Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management 
ISSN: 2766-824X | Vol. 18, No. 3, 2025 

 

40 

Research on the Influence of Executive Internal Alliance 
on Innovation Performance of Enterprises 

Yanyan Xue * 

School of Accountancy, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, China 

* Corresponding author: Yanyan Xue (Email: 3335880251@qq.com) 

 

Abstract: Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2022, this paper 
studies the relationship between internal alliance of senior executives and corporate innovation performance. The research shows 

that the degree of internal alliance of senior executives has a significant promoting effect on enterprise innovation performance. 

The support of senior executives and directors enables the CEO to have greater decision-making autonomy in the corporate 

decision-making process. This internal alliance stimulates the CEO's need to bring a sense of accomplishment and dignity 

through work, and makes him pay more attention to the long-term development of the company, thus promoting corporate 

innovation. It is also found that ownership concentration has a negative moderating effect on the promotion effect of intra-

executive alliance on enterprise innovation performance, while the dual role of CEO has a significant positive moderating effect. 

This study enriches the literature on intra-executive alliance based on the data of domestic enterprises, explores a new direction 

to improve the innovation performance of enterprises, and provides some new ideas for improving the governance system of 

listed companies, enhancing market competitiveness, and ensuring the sustainable development of enterprises. 

Keywords: Executive alliance, Innovation performance, Ownership concentration. 

 

1. Introduction 

In today's increasingly tense international situation, the 

world political and economic pattern is constantly changing, 

foreign economic fluctuations have a certain impact on our 

economy, complex and changeable economic conditions lead 

to unstable market demand, market competition is 

increasingly fierce. In this context, how to obtain unique 

differential advantages, win a place and stand firm in the 

increasingly fierce market environment, has become the core 

issue faced by each enterprise. In this regard, many scholars 

and entrepreneurs have reached a unified suggestion - 

innovation. In a dynamic and competitive business 

environment, innovation has become a key factor in the 

success of most companies to improve performance and stay 

viable, it can help companies gain new capabilities, enter new 

businesses, improve profitability and promote economic 

growth. At present, China is in a new era of socialist 

development and a critical period of great rejuvenation. In the 

face of increasingly complex international situation and 

intensifying global competition, it is bound to improve the 

level of independent innovation. As an important part of the 

national innovation system, the innovation activities and 

performance of enterprises have been widely concerned. 

Innovation is of great significance to the enterprise itself, 

and it is the key factor to determine whether the enterprise can 

achieve sustainable development in the future and maintain 

its dominant position. As the result of innovation, innovation 

performance is the common focus of theoretical and practical 

circles. How to improve innovation performance is also the 

core issue of strategic management. In the innovation process 

of a company, the executive team is a group that plays a direct 

role, constituting the main alliance of individuals responsible 

for the management of the company, especially in the 

formulation and implementation of the change strategy, and 

they determine the next various innovative activities of the 

company by making decisions, which are often influenced by 

the internal relationships of the executives. Therefore, from 

the perspective of intra-executive alliance, this paper explores 

the relationship between executive alliance and innovation 

performance through theoretical analysis and empirical 

research. 

According to the high-level echelon theory, as the actual 

decision makers and leaders of innovation activities, the 

characteristics of the senior management team will affect the 

innovation behavior and performance results of the enterprise. 

The internal alliance of senior executives based on the 

employment relationship will form a top management team 

with the CEO as the core, thus stimulating the CEO's need to 

bring a sense of accomplishment and dignity through work, 

making him pay more attention to the long-term development 

of the enterprise, avoid opportunistic behavior, reduce 

earnings management, and promote enterprise innovation. At 

the same time, the CEO's connections with other executives 

and directors can reduce the cost of coordinating activities 

and communication among them, which may affect the 

company's innovation performance. In order to verify the 

existence of this positive relationship, this paper discusses it 

and uses a regression model to test the collected data. 

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 

2.1. Literature Review 

Since the CEO is the ultimate corporate decision maker and 

has the explicit legal power to direct the company's behavior, 

many literatures identify the CEO as the key figure 

influencing the company's operational decisions [1]. However, 

the CEO's actions and decisions are subject to oversight by 

board members [2, 3] and other senior executives [4, 5]. In 

addition, important corporate decisions, such as investment 

decisions, often require coordination or acquiescence among 

other executives and directors. Therefore, the relationship 

between the CEO and other executives and directors of the 



 

41 

company is also considered as a factor affecting the business 

decision of the company, because such connection weakens 

the monitoring and increases the cooperation [6]. 

Connections between ceos and other executives or 

directors typically include hometown ties, alumni ties, and 

age. It can be classified into three categories: demographic 

characteristics, external social relations and employment 

relations. Fracassi [7] found that the supervisory role of the 

board of directors over senior executives would be weakened 

due to its connection with the CEO. Faleye [8] showed that 

the more well-connected the CEO is, the more R&D 

investment the company will make and the more patents it 

will obtain. The research results of Khanna [6] show that the 

employment-based internal alliance of senior executives 

increases the possibility of fraud in the company and weakens 

the possibility of fraud being discovered. However, the 

internal alliance formed by other reasons such as educational 

background has no significant effect on the fraud behavior of 

enterprises. Xiaoyu Li [9] found that the impact of CEO 

internal relevance on the performance of private enterprises is 

significantly inverted U-shaped. Balsam [12] found that the 

connection between CEO and senior executives has a positive 

impact on the company in promoting cooperation and 

communication. 

Enterprise innovation performance refers to the result or 

output of an enterprise after innovation activity or innovation 

behavior. Whether innovation can obtain output 

commensurate with its input and whether innovation output 

will help enterprise operation is closely related to the 

development prospect of an enterprise. Therefore, the 

research on innovation performance mainly takes innovation 

performance as the outcome variable and studies the 

antecedent variable that has an impact on it. At present, the 

existing research is mainly carried out from two aspects: 

external factors, including government policies and market 

environment, and internal factors, including corporate 

behavior and executive characteristics. 

The research of Waegenaere [14] shows that for 

multinational corporations, R&D activities will be affected by 

different tax laws and systems in different countries. If the 

domestic tax rate is high, the innovation investment of the 

company is likely to be reduced. According to the study of 

Santoro [15], establishing connections with stakeholders will 

facilitate enterprises to absorb heterogeneous resources, 

promote product innovation and improve innovation 

performance. The research results of Ya'nan Wang and 

Wentao Dai [16] show that internal control, as an enterprise's 

own governance mechanism, can restrain and slow down the 

problem of information asymmetry within the enterprise and 

reduce agency costs, which is conducive to enterprise 

innovation. Zhiguang Li [17] found that academic founders 

showed the best innovation performance by obtaining 

relatively more equity financing.  

Taking a comprehensive view of the above literatures, the 

existing research on the influencing factors of enterprise 

innovation performance mainly focus on the social level, 

corporate governance, and personal characteristics of 

managers. Due to the availability of data, the need for manual 

data collection and sorting, and the high time cost, there are 

few literatures to study the alliance between CEO and other 

executives and directors, and a few research directions on the 

alliance among executives mainly focus on M&A 

performance, business performance, etc., and the research on 

enterprise innovation is relatively scarce. As one aspect of the 

informal system, the research on the influence of the 

executive alliance on the innovation and its mechanism 

cannot be ignored. 

Therefore, this paper considers the impact of the internal 

alliance formed by the CEO of listed companies, the 

executives hired, and the directors nominated on the 

company's operating results, examines their role in the 

innovation performance of listed companies based on the 

significance of corporate innovation in the economic entity, 

and explores the mechanism of the impact of the internal 

alliance of senior executives on the innovation performance 

of enterprises. 

2.2. Hypotheses Development 

According to the reciprocity norm theory, when a person is 

appointed as a senior executive by the CEO or proposed to be 

nominated to the board of directors, he may have a sense of 

gratitude to the CEO. Because the CEO appoints senior 

executives, or participates in the initial appointment of 

directors, the recommended executives and directors will 

most likely not question or oppose the CEO's decision, so they 

will be more loyal to the CEO. Based on the psychological 

support of the CEO's decision, more dedication to complete 

the instructions issued by the CEO. At the same time, the CEO 

has strong stability and cohesion by appointing or nominating 

a team of executives and directors with similar characteristics.  

In addition, the top echelon theory holds that the top 

management team can more effectively influence the strategic 

choice and organizational performance results than the 

individual top managers. In a complex and dynamic 

environment, the top management team is embedded in the 

strategic environment and strategic choice, and has an 

important impact on strategic behavior and strategic choice 

through the ability and cognition of the collective team and 

the mutual influence among team members. The 

employment-based internal alliance of senior executives can 

help improve the communication efficiency and decision-

making efficiency of the management, reduce the 

communication cost, improve the homogeneity of the senior 

management team, and lead to greater decision-making power 

of the CEO. Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes 

the following hypothesis: 

H1: The internal alliance of senior executives can promote 

the innovation performance of enterprises 

According to the principal-agent theory, small and 

medium-sized shareholders pay more attention to the 

development of the enterprise and participate more in the 

operation decision-making of the enterprise than the major 

shareholders who hold the majority shares. From the 

perspective of executives' sense of identification with the goal 

of maximizing corporate value, with the increase of the voice 

of the largest shareholder, the autonomy of the executive team 

to make and implement innovation decisions is weakened, 

resulting in the decline of executives' subjective recognition 

of their decision-making status. At this time, due to the lack 

of consensus on the decision-making power of executives, the 

allocation of enterprise resources will be affected, which may 

lead to a blind state of innovation activities. In view of this, 

this paper proposes the following hypothesis: 

H2: The degree of ownership concentration will weaken 

the promotion effect of internal alliance of senior executives 

on enterprise innovation performance 

Because innovation can improve the competitiveness of 

enterprises, but R&D investment is uncertain, and it takes a 



 

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long time to obtain benefits, so when faced with complex 

issues of opportunities and challenges, there are often 

different opinions between the chairman and the general 

manager. When the two roles are integrated, the conflict 

caused by these differences can be reduced. In the two-in-one 

enterprise, the decision resistance of the CEO is reduced, and 

the support of the appointed senior executives and directors is 

obtained, which greatly reduces the opposition to the 

innovation decision, speeds up the efficiency of the adoption 

and implementation of the innovation decision, and thus 

improves the level of innovation performance. Therefore, 

hypothesis 3 is proposed as follows: 

H3: The integration of the two positions will enhance the 

promotion role of the internal alliance of senior executives on 

the innovation performance of enterprises 

3. Data and Variables 

3.1. Innovation Performance of Enterprises 

This paper refers to the studies of Xinsheng Cheng [18] and 

Xuesong Li [19]. Considering that the patent authorization 

time is relatively long, it may be more reasonable to measure 

the number of patent applications to reflect the progress of the 

enterprise's innovation activities in the current period, and the 

invention patents can more effectively reflect the substantive 

innovation achievements of the enterprise. Therefore, the 

natural logarithm (PA) of the number of invention patent 

applications plus one is used as an indicator to measure the 

innovation performance of an enterprise. The higher the PA 

value, the higher the innovation performance of the enterprise, 

that is, the higher the innovation level. 

3.2. Executive Internal Alliances 

Referring to the research methods of Xu [11] et al, this 

paper uses the proportion of the total number of hired 

executives and nominated directors during the tenure of CEO 

as an indicator to measure the degree of alliance within 

executives. Due to the late introduction of CEO into China, 

many companies with a long operating time have not set up 

this position. Therefore, in this paper, for companies without 

a CEO position, the position of "CEO" is given priority, 

followed by the position of "general manager". The value 

range of explanatory variable is [0, 1]. The larger the value, 

the greater the proportion of appointing senior executives and 

nominating directors during the tenure of CEO, and the higher 

the degree of alliance within the executives. 

3.3. Regulating Variable 

Ownership concentration: This paper uses the proportion of 

the number of shares held by the largest shareholder to the 

total share capital (Top1) as the measurement index of 

ownership concentration; Dual roles of CEO: Dual roles of 

CEO refer to the situation in which the CEO concurrently 

serves as the chairman of the board of directors of an 

enterprise. In this paper, the dual roles are incorporated into 

the model as a moderating variable for regression. When the 

chairman concurrently serves as the CEO of an enterprise, the 

variable is 1, otherwise it is 0. 

3.4. Control Variable 

With reference to the research of Xuchao Wang [20] and 

Yaojia Tang [21], ten control variables are selected in this 

paper: firm Size (Size): the natural logarithm of the firm's 

total assets; Asset-liability ratio (Lev): total liabilities/total 

assets; Net profit rate on total assets (ROA): net profit/total 

assets; Operating Cashflow: measured by the ratio of net cash 

flows generated from operating activities to total assets at the 

end of the period; Total assets turnover (ATO): sales 

revenue/average total assets; Board size: the number of 

directors at the end of the period; Ratio of independent 

directors (Indep): the ratio of the number of independent 

directors to the number of directors at the end of the period 

multiplied by 100%; The proportion of top ten shareholders 

(Top10): the proportion of the number of top ten shareholders 

in the total number of shares; Company listing time (ListAge): 

the logarithm of the current year minus the year of the 

company listing plus 1; Management shareholding ratio 

(Mshare): the proportion of the total number of management 

shareholding in the total number of shares multiplied by 

100%. 

3.5. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 

The main research content of this paper is the impact of 

intra-executive alliance on enterprise innovation performance. 

Due to the outbreak of financial crisis in 2008, considering 

the availability and completeness of data, this paper selects 

China's Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 

2011 to 2022 as samples, and treats the samples as follows 

according to research needs: (1) Remove companies with ST 

and *ST; (2) Exclude sample companies in the financial 

industry classified according to the 2012 version of the CSRC 

Industry classification standard; (3) Remove the samples with 

missing values of relevant variables; (4) Eliminate samples 

with abnormal conditions such as insolvency; (5) In order to 

mitigate the impact of outliers on regression results, all 

continuous variables were curtailed at 1% and 99% levels. 

Finally, 21937 valid observations were obtained. The 

innovation performance data used in this paper came from the 

China Research Data Service Platform (CNRDS), and the 

internal alliance of senior executives measured the proportion 

of the number of people who hired senior executives and 

nominated directors during the tenure of CEO. The data used 

were from the (CSMAR) database and were manually 

calculated and collated. All other data are from Guotai 'an 

database. 

This paper first makes descriptive statistics on the collected 

and sorted sample data to understand the basic situation of the 

variables used in the research, such as explained variables, 

explanatory variables and control variables. Table 1 shows 

descriptive statistics for the main variables. 

According to the statistical results, the maximum value of 

PA is 5.624, indicating that the enterprises with the highest 

innovation performance applied for 276 invention patents in 

this year, while the minimum value is only 0 and the standard 

deviation is 1.379, further indicating the disparity in 

innovation performance among different enterprises. At the 

same time, the mean value of innovation performance is 1.126. 

The innovation level of the enterprises in the selected sample 

is generally low, and the number of invention patents applied 

by most enterprises is 0-1, and only a small part of enterprises 

with high innovation performance are applied for. The 

average value of FTEA is 0.489, indicating that 48.9% of 

listed companies have ceos hiring executives and nominating 

directors, which means that nearly half of listed companies 

have such employt-based alliance relationship, indicating that 

it is of practical significance to study it. The average value of 

Top1 is 33%, indicating that the shareholding ratio of the 

largest shareholder of the sample enterprises is generally high 



 

43 

and the equity is relatively concentrated. The Dual average is 

0.249, indicating that 24.9% of listed companies have both 

chairman and CEO. After analysis, the statistical results of the 

selected variables belong to the normal range. 

 

Table 1. Summary statistics 

Variable sample mean sd min max 

PA 21937 1.126 1.379 0.000 5.624 

FTEA 21937 0.489 0.271 0.000 1.000 

Top1 21937 0.330 0.146 0.081 0.732 

Dual 21937 0.249 0.432 0.000 1.000 

Size 21937 22.475 1.267 20.104 26.408 

Lev 21937 0.448 0.198 0.069 0.887 

ROA 21937 0.035 0.063 -0.227 0.216 

Cashflow 21937 0.049 0.066 -0.137 0.242 

ATO 21937 0.654 0.448 0.085 2.678 

Board 21937 8.598 1.704 5.000 15.000 

Indep 21937 37.535 5.354 33.330 57.140 

Top10 21937 0.550 0.147 0.225 0.889 

ListAge 21937 2.482 0.535 1.386 3.367 

Mshare 21937 9.598 15.710 0.000 60.819 

4. Empirical Analysis 

4.1. Empirical Results 
Table 2. Impact of internal alliances on Innovation Performance 

  (1) (2) 

 PA PA 

FTEA 
0.114*** 0.080*** 

(0.031) (0.030) 

Size 
 0.293*** 

 (0.010) 

Lev 
 -0.059 

 (0.053) 

ROA 
 1.340*** 

 (0.152) 

Cashflow 
 0.479*** 

 (0.134) 

ATO 
 0.112*** 

 (0.020) 

Board 
 0.043*** 

 (0.007) 

Indep 
 0.006*** 

 (0.002) 

Top10 
 -0.483*** 

 (0.062) 

ListAge 
 -0.287*** 

 (0.019) 

Mshare 
 0.004*** 

 (0.001) 

_cons 
1.071*** -5.271*** 

(0.017) (0.228) 

Control  No Yes 

Industry Yes Yes 

Year Yes Yes 

r2 0.178 0.250 

N 21937 21937 

 

Note: *** indicates a significance level of 1%, ** indicates a 

significance level of 5%, * indicates a significance level of 10%, the 

same below 

In order to test hypothesis 1, this paper conducts regression 

analysis on sample data, and the regression results are shown 

in Table 2. Among them, (1) is the regression result of 

examining the relationship between the internal alliance of 

senior executives and innovation performance based on the 

control industry and year without considering the control 

variables, and (2) is the regression after adding the control 

variables. According to the regression results, there is a 

significant positive correlation between intra-executive 

alliance and enterprise innovation performance at the level of 

1%, and the regression coefficient decreases after the addition 

of control variables, while the fit degree increases, indicating 

that with the enhancement of intra-executive alliance, the 

innovation performance of enterprises will also be relatively 

improved, which verifies hypothesis 1. 

4.2. Adjustment Effect Test 
Table 3. Regression result 

  (1) (2) 

 PA PA 

FTEA 0.078*** 0.105*** 

 (0.030) (0.030) 

Top1 0.350***  

 (0.078)  

FTEA×Top1 -0.697***  

Table 3. (continued) 

 (1) (2) 

 PA PA 

 (0.215)  

Dual  -0.095*** 

  (0.020) 

FTEA×Dual  0.314*** 

  (0.071) 

Size 0.293*** 0.291*** 

 (0.010) (0.010) 

ROA 1.321*** 1.339*** 

 (0.152) (0.152) 

Lev -0.063 -0.056 

 (0.053) (0.053) 

Cashflow 0.486*** 0.474*** 

 (0.134) (0.134) 

ATO 0.107*** 0.110*** 

 (0.020) (0.020) 

Board 0.044*** 0.041*** 

 (0.007) (0.007) 

Indep 0.006*** 0.007*** 

 (0.002) (0.002) 

Top10 -0.717*** -0.485*** 

 (0.079) (0.062) 

ListAge -0.292*** -0.296*** 

 (0.019) (0.019) 

Mshare 0.004*** 0.004*** 

 (0.001) (0.001) 

_cons -5.254*** -5.210*** 

 (0.227) (0.228) 

Industry Yes Yes 

Year Yes Yes 

r2 0.251 0.251 

N 21937 21937 

 



 

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Table 3 shows the regression results after incorporating the 

adjustment variables into the model. Columns (1) and (2) are 

the regression results that take ownership concentration and 

integration of two jobs as the adjustment variables, 

respectively. The coefficients of intra-executive alliance in 

the model are both positive and significant at 1% level, further 

verifying hypothesis 1 in this paper. From the data in column 

2, the regression coefficient of the product interaction term 

(FTEA×Top1) of intra-executive alliance and ownership 

concentration is -0.697, which is significant at the 1% level, 

indicating that the strengthening of ownership concentration 

will significantly inhibit the positive impact of intra-executive 

alliance on the innovation performance of enterprises, which 

verifies hypothesis 2. As can be seen from the regression 

results in column 3, the coefficient of FTEA×Dual (=0.314, 

p<0.01) between CEO dual job integration and intra-

executive alliance passed the 1% significance level test and 

was positive, indicating that the dual job integration has a 

significant promoting effect on the impact of intra-executive 

alliance on enterprise innovation performance, which verifies 

hypothesis 3. 

4.3. Robustness Test 

In order to ensure the robustness of the research results, the 

robustness of the sample data and the model was tested by 

replacing the explained variables, and the endogeneity test 

was conducted by propensity matching score (PSM). 

4.3.1. Replace the Explained Variable 
In this paper, the natural logarithm of the total number of 

patent applications plus one is selected as the measurement 

index of innovation performance of listed companies, and the 

regression results obtained after it is substituted by the 

regression model of primary effect and regulatory effect are 

shown in Table 4. In the second column of the regression 

results of the main effect model, after replacing the innovation 

performance measurement indicators, the coefficient between 

the intra-executive alliance and innovation performance is 

significantly positive at the level of 5%, indicating that the 

intra-executive alliance has a significant positive impact on 

innovation performance, which verifies hypothesis 1. The 

third and fourth columns show the regression results of the 

two moderating effects respectively. Among them, the 

interaction coefficient between intra-executive alliance and 

ownership concentration is -0.862, which passes the 

significance level test of 1%, indicating that ownership 

concentration has a significant negative impact on the 

promotion effect of intra-executive alliance on innovation 

performance. The coefficient of the interaction term between 

the alliance within senior executives and the combination of 

the two roles is significantly positive at the level of 1%, 

indicating that the combination of the two roles has a 

significant positive impact on the promotion of the innovation 

performance of the enterprise. This result is consistent with 

the above regression results, which proves that the results of 

this study are robust. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4. Regression result 

  (1) (2) (3) 

 PA1 PA1 PA1 

FTEA 0.072** 0.070** 0.108*** 

 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 

Size 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.295*** 

 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 

ROA 1.511*** 1.487*** 1.511*** 

 (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) 

Lev -0.050 -0.056 -0.045 

 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 

Cashflow 0.790*** 0.798*** 0.782*** 

 (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) 

ATO 0.146*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 

 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 

Board 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 

 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 

Indep 0.006*** 0.006** 0.006*** 

 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 

Top10 -0.320*** -0.644*** -0.323*** 

 (0.074) (0.094) (0.074) 

ListAge -0.446*** -0.454*** -0.459*** 

 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 

Mshare 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 

 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 

Top1  0.484***  

  (0.093)  

FTEA×Top1  -0.862***  

  (0.257)  

Dual   -0.135*** 

   (0.024) 

FTEA×Dual   0.450*** 

   (0.085) 

_cons -4.731*** -4.709*** -4.645*** 

 (0.258) (0.258) (0.259) 

Industry Yes Yes Yes 

Year Yes Yes Yes 

r2 0.294 0.295 0.295 

N 21937 21937 21937 

 

4.3.2. Endogeneity Test 
In order to alleviate the endogeneity problems caused by 

sample selection, propensity matching score (PSM) was used 

for testing. The results are shown in Table 5. After propensity 

matching, the correlation coefficient between intra-executive 

alliance and enterprise innovation performance is 0.222, 

which is significant at 1% level, indicating that intra-

executive alliance still has a significant promoting effect on 

enterprise innovation performance. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

45 

Table 5. Regression result 

  (1) (2) 

 PA PA 

FTEA 0.235*** 0.222*** 

 (0.084) (0.080) 

Size  0.249*** 

  (0.032) 

ROA  1.795*** 

  (0.434) 

Lev  -0.051 

  (0.155) 

Cashflow  0.431 

  (0.377) 

ATO  0.104 

  (0.066) 

Board  0.044* 

  (0.023) 

Indep  0.008 

  (0.006) 

Top10  -0.584*** 

  (0.181) 

ListAge  -0.308*** 

  (0.058) 

Table 5. (continued) 

 (1) (2) 

 PA PA 

Mshare  0.002 

  (0.002) 

_cons 1.031*** -4.255*** 

 (0.031) (0.740) 

Industry Yes Yes 

Year Yes Yes 

r2 0.177 0.236 

N 2467 2467 

5. Conclusions 

Innovation plays an important role in promoting the high-

quality development of China's economy and is the driving 

force for the long-term sustainable development of 

enterprises. It is the top priority to increase investment in 

R&D and innovation to promote the high-quality 

development of manufacturing enterprises. This paper takes 

the relevant data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed 

companies in China from 2011 to 2022 as research samples, 

and explores the relationship between the intra-executive 

alliance formed based on employment relationship and the 

enterprise innovation performance through empirical testing. 

The research finds that the intra-executive alliance has A 

significant promoting effect on the enterprise innovation 

performance. After introducing moderating variables, it is 

found that higher ownership concentration will weaken the 

positive impact of intra-executive alliance on innovation 

performance, while the combination of two positions has a 

positive impact on the promotion of intra-executive alliance 

on enterprise innovation performance. 

According to the research conclusion of this paper and 

combined with the reality of our country, the following 

suggestions are put forward: First, in the process of hiring 

executives, enterprises should appropriately relax the 

restrictions on ceos and give ceos appropriate freedom and 

power to set up senior management teams within a certain 

range, so as to enhance the sense of belonging of ceos to the 

enterprise and improve the cohesion and stability of the senior 

management team. At the same time, proper supervision and 

vigilance should be maintained on the behavior of the senior 

management team. Second, a high degree of ownership 

concentration should be avoided, the proportion of shares 

held by major shareholders should be diluted relatively, the 

shares of other legal persons and even individuals in the 

company should be increased, the share concentration should 

be reduced appropriately, and the share incentive plan should 

be formulated so that the company's executives and 

employees can also hold some shares, so as to bind the 

interests of executives and the company more closely. It helps 

the senior management team to strive for the future 

development of the company. In order to make more 

innovation investment, improve their competitiveness, stand 

out in the cruel market competition environment, seize the 

opportunity to promote the sustainable development of 

enterprises. 

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