Focus 2002.tif


174 1-:tll:ra on Germ/lLJ Studies 

Sekundarliterarur 

Althoff. Gerd. Spidn;gtbt tkr Politi):;111 MifteialIu. lWHmuflikoliolf ifr Frnde" II"J FthJt. 
Darmstadt Primus, 1997. 

Bauer, Barbara. ''Aptum, Decorum." ReaJJcakon tier· Deutsche" UtmJlufJlimnuho/i. 
Bel. I. Hng. Klaus Weimar. Berlm, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997. 
115-119. 

Brall, Helmut. CnzLrudu ,I1,d AJelthal Sll(dilll!(!/ Wo{fWlIJ Par.:;jwl Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter, 1983. 

Bumke, Joachun. WoffWJl'",1f Euht"bath. 7", vOllig neu bearbe.tete Auflage Stutt­
gart, Weunar: Metzler, 1997. (Sammlung Metzler; Bel. 36) 

BwnJce.Joachim. " Hofische KDrpel' - H6fische KuJtur." Mot/mlts Millt1alw: NUit 
Bibkr tintr fXJPulimn EpodJl. Hrsg. Joachim Heinzle PrankJurt am Main: 
losei, 1994. 67- 102. 

Christoph, Siegfried ... G~muret, Heruloyde, and Parzlval's ,erbe'." CDlbqMia 
GermuN(U 17 (1984): 200-219. 

Cucuel. E rnst. Die Ein§JII!,lblidltr des POI"{jtui und dar GesUnf(u'erk. Frankfurt a. M.: 
Diesrerwcg. 1937. 

Francke, \v,utcr K "The function of 'wis' in ilie char.llcteriz:uion of Gahmurc:t, 
Gawan and Parzival." kfLN 81 (1972): 409418. 

Geitner, Ursula. Die SprwlN der Vmu/lung. Tiibingen: Niemeyer. 1992. 
Green, Dennis H ... Der Auszug Gahmurets.. '" WoflWll-Sludien 1 (1970): 62-86. 
Hartmann. Hedro. Gahmllnt lind HUZdttJde- KiJmlfuntar'{!llll zv·tilen Buch del ,Pmziuu' 

WoflWll Wit Euhubach. Heme: Verlag rur Wissenschaft und Kunst, 2000. 
Jaeger, C Stephen. The origi"J of «Jllrt/i"UJ. Qlilizin!, trt1"ds and tIN flrmatioll of tl)urt!J 

idea/J 939.1210. PhIladelphia: U of Pennsylvama P, 1985. 
Kratz. Henry. Wofnzmw" EJdJuJbadJ} ,Por.dtui~ AlI'altll1ljJlatahJtaieluINatuill. Bern: 

Francke, 1973. 
Meyer, Herbert. Dm /-lmuFlmai tJl.r Gm"thtJwahrzddun del fitiell Guchkchtr bei dell 

Get7IIaMlL U"tmUrhll"lP' 11M-AhM"&~ ErlIbt(, Add IIltd Ur.CJ(lItk. Weimat", 
1934. 

No!t:ze, Holger. GahlllllrtfS Orienifahrt. Kommen!ar ~(III mien Buch wn Woffrom ,Parzi­
w1'(4. 27 -58, 26). Wilrzburg: KOnigshausen und Neumann, 1995. (\Viirz­
burger BeIrr3ge zur deutschen Phllologie). 

Ortmann, Christa. ,,'Rutenchaft'. wr Prage nach dec Bedeutung der Gahmuret­
Geschichte im ,Par-zivaJ' \':blframs von Eschenbach." Dt.:JS 47 (1973): 664-
710. 

Schmidt-\Vi~d. Rum . .. holtll.emmlik (Parzival 6, 19): RtthtsWOrt und Reclus­
sinn bei Wolfram von Eschenbach.;' Studielt?JI WofrrJlfl ~Clf Euht"badJ. Flit­
f(hrijt fiJr WerneT SchrMer!?JIm 75. Gtburtsta,g. Hrsg. Kurt Gartner und Joa­
chim Heinzle. T ubingen: Niemeyer, 1989: 333-342 

Weber, W "Handgemal." Ha"d1lWter/JlIlh ~r deNtstbtn Ruhts/,tUhi<hlt (HRG). Hesg. 
Adalbert Erler und Ekkehard Kaufmann. Berlin: Erich SchmIdt. \960-

The Priorities of Pope PillS XII during the Holocaust 

Jason Williamson 

.... he sununcr o f 2001 marked the most recent breakdown in relations 

.. between Jewish and Cadlolic officials. The loternational Jewlsh­
Catholic Liaison Committee, formed twO years ago to review the Vallcan's 
a.ctivities during World War n. dissolved amid growing tensions among 
leadingJewish and Catholic scholars concerrung access to still inaccessIble 
archival materials in the Vatican. Jewisb leaders lamented that the Vatican 
denied the comrrussion full access to the archives, willie the Vatican CO\U1-

tered thatlhe Jewish scholars 00 the committee were guilty o f «irres[){)n­
sible. behavior" and a <'defamatory campaign" (Perelman). At dle heart of 
all the contrOvcrsy srands onc man: Pope Pius XJI (1876-1958). 

On the one hand arc thoSt who contend that PIUS XlI was Silent 
during the Holocaust, and that if he had only spoken out publicly he could 
have saved many byes. On the o ther are those who believe that Pius was a 
benevolent man, and that he should be beatified by the Ca tholic Church, 
which is dle fi rst step toward evennlal samthood.1 My goal here is not to 
argue fo r or against Pius' holiness, but ralher to present evidence suggest­
ing that many o f his words and actions, sometimes e~pllcltly and some­
times implicitly, were anti-J udaic and therefore lent themselves to lhc anti­
Semitism of the day.l Intentionall y Or nOl, Pope Pius XlI did, in fuCI, play 
a key role U\ Hitler's Firul Solution. 

Christian Allti-Jlldoisll' and the Plltllrt Pope 

As pope, Pius XJ] was able to enloy near-absolute contro l over Germa.n 
Catholics largely because o f work he had done in the years precedu1g his 
papacy. During that time, he was still Eugenio Pacelli - a. young Roman 
man born intO a family Wllll a h isto ry of close ties to dlC Church (Cornwell 
4).l One of his first encounters WIth anti-JudaJc sentime nt may have oc­

O lrred as a schoolboy in the late nmeteenth cenntry when, accordlllg to 
biographer John Cornwell, Pacelli's schoolmastcr, Signore Marchi, !":lnted 
frequently about the '<hw-heartedncss» and "obstinacy" of til e. Jews 



176 Focus on Germ:m Studies 

(Comwell16-17. 26). Laler, as a young man, Pacelli attended the St. 
Apollinaris Instimte where he studied cano n law. The theme of his doc­
tara.! dIssertation was the narure o f concordats, that is, speclal treaties be­

tween nanons OC emplres and the Holy See. It was also during his student 
yea£s that the Jesuit Journal Citiltd Cot/oam was arguing the guilt of Alfred 
Dreyfus, as well as publLshingarticles accusing the Jews of blood libel and 
instigating the French Revolutio n (Cornwell 24, 28). Although Cornwell 
does not comment o n Pacelli's personal views at this time, twO things are 
clear: the future pope was very ulterested in papal authoDty. and he was 
growing up in dose contact with anti-Jewish sentiment. 

In 1917 Pope Benedict XV named Pacelli the papal nuncio to Munich 
(Cornwell 63). He later moved to Beruo, serving as nuncio there until 
1929. AldlOugh Pacelli 's years in Geunanyare mostly marked by his nego­
tiating concordats with individual German states and e,'ennWly the Third 
Reich, losrances o f anti-JewIsh feehogs o n his part do surface a few times 
in the years prior (0 his papacy. 

fn o ne instance, a rabbi in Munich approached the nunclature for 
help in obtaining palm frOllds from Italy for the Feast of Tabernacles. T he 
Jewish community had purchased the fro nds already, but the I talian gov­
ernment had forbidden their exportation and was holding the fro nds in 
the Italian city of Como (Cornwell 70). Pacelli's letter to his superio r in the 
Vatica.n's Foreign Affairs Office ind icates his stance o n the request: 

r ( seemed to me that 10 go along with this wouJd be to give the 
Jews special assislaflce Ilot within the scope of practical, arms'­
length, purely ow or naruraJ rights common (0 all human beings, 
but in a positive and duect way to assist them in th e exercise o f 
their Jewish cult [ ... ]. (qtd. in Comwel1 70-7 1t 

Thus is appears that Pacelli did in fact thim somewhat negatively o f Jews 
in terms o f thel,[ rehgion, and that he was nOt willing to help dlern in any 
way if II ruded them Ul the pr.lccice of their «culL" 

P-acelli wrote anodler letter to the same superior less than one year 

later at a time when Communist revolutionaries were staging a violent 
cou; in Munich. Pacelli, loadling Communists, had sent one of his suOOr-

Priorities of Pope Pius XlI during the Holoca.ust 177 

dinates to M:u: Levien, the head o f the Munich soviet, to argue the 
nunciature's diplo matic immunity. Pacelli then descobed his suOOrdume's 
expenence -as foUows: 

[ ... ) a gang of young wo men, of dubiOUS appearance,Jews hke all 

the rest o f them, hanging UOlUld m all offices With lecherous 
demeanor and suggestive smiles. The boss o f this female rabble 
was Levien's mistress. 3. young Russian woman, a Jew and divorcee, 
who was in charge [ ... ), [I)his levIen is a young man, of about 
thirty or dtirty-five, aJso Russian and a Jew. Pale, dirty, Wi th drugged 
eyes, hoarse voice, vulgar. repulsive, with a face that is both lore!­
ligenr and sly. (qtd. in Comwe11 74-75)S 

Why did Pacelli find it necessary to mention repeatedly the (repulsive) 
Jewishness of these people? We know that many Germans at this time 

believed that Jews had instigated the BolsheVIk revolution. and it appears 
that Pacelli's views were also of this nacure.' But the fact that he used 
descriptions such as " lecherous demeanor", "suggestive smiles," and " in­
telligent and sly" - epithets commonly found in anti-Se1lll11c racial folk­
lore - suggests dlat his feelings toward Jews may have been mo re than JUSt 
political in narure. 

I n December 1929, Pacelli renuned to Rome as the newly ap­
pointed Cardinal Secretary of Stale, the most powerful POSI m the VaucaH 
next to the Pope (Comwe1l 104). HIS renure in this position (1929-1939) 
was flUrked by his frequent negotiations for concordats betv.'cen lhe Church 

and individual German states, culminating with the Reich Concordat of 
1933 after heated debates with, among o Lhers. IIltler himself. Although 
such dea1ngs appear purely polil1ca1 on the surface, the repercussions o f 
the Reich Concordat o n Jews as well as Pacelli's ambivalence loward [he 
<jeW1sh question" are worth a closer examination. 

T he Baden Concordat of 1932 is an CJample o f Pacelli's lOadvert­
ently lending support to anti-Semitism. In the montilS preced ing the Con­
cordat, the Baden government was engaged in an lIneasr standoff be­
tween the ruling Cathohc Center Party and the Social De.mocrars. Due to 
this volatile polItical clinute, the Center Party's leader 10 Baden , Peter Fohr, 

urged Pacelli to postpOne a concordat (ComweIl125). Pacel!J, wanting to 
further his own agenda of Church-Sute relallons posthaste, tllen threat· 
ened to pull rank on the local church authorities and appoint a new arch-



178 FoCUJ on German Studies 

bishop to Freiburg aftcr the previous one had unexpected ly died. He car· 
cied out his threat in the spring of 1932, appointing. «witho ut reference to 
me rights o r wishes o f the diocese," bishop Konnd Grober, a NazI sym­
pathizer (ComweU 126). Although Grober wo uld evenrually disapprove 
o f Nazi genocide, the move clearly dernonsttales that Pacelli was willmg 
to lend support to National Socialism if it set'Ved the purpose of "pl'otect­
ing" Catholicism in Germany. 

L~celb 's ultimate victory as Secretary o f State came with the pas­
sage of the Reich Concordat. Ever fearful that Communism might spread 
to Europe, Pacelli had begun pressuring the leadershIp o f the Catholic 
Center Party to avo id collaborations with the Socia] Democrats and in­
stead move closer to the National Socialists (Comwe1l 116). His main im­
petus for SO doing was, that w hile Lenin and Stalin had never hidden their 
<\vat on religion," dle Nazis had vowed nOt to destroy Christianity (Cornwell 
112). Pacelli, who did nOt like most Nazi po licies, neverd leless saw Na· 
tional Socialism as me lesser o f two evils. 7 

The Reich Concordat went into effect o n July 20, 1933. While it 
guaranteed the Church certain freedoms associated widl Cathohc schools 
and the clergy, the Reich Concordat also effectively banned clergy and 
other members o f Catholic associatio ns from party pohtical aCDviDes aJ 

Catho/ks (Cornwell 147). [nterestingly, in dIe months leadmg up to the 
s1grung o f the Concord:ilt, Nazi o fficials bad arrested ninety-two priests 
and shut down nine Catholic publications, while SA brownshirts had via· 
lf~ntly attacked sateen Catholic yo uth clubs (Mclnerny 30). Fucthermore, 
during a cab inet meeting on July 14, Hitler commented that the conco rdat 

would be " especially significam in the urgent Sttuggle against internatio nal 
J ewry" (<jtd. in Cornwell 152). 

And yet Pacelli proceeded with concordat nego tia tions. When 
[vane Kirkpatrick of the British Legatio n in Rome asked Pacelli why he 
had acquiesced in the midst o f Nazi violence, Pacelli r.cplied, «I had to 
choose between an agreement on these lines and the virtual elimination o f 
dIe Catho ltc Churd l in the Reich" (qtd. in Mci nerny 30). T his stltement 
highlights the future Po ntiff 's centtal objective - to preserve the Catho lic 
Church \0 the German Reich, even if conceSSIOns had to be made. Addi· 
rio nally, he believed the Conco[dat could be used as a basis fo r p rotesting 

furure violauons. But most importan t, as Hitler's quote dem OnSltiltes, was 
the Reich Concorda r's prohibition of Catho liCS partllong in political ac­
Ilon as Cathohcs. According to Cornwell, «[SJince the persecutio n and 

Priorities o f Pope Pius XII during the ll olocalls t 179 

elimination of the Jews in Germany was by now a stl ted po lICY, the (1'eaty 
had legally bound the Catholic Church in Germany to Silence on outrages 

agains t the Jews" (153). 

FlI11htr Etidma of Poctlli's Anli-Jur1oi.sl1l: 1938 (Jllti 19)9 

In the year before he was to be elected pope, Eugenio Pacelli twice dem· 
Oflstrated anti.Jewish feelings. once in word and o nce in deed . In May 
1938, Pacelli opened dIe thirty-fou rth International Eucharistic Congress 
in Budapest, Hungary. Anci·Semitism was o n the nse in J l ungary, and .at 
the very mo ment when Pacelli delivered his address lhe I lunganan parha· 
ment was discussing (and would evenmally pass) anti·Sctnitic laws (phayer 
4). Rathe( than take ad vantage o f the chance to condemn Il ungacian allti­
Semitism at tlus very large and public forum, Pacelli instead made refe(­
ence to the Jews "whose lips curse [Christ1 wd whose heans reje<t him 
even (Dday" (phayer 5). These wo rds, lho ugh nOt overtly aflt l·$emitiC in a 
political sense, nevertheless contained an anu-Jewish reh~ous tone and 
were very likely meant as an appeasement to tl)e new, vtmlently anu-Semwc 
prime miruster o f Hungary. Bela Imredy (Cornwell 185). 

T he o ther moment o f Pacelli's ambivalence toward Jews came 
very sho nly before Pius Xl's delllh in February 1939. Toward the end o f 
his life, PIUS Xllud become increllsingly dIsgusted by Nazi treatment of 
Europea.n Jews and felt moved [0 commissio n an encyclica l o n anll­
Se1l'litism, H UIIIQl1il,tl1tr1.J Uf/ilaJ, Ullate summer 1938 (Cornwdl 189). Later 
in the same year he would issue a stltement III which he no ted , «[AJnti. 

Semirism is inadmissible; spiriruaUy we arc all Senmcs" (q\d. I II Cornwell 
190) . Cornwell points o ut rhat neither the Vatican's daily newspaper 
L O SS(f1.'(JI()re R()fIIOf/(), wluch Pa,celli con trolled, no r Civi/tfi CoIMiCil pllblished 
the Pope's wo rds. T hey appeared instead o ne week latcr in a Belgian news­

paper. 
In February 1939, Pius Xl was awaiting the fi rs t dl'Jft o f the en· 

cyclical. He received I t days before his deatl) on February 9 , but Pacelli, 
according to Cornwell, buried the document "deep in the secret arcluves" 
(192). Pacelli, knowing In all L.kelihood he was to be the nex t pope, was 
apparently more interested in n'l3.lntaining dlplomal1c relations wnh the 

Nazi regime than confronting Citholic Germans wllh a question o f mo ral 
conscience. SUdl a mo ral dllenuna couJd have poreOl13J1y risked the lives 
o f Catho lics as well as weakened those nations combalUlg the spe<rer o f 



ISO F0a4 on Germ#D Studies 

Communism. 

Pacelli was, mdeed, Pius' XI successor. He also chose the name Pius as his 
papal moniker, and on March 12, 1939, the Vatican formally installed him 

as Pope Pius xn. One of his first actions as pope was to send a conclUa­
tory letter to " the illustrious Herr Adolph Hitler," with lhe implicit Intent 

that such a Jener would help keep the Reich Concordat in place. Pius even 
directed his nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo, to arrange a gala reception 
for Hitler's fiftieth birUlci:l.Y (208-210). 

Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and a wave of per­
secution agamsl all Poles, Catholic and Jewish, sUrted immediately. By 
1941, some 500 priests were in concentration camps and by the end of the 
war the Nazis had killed 2600 Polish clergy (Phayer 22). J n spite o f re­
peated pleas from Polish bishops., Pius xn continually refrained from openly 
condemning the Nazis "outo£ consideration for repercussions on Roman 
Catholics of the Reich (qtd. in Phayer 2 ... ) ... • Early into the\V'aC, the Vatican 
radio and press did info rm the world o f the sufferiflgof dIe Polish people, 
and Pius XJI addressed (he maltreatment o f the elderly, women, and chil­
dren before the College of Cardinals in December 1939 (phayer 24-25). 
After 1941, however, Pius kept relatively silent on the issue. and when he 
did make public statements, they were vague and aVOided naming the Na­
zis as perpettators. This theme o f Silence and clouded statements is un­
portant because it would occur agam repeatedly after the Holocaust began 
in ea.rnest in 1942. 

Dtafenill!, S i4na 

Even prior to 19"'2, the Nazis had estabLshed a prognun o f anti-Semitism 
in each country the)' occupied, and the Vatican was largely aware of these 
measures. For example, beginning in 194 1, dIe Vichy government of France 
passed a series of anti-Semitic decrees, the first of which banned Jews 
from public service (phayer 5). Several members of the clergy in Fra nce 
made pleas fO the Pope for intervemion, bu~ as GUnter Lewy POlllts Out, 
«lbe Holy See merely counseled tlur no provisions o n marriage be added 

to the stamtes and 'that the precepts of justice and charity be considered 
in the apphcatiOn of the law'" (143). 

Priorities o f Pope Pius XJI duringthe Holocaust 181 

The lack of concern for j ews unless the iss\le in question some­
how involved Catholics surfaced again in 1941, tllis time i.n SlovakIa. The 
new anti-Semitic code in this largely Catholic country prohibited marnage 
between Jews and non-Jews (phaycr 5). Michael Phayer notes that tlus 
time the Holy See took notice and voiced its disapproval (5). The d iffer­
ence befWccn the inCidents i.n Francc and Slovakia seems to indicate that 
the Vatican was certa.inly concerned with what it considered one of its 
own sacr.tments - marriage - but not with Nazi racISt policy. 

The situation for Jews in Croatia was WO[Se. Under tile leadership 
of Ante Pavek, the fascist and pro-Catholic head of the Ustasha govern­
ment in Croatia, j ews were deprived of their cluzenslup and forced to 
wear the Star of David beginning i.n May 1941 (Phayer 33). By the end of 
the year, the Vatican had received the first reports of the persecution. On 
August 14, the president o f the Union for the Israelite Comnlllfury of 
Alrari wrote to Vatican Secretary of State Luigi Maglione pleading for 

Croatia's Jews, but Cornwell notes there is «no record o f a respo tl.se OC 

action o n the part of the Holy Sec" (256-7). In Apn1 of 1942 Bishop 
Alojzije Stepinac delivered a nine-page account o f Uswrn misdeeds to 
the Vancan whid, was later Oll'llrted from dIe Vatican's collectio n of Wodd 
War n doc:mlents. The H oly See remained silent on the issue, in splle of 
the faCt that the Croat fascists, unlike their Naz1 countecpans, nude no 

secret of their murderous policies. 
In August 1942, Pius again received news of the genoode, tlus 

time from the Croauan rnbbi Miroslav Shalom Freiberger, who implo red 
the pope to help save his country's jews. Phayer writes tha t Pius then in­
scructed Apostolic Visitator Marcone " [0 (hank [the rnbbi) for his letter, 
but to do so prudently and taClfuJly." Rabbi Freiberger died in Auschwitz 
a few months later, along with 6000-7000 a dler Croauan j ews (37 -38V 
The Vatican was simply no t will ing [0 condemn the Croatian governmen t 
publicly because il wanted to maintaut diplomatic tJeS, and because It hoped 
that dIe vtOlence represeo.red only a sort of «growmg pain" that tile nedg~ 
IUlg Catholic state was going through. 

In December 1941, the 6rstdeath camp had been eSlabhshed near 
Lodz, Poland (Lewy 137). Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz began op ­
eations in 1942. Owen Chadwick no tes that "everyo ne" knew by 19 ... 1 

that Jews were being deported to the East, but no one beLeved they wo uld 
be murdered there (204-5). Ch.adwlCk goes o n to point out tlut people 
should have had an idea, given that in j anuary 1942 Hitler deltvered a 



182 Focus 011 Germ/Hl Studies 

series of speeches in which h e. ranted against the Jews and unplied their 
liquidation (205). 

1l1roughout the summer of 1942 the BBC and London's Dm!! 
Ttlegraph released reports about the deportations to and murders tn the 
ca.mps of Eastern Europe (Chadwick 208). Furthermore, three Jewish in­
mates of the Polish camps escaped to the West and told their story in 
American newspapers (Chadwick 284). And yet Pius XlI remained silent 
on tbe subject. Meanwhile, the Vatican was receiving its own internal ac­
counts of these atrocities - accounts it chose either to ignore or to downplay 
as propaganda or exaggeration. llU"ee of the earliest reports are as fo l­
lows: 

1. In October 1941, Charge d'Affaires Giuseppe Burzio of Slovakia 
sent reports to the Vatican o f Jews being immediately shot by 
Germans. 
2. Gerhart Riegner of the \Vorld Jewish Congress sent a memo in 

March 1942 ( 0 the nuncio in Bern, Monsignor F ilippi Bernardini, 
stating that there was sufficient information from a number of 
sources to verify Jewish extennination. (Document omitted from 
Vatican collection Acles et Documwts). 
3. Ambassador Kazimien Papee (poland) and Envoy Myron C. 
Taylor (U.s.) sent memos dated Sep tember 26, 1942, to Secretary 
of State Maglione reporting on the liquidation of the Warsaw 
ghetto, mass executions at special killing centers, and mass depor­
tations of Jews from various E uropean countries. (phayer 48_49)10 

Additionally, the Vatican received an account in mid- to late 1942 ftOm SS 
officer Kurt Gerstein about how he had witnessed the toeNre a.nd gassing 
of 700 to 800 Jews at dle Belzec death camp. After nuncio Orsenigo re­
fused to see him. Gerstein told his story to an anti-Nazi bishop in Berlin 
who relayed the information to the Vatican. As Phayer points out, Gerstein's 
report «died" in the Vatican and was not rdayed to other countries, such as 
France, where the deportations had not yet started (46). T he Holy See 
neither made such reports public nor released them privately to other church 
leaders in Europe. 

Accord i.ng to one account, Pius XII made up his mind to be silent 
on the fate of the Jews once and for all after the Nazis initiated a policy of 
deportation in the Netherland s (CoOlwelJ 286-87).1l Once the deporta­
tions got under way, Catholic and Protestant churches threatened a wide-

Priorities of Pope Pius XU duringdle Holocaust 183 

spread Christian protest if they did not cease. The Nazis then responded 
dlat dley would exempt those Christian Jews who had converted before 
1941 if the churches remained silent. The Catholic archbishop o f Utrecht 
rejected (he offer and issued a p ublic letter of denunciation to local churches. 
As a result, the Nazi soldie[s rounded up all the Jews they could find and 

deported them. Upon hearing the news, Pius reportedly made up his mind 
resolutely that silence was better, because if the protest of o ne archbishop 
had caused such a terrible tragedy, then a public denunciation from the 
Holy See potentially would have caused even more death - for Jews, con­
verted Jews, and Christians alike. Tn a recent article, Daniel Goldhagen 
rejects sud) an alibi for two reasons. First of all, he nOtes that " it is d isin­
genuous to present this as an instance of a Church attemp t (0 help Jews 
that [m tunIJ led the Germans to kin Jews whom they would otherwise 
have not killed. Quite simp ly,:in tbe eyes of the Church, tbese people were 
not Jews but Catholics" (26). Furthermore, Goldhagen points out, dle 
Church quickly learned that these Catholics were doomed anyway when 
the Nazis began deporting Protestants who had conven ed from Judaism, 
aldlOugh Dutch Protestant churches had nOt protested publicly (26).12 

As deportations in the Nedlerlands and France began in full force, 
foreign diploma.ts in the Vatican decided dley would have to confront the 
Pope about his silence. One of the first to do so was Hugh Montgomery, 
assistant to dle British minister to the Holy See. Montgomery explained to 
Pius dlat "the Poles had hoped fo r some nlrther expression of sympadly 
from the H oly See," to which P ius replied, <13ut 1 have already done so 
much!" H e cited his Easter br:oadcast o f 1941 which. had been suppressed 

in Germany because the Nazi regime knew its real message, and he went 
o n to note that correspondence from the Vatican to Poland was Ulter~ 
cepted by the Germans. I f such correspo ndence were to contain nam es 
and details, it would only harm the victims more (Chadwick. 212). 

By December ·1942 British minister Francis D'Arcy Osborne was 
so appalled by the atrocities of the war that he felt he had to encourage dIe 
Pope as forcefully as possible to speak out against the Nazis. Diplomats 
from the United States, France, Poland and Brazil had aJso requested a 
denunciation o f genocide (ColTIwell 288). Jewish communities from Mound 
the world beseeched the Pope to do what he could. OsboOle was con­

vinced that dIe Vatican was being silent because Pius was not yet sure 
whidl side would win the war, and because he was highly fearful of an 
Allied bombardment. 



184 FoalS on Germ :lO Studies 

Shortly before Chnstmas 1942, Osborne delivered a declaration 
on dIe persecutio n of the Jews to Pius, drafted by Great Britain,the United 
States, and the Soviet Union. Osborne pleaded with the Pope [0 simply 
cndo[Se it, but was soundly rejected. Cornwell no tes o f dIe reason, "'The 
Pope could not condemn 'particular' atrocities, nchhe[ could he verify the 
Allies' reports on the nwnbe( of Jews murdered" (291). The Pope decided 
lflstead to address the violence of the war In his annual Christmas broad~ 
cast During the radio address, P ius condemned war, killing. and displace­
ment, but no t o nce. did he use the words "Nazi" or "Jew" (293). The ad­
dress was sweeping and ambiguous, and one very well could have inter­
preted it as applying to either the Axis or to the Allies. 

Liqllidt1lion of the &"Ion Ghtl/o 

lly Ule summer of 1943, the Allies had gained control o f Sicily and were 
pushing no rthward toward Rome. As dle fighting got underway in Italy, 
tbe Pope's fears of an aerial bombardment of Rome increased . Although 
Pius XII would not speak out p ublicly against the Ho locaust, the Ho ly See 
did communicate with Envoy Taylor and American Charge d 'Affaires 
Harold Tinman at least thirty-four times betwecn the sununer of 1943 
and the summer of 1944 in an effort to forestall the bombing o f Rome 
(phayer 61). The Allies. however, were apparently nOi tOO concerned about 
the Pope's pleas. This was due ln large part to the fact dut PlUS had been 
quick to condemn Allied bombings of German civilians and chllrdles, 
but, back in 1940 and 1941, he had failed to denounce the German bomb­
ings o f England. When President Roosevelt stated that "war is war " and 
dut he could oOt guarantee the safety o f Vatican propeny. thc H oiy See 
responded with a lhreat of public denunciatio n should the Allies bomb 
the Vatican (phayeI: 62). Phayer points OUl that, " [010 such threat was ever 
made regarding the murder of the Jews" (62). 

By September 1943, Hitler had made the decision to extend the 
FinaJ Solution to all parts o f occupied Europe. T he chief o f German 
security po hee in Ro me, SS Lieutenant Colonel H erbert Kappler, was loki 
by his superiors in Berlm to prepare a surprise roundup of Rome's Jews 
and to do sO as c1andestind y as possible. On September 26, Kappler sum­
mo ned twO of Rome's most pro minent Jewish leaders, Dame Almansi and 
Ugo Foa, whom he told that if Rome's Jews couJd not produce for him 
fifty kilogcuns of gold in thirty-six hours, theo the Nazis would take two 

Priorities of Pope pius XTI during the Holocaust 185 

hund red jews and depoct tllem to Germany. If [hc jewish commuOity 
could provide the gold, dlen Kappler could guarantee no harm wo uld 
come to any o f them (ZUCCOItl 153). 

With such a threat facmg the Roman Jews, Pius XI I dId finally act 
di.rect.ly on thei.r belu lf. T he community u} Rome was small , ournberulg 
about SOOO and it was only able to generate tlurty-five kIlograms of gold 
after the d~dline had been e~tended by a few ho urs (ZlicCotti 153-4). 
Approached by Jcwish leaders for help, Pius approved a loan from the 
Vatican tte:tSury to cover the balance. The u:ansaction -was made to the 
Germans' satisfaction, and Romc's Jews felt a sensc o~ security . . 

The pope's benevolence IS. however. thrown 111[0 qucstlon when 
o ne considers dl3t he knew o f the impending roundup of the Jews at least 
o ne week before it started 0 0 October 15 but apparently failed to warn 
anyone O)hayer 98). Tn the wceks lead i11g lip to October 15, Berlin had 
mformed its ambassador [0 the Vatican. Ernst von \Vetzsacker. tllal he 
should exact a public statement from dle Vatican that the German anny:s 
beluvior m Rome Iud been propcr. With the statcment sull pendmg, It 
appeared ro Weizsacker that the Vatican was in a position to put behUld 
the scenes pressure on the German authonties 10 delay o r preven~ the 
scheduled SS seizure of the Jews, which he had learned was now unm11lcnt 
Whay« 98). 

Weizsa.cker informed tlle Vatican of whal he knt.'W aboul one week 
befo re the Jewish arrests commenccd . ' [llC Vatican. however, did nOt in· 
fO[ln Jewish community leaders. Instead, il was Weizsiickcr's. dep uty, 
Albrecht von Kessel, who attempted to warn Ro me's Jews of the Impeod· 
tng " resen lemeot" plans (phaye( 99). He failed for the most part. Most ~f 
the people he warned did not bcheve that they could actually be exlernu­
oared. O llt! a.n o nly speculatt! if a warning from the Pope would have 
helped more, bur, coupled wit.ll Kessel's warnings aod endorsed by promi­
nent Jewish leaders, such a warning could very well have en~ou~ged mor~ 
Jewish families to go into hiding or flee. At any cate, one lIlIng IS clear - II 
-was a few Ge[O"W1S, not the Vatlcan. who attempted to warn Roman jews 
of their impending doom. 

T he roundup began on October 15- 16, 1943. O n October: 18, 
approximately 1,023 derained Jews were transported o ut of the City vta 
freight cars to Auschwitz. Within a week, all but 196 had b.een gas~ed 
(Zuccotti 155-6). Of the remaining 196, o nly 17 would survwe. Dunng 
and immc<hately fo llowing the roundup, Pius Xli remained suent, even 



186 F(KJI.J on German Studies 

though die events described here happened in the immediate vicinity o f 
the Vatican. 

Two main reasons have been cited as to why he refused to issue a 
public condemnation. TIle first is that approximately 4000-5000 Jews had 
gone into hiding. and the Pope feared that a pUblic outcry would only 
encourage the Nazis to seek them out, too. 111C second reason hinges on 
the first If the Nazis became tOO outraged or doubtful of the Vatican's 
neutrality, then Hitler could very well have given the o rder to invade Ro me 
and use it as a base of operations in Italy. Such a circumstance would have 
increased greatly the risk o f an Allied bombardment over Rome, which the 
Pope w.uned to avoid at all COSts (phlIyer 1(0). 

Although publicly silent, it is important to know that U1C Vatican 
did aid tile Jews privately during the liquidation of the Roman ghetto. Fo r 
example, many of Rome's rcmainingJews found safe refuge in the Vatican's 
various properties aro und the city. Pius had given an order co church supe­

nors in these properties to open th eir doors to Jews, although many monks, 
nuns, and others had been doing so already even before the Vatican's in­
structions. It is also possible dut a smaU number o f Jews were able to find 
shelter in the Vatican itself, although recent scholarship has not been able 
to confirm it (phayer 102). 

In December 1943, Iuly's &sc.istpuppct regime threatened to send 
all remaining Italian Jews to concentration camps. L3 T he Vatican newspa­
per L 'OmnVJIort RiJIIJano protested vehemcndy dlis time, calling the order 
1m-Christian with regard co all Jews, converted and non-converted, asserted 
that Italian Jews were rightful citizens, and that the fascists must obey 

public law (phayer 103). \vhy did the Vatican pro test this time but not two 
m onths earlier? T he answer Lies in whom the Vatican directed its charges 
against. The Vatican knew dlat leveling charges against the native-born 
fascists in staunchly pro-CadlOlic Italy posed a great dlCcat neither to its 
integrity nor to its physical property. The Gem'WlS were not directly in­
volved in trus instance. Funhermore, the anti-Jewish policies of the pup­
pet government had ne\'er been popular among Roman citizens, thus the 
Vatican probably knew its readers would appreciate such conunents (Lewy 
146). 

Priorities of Pope Pius XlI during the Holocaust 187 

Condl/.Jion 

No current research seems to indicate dUl llius xrr was an overt anti­
Semite, nor do I believe he \...as. H e defmitely felt a speCial affection for 
Germany and its people, but he was nota fan of H itler. Pius was outraged , 

for example, over Hitler's 1942 implication that the Reich Concordat would 
be key ( 0 the «struggle againSt i.nternational Jewry." In L 'Os.sen'tllore Romallo 
Pius emp hatically denied that the concordat was an endorsement of Na­
tional Socialism. He viewed the concordat, rather, as a victory for Catholi­
cism because it ensured the Reich's total recognition and acceptance of 

the Church's law (Comwell130-31). 
Furthermore, Pius XII did speak out at times against wartime 

atrocities. For example, he had \'Oiced his concern publicly on a few occa­
sions, as in his Christmas 1942 address, even though he fai led every time 
to name "Jews" and «Nazis" explicitly. And th e Vatican had aided many 

people, including Jews, 10 their efforts to leave Nazi-occupied countries 
for safe havens elsewhere (Zuccotti 300-1). 

The Church was particularly interested in the well-bcmg o f mem ­
bers who had converted from Judaism, and this issue represents a clear 
division between Nazi anti~Scmitism and religious anti-Judaism. Since the 
Church's o fficial stance was religious and not racial on questions of faith, 
Catholicism had no problem with persons who had converted and been 
baptized. Baptism basically "erased" one's Jewishness. For the Nazis, how­
ever, this was n ot the case. A person's religion could change, but an IOher­
ent Jewish essence was still present On dtis touchy subjecr dIe Church 
came into conflict with Nazi policy time and again. However, a divisive 
issue like converts was an exception to the o therwise peaceful coexistence 
o f Catholic prejudices and an ci-Semitic dogma. 

Sinlply put, Pius XJf embodied the historic Ch.ristian anti-Juda­
ism that had existed since approximately 100 C.E. T he actions and com­
ments from his days as nuncio in Munich and Berlin attest to tltis. Such an 
anti-Jewish sentiment, even if purely re ligious in ruHure, could only have 
complemented a Christian and Natio nal Socialist COllntry like Germany 

widl a radical anti-Semite as a bsolure ruler. 
T he cenruries-old tradition of blaming dIe Jews fo r the death of 

Christ is therefore at the heat't of Pius' complacency on issues of geno­
cide. [l is allegiance was to his C hurch and his religion. His interest in those 
who did not accept the divifu ty o f Jesus Christ was necessari ly secondary 



188 FOlUS on Germ;m Studies 

at beSt. At some point he must have realized the serious narure o f such 
anti-Judaism, because he SlOpped issuing defamatory statements like the 
one he had made in 1938 in Budapest and instead adopted a policy of 
silence. This policy of silence is wlut has fueled an ongoing debate and is 
the reason why Catholic and Jewish scholars saw dIe necessity (0 form the 
now defunct Imemarional Jewish-Catholic Liaison Comminee mentioned 
:n the beginning of this essay. 

Central to Catholic theology is the belief that all human life has 
value and is to be respected. Historically central to the Chucch is also the 
conviction of its sp.rimal supremacy, as evidenced by a passage from lhe 
Niceoe Creed and still recited at Catholic mass: ''''''e believe in onc holy. 
Catholic and apostolic Church" (Kelly). h appea£'S then that Pius XlI placed 
greater emphasis on maintaining Church authoriry than on valuing aU hu­
nun life. This ordenng of priorities - coupled with fears o f Nazi reprisal, 
Conununism, and the desire to be:l peace negotiator - is w hat contributed 
to his silence concerning the plighl of Europe's Jews. W h e ther o r nOt he 
could luve: handled I1l3.lters differently and thus saved lives is the subject 

of many scholarly wo rks and no dou bt will continue to be for some time 

to come. 

NOles 

I The Reverend Peter Gumpel of the Jesuits has been the coordinator 

of the l1us X II beatification process smce 1983. 

1 The tradition of Cathoilc anti-Judaism and its implicatio ns is the sub­

ject of David I. Kerner's book The PtJPUAgzinJllhe ]l1PJ. Neo.v York::: Knopf,2OO 1. 

l Pacelli was born o n t.<farch 2, 1876. T he restor me information in mis 

parAgraph also comes from ComweU. 

• Quotaoon taken from: Vatican SRS, Germania, 1917, rase. 852, fol io 
4. 

5 Quo tation Clken from: Vatican SRS, Baviera,. letter from PacellI ro 
Gasparn, Apnl 18, 19 19. FoliO 37. 

I Accordmg to Ken.zer , Pacelli's predecessor, Pope Pius Xl, also be­

lieved me Jew!> to be at least partly responsible for me Bolshevik Revolution and 

voiced hiS concerns about Jt:wlSh threats in a 1932 conversation wim Mussohm 

(263). 
1 A 5Lmllar SltualJOn existed in Italy between me Church and Italian fas ­

cists.. Denis Mack Smith notes 10 his book MItJJofni that, although the Church did 

Prio rities o f Pope Pius XJl during the [lo locaust 189 

not support all tenets of fascism, the papacy nevertheless did not want Italy's 

government to be agnostic and hberal as m the past, and it preferred to see l taltan 

Cathohcs allying ¢emselves with fascism rdther than with SO<:lailsm (80-81). 

• Even some of the VDllestkNIJme, or ethlllc German, priests in Poland 

wrote letterS to the Vaucan pleading fo r help. 
t By waCs end, 50,000 Croattan Jews had been either murdered or de­

ported. Between 300,000·400,000 Serbs were also murdered 
10 I am also indebted to Phayer for the mformation about Kurt Gerstem. 

GentelO had made his initial report in late 1941 or early 1942 (45-46) . 

" The account comes from PIUS' housekeeper of forty yean, Sister 

Il:lsqualina, who narrated her mformation to the tribunal supportlOg Pius' beati­

fication. Cornwell provides the details, and also casts doubt on SlSter Pasquahna's 

story. 
\I Goldhagen's new book, A AlorTIl Rtd:onillg: The Cctholk Chltrch Dwing 

Iht H%taItSl affd Todg, IS scheduled to be published by Knopf in Pall 2002. 
U According to Oems Mack Smith, t-,'lussohni, like many Ital ians., had 

never really bought into N3ZJ ideas of racial purity. Bot he was opportunisuc and 

afraid of his ally Hitler, and therefore Issued anti-Semitic decrees to shoo.v sohdar­

itywith Nazism (221, 3 12). 

Works Cited 

Chadwick, O ..... en. BrilDln (1l1d lhe Vati(an tlHring Iht Serond World W"r: Carnbndge: 

UP, 1986. 
Comwell, Jo hn. Hitltr} Pqpe: The Seml l-JiJwry oj P;ItJ XII. New York: Viking. 

1999. 
Goldhagen, Daruei Jonah. "What would Jesus have done?" J'be NeJII R.8p"b/ir 21 

Jan. 2002: 26. 
Kelly,J.N.D. Em!J ChtiJlilln Dodrille.s. San FranCISCo: Harper and Row, 1978 . 
Kertzer, David 1. The Popu A§inJI thtjtl"l. New York: K.nopt: 2001. 
Lcwy, Gunter. " Pius xn, the Jews, and the German Catho lic Church." &1fl!JfJl: 

Gtf7IIon ChltrrheJ "lid the H owaJul. Eels. Robert P. Encksen and 
Susannah Ileschel. Minneapolis: Iwgsburg. 1999. 

Mack Smith, Denis. MItJloIilU. New York: Knopf, 1982. 
Mcinerny, Ralph. The D((1III{llioll If PIMJ XU. South Bend, IK: 51. Augusune's, 

2001. 
Perelman, Marc. "Vatican Blasts Jewish Critics" FofJjrmf 10 Aug. 2001: 3. 

Phayer, Michael. The GJ/1xJIi( Chllrrh aNd lht HoIocauSl, 1930·1965. Bloomtngton: 

lndlana UP, 2000. 
Zuccoro, Susan. Ulltkr HI! Very IJVmdoJl'J: The Va/iwn (llId tJx H%aJltJl in 1UJ!y. 

New Haven: Yale UP, 2000.