id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentence	flesch	summary	cache	txt
fbem-17289	Ye, Dingnan; Li, Jingwen	Game Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain Based on Different Rights Structure	2024	6	.pdf	application/pdf	4031	196	50	a represents the overall market demand for the product, which reflects the overall market development level of the product, and for the general merchandise with dual channels, the scale of its total market demand is much bigger than its wholesale price w; k is the market share of the traditional retail channel, and 1-k is the market share of the direct sales channel; and Its wholesale price w; k is the market share of the traditional retail channel, 1-k is the market share of the direct sales channel; b is the channel cross-price elasticity coefficient, and there are 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, i.e., the impact of the price of this channel on demand is not less than the impact of the price of other channels on the demand of this channel. (2) When the coefficient of cross-price elasticity of demand is not 0, under the Stackelberg game dominated by the retailer (manufacturer), the traditional channel (direct channel) has the highest pricing, and the demand of the traditional channel (direct channel) is the smallest, while the demand of the traditional channel (demand of the direct channel) is the largest in the Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer (retailer); both manufacturers and retailers are willing to choose to give up their power and do the Stackelberg game.	cache/fbem-17289.pdf	txt/fbem-17289.txt