







































Modes of Democratic Transition, 
Power Dynamics Between

Opposition and Incumbents, and 
Mass Internet Access: A

Literature Review
Ruoya Huang

 
GEORGETOWN SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH JOURNAL

Volume Five
Edition One
Fall 2022

6



Georgetown Scientific Research Journal 

 

Modes of Democratic Transition, Power Dynamics Between 
Opposition and Incumbents, and Mass Internet Access: A 
Literature Review 
 
RRuuooyyaa  HHuuaanngg11  
  
11  Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 
Email: rh1192@georgetown.edu 
hhttttppss::////ddooii..oorrgg//1100..4488009911//88ffkkkkqqgg3300  
AAbbssttrraacctt  
This literature review explores the evolving landscape of democratic transitions in the 21st century 
within academia, with a particular focus on the influence of digital technology and access to information. 
The author examines the role of factors such as primary education, civil liberties, income, and internet 
access in three types of democratic transition: conversion, collapse, and cooperative. Drawing upon 
extensive literature, the author scrutinizes the ways in which the aforementioned factors shape the power 
dynamics between opposition and incumbents, which have a significant impact on democratic transition 
and maintenance. The author concludes her investigation with an emphasis on the need for systematic 
analysis of the relationship between digital access, freedom of information, and democratization. 
Keywords: democratic transition, digital technology, power dynamics, internet access

11..  IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn  
According to the International Institute for 

Democracy and Electoral Assistance, more 
countries were moving toward authoritarianism 
than approaching democracy in 2021.1 Some 
might consider this observation as a glitch caused 
by the COVID-19 pandemic amid the overall 
optimistic wave of democratization in the 21st 
century, while others may view it as a sign of 
democratic backsliding. Regardless, this changing 
trend raises questions about what prerequisites are 
sufficient or necessary for democratic transition 
and how different processes of regime change 
shape post-transitional democracy consolidation. 
Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, many 
political theorists have examined the causes of 
various modes of democratic transition using 
theoretical reasoning or empirical data. From 
Seymour Martin Lipset’s classical theory—which 
argues that democratization requires specific 
socioeconomic requisites—to more recent studies 

examining the role of particular economic features 
and gender in regime transitions, our 
understanding of democratization has continued 
to evolve.2,3 

Though empirical findings are rarely in 
consensus, most theorists agree that democratic 
transition can be categorized into “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” approaches.4 These different 
approaches are each characterized by a unique set 
of conditions and power dynamics between the 
incumbent, who are the ruling political party or the 
authoritarian leader and its supporting elites, and 
the opposition, who are the challenger aiming to 
end and replace the standing leadership. The top-
down transition happens when the elites initiate 
liberalization policy, usually for economic reasons 
or to appease social unrest, ultimately leading to a 
democratic transition.4 The “bottom-up” regime 
occurs when the people rise to demand democracy, 
disrupting the normal function of the government 
and diminishing the incumbent’s power to repress. 

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This tends to happen when the opposition 
effectively mobilizes, or the authorities are 
handicapped due to endogenous and exogenous 
influences, such as a fallout with the military, so-
called “democratic sanctions,” or the interference 
of pro-democracy agencies.5 While the 
effectiveness in successful democratization of some 
of these external forces is unclear, there is a general 
consensus that they have helped increase awareness 
and fueled grassroots oppositions. Agreeing on the 
basics, scholars then examine the preexisting 
conditions of various modes of democratic 
transition and their implications on democratic 
consolidation and stability of the new regime. 
Some findings have affirmed previous theories 
while others challenge them, citing flaws of the 
models used or time-period inconsistencies in data 
selection. More recently, communication 
technologies have emerged to the center stage of 
the democratization effort due to their growing 
role in both facilitating mass mobilization and 
reinforcing centralized governmental control. 

This literature review aims to synthesize major 
existing arguments on preexisting conditions of 
democratic transitions to understand how various 
power dynamics between the authorities and the 
opposition shaped by primary education, civil 
liberties, income, and access to the internet lead to 
different types of democratic transition and impact 
the stability of the new democratic regime. The 
current literature concludes that disruptive 
bottom-up democratic transition occurs when the 
opposition acquires more strength than the 
authorities who refuse to negotiate; the violent and 
turbulent nature of this type of democratization 
leads to a less stable democratic regime than a 
cooperative transition does. In recent years, 
increasing observations and empirical evidence 
suggest that the advancement of digital technology 
and its access by citizens have significant impacts 
on the power dynamic that shapes democratic 
transitions. Yet, unlike factors like primary 

education and wealth level, access to the internet 
has not been studied through systematic analyses 
using a reliable and comprehensive dataset. 
Therefore, future studies should aim to examine 
how regime change evolves in the digital world 
with a more holistic approach based on adequate 
data. 

This paper will be divided into four sections, 
with the first three each focusing on one of the 
three modes of democratic transition identified by 
Gary Stradiotto and Sujian Guo and one dedicated 
to discussion of digitalization. The three modes of 
transitions are:  

1. CCoonnvveerrssiioonn  DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn: A top-
down reform led by incumbents to 
liberalize without fully conceding power. 

2. CCoollllaappssee  DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn: A bottom-up 
transition driven by public revolt or regime 
weakness, leading to overthrow. 

3. CCooooppeerraattiivvee  DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn: A 
negotiated transition where both 
incumbents and opposition agree on 
reforms and election.6 

While the scholars have also recognized 
foreign intervention as a fourth mode of transition, 
it has been omitted in this review to narrow the 
scope of research to domestic factors.  
22..  CCoonnvveerrssiioonn  DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn  

As Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead explain, the 
“top-down,” also called conversion, democratic 
transition occurs when the soft-liners in the 
government or citizens of high socioeconomic 
status adopt liberalization policies.7 Liberalization 
policies can manifest as greater private property 
rights for citizens, a freer market, religious 
freedom, and so on. The soft-liners provide greater 
liberty and rights to the citizens to either 
“strengthen their position in relation to hardliners” 
or address economic challenges.4 In other 
instances, they do so to resolve deadlocks between 

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social groups.8 Guo and Stradiotto argue that such 
a transition occurs when the incumbents are more 
powerful than the opposition and often act solely 
without much pressure from hardliners or 
grassroots.6 However, opposition groups can 
occasionally get involved in the reform process by 
engaging in incumbent-led negotiations. 

As part of modernization and development 
efforts, some authorities implement reforms to 
provide greater access to primary education. 
Scholars have not yet reached a consensus on the 
role that such reforms have in the chances of 
democratization. Best and Wade found that 
literacy is a poor predictor of democracy using data 
from 1992-2002 collected from the World Bank 
Development Indicators database and measuring 
political rights and civil liberties through the 
Freedom House (2004b) scores.9 Mancur Olson 
only found an indirect correlation between 
education and democracy.10 In contrast, Murtin 
and Wacziarg observed a strong causal relation 
between primary schooling and the quality of 
newly emerged democracy by sampling 70 
countries from 1870-2000 using the Polity IV 
index and eliminating country-specific, time-
invariant factors.11 The inconsistencies among 
research findings can be partially attributed to the 
different periods surveyed and the different criteria 
used (i.e., Freedom House and Polity IV). One 
potential reason that the strong correlation 
between education/literacy and democratic 
transition, which existed in earlier democracies, 
gradually disappeared in more recent democratized 
countries could be the increasingly secured access 
to primary education in middle-income countries 
due to improved infrastructure and internet 
access.9 With the majority of the population in 
most countries obtaining a basic level of literacy, 
primary education’s association with regime shifts 
reasonably decreases. Meanwhile, the internet has 
emerged as a potential catalyst in reshaping social 
mobilization and political organization as 

countries around the world provide varying access 
to and degrees of freedom in internet usage.9 

Scholars such as Daniel Treisman challenge 
the argument that top-down democratization 
happens when the soft-liners favor the democratic 
system and willingly initiate reforms.12 He argues 
that most authoritarian regimes will never 
democratize willingly, and liberalization policies 
only aim to address a specific issue or rally political 
support rather than initiate a regime shift. 
Referencing Louis-Philippe of the Philippines, 
Augusto Pinochet of Chile, and Leopoldo Galtieri 
of Argentina, Treisman instead reasons that 
democratization usually happens when the 
authorities underestimate the strength of the 
opposition or overestimate their popularity or 
power.12 Due to these misjudgments, the 
government assumes that a certain degree of 
liberalization will not pose a threat to itself and 
that the elites will still wield sufficient power to 
repress the citizens if necessary. It is with this false 
confidence that the incumbents initiate reform and 
empower the citizens. 

When a country was in distress and the 
government felt threatened—such as during 
wartime, amidst heightened extremism, and facing 
political unrest—civil liberties such as freedom of 
the press and free expression were severely 
curtailed. As Michael Best and Keegan Wade 
observed, in the late 20th century and early 21st 
century, elites in non-western nations tightly 
controlled access to media and used the internet to 
consolidate power.9 If state-censored and 
controlled internet access helps strengthen 
authoritarian rule, then does freer internet access 
undermine the ability of the incumbent to prevent 
a regime change? In 2002, Best and Wade found a 
statistically significant result that internet 
prevalence became a stronger predictor of 
democracy than GDP in 2001-2002 using raw 
data from 188 nations and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression.9 They concluded that this 

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correlation could be a recent development, while 
acknowledging the lack of consistency in empirical 
evidence across the globe. Subsequent research 
confirmed that the internet did play a key role in 
facilitating multiple regime changes in the early 
2000s by empowering the masses when authorities 
either underestimated its potential or were 
incapable of responding timely and effectively. 
However, often, information controls have been 
employed by authoritarian governments to 
suppress the seeds of liberation. 

In summary, conversion democratic transition 
tends to occur when the incumbents are more 
powerful than the opposition and intentionally 
reform the system. Or, as some scholars argue, 
regime change happens when the elites fail to 
accurately calculate the strength of the opposition, 
causing liberalization to become unmanageable 
and eventually topple the existing authoritarian 
government. Besides theorists who promote this 
top-down approach, there is another group of 
scholars, including Arthur MacEwan, who point 
out that such focus on examining the “perennial 
tension between ‘hard-liners’ and ‘soft-liners’” fails 
to account for other important actors—the 
people—in many historical democratizations.13 
Hence, scholars who share similar critiques have 
constructed another approach: bottom-up 
democratization. 

33..  CCoollllaappssee  DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn  
The collapse mode of democratic transition is 

also commonly referred to as the “bottom-up” 
approach. Recognizing that they cannot rely on 
incumbents to initiate reforms and feeling that 
their quality of life is unbearable, the people 
attempt to overthrow the government through 
either revolution or coup d’état.14 Compared to the 
conversion mode, which consists mostly of the 
efforts of some high-position policymakers or 
elites, the collapse mode relies heavily on “the 

involvement and support from public masses”.14 In 
addition to mass support, the unwillingness of the 
military to defend the old regime is a common 
theme in the collapse mode. A successful 
revolution or coup d’état tends to result in the 
execution, imprisonment, or exile of the original 
leaders.14 

For the transition to initiate and succeed, the 
incumbents must be too weak to repress the 
opposition or to bargain for a more desirable 
outcome. This is determined by factors such as 
freedom of movement, primary education, GDP 
per capita, and the more recently observed 
increasing mass digital access. In particular, the 
internet and social media, which facilitate the rapid 
spread of information and communication, have 
become often-used tools in organizing popular 
protests. Best and Wade found that internet access 
is weakly correlated with the democratic transition 
based on full data from 1992 to 2002, but 
significant when only considering 2001 to 2002.9 
This discrepancy, they reason, might be due to the 
shift from limited access by the few elites to the 
widespread usage of the internet by a greater 
number of citizens. In the next decade, with new 
revolutions happening in parts of Africa and the 
Middle East, scholars expanded on the findings of 
Best and Wade. For instance, Tunisia was subject 
to strict censorship prior to 2011, which 
demonstrates the non-compromising stance of the 
incumbent leaders. Yet, as Tunisian “bloggers with 
previous cyber-activism experiences were able to 
aggregate stories of government abuse and to use 
technology to bypass state authorities to broadcast 
images and narratives about the Ben Ali regime” 
during the eventually successful Tunisia revolution 
in 2011, scholars like Anita Breuer and Jacob 
Groshek became interested in examining the 
impact of internet access.15 Through a respondent-
driven, snowball sampling technique that helped 

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them collect 610 survey responses, the scholars 
found that “political use of the Internet during the 
revolution had a significant effect on the 
[respondents’] perceived political efficacy after the 
rebellion” and led to increased participation in 
“democratic-founding elections”.15 It should be 
noted that snowball sampling is a type of 
convenient sampling that produces 
nongeneralizable results, so this finding cannot be 
reliably applied to other incidences or countries. 

It is theorized that the collapse mode of 
transition is inherently more violent and disruptive 
to a country’s economy and social structure than 
other forms of democratization. In 1986, 
Schmitter, O'Donnell, and Whitehead reasoned 
that a radical upsurge tends to result in the rise of 
authoritarian regimes and is counterproductive to 
pro-democracy efforts.7 MacEwan, however, 
challenges this assertion by pointing to a lack of 
empirical evidence. He argues that the mere fact of 
a radical social opposition movement followed by 
military action does not establish a causal relation 
between the collapse mode of transition and a 
more destabilized new democratic regime.13 
Pointing to the empirical evidence of military 
leaders conceding to opposition forces in fear of 
losing not only “their political position but their 
positions of social and economic privilege as well,” 
MacEwan presents a counterargument that rapid 
popular movement could be effective at 
accelerating a democratic transition rather than 
provoking destructive suppression from 
incumbents.13 

This disagreement was to some degree 
reconciled by Guo and Stradiotto, who found that 
“rapid transitions [collapse] are associated with 
lower levels of democracy during the post-
transitional phase and are more likely to revert to 
authoritarian rule than are peaceful transitions, 
characterized by an atmosphere of cooperation and 

pacts”.6 The finding suggests that empirical 
evidence supports a middle ground between the 
arguments of Schmitter, et al. and MacEwan: a 
more violent democratic transition is not 
necessarily a transition-reversing coup, but it does 
carry a higher risk of reversal during the post-
transitional phase compared to smoother and more 
cooperative transitions. This also affirms the claim 
of Ward and Gleditsch that steadier transitions 
indicate a greater probability of a strong and 
consolidated democracy.16 While this view serves 
as a reasonable explanation, it does not provide 
clarity on another point of contention: the 
difference between a failed democratization and a 
successful one that later experienced a reversal. 
While both remain authoritarian, the process and 
the dynamic through which they reached that 
outcome could be drastically different. 

The aforementioned studies were mostly 
conducted from a global perspective. Realizing the 
overlooked regional uniqueness of countries 
shaped by particular historical development, 
Bratton and Walle added their analysis of African 
countries, which display unique 
neopatrimonialism, to this dialogue.14 They argued 
that neo-patrimonial regimes differ from other 
types of preexisting authoritarian states due to the 
lack of institutional structure to support a strong 
and active civil society that sustains a newly 
emerged democracy. As they observed, many Latin 
American and Eastern European countries that 
underwent democratic transition already have 
“formal governing coalitions between organized 
state and social interests or the collective 
bargaining over core public policies” that 
demonstrate “organized class interests within 
domestic society”.14 Without the crucial structure 
that allows citizens to mobilize and collectively 
advocate for their political demands and voice 
grievances, democracy faces a greater risk of regime 
reversal. For instance, despite the positive 
democratizing developments facilitated by digital 

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technologies in countries like Egypt and Tunisia in 
the early 2000s, both countries have struggled to 
consolidate.14 Nevertheless, the Internet helped 
expedite the formation of civil society and is less 
susceptible to intervention by governmental forces 
than traditional forms of mobilization. 

In fact, the potential correlation between 21st-
century regime changes and access to the internet 
is worth exploring: Of the 16 African countries 
that had 50% or more internet users in 2022, 9 
scored 5.00 and above on the Economist 
Intelligence Unit democracy index (See 
Appendix).17,18 Though data is not available for 
five African states, the observed possibility of 
correlation between the two factors warrants future 
research to explore the causal relationship between 
citizens’ access to the internet and the likelihood of 
democratic transition, especially in African 
countries and potentially in Middle East. 

44..  CCooooppeerraattiivvee  DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn 
Though top-down and bottom-up modes of 

democratization each have their merits, historical 
examples and empirical data have shown that many 
democratic transitions do not fit neatly into either 
conversion or collapse mode. Often, it is the 
collaborative efforts of both incumbents and 
opposition that contribute to regime change. This 
approach is called cooperative democratic 
transition. Regime change of this nature “begins 
when a moderate faction within the state elite 
recognizes that social peace and economic 
development alone cannot legitimate an 
authoritarian regime,” so they implement reforms 
based on the demands of the opposition and 
eventually concede to holding free and fair 
elections.6 This differs from the conversion 
democratic transition because the soft-liners and 
hardliners are similarly strong, which makes them 
prefer negotiating a regime reform with the masses 

for a favorable outcome, as opposed to a full-on 
regime change most likely to their detriment6. 

One factor that determines the government’s 
willingness to negotiate a change of regime is its 
perception of the costs of repression, which helps 
inform the power dynamic between the incumbent 
and the opposition. The cost depends on “the 
diversification and extension of opposition 
throughout society” to a large degree.13 Repression 
becomes sufficiently costly when the opposition is 
not so weak that the authority can ignore their 
demands or too strong that the opposition need 
not negotiate with the government to accomplish 
the reforms. Most studies examining the cost of 
revolution and repression focus on increased 
mobilization as a result of modernization. The 
growing middle and working class, and their 
increasing integration into the global economy, 
make asset ownership and movement difficult to 
track and regulate.19,20,21 When the cost is 
sufficiently high, MacEwan argues that 
incumbents’ realization of their weakness leads to 
intense fear, pressuring them to enter a 
negotiation: “Military regimes and their allies are 
willing to cede authority to conservative or 
moderate civilians only because they fear a more 
radical, popular upsurge, which would threaten not 
only their political position but their positions of 
social and economic privilege as well”.13 Bratton 
and Walle echoed this logic, affirming that not 
only military but personal dictators who fear 
“egregious persecution” are more likely to step 
down.14 In other words, when the authoritarian 
government has an adequately accurate 
understanding of the mounting power of the 
opposition and intensifying revolutionary 
sentiments, they will strategically compromise to 
minimize harm. One way that allows incumbents 
to gain such an accurate understanding of the 
situation is through technologies, either via 

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security surveillance systems or access to massive 
amounts of digital information. However, it must 
be noted that phenomena such as preference 
falsification, caused by fear of persecution and 
ostracism, might distort real public opinion and 
sentiments.4 

55..    DDeemmooccrraattiizzaattiioonn  iinn  TThhee  DDiiggiittaall  AAggee    
I would be remiss not to dedicate a section to 

discuss the role of digital technologies and systems 
in shaping regime transition. From news reporting 
to mass participation in political conversations and 
social movements on social media, the Digital 
Revolution has shaped, if not completely 
transformed, how citizens engage with authorities. 
has the political landscape around the world. Due 
to the recency of this development, however, there 
are very few extensive research conducted on the 
causal correlation between levels of governmental 
monopoly over digital technologies and 
democracy. While frameworks such as the E-
democracy index created by Kneuer in 2016 help 
provide some insights into the digital processes in 
established democracies, they provide limited 
insights into how similar developments fare in a 
authoritarian and transitional context.22  

Despite the lack of systemic inquiry, recent 
scholarships reveal two major factors of the 
phenomenon through which we can began began 
unpacking it.  

The first is the ttyyppee  ((ffuunnccttiioonnaalliittyy))  ooff  
tteecchhnnoollooggyy. Information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) have been the most relevant 
and widely used in driving regime transitions. The 
Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions both illustrate 
how effective use of social media such as Facebook 
and YouTube can augment domestic opposition 
and raise international awareness to exert sufficient 
pressure on incumbents to concede. While the 
tools alone could not have led to a positive 
outcome, the high level of access helped tip the 
balance of power between the opposition and the 

incumbent. ICTs lower barriers to social 
movements by significantly improving the two key 
elements of speed and interactivity in social 
mobilization.23 As Larry Diamond of the Hoover 
Institution Stanford University’s Center on 
Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law 
describes, social media facilitates the dissemination 
and exchange of information, providing “dramatic 
new possibilities for pluralizing flows of 
information and widening the scope of 
commentary, debate, and dissent.”24 Compared to 
traditional mobilization techniques like 
distributing posters, new communication 
technologies leverage time-space compression and 
real-time interactions to sustain a movement 
across a larger geographical area and at a higher 
engagement level.25 Besides strengthening the 
initiation of change, some scholars have found a 
correlation between greater social media 
penetration and less corruption in a country, 
independent of the economic development level.26 
While causality has not yet been examined, this 
finding suggests that ICTs might have 
instrumental value in both catalyzing regime 
change and consolidating post-transition 
democracy, establishing new mechanisms and 
norms to keep authorities accountable. So far, 
existing empirical evidence shows mixed impacts 
of digital media on the emergence and 
maintenance of democratic values and 
institutions.26 Additional case studies with a 
particular focus on the specific impact of mass 
media on democratic institutions and cultural 
norms are necessary to inform a more robust 
understanding of how these tools can be utilized to 
advance certain political objectives.  

Another type of technology that has only 
recently come into the political landscape is 
Machine Learning (ML). ChatGPT, the AI-
powered chatbot that has arguably transformed all 
aspects of our lives, for better or worse, is 
developed using ML. Another technology built 

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from ML capability is Deepfake, which has already 
contributed multiple harmful political moves in 
both democratic and authoritarian states. In the 
current Russia-Ukraine war, the Kremlin advanced 
its propaganda campaign by producing and 
disseminating a deepfake of Ukrainian President 
Zelensky calling the Ukrainian army to 
surrender.27 Similar dissemination of fabricated 
content has been spotted across Europe and the 
Americas. Though many are later debunked, the 
confusion and disruption to the public can be easily 
exploited by any political groups, especially 
powerful incumbents, to create misleading 
narratives that weaken the opposition.  

The second factor to consider is wwhhoo  ccoonnttrroollss  
tthhee  tteecchhnnoollooggyy. Usually, when the incumbent has 
an iron grip over the Internet and communication 
technologies, such as in the case of China, pro-
democratic movements are constrained. 
Monitoring public sentiment and activities, 
preempting latent or emerging threats, and 
suppressing a brewing uprising, authoritarian 
regimes are leveraging technologies to enhance 
their control over the population.  As Ronald 
Deibert observed, authoritarian states have rapidly 
developed information-control measures—
including national cyber barriers, targeted 
regulations, surveillance systems, and disruptive 
cyber espionage—over the past two decades for 
repressive and constraining purposes.28 

Besides the incumbent and the opposition, 
digitalization led to the entrance of another major 
player: Tech Companies.  So far, tech giants’ 
response to incumbents exploiting their platforms 
for political objectives has been ambiguous. Facing 
activists’ criticism of breeding hate speeches 
targeting Rohingya and Muslims since 2013 and 
recognizing growing violence and escalation in the 
country in 2021, Meta’s Facebook and Instagram 
both banned the Myanmar military on March 3, 
2021.29 Then, X censored accounts that criticized 
Turkish President Erdogan in 2022 and answered 

the Modi government’s request to block 
journalists, activists, and a member of parliament 
in 2023. Despite a lack of clarity in these decisions 
on the part of the companies, the impact of Big 
Tech on political and social movements in both 
democratic and authoritarian countries is evident. 
By either passively permitting or outright banning 
certain political actors from spreading their 
messages, these companies have, been forced to 
pick a side. In other words, these powerful 
technological multinational corporations are 
becoming increasingly relevant stakeholders in the 
governance of authoritarian regimes and in how 
these authorities pre-emptively respond to 
conditions that could facilitate democratizing 
efforts. Beyond the most direct bans on apps and 
platforms in non-democratic countries, the 
growing legal controversies and tensions in 
democracies—such as the legal battle between 
Brazilian courts and X30—further highlight the 
complexity and ambiguity of digital implications in 
governance across jurisdictions. 
66..  CCoonncclluussiioonn  &&  FFuuttuurree  RReesseeaarrcchh  

As demonstrated in all three types of 
democratic transition, the power dynamic between 
incumbents and opposition, as well as their 
perception of each other’s strength, largely shapes 
how a transition occurs. When the opposition can 
mobilize a huge population without subjecting to 
much state intervention, a cooperative transition is 
the likely outcome. When opposition appears 
misleadingly incapable of mobilizing, an 
unintended top-down or conversion transition 
could occur. These conditions change depending 
on many factors, including access to information 
and online communication. Improved 
technologies in an increasingly digitalized world 
bring both opportunities and risks to opposition 
groups pushing for democratic transitions. The 
Arab Spring would not have had such a sweeping 
influence without information, videos, and words 
being spread so rapidly. However, when advanced 

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technologies are used by the incumbent to monitor 
the opposition and eliminate potential sources of 
rebellion, the power dynamic tilts toward the state. 
For instance, through selective control and media 
censoring by authorities, and a culture of self-
monitoring in China, Chinese authorities have 
been successfully maintaining strong control over 
their citizens. Recent findings also suggest that 
rapid technological advancement and adoption in 
the past decade pose considerable threats to 
democratization. This is partially due to state 
monopoly, disparity in access, and the absence of 
key institutions and factors that are imperative in 
channeling the power of digital connectivity 
towards individual freedom and rights. In short, 
the correlations are ambiguous,31 but a synthesis of 
findings suggest that 1) level access, 2) 
nature/function of technology, and 3) who exercise 
control over the technology are determining 
factors in democratic transition process.   

With the world’s attention increasingly turned 
towards the global South for its untapped resources 
and manpower that make it essential to the global 
value chain, the research community and 
policymakers have realized the importance of 
aligning political agenda with economic interests 
to establish sustainable collaboration and alliances. 
The rapid growth of access to the internet and 
critical infrastructure in the region, evident in 
Nigeria’s digital transformation in the past two 
decades,32 makes now the critical time to evaluate 
how digital technologies and informational control 
might tip the scale of the power dynamic between 
the incumbents and the oppositions in not only 
authoritarian states and weak states but also in 
flawed democracies.   

This paper only addresses domestic factors 
shaping three different modes of democratic 
transition. Future research should also assess the 
omitted fourth modes of democratization of 
foreign intervention, especially as growing digital 
connectedness and rapid technological 

advancement have surpassed physical borders and 
turned cyberspace into a major battleground for 
geopolitical competition.   

Lastly, on a more general note, there has been 
limited empirical data to assist the reconciliation of 
conflictual theories in the study of 
democratization. Most of the existing literature is 
either based on a convenient sampling of survey 
responses or are case studies of specific regions, 
making the findings nongeneralizable. Therefore, 
future research should compile a comprehensive 
data set and use less biased, systematic methods to 
analyze the correlations between freedom and 
access to the internet and democratic transition, 
and subsequent democratic consolidation.  
AAcckknnoowwlleeddggmmeennttss  

I would like to thank Ashley Johnson for 
providing academic advice for this literature 
review.  
RReeffeerreenncceess  
1. Global State of Democracy Report 2021. (2022). 

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. Received November 8, 2022, from 
https://www.idea.int/gsod/.   

2. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy. The American Political Science 
Review, 53(1), 69–105. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1951731. 

3. Baum, M. A., and David A. L. (2003). The Political 
Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human 
Capital. JSTOR, 47(2), 333–347. 
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AAppppeennddiixx  
TTaabbllee  11::  DDeemmooccrraaccyy  IInnddeexx  PPooiinnttss  aanndd  IInntteerrnneett  PPeenneettrraattiioonn  iinn  22002222  bbyy  CCoouunnttrriieess  iinn  AAffrriiccaa    

    Country (Ranked based on 
Democracy Index pts) 

Democracy index points 
in 2022 

(10 = full democracy)  

Internet penetration in Africa 
in 2022 by country 

1 Mauritius ** 8.08 64.9% 
2 Botswana ** 7.73 61.0% 
3 Cabo Verde ** 7.65 61.9% 
4 South Africa ** 7.05 61.9% 
5 Namibia ** 6.52 59.0% 
6 Ghana ** 6.50 53.0% 
7 Lesotho ** 6.30 51.9% 
8 Tunisia ** 5.99 66.7% 
9 Malawi * 5.74 20.2% 

10 Zambia * 5.72 28.5% 
11 Madagascar * 5.70 22.3% 
12 Senegal * 5.63 46.0% 
13 Liberia * 5.43 22.0% 
14 Tanzania * 5.10 25.0% 
15 Kenya * 5.05 42.0% 
16 Morocco ** 5.04 84.1% 
17 Sierra Leone 4.97 32.4% 
18 Uganda 4.80 29.1% 
19 Gambia 4.41 51.0% 
20 Côte d’Ivoire 4.22 36.3% 
21 Benin 4.19 29.0% 
22 Nigeria 4.11 51.0% 
23 Mauritania 4.03 35.8% 
24 Burkina Faso 3.84 27.3% 
25 Algeria 3.77 60.6% 

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26 Mozambique 3.51 23.1% 
27 Mali 3.48 29.9% 
28 Gabon 3.40 62.0% 
29 Angola 3.30 36.0% 
30 Ethiopia 3.30 25.0% 
31 Niger 3.22 14.5% 
32 Comoros 3.20 8.5% 
33 Rwanda 3.10 26.3% 
34 Eswatini 3.08 47.0% 
35 Egypt 2.93 71.9% 
36 Zimbabwe 2.92 30.6% 
37 Togo 2.80 25.9% 
38 Congo (Brazzaville) 2.79 25.4% 
39 Guinea-Bissau 2.75 28.0% 
40 Djibouti 2.74 59.0% 
41 Cameroon 2.56 36.5% 
42 Sudan 2.47 30.9% 
43 Guinea 2.28 23.0% 
44 Burundi 2.13 14.6% 
45 Eritrea 2.03 8.0% 
46 Libya 1.95 49.6% 
47 Equatorial Guinea 1.92 26.2% 
48 Chad 1.67 19.0% 
49 Central African Republic 1.43 7.1% 
50 Democratic Republic of the Congo 1.40 17.6% 
51 Seychelles N/A 79.0% 
52 Western Sahara N/A 61.3% 
53 Sao Tome & Principe N/A 32.0% 
54 Somalia N/A 13.7% 

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55 South Sudan N/A 10.9% 
Notes: Countries marked with one asterisk (*) are the 16 countries with 50% or higher internal access 
rate. Countries marked with two asterisks (**) are the 9 countries that have both a 50% or higher internal 
access rate and scored 5.00 or higher on the democracy index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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