Focus 2003.tif


46 FaCtII on German Studiu 

Traumatic Metamorphoses: 
The Concept of the Animal in 

I-Iorkheimer and Adorno's Dialektik der Aufkldnmg 

Carolin Duttlinger 

O ne o f the fundamental paradoxes underlying H orkheimcr and 
Adorno's philosophical project in the Dialekllk der AuJkliinmg 

is their llucmpr to undertake a critigue of Enlightenment [houglH 
while scin using rhe very concepts and argumentative straregies they 
intend to criticize. In dleir analysis, the authors demonsu-ate both the 
dangers and the inheccnr aporia of Enlightenment rationality, that 
is, its gradual self-destruction through the iostIumemalisacion of 

rational concepts for the purposes of domination over nature and, 
ultimately, over the human subject (DdA 13),1 Allbaugh Horkheimcr 
and Adorno's analysis of the failings of rationality is still aimed at 
its (partial) recuperation from the barbaric practice of Fascism - [he 
historical phenomenon which underlies and motivates their project 
- this undertaking remains aporetica\ because the authors' criogue 
is persistently indebted [Q the basic concepts of Enlightenment 
thought. This problematic configuration has been described by 
Jurgen f-i abcrmas (1985) as the 'performative contradiction' of 
Critical Theory: 

Diese beschreibl ( ... ] dje Selbstzerstorung des 
kritischen Vermogens auf paradoxe Weise, 
weil sie im Augenblick der Beschreibung noch 
von der totgesagten Kritik Gebrallch machen 
muG. Das TotaliraI\Verden der Aufklarung 

denunzien sic mit deren eigenen tvf..ittdn. (1 44) 

In this article I shall use Hahermas' cricigue as a point of 
deparmre for my reading o f one, seemingly marginal, pan of 

Horkheimer and Adorno's argument in the Dialektik derAuJklarung. 
the concept of the animal as developed in tbe essay 'I','fensch und 



48 FonIlon German JhldieJ 

lier.' I intend [0 iUustrate that, despite their incisive critique of 
insLrument2lising reason, which in the case of rhe animal manifests 
itsel f in the scientific practice of vivisection, the authors' own stance 
is ultimately informed by the same reductive notion of the animal 
as the 'Other' of human subjectiviry which they set out to criticize. 
Despite this argumentative impa.sse by which the authors reiterate 
the objectifying tendencies of rarionll discourse, their en~gemenr 
with the concept of the animal also leads them to consider other, 
non-philosophical discourses, such as the fairy tale, as sources and 
discursive models in theLr argument. \'{'hile the authors' smne/: 
towards the animal thus suppOrtS H abermas' nOlion of the discursive 
apoda of Critical Theory, their argument also raises questions about 
the very naruce of philosophical discourse and opens up new 
perspectives on alternative discursive models, such as the use of 
exp[essive camer man conceprual language. As I shaU argue, the 
authors' engagemem -.vith the role of the animal 111 Enhgluenment 
rarionaluy also emaiis a rethinking of the starus and function of 
philosophical discourse. The use of argumentative models taken 
from aesmenc and literary discourses thus emails a reconception of 
philosophical critique as it enables rationality to adopt a different, 
non-domina tory stance towards its Other - a concepuon which is 
further developed in Adorno's Ntgativt DiIlkkllle. 

The animal as Other: 'Mensch und Tier 

Horkheimec and Adorno's own awareness of the potentially 
problematic implications of their use of philosophical discourse is 
indicated in the introduction to the Diakktik der Au/Ie/limn!. Ln whicb 
the authors commem on the dangerous similarity, and therefore 
complicity, between their critique and the instrumentalising 
tendencies of Enlightenment rationali[}': 

Bei dec Selbstbestimmung tiber seille eigene 
Schuld siehr sich Denken daher nicht blol1 des 
zustimmenden Gebrauchs dec wissenschafwchen 
und aUraglichen, sondern ebenso dec alltaglichen 
Begriffssprache beraubt. Kein Ausdruck bielel 
sich mehr an, der nichr zorn Einverstandnis mit 

, 

Traumatic Metamorphoses 

herrschenden Denkrichtungen hinslrebt, und was 
die abgegriffene Sprache nicht selbstandig leistet, 
das wird von den geseUschafllichen Maschineriell 
prnzis nachgehoh. (OdA 12) 

49 

Despire this claim, which indicates their awareness of the 
problem, rhe audlOrs' argument in <Mensell und TIer' serves as 
a showcase example for the problematic Implication of their use 
of, and <rootedness' in, rhe 'angegriffene Sprache' of Western 
rationaliry. As Horkheimer and Adorno point out at the beginnmg 
of their essay, the exclusion of the animal as the non· rational from 
the realm of reason and consciousness is a founding principle of 
Western philosophy: "Die Idee des Menschen in dec europilischen 
Geschichte drtickt sich in seiner Unterscheidung vorn Tier 
aus. Mit seiner Unvernunfr beweisen sic die Menschenwlicde" 
(OdA 283). However, if rational discourse is defined rhrough its 
disuncuon fcom its Other, then it is also obliged in a second step 
to incorporate the non·['3tionalmto LIS discursive field, in order to 
control the threat this Other may pose 10 the absolute validiry of 
reason. Figured as the embodiment of the Olher of racionali[}" the 
animal is therefore incorporated and e,ren conSONted withm an all­
inclusive Enlightenment discourse precisely by its exclusion, by ItS 

consuuction as divergent from the system. 
According to the authors, Man's reducllve and inslrumema!islllg 

attitude rowards the animal is nOt limited to the lise of the cof/apt 

<animal' in lheoretical argumentS attempung to dellne Man's own 
identity; it is also manifesled in Man's practical engagemel1t with 
individual, literal animals, in, for instance, the crud explOitation 
which takes place in rhe experiments of medicine and behavioural 
psychology: 

Dall [die Benaviouristenj auf die Menschen 
dieselben Formeln und Resuhate anwenden, die sic, 
en tfesseh, in ihren scneufiuchen physiologischen 
Laboratorien wehl'losen Tieren abzwingcn, 
bekunder den Umerschied Izwischen Mensch und 
Tier] auf besonders abgefeimte Art. Der Schlu13, 
den sie aus den versrummehen Tierlelbern ziehen, 



50 Fo(J(s en Gtnnan Studies 

paRI nicht auf das Tier in Freiheit, sonclern auf 
den Menschen heute. Er bekundet, indem er sieh 
am Tier vergeht, daB cr, und nur er in der ganzen 
Sch6pfung, freiwillig SO mechanisch. blind und 
automatisch funkrionien, wie die Zuckungen 
der gefesselten Opfer, die der Fachmann sich 
zunutze maehl. [ ... ] Oem Menschen gchor! die 
Venunft, die unbarmherzig abEiuft; das Tier, aus 
clem er den blucigen SchluG zieht, hat our das 
unvernunfrige Entsetzen, den Trieb zur Flucht, die 
ihm abgeschniuen is£. (OdA 283) 

The applicability of resuirs gained from these experiments to 

the human subject does not undermine the notion of me animal as 
Man's Other; rather, this scientific practice is symptomatic of a mOrC 

general tendency of instrumental reason whose domination over 

nature is established by means of me objectification and exploimtion 
of narure. In this respect, the use of animaJs in the research imo the 
human condition does nO[ undermine the dichO[omy bero'een Man 
and the animal in its narural srue; instead, (he applicability of results 
gained from the conditioning and experimental exploituion of the 
animal in vivisection is symptomatic not of the belief in an inherent 
similarity berween Man and animal but rather of the existence of 
the human subject who can recognize him- or herself in nature on ly 
after it has been objectified and changed berond recognition. 

In comras[ to rhis experimental exploitation of the animal's 

body in vivisection, [he authors propose an alternative perspective 
on rhe animal, based on some more 'intangible' aspen of its 
existence, that is, 

das Dasein ohne Licht der Vemunft, (ue Existenz 
der Tiere se!bsc. Sie ware das echte Thema der 
PSj'chologie, denn nur das Leben der Ticre veriiiufr 
nach seelischen Regungcn; wo Psychologic die 
Meoschen erklaren mu3, sind sie regredien und 

zemon. (DdA 283f) 

The authors' critique of the exploimtive stance towards rhe animal 

Traumatic tvfetamorphoses 51 

in rhe field of science does not prevent them from pursuing an 
argument that reaffirms the same objectifying tendencies of the 
rationalist dichotomy between nanae and culrure. Already their 
conception of an alternative, psychological app roach towards 
the animal's existence is founded on an almost stereotypical 
Enlightenment ideal, the 'light of reason' from which the anin1a l 

is excluded as its inferior and deprived Othe r. From dle start, the 
authors' programme o f a non-instrumentalising stance towards 
the animal is thus informed by an inherent contr.ldiction between 
their explicit nicique of rational, scielllific practice and their usc of 
vocabulary that indicates their indebt'edness ro the very conceptions 
and oppositions that they attempt to undermine. in this respect, 
the authors' notion that the applicability of psychology to Man 
is symptOmatic of h is (or her) regression and destruction is itself 
indicative of a rather uneasy stance towards the non-rational in the 
human subject. The autho rs' notion of the animal as the true objeCl 
of psychology is thus in line with the aforementioned tendency in 
Enlightenment discourse (Q use [he animal as a plane of projection 
for such characteristics as the non-rational (such as, in Freudian 
thought, me unconscious) which conflict with the conception of the 
rational, civilized and self-centred human subject. 

This tendency becomes even more apparent when the authors 
develop their notion of the animal's existence in more detaiL To 
stan with, Horkheimer and Adorno Stress the animal's inability to 
perceive time as a threefold scheme of past, present and future; 
rhey characterize it as essentially lacking in speech or any capacity to 

conceptualise its own existence. The animal is hence condemned to 

a state of oblivion: 

Das T ier hort auf den Namen lind hal kein Selbst, 
es 1St in slch eingesch losscn lind doch preisgegeben, 
immc[ konunt ein neuer Zwang, keine neue Idee 
reiclH liber ihn hinaus. Fu r den Entzug des Trostes 
tauscht das Tier nicht .Milderung dec Angst cin, 
fur das fehlende Bewufitsein von Gliick nicht die 
Abwesenheit von Trouer und Schmerz. (DdA 284) 

In its general lhrust. Borkheimer and J\Jorno's account 



52 Fofll$ on Gtrntan Studies 

of what they refer (0 as "[dlie Weir des Tieres" (DdA. 284) does 
nOt fu ndamentally dJfrer from [heir description of the animal's 
predicament in scientific experiments. The animal's inner, 'natural' 
existence Independent of any human inrerference is informed by 
the same nouons of fear, pain, and passive, oblivious suffering 
which characterize its reaction [Q (he abusive practices of 

vivisection. Horkheimer and Adorno's account of lhe animal's 
'natural: existential predicament thus relacivises their own critique 
of inSLIumemal ceason and its insu umenralising stance towards 
narure. Consequently. [he conclusions wbich the authOrs d raw from 
the animal's existen tial predicament show that they do not succeed 
in promoting an alternative, non-reductive understanding of t.he 
animal; instead, these conclusions serve to legitimise the authors' 
own philosophical project: 

Damit GlUck subsramieU werde, dem Dasein 
den Too .... erleihe. hedarr es identi6z.ierendet 
Ennnerung, beschwic:hrigender Erkenmnis, der 
religiosen und philosophisc:hen Idee, kur, des 
Begriffs. Es gibt gliickliche Tiere, aber welc:h kurzen 
Atem hat dleses GlUck! Die Dauer des Tiers, ,'om 
befreienden Gedanken nicht unterbrochen, 1St 
trube und depressiv. Urn dem bohrend leeren 
Dasein zu entkommen, ist ein Widerstand norig, 

dessen Ruckgrar die Sprache ist. (DdA 284) 

Language, figured as rhe precondition for memo ry and 
substamial, permanent happiness, is here identified with concepts 
and rhe discourse of philosophy. This rum of [he argument 
illustrates Il abermas' thesis o f the performative contradiction of 
Critical Theory, which, in [he authors' own words, manifests itself 
in me h~letll.morphosen von Kritik in Affirmation" (DdA 12). The 
authors' inability to relativise the value o f rhea own, ra tional position 
counters their attempt [0 enter into an ahemative, non-dominarory 
relationship with the animal which is not informed by the notion 
of the animal as in ferio r and deprived Other. As a consequence, 
the animal's fate In modern scientific practice figures as an empry 
che(Orical devlce by which the authors establish their critique of 

Traumatic Metamorphoses 53 

a system whose values and presuppositions they do not call into 
question. Despite dUs argumentative impasse, however, [he passage 
cited 2-bove: opens up one poSSible avenue of enquIry - the: relauon 
between language and memory, Wh iCh, as I shall argut, furnishes 
a new perspective o n the narure of philosophical discourse and 
its relation to its non-rational Other. Although the authors here 
associate memory with conceptual language, lhis relationship 
between discourse and remembrance can also be figured in 

altcrnative, non-conccptual [erIllS. As I shall argue, I-f orkheimer 
and Adorno's reading of the Odyssey develops sllch a model as a 
narrative which enables an alternative, non-ldemificatOry form of 
remembrance and recognition and which can In turn be appbed 10 

the concept of the animal in Western rauonabty. 

T he anim al as self: traumatic metamorphoses 

TIle concept of an inherent relation be(V,'een langu:lge and memory 
is developed in rhe fi rst pan of the Dia/l/:Jlle dtr Aufolonmg, In [he 
chapter <Begriff dec AufkJarung: in which the authors explote the 
historical development of language. In ItS early stages, language is 
not yet a means of conceprual ahsuacuon from rea il ry, but forms 
pan of a pre-rational, 'magical' conception of Ihe world III which 
language is believed to maintain a mimetic relauon to the reali ty 
it describes, thus establishing a b ridge between nature and the 
spea king subject: 

Auf der magische:n Stufe galren Traum unci Bild 
nicht als blolks Zeiche:n der Sache, sondeen als 
mit dieser durch AhnlichkCll oder durc.h den 
Namen vcrhllnden. Die Beziehung iSI nicht die 
der Intentio n sonclem de r VelVl'.Indrschafr. Ole 
Zauberei ist wie die Wissenschaft auf Zwecke 
aus, aber sie verfolgt sie durch r-.lJmesis, nicht in 
fortschreitender Dis[anz zum ObJckt. (DdA 27) 

Ahhough the spea king subject'S mimetic Idemifica uon wi th nature 
through language avoids the objectifying stance which characterizes 
the later abstraction from reality through concepts, [his early 



54 FOOIJ on Gtrman S ,udiu 

conception o f language emails rather problematic implications for 
the position of rhe subject in this configuration. Whereas conceptual 
language e:ntliis the distance and alienation of Man from nature, 
the eady, mimetic conception of language threatens lhe subject's 
supposedly self·conrained starus, which is co[)slamiy under threat In 

lhe e:lrly stages of the formanon of the self (DdA 50). 
to this respect, language comributes to what Ilorkheimer 

and Adorno, from tbe Enlightenment perspective, perceive as the 
thecal inherent in the notion o f th e primeval subject's mimetic 
identifica tion with lhe surrounding nature. Rather lilan providing 
a clear-cm division between speaking subject and outside reali£),. 
language in this early stage is still infor med by rhe expedence of 
l-, fan's precarious and constantly threatened individuatio n and 
his incomplete dissociation from the nature around him. In this 
respect, the magical conception of language is symproma[ic of the 
incomplete separatio n of Man from narure. The mimetic co ncepuon 
of language mirrors Man's lack o f actual and rational distance ftOm 
nature while it at the same time figures as a mode of expression 
for the subject's experience o f this threatening nature which has 
yet ro be identified, described and ordered in language. Language 
in this early stage thus refers both to the unknown, mysteriOus and 
threatening elements in nanue and to the pre-rational subject'S 
irrational response to lhis unknown and unexplored part of reali ry: 

Der Ruf des Schreckens, mn dem das Ungewohnte 
erfuhren wird, wild zu seinem Namen. Er fixierr 
die Transzendenz des Unbekannten gegeniiber 
dem Bekannten und damit den Scbauder als 
Heiligkeir. Ole Verdoppelung der Narur in Schein 
und \,\/esen, Wirkungund Kraft, die l\[ythos sowoh l 
wie die Wissenschaft erst moglich macht, stamm! 
aus der Angst des Menschen, deren Ausdruck 
zur ErkJarung wiLd. [ ... J Das war die Urform 
objektivicrender Bestimmung, in der Beg riff und 
Sache auseinandematen [ ... J. Aber diese Dialektik 
bleibt ohnmachtig, solange sie aus dem Ruf des 
Schreckens sich entfahet, der die Verdoppelung. 
die Taurolo!:,oie des Schreckens se\bst 1St. ( ••• J 

Traumatic Metamorphoses 

Aufklarung ist die radikal gewordene, mythische 
Angst. (OdA 3 1 f) 

55 

The insrincrual expression of fear, rather than me distancing, 
detached description. IS thus al the heart of conceptual language 
and as such underpins even the entire Enlightenment movement. 
Although [he source o f Man's fear, the fcelLng of an incomplete 
separauon and insufficient distance from the surrounding narure 
is later overcome through the abstraction from reality in language; 
this fi rst, instinctual exp ression of fea r is suit preserved in tbe 
resulting concepts. Tn order to use language as a tool o f objective 
description, Enlightenment rationality must therdore be oblivious 
to the foundation of language III the expression of fear, (hat is, 
the subject'S lack of control and disrance towards the surrounding, 
unknown rcaliry. In this respect, the transition from a mimetic to a 
conceptual notion o f language also entails that the language loses LtS 

capacity 10 serve as a mode of expression for the speaking subject. 
The exertion of control and dommauon over outside reality lhrough 
conceptual language thus resultS in the subject's increased alienation 
from the surrounding reahty. 

The impact o f these instrumentallsiog tendencies of 
En iJgluenment rationaiJty on the subject is exemplified 10 

l-t orkheimer and Adorno's account of anOlher, somewhat different 
concepuon of me animal which complements the lfIsuument'liising 
stance of behavioural psychology and viVisec tion. Alongside the 
scientifi c conceptions of the anllllal, the authors also draw on 
literary sources such as mythology and fo lktales to introduce the 
conceptio n of the animal as Man's bewi tched, es t ranged Self. This 
notion is ceorral to One particular mOlif: the mt t:llnorphosis from 
l\Ian into animal, which, as the authors claim, is commonly regarded 
as a punishment. l This problematic configura uo n is exemplified 
by Horkheimer and Adorno's ambiguous relauonshlp towards Ihe 
animal. While their account is on the one hand Info rmed by their 
inability 10 overcome the objectifying stance Inherent in rational 
discourse, thelI Stance lowards the an llnal is also characterized by a 
sense of uneasy recognition and Idemific:.won: 

In den Tierleib gebannt:w sClO,gllt als Verdal1lmnis. 



56 foals on Ctrman SIlidiu 

[ ... ] Die srumme Wildheir im Blick des Tiers zeugt 
von demselben Grauen, das die Menschen in 
solcher Verwandlung rurchrcren. Jedes Tier ennnert 
an ein abgri.indiges Ungtuck, das in dec Urzeit 51Ch 

ereignet hat. (OdA 285) 

Ths passage illustrates how me conceptions of the animal in 
the discourses of science, philosophy and literature are utumately 
related to the underlying question of Man's own identity in relation 
o r contradistinc tion ro [har of the animal. Tn this respect, the 
'memffiorphosis' moti f, originally derived from mythology, preserves 
rhe memory of Man's origin - [he formation of his subjectivity in a 
process of separation from a state of undifferentiated 'oneness' with 
naNce and undermines the clear-cut distinction berween Man and 
animal which is maintained through the emphasis on the animal's 
Otherness. Indeed, the motif of metamorphosis undermines the 
o pposition of subject and object, self and orner, culrure and Ilarure 
when it casts the lInlffial as Man's bewitched double. This rum 
of the argument emphasizes a notion which was latently present 
throughout Horkheimer and Adorno's account: the sense lhat the 
norian of the animal reRects as much on (he Enlightenment concepr 
of narure as the Other of reason as It does on the implicauons of 
(hese objectifying tendency on Man's own identity. 

The animal's gaze as encoumered by the human subject, "we 
stwnme Wildhel( Inl l3lick des "fieres" (OdA 285) therefore figures 
as a reminder of the threal to human individuation symbolized by 
the animal's ·Otherness.' Tbe dread (Grautn), whicb {be protagonisr 
in Ihe fai.ry talc discerns in the ammal's eyes, corresponds to 
H orlilleimer and Adorno's accoum of the animal's pred icament. 
Rather (han referring to actual suffering on the part of the animal, 
the 'Grauen' perceived in the animal's gaze is a projection by the 
human subject who is reminded by the animal's gaze of his own 
origin in a state of undifferentiated oneness with narure. This fear, 
however, is as much the effect of the common ocigin of Man and 
animal as a reRection of the alienating effect of instrumental reason 
over namre bOlh exrernal and imernal to Man. 

The threat which the idea of being transformed into an aormal 
harbours for the human subject is only In part symptomatic of the 

Traumauc Metamorphoses 57 

Enlightenment's reductive notion of the animal's Otherness and 
its inferior, unhappy existence. The terror which Man discerns 111 

the animal's eyes mirrors his own position 111 a v.'Orld in which dl(! 
impact of inslrumentalising reason entails ~Iatl's alienation nOt 
only from naNn:: bur also from himself. Horkheimer and Adorno's 
misconception with regard to the motif of Man's tnnsformatlon 
into an animal derives from their misconception of the dread in lhe 
bewitched subject's gaze which reflects not on Ihe existence of the 
ani mal bUI on that of the human subject in the age of instrumental 
reason. In a comment wh ich can be seen as a paraphrase of the 'spell' 
exercised over the bewitched subject, Jessica Benjam.in summarizes 
this complex imerplay of projection and alienation in Horkheimer 
and Adorno's argumenr, claiming that "the subject fears becoming 
like the object he controls, which no longer has the capacity to 
recognize him" (Benjamin 185). 

In orde r to escape this aporeticai 
configuration of fear, domination and (self·) 
alienation, a critique of instrumentalising reason such as the one 
undertaken in the Dialthile dtr AujJekinmg would thus have to be 
formulated in a discourse llut recuperates the muneuc, expressive 
side of language rather than repress1l1g this dimension. \'\lhile In 
its conceptua l dimension, language has, over (he course of history, 
become a tool for l\ [al1's rational understanding of and, ultimately, 
donunation over narure, liS originaJ, mimetic concepcion and 
expressive dimension is also preserved III the literary, or 'aestheuc' 
dtscourse in which the mimetic association \\'nh nature is not 
repressed but forms part of rhe communicative act (Honneth 79): 

Gerade der Ve.rzichr auf Einwirkung, d urch welche 
KunS[ von der magischen Sympathic sich scheidet, 
hah das magische Erbe um so ticfe[ fest. Es 
ruckt das reine Bud 111 Gegensatz zur ICibhaftigen 
Ex islenz, deren Elemente es tn sich aunlebt. Es 
liegt im Sinn des KUl1s(wcrks, clem asthetischen 
Sche.in, das zu sein, wow in jenem Zauber des 
Prim.itiven das neue, schreckliche Geheimnis 
wurde: Erscheinung des Ganzen 1m Besonderen. 
( ... ) Als Ausdruck cler TOlalidit Ixansprucht Kunst 



58 

die \,(/tirde des Absoluten. Die Philosophie ist 
dadurch 2:uweilen bewogen, ihr den Vorrang voe 
der begrifRichen Erkenntnis zu geben. (DdA 35) 

Through its similanry to the mimetic, magtcal concepcion 
of language, the aesthetic discourse is figured by Adorno in his 
Ntgab"w Diakkiik as an alternative [0 the conceptual language used 
in philosophy. This argument is criticized by Habermas who sees in 
it a step towards philosophica! self.delegitimarion, "die Abuerung 
de.r Erkennmis-Kompetenz an dIe Kunst" (Hai>ermas, Theone 514). 

Habermas' critique is irsdf basc:d on a rather monolithic conception 
o f {\\'O entities called An and Philosophy which, in their style and 
function, are mutually exclusive. l \'(fhile Habermas' argument could 
itself be read as yet anorher a[[empt at philosophical self-Iegltimation, 
he fails to recognize that the expressive or figura tive dimension o f 
language is itself vltal for me production of meaning in any context 

and thus cannOl be separated from IlS conceptual or argumentative 
function in philosophical djscourse. This is exemplified in {he 
D10kkJik der AujleJanmg. where the opposition between aesthetic, 
that is, literary, and philosophical discourse is already undermined 
by lhe intenextual suucrure of the argument, 10 panicular by me 
aumors' account of Homer's 041s19 2S a philosophical aUegory for 
the formauon of the modern subject. 

The Odyssey: re me mbrancl! a nd exp ress ion 

In their reading of lhe OdyJJt.J, Horkhcimer and Adorno 
explore the "'1lys 10 which the insrcumentalising effect of conceptual 
12nguage is inexuic2bly linked will, its expressive 2nd mimetic side. 
In their discussion of Book 22, the authOrs analyse the way in which 
the cruelty of an execution is conveyed in a detached, precise but 
cold narrative: 

Du:: kalte DistallZ der Erzahlung, die noch das 
Grauenhafte voncig[, als ware es wr Umerhalrung 
bestimmt, laRt zugle.ich das Grauen erSt 

hcrvometen, das im uedt: zum Schicksal feiedich 
sich veIWirn. [ ... J Die Genauigkeit des Beschreibe rs, 

Tl'2umauc MetamoThoses 

die schon die Kiihe von Anatomic und Vivisektion 
ausstrahlr, fiihn romanmaRig Protokoll tiber die 
Zuckungen der Untcrworfenen ... (DdA 98) 

59 

'ntis characterisauon IS reminiscent of the authors' accouOl of 
medical e:KperimentS in 'Mensch und Tier,' where the "Zuckungen 

der gefesselten OpfeL2ffi Seziertisch" exemplify the merciless 
execution of instrumental reason (DdA 284). Encoded In dllS 
double association of viviseCtion with both narrative style and 
scientific practice - Ihe animal's exposure to the IIlsuumentahsmg 
reason o f the medical experiment and Homer's detached p rol0col of 
suffering - is the reference to Ihe conc rete hiSlOcical manifestauon 
of Instrumental reason in Nazism, the pretext and focal poim of the 
authors' critique of [ationauty. 

Against this background, lhe authors' notion of the animal's 
speechless 'Grauen' refers nOI only ro the abusive praCtice of 
instrumen tal reason but also nlore specifically to the historical 
context of Nazism. In particular, the concept of \'iVlsection as an 
example of the barbaric scienufic practice associates the medical 
experiments carried Out in the context of the Holocaus(, which are 
also justified by their function as research applicable to Mankind 
in general, 2hhough this contrasts \\'ith lhe nODon of the Jewish 
subject'S Otherness and 'deviant' nalOre. 

A similar configuration can be discerned in the discurSIve, 
Ideological manifesration of anu-Semitism. As Horkheimer 2nd 
Adorno 2rgue in 'to.lensch und 'lier,' one of the recurring monfs of 

ann-Semitic discourse IS the stereotypical association of the Jew with 
the animal in ca ricattlre and Nazi propaganda: "Das prononcicrte 
Menschengesicht, £las beschiimend an die eigne Herkunfl aus Natur 
und die VerfaUenheit an sie ennncrt, forden unwiderstehlich nur 
noch zum Totschlag auf" (DdA 290). The anti-Semitic idemification 
of the Jewish subject wirh lhe animal can therefore be said (Q be 
motivated by the same exclusionary gesture that is performed by 
\'('estern philosophy against rhe animal as the Othcr of reason. In 
DOl Unbeho,!,tn in dtr f<.JIllllr, Sigmund Freud summarizes thi:; interplay 
of ideOlification and difference under the term "NarziBmus def 

kleinen Differenzen" (474) - a phenomenon which, in a radicahscd 
form, also underpms antl-Semiusm and other cases where identiry is 



60 Foall on German JflldilJ 

founded on exclusion and discrimination. 
Horkheimer and Adorno's concept of the animal therefore 

exemplifies the inherent connection between, on tbe one hand, 
the objectifying tendencies of modern science and, on me otber, 
the Holocaust in its rationalized efficiency. At the same rime, 

however. the propagandistic association of lhe Jewish sub ject wim 
the animal is founded on a mUlCC of identification and alienation 
derived from the recognition of an inherent link between t"lan 
and animal in general. In this respect, rhe anti-Semitic discourse 
displays characteristics that are not completely different from 
Horkbeimer and Adorno's own norion of the animal. T heir accoun t 
of the 'Grauen' in the animal's gaze and the projective notion of its 
existential, speechless predicament displays the same uneasy mixture 
of identification and rejection which informs the conception of 
rhe animal in \\?esrern discourse and which fo rms the basis of its 
exclusion domination and extinction. The concept of the animal 
in the Di~/ektik der Aujkliinmg therefore illusrrates the inherent link 
between Enlightenment discourse, sciemific practice, and absolutist 
dictatorship, while at the same time providing a prime example of 
rhe aporia of the aUlho~' own philosophical project. 

Tn their analysis of the Homeric myth, Horkheimer and 
Adorno nor only explore the detached, rational mode of description 
employed in the OdyfJ!J, bur they also discern a momem in the 
narrative which counters me insuumentalising tendel)cies of 
rational discourse. Despite its descriptive character, Homer's 
narrative also contains an expressive, poetic dimension that refers 
to the mimetic origin of language. H orkheimer and Adorno argue 
lhat the rational discourse of the Homeric narrative is achieved 
through [he abandonment of dle musical medium of song through 
which myths had been conveyed in the oral uadition . The rational 
distance from the described incidents which is established in the 
narrative marks dle precondition for a permanent memory of d1e 
recounted disaster and, as a consequence, provides the possibility 
of an escape from it: "Rede seiber, die Sprache in ihrem Gegensatz 
zum mythischen Gesang, die M6glichkeit, das geschehene Unheil 
erinnernd festzuhalren, ist das Geserz des homerischen Emrinnens" 

(DdA 98). These nOllOns of escape and memory, which eounteract 
the objectifying tendencies of rational discourse, are founded on a 

Traumatic r-" fctamorphoses 6 1 

rhetorical element, that of caesura, which disrupts rile continuity of 
the narrator's description: 

Das I nnehalten def Rede aber ist die Zasur, die 
Verwandlung des Berichtelen in langst Vergangcncs, 
kraft deren der Schein von Freiheil aufblirzt, den 
Zivilisauon ~eitdem nidu mehr ganz ausgeloscht 
bat. (DdA 98) 

T he break in the narrative, which disrupts its coherence 
and undermines its realism, marks the moment at which the 
horror of the recounted execution is suspended. The narrative 
discourse not ani), records the content of a culture's history as it 
is preserved in collective memory but also provides a su ategy for 
coping with the threats of both narure and inslwmenralised reason. 
Homer's narrative therefore provides a means of recording which 
can preserve the memory of r-,·fan's p re-rational origin, as well as 
a means of expression for the subject's traumatic encounters with 
borh natu re and instrumenralised reason. In this respect, dle caesura 
is viral fo r this mnemonic function of Homer's text, as it does not 
mark a moment of oblivion, as the authors argue with regard to 
dle animal's speechless ex.istence, but rarher opens up a rcalm of 
memory and non-verbal Jdemincation: 

Ais Burger, der der Hinrichtung nachsinnt, u6sret 
Homer sich und seine Zuhorer, die eigendich Leser 
sind, mit der gesicherten Feststdlung, dan es nicht 
lange wiihne, ein Augcnblick und alles isr "oruber. 
Abel nach dem 'Nicht lange' stehr der innere 
FluB der ErzahlLlng still. Nicht lange? fragt die 
Geste des Erzahlers und strafe seine Gelassenheit 
Lugen. Tndem sie clen Bericht aufhii.lt, verwehrt 
sie es, die Geriehreten zu vergessen, und dech die 
unnennbare ewige Qual ckr tincn Sekunde auf, in 
def die Magde mit clem Tod kiimpfen. (Ddi\ 99) 

I [ is not through the coherence and analytic logic of language, 
but rather through its inherent, genealogical link to traumatic 



62 fifllJ on German Studies 

experience, mal the memory of (he victims is both expressed and 
preserved. The caesura, which interrupts the clinicaJ precision with 
which me execution is descrilxd, suspends me reader's rational 
disunce from the narracivc and provides a moment of identification 
be(ween reader and charactus. This identification, however, takes 
place outside conceprual languagl:; when it refers to death as the 

indescribable, the impossible speech-ac[.~ language suspends its 
representational function and becomes a mere gesture towards the 
unrep resentable. The interplay of silence and narrative in the Odymy 
mediates me twO e1emems of language, the distancing. rational 
acCOunt of an incident and its gestural expression: 

Hoffnung aber kniipft sich im Bericht yon dec 

Untat daran, daJ1 es schon lange her ist. Fur die 
Verstrickung von Uneit, Barbard und Kulrur hat 
Homer we rrostende Hand 1m Eingedenken von 

Es war c.inma!. Em als Roman geht das Epos ins 
Marchen uber. (DdA 99) 

The development from me epic to the novel, which is 
concomitant with the general development of Enlightenment 
reason, is mediated by the Wry tale as the discursive model that 
combines both desc[]ption and expression. The fairy tale. therefore 
reimegrares its mimetic origin into language while at the same time 
providing the means for a represenracion of the world that can 
preserve the memory of Man's past. Significantly, the discourse 

of the fairy tale recurs in 'r-. lensch und Tier' in the': aforementioned 
example of Man's me':ramorphosis into an animal. As 1 shall argue, 
the fairy tale nOt only reinforces the notion of me: animal's Otherness 
bur it also provides a momem of non·disculsive remembrance and 
identification similar to that in the Odyssey which undermines the 
re.ined oppositions berwee':n the rational subject and the anima l as its 
non-rational Other. 

Negatil'e Dialektik a nd the ut o p ia of the 'versohnte Z us tand' 

Horkheimer and Adorno argue that like (he 04;yJS9, the fairy tale 
provides, as a narntive medium which preserves me memory of (he 

Tnumatic Metamorphoses 63 

past, a memory which, like thal in the case of the execution, refers 
to a traumauc inddem: '1edes Tier erinnen an ein abgrundiges 
UnglUck, das in der Uneit sich ereignel hat. Das Marchen S~ric1~1 
die Ahnung der Menschen aus" (DdA 285). At lIus pomt, It 

becomes clear that Il orkheJmerand Adorno's notion of the animal's 
ex.istential prewcament is Informed not only by a reductive stance 
towards the animal as the': Other of reason but also by a more deeply 
rooted fear about the Slarus and existence o f the human subjecl. 
In this respect, the authors' project to enforce the dividing tine 
between Man and animal IS informed by a LWofold aporia: while the 
historical context and political practice of Fascism undermined any 
clear-CUI di stinction between rationality and irrationality, fl. lan and 
animal, culture and barbarism, the attempts made by Horkheimer 
and Adorno's own attempt to renegotiate this distinction only 
reinforces the aporetical implications of Enlightenment rationality. 

At lhe same 1II1le, however, the non-verbal interaction beLWeen 

Man and animal as II is described in the fairy tale provides a moment 
of recollection similar (0 that of the caesura in the Ot!Juy. In the 
fairy tale, the common origin of to.lan and animal is preserved 
but simultaneously transformed into a comforting narrative, "dte 
Ifoslende Hand im Eingedenken von Es war cinmal" (DdA 99). 
TIle fairy tale thus marks a form of remembrance of this common 
origin that has remained unaffected by the inslCUme.nralislOg 
conception of the animal as the Other of reason. The fairy ule of 
Man's metamorphOSiS into an animal provides a nArrauve in which 
Man's pre-culrural oneness widl nal\lre is cast iOlo a mythic, pre­

historical realm, a phylogenetic myth lhat subsequently becomes an 
olltogene£ic one when the adult remembers the tales told to him as 
a ch ild. The fairy tale thus provides an ahernative to the conceprual, 
rational accounls of the relarion between Man and animal and 
opens up new perspectives for a conceprualtsation of the animal 
which exceeds the binarisms of narure and culture, reason and its 
non-rauonal Other. 

The discursive pOlenual of the fairy talc to enable: an 
alre:rnanve, non-dominatory stance lowards the animal and 
to preserve a memory of to. lan's own origin is illusuated by 

I-Iorkhcimer and Adorno's own Slance rewards the fairy-tale 
mouf of metamorphOSiS. Not only do (hey read the fairy [ale as a 



64 Fol'lis 011 Ger!l/iJ/J S ludil1 

document of culmral his lOry (as they do in me case of the OdySJtJ), 
but their stance (owards the fairy ule changes from one of passive 
reception to one of creative appropriation. In dljS respect, the 
authors' development of the motif of metamorphosis subverts me 
difference between the discourses of philosophy and lilcrarurc when 
they rewrite the fairy tale and transform me traumatic memory of 
(he past infO a utopian vision of the furure: 

Wenn abee dem Prinzen dort die Vcrounft geblieben 
war, so daR er zue gegebenen Zeit sein Lciden sagen 
und die: Fee illn erlosen konnte, so bannt Mangel 
an Vernunft das Tier auf ewig in seine Gestalt, es 
sci denn, daB dec Mensch, dec durch Vergangenes 
mil ihm dos isr, den erl6senclen Sprueh finder und 
durch ihn da s steincrne Hen dec Uncndlicbkeir am 
Ende der Zelten erweicht. (DdA 285) 

The narrarive of me fairy tale as it is adopted and rewritten 
by me authors is still informed by rhe notion of the animal's 
speechlessness and lack of reason, which, as I have argued, signifies 
{he authOrs' lack of critical dmance towards the limitations of their 
own philosophical discourse. Atme same rime, however, lhe animal's 
Otherness, "die srumme Wildheit im Blick des Tiers," preserves the 
memory of rhe common origin of Man and animal and. in rum, 
opens up the possibility of the redeeming formula in which language 
regains pan of its maglcal pou:ntiaL The prince's 'erlosender 
Sprueh' therefore indLe:ues a utopian concept of a non-dominating 
relationship between Man and animal mat is related to Habermas' 
concept of communicative acrion, understood as "gewaltlose 
Imersubjekrivitat" (Haoermas, Theonl523). 

The relationship berween I\[an and animal, in which the 
magical, expressive component of language is recuperated, thus 
indicates a srate of tolerance cowa rds rhe non-identical rather (han 
the gesture of its exclusion and simultaneous domination. In his 
lare text Ntgotit-e Diflltkllk, Adorno remms to dUs notion of the 
a philosophical discourse of difference rather than of conceprua l 
identification and develops it further: 

Traumauc Metamorphoses 

Oer versohnte Zustand annekuene nicht mil 
philosophischem Imperialismus das Fremde, 
sondern hitte sein G luck daran, daB es in der 
geutihrten Niihe das r-erne und Verschiedene 
bleibt, jenseiLS des Ileterogenen wle des Eigenen. 
(Adoeno 192) 

65 

The amhors' reappropriation of the fairy tale narrative for 
their own argumem in 'Mensch und Tier' figures as a model for 
such a discursive practice which undermines the clear-cur distinction 
between conceprual and expressive language, and therefore between 
philosophical and li terary discourses. By actively transforming the 
fairy-tale narrative, the authors exemplify the interdependence of 
the conceptual side of an argument and its rherorical figuration. 
Tberefore, Borkheimer and Adorno's rewriting of the fairy tale 
not only suspends the absolute opposition between Man and nantre 
but also achieves a momentary independence of their argume.nt 
from the discourse of Enlightenment rationality. At tlus point, the 
authors' argument escapes the performarive conuadiction discerned 
by Habermas and counters lhe aporetical metamorphosis of criuque 
into affirmation. 

The adoption of narrative strategies therefore enables the 
philosophical discourse to regain an expressive function that, as 
Adorno dauns in NtgtJIive DiakkJik, becomes the central funcuon 
of philosophy in the age of instrumentalised reason: 

Das Bedi.irrnis, Leiden beredt werden zu lassen, 
ist Bedingung aller Wahrheit. Deon Lciden ist 
Objekti\·iciit. die auf dem Subjekt lastet; was e.s 
als stin Subjektivstes erfah rl, seill Ausdruck, ist 
objektiv vermitteh. 
Das mag erklaren helfen, warum der Philosophie 
iilre Oarstellung nicht gleichgultig und iiuOerlich 
ist, sondc.rn ihrer Idee immanent. lhr rntegrales 
Ausdrucksmoment, unbegrifl1ich-mimecisch, wird 
nm durch DarstelJung - die Sprache - objcktivicn . 
Die Freiheit der Philosophie is! nichts anderes 
als das Ve rmogen, ihrer Unfreiheit zum Laut zu 



66 Foctrs on German Studies 

verhelfen. (Adorno 29) 

Adorno's argument in the Negatit-e Dio!ektik therefore 
takes the argumentative practice of lhe Dialektik der Aufkldnmg 
one step funher. Horkheimer and Adorno's argument aboU[ the 
animal's speechless existence LUustrates the need for the critique of 

instrumeotalised reason to adopt a discursive strategy that differs 
from that of its object of critique. Failing to do so, Horkheimer and 
Adorno's own argument thus reiterates the reductive, exclusionary 
stance of rational discourse towards naUlte as its 'Other: In order 
to escape this aporetical configuration, philosophical discourse 
therefore has to abandon this mode of generalising critique tlmt 
only enforces me existing binarisms and exclusions. Tn the light of 
the authors' thesis of the self-destruction of Enlightenmen t, Critical 
Theory is required to recuperate the conception of language that 
pI:ecedes its instrumental and rational dimensions. Borkheimer 
and Adorno's analysis of the 04:;ssry and their argumentative 
adoption and transformation of the fairy tale discourse exemplify 
the possibility of a reintegration of the expressive function of 
language into philosophica l discourse. Despite the utopian potential 
in Horkheimer and Adorno's rewriring of the fairy tale, however, 
this discursive strategy does nOt, as in the case of the bewitched 
p rince, provide a magical formula lO redeem critique from its 
'metamorphosis' into affirmation. As Adorno demonstrates in the 
Negative Dialtktik, the freedom .of philosophy in the age of the 
dialectic, or indeed the aporia, of Enlightenment is restricted to the 

(mimetic) expression of its own predicament. 

Sf. John's College, Uniz,-mity of Cambridge 

Notes 

1 References to the Diakktik der A;.ifkldnmg \>iill be given parenthetically in 
lhe teXt using me abbreviation 'DdA.' 

l Probably Ihe most famous example of the motif of mec:amocphosis in 
(non-mymological) litentture is Kafka's Die ~m"'!Jdlling. Here, the common 
criciea! interpretacion of Gregor Samsa's transformation as punishment 
reveals the same deeply rooted anxielies regarding such an imlll existence 
which underlie Horkheimer and Adorno's accoum; as in the Dia/ektik der 

Traumatic Memmorphose.s 67 

AlIjkliinmg, however, the adequacy of rlus imerpretaoon wilh regard to 
Sllffisa's condition remllins questionable. 
3 Habnffias'critique here seems LO be informed by the Aristotelian no tion 
of poetic discour~e as a secondary form of representation thai can at be~l 
be a vehicle for the 'pure' idea (Poetic! 1456a). 
4 ''Versuche dec Sprache, den Tod auszudrucken, sind \'ergcbens bis in die 
Logik hinein; wer ware das Subickt, von clem da prazidicrt wird, cs sei jetzt, 
hier tot" (Adorno 364). 

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Vol. 2 of Cesammeite Schriflm. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. 20 vols. 1997. 

Aristode. Poetics. Ed. Stephen Halliwell. Cambridge, l\hssachuseus· 
Harvard UP, 1995. 

13enjamin,Jessica. Tht BONdi of Love: I'SJch<lana!Jsis, Femillislll ami the Problem oj 
Domination. London: Virago, 1990. 

Freud, Sigmund. Das Ullbehagm in der KuUIlr. Cual!JlJleite Werke. Vol. XJ V. Ed. 

Anna Freud et aL. London: Imago, 1948. 419-506 
Habennas, Jurgen. Du phi/QsophiJChe DiIhm dtr Modem(: Zwii!( VorleJlillgw. 

FrankfuH/ l\(ain: Suhrkamp, 1985. 
---. Theone du knmmun.iJwtivell Han.delm. Vol. \. l-la/1(l/lIngsrationaiiliit mid 

gmllSl;haflliche &tionaJisitrong. Fntnkfun/ Main: Suhrkamp, 1981 . 
Honneth, A xd. Kritik der Math!. Rtfoxionutufen dller kritiscmll Gm llschaft! :h(OIie. 

Fntnkfun/Main: Suhrkamp, 1985. 
Horkheimer, rvlax and Theodor Adorno. Diafrktik der AltjkJiirlillg: 

Pbik;cphiJche Fragmwte. Frankfurt/MaUl: Sulll·kamp Taschenl.lUch, 
1997. Vol. 3 of CesalJ!!!Jelte Schriftm. Ed. Rolf T iedemann. 20 vols. 
1997.