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51-60 

51 

 

 

 

Review 

Agenda setting theory in the digital media age: a 

comprehensive and critical literature review  
Safran Safar Almakaty* 

Imam Mohammad ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 

A R T I C L E   I N F O 
 

Article history: 
Received 02 March 2025  
Received in revised form 
10 April 2025 
Accepted 24 April 2025 
 
Keywords:  
Agenda setting theory, Digital media, Social media, 
Network agenda setting, Algorithmic curation, 
Misinformation 
 
*Corresponding author 
Email address: 
safran93@hotmail.com 
 
DOI: 10.55670/fpll.futech.4.2.6 

A B S T R A C T 
 

This thorough literature study looks at how Agenda Setting Theory (AST) has 
developed in the digital media era over the last two decades (2004-2024). From 
its beginnings in McCombs and Shaw's work, the study tracks AST's evolution 
across three levels: issue salience transfer, attribute agenda setting, and the 
more recent Network Agenda Setting model. It examines how digital media's 
qualities- fragmentation, interactivity, algorithmic curation, and decentralized 
gatekeeping- have challenged and altered conventional agenda-setting 
mechanisms. Based on about 40 studies, the analysis concludes that although 
agenda-setting impacts remain online, they function in a more complicated, 
networked manner with a broader spectrum of players affecting public 
agendas. The article investigates digital platforms' empirical data, the rise of 
new agenda-setting players outside conventional media, and issues including 
audience fragmentation and false information. AST is still shown to be relevant, 
but major adjustments are needed to grasp the several aspects of agenda 
creation completely in today's mixed media environment. 

1. Introduction 

Famously defined by Maxwell McCombs and Donald 
Shaw [1], Agenda Setting Theory (AST) claims that the news 
media shapes the public's view of the relevance of specific 
problems by choosing and prominently showing them. "The 
media may not be successful much of the time in telling people 
what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about," the basic maxim of Cohen 
(1963, p. 13, as referenced in [2]), embodies the theory's 
foundational first level. Later studies concentrated on 
attributing agenda setting- how media framing shapes public 
perception of the qualities or features of those concerns and 
public figures- thereby extending this to a second level [3]. 
More lately, a third level, Network Agenda Setting (NAS), 
looks at the interrelationship of topic and attribute agendas 
throughout the media and public spheres [4]. Primarily in the 
context of conventional mass media- newspapers, television 
news- AST has offered a strong framework for grasping media 
influence for decades. The communication environment has 
been drastically changed by the birth and fast development of 
the digital media era marked by the internet, social media 
platforms, mobile technologies, user-generated content 
(UGC), algorithmic curation, and dispersed audiences. This 
change calls for a thoughtful re-evaluation of AST's relevance, 
tools, and breadth. When media gatekeepers are distributed, 
viewers are active content producers and selectors, and 
information travels through complicated, sometimes 
algorithmically mediated networks, is the idea still relevant? 

Aiming to be thorough and critical, this literature review 
offers an overview of scholarly work produced within the last 
two decades, roughly 2004 to 2024, that explores Agenda 
Setting Theory in this digital media environment. It 
investigates how well the fundamental principles of AST hold 
up, points out essential changes and extensions suggested by 
academics, looks at the part played by new actors and 
technological affordances, and addresses the issues and 
subtleties brought about by events including social media, 
algorithmic filtering, and the dissemination of false 
information. This paper aims to chart the present state of 
knowledge on agenda-setting processes in an increasingly 
complicated and participative media ecosystem by combining 
results from about 40 studies. The review is organized into 
chapters examining the foundations, the digital challenges, 
empirical evidence from the digital sphere, the rise of 
Network Agenda Setting, the role of new actors and 
influences, and the ongoing issues of fragmentation and 
misinformation, ending with a summary and 
recommendations for future research.  Therefore, this 
literature review aims to critically examine the evolution and 
adaptation of Agenda Setting Theory (AST) within the digital 
media context over the past two decades (2004–2024). 
Specifically, the study investigates how digital media 
characteristics such as fragmentation, interactivity, 
algorithmic curation, and decentralized gatekeeping 
challenge traditional agenda-setting processes (Table 1).  

 

 

 

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SS. Almakaty /Future Technology                                                                                                    May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 51-60 

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Furthermore, it evaluates the emergence and 

significance of new agenda-setting actors and explores issues 
such as audience fragmentation and misinformation, thereby 
assessing the continued relevance of AST in contemporary 
media ecosystems [4]. 

2. Foundations of agenda setting theory 

It is important to quickly review the basic ideas of 
Agenda Setting Theory (AST) before exploring the digital 
age's complexity. Originally concentrating on the transfer of 
problem salience (Level 1) from the media agenda to the 
public agenda, AST was born from the groundbreaking Chapel 
Hill study [13]. McCombs and Shaw discovered a close link 
between the concerns highlighted by the news media and the 
ones voters said were most significant by means of media 
content analysis and polling of undecided voters during the 
1968 US presidential election. This result called into question 
the dominant "limited effects" model of media influence by 
implying a significant cognitive effect: the media influences 
our awareness and priorities on societal concerns. Numerous 
studies replicating and extending the theory's results across 
many settings and nations [14,15] helped it gain popularity 
quickly. Researchers investigated several situational factors 
affecting the intensity of agenda-setting impacts, including 
the need for orientation (NFO)- a person's relevance 
perception and problem ambiguity [7]. People with greater 
NFO were found to be more vulnerable to media agenda-
setting influences. The evolution of the second level of agenda 
setting signaled a notable theoretical growth. It went from 
what concerns are deemed essential to how those concerns- 
and related things like political candidates- are seen. This 
degree suggests that the public's knowledge and assessment 
of certain issues or objects is shaped by the media's emphasis 
on certain qualities, features, or frames in their reporting [15, 
16]. Media coverage stressing economic factors of 
immigration as opposed to humanitarian ones, for example, 
might influence public perception of the essential qualities of 
the problem and possible remedies. Research showed a link 
between the prominence of characteristics in media coverage 
and the prominence of those same traits in public opinion. 
Though there are clear variations, mostly AST's emphasis on 
salience transfer, this degree linked AST more closely with 
framing theory [17]. Often mentioned are the fundamental 
assumptions supporting conventional AST: 
• Editors and reporters among somewhat centralized 

media gatekeepers decide on news selection and 
visibility. 

• Especially from elite national news sources, a quite 
noticeable and somewhat common media agenda. 

• A most passive audience that consumes media rather 
than creates or actively curates it on a mass basis. 

• A slower information cycle than the immediate character 
of digital media. 
These basic components, the two degrees of agenda 

framing, the idea of salience transfer, and the underlying 
beliefs about the media environment, provide the required 
baseline from which one may evaluate the changes and 
difficulties the digital age brings about. Contemporary studies 
aim to challenge the strength and universality of these ideas 
in the new media scene (Table 2). 

Table 1. Evolution of agenda setting theory (AST) 

Period Focus References 
First-Level Agenda 
Setting (1972) 

Issue Salience Transfer. 
Media emphasizes certain 
issues, influencing public 
perception of issue 
importance 

[5] 

Second-Level 
Agenda Setting 
(1995-1997) 

Attribute Salience 
(Framing). Media framing 
influences public 
perception of issue 
attributes and evaluations 

[6] 

Digital Media 
Emergence (2000s) 

Rise of internet-based 
platforms challenges 
traditional agenda-setting 
due to fragmentation, 
interactivity, and 
decentralized gatekeeping 

[7] 

Network Agenda 
Setting (NAS) 
(2011) 

Paradigm Shift: 
Introduction of networked 
perspective; salience 
transfer viewed as 
interconnected issue 
networks rather than 
isolated issues 

[9] 

Empirical Validation 
of NAS (2014-2020) 

Studies empirically 
confirm NAS models in 
digital environments, 
highlighting interaction 
between traditional media, 
digital media, and public 
agendas 

[10] 

Contemporary 
Applications & 
Challenges (2020s & 
beyond) 

NAS applied contemporary 
issues like misinformation, 
algorithmic curation, and 
influencer-driven agenda 
setting, underscoring the 
complexity and 
multidimensional nature 
of modern media influence 

[11,12] 

 
 

3. The digital media landscape and its challenges to 

traditional agenda setting 

The shift from an era ruled by conventional mass media 
to the present digital media age poses basic questions for the 
assumptions and processes of conventional AST. Several 
important aspects of the digital environment could interfere 
with or change agenda-setting mechanisms. 
First, the growing number of media sources and channels 
causes media fragmentation [30]. Unlike the small number of 
powerful newspapers and television networks in the past, 
people now have access to a practically limitless range of 
niche publications, social media feeds, blogs, online news 
sites, and more. This considerably complicates the definition 
of a single, consistent "media agenda."  
 
 
 

Abbreviations 

ABC  Agenda Setting Theory 

BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation 

IMSIU  Imam Mohammad ibn Saud Islamic University 

MSU  Michigan State University 

NAS  Network Agenda Setting 

NFO  Need for Orientation 

SEME  Search Engine Manipulation Effect 

SEO  Search Engine Optimization 

UGC  User-Generated Content 

UKY  University of Kentucky 

US  United States 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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The possibility of a common public agenda created by media 
agreement declines if viewers are spread across many venues 
with different material objectives [31]. 

Second, user-generated content (UGC) and interactivity 
change the relationship between media providers and 
consumers. No longer passive consumers, users actively 
produce, distribute, comment on, and remix material [32]. By 
allowing people and non-elite organizations to voice concerns 
and influence stories, platforms like Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, and TikHub may be able to completely avoid 
conventional media gatekeepers. This begs the question of 
who determines the agenda: Is it still legacy media, or do 
online influencers, citizen journalists, or collective public 
emotion on social platforms now have major agenda-setting 
power [33]. 

Third, personal media exposure is more and more 
shaped by algorithmic selection. Based on user behavior, 
interests, and network connections, search engines (Google), 
social media feeds (Facebook's News Feed, Twitter's 
timeline), and news aggregators (Apple News) employ 
sophisticated, often opaque algorithms to tailor information 
delivery [34]. This customization might create "filter bubbles" 
or "echo chambers" in which people are mostly exposed to 
information supporting their current opinions, hence 
restricting exposure to different points of view and impeding 
the development of a wide public agenda [18]. Moreover, the 
algorithmic logic itself, giving engagement or recency top 
priority, could influence the perceived relevance of problems 
differently from conventional journalistic news values [35]. 

Fourth, the fall of conventional gatekeepers changes the 
power structure. Although journalists and editors in legacy 
media continue to have some influence, their capacity to set 
the news agenda is debatable [36]. While powerful people and 
networked communities have a great influence, online 
platforms have their own kind of gatekeeping (algorithmic 

and policy-based). According to Wallace [37], the procedure 
becomes more dispersed and less hierarchical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Fifth, information flow's speed and architecture have 
evolved. News and information can spread virally across 
networks in minutes or hours, causing quick changes in 
attention [38]. The networked system enables intricate 
interconnections between several agendas- media, public, 
and policy, which conventional linear models of agenda 
setting battled to grasp [39]. 
Collectively, these traits- fragmentation, interactivity, UGC, 
algorithmic curation, decentralized gatekeeping, and faster, 
networked information flows- challenge the conventional 
AST framework. They make the measuring of media and 
public agendas more difficult, bringing new powerful players 
into play, changing the processes of salience transfer, and 
creating questions about the possibility of polarization and 
manipulation. Later chapters will investigate how empirical 
studies have struggled with these issues, evaluating AST's 
durability and adaptation in this changed context. 

4. Empirical evidence: agenda setting effects on the 

digital sphere 

A significant number of empirical studies conducted 
throughout the last two decades show that, in different ways, 
agenda-setting influences remain online despite the 
theoretical difficulties the digital media environment 
presents. The platform, the user, and the setting all determine 
the character and intensity of these impacts. Many studies 
show that through their internet platforms, conventional 
news outlets still have agenda-setting power. While blogs 
exhibited some independent agenda power, Meraz [40] 
discovered that conventional media websites nevertheless 
had a major influence during the 2004 US election. Likewise, 
Lim [41] showed first-level agenda-setting impacts for online 
publications in Singapore. Online news exposure on political 
candidates led Conway et al. [42] to discover first- and 
second-level agenda settings as well as second-level agenda 

Table 2. Three levels of agenda-setting theory 

Attribute First-Level Agenda 
Setting(Issue Salience) 

Second-Level Agenda 
Setting(Attribute Salience) 

Third-Level Agenda 
Setting(Network Agenda 
Setting, NAS) 

Focus "What" issues or topics are 
presented as important in the 
media agenda [18]. 

"How" these issues, topics, or 
entities are framed; the 
attributes emphasized by media 
[19]. 

Relationships and 
interconnections among 
multiple issues and attributes in 
media and public agendas; 
network structures and 
dynamics [20]. 
 

Primary Influence Shapes public perception of 
issue importance and priority 
through selection and 
prominence given to topics 
[22]. 

Influences how the public 
thinks about specific issues or 
entities by highlighting 
attributes, characteristics, or 
frames [21]. 

Influences public understanding 
by structuring interconnected 
"issue networks," shaping how 
issues are cognitively linked 
and perceived as related [4, 23]. 
 

Effects Transfer of issue salience from 
media to public; people 
perceive media-highlighted 
topics as most important 
(cognitive effect) [24]. 

Transfer of attribute salience; 
public perceptions and 
evaluations of issues or entities 
are shaped by emphasized 
attributes (framing effects; 
evaluative effect) [25]. 

Transfer of relationships among 
issues and attributes; public 
perceptions of how issues 
interrelate mirror media-
generated issue networks 
(complex, cognitive, relational 
effect) [26]. 
 

Media Environment Traditional mass media 
(newspapers, TV news) initially 
dominant; linear, hierarchical 
transfer of salience [27]. 

Traditional mass media with 
increasing relevance in 
mediated environments; still 
linear but more nuanced and 
evaluative [2, 28]. 

Digital, fragmented, interactive, 
algorithmically curated media; 
networked, non-linear, dynamic 
interactions and exchanges 
among multiple actors [4, 29]. 
 

 



SS. Almakaty /Future Technology                                                                                                    May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 51-60 

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settings. This implies that even when consumed online, 
established news brands keep impact and credibility.  

Vargo et al. [43] found a significant flow of influence from 
legacy media, such as the New York Times, to online news 
aggregators and blogs, implying that conventional media still 
typically establish the first agenda that spreads into the digital 
world. Digital agenda-set studies have increasingly 
concentrated on social media channels. Often examined has 
been Twitter, which is used by journalists, lawmakers, and the 
public, and has a real-time character. Several studies indicate 
that Twitter can affect the public agenda [28, 44] and the 
conventional media agenda (intermedia agenda setting) to 
some level. For instance, trending topics on Twitter or 
powerful users could push news organizations to report on 
matters. Particularly at the attribute level (Level 2), Harder et 
al. [45] discovered reciprocal interactions between Twitter 
agendas and media agendas. The results are complicated, 
though; other studies indicate Twitter mostly reflects and 
magnifies current media agendas instead of directly creating 
them [46]. Though user involvement and network structures 
are very important, studies on Facebook indicate its news 
feed algorithm can affect issue salience [47, 48]. 
Investigations have also been made on search engines, 
especially Google, as possible agenda setters. Studies indicate 
that search engine results may affect user views of problem 
significance and even candidate choice [49]. Search results' 
order indirectly gives importance, thereby acting as a strong 
but subtle kind of agenda framing [50]. 

The data, meanwhile, is not consistent. Several studies 
show online agenda-setting effects that are weaker or altered. 
The high-choice environment may reduce the power of 
conventional media to establish a consistent public agenda by 
allowing consumers to selectively skip news or subjects they 
find uninteresting or objectionable [51]. Moreover, for certain 
demographics, especially for younger audiences or the 
politically involved who actively search for information 
online, the impact of online sources may be more noticeable 
[52]. Studies also show the growing relevance of second-level 
(attribute) agenda framing in the digital domain. Often, with 
comments and emotional signals, the way social media 
discusses frames and shares problems can greatly influence 
how those problems are viewed [53]. The viral adoption of 
certain hashtags or memes linked to an issue can quickly 
create dominant characteristics or frames in online 
conversation. To sum up, empirical data indicates that agenda 
setting is not dead in the digital era but rather more 
complicated and multifarious. While traditional media still 
have online power, social media, search engines, and user 
behavior create new dynamics. Often, the consequences are 
dependent, networked, and maybe more powerful at the 
attribute level than the problem level in relation to the 
conventional media age. 

5. The rise of network agenda setting (NAS) 

Acknowledging the shortcomings of conventional linear 
models in reflecting the complexity of the digital media 
ecosystem, scholars created the Network Agenda Setting 
(NAS) model, sometimes called the third level of agenda 
setting [54]. NAS changes the emphasis from the 
straightforward transfer of salience between two agendas—
e.g., media to public—to investigating the relationships 
among a network of components (issues or qualities) inside 
and across several agendas. It suggests that problems and 
qualities are linked rather than separate and that the 
perceived significance of one item affects the relationship 
with others. According to the NAS model, media coverage 

creates networks of problems and characteristics that can 
shape the development of comparable networks in the 
public's perception [55]. Media coverage, for instance, could 
regularly connect the problem of "immigration" with qualities 
like "national security" and "economic impact," while linking 
"healthcare reform" with "affordability" and "access." NAS 
theorizes that the pattern of these relationships in media 
coverage will reflect the pattern of how the public perceives 
these concerns. 
NAS studies thrive in the digital environment, with its 
hyperlinked structure and networked communication flows 
(social media connections, retweets, shares). Network 
analysis methods have been used in studies to map these 
connections. Vargo et al. [56] examined Twitter (UGC), 
political blogs, and conventional media for issue networks 
connected to US healthcare reform. They discovered notable 
relationships between the problem networks found in these 
various media domains, hence validating the NAS model and 
showing the movement of issue connections between 
channels. Guo [57] showed how various media sources build 
separate networks of characteristics surrounding prominent 
individuals, hence shaping public opinions. Moreover, NAS 
lets one dynamically grasp agenda setting by including 
intermedia agenda setting (how various media affect one 
another) and reverse agenda setting (how media coverage is 
influenced by public or group agendas) all under one 
framework. For example, popular themes or viral campaigns 
starting on social media (public/community agenda) might 
drive conventional media sources to report on a matter, hence 
showing a flow from the public network to the media network 
[58]. Vu et al. [59] offered proof of this dynamic interaction 
across blogs, internet media, and legacy media influencing the 
general problem agenda network. 
Studies have also looked at how various media forms help the 
network in different ways. While social media could highlight 
certain qualities or emotional aspects within the network, 
traditional media could create core issue links [60]. 
Examining network agenda setting among young people, 
Kligler-Vilenchik and Tenenboim [61] discovered that peer 
networks and alternative internet sources significantly 
influence their problem maps alongside conventional media. 
A major theoretical development, the NAS model provides a 
more complex and complete approach to thinking about 
agenda formation in the digital age's interconnection. 
Reflecting the complicated reality of information flow in 
networked societies, it goes beyond basic salience transfer to 
examine the structure of relationships between agenda items. 
Although methodologically challenging (requiring content 
analysis paired with network analysis), NAS offers an 
insightful study of how meaning and salience are created and 
distributed inside the modern hybrid media environment. 
 
6. New actors and influences: beyond traditional 

gatekeepers 

Beyond the conventional emphasis on legacy news outlets, 
the digital media ecosystem has broadened the spectrum of 
players who might influence media and public agendas. This 
chapter investigates the agenda-setting functions of these 
new players and the simultaneous increase of user agency. 
Political actors increasingly use digital platforms to bypass 
conventional media middlemen and set their own agendas 
straight with the public [62]. Influencing public opinion and 
later media coverage, politicians declare policies, express 
concerns, criticize rivals, and rally supporters via Twitter, 
Facebook, and other channels [63]. This direct 



SS. Almakaty /Future Technology                                                                                                    May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 51-60 

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communication questions conventional intermedia agenda 
setting, whereby politicians frequently depend on media 
coverage to contact the people. Conway et al. [64] proved this 
dynamic change by finding that tweets from political figures 
could shape media agendas. Particularly for certain 
demographics or niche issues, social media influencers- 
people with substantial online followings who sometimes 
work outside conventional journalistic standards- have 
become major agenda setters [65]. Often concentrating on 
lifestyle or consumerism, influencers can also highlight social 
or political concerns, hence influencing their relevance and 
characteristics within their networks [66]. Their agenda 
signals may be stronger given their perceived genuineness 
and relational connection with followers. 

Often pushing concerns into the mainstream media and 
political agendas, citizen journalists and activists use digital 
technologies to record events, spread alternative stories, and 
organize group action [67]. Movements such as the Arab 
Spring or #BlackLivesMatter showed the strength of 
networked people using social media to question official 
narratives and create agendas from the ground up [68]. Even 
non-human entities, particularly algorithms, have a 
significant gatekeeping and agenda-influencing impact [69]. 
Rather than conventional news values, the algorithms 
curating social media feeds, search results, and news 
aggregators determine the visibility and prominence of 
information, implicitly setting an agenda based on 
programmed criteria (e.g., engagement, personalization, 
recency) [70]. Often unnoticed by consumers, this 
"algorithmic agenda setting" generates questions regarding 
openness and possible prejudices. At the same time, the 
digital era enables user agencies in ways that were previously 
unheard of. Users actively participate in selective exposure, 
not only passively receiving but rather choosing sources that 
fit their interests and values [71]. They also engage in 
selective sharing and commenting, highlighting messages and 
qualities while downplaying others, so co-constructing 
agendas in their networks [72]. News feed customization 
options let users create their own information environments, 
hence perhaps generating individual agendas [73]. 

Increased user agencies challenge conventional agenda-
setting theories. User decisions and activities inside digital 
networks greatly mediate the reception and spread of media 
and other actors' agenda-setting efforts, even as they 
continue to do so [74]. The general agenda-setting process 
turns into a more dynamic, negotiated event including 
traditional media, new players (political elites, influencers, 
activists, algorithms), and active consumers involved in 
selection, interpretation, and sharing. 

7. Challenges and nuances: misinformation, 

algorithms, and fragmentation 

Although earlier chapters underlined the ongoing and 
adaptive agenda-setting online, this one emphasizes notable 
digital age complexities and challenges: audience 
fragmentation, the widespread impact of algorithms, and the 
intentional dissemination of false information and 
disinformation. Driven by the high-choice media 
environment, audience dispersion remains a primary worry 
[75]. Although others contend that fragmentation is 
overstated and shared experiences endure [76], the 
possibility for people to live in quite diverse information 
universes is genuine. Any actor's (media or otherwise) 
capacity to establish a generally shared public agenda may be 
weakened by this. Rather, several, occasionally contradictory, 
agendas could coexist among various demographic segments, 

hence aggravating political and social polarization [18]. 
Tewksbury and Rittenberg's [77] study indicates that 
although fragmentation happens, its effect differs depending 
on people's media consumption habits and goals. Algorithms' 
influence on information flow curation presents difficulties. 
Designed to increase user involvement, algorithmic 
personalization might unintentionally foster "filter bubbles" 
[78] or "echo chambers" [79], therefore strengthening 
existing opinions and limiting exposure to various 
perspectives. While the empirical extent of these phenomena 
is debated [80], algorithms undeniably act as powerful, non-
transparent gatekeepers that shape the salience of issues and 
attributes based on criteria other than journalistic judgment 
[81]. This begs for important issues regarding responsibility 
and the possibility of algorithmic bias distorting the perceived 
public agenda. 
One of the most urgent issues could be the influence of false 
information and disinformation on the digital agenda-setting 
process. Social networks can quickly propagate false or 
misleading information, often magnified by automated 
accounts (bots) and coordinated campaigns [82]. Such 
material might purposefully try to establish different 
agendas, divert attention from crucial concerns, or influence 
unfavorable qualities linked to groups or subjects [83]. 
Research indicates that fake news travels quicker and farther 
than real news, hence seriously endangering educated public 
debate [84]. Competing, often deliberately deceptive, agendas 
make the conventional AST emphasis on the transfer of 
salience from reliable news sources more difficult. Though 
consequences can be complicated [85], research is 
progressively concentrating on the mechanisms by which 
false information shapes public opinion and how 
interventions such as fact-checking affect these dynamics. 
These issues- fragmentation causing several agendas, unclear 
algorithmic curation affecting information exposure, and 
intentional dissemination of false information- emphasize the 
difficulty of researching agenda setting in the present. They 
emphasize the need for research designs considering 
individual media diets, algorithmic effects, and the truth of 
information spreading inside networks. A still important 
front for agenda-setting studies is knowing how these 
elements interact and influence public perception. 

8. Discussion 

Over the last two decades, this literature review has 
investigated Agenda Setting Theory's (AST) evolution and 
implementation in the digital media context. The results show 
both continuity and change in how agenda-setting 
mechanisms work, hence implying some important topics 
deserving of more debate. Perhaps the most remarkable 
result is the ongoing impact of agenda-setting in digital 
settings. Empirical data regularly shows that, despite 
significant technological and structural changes in media 
ecosystems, the transfer of salience- from media to public 
agendas and within different media platforms- still happens 
[86]. This implies AST's underlying understanding of media's 
influence on determining perceived problem significance 
stays basically correct. These impacts, however, now show 
more complicated mechanisms and routes than conventional 
models included, hence reflecting what Neuman et al. [87] call 
the "dynamics of public attention" in a large data 
environment. Researchers have clearly shown the necessity 
for theoretical extension as they have created the Network 
Agenda Setting (NAS) model to more accurately reflect the 
interrelated character of modern agenda setting. Examining 
networks of related problems and qualities beyond linear 



SS. Almakaty /Future Technology                                                                                                    May 2025| Volume 04 | Issue 02 | Pages 51-60 

56 

 

salience transfer offers a more complex way to grasp how 
meaning is created and communicated in networked settings 
[88]. The advent of the NAS model is not only an incremental 
improvement but also a qualitative change in our 
understanding of agenda-setting processes from separate, 
hierarchical transfers to intricate, interrelated webs of 
influence. This development mirrors larger theoretical trends 
in communication research toward network-based strategies 
[89]. 

The diversification of agenda-setting actors is yet 
another important change. Though they now function under 
a power-sharing framework including political players, social 
media platforms, influencers, activist networks, and 
algorithms, traditional media companies still hold great 
influence [90]. This multiplication of possible agenda setters 
provokes significant normative issues regarding 
responsibility, openness, and democratic debate. The 
consequences for informed citizenship become troubling 
when algorithms with commercial goals or coordinated 
disinformation efforts can greatly affect the creation of the 
public agenda [91]. The study indicates that we want more 
complex models to grasp how these various players interact, 
compete, and occasionally cooperate in forming public 
attention. User agencies' increased importance is yet another 
key topic. Through techniques of selective exposure, filtering, 
sharing, and commenting, digital audiences actively shape 
agendas [92]. This results in a more negotiated, co-
constructed process whereby audience reception and 
amplification determine the agenda-setting power of 
conventional media. Research shows that although user 
decisions, social networks, and technology affordances 
increasingly mediate this transfer, issue salience can 
nevertheless move from media to public agendas. This result 
links AST studies with literature on participatory culture and 
networked publics, hence implying fruitful paths for cross-
fertilization. The studies, however, raise major obstacles to 
common public objectives. All could compromise the 
development of a shared, fact-based knowledge of society 
goals: audience fragmentation, echo chambers, filter bubbles, 
and the dissemination of false information [93]. Although 
some studies indicate these issues might be exaggerated [94], 
the possibility of ever more tailored and algorithmically 
managed information environments enabling various, often 
conflicting public agendas remains a major worry. The high-
choice media environment lets people create quite distinct 
information universes, as Tewksbury and Rittenberg [95] 
point out, which may aggravate polarization and make 
democratic administration more difficult. 

The research also highlights methodological issues in 
investigating agenda settings in digital settings. All these call 
for creative solutions outside conventional content analysis 
and survey techniques: measuring and comparing agendas 
across platforms, tracking the flow of topics through 
complicated networks, and considering algorithmic 
customization. Though researchers have used digital trail 
data, computational techniques, and network analysis to 
tackle these issues, doubts still exist regarding the optimal 
ways to capture the several aspects of modern agenda 
creation [96]. Processes of agenda-setting across cultures 
merit more focus. Much of the study examined centers on 
Western media settings, especially the United States. Digital 
media environments, on the other hand, vary greatly among 
political and cultural systems. Still underexplored is how 
agenda-setting works in more restricted media settings with 
various platform ecosystems (e.g., China with WeChat and 
Weibo instead of Twitter and Facebook). The few comparison 

studies point to perhaps significant differences in how 
agenda-setting operates across various media systems [97], 
suggesting a need for more globally varied studies. In the 
digital environment, the connection between conventional 
agenda planning and associated theories needs more 
explanation. Although this study has mostly concentrated on 
AST and its extensions, agenda setting has notable conceptual 
overlaps with ideas such as framing, priming, gatekeeping, 
and information flow. The digital world could be blurring 
certain differences between these theories or exposing fresh 
links deserving of theoretical integration. Several priorities 
for future study become clear as one looks ahead. First, 
additional longitudinal research looking at stability and 
change in agenda-setting processes across the fast expansion 
of digital platforms will give an insightful analysis. Second, 
especially studies that can access and examine proprietary 
algorithmic systems, research on the relationship between 
algorithmic and human agenda-setting impacts requires 
more development. Research on successful interventions to 
combat false information while maintaining the open nature 
of digital communication is third and constitutes a pressing 
concern. Fourth, ongoing improvement of the NAS model to 
reflect the more complicated networked character of modern 
agenda creation would enhance our theoretical toolbox. 

All things considered, this study shows that although 
Agenda Setting Theory has changed considerably to fit the 
reality of the digital media world, it is still a crucial framework 
for comprehending media influence. From its initial emphasis 
on problem salience transfer, the theory has demonstrated 
extraordinary flexibility to include attribute agenda setting 
and network viewpoints. Still, a difficulty, though, is 
completely considering the complicated, dynamic, 
algorithmic, and sometimes controversial character of 
modern agenda creation. Integrating knowledge from 
network science, computational social science, and critical 
algorithm studies as we move forward could assist AST keep 
evolving with the always shifting media environment it aims 
to clarify. 

9. Conclusion  

Over the past two decades, Agenda Setting Theory (AST) has 
shown adaptability within the evolving digital media 
environment. Despite significant technological and structural 
changes, the core concepts of AST—issue salience (Level 1) 
and attribute salience (Level 2) transfer—remain relevant. 
Research indicates that traditional media still retain agenda-
setting influence online, while social media and search 
engines introduce new dynamics, requiring a departure from 
linear models. The Network Agenda Setting (NAS) model has 
enhanced the theoretical framework by capturing the 
interconnected nature of issues and attributes across various 
media and public agendas. This networked perspective 
reflects the complexity of online communication and provides 
a stronger foundation for understanding agenda formation in 
digital contexts. The diversification of agenda setters, 
including political actors, influencers, algorithms, and 
networked publics, challenges the traditional dominance of 
legacy media gatekeepers. These actors, along with the rise of 
active user participation through selective exposure, sharing, 
and commenting, have made agenda-setting a more 
participatory and negotiated process. However, challenges 
such as audience fragmentation, echo chambers, algorithmic 
curation, and the spread of misinformation pose risks to 
forming a shared, informed public agenda. Future research 
should focus on cross-platform agenda-setting dynamics, the 
ethical implications of algorithmic influence, and the impact 



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57 

 

of misinformation. Additionally, global studies are needed to 
examine AST's applicability across different cultural and 
media environments. Despite these challenges, AST remains a 
valuable framework for understanding media influence, 
demonstrating its resilience and adaptability in the complex 
digital media landscape. 

Ethical issue 
The author is aware of and complies with best practices in 
publication ethics, specifically with regard to authorship 
(avoidance of guest authorship), dual submission, 
manipulation of figures, competing interests, and compliance 
with policies on research ethics. The author adheres to 
publication requirements that the submitted work is original 
and has not been published elsewhere. 

Data availability statement 
The manuscript contains all the data. However, more data will 

be available upon request from the authors. 

Conflict of interest 

The author declares no potential conflict of interest. 

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