Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 645 Georgian Scientists Vol. 7 Issue 3, 2025 https://doi.org/10.52340/gs.2025.07.03.34 A Comparative Analysis of Competition Policy in Science Commercialisation Science for society, or just for business? Sergo Sanikidze PhD student in Business Administration, University of Georgia ORCID ID: 0009-0006-9401-8384; Email: s.sanikidze@gmail.com Abstract Science commercialisation serves as a fundamental process to convert research discoveries into marketable products, which drive economic development and solve social requirements. Science commercialisation maintains a sophisticated relationship with competition policy. This research examines how competition policy creates conditions that support science commercialisation while maintaining fair access to benefits for all. The analysis examines three significant challenges, which include research monopolisation, high barriers to entry for new innovators and ethical concerns about privatising public knowledge. The research evaluates worldwide best practices by studying the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States and the Horizon 2020 programme of the European Union to determine their impact on outcomes. Moreover, the paper addresses the gap by examining how competition policy mechanisms can balance innovation incentives with broad access, using case studies and policy analysis, and this analysis leads to policy recommendations that support innovation-friendly competition. Keywords: Science Commercialisation, Competition Policy, Innovation Policy, Intellectual Property Rights, Market-Entry Barriers Introduction: Competition, Innovation and Science Commercialisation The commercialisation of science is crucial to achieving the social and economic benefits of research. It helps universities, industries, and governments make new products available to the public. It brings better economic conditions, a higher standard of living, and solutions to global problems such as climate change and global pandemics. Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 646 Investments in research and development (R&D) bring significant economic benefits through the improvement of high-tech industries and job opportunities (OECD, 2023). However, the full benefits of these investments are sometimes constrained by insufficient competition policies that limit the commercialisation of scientific research. Competition policy is closely linked to science commercialisation. A well-designed policy protects competition and prevents excessive market concentration, while also driving innovation and ensuring fair access by preventing monopolies and other restrictive practices. The relationship between competition and innovation has received extensive academic attention through two opposing theoretical approaches, which present different interpretations: Schumpeterian View: Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that large firms possessing significant market power are often better positioned to foster innovation. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Schumpeter maintained that market concentration allows such firms to generate surplus revenue, which can then be reinvested in the risky and expensive research and development (R&D) process. This perspective is widely applied to industries like pharmaceuticals, where only the largest firms can absorb the high costs and risks associated with drug development, as well as to technology giants such as Google and Microsoft, who use their dominant market positions to fund frontier research in areas like artificial intelligence and quantum computing (Todorova, 2021). Arrow’s View: In comparison, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow (1962) stated that a competitive market provides stronger incentives for innovation because companies must continually improve their products to survive. Arrow’s model predicts that competition stimulates persistent innovation, often resulting in smaller firms generating new technologies that challenge industry incumbents (Baker, 2007; Shapiro, 2011). These opposing perspectives find empirical evidence through specific research: While regulatory measures that reduce market dominance can limit the ability of large firms to invest in high-risk, long-term R&D, the lack of adequate regulation can allow monopolies to stifle innovation from new entrants (Aghion et al., 2005; Baker, 2007; Shapiro, 2011). Effective science commercialisation requires comprehensive policy structures which handle both ethical and societal elements. Mazzucato (2018) supports "mission-oriented" innovation policies, which state that public funding should serve societal needs instead of private financial gain and public interest considerations need to be integrated into competition policies to guarantee fair and equitable access to innovations (Mazzucato, 2018). Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 647 Overall, the current literature shows that competition policy should protect markets from anticompetitive conduct while creating conditions that support innovation. By strategically managing intellectual property rights, promoting the innovation ecosystem, and addressing societal needs, competition policy enables science commercialisation, which leads to broader societal welfare goals. Challenges in the Commercialisation of Science Science commercialisation faces substantial barriers that limit its development. The following section addresses three major obstacles: Research monopolisation, Barriers to entry for innovators, and ethical and societal implications of science commercialisation in a competitive market. Research Monopolization Science commercialisation has a significant challenge because of research monopolisation, which arises when several corporations control scientific findings. They receive exclusive rights to research outcomes through patents, licences, and strategic partnerships, particularly for results emerging from public funding projects. Technology transfer partnerships between firms and universities often yield exclusive IP rights, giving a few corporations control over commercialisation opportunities. For example, major tech companies partner with AI and machine-learning labs to secure patents on key algorithms before competitors can (WIPO, 2019). Research monopolisation, often enabled by insufficient competition policy, concentrates profits among a few private entities and reduces equitable access to scientific discoveries. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic saw public funding and international cooperation accelerate vaccine development, yet major pharmaceutical companies retained control of vaccine patents. This led to wealthier nations obtaining priority access through advance purchase agreements, while many low-income countries faced delays due to patent barriers and limited technology transfer (Wouters et al., 2021). When research outcomes become overly privatised, this can undermine public health and welfare. Therefore, addressing research monopolisation requires active competition policy and regulatory frameworks that promote shared intellectual property models, especially for publicly funded inventions, and restrict the use of IP rights for market suppression rather than genuine innovation (Florio & Gamba, 2021). Developing economies experience a stronger negative effect from research monopolisation practices. Public research institutions, alongside universities in underdeveloped nations, do not possess enough resources or sufficient bargaining power to secure beneficial contracts when collaborating with multinational corporations. The lack of resources and bargaining power causes these institutions to give away IP rights for significant discoveries without Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 648 receiving any control or benefits for their local community. International frameworks, together with national policies, must create mechanisms like joint IP ownership, local licensing mandates, and benefit-sharing agreements to stop global companies from monopolising local research results, which harms the development of the originating country (UNCTAD, 2021). The challenge of research monopolisation extends across three areas, including competition law, patent law and contractual research practices. To keep science commercialisation fair and inclusive, policymakers will need to implement various tools that work together as a system. Barriers to Market Entry for Innovators Science commercialisation faces significant entry barriers for startups and SMEs. The entry barriers arise from multiple challenges, including expensive R&D and product development costs, financing challenges, strict regulations, and established player control of essential assets and intellectual property. The combination of these barriers prevents new participants from converting scientific discoveries into profitable market products. One primary barrier is the high cost and risk associated with R&D. Bringing a novel technology to market, such as a new drug, clean energy solution, or advanced material, typically demands enormous investment in research, prototyping, testing, and regulatory approval before any revenue is realised. For instance, developing a new pharmaceutical drug can cost upwards of $1–2 billion, including the cost of failed trials (Petrova, 2013). Moreover, DiMasi et al. (2016) found that more recent estimates from the Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development place the average capitalised cost at approximately $2.6 billion. Such investments are generally not accessible for startups and innovators. Moreover, new companies experience significant challenges when entering markets due to regulatory barriers. Development of scientific innovation demands that it pass through complex approval systems, which demand extensive trials, strict safety and compliance standards for new products. Established companies sometimes use their influence to shape regulations, which elevates the challenges that new entrants face when attempting market entry. For example, large agribusiness firms have advocated for strict regulations of genetically modified crops, which both protect biosafety and impose costly testing procedures that only major firms can sustain, thus blocking smaller biotech startups (Brookes, G., and Barfoot, P., 2020). One more challenge is that accessing knowledge and networks creates a barrier that directly relates to competition policy. Incumbents use their market power to establish exclusive supply relationships with key suppliers, data providers, and distribution channels that limit new companies from entering the market. For example, new renewable energy startups face challenges when they need to access electricity grids because established energy corporations dominate these critical infrastructure routes (Fox-Penner, 2022). From a Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 649 competition policy perspective, keeping entry barriers low is vital for market dynamism and ongoing innovation. A marketplace open to new entrants puts continuous pressure on incumbents to innovate, and ensures that a few legacy firms do not dominate. Competition policy thus complements direct innovation support by shaping a structure that encourages newcomer participation and sustained technological progress. Ethical and Societal Implications Multiple social and ethical problems emerge when scientific discovery is driven by commercial interests. The focus of commercialisation creates a danger that disadvantaged communities, together with developing countries, will either fail to receive new technologies or suffer because of their exclusion. Life-saving medical innovations, including advanced gene therapies and cutting-edge diagnostics, tend to have high price points that exceed the financial capabilities of numerous patients and healthcare systems operating in lower-income regions. The ethical problem emerges regarding innovation access because profit-driven companies maintain the right to deny access to expensive new treatments. The ethical discussion about pharmaceutical costs for rare diseases and HIV/AIDS medicines in developing nations has triggered government interventions through tiered pricing models, subsidy programs, and compulsory licensing for humanitarian reasons. The success of ethical commercialisation depends on achieving equal financial benefits for private entities while delivering maximum public advantages. Mazzucato (2018) and colleagues recommend that governments, when partnering with industry, should establish clear conditions that integrate societal benefits, such as access and affordability, alongside the financial returns to companies (Mazzucato, 2018). The societal function of competition policy requires maintaining innovative markets which align with public values. It works to prevent dominant firms from blocking alternative innovators while also supporting the growth of new entities from diverse innovation ecosystems. The pursuit of equitable science commercialisation outcomes proves difficult, but responsible innovation policy now recognises this as an essential requirement. UNESCO, together with other organisations, supports the "science for society" principle, which demands that governments prevent commercialised science from diverting attention away from its core purpose of advancing human welfare (UNESCO, 2021). Success in science commercialisation requires more than profit or patents since ethical and social considerations demonstrate that it must improve lives while reducing social inequalities, thus needing intentional competition policy alignment with public interest objectives. Global Perspectives and Best Practices Various policies and frameworks have been implemented worldwide to harness science for innovation while maintaining healthy competition. This section reviews some global best Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 650 practices and international perspectives on aligning competition policy with science commercialisation. The Bayh-Dole Act (United States) Science commercialisation has significantly advanced through the Bayh-Dole Act, which the United States government passed in 1980. Before the Act, the majority of federally funded research inventions remained unused. Through the Bayh-Dole Act, universities and small businesses, along with non-profits, received ownership rights to federal research inventions as long as they pursued commercialisation efforts. The law created a significant transformation between academic institutions and their industry partners. The establishment of technology transfer offices, it created powerful incentives for commercialisation and helped make university-to-industry technology transfer a defining element of the American innovation system (Mowery et al., 2004). From 1996 to 2020, the Bayh–Dole–enabled U.S. academic tech-transfer system is estimated to have contributed up to $1.9 trillion in gross output and about 6.5 million jobs, based on BIO–AUTM’s analysis of university/nonprofit licensing (Pressman et al., 2022). The Act also stimulated the formation of many biotech startups that brought university discoveries to market. Under the act, the government maintains the right to take ownership of inventions if developers fail to make them available to the public on reasonable terms (Association of American Universities, 2024). The model has inspired multiple countries, including Japan, South Korea, India, and several EU member states, to adopt similar regulations for university ownership of research results. The agreement among experts shows that Bayh- Dole has increased its commercialisation rates. However, the model has faced criticism. Analysts point out that increased university patenting does not always lead to widespread social benefits, since most technology transfer income accrues to a small handful of valuable patents (Bulut and Moschini, 2009; Nelson, 2001). As a result, the effectiveness of university tech transfer operations in generating broad social returns remains a subject of ongoing debate. The Horizon 2020 Program (European Union) The European Union established the Horizon 2020 program as its research funding initiative between 2014 and 2020 to advance continental-scale innovation by supporting open science collaboration instead of patent-based commercialisation, which characterises the U.S. approach. Horizon 2020 operated as a significant research funding program that received approximately €80 billion in funding. The main goals of the project involved Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 651 supporting science alongside industrial leadership to address multinational research projects which solve societal problems. A significant component of Horizon 2020 supported international public and private partnerships between European research institutions, businesses, government laboratories, and non-profit organisations across EU member states. The program understands that complex problems require institutions and nations to share expertise while dividing risks and rewards because problems such as climate change, public health and advanced technology development require this approach. From a competition policy point of view, a key feature of Horizon 2020 was its robust open- access mandate, which stated that all project grant recipients would have to publish their research findings in open-access journals or repositories and make their research data publicly available. This way, the EU wanted to make sure that publicly funded knowledge was not restricted by patents. In addition, Horizon 2020 actively promoted SME participation by setting aside some of the funds for small businesses and by providing networking opportunities to link them with academic partners. Horizon 2020 ultimately funded over 35,000 projects across domains from renewable energy to healthcare and AI, contributing to major breakthroughs (for example, supporting early mRNA vaccine technology development). Moreover, the project highlighted important challenges. Many SME companies reported difficulties regarding the program’s complex bureaucracy and the requirements, which could be particularly discouraging for newcomers (Fonseca & Maguire, 2024). However, despite challenges, Horizon 2020 shows that public funding can be organised to enhance competition and innovation by supporting a wide range of participants, encouraging knowledge sharing and focusing on important issues that have public value. It is a model of best practice where competition can coexist with collaboration to drive the commercialisation of science. International Organisations and Policy Frameworks Science and innovation increasingly operate within a global context, with international organisations playing a significant role in shaping how competition and commercialisation will play out across countries. One major international agreement that links trade, intellectual property (IP), and innovation is the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Since its inception in 1995, TRIPS has established basic global standards for IP protection, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Importantly, TRIPS allows countries flexibility, such as issuing compulsory licenses to Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 652 enable local vaccine production during emergencies, thereby balancing IP rights with public health needs. Moreover, organisations like the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) offer best practices through guidelines and treaties that can affect science commercialisation. For instance, WIPO has been trying to understand the effects of new technologies on intellectual property. Concerning gene editing tools like CRISPR, WIPO has emphasised the importance of keeping a balance between innovation incentives, ethical concerns, and access. They have facilitated the discussion on patent pooling or licensing frameworks that could allow researchers all over the world to use gene-editing technologies on a fair basis (WIPO, 2022). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) does not have regulatory authority, yet it has developed important reports and recommendations about competition and innovation policy. The OECD's reviews of competition law in high-tech sectors, guidelines on research cooperation, and principles for data access all serve as reference points for national policymakers as they shape their laws. Cross-border collaboration and standardisation constitute another critical aspect of international science commercialisation. Organisations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) play a vital role by developing global technical standards incorporating advanced scientific knowledge, including standards for 5G networks and quantum cryptography. Overall, international organisations and agreements create important principles for the commercialisation of science beyond national borders. Countries benefit by participating in these initiatives, which address global challenges like pandemics and climate change. Ultimately, integrating diverse international perspectives results in balanced and effective strategies that align competition policy with global scientific advancement. Case Studies and Real-World Applications Multiple case studies demonstrate how competition policy affects the commercialisation of scientific innovation. Different competitive conditions, together with various policy frameworks, demonstrate both successes and challenges in turning scientific breakthroughs into marketable products. Case Study 1: Commercialisation of CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Editing Scientists introduced CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technology as a revolutionary scientific discovery that could transform industrial applications across different industries, including medicine, agriculture and biotechnology. According to Markets and Markets (2023), Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 653 CRISPR technology will reach a market value of £6.7 billion by the end of 2025, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 24.3%. However, CRISPR-Cas9 commercialisation faced major challenges because of complex legal rights. The intellectual property conflicts created uncertainty, which slowed down commercialisation and increased costs for developers who need to navigate the fragmented licensing environment (Panagopoulos and Sideri, 2021). The process of negotiating multiple patent licenses for each CRISPR application is often costly and time-consuming, disproportionately affecting smaller firms and research organisations. To tackle these challenges, nonprofit alliances have formed to provide CRISPR tools under open terms, which aim to reduce entry barriers for researchers and smaller businesses, according to competition and innovation policy principles. The CRISPR story demonstrates how competition and innovation policies create social and technological advancement (Panagopoulos and Sideri, 2021). Additionally, ongoing policy oversight must continue to stop monopolistic control of foundational technologies while maintaining ethical priorities about safety and responsible use for CRISPR's future. Finally, the CRISPR case demonstrates the limits of an IP-driven innovation model, where the competitive race for patents leads to an anticompetitive 'thicket' that harms follow-on innovation, a pathology that neither Schumpeter nor Arrow fully predicted. Case Study 2: Development and Distribution of COVID-19 Vaccines The development of the COVID-19 vaccine in 2020 established a new scientific and commercial milestone. Multiple vaccine solutions emerged from company-public research partnerships following the novel coronavirus's discovery. The combination of exceptional funding, alongside innovative mRNA vaccine technology and worldwide scientific collaboration, led to this outstanding achievement. The distribution phase for vaccines revealed new tensions between competition and intellectual property rights, as well as issues regarding fair market access. Several pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer-BioNTech, together with Moderna, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson, produced vaccines simultaneously for market distribution. Traditional market logic would suggest competition on price and output. The pandemic created a massive demand for vaccines, which exceeded supply levels for several months, while most initial vaccine shipments went to high-income nations through pre- agreement purchases. The vaccine manufacturers maintained a practical temporary market dominance of their products despite competing against other vaccine developers. The mRNA vaccine developers failed to distribute their technology licensing in 2021, thus blocking generic or follow-on manufacturers from producing these vaccines. The Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 654 AstraZeneca vaccine distribution model, through licensing agreements to various manufacturers, together with pandemic emergency profit restrictions, resulted in better product availability. A worldwide discussion started after this situation regarding the suspension of standard IP rules for increased manufacturing during a global health crisis. Governments, together with activists, supported a TRIPS IP waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics, which temporarily suspended patent rights. Supporters maintained that this move would allow skilled manufacturers worldwide to manufacture vaccines, which would boost supply levels and decrease prices, thus helping nations get enough doses. The waiver opponents, consisting of some vaccine companies together with developed nations, claimed that IP restrictions were not the main challenge because manufacturing expertise, along with raw materials and quality control, were the actual barriers, and a waiver might reduce future investment in innovation. During the COVID-19 vaccine development process, the WHO introduced the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) in 2020, but it did not obtain sufficient industry support (WHO, 2021). The implementation of public interest clauses by competition-driven policy in critical healthcare innovations will need stricter standards when public funding is involved to prevent life-saving innovations from becoming monopolised. The COVID-19 vaccine rollout demonstrated both the promise and limitations of scientific commercialisation, revealing that relying solely on marketplace dynamics is insufficient for meeting urgent global needs (Rimmer, 2022). The pandemic highlighted the importance of striking a balance between proprietary interests and global solidarity, using innovative approaches to intellectual property and competition management in the distribution of essential health technologies. Case Study 3: Artificial Intelligence in China China's AI sector demonstrates how state-led commercialisation of science, together with market competition, can rapidly establish a high-tech industry. During the last ten years, China has designated AI as its vital national priority through substantial research and development funding alongside commercialisation initiatives. The Chinese government published its New Generation AI Development Plan in 2017 to outline specific goals for AI research advancement as well as industrial expansion. The Chinese government invested significantly in AI research and development laboratories, along with startup incubators and educational institutions, to create one of the most dynamic AI ecosystems worldwide (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2017) The development of AI in China is unique, especially in the pharmaceuticals and energy sectors, since it combines big technology companies (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei) with numerous startup businesses that stay connected to universities or research Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 655 institutions. The government demonstrates multiple functions by supporting basic scientific research conducted at universities or the Chinese Academy of Sciences, as well as by providing access to data through infrastructure development and domestic market advantages, and by subsidies, procurement contracts, and market protection from foreign competition. The combination of these factors enables AI technologies, including facial recognition algorithms and AI healthcare diagnostics, to rapidly transition to commercial use, which local governments, together with industries, actively adopt. The implementation of competition policy in China is complex. For much of the past two decades, Chinese authorities maintained a relatively relaxed antitrust approach, enabling national tech champions such as Alibaba and Tencent to achieve substantial growth and foster innovation through economies of scale (Qian, 2025). However, by 2020–2021, regulators recognised that unchecked monopoly power risked stifling future innovation. This prompted a wave of antitrust probes and new regulations targeting platform practices, data restrictions, and anti-competitive behaviours of major firms (Zuo, 2023). At the same time, the state actively supports Chinese tech firms as global competitors, particularly in AI, while facilitating rapid domestic adoption across sectors like smart city surveillance and fintech, often with less stringent privacy oversight (Qian, 2025). These policies have allowed Chinese AI companies to benefit from fast domestic scaling, supporting their export competitiveness even as they face ongoing challenges around privacy and data governance. The rapid advancement and commercial use of artificial intelligence (AI) in China demonstrate the country's capacity to effectively utilise innovation from startups, ensure sustainable technological progress, and build international trust. Achieving these outcomes relies heavily on maintaining fair competition practices and upholding strong ethical standards (Katterbauer and Cleenewerck, 2024). Conclusion and Policy Recommendations Innovation-driven growth and equitable competition are the two primary goals of modern competition policy, and its effectiveness leads to increased productivity and inclusive economic growth. However, market concentration has emerged as a significant obstacle which slows innovation and restricts people from accessing its advantages (Aghion et al., 2005; Cunningham et al., 2021). Therefore, policymakers must adopt frameworks that combine immediate open access to publicly funded research with nuanced IP management, including streamlined patent processes and reduced entry barriers for smaller entities, thereby democratising innovation opportunities (Laplane and Mazzucato, 2020). Supporting entrepreneurial ecosystems is equally essential for converting research into innovative products. Evidence from the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act demonstrates how supportive policy structures, including university technology transfer mechanisms and startup incubation programs, significantly boost innovation commercialisation and economic Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 656 impact (Lerner, 2002). Such projects diversify innovation landscapes and promote economic inclusion by enabling a broader range of participants to benefit from research commercialisation. Nevertheless, promoting innovation requires sharp antitrust enforcement to prevent dominant incumbents from stifling dynamic competition. These companies often utilise acquisitions or strategic barriers to undermine emerging competitors, thus dampening overall innovation. "Killer acquisitions," where major incumbents purchase startups solely to eliminate competition, notably reduce innovation outputs in critical sectors like pharmaceuticals and technology (Cunningham et al., 2021). Antitrust authorities must adapt regulatory frameworks to protect developing competition, investigate mergers and counteract exclusionary market practices to sustain competitive markets. Global cooperation significantly enhances these domestic policies. Innovation is inherently global and international collaboration on research and harmonisation of IP and competition policies is crucial. Such collaboration coordinates enforcement practices, mitigates cross- border anti-competitive behaviours, and ensures that innovation benefits extend universally. In conclusion, a competition policy that supports innovation while being inclusive serves both economic and societal needs. Through policies that boost innovation alongside public protection, we can guarantee that scientific advancement benefits the entire population rather than just the privileged few. A balanced method will maximise science's capability to serve society while achieving research and innovation goals for addressing contemporary problems. References 1. Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P. (2005). Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 701–728. 2. Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In R. R. Nelson (Ed.), The rate and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors (pp. 609–625). Princeton University Press. 3. Baker, J. B. (2007). Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: Antitrust fosters innovation. Antitrust Law Journal, 74(3), 575–602. 4. Brookes, G., & Barfoot, P. (2020). GM crops: Global socio-economic and environmental impacts 1996–2018 (2nd ed.). PG Economics Ltd. Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 657 5. Bulut, H., & Moschini, G. (2009). US universities’ net returns from patenting and licensing: A quantile regression analysis. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 18(2), 123–137. 6. Cunningham, C., Ederer, F., & Ma, S. (2021). Killer acquisitions. Journal of Political Economy, 129(3), 649–702. 7. DiMasi, J. A., Grabowski, H. G., & Hansen, R. W. (2016). Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New estimates of R&D costs. Journal of Health Economics, 47, 20–33. 8. Florio, M., & Gamba, S. (2021). Biomed Europa: After the coronavirus, a public infrastructure to overcome the pharmaceutical oligopoly. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 92(2), 165–185. 9. Fonseca, L., & Maguire, R. (2024). The good, the smart, and the innovative: Governance and implementation of Smart Specialisation Strategies in 2021–27. IQ- Net Thematic Paper 57(2), European Policies Research Centre Delft. 10. Katterbauer, K., and Cleenewerck, D. (2024). AI governance and sustainable innovation: A Middle East perspective. Springer. 11. Laplane, A., & Mazzucato, M. (2020). Socialising the risks and rewards of public investments: Economic, policy, and legal issues. Research Policy, 49, 103985. 12. Lerner, J. (2002). When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: The design of effective “public venture capital” programmes. The Economic Journal, 112(477), F73–F84. 13. MarketsandMarkets. (2023). AI in drug discovery market by technology, application, and region - Global forecast to 2028. https://www.marketsandmarkets.com 14. Mazzucato, M. (2018). Mission-oriented innovation policies: Challenges and opportunities. Industrial and Corporate Change, 27(5), 803–815. 15. Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R., Sampat, B. N., & Ziedonis, A. A. (2004). Ivory tower and industrial innovation: University–industry technology transfer before and after the Bayh–Dole Act. Stanford University Press. 16. Nelson, R. R. (2001). Observations on the post-Bayh-Dole rise of patenting at American universities. Journal of Technology Transfer, 26(1–2), 13–19. 17. OECD. (2023). Main science and technology indicators. OECD Publishing. 18. Panagopoulos, C., & Sideri, M. (2021). Prospect patents and CRISPR: Rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment. Journal of Law and the Biosciences. 2021, 8:031. 19. Petrova, E. (2013). Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: The process of drug discovery and development. In M. Ding (Ed.), Innovation and marketing in the pharmaceutical industry (pp. 19-81). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614- 7801-0_2 20. Qian, X. (2025). Governing China's digital transformation: Industrial policy, regulatory governance, and innovation. Routledge. Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 658 21. Rimmer, M. (2022). The People's Vaccine: Intellectual Property, Access to Essential Medicines, and COVID-19. The Journal of Intellectual Property Studies. 2022, V:1- 71. 22. Shapiro, C. (2011). Competition and innovation: Did Arrow hit the bull’s eye? In J. Lerner and S. Stern (Eds.), The rate and direction of inventive activity revisited (pp. 361–404). University of Chicago Press. 23. State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2017). A next-generation artificial intelligence development plan (English translation). 24. Todorova, E. (2021). Schumpeter, innovation, and competition policy: Lessons for the digital economy. Technology and Innovation, 22(3). 25. UNCTAD. (2021). Technology and innovation report: Catching technological waves – Innovation with equity. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 26. UNESCO. (2021). Science report: The race against time for smarter development. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 27. WHO. (2021). WHO COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP). World Health Organisation. 28. WIPO. (2022). Gene editing and intellectual property: A global perspective. World Intellectual Property Organisation. 29. Wouters, O. J., Shadlen, K. C., Salcher-Konrad, M., Pollard, A. J., Larson, H. J., Teerawattananon, Y., and Jit, M. (2021). Challenges in ensuring global access to COVID-19 vaccines: Production, affordability, allocation, and deployment. The Lancet, 397(10278), 1023–1034. 30. Zuo, Z. (2023). China's data strategies: Institutionalisation, activation and layering. In Global data strategies (pp. 119–160). Beck/Hart. 31. World Intellectual Property Organisation. (2019). WIPO technology trends 2019: Artificial intelligence. WIPO 32. Fox-Penner, P. (2022). The key to electric grid reliability: Modernising governance. Kleinman Centre for Energy Policy, University of Pennsylvania. 33. Association of American Universities. (n.d.). Preserve the Bayh-Dole Act and university technology transfer. Retrieved from https://www.aau.edu/key- issues/preserve-bayh-dole-act-and-university-technology-transfer 34. Pressman, L., Planting, M., Moylan, C., & Bond, J. (2022). Economic contributions of university/nonprofit inventions in the United States: 1996–2020 [Report]. Biotechnology Innovation Organisation (BIO) & AUTM. https://autm.net/AUTM/media/About-Tech-Transfer/Documents/BIO-AUTM- Economic-Contributions-of-University-Nonprofit-Inventions_14JUN2022.pdf Georgian Scientists/ . 7 N 3, 2025 659 , ? , ORCID ID: 0009-0006-9401-8384 : s.sanikidze@gmail.com , , , , . . , . : , . “ „ 2020“- , . , (case studies) , , . , . , , , ,