calls situations of “radical 
choice,” there is “a conflict between [impartial] morality and the demands of 
[personal] love [and loyalty]” (Wolf 2015, 42). Moral considerations point the agent 
in one direction, while personal reasons point her in the opposite way. Importantly, 
when such conflicts arise, it is not obvious what the all-things-considered best course 
of action is for the agent. Acting according to impartial morality would require 
betraying something she loves or is loyal to. However, acting on personal reasons 
would require violating impartial moral principles. Thus, for Wolf, situations of radical 
choice are situations in which one faces the problem of weighing two 
incommensurable values against each other. Whatever one chooses to do, the choice 
is “radical” in the sense that it is a choice to act in favor of something of significant 
value at the cost of something else of significant value.  

Wolf illustrates radical choice with the example of a loving mother whose son 
has committed a serious crime and who must decide whether to report him or to hide 
him from the police: “He will suffer gravely should he be caught, but unless he is 



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caught, another innocent man will be wrongly convicted for the crime and 
imprisoned” (Wolf 2015, 41). From the point of view of impartial morality, the mother 
is morally obligated to turn in her son. However, the mother’s love urges her to 
disregard this consideration and to hide her son from the police instead. The 
circumstances thus create a special practical dilemma for the mother, with reasons of 
maternal love and reasons of impartial morality pulling her in opposite directions.  

Regardless of what we think the mother ultimately should do (a point over 
which there may be reasonable disagreement), it is important to recognize that the 
stakes are quite high for her. The problem she faces does not permit an easy answer. 
Since her identity and the meaning of her life are so intimately connected with her 
son’s, turning him in to the police would be personally devastating. It would mean 
acting disloyally to her child, whom she loves dearly, and allowing him to be subjected 
to great (even if justified) harm. Not only would her child suffer in prison, but the 
mother’s own life (and presumably the life of her entire family) would be significantly 
changed if he were convicted and taken away. On the other hand, hiding her son from 
the police is no less difficult a choice. She would be committing a serious moral wrong. 
Standard moral theories may conceive of the wrongness of such an action in different 
ways. On one conception, lying to the police and the victims of her son’s crime 
amounts to treating them as mere means to her own ends, failing to respect them as 
her equals. On another conception, the consequences of this act explain its 
wrongness. Hiding her son from the police would effectively ruin an innocent man’s 
life, along with the life of his family, without any contribution to the common good. 
Her guilty son would evade responsibility for his wrongs, perhaps even getting away 
with further injustices. Regardless of how we conceive of the wrongness of such an 
action, impartial morality seems to count strongly against it.  

Wolf’s discussion of radical choice is useful in understanding the ethical 
complexities involved in violent resistance. Namely, we should recognize that when 
deliberating about whether to engage in violent resistance, victims of oppression may 
have to make difficult choices, much like the mother’s in Wolf’s illustration. The 
decision to engage in (or refrain from) violent resistance may constitute a kind of 
radical choice in which one must decide between conflicting personal and impartial 
considerations.12 Conflicts of radical choice may take at least two different forms. In 

 
12 It is important to note that one can face a radical choice even if one has not gone 
through a conscious process of weighing and balancing different reasons against each 
other. To see what I mean, consider the notion of normative reasons assumed in this 
paper (which is the notion also used by Wolf [2015] and Williams [1981], as well as 
Manne [2014]). Namely, a normative reason for someone to perform an action is a 
consideration that counts in favor of that action and that would be apt to cite when 
reasoning with her about what to do. Such reasons bear some relation to the agent’s 



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some cases, personal reasons may point in favor of violent resistance while 
paradigmatic moral reasons urge against it. Consider, for instance, Eltahawy’s case. 
Her personal commitment to terrifying misogynists pulled her to use excessive force 
against a man who groped her on the dance floor. Impartial reasons such as necessity 
and proportionality, however, seem to urge restraint from such extreme behavior. 
There may be other cases, however, where paradigmatic moral reasons favor violent 
resistance while personal reasons urge restraint. Consider, for instance, someone 
living under colonial rule who must decide whether to fight a colonizer or to hold back 
and care for an elderly parent with a terminal illness. Paradigmatic moral reasons 
pertaining to the greater good may pull him to fight, where familial love and loyalty 
may urge him to stay home.  

Importantly, unlike Wolf’s radical choice, the notion of radical choice for my 
purposes is not one in which “it is morality itself . . . that stands on one side of the 
dilemma” and nonmoral value that stands on the other side (Wolf 2015, 42; emphasis 
added). This is because I have not defined paradigmatic moral reasons and personal 
reasons in terms of the distinction between moral and nonmoral values. Rather, the 
distinction between paradigmatic moral reasons and personal reasons hinges on the 
partiality of the latter and the impartiality of the former. Thus, where Wolf’s 
conception of radical choice illustrates “the problem of whether to attend ultimately 
to moral concerns at all” (Wolf 2015, 42), the conception of radical choice I am using 
illustrates the problem of whether to attend ultimately to impartial considerations 
when deliberating about how to resist one’s oppression.  

Returning to the cases from the previous section, we can identify tensions 
between paradigmatic moral restrictions on violent resistance and what the agent 
had reason to do from the point of view of her personal projects. Garner’s love for 
her children provided her with a personal reason to seize control over their fate and 
prevent them from leading dismal lives of slavery. However, a typical standard from 
the perspective of impartial morality has it that every human being has an inalienable 
right to life.13 On this view, paradigmatic moral reasons would urge Garner to refrain 
from committing violence against her children. Ending her children’s suffering, 

 
desires and values. However, they need not be considerations of which the agent is 
necessarily aware. One may be mistaken about the reasons that she has for acting, 
and she can come to learn about her reasons through conversation with others.  
13 For instance, in the Second Treatise of Government, John Locke ([1690] 1980) argues 
that the right to life is the most basic human law of nature and that human beings 
have both a right and a duty to protect it. Moreover, according to Article 3 of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person” (UN General Assembly, A/RES/3/217 A, Dec. 10, 1948, 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights). 



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however, was far more important to Garner than honoring this right. Moreover, 
Bennett and Eltahawy both had personal reasons to physically assault the men who 
sexually harassed them, Bennett’s having to do with her devotion to her career and 
Eltahawy’s having to do with her personal mission to terrify misogynists. However, 
impartial considerations of necessity and proportionality may provide both with 
reasons to refrain from the kind of extreme violence they undertook. Nevertheless, 
for both women, honoring their personal goals and aspirations mattered more than 
adhering to these impartial restrictions. Thus, each of the previous cases seems to 
involve a kind of radical choice where personal reasons urge the resister to engage in 
violent resistance while impartial reasons provide grounds for exercising restraint.  

However, it is worth noting an important difference between the context of 
radical choice in Wolf’s example and the contexts of radical choice in the cases 
presented in section 3 of this paper. That is, the reason why the agent’s options are 
limited in Wolf’s case is importantly different from the reason why Garner, Bennett, 
and Eltahawy’s options are limited. In Wolf’s case, the mother’s ability to fulfill her 
personal values (i.e., her love for her son) is constrained due to her son’s criminal 
behavior, thus placing her in the circumstances of radical choice. This is not because 
of her oppression or any injustice that has been done to her but rather because of an 
injustice committed by her son. The mother’s choice regarding her son is certainly 
difficult, but this is a tragic situation that could befall anyone regardless of race, class, 
or gender; it is not forced upon her as a result of being a victim of oppression. (That 
said, there are, of course, ways of filling out the details of the case on which 
oppression may be relevant. It is fair to assume, however, that such a filling out of the 
details was not intended by Wolf in her essay).  

By contrast, the cases of Garner, Bennett, and Eltahawy are contexts where 
oppression severely limits one’s options, including the kinds of resistance available to 
them. That is, racism, classism, and sexism largely explain why violence has become 
one of their few relevant options, especially if they are not willing to passively comply 
with their oppression. In Garner’s case, it is because escaping slavery was not an 
option for her and her family that she had to consider killing her children to protect 
them from it instead. In Bennett’s case, it is because there were no effective resources 
in her workplace to deal with sexual assault that she had to resort to violent means 
to end harassment from her colleagues. In Eltahawy’s case, it is in part because there 
are no serious social or legal repercussions for sexual harassment that a violent 
response became a live option for her. Were it not for their oppression, such radical 
options would neither be relevant nor worth considering. As a result of their 
oppression, and the severe limitations it places on the ways in which they can 
adequately resist, violence becomes a live option, thus placing them in the 
circumstances of radical choice.  



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How should we judge people who engage in violent resistance when it is not 
supported by impartial reasons? Although it is not my aim in this paper to defend a 
particular response to this question, I will briefly sketch three natural possibilities that 
arise from the conflict in reasons I’ve highlighted throughout.14  

First, one may hold that the strength of the impartial reasons in such cases 
simply trumps any of the personal reasons that have been under discussion in this 
paper. On such a view, acts of violence that violate impartial moral restrictions are 
ultimately unjustified.  

Second, one might take a stance that is radically skeptical of impartial moral 
restrictions in such cases—for instance, by saying that the personal reasons of those 
who are severely oppressed always bear greater weight than impartial reasons. On 
this alternative view, acts of violence that go against one’s personal values are 
ultimately unreasonable, overly self-sacrificial, or self-abnegating.  

Third, one might take inspiration from Wolf’s discussion of the criminal’s 
mother. On such a view, there is no simple way of resolving conflicts between 
impartial reasons and personal reasons in the context of radical choice. That is, there 
is no single metric according to which impartial reasons may be ranked more highly 
than personal reasons, or vice versa. Instead, we should be sympathetic with 
someone who decides to fulfill their personal values by acting violently, even if we 
should also grant that they have gone against important moral demands—just as Wolf 
(2015, 41) contends that the criminal’s mother at the very least “deserves our 
sympathy.” What’s more, regardless of what we think a person in the context of 
radical choice should do, we ought to acknowledge that “there is something positively 
reasonable (and not just understandable)” about someone who fulfills their personal 
values rather than simply acting in accordance with impartial morality (Wolf 2015, 
41). A natural extension of Wolf’s view would have it that victims of oppression facing 
such circumstances likewise deserve our sympathy. Violent resisters are not 
necessarily engaged in reckless or irrational acts of destruction. Rather, they may be 
acting to defend or maintain their personal values. Far from being worthless, such 
actions may be integral to victims’ integrity, self-worth, and meaning in life under 

 
14 Although I will present the answers below as very general answers to all cases of 
violent resistance and radical choice, it would be open to someone to take more 
specific attitudes to particular cases. For instance, one might be inclined toward the 
view that impartial morality trumps personal reasons in the case of Margaret Garner 
but that personal reasons carry greater weight than impartial morality in the case of 
Adrienne Bennett. However, since I am merely sketching the most natural responses 
below, these distinctions will not be crucial in the discussion that follows. 



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oppressive conditions.15 At the same time, we might still consider their actions to be 
morally questionable or ambiguous.16 Moral evaluations of such cases do not settle 
the question of their ethical value (at least not without further argument).  

Wolf’s view about radical choice may be even more compelling in the cases 
considered throughout this paper for the following reason: the circumstances of 
radical choice are foisted on them by their oppression—a fact about their life which 
is completely beyond their or their loved ones’ control—thus making a response of 
sympathy yet more appropriate. Although the mother in Wolf’s example committed 
no injustice herself, her son did, and this is what placed her in the context of radical 
choice. By contrast Garner, Bennett, and Eltahawy were each forced into a position 
of radical choice as a result of systemic oppression. Neither their own actions nor the 
actions of any of their loved ones led to this. Since the adversity they face is arguably 
more tragic and arbitrary, it is not unreasonable to have greater sympathy for them 
than for nonoppressed agents facing radical decisions like the criminal’s mother.  

As it turns out, however, agents of violent resistance are often unfairly or too 
quickly judged. It is not uncommon for onlookers to hastily moralize, infantilize, or 
discount their behavior. Far from helping us to better understand or to eliminate the 
circumstances that give rise to violence, such attitudes only multiply the oppression 
of the resisters. This may occur in various ways. For instance, since (as many 
philosophers argue) violent resistance may be an act of communication, dismissing it 
as the result of adolescent recklessness may itself be a form of epistemic injustice. 
Uncareful moralizing of the actions of the oppressed can lead to stereotyping, victim-
blaming, or the imposition of unrealistic or overly burdensome expectations. 
Moreover, excessive preoccupation with moral praise or blame can distract from 
understanding the underlying causes and effects of oppression and from properly 
supporting those who struggle, often imperfectly, to resist.  

It has not been my aim here to provide a moral or ethical verdict on violent 
resistance, nor has it been my aim to discourage others from making such 
judgements. Rather, I have been focused on describing two different kinds of 
normative reasons that can weigh in favor of (or against) violent resistance and 
considering how such reasons may interact in practical deliberations. How we 
ultimately ought to evaluate violent resistance along moral or ethical lines requires 
more discussion than can be provided here.  

 
15 This is especially true provided that, as Williams notes, an agent may be so 
identified with her projects that she takes them “seriously at the deepest level, as 
what [her] life is about” (Smart and Williams 1973, 156).  
16 For discussion of the absence of nuanced thinking about violent resistance, the 
misguided tendency to jump to final moral verdicts, and the morally ambiguous 
nature of such actions, see Rini (2020).  



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6. Conclusion  
Recall the opening question of the paper: for victims of oppression, what 

reasons may stand in favor of (or against) engaging in some form of violent resistance? 
I argued that we can differentiate two kinds of reasons: paradigmatic moral reasons, 
arising from commitments to impartial moral values and principles, and personal 
reasons, arising from attachments of love and loyalty to specific people, projects, and 
personal values. Ideally, when deliberating about violent resistance, both reasons 
cohere. But there is no guarantee that conflicts will not arise. Thus, some acts of 
violent resistance may take the form of a radical choice in which paradigmatic moral 
reasons and personal reasons pull the agent in opposite directions. Recognizing that 
violent resistance may involve deliberating under circumstances of radical choice 
allows us to have greater sympathy with people who are pushed to such extreme 
forms of resistance. Moreover, it opens up the possibility that such actions may have 
personal value, independently of how they measure up from the point of view of 
impartiality.  

To be very clear, it was not my aim here to endorse violent resistance either 
in general or in any particular case. Instead, I have made the much weaker point that 
some of the normative considerations that go into the balance when deliberating 
about whether to engage in violent resistance are personal reasons, and that such 
reasons are not guaranteed to cohere with the paradigmatic reasons of impartial 
morality. Nor was it my aim to simplify our understanding of the reasons that bear 
relevantly in deliberations about violent resistance or to provide a way of resolving 
conflicts of radical choice that may arise in such deliberations. Instead, I have focused 
on drawing out some of the ethical complexities that are involved in violent 
resistance. By centering these complexities in the conversation about (non)violence, 
my hope is to enhance our understanding of violent resistance and the people who 
engage in it.17  
 
 

 
17 I would like to thank Adam Cureton, Juliette Cherbuliez, Em Hernandez, Sarah 
Holtman, Thomas E. Hill Jr., Matthias Rothe, Valerie Tiberius, Susan Wolf, and three 
anonymous referees for valuable feedback on previous versions of this paper. I am 
also grateful for helpful discussions with audiences at the 2022 North American 
Society for Social Philosophy, 2021 Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference, 
2021 Central APA, and UMN Philosophy’s work-in-progress series; and with students 
in my Philosophy and Feminist Theory (Fall 2021) and Race, Gender, and Radical 
Politics (Spring 2022) seminars. Special thanks to Philip Bold for many conversations 
which culminated in the major ideas of this paper, in addition to his insights in writing 
and editing this piece along the way. 



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TAMARA FAKHOURY is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of 
Minnesota. Her research focuses on the ethics and moral psychology of resisting 
oppression. She is particularly interested in the ethical conflicts that arise for victims 
in resistance and how conditions of oppression shape what it means to live a good 
and meaningful life. Her recent publications include “Oppositional Anger: Aptness 
without Appreciation,” “Quiet Resistance: The Value of Personal Defiance,” and “Eight 
Dimensions of Resistance.” Her current research discusses the value of morally 
imperfect acts of resistance, nonnormative behavior, and rebelliousness as a virtue 
under oppression.  
 


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