id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
fpq-14386	Pearlman, Savannah; Williams, Elizabeth	Why You Ought to Defer: : Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience	2022	29	.pdf	application/pdf	13285	666	53	We distinguish between two types of deference: epistemic deference, which refers to believing p in virtue of trusting the testifier, and actional deference, which involves acting appropriately in response to the testimony given. In this paper, we set aside the traditional puzzle of moral deference, which focuses on explaining (or denying) an asymmetry between the straightforward acceptability of nonmoral deference and the controversial nature of moral deference.3 Instead, we focus on a subset of moral deference, which we take to be not only permissible but prima facie obligatory in cases in which the testifier is a member of a marginalized social group that the receiver is not and testifies about their marginalized experience.4 Deference is justified in these cases in part because marginalized people have more relevant nonmoral information with regard to moral claims about their own experience as a member of that marginalized group as compared to their nonmarginalized counterparts.5 We argue that there are two distinct varieties of deference: epistemic and actional.6 At its broadest level, epistemic deference refers to believing p in virtue of 3 For discussion of this puzzle, see McGrath (2009, 2011), Hills (2009), Sliwa (2012), Enoch (2014), Howell (2014), Davia and Palmira (2015), Callahan (2018), and Lewis (2020).	cache/fpq-14386.pdf	txt/fpq-14386.txt