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01-10 

1 

 

 

 

Article 

Emergency action plan for Haditha dam failure 

scenario, Al-Anbar, Iraq 
Yasameen Hameed1, Redvan Ghasemlounia2, Thamer Ahmed Mohammed3*,  

Abdulwahab Al-Ansi4   

1Engineering Management, Institute of Graduate Studies, Istanbul Gedik University, Istanbul, Türkiye 
2Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Istanbul Gedik University, Istanbul, Türkiye 
3Department of Water Resources, College of Engineering, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, Iraq 
4Department of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, University of Science and Technology, Sana'a, Yemen 

A R T I C L E   I N F O 
 

Article history: 
Received 10 January 2025  
Received in revised form 
18 February 2025 
Accepted 03 March 2025 
 
Keywords:  
Haditha Dam, Risk factor, Failure,  
Emergency response plan 
 
*Corresponding author 
Email address: 
tthamer@gmail.com 
 
 
DOI: 10.55670/fpll.futech.4.2.1 
 

A B S T R A C T 
 

Dams are essential structures that regulate and manage water for human 
activities such as irrigation, power generation, flood control, and water supply. 
However, building and operating dams involve inherent risks that can lead to 
catastrophic consequences in case of failure, such failures can threaten the 
environment and populations downstream. Haditha Dam, Al-Anbar Governate, 
Iraq has been chosen as a case study due to its unique geological conditions 
(existence of limestone formations prone to karstification) and susceptibility to 
terrorist attacks. In this research, the risk factor for Haditha Dam is categorized 
as extremely high risk, with a Total Risk Factor (TRF) of 36. An emergency 
action plan that includes three possible failure scenarios has been proposed. 
Based on the flood maps, there is an urgent need for evacuation planning and 
the designation of safe and unsafe zones in the cities downstream of Haditha 
Dam to mitigate the consequences of a potential failure of the Dam. This plan 
aims to address immediate flood inundation, minimize loss of life, and manage 
the damage that could occur to infrastructure. As part of the emergency 
response strategy, an evacuation program has been proposed to protect lives 
and reduce the impact on affected populations. 
 

 

1. Introduction 

Dams are critical engineering infrastructures designed to 
regulate and utilize water resources for diverse purposes, 
including water supply, hydroelectric power generation, 
flood control, and irrigation. They play a pivotal role in 
supporting human activities by providing water for 
agricultural, industrial, and domestic use. Furthermore, dams 
contribute to the regulation of river flow, helping to alleviate 
the impacts of both droughts and floods. Despite the 
significant benefits dams offer, their construction and 
operation can potentially result in environmental and 
catastrophic consequences, particularly for downstream 
populations in the event of failure. Dam failures pose serious 
threats to human lives, property, and the surrounding 
environment. Ensuring the safety and security of 
communities residing downstream of the Haditha Dam is of 
utmost importance, Although the Haditha Dam is designed 
with strong systems and monitoring mechanisms, no 
infrastructure is completely immune to risks. Natural 
disasters, extreme weather events, human errors, or even acts 

of terrorism could compromise the dam's structural integrity, 
potentially leading to its failure. 

1.1 Dam safety 
The impact of hydropower operations on embankment 

dam safety was investigated by comprising two main 
components. Firstly, a three-dimensional finite volume model 
generated with ANSYS-CFX simulates a vertical Francis 
turbine at the Mosul hydropower plant; the resulting 
pressure patterns from the turbine operation are then 
analyzed with the dam body's stability under various 
conditions, such as different flow rates and reservoir levels. 
Secondly, a three-dimensional finite element model of the 
Mosul dam is simulated using ANSYS software, and the water 
pressure patterns from the turbine operation are 
incorporated into the dam model to assess its stability, 
considering different reservoir levels [1]. A control program 
is developed based on the principal stress data collected from 
hydropower plant operations, aiming to minimize stress on 
the dam body and increase its operational lifespan.  

 

 

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May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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Improvements to the turbine operating system to 

mitigate the stress on the studied dam body and enhance dam 
safety were suggested [2-5]. The flux rates on the safety of 
dams in Iraq were simulated using the SEEP/W model. Many 
studies have been conducted on the impact of the maximum 
water level in the reservoir of Hemrin Dam in Iraq on seepage, 
pore water pressure, phreatic line, and stability of the 
downstream slope of the dam by using SEEP/W and 
SLOPE/W [6, 7]. The same methodology was followed for the 
Kongele Earth dam in Iraq [8]. Seepage in Shirin Dam, Iraq, 
was analyzed using the SEEP/W model, and results suggested 
that  The core in an earth dam can reduce seepage by 99% [9]. 
Many studies investigated the effects of dimensions, 
geometry, and side slopes of earth dam zones on seepage 
rates, including different seepage control methods. The effect 
of various characteristics of the dam shell and core materials 
on the dam experimental and numerical models were 
conducted to assess the safety factor of the dam body and 
foundation before and after sealing. Additionally, the impact 
of dam height on stability was analyzed using the Plaxis 3D  
finite element program. Results indicate good agreement 
between measured data and computational outputs and 
highlight the tested measures' effectiveness in improving dam 
safety [10-14].   

1.2 Failure modes and causes of earth dam failure  
The most common causes of failure for homogeneous 

earth dams, zoned earth dams, earth dams with diaphragm, 
and earth dams with concrete slabs at the upstream face had 
been extensively studied and categorized as failure due to 
overtopping, seepage, and piping.  Overtopping occurs when 
water flows over the dam crest and causes erosion of the 
embankment and slope stability and failure, while the 
collapse of channels and pipes resulting from internal erosion 
due to the removal of soil particles by seepage causes dam 
failure. The failure of large dams such as the Teton Dam and 
Baldwin Hills Dam in the USA and Malpasset Dam in France 
necessitate the preparation of an effective emergency plan for 
the protection of downstream areas [15, 16]. The analysis of 
dam failures is of paramount importance for engineers as it 
provides crucial information on failure modes informing 
causes. In addition, it enables them to take preventive 
measures in the development located downstream. Data on 
failed earth dams play a vital role in the improvement of 
maintenance and inspection practices. besides, it will help in 
the consideration and implementation of the new required 
preventive measures that increase dam safety [17]. Studying 
historical dam failures is an essential practice for learning 
from past challenges and improving engineering practices; by 
analyzing both failures and successes, engineers can gain 
valuable insights into the design, construction, and 

maintenance of dams [18, 19]. In the case of the Tawila Dam 
failure in North Darfur, Sudan, the author explained that the 
leading causes of the dam failure were sediment deposition, 
erosion, excessive deformation of the foundation, high silting 
rate, and seepage of water leading to piping through the 
existence of loose sandy soil in the foundation [20].  Similarly, 
the failure of the Ivex Dam in north-eastern Ohio, USA, 
resulted from a combination of factors, including a significant 
hydrologic event triggered by a 70-year rainfall event, 
inadequate spillway design, lack of an emergency spillway, 
loss of permanent pool capacity due to sedimentation, and 
poor dam maintenance leading to seepage and piping [21, 22]. 
Examples of significant dam ruptures that have led to 
substantial loss of life have been provided, such as the Vajont 
dam rupture in Italy in 1963, the Johnstown dam rupture in 
Pennsylvania in 1889, and the Machhu II dam rupture in India 
in 1974. These examples highlight the devastating 
consequences of dam failures and highlight the urgent need 
for effective risk management practices to prevent such 
tragedies in the future [23]. The importance of anticipating 
dam failures through evaluations of age, storage capacity loss, 
and management history has been studied, including the 
vulnerability of older dams with inadequate spillway design 
and the lack of emergency spillways due to storage capacity 
loss caused by sedimentation [24]. Notably, the failure they 
discuss was caused by seepage piping near the masonry 
spillway-earthen dam contact, leading to the breach of the 
dam and the rapid release of 38,000 m3 of impounded water 
and sediment [22, 24]. The Oroville Dam crisis in February 
2017 highlighted the significance of resilience processes and 
adaptive decision-making in managing dam safety [25].  Four 
key resilience processes have been identified: sensing, 
anticipation, adapting, and learning. These processes play 
vital roles in effectively managing and responding to 
disruptions and crises of the Oroville Dam. The processes 
involve continuous monitoring of the dam and spillways 
(sensing), preparing for potential disruptions, developing 
contingency plans (anticipation), emergency repairs and 
evacuation plans (adapting), and analyzing the causes of the 
crisis for future improvements (learning). Also, they argued 
that considering adaptive decision-making in both the 
development and resolution of the crisis is crucial for a 
comprehensive understanding [24].  Table 1 shows the dam 
failures that occurred around the world between 1975 and 
2011. The main causes of the dam failure were different from 
overtopping due to flood to piping due to seepage [25].  

Table 1.  Causes of dam failure between 1975-2011 [25]  

 

 

Cause of Failure Number of 
Dam Failures 

Percentage of 
Dam Failure 

Flood or Overtopping 465 70.9% 

Piping or Seepage 94 14.3% 

Structural 12 1.8% 

Human Related 4 0.6% 

Animal Activities 7 1.1% 

Spillway 11 1.7% 

Erosion/Slide/Instability 13 2.0% 

Unknown 32 4.9% 

Other 18 2.7% 

Total number of dam 
failures 

656  

Abbreviation 
ANSYS-CFX: Analysis system software used for fluid     

turbomachinery problems 

 SEEP/W: A model for seepage prediction in earth 

dams    

a.s.l.: Average sea level   

JCMC: Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center  

TRF: Total risk factor.  

RFc: Risk factor for capacity of the reservoir.  

RFh: Risk factor for the height of the dam.  

RFer: Risk factor for evacuation requirement   



Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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It is important to mention that High-Energy Facilities 
(HEFs) are attractive targets for terrorists due to their 
importance and interconnectedness, which can lead to 
significant environmental damage, loss of life, and property 
damage. Cyber-attacks, physical attacks, and insider attacks 
are the three types of attacks that could be carried out against 
HEFs. Understanding these attack vectors is crucial in 
developing effective strategies for prevention and response 
[27]. Regarding recent events, the Nova Kakhovka dam in 
Ukraine was subjected to a physical attack, resulting in its 
explosion during the ongoing war. Figure 1 illustrates the dam 
before and after the failure, while Figure 2 shows one of the 
inundated areas downstream. The catastrophic failure of the 
Derna dams, notably the Bu Mansour Dam and Al Blad Dam, 
during Storm Daniel on September 11, 2023, was a 
multifaceted disaster influenced by several critical factors.  
Firstly, the unprecedented intensity of Storm Daniel produced 
runoff that vastly exceeded the dams' design capacities, 
highlighting a severe underestimation of potential storm 
impacts.  

 
Figure 1.  Aerial photographs of the Nova Kakhovka dam, Ukraine, 
before and after failure (Google Earth accessed on 15 December  
2022) 

 

Secondly, design and maintenance issues were 
identified, with investigations suggesting significant flaws in 
the Bu Mansour Dam's design that compromised its integrity 
under extreme conditions. Thirdly, the rapid overtopping and 
subsequent breach of the dams underscored their inability to 
manage such extraordinary volumes of water, leading to 
structural failures. Additionally, the absence of adequate 
emergency planning and historical neglect of the dams' 
vulnerabilities- evidenced by previous damage and 
inadequate resource management- exacerbated the disaster's 
impact [28].  Structural weaknesses and erosion due to water 
overflow and seepage were identified as direct causes of the 
collapses. These factors, combined with insufficient 
preparedness for such extreme weather events, culminated in 
a tragic loss of life and significant displacement, underscoring 
the urgent need for revaluation of dam safety protocols and 
emergency response strategies in similar regions [29, 30]. 
Based on previous literature and to avoid such a catastrophic 
event in western Iraq, Haditha Dam was selected as a case 
study because of its unique geological conditions, primarily 
characterized by limestone formations undergoing active and 
ongoing karstification, the process of karstification leads to 
the formation of karst landscapes such as caves, submerged 
surface rivers, and karstic slopes. This process causes the 
erosion of carbonate rocks, such as limestone, due to water 
saturated with carbon dioxide, resulting in the formation of 
unique and complex geographical structures. Karst 
formations embody prominent features in nature and pose 
challenges for risk management, Understanding the impact of 
karst formations can be an essential part of assessing the risks 
of dam failure and developing emergency plans to deal with 
potential emergencies. Given its geological conditions, 
preparing an Emergency Action Plan for Haditha Dam is 
paramount. Large voids caused by limestone formations 
could jeopardize its safety and may affect its safety.  

 

 
Figure 2. The inundation of residential areas downstream of the Nova Kakhovka dam 



Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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Another reason for the selection of Haditha Dam is that it 
is susceptible to terrorist operations, having been previously 
targeted by ISIS terrorist groups. Additionally, it is situated 
downstream of the Tabqa Dam in Syria. It is well-known that 
Syria is a country facing security instability. This study aims 
to prepare an integrated emergency action plan to minimize 
the loss of life and the potential for property damage due to 
the failure of the Haditha Dam. The plan focused on all the 
densely populated areas downstream of the dam. 

2. Methodology 

An emergency action plan is developed specifically for 
this purpose to ensure the Haditha Dam’s safety and minimize 
the potential impact of dam failure. Haditha Dam is a mega 
structure that plays a key role in supplying water for various 
purposes. Figure 3 shows the flow chart for various activities 
included in the research methodology.  

2.1 Study area 
Haditha Dam is an earth-fill dam constructed on the 

Euphrates River, Al-Anbar governorate, Iraq. Geologically, the 
Haditha Dam is situated on various layers of limestone beds 
from the Euphrates and Ana formations, characterized by 
fissures, cracks, and nearly isolated sinkholes. Despite the 
prolonged development and collapse of sinkholes, they are 
relatively less hazardous [31].  Figure  4 shows a typical cross-
section of the Haditha dam with the major materials. The 
construction of the Haditha Dam, initiated in 1977 and 
completed in 1988, represents a hallmark of international 
collaboration, primarily between the Soviet Union and the 
Iraqi Government under the Technical and Economic 
Cooperation Treaty.  

 
Figure 3. The flow chart summarizes the research methodology 

activities 

 

 

 

 
Figure 4. Typical cross-section of Haditha dam with the major 
materials  

The dam's strategic location and construction were the 
outcomes of thorough geological and topographical analyses, 
resulting in a multi-faceted structure that spans over 9 km, 
featuring a complex amalgamation of materials, including 
sand, gravel, reinforced concrete, and rock-mass revetments. 
With a crest level of 154 meters above sea level and a width 
of 20 meters, the Haditha Dam serves multiple functions, 
including flood control, irrigation, and hydroelectric power 
generation, making it a critical component of Iraq's 
infrastructure. Its capacity to generate 660 megawatts of 
power and its role in river flow regulation and flood 
management underscore its significance to the country's 
water resource management and energy production. The 
Haditha Dam project, through its innovative approach and the 
synergy of international expertise, embodies the essence of 
engineering ingenuity and sustainable development in 
addressing the intricate demands of water resource 
management and power generation in Iraq. 

2.2 Downstream areas affected by failure   
The cities around the dam and directly affected by dam 

failure are Haditha, Baghdadi, Heet, Ramadi, and Fallujah. 
These cities are considered major cities and are located near 
the Euphrates Riverbanks. The total population of these cities 
is estimated to be one and a half million. The population will 
be severely affected by dam failure due to overtopping or 
breach. Table 2 shows the affected cities from the dam failure.  

Table 2.  The affected cities by the dam failure  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

City Population Distance from 
Haditha Dam (Km) 

Haditha 120,000 7 

Heet 100,000 76 

Ramadi 570,000 168 

Fallujah 500,000 250 



Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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2.3 Estimation of risk factor  
The risk factor calculation method used in this research 

is that proposed by ICOLD (International Committee On Large 
Dams). The total risk factor for Haditha Dam can be calculated 
based on the available data and based on Tables 3 and Table 
4 and Eq. (1) [32]. 

𝑇𝑅𝐹 = 𝑅𝐹𝑐 + 𝑅𝐹ℎ + 𝑅𝐹𝑒𝑟 + 𝑅𝐹𝑝𝑑𝑑                  (1) 

where TRF is the total risk factor, RFc is the risk factor for the 
capacity of the reservoir, RFh is the risk factor for the height 
of the dam, RFer is the risk factor for evacuation requirement, 
and RFpdd is the Risk factor for potential downstream 
damage. Table 3 indicates the potential risk rating in the 
ICOLD method. 

Table 3. The potential risk rating is given in the ICOLD method 

Risk Factor Contribution to risk (weighting points) 

Extreme High Moderate Low 
Capacity (hm3) ˃120 (6) 120-1 (4) 1-0.1 (2) ˂ 0.1 

(0) 

Height (m) ˃ 45 (6) 45-30 (4) 30-15 (2) ˂ 15 
(0) 

Evacuation 
Requirements 
(# of persons) 

˃1000 
(12) 

1000-100 
(8) 

100-1 (4) None 
(0) 

potential 
downstream 
damage 

High (12) Moderate 
(8) 

Low (4) None 
(0) 

 

Table 4. Risk classes based on the total risk factor 

Total Risk Factor Risk Class Risk Rating 

0-6 I Low 

7-18 II Moderate 

19-30 III High 

31-36 IV Extreme 

 

2.4 Possible failure scenarios for Haditha Dam   
This study will consider three scenarios and an 

emergency response plan is prepared for this purpose.  

2.4.1 Dam failure due to hostile attack 
The scenario begins with the failure of the dam's 

foundations, leading to a gradual erosion of the dam towards 
the left of the power station. Ultimately, this failure resulted 
in a catastrophic collapse with a width of 420 meters 
downstream from the dam's body (these findings were 
derived from the utilization of a Digital Elevation Model 
(DEM) for the study area).  The angle of this collapse is 34 
degrees to the left of the valley's direction, and the erosion 
continues downward until it reaches an elevation of 100 
meters above sea level. 

2.4.2 Dam failure due to overtopping 
Overtopping occurs when the water level in the dam's 

reservoir exceeds the dam's crest elevation, which means that 
the dam is facing a potentially catastrophic situation where 
the water level in the reservoir rises above the crest elevation 
of the dam, which is for Haditha Dam at an elevation of 155 
meters above sea level.  

2.4.3 Dam failure due to geological problems, including   
seepage 
The Haditha Dam was constructed on various 

limestone beds from the Euphrates and Ana formations. 

These beds contain fissures, cracks, and almost isolated 
sinkholes. However, it took a significant amount of time for 
the sinkholes to develop and collapse, leading to a settlement 
in the dam. Hence, the dam requires constant monitoring to 
prevent seepage issues that will directly affect its safety. So, 
the failure will start with the dam's foundations, leading to the 
dam's gradual erosion towards the power station's left. 
Ultimately, this failure results in a catastrophic collapse. In 
this study, the River Analysis System software (HEC-RAS) 
Version 6.6 was used as a tool to simulate the possible 
scenarios for the Haditha Dam break and the resulting flood 
wave and inundation along the Euphrates River downstream. 
Two-dimensional (2D) unsteady flow encroachment analysis 
is adopted, and the procedure of creating encroachment 
regions is used.  The floodway encroachment analysis can be 
based on 1D, 2D, or combined 1D/2D models with a mix of 
encroachment methods. However, for portions of the 2D 
model domain, Encroachment Regions are the only method to 
control the floodway analysis. For unsteady flow, HEC-RAS 
solves the full, dynamic Saint Venant equation by using an 
implicit, finite difference method. The simulation examines 
critical factors such as peak discharge, the timing of the flood 
wave's arrival, and the maximum water levels at various 
locations within the cities along the Euphrates River 
immediately following the dam's hypothetical failure. These 
findings are based on a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) of the 
study area.  

2.5 Proposed emergency response plan  
It is a systematic plan that identifies potential 

emergencies in the dam and categorizes the actions and steps 
that must be followed to mitigate human and material losses. 
Emergencies in dam operations are defined as unexpected 
situations that threaten the overall dam facilities, properties, 
and lives downstream, necessitating immediate measures. 
For Haditha Dam, there are three emergency levels (Level III- 
imminent failure emergency, Level II- potential failure 
emergency, Level I- non-emergency), and the primary 
purpose of pre-defined emergency levels is to provide clear 
external communications of project conditions and project 
owner/operator incident management activities. The 
emergency level helps to define the primary goal of 
emergency response, such as to intervene to prevent the 
breach, to communicate that a breach or high flow is 
occurring, and to expedite evacuation by government 
authorities. 

2.5.1 Emergency response plan downstream of Haditha 
Dam  
Step 1: Event Detection and Evaluation - The 

Emergency Action Process begins by identifying any events or 
unusual conditions near the dam through observations made 
by project personnel and landowners and the evaluation of 
instrumentation data gathered from monitoring devices and 
sensors that provide information about the dam's condition. 
During the initial stage of the Emergency Action Process, 
project personnel conduct regular inspections, ranging from 
weekly to 24-hour inspections during high pool levels, to 
identify any abnormalities. If any abnormalities are detected, 
they are reported to supervisors or managers. Various 
methods, such as observations, evaluation of instrumentation 
data, and forewarnings of potential events, are used to detect 
events. Signs of distress, such as seepage, movement, or 
structural changes, are thoroughly investigated. 
Step 2: Emergency Level Determination - Once the event is 
detected, the emergency level needs to be determined, which 
involves assessing the severity of the situation and classifying 



Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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it into one of the predefined emergency levels. The dam 
Project Manager, in consultation with engineers, determines 
the emergency level.  
Step 3: Notification and Communication - After determining 
the emergency level, the next step is to notify and 
communicate the situation to the relevant stakeholders and 
authorities in charge. This includes internal reporting and 
external communication to downstream populations and 
government authorities. Stakeholders for Level III and Level 
II Emergency: 
• Government of Iraq – Ministry of Water Resources 
• Governor of Al-Anbar Province 
• Ministry of Interior 
• Ministry of Defense 
• Director of Water Resources in Anbar Province 
• Director of Police in Anbar Province 
• Joint Coordination and Monitoring Center (JCMC) 
• Stakeholders for Level I (non-emergency): Government of 

Iraq – Ministry of Water Resources 
Step 4: Emergency Actions – in this step, the needed actions 
and emergency procedures are implemented based on each 
level of emergency level as follows: 
Level III (Imminent Failure Emergency) 
• Quick decision-making and notification are crucial. 
• Multiple communication channels are utilized. 
• Local authorities lead evacuation efforts. 
• Continuous communication with local authorities is 

maintained. 

Level II (Potential Failure Emergency) 
• Notifications and communication tools are activated. 
• Project personnel assess dam conditions. 
• Investigation and corrective actions are initiated. 
• Level I (non-emergency) 
• Dam inspection is conducted following the monitoring 

plan. 
• Conditions are analyzed, and corrective actions are 

recommended. 
Step 5: Resolution and Follow-up - The final step of the 
emergency response plan involves resolving the emergency 
and following up on the actions taken. Once the emergency 
response plan is activated and the emergency is resolved, the 
termination responsibilities include the following: 
• The Dam Manager declares the termination based on input 

from MWR and support. 
• Inspection is conducted to ensure no threat remains. 
• Records are compiled and distributed to relevant 

stakeholders. 
This comprehensive process ensures a systematic and 
effective approach to emergency planning for Haditha Dam. 

3. Results and discussion 

3.1 Estimation of risk factor 
By following the specifications provided by the 

International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) and using 
the equation to calculate the risk factor, we can determine the 
level of risk associated with Haditha Dam. The Haditha Dam 
is 57 meters high and 8,700 meters long, with 8.2 billion cubic 
meters and by applying Eq. (1), the value of TRF was found to 
be 36. According to the classifications mentioned in Table 3, 
Haditha Dam falls under the extreme category.  

3.2 Description of the situation after failure   
The Haditha Dam holds an extreme risk of failure, which 

could lead to catastrophic consequences due to its strategic 
location, substantial population, and infrastructure that 

depend on its stability. The impact of its failure would not 
only be limited to the immediate vicinity but also affect 
regions downstream. The repercussions of a dam failure 
would be severe and can be summarized as follows:  
Immediate Flood Inundation: The failure of the Haditha dam 
would release an immense volume of water stored in the 
reservoir (estimated to be 8x109 m3), causing a rapid and 
massive flood downstream. Communities located near the 
dam would be inundated almost instantly. Table 5 and Figure 
5  show the results obtained from the hydraulic model based 
on the failure scenario of Haditha Dam.  

Table 5. The results of the peak time, discharge, and elevation of the 
flood wave  

 

 

 
Figure 5. The hydrograph of the dam failure in cities downstream of 
Haditha Dam during the failure  

The loss of Life and Injury: The unexpected flooding 
caused by the dam could catch approximately a million people 
downstream off guard, which could potentially lead to a 
significant loss of life and injuries. Those who are not able to 
evacuate in time or are trapped in low-lying zones would be 
particularly vulnerable. Infrastructure Damage: Critical 
infrastructure such as roads, bridges, power lines, and 
communication networks would suffer extensive damage or 
destruction, hindering rescue and relief efforts and 
exacerbating the crisis. Displacement of Population: 
Communities downstream of the dam would face 
displacement due to flooding. This would strain resources 
and infrastructure in areas accommodating refugees, leading 
to humanitarian challenges. Environmental Impact: The 
floodwaters would carry debris, pollutants, and sediment, 
causing environmental degradation downstream, 
contaminants from agricultural areas, industrial sites, and 
urban centers could pollute water sources and harm 
ecosystems. Impact on Agriculture: Agricultural land along 
the riverbanks would be submerged, leading to crop loss and 
damage to livestock, especially since almost all the cities 

Location Peak Time 
(hour) 

Discharge 
(m3\s) 

Elevation m 
(a.s.l) 

Haditha 8 173350 131 

Heet 13 122053 79.56 

Ramadi 18 100582.7 55.08 

Fallujah 28 64754.37 47.04 



Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

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downstream of Haditha Dam have agriculture activities. 
Economic Disruption: The economic impact would be 
profound, with damage to infrastructure, agriculture, and 
businesses leading to loss of livelihoods and reduced 
economic activity. Recovery and rebuilding efforts would 
require significant financial resources and time. The process 
would be lengthy and resource-intensive. All the catastrophic 
damage mentioned above can be avoided by having an 
Emergency Action Plan; by applying the emergency action 
plan and following the evacuation procedures, the casualties 
can be reduced to the least possible amount.  

3.3 Evacuation program 
The evacuation program involves the efforts of 

authorities in charge to evacuate people at risk downstream 
of the dam to the safe zones (the areas with a high level). 
Figure 6 displays the flood path with dark blue colour and 
areas with elevations above 140 m (a.s.l) marked in green. 
The HEC-RAS model results indicate that if the Haditha Dam 
were to experience failure due to hostile attack or seepage, 
the elevation of the flood wave in Haditha city (with a total 
population of 120,000) would reach 131 m (a.s.l). In case of 
failure due to overtopping, the elevation would reach 134 m 
(a.s.l). People should evacuate to these higher areas in such 
scenarios. Conversely, the low zones marked in red should be 
avoided in the downstream areas during a Haditha Dam 
failure. 

 
Figure 6. High and low zones of Haditha City 

Figure 7 displays the flood path with a dark blue color 
and areas with elevations above 84 m (a.s.l) marked in green. 
The HEC-RAS model results indicate that if the Haditha Dam 
were to experience failure due to hostile attack or seepage, 
the elevation of the flood wave in Heet City (with a population 
of more than 95,000) would reach 79.56 m (a.s.l). In case of 
failure due to overtopping, the elevation would reach 81.32 m 
(a.s.l). People should evacuate to these higher areas in such 
scenarios. Conversely, the low zones marked in red should be 
avoided in the downstream areas during a Haditha Dam 
failure.  

Figure 8  displays the flood path with a dark blue color 
and areas with elevations above 56 m (a.s.l) marked in green. 
The HEC-RAS model results indicate that if the Haditha Dam 
were to experience failure due to hostile attack or seepage, 
the elevation of the flood wave in Ramadi City (with a 
population of more than 570,000) would reach 55.08 m (a.s.l). 
In case of failure due to overtopping, the elevation would 

reach 55.95 m (a.s.l). People should evacuate to these higher 
areas in such scenarios. Conversely, the people living in the 
low zones marked in red should be evacuated immediately 
after the failure of the Haditha Dam. Figure 9  displays the 
flood path with a dark blue color and areas with elevations 
above 49 m (a.s.l) marked in green. The HEC-RAS model 
results indicate that if the Haditha Dam were to experience 
failure due to hostile attack or seepage, the elevation of the 
flood wave in Fallujah City (with a population of more than 
500,000) would reach 47.04 m (a.s.l). In case of failure due to 
overtopping, the elevation would reach 48.88 m (a.s.l). People 
should evacuate to these higher areas in such scenarios. 
Conversely, Conversely, the people living in the low zones 
marked in red should be evacuated immediately after the 
failure of Haditha Dam. 

 
Figure 7. High and low zones of Heet City 
 

 

 
Figure 8. High and low zones of Ramadi City 



Y. Hameed et al. /Future Technology                                                                                              May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 01-10 

8 

 

 
Figure 9. High and low zones of Fallujah City 

Maps were prepared based on the inundation areas 
obtained from the application of the HEC-RAS model. The 
maps were coloured to show the safe areas in green while the 
red shows the dangerous areas. In Haditha City (with a 
population of 120,000), the areas with elevations above 140 
m (a.s.l) are marked in green. If the dam fails, the flood wave's 
elevation would reach 131 m (a.s.l). In case of overtopping, 
the elevation would reach 134 m (a.s.l). Therefore, people 
should evacuate to the areas with elevation higher than 140 
m (a.s.l) as marked in the maps with green color and avoid 
low zones marked in red in the downstream areas. In Heet 
City (with a population of more than 95,000), The flood 
wave's elevation would reach 79.56 m (a.s.l). In case of 
overtopping, the elevation would reach 81.32 m (a.s.l). People 
should evacuate to the areas with an elevation higher than 84 
m (a.s.l) as marked in the maps with green color and avoid 
low zones marked in red in the downstream areas. In Ramadi 
City (with a population of more than 570,000), The flood 
wave's elevation would reach 55.08 m (a.s.l). If there is 
overtopping, the elevation would reach 55.95 m (a.s.l). People 
should evacuate to the areas with an elevation higher than 56 
m (a.s.l) as marked in the maps with green color and avoid 
low zones marked in red color in the downstream areas. In 
Fallujah city (with a population of more than 500,000), The 
flood wave's elevation would reach 47.04 m (a.s.l). If there is 
overtopping, the elevation would reach 48.88 m (a.s.l). People 
should evacuate to the areas with an elevation higher than 49 
m (a.s.l) as marked in the maps with green color and avoid 
low zones marked in red in the downstream areas. However, 
the dam's unique geology, which includes voids caused by 
limestone formations, poses a risk to its structural integrity. 
This makes it more susceptible to failure, especially in the 
event of a terrorist attack, as it has been targeted before. In 
this research, an emergency action plan was proposed that 
includes three possible failure scenarios, categories of 
potential emergencies in the dam, and the actions and steps 
that must be followed to mitigate human and economic losses. 
Also, an evacuation program has been suggested as part of the 
emergency response plan that involves different stakeholders 
and authorities in safeguarding the population downstream 
of the dam.   

4. Conclusion  

The Haditha Dam located in Iraq is a crucial safeguard 
against potential risks, such as natural disasters, deliberate 
acts of sabotage by terrorists, or failure due to geological 

conditions. The dam has a significant storage capacity of 
around (8x109 m3), and most of the cities downstream are 
located in low areas, making it an essential structure for the 
region's safety. The authorities in charge have developed an 
evacuation program to help people at risk downstream of the 
dam to reach the areas with higher elevations that are 
considered safe zones.   

Acknowledgments 
The authors highly acknowledge the cooperation and 
encouragement that they got from the Ministry of Water 
Resources, Iraq,  Istanbul Gedik University, Turkey, and the 
University of Baghdad, Iraq. 

Ethical issue 
The authors are aware of and comply with best practices in 
publication ethics, specifically with regard to authorship 
(avoidance of guest authorship), dual submission, 
manipulation of figures, competing interests, and compliance 
with policies on research ethics. The authors adhere to 
publication requirements that the submitted work is original 
and has not been published elsewhere. 

Data availability statement 
Datasets analyzed during the current study are available and 

can be given following a reasonable request from the 

corresponding author. 

Conflict of interest 

The authors declare no potential conflict of interest. 

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