





































152 

 Volume 1. Issue 2. July 2019 

ISSN 2603-5324 

http://faba.bg 

 

Integration Between Voice and Silence in Human Resource Management (HRM) 

Perspective, A Literature Review  

 

Imam Suwandi, Sam’un Jaja Raharja, Rusdin Tahir 

 

Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,  

Padjadjaran University, Indonesia 

 

Info Articles 

________________ 
History Articles: 

Submited 12 March 2019 

Revised 30 April 2019 

Accepted 1 July 2019 

________________ 
Keywords: 

Voice and Silence, 

Human Management 

Management, 

Organizational Behavior, 

Industrial Relations, 

Labor Process    

Abstract
 

___________________________________________________________________ 

Many developments from studies on the concept of employee voice actualization in 

various theoretical disciplines - including Human Resource Management ( HRM ) , 

Organizational Behavior ( OB ), Industrial Relations (IR) and Labor Process (LP) - are 

approaching phenomena from various ontological points. However, very few study the 

antithesis of employee voice, namely employee silence. This article aims to develop a 

conceptual framework of Voice and Silence employees based on interdisciplinary 

integration from the perspective of OB, IR, and LP. An integrated approach like this 

can offer a more reflective understanding of the social and psychological antecedents of 

employee Voice and Silence to academics, policymakers, and human resource 

management practitioners. This framework is critical to promote a pluralist view of the 

" silence " of employees which is illustrated by the concept of 'antagonism structured', 

which is rarely used in the study of HRM and OB. research continues suggested 

outlined to help integrate a more diverse approach to the vase of employees. 
 Address Correspondence:  

   Jl. Raya Bandung Sumedang KM 21, Jatinangor 45363 
 

  

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INTRODUCTION 

 

Analysis of employee voice can be traced 

in Hirschman's research (1970: 30), where voice 

is seen as a vehicle for "changing unpleasant 

circumstances". However, the employee's " 

silence " is not part of the analysis, even though 

the employee's silence can be a manifestation of 

'leaving' under the Hirschman framework. HRM 

tends to use OB insights to explain VaS (for 

example, Kwon, Farndale, & Park, 2016; 

Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011; 

Farndale et al., 2011; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 

2018; Rees, Alfes, & Gatenby, 2013; Wang, Wu, 

Liu, Hao, & Wu, 2016). In this article it is 

proposed that the HR audience can gain greater 

insight into the depth of integration approaches 

that are often opposed to each other, that is the 

perspective of organizational behavior (OB), 

industrial relations (IR) and the work process 

(LP). Wilkinson et al. (2014: 5) defines voice as 

"an opportunity for employees to have a voice 

and potentially influence organizational affairs 

related to issues that affect their work and the 

interests of managers and owners ". Silence can 

reflect a situation in a company where 

employees do not have the opportunity to vote 

or do not use it for various reasons (Donaghey, 

Cullinane, Dundon, & Wilkinson, 2011). 

This article provides a conceptual 

framework of multi-dimensional and multi-

layers voice and silence, based on 

interdisciplinary integration from the perspective 

of OB, IR, and LP. This article contributes to 

advancing HR knowledge in four important 

ways. First, the integrated framework 

encourages HR academics to expand HRM 

beyond any paradigm by including forms of 

indirect, direct, informal and formal social 

dialogue. Approaches in a way that can capture 

how the vase reflects a relationship centered on 

strength; that is, relationships formed by unequal 

power exchanges. Second, a framework that 

integrates allow academics HR to connect the 

various levels, layers, and dimensions silence 

different employees to describe more fully why 

the employees do not speak. While OB provides 

more useful insights into understanding such as 

collective reasoning, managerial behavior, 

individual traits, and psychological security, IR 

helps understand the institutional context for 

voice, and LP informs a deeper appreciation of 

the influence of agents connecting wider social 

structures of accumulation. with the political 

process of HR decision making at the company 

level. Third, this article builds on the HRM 

literature (Farndale et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 

2011; Rees et al., 2013; Knoll and Redman, 

2011; Avery, McKay, Wilson, Volpone, & 

Killham, 2011) for building critical pluralist 

perspectives on employees ' " voice " and " 

silence " in various workplace settings (Godard, 

2014; Ramsay, Scholarios, & Harley, 2000; 

Wright, 2000). Specifically, this article develops 

the critical pluralist concept of 'structured 

antagonism' (Edwards, 1986), which is ignored 

in most HRM studies (for example, Knoll and 

Redman, 2016; Morrison et al., 2011; Avery et 

al., 2011; Kwon et al., 2016; Farndale et al., 

2011; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Wang et 

al., 2016). 'Structured antagonism' explains how 

structural strength imbalances can damage 

employees ' ' voice ' and ' silence ', depending on 

the formation and articulation of conflicting 

interests between employers and employees (eg 

cooperation vs. conflict and control vs. approval 

tension). Finally, the proposed integrative 

framework can support public, managerial and 

broader policy debates. For example, this article 

highlights the human hearing that silence - its 

employees may occur because of the mechanism 

of voice that effectively inaccessible; or 

employees whose silence alone may be a form of 

rejection and / or bad behavior. HR practices 

can then be critically evaluated using 

understanding from a variety of disciplinary 

perspectives to help move beyond narrow 

performance-driven metrics that have little 

meaning to employees. 

This review literature compares the 

intersection of OB, IR, and LP analyze 

regarding employee voice and silence. 

Furthermore, a brief description of " voice " on 

the concept of HRM will be described, the 

contribution of OB in " voice " and " silence " of 

employees and then reviewed, and incorporated 

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154 

from the viewpoint of HRM when necessary. 

After that, the relevance of structured 

antagonism to employees' " voice " and " silence 

" is considered and extended to section four to 

be developed into an integrated OB-IR-LP 

sensitivity framework. 

 

THEORETICAL REVIEW 

 

Voice and Silence in Human Resource 

Management perspective 

The main focus of the literature HRM 

typically discusses how the opportunities for the 

mechanism of voice directly to help improve 

organizational processes (Fu et al., 2017; 

Huselid, 1995; Knoll & Redman, 2016). For 

example, Knoll and Redman (2016: 832) ber 

focus on voice upward sponsored by a company 

where employees "to express the idea that aims 

for process improvement and innovation". Rees 

et al., (2013: 2782) tested employee perceptions 

about the extent to which they were involved in 

voice behavior aimed at improving the 

functioning of their workgroups ". Fu et al., 

(2017: 344) encouraged" HR practices that are 

easily implemented focusing on the process of 

creating opportunities for employees to get 

involved, as a medium to improve higher 

performance ". Fu et al., (2017: 344) suggest 

making an internal bulletin, or social media, 

where employees can exchange knowledge, 

information, and ideas to improve existing 

practice. 

HRM interpretation is often assumed that 

the mechanism of voice employees can align 

employee goals and organization through 

increased commitment and involvement 

(Farndale et al., 2011: 115). Holland, Pyman, 

Cooper, & Teicher, 2011 (2011: 97) a union "has 

been accompanied by direct voice diffusion, 

with priority placed on voice as a means of 

increasing employee productivity and 

commitment to the organization." Rees et al., 

2013 (2013: 2780) claim a positive relationship 

between employee voice and engagement, where 

the engagement strategy is a way of "aligning 

employee interests more closely with 

organizational goals, which is predicted 

assuming that employee voice will, in turn, 

improve organizational performance". Such 

narratives present a unified focus on a direct 

voice where employees share ideas to benefit 

from organizational goals. However, this can 

disregard the different (or conflicting) interests of 

managers and employees and the imbalance of 

structural forces between them (Cullinane & 

Dundon, 2014; Kaufman, 2015; Marchington, 

2015). 

Researchers previously found the scheme 

voice that is facilitated by the employer provides 

the voice of employees on management 

requirements, which may be very limited in 

communication at lower levels and has a 

shortage of inclusion for decision-making (Barry, 

Dundon, & Wilkinson, 2018). Examining 'depth' 

(ie, level of influence), 'scope' (ie, about what 

problems), 'level' (ie, department, team or 

company) and 'form' (ie, direct, formal, 

informal) voice mechanism very important for 

academics and HR practitioners (Wilkinson et 

al., 2014). Holland et al. (2011: 106-107) said 

that they measure the presence of the 

mechanism of voice, which is not too embedded 

depth and breadth pettings voice which is in the 

level of early-stage at the workplace ". Rees et 

al., 2013 (2013: 2793) further cautions: "We 

have considered voice perception, not voice 

reality ." Likewise, Farndale et al., (2011: 124) 

noted, "this study has used indirect voice 

measures, exploring how many employees 

believe that their managers provide 

opportunities for voice, not a real voice. " 

It can be said that HRM is very focused 

on generating employee voice perception, rather 

than providing insight into the depth of voice. 

For example, Farndale et al., (2011: 116 ) states: 

" Voice can lead to long-term positive attitudes 

because employees see the potential to influence 

decisions, regardless of whether the impact of 

employee voices on the outcome of decisions is 

realized". Also, they conclude that voice 

perceptions build trust relationships "regardless 

of whether the outcome of the decision is 

beneficial for employees or not". ' Voice 

perception ' without a broad voice can "motivate 

employees to respond according to the wishes of 

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the organization" (Kwon et al., 2016: 3) and 

legitimate decisions with negative employee 

outcomes in the short term, but this is not 

sustainable. 

So, overall, the danger is that HRM's view 

of voice is based on the erroneous idea of the 

voice mechanism as evidence of shared interests 

and shared goals. Furthermore, this becomes a 

pro-market orientation where voice is mainly 

based on values deemed to be in the interests of 

shareholders and organizations, rather than the 

right to expand or enhance democracy in the 

workplace (Boxall, Purcell, & Wright, 2008; 

Dundon & Rafferty, 2018). The HRM literature 

on voice and silence often evokes insight into 

OB (for example, Goldberg, Clark, & Henley, 

2011; Kwon et al., 2016; Knoll and Redman, 

2011; Avery et al., 2011; Farndale et al., 2011; 

Wang et al., 2016 Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 

2018; Rees et al., 2013) 

  

Voice and Silence in the Perspective of 

Organizational Behavior (OB) 

Likewise, with HRM, OB research 

strongly emphasizes how 'opportunities to have 

voice are provided by direct voice mechanisms 

based on unitary, oriented-oriented assumptions 

(Ashford & Barton, 2007; Burris, Detert, & 

Chiaburu, 2008; Detert, Burris, Harrison, & 

Martin, 2013; Fast, Burris, & Bartel, 2014; 

Grant, 2013; Liu, Tangirala, & Ramanujam, 

2013; Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008). For 

example, constructing several definitions of the 

OB voice, Morrison (2011: 375,) conceptualizes 

it as "communicating ideas or suggestions about 

work-related problems to improve the 

functioning of an organization or unit". 

Likewise, Grant (2013: 1703) defines voice as 

"proactive behavior that involves talking with 

suggestions for improvement". Detert et al. 

(2013: 626) explains that the voice is a 

challenging organizational citizenship behavior, 

prosocial, and aimed a specific role in improving 

the performance of the organization by changing 

existing practices. They investigated three 

"different voice flow ideas or proposals to attract 

more business, increase customer satisfaction, 

and increase effectiveness" ( Detert et al. 2013: 

659). The voice flow includes employee voice 

for 1) partners, 2) direct managers and 3) other 

managers. They aim to "see what and how 

differences exist in ways that are relevant to 

predictions that might be made about their 

impact on performance". 

Reflecting unitary perspectives where 

conflict is seen as dysfunctional, employee 

complaints and complaints are usually not 

considered voice because employee complaints 

do not directly support organizational goals 

(Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Mowbray, 

Wilkinson, & Tse, 2015). According to Detert et 

al. (2013: 641), the weakness of voice among 

coworkers is that it will be "coded by outside 

observers or internal leaders as" ventilation, 

"blowing steam, "or even" complaining "and 

that" while such communication can make the 

speaker feel better in the short term, it might just 

reduce the climate and unit performance over 

time ”. Morrison (2014: 179-180) states that "the 

main intention of " voice " is to bring positive 

change, improvement, and not just to complain 

or get positive results for yourself." Tangirala & 

Ramanujam, 2008 by arguing that employees 

with autonomous, less expressing voice. But 

they see voice as "ideas and suggestions that are 

change-oriented about work-related issues " 

rather than "personal complaints resulting from 

perceived injustice." 

The OB voice mechanism is usually a 

direct channel that builds performance around 

the organizational climate and socially shared 

cognition between workers and leaders (LePine 

& Van Dyne, 1998; Morrison et al., 2011). 

Morrison (2011: 386) explains that recent OB 

research "has not yet considered the role of 

formal communication mechanisms much, 

perhaps because of the conceptualization of 

voice as extra-discretionary role behavior that 

occurs in face-to-face contexts. "Exceptions 

include Morrison and Milliken (2000), who 

encourage formal upward communication 

channels to promote voice, and Miceli, Near, 

and Dworkin (2008), which state that 

complaints are more likely to occur if internal 

reporting procedures exist. 

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Silence - its employees in the OB literature 

is "cutting ideas, questions, concerns, 

information or opinions deliberate by employees 

on issues related to the job and the organization 

they work" (Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero, 2003: 

1389). Silence is described as things that are not 

desirable because the employees are not clicking 

to communicate their ideas so it may damage 

the interests of the organization. For example, 

silence has "significant implications for the team 

and organizational performance" because, "key 

decision-makers or teams may not have the 

information they need to make the right decision 

or to fix potentially serious problems" 

(Morrison, 2011: 374). Fast et. al., (2014: 1028) 

states that "holding back voices that are oriented 

to improvement can deny an organization's 

access to ideas that trigger growth, learning, and 

adaptation." Likewise, with HRM research that 

highlights employee involvement, Morrison 

(2014: 88) notes how employee silence can 

stimulate "high levels of stress, dissatisfaction, 

and loss or loss of potential employees, which 

can damage performance and retention". 

Research in the field of OB addresses two 

important issues that shape whether or not 

employees speak up (Morrison, 2011, 2014). 

First, employees value ' voice efficacy ', 

therefore, they can remain silent if they consider 

the conversation useless and/or no one will 

listen (Detert & Trevino, 2010; Milliken, 

Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Pinder & Harlos, 

2001; Van Dyne et al., 2003). Second, voice is 

formed by 'psychological security', "people's 

perceptions about the consequences of taking 

interpersonal risks in certain contexts such as the 

workplace" (Edmondson & Lei, 2014). Silence 

in such contexts is labeled silence (Pinder & 

Harlos, 2001) and ' silence ' (Van Dyne et al., 

2003). Negative impacts might involve how 

others perceive their image, colleague relations, 

identity, social capital, termination of 

employment, restrictions on career development, 

and unattractive work assignments (Ashford & 

Barton, 2007; Bowen & Blackmon, 2003; Grant, 

2013; Liang, Crystal, Farh, & Farh, 2012; Miceli 

et al., 2008; Milliken et al., 2003; Morrison & 

Milliken, 2003). These OB ideas are applied in 

HR studies; for example, Goldberg et al. (2011) 

evoke psychological security and the efficacy of 

voice (see also Kwon et al., 2011; Farndale et 

al., 2011; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Rees 

et al., 2013). 

'Organizational identification' is a 

prominent idea in voice and silence in the OB 

perspective, developing ideas about commitment 

and involvement with unitary postures for 

common goals and shared interests. 

Organizational identification is "the extent to 

which employees feel unity or ownership with 

their organization and include organizational 

attributes in their self-definition" (Tangriala and 

Ramunjam, 2008: 1190). This reflects "the 

amount of interest felt by individuals and 

organizations" (Smidts, Pruyn, & Van Riel, 

2001: 1051). Ashford and Barton (2007: 231) 

assert that organizational identification fosters 

voice by creating "motives to try and help and 

improve those organizations." Liu et al. (2013: 

199) argue that "managers who want to 

encourage voice behavior need to build or 

strengthen employee identification." They found 

a positive relationship between transformational 

leaders and voice. Such leaders "emphasize the 

collective identity and values and vision of the 

whole organization (or group)" and make 

"organizational or group goals meaningful to 

employees" (: 192). Organizational identification 

is also considered a positive byproduct of voice. 

Smidts et al. (2001) argue that when employees 

perceive voice opportunities, organizational 

identification is enhanced. Besides, as stated by 

Morrison and Milliken (2000), if employees 

evaluate the voice opportunities they feel valued, 

thereby increasing organizational commitment 

and identification. 

What is interesting is the argument that 

organizational identification can also trigger 

silence, because attachment to the organization 

overrides employee dissatisfaction (Tangirala & 

Ramanujam, 2008). Related, Ashford and 

Barton (2007) argue that employees may not 

speak up because it can threaten their identity 

(and organization). Highly identified employees 

do not always recognize problems outside the 

organization's current framework of reference 

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157 

and they tend not to conflict with applicable 

norms, so they remain silent. Research by Burris 

et al. (2008: 914) do not support the hypothesis 

that the more employees are psychologically 

attached to the organization (ie, "identify with 

their organization's goals and values"), the more 

they are involved in voice-oriented 

improvement. 

They argue this may be due to employees 

who are very bound like organizations. Similar 

arguments are made in the HRM literature. For 

example, Knoll and Redman (2011: 833) find 

that employees who feel "a sense of belonging to 

the organization" and show a "strong 

psychological relationship with their 

organization", tend to be involved in voice 

promotions. However, they conclude that the 

employee can also engage in silence - it is pro-

social where they "hold the views that can 

disrupt the functioning of the workplace without 

hindrance" ( Knoll and Redman 2011: 832) and 

"hold opinions or concerns them if they thinking 

to express them will challenge relationships at 

work ”( Knoll and Redman, 2011: 833). 

From the perspective of HRM, 

perspective OB on the voice and silence research 

is strongly based on the views of unity of 

purpose and common interests, where 

employees speak to fulfill a common goal, and 

perhaps silence for the identification of a strong 

organization. Morrison & Milliken, 2000 

acknowledged that reduces silence - its 

employees is very important to create a pluralist 

organization, which they define as "an 

organization that respects and reflects the 

difference between the employee and which 

allows the disclosure of a range of perspectives 

and opinions". However, as Fox (1979) notes, 

although pluralism is in principle attractive, it 

can also be aspirational and difficult in practice 

because of various external forces and because 

management has structural strength advantages. 

Furthermore, pluralist organizations that 

provide mechanisms for expressing alternative 

concerns are different from pluralist 

organizations that facilitate the distribution of 

power in decision making through these 

mechanisms. There seems to be more focus on 

OB that observes the perception of voice than 

building democracy in the workplace. For 

example, Milliken et al. (2003: 5) note that when 

top management is "considered willing to 

listen", this motivates the voice, but this is not 

the same as assessing whether managers share 

power over the outcome of decision making 

when a voice is expressed. 

OB insights indeed draw attention to how 

positional and hierarchical power relations 

shape voice and silence (Morrison & Milliken, 

2000; Fast et al., 2013; Kish-Gephart, Detert, 

Trevino, & Edmondson, 2009; Detert & 

Trevino, 2010). Kish-Gephart et al. (2009: 174) 

argue that the emotion of 'fear' has a significant 

effect when employees consider facing an 

authoritative individual. In this context, 

"contemplating voice triggers fear of being ready 

to anger other people of higher status, which 

automatically triggers recognition of potential 

negative consequences." Likewise, Detert and 

Trevino (2010: 263) found that fear prevents 

employees from using voice to managers and 

that "this fear can originate from the idea of 

speaking to more senior authority figures". 

Furthermore, Morrison and Milliken (2000) and 

Fast et al. (2013) asserted that managerial 

perceptions of employee voices as threats and 

suspicions were largely shaped by the strength of 

positions and hierarchical relationships. 

In short, OB and HRM perspectives are 

generally biased toward direct voice 

mechanisms, not overly recommending indirect 

forms of voice. While OB research focuses on 

informal voice behavior (Morrison, 2011), the 

HRM literature examines formal and informal 

practices (Mowbray et al., 2015). OB offers a 

range of employee motivations that are useful 

for speaking or maintaining silence, including 

the efficacy of voice, psychological security, 

leader-member exchange, identity, emotions and 

position and hierarchical resources (Detert & 

Edmondson, 2011; Detert & Trevino, 2010; 

Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Morrison, 2014). This 

idea is presented in HRM research with different 

psychological differences (eg, Goldberg et al., 

2011; Kwon et al., 2011; Knoll and Redman, 

2011; Avery et al., 2011). However, OB 

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drawbacks include paying too much attention to 

individual-level factors and ignoring broader 

socio-economic, political and institutional forces 

(Godard, 2014; Barry et al., 2018), 

Also, weaknesses in many OBs and HRM 

related research are the premise of unitary 

shared goals and aligning the interests of 

employees and organizations (for example, 

Ashford & Barton, 2007; Liu et al., 2013; 

Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008; Farndale et al., 

2011; Rees et al., 2013). This creates a bias 

towards voice 'oriented improvements' (Detert et 

al., 2013; Grant, 2013; Burris et al., 2008; Fast et 

al., 2014; Liu et al., 2013; Tangriala and 

Ramanujam, 2008; Ashford & Barton, 2007; 

Morrison, 2011; Knoll & Redman, 2016; Fu et 

al., 2017) and ignore how the interests of 

different employer-employees in power 

relationships that are structurally unbalanced 

shape the results of voice and silence. Finally, 

the focus in OB and HRM focuses on the 

presence and perception of behavior and voice 

mechanisms, rather than whether they provide 

democracy in the workplace or how deeply these 

arrangements are embedded (Holland et al., 

2011; Farndale et al., 2011; Rees et al. , 2013; 

Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Milliken et al., 

2003). 

  

Similarities in the interpretation of IR and LP 

Following the definition of voice as 'an 

opportunity to have a voice ', employees can use 

this opportunity to support organizational goals; 

but importantly, they can also challenge HR 

management and practices by attempting to 

influence alternative outcomes. Most 

importantly, 'opportunities to have a voice 

reflect' structured antagonism 'are permanently 

embedded in people management systems 

(Edwards, 1986; Kaufman, 2014). 

While the different positions adopted in 

the flow IR / LP, including dialectical pluralist 

discourse, Marxist, post-modernist and critical 

framework for this support pluralist orientation 

critical in supporting the inclusion and 

integration (Dundon & Dobbins, 2015; 

Edwards, 1986). Powered by antagonism 

structured political and economic theory, the 

framework seeks to map the phenomenon 

around silence its employees to capture better 

how and why workers remain silence, knowing 

the context and external processes and 

endogenous. 

The HRM approach builds a critical 

pluralist view to recognize that aligning shared 

goals may be desirable but problematic. 

Although there is a degree of mutual 

dependence between employers and employees, 

inherent power imbalances usually favor 

employers. The power here is more rooted 

structurally and extends deeper than the 

'position' and 'hierarchical' power relations 

presented in several OB / HR studies (Detert & 

Trevino, 2010; Fast et al., 2014; Kish-Gephart et 

al., 2009). Both parties have interests that are 

structurally conflicting because employers and 

employees will always seek control. There is a 

potential for tension, where employees can 

pursue the interests and beliefs of individuals 

who differ from management, which can trigger 

conflicts. However, both parties also seek to 

secure potential joint goals, for example, the 

survival of the company (Edwards, Bélanger, & 

Wright, 2006), generating opportunities for 

cooperation (Dobbins & Dundon, 2017; 

Edwards & Ram, 2009) and organizational 

efficiency ( Johnstone & Wilkinson, 2016). 

Furthermore, employers not only actively seek 

to control workers' efforts and work tasks but 

also try to support employee commitment and 

loyalty (Edwards, 1986; Fox, 1966; Johnstone & 

Wilkinson, 2016). 

Employee costs and benefits including 

social and monetary rewards reflect the 

uncertainty in which employee exchange efforts 

are unbalanced, unpredictable, varied and can 

be felt differently by workers when comparing 

with other groups (Baldamus, 1961; Fox, 1966). 

Therefore, employers and employees engage in 

ongoing effort-reward bargains and their 

respective concerns can be unified or distorted 

day by day. But how managers can adopt or 

engage in voice relationships is a complex thing. 

Managers are under pressure to achieve 

company goals and are limited by the interests of 

owners and shareholders, especially under 

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financial capitalism (Thompson, 2003, 2013). 

This is proven in the HR literature, Ulrich (1998: 

125-126) states: "Line managers have primary 

responsibility for the processes and outcomes of 

a company". However, as Jaros reminds (2005: 

8), managers may have "a level of discretion that 

is independent of profit or mandatory value 

maximization", which can determine the nature 

and quality of voice or the level of structured 

antagonism. The manager is the employees 

themselves, but also the owner's agent, and thus 

can pursue their own goals that may conflict 

with interelict-cooperation and control-

agreement tensions are important, as described 

in the following section. 

Based on the view that employment 

instills 'structured antagonism', the IR / LP 

perspective can help explain the three main 

issues surrounding " voice " and " silence " that 

are ignored in the HRM / OB perspective 

discussed in the previous section. First, given the 

relationship of power imbalances and the 

potential interests of different employers-

employees, the IR / LP perspective provides a 

thicker explanation of why employees do not 

always express a voice to benefit the 

organization, but rather to advance the interests 

of individuals and/or their collective, who can 

compete with organizational goals. What is 

important for the HR audience, providing 

employees with effective mechanisms to express 

potentially conflicting interests can be beneficial 

to the organization in the long run (Dundon & 

Rafferty, 2018; Mowbray et al., 2015). Second, 

employees can withhold potentially valuable 

information to reject managerial authority or 

improve degrading work. The idea has a long 

and established pedigree in the study of 

sociology and policy theory on employment 

relations and employment (eg Braverman, 1974; 

Burawoy, 1979; Thompson, 1989). It recognizes 

cooperative and conflictual debates about how 

human resource practices can change work 

practices that expose exploitative results or 

increase sustainability and protect workers and 

organizations from time and space. Third, 

recognizing the complex tensions that underlie 

people who manage, " silence " can manifest as 

a form of cooperation and compromise, which 

can be manipulated or coerced by management 

actions (Burawoy, 2013). For example, 

MacMahon, O'Sullivan, Murphy, Ryan, and 

MacCurtain (2018) report incidents in which HR 

procedures to combat intimidation at work are 

sometimes in vain and management actions give 

rise to a culture of employee silence due to the 

perception of fear about possible retaliation 

against them. 

Although the IR / LP perspective 

combines a more socio-political world view of 

workplace relations based on 'structured 

antagonism', their explanations of voice and 

silence differ in several key aspects, which are 

found in the sections to come. 

  

Voice and Silence in the Perspective of 

Industrial Relations 

IR Analysis develops many disciplines 

such as history, economics, law, politics, 

sociology, and psychology, and focuses broadly 

on all labor actors, including management, 

labor, workers '/ employers' associations and 

government agents (Kaufman, 2014). Various 

levels of analysis are explored in IR, examining 

external influences on the behavior of 'actors', 

'institutions' of the labor market, on IR 

'processes' (eg bargaining, rewards, 

commitments, etc.), and 'outcomes' (such as 

voice and silence )). IR research for decades has 

contributed to public policy; from the Wagner 

Act (1935) US New Deal and the UK Donovan 

Commission (1968), to the display of economic 

employee rights, or the implications of robot 

technology on work (Ackers, 2010; Berg, 2016; 

Kochan, 2015). While IR examining managerial 

behavior, the way he connects workplace 

relationships with macro-level factors, such as 

labor laws and institutional rules, helping inform 

a broader understanding of contextual diversity 

in contemporary HRM vis-à-vis the voice and 

silence "of his employees (Wilkinson, Gollan, 

Kalfa, & Xu, 2018). In contrast to HRM / OB, 

IRs build a unique agency-focus focus on 

employee voices that are oriented in direct and 

indirect forms, including unions, work councils, 

consultative committees and Civil Society 

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Organizations (CSOs) (Williams, Abbott, & 

Heery, 2011). 

The results of institutional voices are 

learned in IR. For example, the workers' council 

has been proven to support two benefit claims. 

The first is the rent-producing effect: when 

workers have a collective voice through the work 

board, the rate of employee resignation is lower 

(Nienhüser, 2014). The effect is sharing 

information and supporting organizational 

efficiency. The second is rent-seeking outcomes, 

trough compulsory collective dialogue, workers 

can organize the supply of labor and support a 

higher income than under the competitive labor 

market that was charity (Nienhüser, 2014: 247). 

Besides, institutional economists have shown 

that collective bargaining has proven the effects 

of positive income distribution, along with social 

and ethical values regarding greater justice 

support (Kaufman, 2007). The study also 

examined the relationship between the 

mechanism of employee voice and non-union 

(Willman, Bryson, & Gomez, 2009.). For 

example, Dundon, Wilkinson, Marchington, 

and Ackers (2004) found the mechanism of 

union and non-union HRM voice in multi-

factory organizations in the United Kingdom 

and Ireland to be complex, involving joint 

contestation of coexistence. The findings that are 

well cited in union settings are those reported by 

Black and Lynch (2004), which show a positive 

relationship between bargaining and labor 

productivity. Likewise, Dobbins and Gunnigle 

(2009) report, in making capital-intensive, that 

union-management negotiation systems can help 

reconcile different interests that support new and 

innovative HR arrangements. 

Contrary to OB, IR analysis seeks to 

capture the 'depth' of the influence of voice, 

where employee problems can contribute, and at 

what level in the organization (Wilkinson et al., 

2014). This is important because research shows 

that " silence " may be a byproduct of a shallow 

voice system, and managers force decisions 

unilaterally. According to Cullinane and 

Donaghey (2014: 402), ' accidental silence ' can 

occur when 'there is no voice ' in the 

organization. Subsequently, Dobbins, Dundon, 

Cullinane, Hickland, and Donaghey (2017) 

examined the results of organizational-level 

voice mechanisms established under the 

Information and Consultation (ICE) Regulations 

(2004) in the United Kingdom and Ireland. They 

found that weak and minimalistic regulations 

gave employers high-level policies. 

Contrary to OB, IR analysis seeks to 

capture the 'depth' of the influence of voice, 

where employee problems can contribute, and at 

what level in the organization (Wilkinson et al., 

2014). This is important because research shows 

that silence may be a by-product of shallow 

voice systems, and managers force decisions 

unilaterally. According to Cullinane and 

Donaghey (2014: 402), ' accidental silence ' may 

arise when 'there is no voice ' in the 

organization. Furthermore, Dobbins, Dundon, 

Cullinane, Hickland, and Donaghey (2017) 

examined the results of organizational-level 

voice mechanisms established under 

Information and Consultation Regulations (ICE) 

(2004) in the United Kingdom and Ireland. They 

find that weak and minimalistic regulations 

provide employers with a high level of discretion 

when responding to legal regulations for voice 

that result in shallow employee participation in 

small matters. 

For this purpose, relevant contextual 

factors recognized in IR research are socio-

economic and political characteristics in various 

labor regimes (see also Barry, Wilkinson, & 

Gollan, 2014). For example, voices are generally 

shallower in Liberal Market Economies (LME), 

such as the UK, US, Australia or Ireland, where 

voices and labor regulations do not have a legal 

support mandate (see also Gallie, 2011). 

Conversely, voice may be more expansive in 

Coordinated Market Economics (CME), such as 

Germany, when voice is supported by tougher 

institutional support for social dialogue 

(Dobbins et al., 2017). IR also recognizes that 

institutional structures can be very different. For 

example, Artus (2013) discusses the shallow 

voices found in the critical service sector in 

Germany. Important here is that the divergence 

of institutional labor regimes is important in 

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terms of labor practices and HR design (Holman 

& Rafferty, 2018). 

Therefore, you could say, the contribution 

of IR has a lot to offer in troubleshooting voice 

and silence - its employees. Some OB studies 

analyze outside the organizational level (eg, 

Morrison & Milliken, 2000). IR research 

connects voice and silence in the workplace with 

institutional arrangements such as trade unions, 

labor laws and regulations, civil society 

organizations and employers' associations. 

However, the exclusive IR approach can 

be seen partially for several reasons. First, 

despite shifting to direct forms and employee 

engagement (Ackers, 2010), IR studies generally 

focussed indirect employee voices by ignoring 

individual or hybrid voice systems that combine 

trade unions and non-union mechanisms (Barry 

& Wilkinson, 2016). Only a few studies 

highlight the increasing importance of informal 

voice (Marchington & Suter, 2013; Townsend, 

Wilkinson, & Burgess, 2013). For example, non-

union SME workers can use family and 

friendship relationships to modify work 

conditions (Edwards & Ram, 2009). Associated, 

IRs often prioritize the level of institutional 

analysis, especially employment regulation, 

collective bargaining and recent non-union 

representation (Wilkinson et al., 2014). This can 

cause IR to understate the influence of 

individual-level factors that OB conveys insight 

into; for example, employees may feel they are 

not treated with dignity, even if they are satisfied 

with other conditions (Hodson, 2001) 

Similar to OB / HRM, pluralist IR strains 

do not always recognize structural 

contradictions that are rooted to the same extent 

with more radical perspectives (Dundon & 

Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986, 2014). Voice 

widely regarded as a good thing for employees 

because it will be good for the union and 

managerial effectiveness (Goodman, Earnshaw, 

Marchington, & Harrison, 1998). However, this 

view may not fully appreciate that employees 

can remain silence even when the voice 

mechanism is very broad, perhaps as a form of 

pressure (eg suffering in silence ) or to correct 

the effects of inherent power imbalances (eg 

changing current circumstances) as discussed in 

the following section (Burawoy, 1979; van den 

Broek & Dundon, 2012; Woodcock, 2017). 

Therefore, pluralist IRs underestimate silence as 

a benefit for employees or as rational and 

deliberate workers' actions. Furthermore, the 

recent neural "-pluralist" IR (Ackers, 2014) lacks 

coverage when describing situations where 

employee voices suppress the interests of 

workers; for example, employees who share 

knowledge about organizational improvement 

and processes with management can trigger 

exploitation through increased workload, 

reduced autonomy, or job insecurity (Adler, 

1993). 

In short, IR research may lack respect for 

individual-level social processes and 

psychological traits, informal voice and line 

management involvement that underlies HRM. 

That is indeed interesting insights about 

institutional structures, regulations and other 

macro-level context factors that can exploit or 

break patterns. LP voice and silent research offer 

additional explanatory utilities in these areas, 

discussed in the next section. 

  

Voice and silence in the labor process 

perspective 

Antecedents of sociological LP can help 

with a more integrative approach by examining 

the contradictions and tensions in human 

resource management, by including community 

strengths and the implications that accompany 

them on the voice of workers at the 

organizational level. 

LP emphasizes that because of labor 

uncertainty and the potential for conflicting 

interests, voice and silence can be evident in the 

form of resistance from individual and / or 

collective workers (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999: 

31). Theory LP adding that the silence of his 

employees may manifest in various forms of 

resistance, bad behavior, or damage, to oppose 

HR practices is believed to damage the interests 

of their workers. Resistance may stem from 

concerns surrounding autonomy, skills, manager 

limits, reconfigured managers, organizational 

structure and job design. This may involve 

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employees who seek 'retaliation' in management 

for some previous decisions or conditions 

imposed by withholding information or ideas 

that can improve work or organizational results, 

or increase management's ability to control or 

intensify employee efforts. For example, 

Graham (1993) points out that Subaru-Isuzu 

employees deliberately refuse to share work 

improvement information with management. 

Here, silence effectively limits management's 

ability to accelerate production lines. Thompson 

(1989: 137) discusses silence by Chrysler 

workers, who follow management's instructions 

to fit the door on the vehicle, despite knowing 

that management is sending the vehicle on the 

telephone in the wrong order. That mistake 

means expensive correction. Van den Broek and 

Dundon (2012) found that workers at non-union 

call centers regulate the flow of information and 

feedback to customers and management as 

different actions from employee silence, to 'get 

back' to managers for tight supervision. 

Woodcock (2017) makes a similar observation. 

Importantly, these may or may not be the 

actions that employees want to take, but they are 

embedded in economic and social relationships 

that are centered on power. 

In addition to trying to "get-by" in 

management, " silence " can help workers 

overcome and 'get-by' in reducing work capacity. 

For example, employees may feel 'alienated' 

because they have limited job autonomy and 

ownership of decisions that affect them and their 

work (Donovan, O'Sullivan, Doyle, & Garvey, 

2016; Woodcock, 2017). While OB research 

discusses the influence of managerial beliefs with 

concern for organizational effectiveness, LP 

assumes that managerial beliefs can have overall 

ideological value, so that voice can be 

considered by managers as an "unwanted barrier 

of effective work processes" (Kaufman, 2014: 

19). Thus, employers can actively limit the 

opportunity for employees to air noise as a way 

to actively consolidate the power of the 

employer and silence - its workers can gain 

control of managerial standpoint (MacMahon et 

al., 2018: 14). Reflecting some extent the OB 

"psychological safety", workers who recognize 

negative managerial attitudes towards voice or 

trade unions can remain silent for 'fear' of 

retaliation should management view them as 

troublemakers (Artus, 2013). 

However, unlike OB, LP places these 

ideas within a broader political economy 

framework that recognizes structured 

antagonism related to how people are managed 

in the workplace. For example, the perceived 

consequences of voicing to employers are 

influenced by workers' views of management 

style, job identity, gender, contract status and 

job security, legal rights together with the 

interests of employees at a certain point in time 

(Artus, 2013). For example, at Nippon CTV in 

the Delbridge factory study (1998: 132), workers 

believe management "does not want to hear 

questions" at meetings. Under LP, the 

uncertainty of labor uncertainty embedded in 

unbalanced work relationships means that 

conflict and cooperation coexist (Dundon & 

Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986; Edwards et al., 

2006; Wright, 2000). The cooperative 

relationship can motivate employees to suggest 

ideas to support organizational goals, which 

reflect OB's notion of a good quality leader-

member exchange. However, recognizing 

structured antagonism also reveals other 

implications. Managers can create a more 

favorable environment for voicing in certain 

contexts, even if this is against the manager's 

interests, to get employee cooperation on other 

matters. For example, Dobbins (2010) describes 

how managers relax direct control in Anguish 

Alumina and give voice work teams a variety of 

things, ranging from small issues such as 

vacation scheduling to larger budgeting 

problems. However, enabling employee voice 

allows managers to introduce indirect control 

measures such as performance targets and 

technical controls. 

Furthermore, silence can occur because 

employees 'get along' with their work experience 

through a compromise relationship and 

cooperation. In Dobbins' research (2010), giving 

a voice to the team (which also included union 

representatives) triggered fewer conflicts and 

reduced complaints from 150 per year to 3-4 

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years. Besides, staying silence about issues that 

compete with organizational goals can mean 

other future assistance from management 

relating to career development, work-life 

balance, work assignments or other facilities. In 

the MacMahon et al (2018: 13) study, employees 

did not speak out against acts of intimidation 

when they had previous negative experiences 

about HR procedures that failed to protect 

employees who voiced their complaints. 

Nevertheless, employees who are 'active' 

with their work can show the making of a 

silence attitude: that is, employees do not need 

to view HR policies as damaging their interests 

or forming shallow participation. For example, 

in the study of plant Burawoy (1979, 2013), 

bargaining concession-union workers to give " 

the illusion " about the involvement of 

employees. The unit-wage system makes 

workers compete with coworkers, but also 

allows them to determine how they carry out 

their work duties (eg. How much effort is 

expanded using the piece rate system). However, 

this system divides workers, damages collective 

employee representation, and ultimately hides 

the fact that companies enjoy increased 

productivity while paying workers very little. 

Nyberg and Sewell (2014) also found evidence 

of an illusory compromise, in which a 'happy 

family' culture was built to persuade employees 

that union voice was not needed, which further 

legitimized managerial control over workers. 

Therefore, LP theory shows a deeper insight into 

power dynamics that are less visible and how 

they can be played through HR policies for 

voice. 

An important point for OB / HR 

audiences is that manager-employee 

collaboration must be understood in the context 

of different structural strengths and employer-

employee interests (Edwards et al., 2006; 

Belanger and Edwards, 2007). For example, 

silence as a form of 'cooperation' does not 

indicate that conflict has been eliminated, and 

when the interests of employers and employees 

are harmonized, the conflict persists. Likewise, 

if employees voice concerns cooperatively in 

supporting organizational goals, the underlying 

conflict of interest can persist, which can trigger 

voice in other contexts that damage the 

organization's goals. Likewise, if managers 

provide deeper employee voices and 

participation to secure cooperation, structural 

strength imbalances can persist. As Dobbins and 

Gunnigle (2009: 23) note, giving more voice to 

workers "is a new way to manage contradictions 

in work relationships and negotiate workplace 

order. Management control is not displaced but 

re-uses new guises. " 

LP further adds to the conceptualization 

of voice and silence by considering broader 

forces in the capital circuit, such as 

financialization and globalization. As stated in 

Thompson's (2003) Disconnected Capitalism 

Thesis (DCT), due to volatile markets and 

economic uncertainties, management's emphasis 

shifts to financialization, which tends to 

intensify HR around performance metrics driven 

by narrow markets (Cushen & Thompson, 

2016). As a result, managers often fail to give 

their side of the expected agreement (aka 

psychological contract violations), including 

denial or simply not being able to provide 

opportunities for employees to voice. This can 

trigger collective counter mobilization (eg, 

through trade unions), or produce a culture of 

silence either as a form of resistance or 

withdrawal of employees for fear of managerial 

retaliation. For example, in Artus (2013: 416) 

temporary workers have little access to union 

protection, and non-standard contract 

employees are more likely to remain silence 

because of insecurity and "permanent fear of 

opening their mouths". To some extent, silence 

can be seen as a way to correct erratic conditions 

and poor working conditions. 

Ramsay's 'cycle of control' (1977: 481) 

argues that "participation did not evolve from 

the humanization of capitalism, but appeared 

cyclically based on tightening conditions in the 

labor market". Therefore, managers are more 

likely to implement employee voice initiatives to 

ensure labor compliance when employer 

authority can be challenged by organized labor, 

such as during periods of increased union 

membership. However, Ackers, Marchington, 

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Wilkinson, and Goodman (1992) questioned 

Ramsay's thesis (1977) because of macro-level 

social focus. They found that because the 

organizational level managerial approach was 

reconfigured from time to time by interactions 

between many micro and macro-level forces, 

employee voice initiatives appeared in fluid 

'waves' rather than cycles. Therefore, when 

examining how employee voice and silence are 

shaped by a broader balance of social, political 

and economic power under capitalism, it is not 

the only approach and analysis of intra-

organization that remains important, including 

individual values, management choices and 

institutional regulations. 

Overall, LP analysis has a rich 

explanation of the contested nature of people 

management under contemporary capitalism, 

which adds to the utility of examining silence 

and voice. It interweaves and integrates with an 

IR perspective (especially a radical and critical 

pluralist frame), while also signifying discrete 

points of intellectual difference. LP helps explain 

how voice and silence can be an outcome and 

also the process that employees use to improve 

the exchange of reward-degrading efforts. 

Amelioration can include workers 'getting back' 

in management by hiding information; they are 

willing to 'hang out' with their coworkers and/or 

employers because of compromise or 'artificial 

agreement', or they may find themselves 

'hanging out' when facing a difficult job. 

Some of the influential forces discussed in 

LP research relate to OB, for example, 

managerial attitudes/perceptions, voice impact, 

voice vanity, and manager-employee exchanges. 

But, LP adds a valuable analytical lens, based on 

dynamic contestation of micro and macro-level 

strength, in antagonistic and unbalanced social 

relations. One possible way to integrate this 

debate and problem into a multi-layered voice 

and silence sensitivity framework is considered 

next. 

 

DISCUSSION 

 

Integrate IR, LP and OB perspectives: into a 

multi-layered voice and silence framework 

This article tries to give an overview of the 

position of OB, IR, and LP on the voice and 

silence of employees, showing their strengths 

and weaknesses. In advancing the research 

agenda in the future, we invite critical pluralist 

work that integrates OB, IR and LP perspectives 

to help develop HRM perspectives that are more 

heuristic than ease of voice and silence. 

  

Expanding HRM Research on " Voice " and " 

Silence " 

Research shows that a weak voice system 

allows the influence of workers that are shallow 

and narrow, prevents organizations from reaping 

the full benefits of worker's voice, and can 

trigger ' silence ' in the long term (Cullinane & 

Donaghey, 2014). Recognizing variations 

around the depth, scope, level, and shape of 

voice mechanisms can help the HR audience, 

including managers (Wilkinson et al., 2014). 

Voice formal and informal often occur 

simultaneously within the organization 

(Marchington & Suter, 2013). HRM, IR and LP 

perspectives can give more attention to face-to-

face informal voice, as is more captured in OB 

research (Morrison, 2011). Likewise, the OB 

literature can focus more on the behavior of 

actors in formal institutions that influence direct 

and representative voices, including trade 

unions, work councils, and civil society agents, 

as discussed in IR / LP. Besides, the HRM 

approach is generally biased towards the voice 

system initiated by management, but employees 

are more likely to secure a deeper voice by 

influencing voice initiation and requirements 

(Barry et al., 2018). Combining direct, formal, 

indirect and informal mechanisms can produce 

deeper conceptualizations of workers' voices, 

motives, and variable contested outcomes. 

Finally, the tradition of IR / LP does not need 

to be an impartial voice of non-union, classified 

the voice unions as effective and the voice of 

non-union is not effective, which has been 

deemed too simple (Cullinane & Dundon, 

2014). 

Although HRM discusses 'employee 

complaint procedures' and OB research 

considers alternative voice motives (Burris, 

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2012; Klaas, Olson-Buchanan, & Ward, 2012), 

this focus is mainly based on the unitary 

assumptions about the improvement-based voice 

that support shared interests (Barry & 

Wilkinson, 2016). Several OB studies note 

'organizational pluralism' that reflects the 

interests of different employer-employees 

(Morrison & Milliken, 2000), but too often the 

OB literature does not integrate cooperatives 

with conflict dynamics or combine internal and 

external factors around 'structured antagonism' 

(Dundon & Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 1986). 

Conversely, a more critical pluralist perspective 

emphasizes how employee voice and silence 

reflect long-lasting structural determinants, 

which are potentially at odds with employer-

employee interests, relational power imbalances, 

and changes in institutional and legal contexts 

that affect HR policies and practices. 

 A further consideration is needed in the 

HRM OB flow from these fundamental 

structural factors to better explain why 

employees express voice, regardless of what is 

deemed necessary to maintain organizational 

goals, and how employees can challenge 

management goals with resistance, damage or 

silence. Seeing voice and silence in this way can 

be considered by the HR audience as 

undermining management goals, but this 

depends on the context and, indeed, it can 

stimulate positive results for the long-term 

organization. 

  

Deepening HRM Theory About the Power 

That Forms " Voice " and " Silence " 

The proposed sensitivity framework is 

graphically depicted in Figs. 1, silence bil of 

Goodrich's (1920) 'frontier of control'. This 

builds and expands the "silence" which is 

debated by Donaghey et al. (2011: 61) through 

potentially integrative synergies in OB, HRM, 

IR, and LP, as discussed in the previous section 

so far. As noted in Fig. 1, some of these 

dimensions overlap between disciplinary 

boundaries, while others remain distinct and 

separate. Phase 1 describes the formation of 

interest 'and' antagonism structured 'as the basic 

principles that form the attitude of " silence " 

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and HR practices. OB's contributions include 

insights into pro-socialbehavior, informal voice, 

efficacy and safety, making common sense, 

emotions and the nature and behavior of 

individuals. Also, LP helps understand a variety 

of contextual influences including market and 

capitalism influences, management beliefs, 

depth and scope of voice, skills and gender 

identity (among others). Most important, LP 

theory links this with structured antagonism and 

the diverse interests of manager-employees. 

Contributions IR provides a canvas institutional 

smooth, unpack the dynamic interactions 

between contexts (eg markets, financialization), 

actor (eg, unions, management style, country, 

etc.), Process (for example, talks of trade unions, 

the depth and scope voice, etc.) and results (for 

example, feminization of work, temporary 

employment contracts, involvement or 

satisfaction). This idea encouraged a debate on 

HR that discussed how managers could balance 

internal and external forces that compete better 

under contemporary capitalism, to provide 

deeper employee voices and protect the 

sustainability of work practices. 

Factors that influence stage 1 join HR 

practices between organizations to form the 

formation of manager or employee interest, 

voice and silence. Most importantly, the effect of 

such mediation can coexist in the organization 

simultaneously, depending on the problem (for 

example, whether it is an employee's concern 

about wages, hours, etc . ; and suggestions that 

will make employee work more intense and 

repetitive), management or supervisory 

resources (including more latent powers) and the 

interests of employers or employees. What is 

important for HR viewers, depends on the 

unique configuration of Phase 1 (eg, 

management support or opposition to trade 

unions, market changes, employee supervision 

support, etc.), the type of HR practice that is 

applied can differ in various contexts. 

The interaction between the forces of 

Phase 1 helps explain the voice of sense, the 

attitude of " silence " the intentional and 

unintentional, and workers 'return', 'hang out' 

and 'hang out', as illustrated in Phases 2 and 3. 

Voice shallow or weak may cause 'intentional' 

and 'accidental' silence episodes or cultures. It is 

this can lead to an attitude of " silence " where 

workers are trying to 'get back' on their 

employer; for example by withholding 

information in various ways. Such silence can 

improve work experience that can be derived but 

can also reduce productivity and cooperation. 

Collaboration often occurs and coexists 

alongside dissatisfaction: if not, the relationship 

will stop over time (Johnstone & Wilkinson, 

2016). Thus, employees can pro-actively 'get 

along' with their work through compromise 

relationships, without contributing ideas or 

expressing complaints and being compliant, but 

do not have to commit to organizational goals. 

Furthermore, workers can deliberately withhold 

information or be emotionally and 

psychologically attractive but remain compliant. 

Fear, the potential for retribution and / or vanity 

in speaking can lead to employee silence 

(MacMahon et al., 2018). To some extent, 

silence can function as a rational coping 

mechanism for employees to 'survive' in their 

work. Similarly, employees can engage in ' 

meaningful voice ' through union bargaining and 

/ or non-union employee representative 

channels (Kaufman, 2014). However, the scope 

and level of such voices are not static or 

universal, but elastic and supported by 

structured antagonism. 

HR hearings will benefit from a more 

critical pluralist and integrative approach to 

explain whether, and if so why, silence workers 

to 'get back', 'get back' and / or 'get with'. All 

three actions show that the various interests of 

workers are not fulfilled and tend to prevent 

organizations from fully fulfilling their goals 

either now, or in the future. The task for the 

policymakers, HR practitioners, and academics 

OB / IR / LP, is to explore how to meet the 

interests of a better worker, for example by 

giving a voice that was initiated by workers 

more effectively and make the job is not 

degrading and unsafe. To this end, the 

sensitivity framework has the potential for 

broader public policies and the implications of 

organizational practice. 

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The last column, Phase 4, describes the 

results of voice and silence formed by how 

manager/employee interests, structural 

antagonisms, and HR policy interventions 

subsequently mediate the interaction of social 

relations mentioned earlier in Stages 1, 2 and 3. 

Recognizing structural antagonisms can 

arguably add insight deeper understanding of 

HR. why employees can express " voice " to 

challenge management as a dynamic force, as 

well as to support organizational goals. This is 

not to judge whether the behavior of employees 

(or indeed HR managers) is good or bad in 

mobilizing resources for certain interests. 

Integrative contributions are based on the 

knowledge generation social science paradigm to 

develop a heuristic picture of why workers can 

speak or not by placing HR voice and silence in 

a multi-level political economy and institutional 

framework (Kaufman, 2014; Thompson, 2013; 

Wilkinson et al., 2018). 

The last column, Phase 4, Review of voice 

and silence results compiled by the interests of 

managers or employees, structural antagonisms, 

and HR policy interventions then mediate the 

social relationships discussed earlier in Stages 1, 

2 and 3. Recognize antagonisms that can be said 

to embellish HR dialogue the deeper. Why 

employees can support voice to challenge 

management, as well as to support 

organizational goals. This is not to judge 

whether employees (or indeed HR managers) 

are good or bad in mobilizing resources for 

certain purposes. Integrative contributions are 

based on the social science paradigm of 

knowledge generation to develop heuristic 

classifications of workers' speeches that can 

speak or not by using " voice " and " silence " on 

the perspective of HR in multi-level political 

economy and improving work safety (Kaufman, 

2014; Thompson, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2018). 

 

CONCLUSIONS  

 

This article reviews the perspectives of 

OB, IR, and LP to develop a multi-layer and 

multi-level conceptual framework that can be 

used by HR academics and practitioners to 

better understand employee voices, and more 

important is employee silence. " Voice " and " 

silence " research in the perspective of OB has 

used, but can be integrated with IR-LP fusion, 

which connects actors, processes, and 

institutions, while instilling micro-relationships 

in the workplace with contexts of change and 

socio-political continuity and meso-social 

politics. Our framework contributes to 

understanding " voice " and " silence " as a 

dynamic interface that combines formal and 

informal, direct or indirect and structures or 

institutions in the context of imbalance 

structural forces and diverse interests. 

Designing a system of " voice " that is 

effective to provide benefits to workers and 

organizations in the future requires 

conceptualization more in what the " voice ", 

and understand the impact the attitude of " 

silence " for a different purpose in its own right. 

This framework discusses voice and " silence " 

from the perspective of HRM by considering 

how it reflects 'structured antagonism' as an 

imbalance of deeply rooted forces that are 

formed in layers. Related, work talks also 

encourage HR hearings for critical voice 

criticism given to employees. This includes a 

discussion of their level, level, and discussion 

space, how indirect and informal voices can be 

approved in the form of direct HR and whether 

employees can start voice practices (Barry et al., 

2018). 

Second, the framework seeks to explain 

the situational factors internal and external 

multi-dimensional and social relationships that 

form the shape and pattern of silence employees 

in the context (ie., Silence deliberate silence 

unintentional, voice meaningful). These include 

OB ideas around pro-social motivation, 

psychological security, identity, images, group 

norms, position strength, perceptions, emotions, 

leadership and colleague relations (Morrison, 

2011, 2014; Morrison & Milliken, 2000, 2003 ). 

Nonetheless, the IR / LP's insights on 

'structured antagonism' embedded in the 

management process of people capture the 

broader external political-economic forces 

operating under capitalism (Thompson, 2013). 

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This framework also offers deeper meanings of 

silence, for example, perhaps reflecting the 

strategies of workers 'getting back', 'getting 

along' and 'getting-by'. Hopefully, this will 

trigger debate among HR hearings about how to 

better meet the problems of different workers, for 

the benefit of employees, organizations, and 

society. 

This analysis calls for a future research 

agenda that examines, refutes and adjusts the 

source of the influence of the relationship about 

voice and silence as a resource that can be 

silence and more veiled. To gain a fuller and 

deeper insight, future research can be based on a 

critical pluralist approach that links the actions 

of micro individuals with the context of meso 

organization and broader macroeconomic 

political forces. Examining how workers, trade 

unions, local, state managers, shareholders, 

consumers and civil society groups form " voices 

" and " silences " can further enrich the more 

reflective HR knowledge base. Such research 

can use qualitative and / or quantitative 

instruments designed to investigate 'why' 

employees remain silence or 'how' employers 

limit the voice of employees who socially 

regulate the form of silence attitudes generated 

or systematically. Ignoring the internal and 

external challenges facing HR managers about 

voice and silence also deserves attention to 

stimulate debate around how to better balance 

this tension without suppressing employee 

interests. 

Although OB unitary posture that 

supports the goals of the organization has been 

criticized, it does not mean that well-established 

psychological research methodology has limited 

appeal. Indeed, capturing employee and 

management attitudes about silence is important 

and has a valuable contribution to make, but it 

can benefit from relationships with structured 

antagonism and macro-level political economy 

power. A challenge here is still about how to 

encourage rich interdisciplinary research using a 

disciplined approach that addresses related 

phenomena but speak in alternative dialects of 

meaning and understanding. To this end, future 

research may explore the " silence " of his 

employees in connection with the issue and 

inter-disciplinary methodology that reflects the 

fragmentation of work, the pressures and 

demands precarious, flexible working 

arrangements, the determination of 

remuneration or wages and the extent to which 

employers enter, or exclude workers when 

designing voice settings. We hope this 

framework offers future research pathways for 

HR / OB / IR / LP scholars and practitioners to 

better explore empirical nuances about employee 

silence . 

              

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