Focus 2002.tif 102 Focus Oll German Studies Buchges., 1999. 162-180. Tanzer, Ulrike. Fratlenbii.der im Werk Marie von Ebner-Eschellbachs. Stuttgart Verlag Hans- Dieter Heinz, Akademischer Verlag, 1997. 174-180. Toegel, Edith. ,,'Entsagungsmut' in Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach's works: A Female-Male Perspective." Forumfor l'vlodern Langwge StudieJ- 28.2 (1992):140-149. - - -. Man'e VOll Ebner-Eschenbach. Leben und Werk. Austrian Culture Bd. 25. Hrsg. Harry Zohn. New York: Peter Lang, 1997. 51-61. Eighteenth-Century Origins of the Self and Other in the third Earl of Shaftesbw::y and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Matthew Binney .. primaIy concern in postInodemist theory and moral philosophy Ed is the relationship between the individual, as self, and the other, the externalized world outside the reasoning subject. The debate between Michel Foucault and Jiirgen Habermas crystallizes this discussion in which Foucault sees the connection of self and other as a proliferation of power. In this relatiooship, the individual and the community outside of her are in constant relational positionings of power, where the gaze of the other plays an important role in connecting the other to the subject. Habermas wants to define this relationship in terms of intersubjectivity and solidar­ ity, in which thought processes within individuals themselves facilitate the connection of the subject and the other in discourse. Tlus intersubjective notion represents the latest attempt to provide an aJ temative to John Rawls' theory of justice, which has been criticized by critics on many fronts (Moon 157-15 9). In order to better understand this latest theory, one must look for the origins of Habermas' conception of the incLviduai in relation to a community. One can see the influences on this thought in the defining moment in Western philosophy's conception of the self and other in the third Earl of Shaftesbury and G. W Leibniz' moral philosophies. As many critics note, such as Ernest Tuveson, the initial stirrings of the discussion on the connection between the self and the other fmd their birth in the problems of egoism that Thomas Hobbes and John LDcke initiate in their thought (75). Hobbes, of course, maintains that humans see the world through brutish and self-serving eyes, where the connection between the self and the other reflects a mere assertion of wills as one group attempts to assert its localized ideals upon the other. Locke compli­ cates this conception as well in his notion of innate ideas. That is, humans enter the world like a blank slate, tabula rasa, without any common, con­ necting notions that would create a bridge between the desires of the indi­ vidual and the desires of the community. This is the notion of the self and 102 Focus Oll German Studies Buchges., 1999. 162-180. Tanzer, Ulrike. Frauenbii.der im Werk Marie von Ebner-Eschenbachs. Stuttgart: Verlag Hans- Dieter Heinz, Akademischer Verlag, 1997. 174-180. Toege~ Edith. ,,'Entsagungsmut' in Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach's works: A Female-Male Perspective." Forum for l'vlodern Langwge StudieJ· 28.2 (1992):140-149. - - -. Man'e von Ebner-Eschenbach. Leben Imd Werk. Austrian Culture Bd. 25. Hrsg. Harry Zohn. New York: Peter Lang, 1997. 51-61. Eighteenth-Century Origins of the Self and Other in the third Earl of Shaftesbury and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Matthew Binney .,. primaIy concern in postnloderoist theory and moral philosophy Ed is the relationship between the individual, as self, and the other, the externalized world outside the reasoning subject. The debate between Michel Foucault and Jiirgen Habermas crystallizes this discussion in which Foucault sees the connection of self and other as a proliferation of power. In this relatiooship, the individual and the community outside of her are in constant relational positionings of power, where the gaze of the other plays an important role in connecting the other to the subject. Habermas wants to define this relationship in terms of intersubjectivity and solidar­ ity, in which thought processes within individuals themselves facilitate the connection of the subject and the other in discourse. Thls intersubjective notion represents the latest attempt to provide an aJ temative to John Rawls' theory of justice, which has been criticized by critics on many fronts (Moon 157-159). In order to better understand this latest theory, one must look for the origins of Habermas' conception of the ind1vidual in relation to a community. One can see the influences on this thought in the defining moment in Western philosophy's conception of the self and other in the thUd Earl of Shaftesbury and G. W Leiboiz' moral philosophies. As many critics note, such as Ernest Tuveson, the illitial stirrings of the discussion on the connection between the self and the other ftnd their birth in the problems of egoism that Thomas Hobbes and John Locke initiate in their thought (75). Hobbes, of course, maintains that humans see the world through brutish and self-serving eyes, where the connection between the self and the other reflects a mere assertion of wills as one group attempts to assert its localized ideals upon the other. Locke compli­ cates this conception as well in his notion of innate ideas. That is, humans enter the world like a blank. slate, tabula rasa, without any common, con­ necting notions that would create a bridge between the desires of the indi­ vidual and the desires of the community This is the notion of the self and 104 105 Focus on German Studies the other that the third Earl of Shaftesbury seeks to remedy in the formu­ lation of his moral philosophy. The third Earl of Shaftesbury studies under Locke and closely e~es Locke's arguments on innate ideas and the construction of thought ill empiricism, collecting primary and secondary ideas to construct con­ cepts. Shaftesbury sees this approach as problematic because it does not readily allow for people to come together in discourse to agree upon ideas that everyone within a community could accept- As a response to Locke and Hobbes' formulations, Shaftesbury posits a theory of sensibility, or enthusiasm - a latent, innate sense of intrinsic quality in experience apart from selfish interest- Everyone possesses this intrinsic quality because ev­ eryone exists or operates within a system of social interaction. Leibniz sees this notion of Shaftesbury as an important step for­ ward in providing a connection between the individual and the other. Like Shaftesbury, Leibniz acknowledges that the intrinsic notion of sensibility could be disrupted in some manner by the inability of individuals to use right reason to interpret the natural world that God has created (Brown 438). Shaftesbury avoids the problem of having individuals exercise wrong reason through his concept of self reflection - that is, reflection upon self and natural affections. Leibniz, on the other hand, avoids this misuse of reason through positing that God Creates a natural connection of love that forces the individual to recognize the desires of the community which are the dictates of God. Importantly though, Leibniz recognizes in Shaftesbury this role of sensibilites to provide foundations for discourse between the self and the other (apart from how these sensibilites could be distorted) . One can achieve a clearer understanding of this notion of sensiblity which connects the individual to the other in Shaftesbury's philosophy through seeing its later, altered form in Habermas' concept of solidarity. Through applying Habermas' theory to Shaftesbury's and Leibniz' moral philoso­ phies, one can trace the development of this important idea of connecting the self and the other and can clarify the distinctions between Shaftesbury and Leibniz, noting why Shaftesbury's concept, rather than Leibniz' proves mOre effective as a tool for later moral philosophers to use. Indeed Leibniz relies upon the role of God as a facilitator be­ tween the individual and the community, whereas Shaftesbury relies upon a notion of the passions (enthusiasm) coupled with the notion of a univer­ sal mind. Shaftesbury's conception of natural and unnatural affections re­ flects a Habermasian conception of solidiarity, externalizing the notion of Eighteenth-Century Origins of Self and Other good in the individual to the notion of good in the community. Shaftesbury and I....eibniz both see this process as flawed in some instances (especially since they both work to argue against the self-serving egoi.sm in Hobbes), but Shaftesbury's theory posits a practical methodology much more in line with Habermas, because the Englishman provides a means for the partici­ pant in discourse to work through his or her desires to make them con­ form to the community, whereas Leibniz relies upon fOlmding this con­ nection solely upon the participants' understanding of the love of God. In essence, through this use of the role of God, Leibniz experiences similar problems that he tries to avoid in H obbes, where, resembling H obbes' sovereign, Leibniz uses the love of God as the controlling factor in con­ necting the subject and the other. In such a construction, the connection between the self and other can only be made by something external to the person's mind itself. In contrast, Shaftesbury empowers the participants by providing them with a functional and personal methodology to connect the subject to the other; this connection begins in the autonomy of the individual's mind Shaftesbury's most important ideas which explain his connection between the self and other appear in "Inquiry Concerning Virtues", which was originally published in 1699 and again in a collection of other essays in Characteristics oj Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) The first step in understanding Shaftesbury's notions of the individual and the other in "Inquiry" requires that one look at his notion of "System." Shaftesbury treats the living world holistically as a unified ecolOgical system (Redding 86). In this system, the world exists as an interdependent, correlating body, in which, like a living body, the different parts rely upon the others to function properly in unison, "there is a system of all alumals: all animal order or economy according to which the animal affairs are regulated and disposed" (1: 169). That is, an order exists within "arumal affairs" where the interdependent processes of life are "regulated and disposed." As one moves outside the nmctions of animals, one can continue to observe this order until he Or she fmally encounters a "system of all things, a universal nature" (1 : 169) - a complex web of inanimate and animate objects that are all interconnected. For Shaftesbury, the human subject's body and mind inhabit such a complex web of order, standing, like other living things, in necessary relations to objects surrounding them. This relation proves necessary be­ cause the human subject must rely upon that external world to function 104 Focus 011 German Studies the other that the third Earl of Shaftesbury seeks to remedy in the formu­ lation of ills moral philosophy. The third Earl of Shaftesbury studies under Locke and closely examines Locke's arguments on innate ideas and the construction of thought in empiricism, collecting primary and secondary ideas to construct con­ cepts. Shaftesbury sees this approach as problematic because it does not readily allow for people to come together in discourse to agree upon ideas that everyone within a community could accept- As a response to Locke and Hobbes' formulations, Shaftesbury posits a theory of sensibility, or enthusiasm - a latent, innate sense of intrinsic quality in experience apart from selfish interest Everyone possesses this intrinsic quality because ev­ eryone exists or operates within a system of social interaction. Leibniz sees this notion of Shaftesbury as an important step for­ ward in providing a connection between the individual and the other. Like Shaftesbury, Leibniz acknowledges that the intrinsic notion of sensibility could be disrupted in some manner by the inability of individuals to use right reason to interpret the natural world that God has created (Brown 438). Shafiesbury avoids the problem of having individuals exercise wrong reason through ills concept of self reflection - that is, reflection upon self and natural affections. Leibniz, on the other hand, avoids this misuse of reason through positing that God creates a natural connection of love that forces the individual to recognize the desires of the community which are the dictates of God. Importantly though, Leibniz recognizes in Shaftesbury this role of sensibilites to provide foundations for discourse between the self and the other (apart from how these sensibilites could be distorted) . One can acilleve a clearer understanding of this notion of sensiblity which connects the individual to the other in Shaftesbury's philosophy through seeing its later, altered form in Habermas' concept of solidarity. Through applying Habermas' theory to Shaftesbury's and Leibniz' moral philoso­ pilles, one can trace the development of this important idea of connecting the self and the other and can clarify the distinctions between Shaftesbury and Leibniz, noting why Shaftesbury's concept, rather than Leibniz' proves mOre effective as a tool for later moral philosophers to use. Indeed Leibniz relies upon the role of God as a facilitator be­ tween the individual and the community, whereas Shaftesbury relies upon a notion of the passions (enthusiasm) coupled with the notion of a univer­ sal mind. Shaftesbury's conception of natural and unnatural affections re­ flects a Habermasian conception of solidiarity, externalizing the notion of Eighteenth-Century Origins of Self and Other 105 good in the individual to the notion of good in the community. Shaftesbury and Leibniz both see this process as flawed in some instances (especially since they both work to argue against the self-serving egoi.sm in Hobbes), but Shaftesbury's theory posits a practical methodology much more in line with Habermas, because the Englislunan provides a means for the partici­ pant in discourse to work through ills or her desires to make them con­ form to the community, whereas Leibniz relies upon fOlmding this con­ nection solely upon the participants' understanding of the love of God. In essence, through tills use of the role of God, Leibniz experiences simila.r problems that he tries to avoid in H obbes, where, resembling H obbes' sovereign, Leibniz uses the love of God as the controlling factor in con­ necting the subject and the other. In such a construction, the connection between the self and other can only be made by something external to the person's mind itself. In contrast, Shaftesbury empowers the participants by providing them with a functional and personal methodology to connect the subject to the other; this connection begins in the autonomy of the individual's mind Shaftesbury's most important ideas willch explain ills connection between the self and other appear in "Inquiry Concerning Virtues", willch was originally published in 1699 and again in a collection of other essays in Characteristics oj Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711) The first step in understanding Shaftesbury's notions of the individual and the other in "Inquiry" requires that one look at ills notion of "System." Shaftesbury treats the living world holistically as a unified ecolOgical system (Redding 86). In this system, the world exists as an interdependent, correlating body, in willch, like a living body, the different parts rely upon the others to function properly in unison, "there is a system of all animals: an animal order or economy according to willch the animal affairs are regulated and disposed" (1: 169). That is, an order exists within "animal affairs" where the interdependent processes of life are "regulated and disposed." As one moves outside tile functions of animals, one can continue to observe tills order until he or she finally encounters a "system of all things, a universal nature" (1: 169) - a complex web of inanimate and animate objects that are all interconnected. For Shaftesbury, the human subject's body and mind inhabit such a complex web of order, standing, like other living tillngs, in necessary relations to objects surrounding them. Tills relation proves necessary be­ cause the human subject must rely upon that external world to function 106 Fotu.J on Germ:m 5rudies properly withtn a system, as the limbs of the body are necessary for the functioning of the entire body. W e any o ther animal wh.idl has "relation to some other being or nanue besides his own" ot: which "points beyond himsel~" the human being will "undoubtedly be esteemed a part of some other system" (1: 168). This characteristic of "pointing beyond itself" emphasizes the particIpation of the human in me system, not only physi­ cally. bUI menuUy as weU. Since the human min~ for Shaftesbury, exists within an interdependent relation to o thcr minds, then, human minds ulti­ mately form a system o f minds, as one moves outward, beyond the indi­ vidual. It is important to notc. that with this no tion of system, Shaftesbury effectively creates a new perspective upon the mind and the body in West­ ern thought. He claims that minds cannOl be conceived as substantially distinct &om peop le's bodies, and SU1ce the hwnan's mind itself points beyond itself to o ther things, no metaphysical barrier exists which wouJd pre\'ent the individual mind from directly engaging with o dler rrunds in a world where «everything is governed, ordered Or regutued for the beSt by a designing prinople o r mind" (1: 165). T luough these relations between minds. the indiVidual can participate wlthin the divine or uruve~al rrund. a mind wruch is essentJ2l1y me system of all living minds (Reddulg87). Hence, through Shaftesbucy's formulation of system, he an connect me indio vidual as a thinkmg subject to a general community of rrunds; individuals within a system ace necessarily connected physically and mentally because they function widun the same order as omers. \Vith dus concepaon of the individual 's mind as a portion of a who le,living mind -system,. Shaftesbury can stress the impo[tance of the cole of the indiVidual as he en ernali2es his ideas iruo an outside space, inhabited by ocher minds seeking their own desires. In this interconnected system of mi.nds, the individual mind reaches out to engage wilh objccts in tbe world from its rootedness in the human body and from the biased perspective of this body: '~'(Ie know that every creanl[e has a private good and interest of his own which Nature has compelled him to seek, by all the advam:ages afforded lurn within the Compass of his make. We know that there IS in reality a right and a wrong state of every cfearure, and that his oght-one is by nature forwarded and by himself affectionately sought" (1: 167). Here. Shaftesbury acknowledges that the thinking subject is a desir· ing subject. wludl seeks a "povate good and interest of hiS own." At the same time, Slu.ftesbury wants to emphaslZe that since each mdwidua1 stands wnhin a larger, living system, humans can focus on their pcivate affections Eighteenth-Century Origms of Self mel Other 107 and work toward their own private good, willie at the same time, tbey can develop naturnl social affections directed towards Ule g~ o.f .dle syst~m of which uley are a part - the system Ulal relies on their tnd.1Vldual exiSt· ence and identiry (Redding 87). When minds seek somcuung (good or bad), then the mind's yeammgs affect the enme system as a whole: '~lf any being be wholly and really ill, II must be ill Wlm respect to dIe wuversal system, and Ulen t.he system of the uoJ\'erse is ill or Imperfect" (~: 169). Though the subject seeks to fulfill Its desires wlUlm Ule system, It must seek the desires "forwarded" by " nature" because the correct desires will keep the individual from making herself or the entire "system of the uni. verse" "ill." ll ere ulis notion of "natU(e" plays an Important role, but befo(e examining thi~ idea, o ne must e.J:amine people's mmds in the world , where feelings or affections playa connecting role between the isolallon o~ the individual's mind and its position within the system of human mlOds. Shaftesbury rejecrs the idea o f an absolure viewpomt from which the.world can be perceived free of subJcctwe conditions (Reddlllg 89). SubJective experiences become meaningful because people eXIst WI!.hlO a system, and this system becomes larger as one moves outward from the individual's mind. but no fin:tl position of dlscernmem existS where one can perceive all minds or where one can observe all minds obJccuvely. Each person views the system f[Om their isolated posiuons and their Isolated attempts to seek private goods. As a result, people can, of course, make errors when perceiving the world and invesugaung values; errors of .d.lSCemnlel~t OCCllr because people are, in some sense, limited in their views (Reddmg 89). Since people have !imired perspecuves in viewlI1g the 'world, th~y need to possess a methodology that would circumvent these problems III fonnu­ latingdesircs. That is, [hey would need a practice that would allow the.1ll to extcmalize positive desires into a public setting. Shaftesbury accomphshes this through his no tion of sympathy or enthusiasm. . Shafresbury argues that sympathy, emhuslaslll. or passions for the other (an understanding o f "nalure", plays a necessary role in connecting With the minds of o thers to the system, through communicating. I n order to exhibit how o ne can commUnicate through sympathy, Shaftesbllry diS· tinguishes between twO sets o f emotions in his theory: pri"":te an.d natural affections. Private affections are rooted in dlC desires of the mdNldual and his or her idea of private good, willie natunU affecbons aTe roared in the good of the community (2: 196). Slflce indiVIduals' desires playa necessary 108 F(J(US (m German Studies role tn the system, they playa necessary role in virtue, and Virtue, for Shaftesbury IS rooted in tbe naruce of humans' sociabthry that arises from their affections (Klein 56). Since humans inhabit a syslem of mrerlocking and mterconneccing minds, then. in order to perpetuate goodness Wllhin the entu:e system, one would have to reflect naNn! affections that con­ form to the affecbons withIn the system's whole. These natural affecbons are bcoughr about through a "communicative or social principlc" (2: 193) - a sociabiliry - where people derive pleasure in society from " that enjoy­ ment of participation and community which is so essential to O Uf happi­ ness" (2; 205). People enjoy "p leasures of sympat11y" through an "enjoy­ ment of good by communication, a receiving it, as it were, by reflection o r by way of particIpation Ul the good of others, and a pleasing conscious­ ness of the actual love, merited esteem or approbation of others" (2: 2(4). Here communiCiDon between dle individual and the other invo lves a par­ ticipation in the "good of others." People that corrununicne are sociable bec2Use they on Cl.'Pect (0 panicipare positively through discourse widl o thers, a "pleasmg consciousness." T he mind is constantly engaged com­ municatively With o ther mUlds with whom the mdividual shares sympa­ cllenc emotions and affections. In order to enJOY tile connection through commurucation, the individual's relaDon to Otller.; relies upon his or her abilIty to order his or her natural affections, to crcate an «economy." One must conform his private affections to the ertema1 natural affections, "a creature must have an his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and temper, suitable and agreeing with the good of his kind or of that system m which he is included and of whidl he constitutes a parr" (2: 192). Because of his o r her necessary role in the system, the individual must order his or her affections in such a way to Ill:l.ke them "good" for the "system," In com­ municating SOCially with the o ther, the individual's passions become an important device in ordering the affections, «in the passions and affec­ tions of particular creatures, tllere is a constant relation to clle Interest o f a species or common nature" (2: 192). That IS, the affections or emo uons of the mdividual connect Ule individual to "common nature." Shaftesbury gives examples of these natural emotions; in «the ose of natural affec­ tions, parentll kmdness, zeal for posterity, concern for the propagation and nurrure of the young, love of fellowslup and company, compassion, murual succour and the good of the species or common nature is 3S proper and natural to him as it is to any organ, paeror member of an arumal body" Eighteenth-Century O cigtns of Self and Other 109 (2: 192). Here, the ordering process of the affections tnvolvcs .rec~lZing «fellowship" or connectedness between hunnn mtnds, and tillS fDen~s~p is never linked [Q status or hierarchy (Dltnn 130). Through (ccogruzmg thiS disinterested , emotiona l inclination tn each other, a natural affection, tilen individuals would want to order therr pOV3.te affections to conform to those externally-doven passions of fellowslup, . . Even tilough the emouons provide a bodge between tile Indi­ vidual and lhe other, the affections only form the foundations of human morality; reason must be used to properly order lhese affections according to tills fe llowship, Human morality, though It anses in the feelings, IS a phenomenon of conseioUStleSs and rationality as well because "solUld and well-established reason" alone constitutes a " jUSt affecnon" (1: 116). As noted earlier while humans are naturally soctable and natut:ally capable of virtue, they ~re not, to speak precisely, naturally good o r ~rtuous; ~ne must construct an "economy of t.he passions" (2 198). Vtrtue reqUites training and wor~ for Vtrtue is nOI merely an affecDve disposition, but affection raised to a conSClOUS ponciple mthe rauonal agenl by reflecnon on disinterested natural affection and the sorts of actions endorsed by affection (Klein 56). Thus m the "l nquiry," the uldtvldual as t.lunking sub­ ject and IOdividual as a necessary member of a commurucaU\'e system play complemenClry roles. Moral insight, for Shaftesbury, reqUires, first. that one see hinlSClf o r herself as a thinking subject, and then he or she must move into a relation wldun a system of 1lllnds; one must order his or her i.nternal parts to, then, reflect lus or her eli:lenu.1 relatlot\S. O ne must first, hive Illmself or herself off from ex ternal authOolY and deploy the re­ sources of the interior (a ffec tion and reason). The fundamental insight of moral feeung and reflection is onc's connected ness to ot.llers and the fUIl­ damental demand tllat one act rationally to benefit them (Kletn 57). For Shaftesbury, "social love, friendship, gratttude or whatever else is of tius generous kind does by lI S llaNre uke place o f the sdf-i:nterestin~ paSSions, draws us out of ourselves" (2: 193). That IS, people fonnulate dest:!es \\'ttlun their priw te good, but must order o r orgaruze these deSires Within an ex­ ternal cOnterl through recogniZing the natllral emollons, such as "SOCial love;' "friendslllp," "!undness;' "compassion." Only Ulen, mil we be drawn "out of oursekes" and propedy ground human nlOra.ltl)', when we deter­ mine whidl narura1 and self affecbonS might be tOO strong or tOO weak (2: 2(0). when we exclude "self passions" thaI prove «tOO intense o r strong" (2,216). 110 Focus on German Studies This propcr balance o r o rdering of the affections, ulrimately cre­ ates the means of connection between the indMduai and the othcr, People must learn to exclude unnarural affections (K1ein 58). because «to have those horrid, monstrous and unnatural affections tS to be miserable to the highest degree" (2: 229). Through recognizing lhe coaeet affections to possess in an envtrOnment of others, the individual places herself Within a culrural discourse. Indeed, the altering of affections inVlles a cuhural dis­ course since it offers a tegones by which individuals can be located with respect [0 social o r cultural formations (Klein 59). Through examining affecDons, people can recognize when their passions do nOt conform with the community, and peop le can alter these affections to help Situate them better widlin the system. Hence, in stressing the affections, Shaftesbury stresses the importance o f mo ral autonomy, because the individual's mind becomes a place where different "opinions" o f society can be evalualed. Here Shaftesbury places the seat of the connecaon between the self and the adler, the indIVidual's passionate and autonomous rrund. Shaftesbury construC[S his connecaon between the subjeC[ and dIe o bJect by ground. ing thts link upon the IOdtvidual's emotions. Lelbna, o n the OIher hand, moves for a foundation that hes outside the individual, and he constructs this connection through the no tio n of narurallaw. Important in Lelbniz' moral philosophy is his formulatio n of a law o f narure, or the o rder of the uru,"erse through whtch humans can come to know God. Leibn.iz, like Shaftesbury, attempts to SIde step dIe self· ISOlating problems thar anse from H obbes and Locke. and the Ger· man philosopher attempts 10 do dlis through Ius nouon o f ''Pre-cstab· lished Harmony" which he uses to construCt his enure philosophy: By nature every Simple substance has perception, and that its indi­ viduality consists in the perpetual law which brings about the se· quence of perceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally fro m one ano ther, to represent the body dUll is allotted to It, and through its instrumentality dIe entne uni\"er:se, U1 accordance widl the point of view proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive its pan adapts itself to dIe wishes o f the soul by its own laws, and consequendy omy obeys it according to the promptings of these laWs. \'(/hence it follows that the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depend s o nly upon God wd upon i[self in itS actions. (TJl'odifJ 304) Eighlcenlh.Cemucy Ociginsof Self and Other 111 Here "simple substances" Qatcr monads) reflect the natural law o f dIe world around them. TIllS substance "adapts itself to the wishes o f the soul" oc the all encompassmg law, and the "slluple substance" arranges Itself 10 accordance to the "promptulgs of these laws.'~ A nurror·hke rcla· uonship exists where the hamlOny o f God's law IS reflected witlun the individual substances. Simply put, God's law reflects or equals narurallaw. Leibniz uses tlus concep t o f natucal law to ultimately relOforce his overarching nOtion thai God creates this world as the best of all possible worlds: God " is determined by this same goodness, untied to an infinite wisdo m, and by the very concourse of alllhe previous and p:trticular ~lch­ natio ns towaros each good, and towards lhe prcvenllllg of each evd, to produce the best possible deSign of things" ("'Reflcxio ns" 402). Since God has created the "best possible deSign of dUngs" wldtin the construct of his law wd natural law, and humans can have access to tillS nan.ara1 Jaw through theu: enstence 2S subst:atlces in the uruverse, then God's narure representS a perfect form, from wluch people can extract "wISdom" wd "goodness." Through tlus nOllon o f ordered "goodness" o f natural law based upo n pre.established harmo ny, Lelbniz wishes to argue against a world where " Wisdom, goodness, justice [o r right] are o nly fic Dons in relauon to God and the universe" (,,'Reflexions" 838). Here Leibruz places his nOllon of a pre-established law of h.u:mony in opposition to H obbes' nouon of a sovereign. who "-;l.cts through the necessity of Its power and nOt !'Y the choice of its wisdom" ("Re nexions" 399). Hobbes eas, accordmg to Leibniz, because the Englislunw sees God as 2 powe rful sovereign who forces Ius dictares upon tile ruled; in contrast, Lelblllz asserts that human s follow God's law because il constinlles a ''wise'' decisio n which confo rms to the natural harmony of lhe universe. In Lelbniz' U1uvcrse " laws of Na· lure are neither enllCely necessary no r entirely arbitrary [ ... J they are a choice o f the mOS t perfect wisdom" (The()(ufJ3 3-1). Conversely,ln Ut'lIJlholl, Hobbes states dlat laws are only properly called laws " If we conSider [them] as delivered to lhe word of God, that by eight commandedl all dungs" (111). In -;I. later. discuSSion of the kmgdom of God, Hobbes explains that "the Right of Narure, whereby God relgnedl ovec mcn, and pUOlsheth those that break his Lawes, IS to be denved [, .. 1 from Ius Irreslsl1ble Power" (Ul'io/hOl/2: 246) ; for Hobbes, irresistible power rules by nature (Brown 414). ''To those therefore whose Power is lITesisnble," Ho bbes adds, "the 112 FoCUJ 011 German Studies dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power, and consequently it is from t1l3.t Power, t113.t the Kingdome over men, and dIe Right of Afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almightly" (247). God forces humans to accept his will through powee. Against this, Leibniz argues that justice, or right, must be fOUflded in wis­ dom and goodness, "goodness guided by wisdom [ ... ] makes dIe justice of God"; Leibniz adds d'l3.t ''Justice docs not depend upon arbitrary laws of superioes, but on the eternal rules of wisdom and of goodness, in men as well as in God" ("Reflexions" 403). These rules are eternal and good be­ cause they reflect the rational, pre-established harmony of the universe. Hence, a sovereign docs not force people to accept these rules through "Power," but people would adopt these rules because they reflect the natu­ ral wd rational order of the universe. Leibniz states this point in Theodicy where "precep ts of natural law assume the reasonableness and justice of tlut which is enjoined, and that it would be man's duty to practice what they contain" (242). Narurallaw reflects God's laws; hence, if one chooses to follow narural law, then he or she must choose to follow the law ulti­ mately that emanates from the harmony of the uni\'erse, the law of divine undemanding. Since one can acquire wisdom and goodness through conforming himself or herself to natural law, then one must ask how the truly virtuous person can be motivated to right action through conforming his ideas to this universal harmony. Leibniz argues that one would find motivation through God, who is, after aU, a morally perfect being and the origin from which natural, just law springs (Brown 422). Leibniz argues that the con­ nection between the virruous man and God rests within reason where "God's dom.:un, the dominion of wisdom, is that of reason'" (Theodiry323) and, similarly, man's "dominion is that of reason" too (Theorliry322). How­ ever, man can will wrongly. whereas God ''who always wills wl'l3.t is most to be desired [. .. ] has no need of the power [0 change his will" (Theodicy 323). But, humans can perceive the just laws of natu(c because, "God, in giving (man] intelligence, has prese.nted him with an image of the Divin­ ity" (Theodiq 215). Hence, the virruous man must observe the natural laws that God has established through the Pre--establ1shed Harmony to arrive at a natural "light of reason" (Theodiry 91), that will guide the virruous man towards God's perfection. Here Leibniz provides his connection between the self and the other. \1;/hen virtuous people follow the narura1 laws, then they will be Eighteenth-Century Origins of Self and Other 113 lifted into a love o f God, and through their shared experience of the love of God, individll3.ls can form norms thal would reflect the harmony of the universe. Simply put, one's love of God will result in taking the great­ est pleasure in willing what God wills, i.e., the common good. When ooe possesses a love of God, then he or she possesses a dIsinterested love for his or her fellow humans. For Leibniz the "necessity of good [···1 be­ comes effective not through the mete essence of clIings, bllt through that which is outside them and above them, that is, through the will of God" (Theodiry 381). People become "good" to others through adopting God's natura.l laws which exist outside and above them, a.nd their love of God a.llows them to connect to one another. Leibniz expounds upon this no­ tion of a virtuous connection to God: TillS necessity is called moral, because for the wise what is neces­ sary and what is owing are equivalent things; and when it is al .... '".lys followed by its effect, as it lfldeed is in the perfectly wise, that is, in God, one can say that it is a happy necessity. The more nearly creatures approach this, the closer do they come to perfect felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kind is not the necessity one endeavours to avoid, and willch destroys morality. (TheodifJ 387) One follows this «necessity of good" because it reflects lhe "happy neces­ sity" of God in willch individuals reach outside of dlcmselves, o~tside of their own personal concerns to connect to adler$. One would an IJl such a way that pcrperuates the "necessity of good" "because one desires it" (Thtodicy 387). This kind of desire represents, for Leihlllz, love because this desire is independent of human questions of hope. of fear. and of regard for any question of utilitY- In trudl, the happiness or "felicity," of dIe adler whose happiness pleases the subject nlms into the subject'S own happiness, since things which please the indiVldual are desired for their own sake (Brown 426). In turn, this fclicity seeps down from God as the "constirution of the divine narure gives an enure satisfaction to rum who possesses it," and this divine narure pleases the individual because, "it is also the best and the most desirable from the point of view of dIe crea­ tures who are all dependent upon Goo" (Thtodiq 387). People desue this disinterested "necessity of good" to all others because If em1.nates ftom the goodness and wisdom of the perfect being. The love that the good person bears toward others is nOt sel fless according to Leibruz because 114 Focus 011 Germ:m Studies everyOfle is dependent upon this love o f God. Justice, then. demands d u t people love o thers disinterestedly and not seek their good solely as a mews beo.use hutn:ln's felicity relies upon everyone's recognition o f the " neces­ sity of good," and wISdom In God. ~'Gnds. or DllOna! souls «capable of knowing the system of the lUllVerse" ace uniquely loveable, leibniz sug­ gests, precisdy because they are rational, "each mind being like a small divini ty," and because minds are rational, they reflect the " inuges of the Deity" (MonoJology 270). Since individuals carry an image of God with them, o thers can see them in a d isinterested manner and connect through the natural recognition o f a residual deity within each person, which ulti­ mately connects back 10 the wisdom and goodness o f God. As people begin to recognize the perfection of God through the scientific srudyo f lhe cOsmos, which reveals the order and beauty in God 's works, people also come to recognize uIe perfection o f the rational soul that imitates God. God has produced order and beauty in the universe, but the rational soul can imit:2.te mar creative ace by discovering and coming to understand scientific theories which nucror the o rder exhibited in the wocld (Brown 428). In each case, peop le use their reason (0 observe the narural laws and to interpre t how God has o rdered the wo rld in. accordance to wisdom KnOWlflg and Ulutating God leads people to see dIe perfection o f God in man. Those who " truSt in ProVldeoce and who love and imitate, as is met, the Autho r of all Good, dehgh ting in Ule contemplatio n of Ius perfections accordmg to the nature o f tha t genuine, pure love whIch fi nds p leasure In the happmess of those who are 10'"00" will be a '\vise and vinuous" person (MoNJdo/ogJ 272). And this is p recisely [he degree o f love that reason permits wilhin individuals so (hal they may connect with o lh­ ers withll1 a society. Here we can outline dIe major di fference in dIe twO philosophers -and expose the weakness in Leiblliz' connection between the self and other. Shaftesbury focuses o n the mternal, autono mous ordering of ideas in io­ d ividuals as Ihey create these ideas to communicate with others (a move­ ment fro m tnternal to external), whereas Leibruz focuses on dIe person's imerpretation o f the external (God's law) and righting the internal (human's reasorung) With the perfectly construCted universe of God (ex ternal 10 interna1). Here o ne can c1eady see the connecting moveme nts between the sub ject and objec(s o f the \vo rld ; Leibniz suesses the imposition o f the o ther upon the individual w lule Shaftesbury highlights the externalizillg of the sub ject IIltO the outside wodd. Leibniz' theory, in essence, echoes Eighteenth-Century Origins of Self '3.lld O ther 11 5 the role tha t Hobbes adopts with his God. Leibniz' distinc tion between "power" '3.lld " right" proves ine ffectual because the laws of God are dIC laws o f the universe; God's laws are laws o f the " right." E'"en if these laws are de fined Ul terms of Wisdom :lnd goodness, they stIli represent laws tha t the people must conform themselves to In o rder to elevate dIe~lves into the realm o f d lslllterested love. Lelb1UZ e.xposes tlus problem Ul hiS own admiSSio n o f his philosophy when he conullents on Aristode, " the pctnclples of tndividual fo:rms o f knowledge depend o n a supen or Imowl­ edge which gives the reason for them; '3.lld this superi<:,r kl1owl~dge ~lUS~ have being, and consequendy God, dIe source o f bemg, for ItS .0bJect" (TbtodirJ 244). li e, again, emphsizes dlis problem o f external to lJl ternal imposition, "God is for us the o nly immediate external o bject, and that ~e see things thro ugh him" (Dis((mrse 47). T hat is, peop le mllst ~ec~ssa.[\ ly o bserve and react to dlC wo rld throllgh the dictates o f God. Leibmz sun ­ ply nunages CO c1lw ge Ho bbes' rhe ton c and places the weight on th e i.ndi­ vidual in i!lterpreting (hese laws OUI of his own sense o f reasoned nght. instead of Hobbes' God punislnng because o f his lITesistib le pOWCL But at the same time, Leibniz' stress upo n dIe individual Intecpreung those laws provides a bridge into Shaftesbury, where the individual must exam ­ ine his natural '3.lld unnatural a ffections. In both Leibniz and Shaftesbury, the sub ject must be trained in some way to interpre t Ihe good, but Sha Ftesbury's relanon of ule mdivtdual to the good reslS more upon the md1Vldual's ability to orga.nize IllS own mmd, nther than haVIng the ound conform to '3.ll over.uching deity m Lelbniz' plulosophy. ShaFtesbury avoids ule pitfall o f Leibniz' theory by focusing on Ihe individual's soaability, which represents a relauo n between the subject'S passio ns and the "system " o f uIe outside wo dd . I nstea~ o f focusing ~olely o n the individual's strict con fonmty to an outside Ufllversc. like Lelbmz, Sha ftesbury stresses ule role o f "enthusiasm," passIo ns. o r sensibili ty m the mdividual's mind . Through sensibility, Shaftesbury believes, rather than in the ulinking process, o ne can fo rge a connection to the wo rld (fuveson 417). T he passions are, in fact, fo rms o f sensibili ty (Tllveson 4 19) which respond to impressions :received from Ihe outside world. rather than mo ­ tio ns of the soul towards what It lmagmes to be "good" Ul the love o f God in Leibniz' case. Shaftesbucy adds that if people will truly comprc­ hend each o thcr, thcn they must no t limit themselves to obscrvmg and describing the mechanisms and physical laws governing them; what is sig­ nificant is um dIe mind and the body both lead people into " Mind" - o r 116 FO&J4J on GerI1J:'.ln Studies the mind collective. Like lbbmz. Shaftesbury no tes that humans have a connection to an outside system ordered according to a universaJ balance, but for Shaftesbucy, tills connection is understood best when people ex­ amine themselves, thelC pasSlOns. Then, people an order these passions with the affections of the enure syStem, without being forced to solely recognize the "righl." or "wisdom" and "goodness" of God in order to f1ounsh. T he effectiveness of Shaftesbury's theory can be shown in Its re­ lation to Habermas' notion of solidarity. Habermas uses solidarity to pro­ vide a means to aCCQum for the welfare of one's fellow man. People must orient themselves to each other in discourse in such a way to recognize one anOlher nOt oolyas equal persons but individuals who ate unidentified by human concerns (Honneth 317). lndividual concern applies to all hu­ man beings to the same degree, without privileging certain participants. For Haberl11as, solidari ty allows all participants [0 reciprocally anend [0 the welhre of ule o ther, with whom (hey also share. as equal beings, the process of communication. This concep t of communication highlights the fundan1C:ntal distinction between Leibniz and Shaftesbury, and the fun­ damental enernalizing problem of Leibniz. H abermas speaks of a con­ sciousness of one's membershIp m an ideal communication communiry. and dus conSCIousness anses from the certamty of mtimate relatedness m a shared 11fe context (llonneth 317). TIut is-everyone within a community muSt acknowledge that Lhey share bfe experiences with each other, and people can acknowledge mese shared experiences through creating coUec­ tive goals. Beause such collective experiences of shared bw:dens and hard ­ ships Ci1l develop only on the conditio n o f collective goals, whose defmi­ cion, however, IS only pOSSible in the light o f commonly shared values, me development of a feehng of SOCial membership temains necessarily bound to the presupposition of a communiry of discourse (Ho nneth 311). For this reason, o ne cannot conceive of solidarity without an element o f par­ ticularism which IS lfiherent in the development of every social commu­ nity, as long as us members understand themselves as being in agreenlent o n particular, ethically defined goals and thereby share the experience of specific burdens (l-Io nneth 318). Through proVIding a means of connec­ tion through shared expenences and concerns, Habermas creates a bot­ to m-up moveme nt o f Ideals IJl which indIViduals with pacricular concerns eJ:ternalize their desires wnhm a sacul space, and those desires become externalized and actualized W1th the goals o f the social community which Eighteenth-Cenrury Orig1llsof Self and Other 117 they belong to. . Here the connecuo ns between the mdIVldual and the Odlet 10 each of these philosophers' dlOUghts can be effectively listed. For Habemus the focee that drives lhcconnect1on between self and other beg'llls m one's membership in an Ideal commWllcaUon community. T lus connecnon lfl Leibniz finds itself in the love of God. In Shaftesbury, the IIldlvldual's enthusiastic recogrution o f Ius role within a Species, a System, in which he is intrinsically connected d efines Ius o r her connection ro the other. LIke Haberous' idea of lhe communication community,Sluftesbury's "System" fwlctions as localized spheres of culturally developing thought in which internal ideas :u-e acrualized through their relationship to the o ther; the o thcr becomes the metho d through which the individual can express her­ sel£ Lcibniz anempts to accomplish tillS through Ius lop-down concept of lhe love of God, but u1l1llutdy f.u ls because he does no t allow for the exprcsSlon o f the individual 's rhought; in Leibniz, dIe other does not re­ flect the meanS by which the indiVidual can express IUfllSelf, but the cnd through which all individuals must confo rm. T hat is, Lelbniz' disinter­ ested love is no t [he individual's positio ning within the system (as an agent), but the system's positioning wit1un the individual (as a receiver of infor­ mation), which. as no ted, ultllnately leads Lelbniz back to the problem he attempts to avoid m Hobbes' nonon of the powerful God/ sovereign. \'(then compared to Ilabermas' and Sluftesbury's theories, Lelbniz' "nght" serves the same purpose as Hobbes' "power"; both serve as medlods ~f Imposl­ tioo, not as means of expression. Leibruz.' "ogh(,' based on Wisdom and goodness functions ooly for people who observe th~ w~om and good­ ness o f God's ordering of the universe. As a (esull, this wisdom and good­ ness may escape the observations o f parucular IIldlviduals (see Voh::ille's cnoclsm o f Leibniz in Col/duit). T he 1I1dlviduals become a reflection of the overarching. controllingconstrucnon o f the o ther, instead of the other becoming the overardung construction of all of the particIpants wlthul the system. Instead of Individuals reflecting the desires o f each o ther to create the system, with Le,bruz, everyone smctly refl ects the demands o f the overarching system, the o rder of the cosmos, as constructed by God. In the dlVcrgence between Lelbniz and Shaftesbury, one can ob­ serve the beginrungs of a system of thought dlat defines contemporary diSCOUrSe theory _ lhe relatio nship between tile self and the odler, and where exactly dus t1 loug ht meets a crossroads. Shaftcsbury's methodology proves mo rc attracnve because t ...elbniz' notio n of an outside force pres,d- 118 FOl'NS (In German Studies ing over the connection between self and other:. ultimately sti fl es and ob­ structs communication; individuals are forced to accept the terms of an ou tside no tIOn of o rder (based upon a pre-established harmony). Sha&esbury's theory of the individual passions proves much more condu­ cive to discourse because the passions allow individuals to foster their autonomous morals and gather in communities to externalize these uHO :tit environment thar would best actualize their personal notions of good. Shaftesbw:y's and Habermas' theoa es still contain, however. residual prob­ lems inherent in Leibniz' theory. Thai is, at a certain point, the mdlVldual must come to terms with the enemal community around hln) or her; at that pouu, certain individuals might have to give up certain ideas o r affec­ tions that [hey would like to keep. lo Shaftesbury, it is when the individual organizes his passions in relatio n to the narural affections; in I-rabermas, it is when the people choose a speofic discourse community in which to actuali.ze their ideas. Contem porary critics have drawn attention to lI11S problem which is similar to Leibniz' dilemma, but more localized. ] Ildeed critics claim that even though Habe.cmas' and Sha ftesbury's thoon es at· tempt to account for as many voices as possible, dlfOugh focusing on their personal notions of right, because one must move oU( uno the realm of communicative action, certaLn vOices will be silenced as parllcipants of the discourse will Wtimale1y have to accept terms o f the discourse imposed by compromising with others (Chambers 233·3-l). Haber-mas moves this thought forward, though, by attempung to avoid complete restnction of the participants' voices, and he does this through adopting E nglish no­ tions of the individual, such as seen in Shaftesbucy, where one can begin to account foe individual differences in tho ught. Auburn Uniw:Ji!J \1;'orks Cited Brown, Gregory. "LeibOlz' Moral Philosophy." The Cambridge Companiolt Jq lAbN~ Ed. Nicholas Jolley. Cambndge: Cambridge UP, 1995. 411 -~ I. Chambers, Simone. ''Discourse and Democratic Pracnces." The Cvnbridge Compallio" to HabtrmaJ. Ed. Stephen K. ,,"'hite. Cambridge: Cambndge UP, 1995. 233-62. Dunn, A1len. "Dialogue and Difference: Shaftesbury and the Pohllcs of Convem.tion." SONlltiln,gs81 (1998): 120-136. Eighteenth-Century Ong'llls of Self and Olher Hobbes, Thomas. UUPlholl. Ed. Richard Tuck. Cambndge: Cambridge UP. 199 1. 119 i lonneth, Axel. "The Other of Jusnce: llabermas and the Ethical Challenge of Posnnodemism." The Cambridge CompaNolt (0 Habtrmos. Ed. Stephen K. \'(!hl te. Cambridge: Cambridge Ul), 1995. 289-323. Klein, Lawrence e. SbofleJbllry altd (ht GIIIII" 0/ POUUlltJI: Momi Disroune (lIId CuUuruJ Politia in &rg Eightttnth-ClJI(ury Eniond. Cambridge: Cam­ bridge UP, 1994. I1lbniz., Gottfried Wilhelm. DUroHrJe on Metapl!Jlies; COl'roponden« /l ith Arnauld,­ MOllaih/ogy. Trans. George f-,·Iontgomery. La Salle: Open Court, 1902- Lcibna., Gottfned \Vllheim. "Reflexions on the \'('ork l1lat t-.k Hobbes Published in Engllsh on 'Freedom, Necessity, and Chance.'" lbeodiq. Trans.. E. M. Huggard. La Salle: Open Court. 1985. + _ • • Theodiry: fus'!)'s on the Goodnm oj God, the Fruoom oJ.Mall, and the Ongjn oj EuL Trans. E. M. Huggard. La Salle: Opcn Court, 1985. Moon, J. Donald. "P raclical Discourse and Communicative EthiCS." The Cambrid§ Compamon fIJ /-labtrrnas. Cambndge: Cambndge UP, 1995.143- 66. Reddmg. Paul. "Spectawrshlp. Srmpathy and the Self. -Ine Importance and FrAgllil)' of Dialogue in the Work of the l1uro Earl of Shaftesbury." Utmz!lIn QIId.AtsJhdirs: The Joumd rf tht Sydney SoattJ if Ufml/Nrt alld Aesthelles. 2 (1992): 82-95. Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley CoopeL Chor.muutm oJ AltII. AlanllerJ ... OpiNOIII, Timel. Ed. Lawrence E. Klem. Cambndge: Cam­ bndge UP, 1999. Tuveson, Ernest. "Shafte.sbury and the Age of SenSibility." Studies in Cntkism undfltJthetirt, 1660·1800: ESS'!)'1 lit 1101l0rof SUIIIHti Holt Monk. Eds. Howard Andtrson and John Shea. Minneapolis: U o f Minnesota P, 1967.73-93.